Date of Award

Summer 2019

Document Type

Open Access Dissertation

Department

Moore School of Business

First Advisor

Alexander Matros

Abstract

I study asymmetric all-pay auction contests where the prize has the same value for all players, but players might have different cost functions. I allow for the cost functions to be discontinuous as long as they are right-continuous. In that setting, I determine sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium. Employing this framework, I discuss the implementation of a soft cap on bids and the effect that has on the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium and players’ bidding behavior, especially with respect to a situation where there is no cap on bids. I also determine the total cost and expected aggregate bids which would influence, and also have an effect on the organizing of such contests.

Drawing from the framework mentioned above, I analyze the implementation of a rigid cap on bids. Rigid cap being one which simply cannot be breached. I determine the players’ bidding behavior in the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium and compute the total cost and expected aggregate bids in this situation.

In the fourth chapter, I explore linguistic explanations for the extremely low labor mobility, but paradoxically high urban wage premium in India. I show how linguistic diversity in India hinders internal migration across state borders. I also find evidence, albeit a weak one, to show that an individual who can speak English is more likely to migrate to an urban center. I find much stronger evidence that links educational attainment with migrating to urban centers.

Included in

Economics Commons

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