Date of Award
Summer 2019
Document Type
Open Access Dissertation
Department
Moore School of Business
First Advisor
Alexander Matros
Abstract
I study asymmetric all-pay auction contests where the prize has the same value for all players, but players might have different cost functions. I allow for the cost functions to be discontinuous as long as they are right-continuous. In that setting, I determine sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium. Employing this framework, I discuss the implementation of a soft cap on bids and the effect that has on the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium and players’ bidding behavior, especially with respect to a situation where there is no cap on bids. I also determine the total cost and expected aggregate bids which would influence, and also have an effect on the organizing of such contests.
Drawing from the framework mentioned above, I analyze the implementation of a rigid cap on bids. Rigid cap being one which simply cannot be breached. I determine the players’ bidding behavior in the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium and compute the total cost and expected aggregate bids in this situation.
In the fourth chapter, I explore linguistic explanations for the extremely low labor mobility, but paradoxically high urban wage premium in India. I show how linguistic diversity in India hinders internal migration across state borders. I also find evidence, albeit a weak one, to show that an individual who can speak English is more likely to migrate to an urban center. I find much stronger evidence that links educational attainment with migrating to urban centers.
Rights
© 2019, Pulkit K. Nigam
Recommended Citation
Nigam, P. K.(2019). Essays on Asymmetric Contests and Urbanization in India. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/5494
