Do Americans’ Perceptions of the Prevalence of Prejudice Impact Their Racial Policy Preferences? Investigating Meta-Stereotypes as a Potential Causal Mechanism

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DO AMERICANS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE PREVALENCE OF PREJUDICE IMPACT THEIR RACIAL POLICY PREFERENCES?
INVESTIGATING META-Stereotypes AS A POTENTIAL CAUSAL MECHANISM

by

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DEDICATION

This dissertation project never would have taken shape were it not for my parents’ dedication to cultivating my sense of curiosity, creativity and empathy; this project is dedicated to them.
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I would like to express many thanks to David Darmofal, Todd Shaw, Ismail White and Chuck Finocchiaro for guiding me in my transition from student to scholar.

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Finally, I am thankful to my friends and family, especially my aunt, Carole Rebman, for her support throughout my time at USC, and to Nadia Jilani-Hyler, TJ Kimel and Paul White for their assistance while putting the finishing touches on my paper and presentation.
Racial discrimination, though more subtle than in the past, is still an enduring
presence in 21st century America. Whether looking at education, health care, the
workforce, housing/lending practices, or the criminal justice system, studies routinely
confirm that racial prejudice and discrimination persist despite claims of a “post-racial”
America. Yet, despite the perseverance of racial prejudice and discrimination, policies
correcting racial injustice remain contentious, either failing to receive the requisite
support to pass reforms or receiving backlash from the public. This project explores
meta-stereotypes in the Black and white communities, and highlights meta-stereotypes’
potential impact when determining why some individuals support those types of policies
while other individuals oppose them. Meta-stereotypes are essentially stereotypes of
stereotypes; they assess how pervasive an individual believes specific stereotypes are.
Using an original survey experiment, this study investigates whether meta-stereotypes act
as a causal mechanism, dictating individuals’ policy preferences regarding two issue
areas related, whether directly or indirectly, to discussions of racial prejudice and
discrimination: affirmative action and criminal justice reforms. Additionally, by
exploring individuals’ meta-stereotypes as both an abstract concept, and also as a more
concrete, real-world concept, by way of hypothetical scenarios, this dissertation project
aims to determine whether meta-stereotypes alone are enough to impact racial policy
preferences, or whether individuals need to have those meta-stereotypes activated and/or
linked to real-world scenarios, thus providing guidance to racial justice advocates trying to gain allies and overcome complacency or opposition.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

On November 4th 2008, Barack Obama was elected president of the United States. On May 25, 2011 entertainment mogul Oprah Winfrey aired the last episode of her wildly successful talk show to focus on expanding her media empire. If anecdotes were evidence, the amount of power wielded in the political and pop culture worlds by these two individuals alone would be enough for many to conclude that racism in America is dead. Of course, anecdotes are not evidence, and there are mountains of evidence that suggest that racial prejudice is present in pretty much all aspects of life—the education system, the health care system, housing and lending practices, the workplace, and the criminal justice system.

Still, many individuals in America have embraced a post-racial narrative that asserts that meaningful racial discrimination is largely a thing of the past. While well-intended, a post-racial narrative has the potential to have highly undesirable consequences—for the Black community, specifically, but also for society at large. In reaction to persistent racial discrimination, a number of policies aimed at correcting those injustices have been proposed. This project uses meta-stereotypes to investigate whether the misguided, yet oft-cited, post-racial narrative in the United States affects individuals’ support or opposition for those proposed racial policies.
In doing so, this project contributes to the scholarly literature by expanding our understanding of meta-stereotypes’ effects within the political world, and does so while measuring meta-stereotypes in three distinct ways, allowing for a more thorough exploration of their potential effects if applied to policies within a real-world political environment. This project goes beyond these scholarly contributions as well and offers guidance for racial justice advocates who have identified lingering problems in our supposedly post-racial America, and who have identified potential policy solutions, and yet are still attempting to identify ways to get more people on board with those plans.

What follows in this introductory chapter is a succinct inquiry of the current state of race relations in America and the ensuing debate about our alleged emergence as a post-racial society, followed by an overview of this dissertation project as a whole.

I. The post-racial narrative on trial: Current events provide context for the ensuing debate

“Race is like the weather. We tend to talk about the weather when it’s at an extreme but it’s always present, impacting our days. Race is similar.”

- Toure (Capehart 2013)

“weird stuff, i mean if a person were obsessed with the weather, 24x7, we would definitely think of them as having a problem. Similar issues apply to race.”


The state of American race relations has certainly improved since the Civil Rights Era. Whereas unapologetic racially discriminatory policies were actively pursued by politicians, and accepted by citizens, in the first half of the twentieth century, such
policies have since been replaced with “color-blind” policies that are designed to be neutral in terms of their applicability to race and ethnicity. Whereas physical and rhetorical violence against Black Americans was not only acceptable, but celebrated, in the first half of the twentieth century, such overt displays of bigotry have largely ceased.

And yet, in place of the de jure segregation of the early twentieth century which legally sanctioned discrimination, a new form of discrimination—de facto segregation, stemming not from legislation but from a combination of the spillover effects of past discrimination and continuing subtle prejudices—has taken root, and the purportedly “color-blind” policies that followed the turbulence of the Civil Rights Era have often fallen prey to systematic racial biases and/or subtle personal biases which play out within the context of the legislation and enforcement of those policies. And though overt bigotry has waned significantly over the past fifty-plus years, more subtle forms of prejudice remain in place.

The contentions that “color-blind” policies may differ in practice than in theory, and that subtle forms of prejudice and discrimination remain a staple in twenty-first century America, however, are quite controversial. It is this controversy—the debate over whether or not America has attained post-racialism—that frames this project; whereas some Americans are willing to accept that the triumph of American post-racialism has become a reality—and are, in fact, quite hostile to assertions to the contrary—other Americans reject the triumphant narrative and remain disappointed, if not exasperated, when faced with assertions of a post-racial America.

This post-racial debate has come to a head a number of times in recent memory; in fact, within the past twelve months alone Americans have grappled with this question,
and they have done so at both the elite level and the mass level. Politicians, activists and media personalities, alike, have helped put this debate at the forefront by not only chronicling the stories of George Zimmerman, Paula Deen, Richie Incognito, Richard Sherman, a fake inter-racial Cheerios family, and ordinary Americans who donned Halloween costumes of questionable taste at best, and of racist designs at worst, but also by highlighting the reactions to these stories as sub-stories in and of themselves. And citizens have, therefore, not only reacted to the stories by adopting attitudes and opinions regarding Zimmerman’s guilt in the shooting of an unarmed Black teenager, Deen and Incognito’s admission of racist language and subsequent apologies/explanations, Sherman’s post-game showboating, the presence of an inter-racial couple in a television commercial, and the motivations and humor underlying costumes depicting standard “blackface,” a dead Trayvon Martin, and even straight up “niggers,” but they have also reacted to the fact that these attitudes and opinions are even up for debate by alleging the audacity of those who dare to disagree with them on the question of American post-racialism. As a result, America has moved away from putting racism itself on trial, and has more recently moved to putting post-racialism on trial.

In one corner of the debate sit those who accept that America has indeed become a truly post-racial society. This side of the debate contends that race is not only surmountable in twenty-first century America, but that is unlikely to be considered a potential detriment or obstacle in the first place. In this account, achieving success is a matter of merit, not favoritism and/or subtle biases, and achieving justice is a matter that is defined by a tried and true outcome, not a flawed and/or biased process. Ironically, these assertions then lead this side of the debate to muster other explanations for
disparities in crime rates, educational success, unemployment and wages, etc. that skeptics of the post-racial narrative then point to as proof of prejudice and racism being alive and well. These opponents would label some explanations—such as that Black Americans are simply, biologically less intelligent, more violent, etc.—as being overtly racist, and other explanations—especially the “culture of poverty” explanation, which is explained as an “internal cultural crisis in black America, exemplified by an increase in single-parent homes, criminal violence in cities and an inadequate attachment to dominant social norms and mores” (Wise 2010, 28)—as being racist as well, albeit cloaked in a false sense of sympathy and, therefore, more subtle.

While proponents of the post-racial narrative point to the election of Barack Obama as evidence of America’s official transformation into a truly color-blind society, deniers of the post-racial narrative would point to the rhetoric during his presidential campaigns and during his time in office to refute a complete transformation of America with regards to race relations. Certainly, whether one asserts or rejects this narrative, the election of Barack Obama to the highest office in American politics was a historic sign of progress toward that color-blind society; yet, the ability of both sides to point to a single moment, encompassing a single figure, and still come to different conclusions speaks volumes about the debate at hand.

Yes, Barack Obama was born to a mixed-race family, raised by a single parent, and still managed to attend one of the most prestigious universities in the nation, graduate from a top-tier law school, and eventually win election to the U.S. Senate and the White House—all points that are likely to be highlighted by proponents of the post-racial narrative. But at the same time, opponents of the narrative would point out that many
Americans did not hesitate to assert the charges that Obama was a secret Muslim who was born in Kenya, not the United States, as though they were facts—a sign, many would suggest, of continued racial prejudice and “otherization”. Additionally, while using Obama as an example of the post-racial narrative, some proponents of the narrative were simultaneously arguing that if it weren’t for affirmative action policies Obama would not have been as successful as he were, which actually diminishes the claim that he is a valid example of a merit-based system leading to a Black president. And in August 2013, protestors in Arizona were documented chanting “bye, bye Black sheep” (Wing 2013). It would seem that many Americans are not only acutely aware of the president’s racial makeup, but that they see it as a defining characteristic and one that is worth bringing to light regardless of the issue at hand.

What’s more, Obama’s election and re-election would spark comments on social media websites that would give serious pause to the post-racial narrative; from Twitter (Morrissey 2012):

“Ok we pick a worthless nigger over a full blooded American what the hell has our world come its called the white house for a reason”

“Niggers are voting #Obama2012 cause they afraid #RomneyRyan2012 is gonna create jobs. Niggers hate to work & rather live off the “gub-mint.”

“Lets face it… Romney aint the best choice.. But hes a hell of alot better than that sand monkey we call a president. #MITT”

“First thing my mom says this morning: did you hear the bad news? The monkey is staying for another 4 years… #WeHateYouObama”

“Is this really our punishment for slavery? Wasn’t 4 years enough, can’t we just call it even.”

Although these are only a handful of examples, and are no doubt more vitriolic than what most Americans hear on a daily basis, there is reason to accept the
expectation that Americans are witness to more subtle forms of racism on a fairly regular basis. For example, when over six hundred white students at more than two dozen college campuses were asked to keep a journal that recorded any racist or racially insensitive comments, jokes, insults, etc. over a six to ten week period, participants reported a rate of about twelve such comments per week (Houts Picca & Feagin 2007, 7, 18 & 101; Wise 2010, 78).

And yet, regardless of the racist sentiments expressed above, Barack Obama is the President of the United States and so there is at least some truth in the assertion that America is moving toward a post-racial status. What’s more, proponents of the narrative can point to other Black individuals who have gained success within politics, including Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell. However, skeptics of the post-racial narrative would assert that the number of influential Black policy makers in the country are still far and few in between and that, when they do find a place in public office, there are often groups who openly doubt their credentials and question whether their motives are truly applicable to the common good (as opposed to being limited to working for their fellow Black Americans, implicitly at the expense of white Americans). And it seems that sentiments that are expressed within social media are now further driving skepticism of a post-racial America and, perhaps, putting racism back on their radar so to speak; from the comments section of the Huffington Post (O’Shea 2013):

Commentator 1: “I had thought that America was OVER it’s racism… Until Obama was elected president. It’s been a real eye opener for ME, and what I’m seeing hasn’t been very attractive.”

Commentator 2: “I totally agree. Knocked me for a loop. I thought I had seen and heard everything… Where were these people hiding? So racist, angry.”
Likewise, the debate over whether the United States has fulfilled its post-racial promise brewed in a similar fashion during the aforementioned news stories of 2013 and early 2014, none of which cuts to the heart of the debate quite as forcefully as the George Zimmerman trial:

George Zimmerman was tried for the murder of Trayvon Martin during summer 2013; Zimmerman claimed that he used self-defense while detractors claimed that Zimmerman only approached Martin in the first place because he equated being Black with being suspicious and criminal. Coverage of the trial was largely shaped through speculation of Zimmerman’s motives when approaching Martin and throughout the ensuing conflict, and the differences in opinion over the possible—if not likely—motives displayed by Zimmerman reflected the overall debate concerning the post-racial narrative. Whether individuals thought he was guilty or not guilty, many also had an opinion on whether they thought racial prejudice and/or animosity played a contributing factor in the death of Martin. In many cases, perceptions of whether or not Zimmerman was guilty coincided with opinions on the likelihood that he was acting—whether overtly or subconsciously—out of racial prejudice against young, Black men, even though the latter technically had little to do with the actual charges against Zimmerman. Additionally, the “not guilty” verdict handed down by a jury of five white members (and only one minority member) again fueled debate over whether there were subtle racial prejudices at work in the Martin-Zimmerman story.

The debate concerning Zimmerman’s motives played out on national television, as scholars, activists, politicians, celebrities, etc. argued the merits of a post-racial
society, and again the debate spread to the masses. For example; via the comments section of a Huffington Post article (Lederman 2013):

Commentator 1: Trayvon Martin was killed because he was walking and skipping while black; many African-American men get profiled and stopped everyday if they are driving or standing around while black. When are the other Americans going to realize there is something wrong with this picture?

Commentator 2: yeah braniac it is called RACISM and everyone that constantly perpetuates these ideals of racism like you only perpetuate racism… sad

Jonathan Capehart, a columnist at The Washington Post, published emails he received from readers after he asserted in an op-ed piece that if the roles were reversed in the case—and Martin and shot and killed Zimmerman—Martin would be found guilty by a jury; among those responses he received (Capehart 2013):

“Would you do us all a favor and stop wearing your race on your sleeve. You and many other blacks that have come out in droves in all the networks to render their opinions about the Martin case, are coming across as extremely biased; your opinions are tainted black… Race relations WILL NEVER IMPROVE until the black community cuts the crap by making everything racial… lose the colored glasses and you’ll be able to see things clearly.”

“You sir are a racist. In reading the first paragraph of your racist piece, I concluded that you were black. Sure enough, when I clicked on your particulars, there you were. Only a black would use this case to stoke racial fires even though Zimmerman is Hispanic. You see anti black sentiment behind every affront claimed real or not and when it is black against white, the answer is this is what is expected after years of oppression. Sadly the Washington Post permits you to write such trash promoting racial unrest. I expect to see you along with the Black Panthers and Al Sharpton egging on demonstrators and riots after Zimmerman is acquitted.”

“There’s a special place in Hell for race-baiting white-hating hypocrites like you and Al the convicted slanderer Sharpton whose whole reason for being is to promote racial discord. Trayvon Martin = Tawana Brawley and you’re no different than David Duke.”
“There seems to be little doubt, although the Post and others like to hid the truth, that Trayvon was a punk wannabe gangster. He died that death. Nothing you racebaiters can scream should drown that out. A hoodie is a thug uniform as much as a hoods and robes represent the Klan.”

Capehart, in deciding to highlight the responses he received, was decisively admonishing those readers by echoing the words of Toure (Capehart 2013): “It’s not racist to notice or point out racism. To say that it is is an attempt to silence those who would talk about it.”

And yet Toure—a contributor to the New York Times—has been met with equal accusations of reverse racism (Toure 2011):

“Perhaps the author suffers from the MOST COMMON RACISM that I see in the United States today: Members of “minorities” ASSUMING racism in the hearts and minds of “white” Americans.”

