Document Type
Article
Abstract
Philosophers of science readily acknowledge that nonepistemic values influence the discovery and pursuit of scientific theories, but many tend to regard these influences as epistemically uninteresting. The present paper challenges this position by identifying three avenues through which nonepistemic values associated with discovery and pursuit in contemporary pollution research influence theory appraisal: (1) by guiding the choice
of questions and research projects, (2) by altering experimental design, and (3) by affecting the creation and further investigation of theories or hypotheses. This analysis indicates that the effects of these values are sufficiently complex and epistemically significant to merit further attention.
Publication Info
© 2009 by the Philosophy of Science Association http://www.philsci.org/
Rights
© Philosophy of Science 2009, The University of Chicago Press.
Elliott, K. and McKaughan, D. (2009). How Values in Scientific Discovery and Pursuit Alter Theory Appraisal. Philosophy of Science, 76(5), 598-611 doi: 10.1086/605807