Date of Award

Summer 2025

Document Type

Open Access Dissertation

Department

Political Science

First Advisor

Kirk Randazzo

Abstract

This dissertation theorizes and quantifies judicial ambition. Article III judges in the United States judiciary are nominated by a president, confirmed by the Senate, and may hold their seat for the remainder of their lifetime. This is a distinct process from other political actors, like congresspeople, presidents, elected judges, and local officials, who are beholden to voters. This dissertation posits that individuals who are high in judicial ambition should consciously choose career paths and interact in networks which will enable them to achieve their goal. After theorizing and quantifying ambition, the measure is replicated on an original dataset of 1300 U.S. district and circuit court judges, nominated between 1989-2020. This measure of ambition is then empirically applied in three substantive chapters, each representing a stage in lower court judicial nominations. Chapter 1 outlines the theory and measure. Chapter 2 examines the considerations of presidents in judicial nominations and finds that ambitious district court nominees are nominated later than their peers. Chapter 3 seeks to understand how ambitious judges experience the confirmation process; results indicate that ambitious judges receive greater bipartisan support from the Senate. Chapter 4 examines the unique position of elevated judges, finding that when presidents elevate district court judges, they choose ambitious nominees.

Rights

© 2025, Abigail Violet Hassett

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