Document Type



Grasping the dynamic of the institutionalization process of the anti-bribery collaboration from the FCPA to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is critical for the next step of analyzing the actual performance of these laws. Previous works, grounded in realist ideology, often reduce the dynamic process to a question of states' free will and rational responses to expected payoffs in relative
legislative strategies. This realist approach offers only speculative and inaccurate explanations that cannot sustain an understanding of the operation of the anti-bribery collaboration at successive stages.Instead, this study employs a historical approach, stressing how decision makers were constrained by existing and evolving institutions through analyzing the process of intertwined interactions among involved political parties, and concludes that the institutionalization process is composed of a sequence of unavoidable choices by decision makers in a concrete, historical context. A lawmaking game among rational parties in an evolving context may plausibly result in altruistic consequences.