Donors are more likely to send aid to leaders facing elevated risks of losing power, but targets' ability to benefit from this assistance is conditioned by regime type and political processes. The institutionalization of winning coalitions' loyalty across regime type follows opposite patterns, supporting opposite temporal dynamics across regime types. Democratic leaders' coalitions are firmest immediately after taking office, and aid is of most assistance to them then. As competition and dissatisfaction grows, aid becomes a political liability. In small winning coalition systems, however, coalitions become more solid over time, facilitating increasing benefits from aid. Without a firm coalition, however, external resources are destabilizing to autocratic leaders. Analysis of 4,692 leader years from 1960-2001 using a censored probit model supports these expectations.
Postprint version. Published in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 54, Issue 1, 2010, pages 58-87.
Licht, A.A. (2010). Coming into Money: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader Survival. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54(1), 58-87. DOI: 10.1177/0022002709351104
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Journal of Conflict Resolution following peer review.