Date of Award

1-1-2010

Document Type

Campus Access Dissertation

Department

Moore School of Business

Sub-Department

Business Administration

First Advisor

Scott Jackson

Abstract

This study reports the results of a series of experiments designed to provide empirical evidence related to fair value opinion shopping. Experiment 1 provides initial evidence that managers fair value opinion shop for external valuation professionals in the current regulatory environment. Further, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that informing managers that they are required to disclose to the board and/or auditor the fact that they obtained multiple opinions generally deters managers from fair value opinion shopping for personal benefits, but not for shareholder benefits. Results of Experiment 2 show that a regulatory change requiring boards to approve or reject a manager's request to seek a second fair value opinion will serve as an effective control against fair value opinion shopping. However, paradoxically, results of Experiment 2 show that boards are more likely to approve a manager's request to fair value opinion shop when it is transparently disclosed. Experiment 3 shows that a regulatory change requiring firms to inform their auditor when they obtain multiple fair value opinions results in increased audit procedures and a reduction in auditors beliefs about the reliability of the second external valuation professional's fair value opinion.

Rights

© 2010, Leigh Salzsieder

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