Date of Award

1-1-2012

Document Type

Campus Access Dissertation

Department

Moore School of Business

First Advisor

Brad Tuttle

Abstract

I examine the effects of subordinate managers' and their superiors' individual horizon preferences along with the effects of project horizon on managers' resource allocation decisions. I define horizon preference as an individual's general preference for long-term versus short-term results. Project horizon is the period it takes to realize substantially all the benefits from a project. In my experiment, business students assume the role of project managers who must allocate a budget to two projects. One project offers the possibility of significant immediate benefits but with limited future benefits, while the other offers the possibility of limited immediate benefits but with significant future benefits. Holding employment horizon constant, the case where managers share the same horizon preference with their superior is straightforward. However, when preferences diverge I predict and find that short-term oriented managers will be more likely to adapt their decisions to their superiors' preferences than will long-term oriented managers.

Rights

© 2012, Lei Wang

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