“Please, America—let’s not start talking about post-racism. It doesn’t matter that we elected a black man as our president, and it doesn’t matter that we have laws against discrimination, and it doesn’t matter that all races are treated as equal before the law. The important thing to remember is that, in these troubled economic times, whining about discrimination and demanding special treatment based on one’s minority status is a cottage industry, and it would be wrong to deprive Tore and his fellow race-pimps of their chance to earn a living.”

“If the US is not yet “post-racial,” it’s because blacks keep screaming “Racism” at every imagined injustice.”

The debate, therefore, often moves from discussion to accusations—for those who assert that America has attained a post-racial status, the real racists are those who see racism, whereas for those who deny the post-racial narrative, the denial of racism becomes a new form of racism (Wise 2010), or at the very least allows racism to continue unabated. And in doing so, the debate now encompasses not whether racism is bad, but whether racism even exists, how it is manifested, and to what degree.
II. The post-racial narrative on trial: What the numbers say about prejudice and discrimination in twenty-first century America

“We are not a nation devoid of racial discrimination nor are we a nation where race does not matter. Race and racism are still critical factors in determining what happens and who gets ahead in America. The election of Barack Obama ushered in this silly term and now that he’s begun running for re-election, I’m here to brusquely escort it out of the party called American English because it’s a con man of a term, selling you a concept that doesn’t exist… “Post-racial” is a mythical idea that should be as painful to the mind’s ear as fingernails on the chalkboard are to the outer ear. It’s an intellectual Loch Ness Monster. It is indeed a monster because it’s dangerous.”

- Toure (2011)

“In a way, Toure is right. There are still many racists in America; they vary in skin hue. However, there is no longer organized, institutionalized racism that can keep groups from opportunity. Yes, there are individual racists, and individual people are discriminated against. However, those discriminated against can go down the block to where there is no racist.”

- Commentator response to Toure (2011), The New York Times comments section

Although anecdotes evidencing the success of Barack Obama, Oprah and other Black Americans may continue to spur a debate over whether the U.S. has fulfilled its post-racial promise, statistical evidence of racial prejudice and discrimination puts the post-racial narrative on shakier ground. Indeed, skeptics of the post-racial narrative can point not only to anecdotal evidence, but also to studies measuring explicit and implicit racism, as well as studies measuring discriminatory outcomes in a variety of areas of Americans’ day-to-day lives.

While the post-racial narrative uses Barack Obama’s election as proof that racism no longer pervades the American way of thinking, let alone American behavior, Americans’ explicit anti-black attitudes seem to have gotten worse in the four years since the president’s historic election, not better—in 2008, 48% of white Americans expressed
anti-black attitudes, compared to 51% white Americans in 2012 (Associated Press 2012). Reactions trying to distract from the Associated Press study included questioning how pervasive anti-white attitudes are amongst the Black community, and pointing out that the pervasiveness of anti-black attitudes is barely a majority of America and hardly a sign of racism running rampant. However, neither reaction succeeds in explaining away the pervasiveness of prejudice in a supposedly post-racial society-- in the former, the presence of anti-white sentiment (albeit problematic) would not, or does not, balance out the presence of anti-black attitudes; in the latter, arguing that only 51% of white Americans outwardly express anti-black sentiments hardly seems like cause for optimism, let alone cause for accepting the post-racial narrative.

When statistics start speaking to the outcomes faced by Black Americans, in contrast with those outcomes received by their white counterparts, the post-racial narrative is called even further into question. Discrimination against the Black community has been observed in studies regarding the workforce, the education system, the health care system, housing and lending practices, and the criminal justice system. And when discrimination hasn’t been traced as the direct cause of a specific area of racial disparities, it often is rooted, by way of spill-over effects, in other areas where discrimination is a major factor.

Discrimination in the workforce has been documented in a variety ways that can be more generally categorized as pertaining to either the hiring process or to wages and employment levels. Studies show racial discrimination persisting in the hiring process, revealing that job applicants with “white sounding names” are about fifty percent more likely to be called back for an interview than applicants with “Black sounding names,”
even when their qualifications are indistinguishable (Bertrand & Mullainathan 2004; Wise 2010, 88). Even white men who claim to have a felony record have been shown to receive call-backs at slightly higher rates than Black applicants without a criminal record. And even when researchers sent out more qualified Black applicants, their white applicants still received interviews twice as often (Pager & Western 2005; Wise 2010, 89). In terms of employment rates, Blacks with bachelor’s degrees have been documented as being twice as likely to be unemployed as non-Hispanic whites (Brown, Carnoy, Currie, Duster, Oppenheimer, Shultz & Wellman 2003, 35; Wise 2010, 66), and in terms of wages, the earnings gap between college-educated Blacks and whites has actually grown in recent years (Associated Press 2009; Wise 2010, 66).

In the education system, discrimination exists in a variety of ways as well; teachers and administrators have been observed treating minority students differently than their white counterparts when subjectivity is allowed to enter into the decision making process, and the opportunities that are present in predominantly minority schools prevent even the best students at those schools from being competitive when pitted against students from non-minority schools. To the former point, studies have shown that Black students are disproportionally likely to be classified as learning disabled and placed in special education programs, especially when the placement is based on more subjective categories of disorders, like emotional disturbance, rather than for medically diagnosable disorders (Shavers & Shavers 2006; Wise 2010, 104), and that (independent of neighborhood factors and school quality) teachers with the most experience, highest levels of certification and best track records in terms of boosting achievement, choose to leave schools when the number of Black students enrolled begins to increase (Jackson
2009; Wise 2010, 102). To the latter point, studies have documented that predominantly minority schools are less likely to offer honors and AP courses which prevents students from being able to successfully compete against students at other schools (their GPA can’t be as high, due to weighting, and they can’t prove they’ve done as well in challenging courses) (Orfield & Eaton 1996; Asian Law Caucus 2003; Grant-Thomas 2010; Wise 2010, 106-107). Studies also show that students at those schools have less than a fifty-percent chance of having math or science teachers with a degree in their field, and that new teachers in all fields at those schools are five times as likely to be unlicensed in what they are teaching (Darling-Hammond 1998; Wise 2010, 103).

Studies have also documented racial discrepancies in the health care system, and while these discrepancies are usually dismissed as products of differences in wealth and insurance (both of which link to discrepancies in areas like employment and education), to dismiss racial discrimination as playing a key role would be to turn a blind eye to a major factor. For example, Black households with annual incomes of $35,000 or more have higher rates of infant mortality than white households with annual incomes of less than $10,000. Similarly, Black women who have attained at least a bachelor’s degree have a higher rate of infant mortality than white women who dropped out before even entering high school, and when only comparing Black and white women with college degrees, the infant mortality rate for children born to Black women is nearly three times higher (Wise 2010, 114-115). And infant mortality isn’t the only health area affected by these discrepancies. Amongst Black and white individuals with similar incomes, education and employment, for example, the racial gap in the outcome of hypertension cases is wider amongst those who would be considered middle-to-upper-class than
amongst those who are poorer (Graves 2004, 133; Wise 2010, 114). And when comparing similarly situated Black and white individuals (for example, controlling for things like age, gender, income, geography, health, etc.) researchers have found that Black women are twenty-five percent less likely to receive mammography screening and that Black patients are sixty percent less likely to be referred for, and to receive coronary angioplasty or bypass surgery (Brown et al. 2003, 15 & 46; Wise 2010, 122).

Part of the explanation for the persisting racial disparities can be traced to studies documenting (likely subconscious) forms of discrimination by those within the medical field, especially doctors. In one study doctors perceived Black patients (who the doctors believed were real, although they were not) to be less intelligent, less likely to fully participate in treatment and more likely to miss scheduled appointments; they also believed that the Black patients were less likely than the white patients to benefit from various invasive procedures despite both being presented with identical symptoms for the Black and white patients (Brown et al. 2003, 48; Wise 2010, 123). In another study doctors were more apt to recommend life-saving drugs to hypothetical patients who were white than hypothetical patients who were Black (Cohen 2009; Wise 2010, 122), perhaps because of the beliefs about Black patients demonstrated in the aforementioned study. Thus, it perhaps shouldn’t be surprising that an aggregate study of racial disparities in the quality of cardiovascular care found that nearly all of the eighty-one studies indicated that Black patients received inferior treatment (Wise 2010, 122). It is also possible that disparities in health are attributable, in part, to housing conditions, which is another area that has seen persistent discrimination.
Although racial discrimination in terms of housing has decreased over the decades, racial discrimination in housing still occurs and generally comes in the form of “steering” wherein agents guide minorities into minority neighborhoods, even if the purchasers prefer to see a wider swatch of residential options. Studies estimate that between two million and three-point-seven million instances of race-based housing discrimination against minorities occurs each year in the United States (Massey & Denton 1993, 200; McCoy & Vincent 2008, 128; Wise 2010, 98). For example, a 2012 report released by the Department of Housing and Urban Development that sent pairs of testers (one white, one minority) into twenty-eight metropolitan areas, found that regardless of age, gender and qualifications to rent/buy, the minority testers were told about and shown fewer units/homes by realtors than the white testers (Gamboa 2013; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2012).

Once the decision to buy has been made, minorities also face discrimination in lending practices. Racial discrimination in terms of loans often comes in the form of “subprime mortgages” or other loans with less than desirable interest rates. Studies have revealed that even high-income Black borrowers are more likely than low-income whites to wind up with a high-cost loan (Applied Research Center 2009; Wise 2010, 98) and that Black households with annual incomes of at least $68,000 are still five times more likely to have a subprime mortgage than white households with similar or even less income (Powell & Roberts 2009; Wise 2010, 99). Studies have also shown that even when Black families have better credit, higher incomes, more savings, and less debt than white families, they are treated worse by lenders sixty percent of the time. They were more likely to be actively discouraged by the lender and told they would not be able to afford
homes, and were given less information about loans or home availability. On average, Black testers were also quoted interest rates a quarter-point higher than the less qualified white testers (Spatter 2009; Wise 2010, 101). Some of these disparities may arise from subconscious prejudices, but affidavits from former Wells Fargo (bank) employees revealed overt racism in play as well; according to those employees, loan officers at the bank regularly referred to Black customers as “mud people” to whom they sold “ghetto loans,” and those loan officers were rewarded by the bank with financial bonuses for pushing subprime loans in minority neighborhoods (Powell 2009; Wise 2010, 99-100).

Finally, racial discrimination has been documented along many stops within the criminal justice system, including interactions with the police, the attitudes of jurors, and punishments that derive from state prosecutors and/or judges. Much of the disparities occur in the context of the U.S. War on Drugs. For example, in a Seattle case study, officers focused their efforts in a particular downtown drug market where the frequency of drug transactions was much lower than in predominantly white areas of the city; additionally, in racially mixed open-air markets Black dealers were far more likely to be arrested than white dealers who were equally present and visible to police (Beckett, Nyrop, Pfingst & Bowen 2005; Beckett, Nyrop & Pfingst 2006; Alexander 2010, 124). In case studies in New Jersey and Maryland, officers pulled Black drivers over at a severely disproportionate rate even though they violated traffic laws at the same rate as white drivers; what’s more, when they were pulled over, white drivers were actually almost twice as likely to have illegal drugs or contraband in their car than were the Black drivers who were pulled over at a higher rate (Harris 2003, 80; Alexander 2010, 131). Again, some degree of racial prejudice is a likely explanatory factor, especially when
considering a study involving officers in a “shoot or hold fire” simulation; in the simulations, officers were quicker to shoot unarmed Black subjects than they were to shoot at armed white subjects (Correll, Park, Judd & Wittenbrink 2002; Payne 2001; Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie & Davies 2004; Alexander 2010, 104; Wise 2010, 84).

Jurors have also been observed to hold prejudicial attitudes; whether it was due to subconscious or overt prejudice, participants in hypothetical scenarios were more apt to misremember aggressive conduct by Black subjects than to correctly remember aggressive conduct by white subjects (Levinson 2007; Wise 2010, 85). Similarly, participants were more apt to misremember that the unspecified perpetrator in a news segment was Black (Gilliam & Iyengar 2000; Steinhorn & Diggs-Brown 1999, 155; Peffley, Shields & Williams 1996; Wise 2010, 85). Such attitudes might help explain why Black individuals would be hesitant to take a trial to court even if they knew they were not guilty; such a line of thinking not only leads Black individuals to take plea deals when they have not committed a crime, but it leads state prosecutors to offer plea deals to Black individuals when they know the prosecution would not otherwise win the case (Davis 2007, 31-33; Alexander 2010, 85-88). Studies have documented that “at virtually every stage of pretrial negotiation, whites are more successful than nonwhites” (Schmitt 1991; Alexander 2010, 115) and that a major reason for the discrepancy is that prosecutors’ subjective discretion is racially biased; the criminal motivations of Black offenders are more apt to be attributed to personality flaws such as disrespect than white offenders whose motivations are more often attributed to external conditions such as conflict inside the home and/or family (Bridges & Steen 1998; Alexander 2010, 115).
And if they do go to trial, Black defendants are judged more harshly than white defendants and receive steeper sentences. For example, studies have revealed that prosecutors are more than three and a half times more likely to seek the death penalty in cases involving a Black defendant and white victims than they are to seek the death penalty in cases involving a white defendant and Black victims and that even after accounting for thirty-five nonracial variables, defendants accused of killing white victims were more than four times as likely to receive the death sentence when that was the sentence prosecutors sought (Alexander 2010, 107). Additionally, the sentencing disparities between consumers of crack cocaine (a form of the drug more often associated with poorer, Black drug users) and consumers of powder cocaine (a form of the drug more often associated with middle-upper class white drug users) persists (Alexander 2010, 109-110) even though Congress’ 2010 Fair Sentencing Act reduced the disparity from a 100:1 ratio to an 18:1 ratio, and eliminated the mandatory five-year minimum sentence that used to accompany crack cocaine convictions. Other studies have documented racial disparities in the likelihood that Black and white juveniles are tried in an adult court and that they are confined to secure residential facilities, and reveal that Black juveniles who have never been sentenced to prison before are still six times as likely to be sentenced to do time as their white counterparts who engaged in identical crimes (Pope, Lovell & Hsia 2002; Hinton Hoytt, Schiraldi, Smith & Ziedenbert 2002; Poe-Yamagata & Jones 2000; Alexander 2010, 115). And, adding an extra layer of difficulty for Black defendants, prosecutors are often able to eliminate minority members from the jury by way of peremptory strikes (Alexander 2010, 116-120).
The racial disparities in the criminal justice system cannot simply be dismissed as a product of disparate rates of drug use or drug dealing among Black individuals in comparison to white individuals, although such an explanation is often offered anyway. Instead, studies show that Black individuals are arrested and incarcerated at higher rates than whites for drug offenses despite similar rates of usage between the two groups. In fact, studies—although they may be tainted with social desirability factors—actually show that drug usage is higher among white students, especially “hard” drugs like cocaine and heroin, and that white teenagers were three times more likely to have sold drugs than Black teenagers (Snyder & Sickman 2006; Johnston, O’Malley, Bachman & Schulenberg 2007; Johnston, O’Malley & Bachman 2003; Western 2006, 47; Human Rights Watch 2000; Alexander 2010, 96-98). Nonetheless, the drug problem in the United States remains a “Black problem” in the minds of many Americans; when asked to imagine a hypothetical drug user 95% of respondents admitted to picturing a Black drug user, and similarly high results were indicated when respondents were asked to imagine a hypothetical drug trafficker (Watson Burston, Jones & Robertson-Saunders 1995; Alexander 2010, 103). Thus, while the War on Drugs, and criminal justice policies as a whole, are not thought to be policies that are directly related to race, the connection between the two are undeniable.

