Date of Award
Spring 2026
Document Type
Open Access Dissertation
Department
Moore School of Business
First Advisor
Timothy J. Brown
Abstract
This study examines how audit billing arrangements (ABAs) influence managers’ willingness to share private information with auditors, a key determinant of audit quality. Drawing on prospect theory, I predict that framing the ABA as either a fixed-fee or a reserve affects managers’ information disclosure decisions, particularly for scope- increasing information. In a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment, I find an interaction of ABA type and information type. Managers are more willing to disclose scope-increasing information with a fixed-fee ABA than with a reserve ABA, but less willing to disclose scope-consistent information with a fixed-fee ABA than with a reserve ABA. Additional analyses suggest that ABA framing alters managers’ risk preferences, which affects their disclosure behavior. These findings highlight how audit contract design influences managerial behavior and audit quality.
Rights
© 2026, Nicole Bruno
Recommended Citation
Bruno, N.(2026). The Cost of Information: How Audit Billing Arrangements Affect Managers’ Information Disclosure. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/8721
Included in
Accounting Commons, Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons