Date of Award
Spring 2022
Document Type
Open Access Thesis
Department
Civil and Environmental Engineering
First Advisor
Erfan Goharian
Abstract
As global warming and climate Variability bring about more frequent and intense rainstorms and accelerate sea level rise, our social and built environments are at heightened risk of flood induced damages and consequent costs. This is particularly true for coastal areas, facing the coupled effects of these threats while serving as home to people, businesses, unique landscapes, and historic landmarks. Complex decisions at all levels of government and community planning stand to benefit from increased understanding of possible outcomes and pathways resulting from decentralized human behavior and decision making in the realm of water resources engineering and management. Game theory has allowed scientists to better understand and predict preferred strategies and interactions of rational self-interested actors in multi-player games. In coalitional games, players are able to work together to increase their individual utility payoffs through formation of strategic subsets, or coalitions. When applied to water resources management dilemmas such as infrastructure development and planning, this practice can be used to identify which and what variety of coalitions should form to benefit their overall hydrologic system. This research aims to determine ideal green infrastructure location and spending scenarios within Charleston, South Carolina’s Market Street watershed using a coalitional game theory solution concept, the Shapley value, in combination with rainfall-runoff simulation. Results offer insights to stormwater services and flood managers concerning suggested areas of focus for green infrastructure spending and advocacy for the purpose of reducing flooding and resulting property damages.
Rights
© 2022, Carly Lawyer
Recommended Citation
Lawyer, C.(2022). Coalitional Game Theory for Stormwater Management and Green Infrastructure Practices. (Master's thesis). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/6745