III. Moving beyond the debate over the emergence of a post-racial America:

Questioning whether the post-racial narrative is relevant to documented racial discrimination

There are, then, ample and abundant examples of racial discrimination occurring in a variety of areas of Black Americans’ day to day lives that are worth considering
when discussing the supposed arrival of a post-racial United States. However, the preceding discussion of whether or not we have yet witnessed the emergence of a sustained post-racial society fails to address a very important follow up question: it fails to address whether the divisiveness in perceptions of the prevalence of racial prejudice negatively impacts the quality of solutions to the racial discrimination catalogued in the previous section. As has already been stated, it is rare for individuals in the United States to openly embrace racism; the prejudice that occurs in our society and our politics is overwhelmingly viewed as being problematic when it does occur. This is true of those individuals who show subtle and/or subconscious forms of prejudice themselves, but it is even true of those individuals who openly wear their prejudice (and at times hostility) toward Black Americans on their sleeve. Again, the discussion in the U.S. rarely concerns whether or not racism is bad, but whether or not it exists, and if it does exist, to what extent.

But the discussion over whether or not racial prejudice remains a problem in a post-Obama, twenty-first century American is normally accompanied by lamentations from skeptics of the post-racial narrative as well. The fear is that if people are unaware of the persistence of racial prejudice in the United States, that they will see little reason to support policy measures aimed at correcting racial injustices, such as those forms of discrimination cited previously herein. Even amongst those Americans who believe discrimination to be a problem, the motivation to address it might be lacking if they perceive prejudice to be largely a relic of America’s dirty past. If individuals buy into the post-racial hype, it is thought, any further progress is stalled.
It is this thought process, these lamentations, which have inspired this broader project, however, because they have not been tested. The assumption that Americans who perceive higher levels of racial prejudice persisting in our current society will be more apt to support policies aimed at correcting discrimination (all other variables held constant) may seem like a reasonable one, but the social sciences are fraught with examples of reasonable, common sense assumptions failing to hold when looked at empirically. Thus, they are worth putting to the test. It may very well be the case (as will later be hypothesized) that those who perceive higher levels of the prevalence of racial prejudice will be more apt to support policies designed to combat prejudice’s effects—and alternatively that those who perceive lower levels of the prevalence of racial prejudice will be more apt to oppose those policies since they would not seem to be necessary—but it might also be the case that skeptics of the post-racial narrative are worrying themselves over consequences that are unlikely to be related to individuals’ perceptions of the current state of the U.S. race relations.

**IV. Moving forward: An outline of what follows**

Having spent time explaining the state of America’s post-racial debate, the context in which the debate currently resides, and the motivating factors in exploring whether differences in perceptions of the prevalence of racial prejudice in the U.S. even matter, the remainder of this dissertation project will move forward on investigating whether there are any effects of post-racial thinking (or the rejection of post-racial thinking) on racial policy preferences. In order to do so, the trajectory of the dissertation will be divided into five subsequent chapters.
Chapter Two introduces the concept of meta-stereotyping as a way of measuring perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice. Meta-stereotypes are more easily understood as stereotypes about stereotypes; in this case, they assess how pervasive an individual believes any given stereotype is in relation to certain racial and ethnic groups. The idea that meta-stereotypes impact opinion and behavior is well documented in other areas of the social sciences, yet they have not been introduced in a way that tests their effects on political inclinations, such as the likelihood that policies impacted by race (whether purposefully or incidentally) will be supported or opposed. Motivated by the research on meta-stereotyping’s impact in other fields, this dissertation draws on (a) the theoretical concept of “double-consciousness” articulated by W.E.B. DuBois, wherein Black individuals are always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, (b) the political socialization literature, and (c) the theories of common and linked fate, wherein individuals interpret whether their own experiences and self-interests may be shaped by the experiences and interests of other people who are “like them.” Chapter Two also introduces this dissertation’s hypotheses regarding the effects of perceived prejudice on individuals’ racial policy preferences.

Chapter Three introduces the methodological justifications for conducting an original experimental survey; in doing so, the overall strengths and weaknesses of experimental studies are discussed, as are the specific strengths and weaknesses of this dissertation’s specific experimental survey design and instrument. The chapter introduces readers to the project’s subjects, to the treatment groups (including vignettes) to which those subjects were randomly assigned, and to the specific questions that are most pertinent to the study—i.e. those measuring meta-stereotypes (and, by extension, a
composite score indicating overall perceptions of the prevalence of racial prejudice),
those measuring perceptions of the prevalence of discriminatory outcomes (an alternative
to meta-stereotyping’s potential effects) and those which measure subjects’ policy
preferences.

Chapter Four will use the data from this project’s respondents to better understand
meta-stereotyping in the United States from a descriptive standpoint. The chapter will
investigate whether or not the meta-stereotypes held by the Black and white community
are accurate—that is, do they reflect the actual rate of stereotyping against Black
Americans—and will compare meta-stereotypes regarding white perceptions of Blacks
against meta-stereotypes pertaining to white perceptions of other racial and ethnic
minority groups. Additionally, the chapter will investigate whether there are certain
demographic traits that are more likely to lead to higher meta-stereotypes, such as race,
partisanship, ideology, age, education, gender and region. Lastly, the chapter will
compare subjects’ levels of meta-stereotyping when using different types of questions to
measure the concept—first, the chapter will compare subjects’ meta-stereotypes when
using a dichotomous measure versus an interval 101-point scale; second, the chapter will
compare subjects’ meta-stereotypes when using more abstract concepts (such as the two
previously mentioned measures) versus a more concrete, real-world application of the
concept via assessments of likely prejudice and discrimination in hypothetical scenarios.

Chapter Five will move beyond a descriptive account of the data and assess the
validity of the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2 in an analytical fashion. Making use
of the experimental design described in Chapter 3, this chapter begins by conducting
ANOVA analyses with the data. Failing to locate meta-stereotyping as a causal
mechanism driving racial policy preferences in such analyses, however, this chapter then moves to investigating meta-stereotypes as a factor that could be significantly related to higher levels of support for policies aimed at alleviating racial injustice while using OLS regression analyses.

Chapter Six concludes this dissertation project by attempting to make sense of the mixed results in Chapter 5, while considering how the information provided by this study can best serve academics and racial justice advocates alike. The chapter also considers possible flaws in the research design that should be addressed in future studies of meta-stereotyping, and potential theoretical considerations that may need to be built into any future research projects on the topic of meta-stereotyping’s effects on racial policy preferences. The chapter concludes by asserting that, regardless of the null findings regarding meta-stereotyping’s effects in this project, academics should continue to investigate the reasons for which Americans—overwhelmingly in favor of such broad concepts as equality, fairness, justice, etc.—are nonetheless reluctant to support policies that are designed to achieve those very principles that continue to allude the Black community in twenty-first century America.
CHAPTER 2:

THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR STUDYING META-STEREOTYPES’ POTENTIAL IMPACT ON RACIAL POLICY PREFERENCES

This project looks at the effects that meta-level perceptions have upon racial policy preferences and is an area that, to this point, has not been explored in terms of their effects on political decision making. Meta-level analyses move beyond the potential effects of individuals’ own, outward beliefs and attitudes, and instead explore the potential effects of individuals’ beliefs and attitudes about others’ beliefs and attitudes. This project is specifically interested in the potential effects of meta-stereotypes. That is, this project explores the potential effects of stereotypes about stereotypes.

This project is keenly interested in the varying perceptions Americans within, and across, the Black and white communities now hold regarding the state of U.S. race relations. Perceptions on this topic may range from believing that we have achieved a truly post-racial society wherein race is not only surmountable, but is unlikely to be considered a potential detriment in the first place—highlighted by the emergence of powerful Black individuals like Barack Obama and Oprah Winfrey—to believing that the U.S. has seen little progress in race relations because the nation is still a remarkably racist society, both at the individual and institutional levels. Many individuals’ opinions, however, fall somewhere between these two extremes, and because there is no unified perception of U.S. race relations, this paper expects to find differences in the way these perceptions impact support for, or opposition to, policies aimed at correcting racial
injustice; specifically, this project looks at the policies of affirmative action, criminal justice reforms, and racial profiling. After all, if citizens are framing issues in two completely different perceived realities, it is no wonder that these debates are still brewing with little inclination of being resolved any time soon.

Meta-level analyses of perception are present in the sociological and psychological literature, however, and so this chapter will clarify a host of necessary background concepts that served as the building blocks for current meta-level research. Likewise, this chapter will highlight how these concepts contribute to the theoretical foundations upon which analyses of meta-level perceptions’ non-political effects have been formed.

The perceptions experienced by individuals or collective groups can be discussed on a number of different fronts, but most pertinent to this project are those perceptions projected upon another group (stereotypes) and those perceptions that are internalized in response to expectations about one group perceives another group (meta-stereotypes). The literature on stereotyping is plentiful and can be found within many social science disciplines due to the importance they have been shown to have upon the psyche, social interactions, and political discourse and decision making; however, the literature on meta-stereotyping is less plentiful, especially as it pertains to public opinion or political behavior.

I. Stereotypes

Stereotypes are broadly defined as “cognitive structures that contain the perceiver’s knowledge, beliefs and expectations about human groups” (Hamilton and
Trolier 1986), and have been more simply described as “pictures in the head” (Lippman 1922), “exaggerated beliefs” (Allport 1954), and “character profiles” (Brown 1986). Stereotypes are part of the categorization process (Tajfel 1969) and act as cognitive constructs in order to help people explain phenomena related to their understanding of groups (McGarty, Yzerbyt & Spears 2002). As such, stereotypes form when a group has been “otherized” (Pickering 2001). Stereotypes extend to groups on account of gender, sexuality, religion, age, race and ethnicity, to name only a few. They ultimately heighten differences between groups (Judd & Park 1988, 1995; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff & Ruderman 1978) and tell a story about the relationship between groups (Wilders 1984), both of which fosters an “us vs. them” mentality which, in turn, creates stronger group attachments and inflates the individual’s tendency to identify with their social group (Tajfel & Turner 1986). This process then further perpetuates the stereotypes that divide the two groups in the first place (Greene 1999) and creates additional intergroup conflict (Tajfel 1981; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell 1987).

The study of stereotyping within the political science literature has taken two trajectories: the effects of stereotyping and the prevalence of stereotyping. Researchers have long been interested in the effects of stereotypes, especially negative stereotypes, on those individuals who hold the stereotypes about an out-group and on those individuals who are on the receiving end of a stereotype or set of stereotypes. As the effects of stereotyping relate specifically to political science, researchers have found overwhelming support for the expectation that those who stereotype a group, and are overall more

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1 For example, taking a cue from specific negative stereotypes, a member of an otherized group could infer their relationship with the dominant group in a more general way—“they feel superior to us” or “they despise us”.

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prejudiced against a group, allow those feelings to infiltrate their political decision making model when racial policies are addressed (Bobo & Kluegel 1993; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo & Krysan 1997; Krysan 2000). Stereotypes, by nature, give way to the “ultimate attribution error” (Pettigrew 1979) and contribute to the development of ideologies that justify discriminatory behavior (Jackman & Senter 1983; Stroebe & Insko 1989; Bar-Tal, Grauman, Kruglanski & Stroebe 1989); thus, it is not surprising that stereotypes color political discourse and political information processes. Among the issues affected by racial stereotyping and overarching racial prejudice are welfare (Gilens 1996, 1999, 2004; Peffley, Hurwitz & Sniderman 1997), criminal justice (Alexander 2010; Gilliam, Valentino & Beckmann 2002; Peffley et al. 1997), school integration (Smith 1990), neighborhood integration (Bobo & Zubrinsky 1996; Farley, Steeh, Krysan, Jackson & Reeves 1994), healthcare (Haynes & Smedley 1999; Smedley & Syme 2000; Smelser, Wilson & Mitchell 2001; Smedley, Stith & Nelson 2002), housing and lending practices (Pager & Shepherd 2008; Turner, Ross, Gaister & Yinger 2002), employment practices (Bertrand & Mullainathan 2004; Pager & Shepherd 2008), equal opportunity programs and multiculturalism (Link & Oldendick 1996).

Given the widespread effects stereotyping has on policy preferences, of which the stereotyped racial minority is often the target, the hope would be that stereotyping would be the practice of the few rather than the many. However, research seems to suggest otherwise. A number of studies in the early part of the twentieth-century confirmed the expectation that negative stereotyping of racial and ethnic minorities was prevalent in the United States (Katz & Braly 1933; Gilbert 1951; Karlins, Coffman & Walters 1969). Given the tumultuous climate of race relations during that era, the confirmation of racial
and ethnic stereotyping is not surprising. However, the continued confirmation of racial
and ethnic stereotyping pervading American society throughout the latter half of the
twentieth-century, and into the twenty-first, is likely to surprise many individuals who
buy into the post-racial narrative. Despite the fact that overt expressions of racial
stereotyping and prejudice have declined (Jaynes and Williams 1989), studies
consistently find a notable portion of the white American population that not only holds
on to negative stereotypes of racial and ethnic groups, but also are willing to admit to as
much when asked by researchers (Smith 1990; Peffley & Hurwitz 1993).\(^2\) Other research
suggests that even if respondents aren’t willing to admit to racist inclinations, the notions
that white opposition to racially targeted policies is due to non-racial factors, and that
those who are motivated by race are limited in number and indicative of uneducated
xenophobes, are but a ruse (Sears, van Laar, Carrillo & Kosterman 1997). These latter
findings may result from an authentic naivety, wherein respondents are truly unaware of
their own prejudice. It may also be the case, however, that respondents have learned how
to talk about race in a way that allows them to simultaneously deny racial prejudice,
while using coded language and explanations to convey a racialized message to like-
 minded individuals (Burton 2013).

II. Perceptions of the U.S. racial climate in the mid-to-late 20\(^{th}\) century

What is interesting about the prevalence of racial stereotyping, and the ensuing
rise it gives to racial prejudice, is the disparity between white Americans’ assessments of

\(^2\) For further discussion, see: Bobo, Lawrence. 2001. “Racial Attitudes and Relations at
the Close of the Twentieth-Century”. In Neil Smelser, William J. Wilson and Faith N.
Mitchell (Eds.), America Becoming: Racial Trends and their Implications, vol. 1.
racial tensions versus those of Black Americans. Research routinely suggests that Black Americans hold a more pessimistic view of race relations than their white counterparts. A 1994 Sigelman & Welch study found that one in four Blacks agreed that more than half of white Americans “personally share the attitudes of groups like the Ku Klux Klan toward Blacks” and only ten percent say that “only a few” whites share such views, while at the same time only one in twenty white respondents agreed that “over half” of their white in-group members held such views and a third of them said “only a few” held such beliefs. Other studies have found that Blacks exaggerate the conservatism of whites, while whites exaggerate the liberalism of Blacks (Hagen & Glaser 1993) and that Black Americans perceive “most whites” to hold a wide variety of negative stereotypes of their racial in-group (Sigelman & Tuch 1997).

The disparities between the documented levels of perceived prejudice in the Black and white communities leads to a better understanding of studies documenting disparities in the perception of the overall racial climate in the country as well. For example, in 1962 and 1963, between two-thirds and nearly ninety percent of Gallup Poll respondents nonetheless reported that they believed blacks were treated equally with regard to jobs, schools and housing (The Gallup Organization 2001). This, despite the lingering effects of segregation and the continuation of rampant, legal inequalities, neither of which would be addressed by the national government until later in the decade (the 1964 Civil Rights Bill banning segregation in the workplace and public accommodations, and the 1969 Civil Rights Bill banning housing discrimination). Given the differences in perceptions about the state of race relations in the U.S., it is not surprising that Americans who failed to acknowledge inequality would also think that the civil rights movement was
overstepping its bounds. Indeed, in 1963, seventy-five percent of white respondents explained that the civil rights movement was asking for “too much” (Steinhorn & Diggs-Brown 1999). Such attitudes might seem misguided in hindsight, even a bit shocking but, when taken in concert with the findings of the aforementioned surveys, it becomes easier to imagine that those respondents might have disapproved of the civil rights movement for asking for more than they thought was necessary given that their perceived reality was framed around a society that exhibited low levels of racial prejudice in the first place and thus had little to correct in terms of U.S. race relations.

