Document Type
Article
Abstract
We examine innovation in an n-player market-entry timing game with complete information and observable actions. In our novel multi-player setup, we allow for heterogeneous payoffs between players and leader payoff functions to be multi-peaked and non-monotonic, only requiring that followers’ payoffs are non-increasing with the time of the leader’s entry. We outline the conditions under which an n-player asymmetric game leads to standard second-mover advantage and preemption equilibria. In the context of a two-player game, we provide a comprehensive characterization of the pure-strategy equilibria for a general case. This includes the potential for the emergence of a new type of preemption equilibrium, as well as scenarios where no equilibria in pure strategies exist. Finally, we connect our findings to various applications, offering a new explanation for entry clustering among heterogeneous players
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
Publication Info
Published in Journal of Economic Dynamic and Control, Volume 187, 2026, pages 105319-.
APA Citation
Matros, A., Smirnov, V., & Wait, A. (2026). General timing games with multiple players. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 187, 105319.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2026.105319
Rights
© 2026 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).