Document Type
Report
Key Takeaways
• Firms with a larger percentage of CEO stock option compensation are more likely to have subsequent product recalls and a greater number of recall incidents. • The relationship between stock options and product recalls is weaker in firms with founder CEOs and where the CEO has a longer tenure.
Publication Date
2015
Source
Wowak, A.J., Mannor, M.J. and Wowak, K.D. (2015). Throwing Caution to the Wind: The Effect of CEO Stock Option Pay on the Incidence of Product Safety Problems. Strategic Management Journal, 36: 1082-1092.
Disciplines
Business
Copyright
© 2015, University of South Carolina
Publication Info
Wowak, A.J., Mannor, M.J. and Wowak, K.D. (2015). Throwing Caution to the Wind: The Effect of CEO Stock Option Pay on the Incidence of Product Safety Problems. Strategic Management Journal, 36: 1082-1092., 2015.