III. **Meta-stereotypes**

Unlike the effects of stereotypes, which have been well-documented within the political science literature, the effects of individuals’ perceptions of others’ stereotypes is an avenue for exploration. This project aims to fill this gap and does so by reintroducing, and extending, the idea of meta-level perceptions into the political science literature. The primary meta-level perceptions studied thus far are meta-stereotypes, and these will also be the primary interest of the present study. While stereotypes evaluate groups in terms of that groups’ own characteristics, meta-stereotypes evaluate groups in terms of what individuals believe regarding the way other groups—in this case, white Americans—stereotype members of the group in question. A meta-stereotype has been defined as “a person’s beliefs regarding the stereotype that out-group members hold about his or her own group” (Vorauer, Main & O’Connell 1998). In simpler terms, and with the scope of this project in mind, a meta-stereotype is measured by asking the following individuals: “What do I (a Black American) think that they (white Americans) think about us (Black Americans in general)?” or, when approaching meta-stereotypes from the vantage point
of the majority in-group whose beliefs are being perceived, “What do I (a white American) think that we (white Americans) think about them (Black Americans in general)?” Additionally, and though this project is mainly interested in meta-stereotypes concerning the Black community, meta-stereotypes can measure perceptions of stereotyping against other minority groups. For example, Black respondents may be asked “What do I (a Black American), think that they (white Americans), think about them (Hispanic/Arab/Asian Americans)?” and white respondents may be asked “What do I (a white American), think that we (white Americans), think about them (Hispanic/Arab/Asian Americans).

IV. Meta-stereotypes as a way of capturing “double-consciousness”

Research on meta-stereotypes speak to the “double-consciousness” articulated by W.E.B. Du Bois (1903) wherein Blacks view themselves through their own lens, as well as through the lens of white society:

“After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and the Roman, the Teuton and the Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world, -- a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt or pity. One ever feels his two-ness, -- an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideas in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.” (12).

The internalization of this double-consciousness, according to Du Bois, effects not only Black thoughts, but Black actions as well; the double-consciousness forces Black individuals to make decisions about their outward appearance and personality, and may compel some to take action (133).
Indeed, Du Bois’ theory of double-consciousness seems to ring true a century later. Predicated upon the salience of white racial attitudes and beliefs, this double-consciousness is well-documented and points toward this project’s assertion that meta-stereotypes should be, and likely are, politically relevant. In a study on social awareness, Sheldon & Johnson (1993) found that thinking about the way an individual believes he/she is viewed by another person ranked third among eight types of awareness, only behind thinking about their own feelings and their own thoughts about others, and ranked second out of the four self-targeted types of awareness. With this in mind, Black individuals’ tendency to consider whites’ stereotypes and prejudice against their minority in-group is not only made possible, but may also probable. Thus, when Torres & Charles (2004) documented Black college students’ proclivity to correctly identify the negative perceptions of their in-group held by white students, and to then take those meta-stereotypes into consideration when engaging in inter-group behavior and when thinking about the university’s race-based policies, they extended the work on meta-level perceptions documented earlier by Sigelman and colleagues.

Sigelman & Tuch (1997) documented the accuracy³ of Blacks’ meta-stereotyping on many different content-factors using data from a 1991 *Time/CNN* poll. The study revealed high rates of meta-stereotyping; that is, a substantial portion of the poll’s Black sample reported thinking that “most whites” endorsed the stereotypes that Blacks are

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³ It should be noted here that accuracy does not whether or not Blacks *are* lazy, violent, etc., or even whether or not an individual him/herself *thinks* their own in-group is lazy, violent, etc. Instead, the accuracy of a meta-stereotype refers to whether an individual properly identified whether or not another group (in this case whites) held stereotypes against his/her in-group—that is, whether their perception of another group’s perceptions of their own group accurately reflect the perceptions of their own group held by the out-group in question.
“violence-prone” (82%), “lazy” (69%), “unintelligent” (76%), and that they “prefer to live off welfare” (75%). In fact, the only stereotype that less than a majority of the Black sample perceived to be held by “most whites” was the “unpatriotic” label, though a still sizeable percentage of those sampled (44%) asserted that “most whites” endorsed that stereotype as well.

If conceptualizing “most” to mean a majority, as do Sigelman & Tuch, the Black sample’s meta-stereotypes were accurate regarding the “prefer to live off welfare” and “violence-prone” content-factors; indeed, more than fifty percent of the whites asked about these stereotypes admitted to accepting those images of the Black community in general. Nearly a majority (47%) accepted the image of Blacks being “lazy”, but the Black sample largely overestimated the perception whites have of Blacks being “unintelligent” (31%) and “unpatriotic” (18%). Still, while the accuracy (or inaccuracy, in some cases) of these meta-stereotypes is intriguing in and of itself, this project is more interested in the rates at which individuals perceive the prevalence of such stereotyping, whether those meta-stereotypes accurately reflect society or not.

The trend of overestimating, or exaggerating, another groups’ perceptions of an individual’s in-group was borne out in the aforementioned research performed by Sigelman & Welch (1994) concerning Blacks’ perceptions of whites’ inclination to adopt attitudes and beliefs similar to that of the Ku Klux Klan, and the trend continued when Krueger (1996) explored Black-white perceptions of negative valence.

Omitted from the current literature on meta-stereotyping is the way white individuals perceive their own in-group as it relates to the stereotyping of minority out-
groups. Sheldon & Johnson did not include this type of perception in their study of eight types of awareness, nor are white meta-stereotypes included in the Sigelman & colleagues’ studies. Thus, there is less data to draw on, and less theory to build on, when formulating hypotheses about the effects of meta-stereotypes on white individual’s racial policy preferences.

V. Acquiring meta-stereotypes as a result of socialization

Meta-stereotypes may be formed through a variety of avenues, but most notable are their formation through experience with out-group members and through the socialization process. The process of racial socialization speaks to personal and group identity, interracial relationships, and social position related to race (Thornton, Chatter, Taylor & Allen 1990). Meta-stereotypes may be formed when individuals observe others’ behaviors toward “people like them”, but they may also be formed by relying on stereotypes which are partially learned via the socialization process (Mendoza 2008).

Many Black individuals continue to feel the residual effects of the blatant prejudice in the past, now masked by more subtle and covert forms or prejudice (Banks-Wallace 1998; Cose 1993; Essed 1991). Additionally, Black individuals are socialized to understand how others perceive “people like them” and how they may expect to be treated as a result (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu 2002; Massey, Charles, Lundy & Fisher 2003; Operario & Fiske 2001). In doing so, the socialization process emphasizes the discrimination that Blacks Americans have faced throughout history, the belief that discrimination has negatively affected Blacks’ advancement in society, and a belief that they should, therefore, fight against discrimination and avoid stereotypical behaviors (Nunnally 2012).
This last part fuels the expectation that Black Americans are not only aware of what those stereotypical behaviors are, but that they actively affect their beliefs and behaviors. The existing research backs the assertion that not only are they aware of stereotypes (Torres & Charles 2004), but that the prospect of being stereotyped is not just possible, but perceived to be probable, and that these meta-stereotypes therefore becomes salient in their day-to-day interactions (Wout, Shih, Jackson & Sellers 2009; Torres & Charles 2004). Thus, despite progressive strides in U.S. race relations, and the resulting opportunities which have opened to Black Americans, a legacy of distrust, frustration and anger persists (White & Cones 1999). Overall, judging by the accuracy with which Blacks’ form meta-stereotypes on many content-factors, and their tendency to over-exaggerate (rather than under-exaggerate) when the meta-stereotype is inaccurate, Blacks’ racial socialization of white beliefs and attitudes about “people like them” seems both highly attuned to their social and political surroundings, and also very strong.

Another consequence of the strong socialization process in the Black community is a heightened sense of racial identity; in fact, race generally trumps, or intersects with, all other social identities, such as gender, sexuality, or class (Simien 2006; Cohen 1999; Hochschild 1995; Dawson 1994). The socialization process of the Black community often begins at a young age, but the aspects of this socialization process described above are continuously reinforced and intensified as children get older by parents (Hughes &

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4 These findings suggest that Voraeuer & Ross’ (1993) indication that meta-stereotypes are less salient than an individual’s own stereotypes—because meta-stereotypes are less usual and available, and entail more psychological risks—may be overstated; instead, it appears that even if meta-stereotypes are less available than an individual’s own stereotypes, he/she still has easy access to meta-stereotypes and uses them quite frequently when engaging in individuals from another group, or members of another group en masse.
Chen 1997), and by other family members, friends and the broader community (Demo & Hughes 1990). The media, schools and churches also serve as important sources for learning about being Black in America (Nunnally 2012; Martin and McAdoo 2007; Dawson 1994). In line with Du Bois’ theory of “double-consciousness,” many Black parents believe that they are not simply raising an American child, but are also raising a Black child who will face situations and experiences unique to members of their own racial group by virtue of being Black (Peters 1985). Studies routinely show a majority of the Black children and parents engaging in “race talk,” and the percentage raises when other non-parental actors are considered as socializing agents. Interviews in the early 1990s (Sanders Thompson 1994) revealed that 79% of the study’s Black participants had discussions of race with their parents, and that 85% of them had discussions concerning race with other family members. These rates were higher than those documented in studies during the 1980s (Bowman & Howard 1985; Thornton et al. 1990). Some of these discussions may have been subtle, but others may have been quite blunt. Recently, for example, this topic made news in the wake of the death of Trayvon Martin. In an interview with CNN, Black actor and activist recounted teaching his son what to do if he was pulled over for speeding by a police officer:

“I taught this to my own son, who is now thirty-three, as part of my duty as a father to ensure he knows the kind of world in which he’s growing up. When I get stopped by the police, I take my hat off, I take my sunglasses off, I roll down my window, take my hands, stick them outside the window and on the door of the driver side because I want that officer to be as relaxed as he can be when he approaches my vehicle. And I do that because I live in America” (Burton 2013).

Burton’s experience points to one possible reason for high levels of racial socialization and “race talk” in the Black community—the perceived need to adapt their responses to,
or their behaviors in the face of, social, economic and political barriers (Harrison, Wilson, Pine, Chan & Buriel 1990).

Alternatively, the socialization process regarding race relations in the U.S. is typically very different in the white community because white families don’t typically have the “race talk” as do members of the Black community. Instead, the socialization of white Americans is geared toward “an orientation that tries hard to ignore racial differences and to think of themselves as individuals without a racial position” (Carlson & Chamberlain 2004). An ethnographic study of eighth grade girls in a white suburban community (Kenny 2000) details the way white parents socialize their children. The study found that the idea of “color-blindness” in this community meant circumventing the topic of race altogether; that “tolerance” meant pretending that the construct of race does not exist, rather than acknowledging it as an obstacle faced by many of their fellow citizens. And Kenny determined that this supposed “color-blindness” failed to mask the fact that this white community was very much aware of race; their actions and words routinely betrayed their aspiration of remaining “color-blind” by highlighting a deep racial consciousness that was all too obvious. Being able to avoid the issue of race altogether is a benefit of white privilege, as are the lessons derived from such a “culture of avoidance” (Baumgartner 1988; Lipsitz 1995) which manifest in ways that stress the merits of liberal democracy wherein success and failure are individualized and not institutionalized (Kenny 2000); however, neither the culture of avoidance or the view of meritocracy are thought to be benefits of a racial privilege when racial privilege is not acknowledged. In fact, in stark contrast with the Black community, the difficulties inherent in Kenny’s attempts to “talk race” with white students (receiving pushback from
the Principal, teachers and parents when the topic of race—even the concept of their own “whiteness”—was mentioned) suggests that the difference in socialization is not merely the racial content, but the receptiveness to discussions of race in the first place. A likely explanation is that in many white communities “to be caught in the act of seeing race [is] to be caught being ‘prejudiced’” (Frankenberg 1993). This culture of avoidance was, similarly, documented amongst white college students, although their Black counterparts at the college were quite interested in talking about racial group issues and the Black-white divide (Sheldon 2000).

The concept of white privilege, whether one admits to possessing it or not, also affects the way the white community engages in “race talk” once it decides to enter the fray. In this sense, white individuals are socialized to view the issue—or the perceived non-issue—of race from their own vantage point, and as a consequence often leave the vantage point of Black Americans out of the discussion (unless the vantage point of the Black community is being assumed by white discussants based on their preconceived notions about what it means to be and feel Black). This aspect of white socialization is noted by Warren (2000) who explains that for many white individuals, their barometer of the racial climate is “based not on whether power was racialized nor the degree of antiblack racism, but rather on [their] comfort level as a white person with ‘dark-skinned’ people” (143). Thus, when white individuals do not feel threatened, intimidated, or bad around Black individuals, it is difficult for them to think of society as anything but a racial democracy (Warren 2000). This avoidance and denial of racism, of course, flies in the face of both anecdote and evidence, but remains as the result of “selective hearing,” “creative interpretation,” and “complicitous forgetting” (Simpson 1996). This approach
to forming perceptions about American race relations is also problematic when taken in concert with statements like those made by Burton (above). If a white individual feels comfortable around a Black individual, it may not be that the white individual is free from prejudice; it may be that the Black individual is aware of potential unease and modifies behavior in a way that manipulates—in a positive way—the pre-conceived notions of a white individual and their ensuing reactions during their brief interaction. Even if the white individual in question is unprejudiced, the fact that Black individuals feel the need to modify their behavior to appease prejudiced whites suggests a potential racial problem nonetheless. Essentially, the white socialization process regarding race relations in the U.S. not only suppresses “race talk” in general, but transforms “race talk” into “white talk” when the topic does come up.

These socialization processes also impact the way Black and white Americans regard the narrative of the “American Dream.” The American Dream (Adams 1931) purports that opportunities for success are afforded to all individuals, regardless of the circumstances of their birth, or their current station in life, and that those opportunities will be capitalized upon so long as the ability and desire to achieve are there. It is “characterized by the beliefs that any individual can improve their position in society (i.e., individual mobility) through hard work (i.e., the Protestant work ethic)” (Wiley, Deaux & Hagelskamp 2012). This conceptualization of the American Dream is predicated upon the belief in meritocracy (Hothschild 1995), which itself is predicated upon (and then reinforces) the belief in fairness and equality (Son Hing, Bobocel, Zanna, Garcia, Gee & Orazietti 2011). As a result, individuals who believe in a meritocratic society also perceive that there are few systematic barriers to success, whereas
individuals who reject the belief that society is meritocratic instead perceive substantial systematic barriers to success, including factors like racial group membership (Major, Kaiser, O’Brien & McCoy 2007). The belief in the American Dream, therefore, contributes to the belief that inequality is acceptable because, under the fair and equal system of meritocracy, an individuals’ station in life—including those who are stuck in a low to middling socio-economic class—is attributed to their own lack of effort or ability (Jost & Hunyady 2002; Major, Gramzow, McCoy, Levin, Schmader & Sidanius 2002; Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz & Federico 1998; Sidanius & Pratto 1999). Perhaps unsurprisingly, those who find themselves in better socio-economic situations are more apt to believe in a system of meritocracy—that is, that their success is due to their own efforts and abilities, and was not aided by a system designed to “work” for “people like them” in the first place—whereas those who perceive that their racial group has a lower socio-economic status stemming, at least in part, to a general sense of disrespect for their racial group, are more apt to reject the notion of American meritocracy (Levin et al. 1998; Major et al. 2002).

Therefore, differences in the socialization of white and Black Americans, with regard to the racial climate of the U.S., are likely, therefore, to impact both the strength of white and Black meta-stereotypes and racial policy preferences. After all, being socialized to either see prejudice in discrimination is likely to yield meta-stereotypes that indicate the belief that more white Americans hold negative stereotypes of the Black community, than would a socialization process that pretends prejudice and race is a non-factor in American life. Likewise, the differences in these socialization processes are likely to impact public policy preferences since those who are socialized to believe in a
system of American meritocracy, for example, might be expected to see policies like affirmative action as asking for special treatment as opposed to asking for equal treatment. On the flip side, those who have been socialized to see prejudice and discrimination in day-to-day life are likely more apt to support policies aimed at correcting such injustice.

Of course, not all Black Americans will have been socialized in the way described above, and even those who were socialized in that sense might not ascribe to such beliefs about the prevalence of racial prejudice and discrimination. While the Black socialization process might generally entail discussions of bias and distrust (Hughes & Chen 1997) or “racial barriers,” many Black families or communities might instead focus on a broader sense of “racial identity,” “self-development” or “egalitarianism” (Bowman & Howard 1995). Likewise, not all white Americans will have been socialized to avoid “race talk.” Instead, some white Americans may have been socialized to be highly attuned to racial differences—either unapologetically reinforcing negative stereotypes, and displaying a more overt kind of prejudice and racism than do most Americans in the twenty-first century, or apologetically highlighting disparities between the way white and Black Americans experience opportunity and outcomes in America today. These differences in socialization, however, are expected to affect meta-stereotypes between racial groups, and even within racial groups, and thus are expected to affect support or opposition to racial policies too.
VI. From socialization to a fateful collective identity

Taken as a whole, “historical narratives about this racial discrimination are transmitted as a form of collective memory about blacks’ collective experiences with race and racism… This information is transferred from generation to generation in a way that conveys the historical and contemporary group status of African Americans” (Nunnally 2012, 68-69).

In addition to socialization about Black group status, which Nunnally documented as being the most emphatic of the content-areas she examined, Black socialization also places heavy emphasis on Black pride and/or Black contributions to society, and on the necessity to cooperate as a unified racial group across Black ethnicities. Thus, the Black socialization process ultimately serves to create a group consciousness and group closeness, which fosters a collective identity around their “Blackness.” This awareness of one’s Blackness, and the importance given to that particular social identity, stems in part from a “double-consciousness” that is aware of the awareness and importance white Americans give to their Blackness as well.

The heightened sense of discrimination as a result of their “Blackness” helps explain the relatively low sense of control Black Americans reported having concerning their own fate in the late 1970s compared to their white counterparts (Cummings 1977). This idea that fate is determined by something other than a system of meritocracy continues into the twenty-first century, and individual fate has instead been conceptualized as being dependent upon the fate of the Black racial group as a whole. The theories of common fate (Gurin, Hatchett & Jackson 1989) or linked fate (Dawson 1994) speak to this conceptualization; the theories measure whether individuals feel that what generally happens to Black people in the U.S. has something to do with what
happens in their own lives, and suggests that this process is representative of a “black utility heuristic” (Dawson 1994). Again, not all Black Americans share a sense of common or linked fate, but high degrees of common or linked fate have been shown to affect levels of activism and the acceptance of Black political ideologies (Dawson 2001), unified voting behaviors and policy preferences (Tate 1993; Dawson 1994), and an overall inclination to support more liberal policies and the radical egalitarian agenda (Dawson 2001). This is because a belief in common or linked fate flies in the face of meritocratic system; thus, “people who perceive that individual mobility is illegitimately blocked… will be more likely to identify with their group and pursue collective strategies to improve their status, such as collective action” (Wiley, Deaux & Hagelskamp 2012; citing Ellemers 1993; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink & Mielke 1999; Verkuyten & Reijerse 2008).

In contrast, white Americans do not generally exhibit a sense of common or linked fate because their socialization process does not emphasize their “whiteness” as an important self identity, nor does it emphasize “whiteness” having an effect on life’s opportunities and outcomes, even though in many cases it does have a bearing. Coupled with an emphasis that is instead placed on meritocracy, and the ensuing belief in individual mobility (Wiley et al. 2012), there are fewer motivating factors in play that would cause white individuals to similarly favor liberal policies and the racial egalitarian agenda. However, those white Americans who do identify with Black Americans may be more apt to support such policy measures.
VII. Effects of meta-stereotyping in the psychological and sociological literature

Armed with the knowledge that negative stereotyping has adverse effects on those being stereotyped and that Blacks in the U.S. are aware of these negative stereotypes (and at times even exaggerate them), sociology and psychology researchers set out to determine whether meta-stereotypes, too, have adverse effects on those perceiving stereotypes against their in-group. Within those studies, researchers have concluded that the effects of meta-stereotypes are plentiful and wide-ranging, and that individuals who perceive meta-stereotypes often adapt their behavior in a way to cope with the perceived “stereotype threat” (Steele 1997; Steele & Aronson 1995; Steele, Spencer & Aronson 2002). Psychologically, common reactions to negative meta-stereotypes are anxiety (Stephan & Stephan 1985; Steele, Spencer & Aronson 2002) and “stigmatization” (Crocker & Major 1989; Crocker 1999; Major & O’Brien 2005), and in response common sociological modifications to behavior have been demonstrated by way of aversion (Vorauer, Main & O’Connell 1998), avoidance (Brewer & Brown 1998; Fein & Spencer 1997; Wills 1981), self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton 1948) and assimilation. Additionally, when an individual disagrees with a meta-stereotype they may also perceive a sense of general unfairness (Gomez 2002), which may shed some light on why Blacks in America are generally more suspicious of whites, perceiving them to be less trustworthy, less honest and more demanding (Nunnally 2009).

Thus, researchers have concluded that metastereotypes are salient because “a Black individual’s behavior is not shaped so much by White stereotypes themselves, as by the person’s perceptions of White stereotypes about Blacks” (Torres & Charles 2004,
As a result, researchers have lamented that the lack of research on metastereotypes is “unfortunate because metastereotypes, like stereotypes themselves, can decisively shape the behavior of members of each group” (Sigelman & Tuch 1997, 89). And while research on the effects of meta-stereotyping is pervasive in other social science disciplines, these effects have not been tested within the political science literature. The closest research has come to introducing the concept of meta-stereotypes in a politically relevant way is the Torres & Charles (2004) piece that shows Black Ivy League students indicating that they believe white students dislike affirmative action policies due to their overarching stereotypes and prejudice, and that they feel as though people may assume that the only reason they are at an Ivy League school is because of the policy rather than their own accomplishments. Their research stops short, however, at trying to gauge how these meta-stereotypes might influence their support or opposition to the policy of affirmative action, and does not introduce any other relevant political matters within their interviews and subsequent discussion. Thus, while Torres & Charles (2004) strive to extend the work of Sigelman & Tuch (1997) in a variety of ways, their contributions are mainly methodological and the contributions to the content only extend our prior understanding of the prevalence of stereotyping and the accuracy of meta-stereotypes. What their research does not do is extend our understanding of meta-stereotypes to politically relevant behavior, despite highlighting a racially charged policy that might be affected by such perceptions. Thus, while the research up to this point stops short on testing the effects of meta-stereotypes on racial policy preferences, this research tests exactly that and, given the known importance of meta-stereotyping on psychological and sociological processes, this project hypothesizes that meta-stereotypes will affect an
individual’s policy preference formation as well. As such, this project’s main hypotheses follow below.

**VIII. Hypotheses**

This project’s main concern is investigating whether an individual’s meta-stereotypes have an effect on their racial policy preferences. Given the theoretical bases covered in the aforementioned sections of this chapter, the overarching hypothesis being tested herein is:

**Hypothesis 1 (H1):** Individuals who perceive a higher level of the prevalence of racial stereotyping (meta-stereotyping) will be more likely to support policies designed to correct racial injustice than those who perceive a lower level of the prevalence of racial stereotyping.

In order to evaluate this hypothesis, however, two additional hypotheses must be investigated. The first of these sub-hypotheses focuses on the different effects that may be expected given the two racial sub-groups in the study. The second focuses on the specifics of these potential effects given the experimental nature of this study’s design. Analyses regarding these two hypotheses will then allow for a fuller assessment of the main hypothesis (H1) described above.

As noted in the above discussion, Black individuals in America are aware of the stereotypes against them, often convert that to an overarching sense of prejudice, and are capable of linking these attitudes and beliefs to white support for or opposition to various policy preferences. Because the policy preferences measured within this project’s survey instrument are of a broader scope, rather than being individual incidents within a larger policy debate, respondents will not have the aid of individuating information (about a specific situation at hand) which has been identified as one way of overriding meta-
stereotypes’ effects (Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie & Milberg 1987; Kunda & Thagard 1996; Locksley Borgida, Brekke & Hepburn 1980; Nisbett, Zukier & Lemley 1981). Instead, respondents will be asked to address—by indicating their levels of support for or opposition to—relevant racial policies that are expansive, rather than contained to one’s own social setting, and in doing so will not have the benefit of knowing the people and players involved in any given situation since those people and players are multiple and ever-changing. Based on these meta-stereotypes, respondents who believe that it is probable that their in-group would be stereotyped when in the presence of out-group members (especially dominant out-group members; in this case White Americans) are expected to perceive it as possible—if not probable—that they (or people they know) would be discriminated against if the political circumstances did not include injustice-correcting measures such as affirmative action and criminal justice reform.

Although research shows that stereotyping and prejudice are still alive and well in America, the prevalence of such feelings is nowhere close to being unanimous. In fact, as was alluded to earlier, the rates at which people admit to holding prejudiced beliefs has declined since the early half of the twentieth-century. When prejudice is exhibited it is generally done subtly; the open, almost braggadocios, displays of prejudice have all but vanished in favor of a new, cultural or symbolic racism (Sears 1988; Kinder & Sears

5 For this study, the issues of affirmative action and criminal justice procedures will be investigated. The maintenance of affirmative action, and the reform of many criminal justice procedures, have been argued due to the perceived injustice that occurs within hiring/admissions and arrests/sentencing that result from a reliance upon individuals tasked with being race-neutral when many are not. Because they cannot narrow either issue down to just one or a few individual cases, respondents must contend with the fact that they do not have individuating information. As such, this project expects that respondents will fall back on meta-stereotypes when forming their opinions on these matters.
1981; Henry & Sears 2002; Sears & Henry 2003)—sometimes called “racial resentment”—that is more muted and which can be shrugged off as not being racist at all (Wise 2010). Thus, there is likely to be a wide range of variance in the perception that their own dominant in-group is still prejudiced against Blacks. Some white respondents will recognize the pervasiveness of stereotyping and prejudice that still occurs, despite living in a “post-racial” America, while others are unlikely to recognize or acknowledge such things.

If the limited research on such matters is any indication, those white individuals who are low-prejudiced (as measured by their responses to the stereotype questions) and suspect that they will be judged for their in-group’s prejudiced ways (therefore perceiving that others perceive people like them to be prejudiced) will feel a similar sense of anxiety that minority group members experience by way of stereotype threat and may avoid behaviors that could be misunderstood as prejudicial by out-group members (Devine, Evett & Vasquez-Susan 1996). The aforementioned hypothesis (H1) makes use of this research when expecting that one type of behavior that would be affected by such perceptions is the policy preferences they are willing to go on the record supporting or opposing.

The emphasis this project’s survey instrument places on whites’ beliefs and attitudes (as a focus for the meta-stereotype, as opposed to other out-groups or the American population as a whole) is suitable for the purposes of this project as well.

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6 For example, arguments that Blacks are naturally inferior have given way to arguments that Blacks suffer from a “culture of poverty” wherein they simply don’t have the necessary cultural or social tools at their disposal to properly assimilate into the American way of life—things like lower economic status, single-family households, poor educational opportunities, etc. (see Moynihan 1965)
because most of the power in the United States still is reserved within the white echelon of society, and because those minority members who do wield power may subconsciously hold stereotypes against their own in-group as a result of the overall socialization effects of white American politics and culture. Thus, the decision to emphasize whites’ stereotypes (and Black meta-stereotypes regarding white stereotypes) is a practical one. The practical purpose does not detract from the theoretical or methodological soundness of this project, however, because studies suggest that Black Americans may have certain groups in mind—notably the dominant group, in this case white Americans—when asked about peoples’ beliefs and attitudes more generally (Nunnally 2009).

It is possible that the expected results could be diminished or non-existent if Black individuals rationalize negative stereotypes, even when they do not agree with the stereotype or even when they dislike the stereotype (Torres & Charles 2004); however it is still expected that the negative appraisal of those meta-stereotypes, and the recognition that they have real-world consequences leading to discriminatory practices, will outweigh such attempts to rationalize such behavior and will, instead, seek to institute policies that will alleviate the opportunity for offenders to rationalize their stereotypes and prejudice. With these theoretical considerations in mind, as well as the theoretical considerations developed due to the different socialization patterns of Black and white individuals (see Section V) regarding race relations and racial discrimination, the second hypothesis (H2) reads as follows:

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7 This is not to say that minorities in power will be susceptible to racial stereotypes against their in-group, only that it is possible. This assertion is bolstered by studies that show many Black individuals, in general, who have subconscious—or implicit—racial stereotypes held against their own in-group (Wise 2010).
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The effects of H1 will be stronger for Black individuals than for white individuals.

This project not only looks for relationships between the strength of meta-stereotypes and racial policy preferences; it also uses an experimental design to try and highlight meta-stereotype’s causal effects. In order to achieve this, some respondents will be primed to consider their meta-stereotypes before answering any questions about their racial policy preferences, other respondents will have the potential effects of meta-stereotypes framed within a real-world hypothetical scenario before answering questions about their racial policy preferences, and a third group of respondents will serve as a control group wherein they answer questions about racial policy preferences before answering question about their meta-stereotypes. It is, therefore, hypothesized that:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Subjects in the primed group will show more support for racial policies aimed at correcting injustice than subjects in the control group. Subjects in the framing group will show more support for racial policies aimed at correcting injustice than subjects in the primed group.

The analysis regarding this final hypothesis (H3) is what will ultimately drive the analysis of this project’s main hypothesis (H1); however, should the analysis of H3 provide null results, the hypothesis (H1) will also be evaluated for a non-causal effect (as opposed to H3’s causal effect) via OLS regression analyses.

IX. Controls

In addition to meta-stereotypes, individual attributes such as political ideology, age, gender and education may also impact levels of support for, or opposition to, the policies being measured in this study. It is also expected that Black individuals who feel more closely connected to their racial in-group will be more supportive of injustice-correcting policies. Additionally, it is possible that individuals will not only take meta-
stereotypes into consideration, but will then dismiss them if they view the larger consequences of such policies to be detrimental to an overall goal of negating those negative stereotypes once and for all.

Among the literature on the more introspective types of perception is the research that has been conducted via group attachment theory (Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes 1960) and, by extension, via social identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel & Turner 1979, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell 1987). In social identity theory and group attachment theory, the individual in question might assess what he/she thinks about other people, and that information is then used to link how closely the individual feels toward that group or identifying characteristic. At the same time, an individual might also assess what he/she thinks other people think about him/her or his/her group (meta-level perceptions). Under such circumstances, individuals orient themselves in terms of their self-categorized group membership rather than as unique individuals (Frey & Tropp 2006), and research suggests that the strength of perceived stereotypes (meta-stereotypes) can strengthen individuals’ connection to their in-group.

