Date of Award
8-16-2024
Document Type
Open Access Dissertation
Department
Moore School of Business
First Advisor
Scott Jackson
Abstract
Prior research extensively examines the external implications of voluntarily disclosing an earnings surprise, yet the internal implications remain understudied. Using two experiments, I examine whether the preemptive voluntary disclosure of an earnings surprise influences management operating decisions. Drawing upon mental accounting and the realization effect, I predict that managers are more likely to make inefficient operating decisions when an earnings surprise is expected and that a quantitative, but not qualitative, voluntary disclosure will mitigate this value-sacrificing behavior. I find that managers are more likely to make inefficient operating decisions when a negative, but not a positive, earnings surprise is expected and that a quantitative voluntary disclosure of the negative earnings surprise mitigates management’s likelihood of making inefficient operating decisions. Further, I find that managers are more likely to make inefficient operating decisions when the disclosure type is qualitative (versus quantitative). By demonstrating that the presence and type of voluntary disclosure of an earnings surprise can influence operating decisions, this study provides new insights for organizations to consider alongside the external implications established by prior literature.
Rights
© 2024, Jonathan Gay
Recommended Citation
Gay, J.(2024). The Effect of Voluntarily Disclosing An Earnings Surprise on Management Operating Decisions. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/7810