Document Type
Article
Abstract
Although many philosophers have employed the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" roles for values in science, I argue that it merits further clarification. The distinction can be formulated in several ways: as a logical point, as a distinction between epistemic attitudes, or as a clarification of different consequences associated with accepting scientific claims. Moreover, it can serve either as part of a normative ideal or as a tool for policing how values influence science. While various formulations of the distinction may (with further clarification) contribute to a normative ideal, they have limited effectiveness for regulating how values influence science.
Publication Info
© 2011 by the Philosophy of Science Association. http://journal.philsci.org/
Rights
© Philosophy of Science 2011, University of Chicago Press Journal.
Elliott, K. (2011). Direct and Indirect Roles for Values in Science. Philosophy Of Science, 78(2), 303-324. doi: 10.1086/659222