An individual’s social identity is closely linked, then, to their closeness—or attachment—to the group which they are basing their social identity in. This sense of closeness might come from shared experiences (Allen, Dawson & Brown 1989; Dawson 1994; Demo & Hughes 1990; Tate 1993) or having been socialized to recognize a shared fate. As such, this project’s survey instrument asks respondents to indicate their level of
closeness to a variety of racial/ethnic groups, including their own, by asking: “How close do you feel in your ideas, interests and feelings to _______________?”

It is expected that those who feel strongly tied to their racial in-group by way of their social identity will be more apt to recognize the need for injustice-correcting measures than those who do not feel closely attached to their racial in-group and will, therefore, be more apt to support such policies.

However, it is possible that low-identifiers will still acknowledge that they are members of a group and that other members of society, especially dominant out-group members, may not differentiate between themselves and high-identifiers and that as a result they will still consider their group membership when interacting with out-group members and expect those out-group members to treat them as they would high-identifiers (Mendoza 2008). Such an assertion is borne out in the interviews with Black Ivy League students conducted by Torres & Charles (2004), wherein some Blacks describe themselves as “not like those other Blacks” but still acknowledge that their fellow students and neighbors treat them as though they are the embodiment of the typical Black stereotype. If low-identifying respondents nonetheless feel as though society judges them as a member of their in-group, the expected effects of H1 may be diminished or may not come to fruition at all.

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8 This question wording is borrowed from the 2004 National Politics Study.
9 For some interviewed students, comments like this one could suggest a manifestation of dominant-group driven stereotypes (termed “self-stereotypes”); for others comments like this one could suggest that they were thinking of demographic variables (and not personal characteristics/stereotypes), such as being college educated, coming from a higher income family, coming from all-white neighborhoods, etc.
If we assume that individuals disapprove and dislike the stereotypes they perceive to be levied upon their racial in-group, then there is also some reason to believe that individuals will not support policies designed to counter discrimination if they believe the over-arching effect will be strengthening the stereotype even more. The recognition of such policies’ potential to have detrimental consequences with regard to stereotyping, while at the same time serving to combat discrimination in a specific arena, was documented within the interviews of Black Ivy League students conducted by Torres & Charles (2004). Within those interviews some students indicated that they believed that students of color are discriminated against in the institutional setting of universities, but that they also thought the proposed solution (in this case, affirmative action) was causing people—white people, those who are perceived to already hold negative stereotypes—to question or doubt whether they were actually qualified to be there or were there merely to fill a quota, therein reinforcing stereotypes that Blacks would rather be given things than earn them, and that Blacks are not intelligent enough to be accepted on their own merits. While Torres & Charles did not follow up these comments with questions regarding their levels of support or opposition to the practice of affirmative action, this project aims to determine whether such thoughts have any effect on policy preferences, and is especially interested to see whether they diminish the expected effects of meta-stereotyping on those same policy preferences.
CHAPTER 3:

DESIGNING AN EXPERIMENTAL SURVEY

I. Experimental studies: Then and now

In a 1909 presidential address to the American Political Science Association, A. Lawrence Lowell warned of the limitations faced by social scientists, and cautioned against the temptation to model political science research after the natural sciences, stating that “we are limited by the impossibility of experiment. Politics is an observational, not an experimental science…” (Lowell 1910, 7). In 1971, an only slightly more optimistic Arend Lipjhart wrote that “the experimental method is the most nearly ideal method for scientific explanation, but unfortunately it can only rarely be used in political science because of practical and ethical impediments” (Lijphart 1971, 684). Still, in the years immediately preceding Lipjhart’s resignation to such impediments, other researchers were signaling a shift in attitudes concerning the potential promises of experimental research: “the major advantage of laboratory experiments is in its ability to provide us with unambiguous evidence about causation” (Aronson and Carlsmith 1968, 10). Given the untapped potential of experiments, the reception of experimental studies in the field of political science grew warmer.

In the century since Lowell admitted defeat, and in the forty plus years since Lijphart maintained the lamentations of these limitations, the political science literature making use of experiments has skyrocketed, thanks to the rise of behavioralism,
improvements in technology, statistical innovations and sharpened creativity (Druckman, Green, Kuklinski & Lupia 2006). As is noted in the *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science* (2011, 3), “more than half of the 71 experimental articles that appeared in the *APSR* during its first 103 years were published after 1992.” The increased interest in experiments can likely be explained by two overarching factors: first and foremost, “the growing interest in experimentation reflects the increasing value that the discipline places on causal inference and empirically guided theoretical refinement” (Druckman, Green, Kukliniski & Lupia 2011, 1); additionally, improvements in experimental methodology allow researchers to ask different types of questions.

Experimental studies are well-equipped to meet three expectations of the scientific process: first, “experiments facilitate causal inference through the transparency and content of their procedures, most notably the random assignment of observations to treatment and control groups,” second, they “also guide theoretical development by providing a means for pinpointing the effects of institutional rules, preference configurations, and other contextual factors that might be difficult to assess using other forms of inference,” and third, they “guide theory by providing stubborn facts—that is, reliable information about cause and effect that inspires and constrains theory” (Druckman et al. 2011, 1).

The chief advantage of adopting an experimental framework, however, is the ability of well-designed and well-executed experiments to “resolve the direction of a causal relationship that has been difficult to entangle” (Mutz 2011, 15). The insufficient use of experiments in the political science literature for much of the discipline’s history, and even in its current state, given the potential experiments possess for practitioners who
seek a more definitive form of causal inquiry, has been heralded by Rose McDermott (2002) as an oversight that must be remedied. Additionally, because political science, like any science, is a process undertaken to improve our understanding of phenomena, the ability of experiments to isolate and examine specific intermediating factors that may be lost in other types of research designs allows for us to better understand how many moving parts fit together in a larger series of complex problems.

Thus, the addition of experimental studies to political science’s methodological tool belt allows researchers to attempt to disentangle elusive causal inferences and to explore complex relationships within a broader phenomenon of interest by breaking down various components of a problem into smaller, isolated and more manageable pieces of the puzzle (McDermott 2002), and they may do so because of the unparalleled control exerted by experimental researchers over the testing environment and also over the design and implementation of measurements, thus “eliminating extraneous factors that might contaminate a study by inducing spurious results” (McDermott 2002, 339).

Given the strengths of experimental studies, optimism can be found in the increased prevalence of such studies in the major political science journals, and their increased citation rates. A 2006 study conducted by Druckman, Green, Kuklinski & Lupia estimated that “in any given year, experimental articles have an expected citation rate that is approximately 47% higher than their nonexperimental counterparts. The effect is somewhat stronger when we compare experimental articles to their contemporaneous counterparts, implying a 74% edge… With fixed effects for each of the 57 matched comparisons, experimental articles maintain a 26% advantage” (633). Thus, while political science was once a skeptical, if not reluctant, discipline at the prospect of
adopting experimental methods, experiments finally seem to have earned a positive reputation, and have asserted themselves as the primary means for solving riddles of causal inference.

II. Population-based survey experiments: A combination of strengths

Much work in the political science discipline, much of which is also very good on their own merits, relies on survey methods as the primary means of data collection. However, as Mutz (2011, 8) notes, there are “often substantial obstacles to drawing strong causal inferences from conventional survey data. Over the years, many have hoped that advances in statistical methods would allow scholars to use survey data to control for all plausible rival interpretations of a potentially causal relationship. But despite massive and impressive advances in statistical methods over the years, few people are as optimistic today that statistics can solve all of our causal inference problems.” Thus, the primary advantage of experiments of any sort over observational data is the ability to infer causal effects and, potentially, causal mechanisms and, therefore, experiments offer a major advantage over survey research which can ascertain important relationships between variables, but which cannot deduce causal inferences. Noting that “as much as we would love it if it were true, there simply are no statistical techniques for observational data that provide the power and elegance of an experimental design,” Mutz (2011, 14) asserts that “for many research questions, experiments are simply the most effective means of evaluating competing causal hypotheses.” Still, the use of representative samples, in real world contexts, gathered using more conventional means than laboratory experiments, allows survey research to maintain a high level of importance because survey research offers a significant degree of external validity.
While experiments’ external validity may not be as strong as observational research’s external validity, due to the latter’s occurrence in a natural state of reality, the increased power of experiments’ internal validity, in comparison to observational research’s internal validity, is quite attractive when attempting to measure causality. Because observational research lacks the ability to control the circumstances under which comparisons across groups are being formed, observational research is more highly subject to confounding effects than experiments are, thus weakening its internal validity. In an attempt to regain some degree of internal validity, observational research often relies on making comparisons across groups that are similar in other theoretically relevant ways; the problem with this process is two-fold however: first, it requires the researcher to narrow the target group which can limit the research’s external validity; second, researchers may still, despite researchers’ best efforts, fail to eliminate comparability problems if they fail to identify unmeasured aspects of the individuals that are different and also theoretically important. As Druckman et al. (2011) note, the ability to properly measure all theoretically relevant aspects of individuals before comparing across groups is particularly difficult when subjects self-select into their groups, which is the case—at least in part—during observational research.

Experimental research combats some of observational research’s internal validity problems because researchers in these settings are able to exert much more control over the circumstances of their study, and because subjects no longer self-select into groups, but are assigned randomly to a control or treatment group instead. Because random assignment requires each subject to have an equal chance of being placed in each of the studied groups, random assignment is able to overcome the fundamental problem of
causal inference by estimating the average treatment effects across groups. Random assignment presumes that the expected behaviors of all subjects are the same prior to any intervention, and allows researchers to justify the assumption that the behavior of the treatment groups would mirror that of the control group had the they not received the treatment, and that the behavior of the control group would mirror that of the treatment group had they been the group to receive the treatment instead. Using appropriate statistical analyses, such as analysis of variance (ANOVA), researchers are then able to deduce whether average treatment effects occurred by chance or, as hypothesized, due to the interventions.

However, laboratory experiments, while being high in internal validity, experience their own limitations as a methodological tool. One such limitation is the skepticism that surrounds laboratory experiments regarding the generalizability of findings, and thus a study’s external validity. This skepticism largely stems from the highly artificial setting of laboratory experiments which may replicate a scenario with great mundane reality, but which fails to embody much of the “noise” that pervades American political discourse in the real world, and which, in turn, may fail to embody the long-term effects of treatment conditions as well. A second limitation is that “under ordinary circumstances in laboratory settings, sampling subpopulations is either massively inefficient (because large numbers of ineligible participants will need to be screened out and turned away) and/or it makes subjects too aware of exactly why they were selected, which threatens the integrity of the results” (Mutz 2011, 13).

Fortunately our options as researchers are not limited to either survey research or laboratory experiments; instead, a combination of the two methods can help bridge the
gap, capturing the benefits of each method, while avoiding some of their limitations. Mutz (2011, 3) asserts that “when scholars want to be certain that a given relationship involves cause and effect, and that their theory may be generalized beyond a narrow pool of subjects, then this is precisely the context in which population-based survey experiments can make their biggest contribution.” Therefore population-based survey experiments challenge the false dichotomy presented by researchers who suggest that there must be a trade-off between internal and external validity: “by combining representative population samples with rigorous experimental designs, they demonstrate that internal validity can be had without sacrificing the generalizability of the study’s sample participants. In addition, people need not be extracted from their everyday settings in order to participate in an experiment. These challenges to the orthodoxy are noteworthy” (Mutz 2011, 132). This evaluation of population-based survey experiments’ importance echoes that of Howard Lavine (2002, 242) who proclaimed that “survey experiments that integrate representative samples with the experimental control of questions represent the most valuable tool for gaining access to the processes that underlie opinion formation.”

Thus, it may be possible for practitioners of population-based survey experiments to, metaphorically, have their cake and eat it too. By combining the strengths of each individual method, population-based survey experiments preserve and promote the benefits of each individual method as well: the internal validity provides a process through which “results and insights that might not have been obvious to a less systematic or larger scale analysis become prominent” (McDermott 2002, 340) and may produce results that provide “a blueprint of what variables might be worth exploring in future
studies” (Druckman et al. 2006, 633); the external validity provides a way to investigate causal effects, and may then use those results to impact real world politics. As noted by Druckman et al. (2006, 634), “political science experiments can transform—have transformed—thinking on a topic when carried out in relevant contexts—and to be relevant, the situation need not be isomorphic with a naturally occurring (i.e. “real world”) referent.”

A political scientist’s investigation of causal inference might appropriately be compared to the quest for the Holy Grail—the difficult and elusive nature of causal inferences fail to deter researchers because the theoretical payoffs loom large, especially now that statistical and technological innovations have advanced to a point that population-based survey experiments can adequately address a number of questions concerning causal effects. In the real world, wherein actions have consequences and those consequences can be interpreted as being positive or negative in nature, human nature commands a heightened curiosity about the process of cause and effect. To better understand the “holy trinity” of causality, Mutz (2011, 9) provides three conditions that generally must be met in order to affirm that one variable “causes” another: “(1) the two must co-vary, whether over time or across units of analysis, (2) the cause must precede the effect in time, and (3) the relationship between the cause and effect must not be explainable through some other third variable, which would render the association spurious” and notes that “the “third variable problem” is the key reason experiments are known as the gold standard for inferring causality.”

In addition to understanding the cause and effect relationships that occur within our political decision making processes, most political scientists also want to know that
their research and actionable—that is, the results might not only be consumed by parties of interest (whether the citizenry, elected officials, activists, etc.) but might also be applied to intended real world contexts, and may be adopted when formulating political decisions in the real world. Druckman et al. (2011) note that while experimental methods may appeal to the scientist inside each researcher because of their “potential to generate stark and powerful empirical claims,” they also may appeal to the citizen inside each researcher because of their potential to “serve the public” by giving “citizens and policy makers a better understanding of their shared environs… [which] can enlighten, inform and transform critical aspects of societal organization”.

Thus, experimental methods not only facilitate improved communication between researchers, they also facilitate improved communications between researchers and policy makers. Because experiments are designed with external validity in mind, the results of those studies can often serve as a starting point in debate, if not a full-on guide to behavior, when policy makers are interested in understanding the causal effects that are in play. Mutz (2011, 52) points out that “policy makers and those outside of academe find it easier to justify a change that has been tested on the same population that it is affected by,” and because population-based survey experiments are not constrained to the artificial settings of laboratory experiments “this gives population-based experiments an automatic leg up on other approaches when it comes to policy-relevant research that will ultimately be implemented.” Alvin Roth (1995) referred to the normative implications of experiments as “whispering in the ears of princes,” though the normative implications might, with a bit more effort, extend to the paupers as well, and Donald Campbell (1969) highlighted the “experimental ethos” encapsulated by experimental research, arguing that
experimental investigation should be an integral part of policy innovation, so that society can draw reliable lessons about the consequences of social, political, or economic change (Druckman et al. 2006, 634).

III. Evaluating population-based survey experiments: Internal and external validity

Research questions that try to draw out causal inferences start out facing a fundamental problem: it is an inconvenient, yet unavoidable, law of reality that we cannot simultaneously observe a person or entity in both its treated and untreated states (Holland 1986). However, if successfully employed, researchers can use experiments to try and artificially create nearly-identical treated and untreated states, and, using random assignment, compare the averages of the means across groups in order to determine whether the intervention (the treatment) is likely to act as a causal effect and/or mechanism if played out in reality. When designing and implementing population-based survey experiments, researchers must be aware of the threats to internal and external validity, and attempt to mitigate those threats when possible.

For population-based survey experiments, with the emphasis firmly targeted on causal inference, a preoccupation with internal validity—first and foremost—is actually the mark of a healthy and sophisticated design. This is not to say that external validity is unimportant; rather, it is to highlight that “without internal validity, there can be no external validity” (McDermott 2002, 334). After all, an experiment highly attuned to mundane reality, but lacking the appropriate randomization and high degree of control that is found in experimental designs, is apt to lead audiences to accept the results of
deeply flawed experiments (McDermott 2002, 334). Additionally, a failure to maintain internal validity threatens the theoretical and normative potential of an experiment as well: “but of the two, internal validity is, of course, the more important, for if random or systematic error makes it impossible for the experimenter to draw any conclusions from the experiment, the question of the generality of these conclusions never arises” (Carlsmith, Ellsworth & Aronson 1976, 85).

Internal validity, as described by McDermott (2002, 334), “refers to whether you are studying what you think you are studying,” whereas external validity refers to whether what you are studying can/will stand up to tests in other environments, whether differing settings, samples, sub-populations, etc. To best achieve internally valid results, an experiment must attempt to strike an appropriate balance between impact and control: “on the one hand, the experimenter wants the experimental situation to be meaningful and involving to the subject—in a word, the treatments should have impact. On the other hand, a situation which the subject finds meaningful and involving is also likely to trigger a wealth of memories and influences from the past which can affect the subject’s interpretation of present circumstances. From the experimenter’s point of view, these memories and influences constitute extraneous variability and jeopardize control over the effects of the independent variable. The choice of an empirical realization of one’s conceptual variable—and an appropriate stimulus situation in which to apply it—always represents a compromise between impact and control, in which case a little of each is sacrificed” (Aronson et al. 1995, 44-45).

There are a number of ways to attempt to maximize the impact of a population-based survey experiment, while also attempting to maximize control (Mutz 2011, 87-91):
first, the researcher should attempt to make the treatments interesting; for this project, treatments include the priming of some subjects to consider their meta-stereotypes and the framing of some subjects to consider specific real-world scenarios involving potential discrimination, and since U.S. race relations are an ever-present issue of debate, and one that people generally feel passionately about one way or another, the survey experiment’s subject matter alone should have stimulated a decent degree of interest.

Second, treatments should be fairly short so that respondents are not forced to store large amounts of material, which could prevent the actual treatment from getting lost in the mix. Third, treatments should be clearly articulated; as a general rule, given the range of respondents in a representative sample, treatments and questions should be written at no higher than an eighth grade level. For this project, the priming treatment consists of a battery of questions concerning meta-stereotypes, while the framing treatment consists of a single pair of hypothetical scenarios that consists of two brief “cases” (each only two or three sentences) to consider before answering two questions about the hypothetical scenarios. The reading levels of the hypothetical scenarios were actually a bit higher than the recommended reading level\(^\text{10}\); however, all but less than two percent of the Black respondents had achieved at least a high school diploma in the sample and over eighty percent of the Black sample had attended at least some college. For the white respondents, less than two percent failed to graduate high school and ninety-four percent attended at least some college. Thus, while the reading level of the treatments might have been higher than the recommended level for a representative

\(^{10}\) According the Microsoft Word’s Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level tool, the three hypothetical scenarios ranged from an 8.8 reading level to a 12.2 reading level.
sample, the skewed educational attainment of the sample precludes the need to be overly
worrisome about this aspect of the survey design.

Fourth, researchers must determine an appropriate length of time between the
reception of the treatment and the reception of the dependent variable. In some instances,
researchers might want to space the treatment and the dependent variable out in order to
prevent respondents from figuring out the purpose of the survey which could limit the
validity of their responses. On the other hand, if too much time is present between the
treatment and the dependent variable, the treatment might wear off prior to measuring its
effect. This second consideration is especially true for experiments using priming and
framing effects, both of which may be relatively short-lived. To combat the potential
detriment of short-lived treatments, respondents in the priming and framing groups were
provided the treatments directly before being asked about their policy preferences
(treatments were, thus, provided one page ahead of the dependent variable). And in order
to combat the potential problem of respondents figuring out what was at stake, a fifth way
to maximize impact was utilized: deception. The purpose of deception is “simply to keep
the subjects from being aware of the actual focus of the study until after the experiment is
over” (McDermott 2002, 337). In this project, while some respondents have been primed
to consider the issue of racial prejudice in America, and some have also been primed to
consider the issue in the framework of real-world discrimination, thus requiring the idea
of U.S. race relations to be at the top of their heads, deception was used in two ways:
first, when asking questions concerning the depending variable on the page(s)
immediately following the treatments, the questions of actual interest (those concerning
criminal justice reforms and affirmative action) were buried between questions
concerning issues that are not expected to be impacted by meta-stereotypes (such as soda bans, global warming, drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, and medicinal marijuana). Second, because respondents answered the survey experiment in the comfort of their own home, and were randomly assigned to a group by a software program, many respondents may not have been aware that other versions of the survey existed and, therefore, may not have been aware that the survey was actually a survey experiment.

While a researcher determines an experimental design that achieves, to a degree, the necessary impact of the treatments, they must do so while also considering how they can maintain a maximum level of control. In a population-based survey experiment the task of keeping every single aspect under control is an impossibility since the researcher is not physically present to observe and/or guide respondents; instead, the randomization process is the key condition to factoring in control of a population-based survey experiment. This project’s randomization process, wherein respondents were broken into sub-groups based on race (either Black or white respondents; no other races or ethnicities, nor mixed-race/ethnicity respondents) and then randomly assigned by a computer software system to one of five groups (control, priming, or one of three framing groups) “creates the pretreatment similarity of manipulations, which take place within the experiment itself, and not to preexisting differences within the subject pool” (McDermott 2002, 339). What’s more, as Mutz (2011, 138) points out, “the beauty of random assignment is not that it guarantees equivalence between experimental and control groups on all possible variables, but rather that the expected sum of any differences between groups across all variables is zero. Thus, excessive handwringing about perfect similarity across groups is unwarranted because the variables on which the groups may, in fact,
differ are highly likely to be normally distributed with a mean of zero… the effects of these known and unknown variables on the dependent variable should largely cancel one another out, with no net effect to undermine the interpretation of the effects of the experimental manipulation.” Thus, even if the five treatment groups are not completely equal based on the software program’s random generation of groups, the fact that the program used random generation at all should eliminate concerns related to between-group differences of other variables.

A population-based survey experiment’s external validity, on the other hand, is generally aided by the use of a random probability sample. However, while random probability samples are the highest quality obtainable in terms of representativeness, they are nonetheless very difficult to obtain given limited budgets and also given the fact that systematic differences exist in the ability to contact different kinds of people, as well as different kinds of people’s willingness to participate if researchers are able to successfully contact them (Mutz 2011, 113). For example, the use of an online survey experiment includes a degree of systematic bias against lower-educated Americans which may skew the sample toward a more affluent subset population (though it should be noted that this project did not suffer from a systematic bias against lower-income Americans). Still, an internet survey is able to offer a more representative take on most other demographic variables than convenience samples (limited to localities, or the ever-popular college sophomore sample), and is more efficient than other forms of sample recruiting—online samples produce faster results for the researcher, involve less effort than mailing or phone interviews for both the researcher and the respondents, and because of those benefits they are more likely to produce higher completion rates as well.
And because the respondents are distributed amongst groups randomly, as noted in the preceding paragraph, the effects of the treatments against the control group can still be ascertained with confidence.

The external validity of population-based survey experiments must also be assessed via the generalizability of the results since, as described earlier, researchers and political practitioners alike expect the findings of political science research to be applicable to the real world. When evaluating an experiment’s generalizability, four dimensions should be considered: setting, participants, measures, and treatments (Mutz 2011, 141). When considering the setting of this project, we actually cannot know much—we do know that respondents used the internet; however, we do not know where they accessed the internet to do so, thus we are unable to tell what kinds of distractions may have occurred, what kind of attention was paid by the respondent, etc. as we would in a laboratory setting. Still, this degree of sacrificed control is outmatched by the previously described attention paid to maximizing other aspects of experimental control and the maximization of impact. Thus, when compared to laboratory experiments, this project may lack a degree of mundane realism, but it still embodies experimental realism which is the more important aspect of reality of the two options (McDermott 2002, 333). When compared to field experiments, which occur within the specific context being theorized, online population-based survey experiments, like this project, lack both mundane and experimental realism; yet, Mutz (2011, 134) asks the not-so-obvious question: “why should we be so quick to assume that results from one particular field setting will easily generalize to another, completely different, real-world setting?” and answers her own question by suggesting that “upon further examination, there is nothing
particularly logical about such a claim.” Thus, the generalizability of population-based survey experiments, when compared to other experimental settings, might not be in as much peril as critics would lead us to believe.

The evaluation of population-based survey experiments due to their participants was covered briefly above but, to reiterate, a more representative sample is more likely to be generalizable. While online population-based survey experiments may not yield totally representative samples, and may indeed by systematically biased in some regards, they are nonetheless more representative than many other means. Additionally, if the theory in question is directed toward specific subgroups, the lack of generalizability for other groups may not be problematic at all, and in fact can lead to future avenues of research. Before conducting a broader study—which would require either more funding or fewer respondents in each group—it may make sense for research to develop theories that are tested amongst the most likely subgroups to be affected, before seeing whether they exist in other parts of the overall population. It is, of course, possible that failing to have a certain demographic included in a sample will lead to missing the hypothesized effects if those effects end up occurring only in the missing subgroup, but this is likely only a problem of real concern if the missing subgroup was originally theorized to respond differently than other subgroups.

The evaluation of an experiment’s generalizability regarding measurement outcomes can occur on a few different fronts. First, this project models the dependent variables after similar policy questions used by other survey researchers by providing respondents with a five-point scale, ranging from being “very supportive” to “very opposed” (including moderated “somewhat” responses, and a neutral response); this
allows the results to be compared against other research and also provides respondents with a range of options so that their answers are less likely to be a false artifact of poor answer options. Second, this project does not simply ask about affirmative action or criminal justice reform as single constructs. Instead, affirmative action is measured in the specific context of employment and also in the specific context of education, since it is possible that the distinction makes a difference in respondents’ opinions. Likewise, criminal justice reforms are measured by asking about specific aspects of the reform movement; questions were asked about the War on Drugs, the death penalty, “three-strikes” laws, and also about racial profiling which itself is broken down into three different contexts (one focusing on racial profiling as it generally pertains to Arab Americans, one that generally pertains to Hispanic Americans, and another than generally pertains to Black Americans). A third aspect of this project’s generalizability in terms of measurement can be evaluated via the types of injustice-correcting reforms I elected to include in the survey experiment (affirmative action and criminal justice reforms). In this regard the survey experiment may very well fail to generalize to other reform efforts, both within the Black community and also amongst other minority groups, whether they be racial, ethnic or some other minority group. The only true way to know how generalizable the results of this study will be to issues of concern to other minority groups is to test for them in subsequent studies. However, selecting these two issues was strategic—first, the racial aspect inherent within discussions of affirmative action and criminal justice reform is likely to be more salient to respondents than the racial aspects of housing and lending practices, of medical treatment practices, and even of K-12 public school practices; if meta-stereotypes’ fail to have an effect on affirmative action and
criminal justice reform preferences than they are also unlikely to yield such effects on the other aforementioned practices. Second, in order to keep the survey experiment to a length that would keep the interest of the respondents, and also to maintain some deception, both of which strengthened the impact of the survey experiment, additional policy questions were inserted into the survey questionnaire which then required the careful selection of racially discriminatory issues for inclusion at the expense of those other potential issues.

The last measures on which to evaluate the generalizability of this project are the survey experiment’s treatments. As with lab experiments, the treatments of population-based survey experiments do not occur in the real world and therefore may not represent the way respondents receive information, or the way they organize information when formulating policy preferences. However, the treatments in this project do not aim to provide new information so much as they serve to force respondents to consider information that is already within them—i.e. their own beliefs about the ways racial prejudice and discrimination pervade society in the United States. Thus, the priming and framing effects in this paper ask respondents to recall their own perceptions of prejudice rather than attempting to change their mind about the prevalence of prejudice. It is true that individuals are not asked about meta-stereotypes in their day-to-day lives, at least, not in the terms posed to them in this project’s survey experiment, but individuals are confronted with the debate over whether we live in a post-racial society by way of the news and entertainment (for example, via debates with friends and family over Henry Louis Gates’ arrest, Paula Deen’s firing or the guilt of George Zimmerman). The hypothetical scenarios chosen for the framing treatments may not mirror the examples
most individuals discuss in their day-to-day lives, but they are scenarios that occur on a
daily basis and which, therefore, are in the minds of activists and politicians, and thus are
more likely to have a direct effect on policy preferences.

IV. Experimental set-up: The specifics

In order to gauge the effects of meta-stereotypes on racial policy preferences, this
project makes use of an original survey experiment. The experiment uses a between-
subjects design wherein each subject is randomly assigned to a single group (each with a
different experimental condition) rather than a using a within-subjects design wherein a
single group of subjects is tested under each experimental condition. Between-subject
designs need not place as much concern over the fatigue, boredom and increased
skepticism that may accompany within-subject tests which require subjects to answer the
same questions repeatedly and which may signal to subjects that they are supposed to be
changing their minds or answering in a specific manner, thereby measuring beliefs,
attitudes, opinions, etc. that are not genuine. Thus, between-subject designs better
maximize the impact of the experimental treatments which is important for a project’s
internal validity. The experiment also uses a blocked design wherein subjects are first
divided into homogenous blocks before being randomly assigned to an experimental
condition (in this case they were divided by race and positioned in a group with other
Black or white subjects depending on their own racial identification). The process of
blocking is important because it shrinks error variance if the particular variable has an
impact on the dependent variable, as race is theorized to do in this project, and because it
strengthens the power of the experimental design by reducing unwanted noise (Mutz
2011, 95).
Once subjects have been blocked into the two groups according to their self-reported racial identity (either Black or white; no other races or ethnicities, or mixed-race/ethnicity subjects), subjects were then placed into one of three groups in order to measure their meta-stereotypes and policy preferences: (1) the control group will be asked about their meta-stereotypes after having been asked the policy questions, while (2) the priming group will be asked about their meta-stereotypes directly before they are asked the policy question. Shifting the location of the meta-stereotype questions between these two groups allows the experiment to locate meta-stereotypes as a causal mechanism, rather than assuming that a correlative effect is akin to a causal effect. (3) A third group—the framing group—will follow the trajectory of the priming group, answering questions about their meta-stereotypes directly before answering questions about their policy preferences; however, they will also receive a hypothetical pair of nearly identical scenarios (the only difference being the race of the individuals involved) and will be asked to judge the likelihood of certain outcomes based on the hypothetical scenarios. Because these hypothetical scenarios allow respondents to consider the link between racial prejudice (one possible outcome of the given scenarios) and the actions of those holding power in the scenarios (another possible outcome of the given scenarios), the framing effects will allow the experiment to see whether individuals’ need to have meta-stereotypes activated by transforming the somewhat abstract notion of meta-stereotypes to one that has evident, real-world consequences. The flow of the experimental design for each of the three groups is detailed in Appendix A; the full experimental survey can be found in Appendix C.
The framing group is divided into three sub-groups, each of which will receive only one of the three possible hypothetical scenarios. These hypothetical scenarios have been designed to frame some of the specific racial policies serving as dependent variables in terms of one of the specific stereotypes being measured as an independent variable. Hypothetical scenario 1 focuses on whether a jury is more likely to view a Black defendant as being violent than a white defendant, and what the consequence of that is in terms of casting a verdict. Hypothetical scenario 2 focuses on police perceptions of laziness of Black loiterers and white loiterers, and what the consequence of that is in terms of being searched for drugs. Hypothetical scenario 3 focuses on whether a hiring representative is more likely to view a Black applicant as being less intelligent than a white applicant, and what the consequence of that is in terms of being hired for a job. These three scenarios directly address the stereotypes that Black individuals are more violence-prone, are lazier, and are less intelligent than their white counterparts, each of which having also been measured pertaining to a respondent’s self-reported stereotypes held about various groups, and having been measured pertaining the respondent’s meta-stereotypes. In terms of the dependent variable, these three scenarios directly address the racial policy issues of “three-strikes laws” and the death penalty, the “war on drugs,” and affirmative action, respectively.

This project uses priming and framing effects in order to better observe the potential effects of meta-stereotypes on policy preferences. Priming has been defined as “the effects of prior context on the interpretation and retrieval of information” (Fiske & Taylor 1984) and as “changes in the standards used by the public” to make evaluations (Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Krosnick & Kinder 1990). Although it is possible that
individuals do not need to be primed to consider their perceptions of the stereotypes held by others, given research that suggests meta-stereotypes are likely readily accessible (Sheldon & Johnson 1993) and that suggests that individuals who already find an issue important are less likely to rely on the priming of an outside force (Converse 1964; Krosnick 1990), setting up this project to embody a population-based survey experiment still allows the project to try and pin down a causal relationship. Providing a priming treatment is a logical aspect of the research design for two reasons: first, asking subjects to provide self-assessed perceptions of racial prejudice is not akin to providing them with information about the reality of racial prejudice in the U.S.; thus, priming allows them to recall aspects of their own beliefs system, making those previously held beliefs more salient for the portion of the survey geared towards measuring policy preferences (the dependent variables). Second, the experimental research on priming effects thus far has painted a fairly clear portrait; that is, priming has a significant impact on the way individuals respond to candidates and policy issues (Hillygus & Shields 2008) because they serve as a reinforcement or reminder of what an individual already knows or believes (Medvic 2006) by making the knowledge or beliefs more accessible (Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Valentino, Hutchings & White 2002).

Framing also serves as a way of amplifying previously held knowledge or beliefs, but it is distinct from priming because framing selects “some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient… in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman 1993, 53). Framing is also distinct from persuasion/belief change because framing does not necessitate the cultivation of new information; instead of providing
messages with positive or negative information about an attitude object that is not already part of the recipients’ knowledge or belief structure, framing operates by activating information already at the recipients’ disposal, stored in their long-term memory (Nelson, Oxley & Clawson 1997). However, just because new information is provided to individuals does not mean that framing effects lack the potential to change individuals’ opinions; rather than having their opinions changed by way of traditional persuasion, individuals’ opinions are subtly swayed by framing effects that change how the individuals in question weight the retrieved information (Nelson, Oxley & Clawson 1997). This project’s experimental conditions do not attempt to persuade subjects that any of the outcomes in the hypothetical scenarios are more likely than others by providing statistics or anecdotes about real-world institutional discrimination; instead, it frames the policy issues of interest (the dependent variables) by asking subjects to draw on their previously held beliefs concerning racial discrimination, but also by providing subjects with the ample chance to situate those previously held beliefs in a specific real-world context that could potentially be remedied by the injustice-correcting policy measures in question. Thus, the framing condition in this project’s survey experiment aims to take the activated knowledge or beliefs in the priming condition and make the potential consequences of such perceptions of racial prejudice less abstract by connecting them to potential areas of racial discrimination.

V. Advantages of online survey experiments

This project uses an online survey platform to recruit and administer the population-based survey experiment. While the use of an online platform does pose some problems for a study’s external validity, most of the problems are not unique to an
online platform, and a number of practical considerations make online experiments an attractive method despite their limitations. The main problem for a study’s external validity is the potentially skewed attributes in an online survey experiment’s sample; those who are most apt to have dependable and convenient access to the internet are likely to differ systematically on some demographic variables such as income, geography, age and education, which could then impact the representativeness of behaviors and attitudes across the spectrum of possibilities since they are often impacted, at least in part, to an individual’s life experiences as a member of each demographic group. However, the gaps on such measures are constantly shrinking as internet access becomes more widely available and at more affordable rates, and as older Americans are incorporating internet use into their daily routine. Another potential disadvantage of online experiments is the potential presence of bias due to samples of “volunteers” because the researcher gives up a degree of control when subjects self-select into the study; thus, it is possible that a study will over represent certain demographic traits at the expense of others, or certain behaviors and attitudes at the expense of others, and it is possible that those with more interest in the topic of the study will opt into it, further skewing the results. Studies comparing the samples and validity of online surveys against other tools of subject acquisition suggest that the problem of systematic bias, however, is not unique to online samples; these studies find that while demographic bias occurs in online samples, “the relationships among variables are similar across recruitment methods and match those implied by substantive theory” (Alvarez, Sherman & VanBeselaere 2003, 23), that “with inclusion of standard demographic controls, typical relational models of interest to political scientists produce similar estimates and
parameters across modes” (Berrens, Bohara, Jenkins-Smith, Silva & Weimer 2003, 1), and that, despite the non-random demographic bias of online surveys, “what occurs in survey experiments resembles what takes place in the real world” especially amongst subgroups, as has been set up in this project’s design (Barabas & Jerit 2010, 239).

Other problems often associated with surveys of any kind include perceptions that the survey is junk mail, which may then lead to low response rates, a sense of impersonality, which may then lead to disinterest and high mortality rates (discontinuing the survey once it has begun), and the inability of subjects who do participate to get clarity on questions that they find confusing (Evans and Mathur 2005, 201-202). However, this project avoids these problems better than other types of survey, and has a number of other advantages as well. Mortality rates are combated by explaining up front how long the study will take, and by rewarding subjects with incentives provided by the survey company only when they complete a study. Because subjects were only compensated for complete response rates, the mortality rates for this study is less worrisome than the 20+% mortality rate of recent NES telephone studies, and the morality rates of face-to-face surveys ranging from 30%-60+% (Berinksy 2008). This project’s white subgroup experienced a mortality rate of 12% which is higher than mortality rates of the mid-1950s, but which is still lower than other recruitment measures and tools used today. Additionally, when looking at the number of respondents that dropped out prior to any of the questions of actual concern (i.e. not the demographic questions on the very first page), the mortality rate of the white subgroup was only 8%, a mere two percentage points more than those obtained by the NES telephone studies in the mid-twentieth century. What’s more, the mortality rate for the Black subgroup is
incredibly low; the Black subgroup experienced only a 2% mortality rate overall, and only a 1% mortality rate when looking at those respondents who made it past the demographic questions. This suggests that the Black subjects were either more interested in the subject matter, or less uncomfortable given the content about racial prejudice and discrimination, and thus the theoretical reasons for creating subgroups in the first place seems warranted. Lack of clarity also remains a potential issue; however, that is an issue that would be faced in a mail survey as well. While a phone interview or face-to-face interview might alleviate a lack of clarity, those kinds of experiments would introduce a new problem: a social desirability factor. Social desirability factors can cause a subject to answer questions in a way that they feel is most acceptable by the interviewer even if it is not truly reflective of their beliefs, attitudes, opinions, etc.

In addition to combating social desirability problems due to interviewer effects, online survey experiments also have the following advantages over other types of surveys (Evans and Mathur 2005, 196-201): they can be distributed faster than other types of surveys and require fewer administrative costs, technological innovations allow the researcher more flexibility in designing question types and sequence logic and more control over the way information is presented on the screen, the online format is often more convenient for potential subjects because the survey can be started at any date and time within the parameters set by the researcher, and provides an easier way of conducting data analysis since coding can be set up in advance and downloaded into a ready-to-use data set. Additionally, unlike paper surveys, online surveys can be designed to require subjects to answer questions before moving on, thus preventing subjects from changing their answers after seeing treatment conditions, or preventing subjects from
skipping a question entirely; likewise, online surveys can create logic sequences that send subjects to various questions depending on the answers provided earlier in the survey and they do a more efficient job of randomly assigning subjects to groups and tracing treatment effects faced by each subject.

VI. Subjects

Because this project explores the beliefs and attitudes individuals possess regarding the prevalence of racial prejudice in America today as a precursor to understanding their preferences on racial policies designed to combat discrimination and injustice, the project uses Black and white individuals, across the United States, as its subjects. While the project clearly oversamples the Black community, the emphasis on those subjects is by design; because the project is primarily concerned with explaining the variance of support and opposition to racial policies within the Black community, within the white community, and across those communities, it was important that subjects be selected based on their racial identification. While the project makes use of this quota-sampling technique, the selection of subjects does not fall prey to sampling bias in the same way other quota-samples may because the survey starts out being available to everybody and it is the subject’s answers to a battery of racial and ethnic demographic questions that determines whether they are able to proceed with the survey or whether the survey terminates based on their self-identified group memberships. Thus, on all other demographic measures, subjects have an equal likelihood of being included in the survey sample. Additionally, the selection of which group (treatment, priming or framing) a subject is assigned to is completely random based on a computer generated algorithm provided within the online survey software. The project has a sample size of 522
subjects\textsuperscript{11}; 267 of those subjects self-identified racially as white (non-Hispanic) while 255 of those subjects self-identified as Black; individuals who identified with multiple racial and ethnic categorizations were terminated from the study before they began answering non-demographic questions, as were individuals who identified themselves as a single non-white or non-Black race or ethnicity. The sample size for each subgroup allowed each treatment condition to net at least 50 responses for inclusion in the ANOVA data analysis. The demographic breakdown of this project’s subjects can be found in Appendix B.

Subjects for this study self-selected their participation; via the SocialSci\textsuperscript{12} online survey platform, individuals who have voluntarily signed up to be research subjects are able to self-select which projects they wish to participate in. Because of the self-selection process, and also because of the online nature of this project, there is the potential for bias to sneak into the sample. When individuals who were active in SocialSci’s participant pool logged onto their account, they were given the option of starting this project; the name and description of the project used to recruit individuals appears below:

\textsuperscript{11} The number of subjects included within the sample reflect only those respondents who completed the survey to 100\% completion; thus, not included in this sample are respondents who quit the survey at any point, respondents who were not asked at least one question due to glitches with the survey software, and respondents who passively bypassed any of the meta-stereotype questions (i.e. they answered 0 for every racial/ethnic group, for every stereotype). <The number of omissions for these reasons is small and I’ll make sure to confirm these numbers after my consultation with the statistics department in case they tell me I need to add some of those subjects back into the sample>

\textsuperscript{12} From the SocialSci website: “SocialSci was designed from the ground up specifically and only for academic research. We have created the most efficient data collection platform online by combining cutting-edge computer technology with modern-day participant recruitment practices. We provide the tools you need to power your research. We also guarantee that every participant takes your study seriously and answers your questions honestly—you no longer need to worry about fake responses or repeat survey-takers.” (http://www.socialsci.com)
Title: Study of Social and Political Attitudes

Description: You are being asked to complete this survey because your social and political attitudes will help us understand the attitudes held by Americans as a whole. The following survey is being administered for use in a political science dissertation. Therefore, it is important that you answer each question as accurately as possible. All information provided will remain anonymous, including all answers to the questions asked within. It is important that you answer each question in the survey. If you feel you need to further explain an answer you have provided, we welcome you to provide open-ended explanations at the end of the survey.

While race is the real focus of subjects’ social and political attitudes, neither the title nor the description of this project belies that focus. The absence of any mention of race is intentional: first, the neglect of race prevents individuals who are turned off by discussions of racism from opting out of the study, while also preventing individuals who are most interested in the discussion of racism from opting into the study (they were still able to participate, but did not elect to do so under the pretense that race was the focus); second, the neglect of race prevents the survey from priming individuals to think about race at the outset (they will be asked questions concerning their own racial stereotypes early on in the survey, but the absence of race in the description still allows subjects to think about the policy questions in more general terms). It is possible that individuals with more interest in politics will self-select into this project, however the inclusion of the term “social” in the description may appeal to individuals who are less interested in politics. Furthermore, because SocialSci provides incentives to members of the participant pool\textsuperscript{13}, individuals who are not interested in sharing their social or political attitudes may still be enticed to self-select into the project’s samples.

\textsuperscript{13} SocialSci rewards members of the participant pool for taking surveys; longer surveys generally provide a greater reward. SocialSci does not pay individuals outright, but they
Subjects were able to opt-out of the survey at any point after accepting the terms of use and consenting to their participation. While it is possible that some individuals decided to opt-out of the survey for non-random reasons, and that the somewhat controversial nature of opinions regarding race in America will lead to a systematic drop-off of individuals who are uncomfortable with the content of the survey or who question the motivation of the survey, it is expected that many individuals who terminated their participation did so for more random reasons, such as the lengthy duration of the survey (designed to take approximately 25 minutes) or due to technical difficulties. Moreover, because subjects were incentivized to complete the survey (termination of participation forfeits any “points” earned for taking the survey), the expected opt-out rate was minimal and 93% of individuals who began the survey ended up completing it.

VII. Measures

In order to measure subjects’ perceptions of the prevalence of racial prejudice, the survey instrument includes a battery of questions aimed at gauging the subjects’ perceptions of the prevalence of four specific stereotypes. The four specific meta-stereotype questions were formatted in the following way:

What we would like for you to do next is GUESS the percentage of white people who you think would say that the characteristics in each question can be applied to the different groups.

Drag the cursor along the scale from 0-100 to register your guess.

Please GUESS: What percentage (0-100%) of white people do you think would say that each group is “lazy”? i.e. that they answered 5, 6 or 7 on the scale of “hard working” to “lazy”? do offer “points” for completion of surveys that can be redeemed for gift certificates or donations to charities. Individuals do not accrue any rewards if they fail to complete a survey.
While “lazy” versus “hard working” is used in the example above, the remaining meta-stereotypes measured are the following pairs of adjectives: “violence prone” versus “not violence prone”, “unintelligent” versus “intelligent”, and “prefer to live off welfare” versus “prefer to be self-supporting”. Because subjects could possibly interpret the question as asking what percentage of white Americans would verbalize such thoughts, rather than the percentage that just holds such thoughts, the question could potentially yield understated levels of meta-stereotyping. This is something to keep in mind when analyzing the descriptive accounts of white and Black subjects’ levels of meta-stereotyping in chapter 4.

These meta-stereotypes can then be analyzed in relation to the dependent variable (policy preference) individually, or they can be merged together to build a composite score of an individual’s overall perception of the prevalence of prejudice held against the group in question. Because of the nature of the question, meta-stereotypes will be measured on a 100-point scale. When the composite score of perceived prejudice is built, the answers to all four meta-stereotype questions will be therefore range from 0-400; this composite measure will be used in select analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 and will be noted as such.

This project’s measurement of meta-stereotypes improves on the previous measure used by Sigelman & Tuch (1997). Whereas Sigelman & Tuch used a dummy variable by asking subjects whether they thought “most whites” held various stereotypes, this project’s new measure provides more variance and thus greater explanatory power. This project also asks subjects to respond to the same
exact question wording used by Sigelman & Tuch in order to compare the degree
of variance lost by using a dummy variable, and in order to compare the degree of
ambiguity in the word “most” used by Sigelman & Tuch.

The four specific stereotypes used in this project were selected due to their
use in previous social science research, including a number of years of the
General Social Survey. Stereotypes of racial and ethnic minorities, especially
Black Americans, as being lazier, more violent, less intelligent and less self-
supportive than their white counterparts are not merely a relic of America’s past;
these stereotypes still persist in America today. Because of the pervasiveness of
these admitted stereotypes, and because these specific stereotypes pair nicely with
the racial policies serving as the dependent variable, those four stereotypes were
identified as being the most appropriate way to measure meta-stereotyping for the
purposes of this study.

In order to measure the effect of meta-stereotypes on racial policy preferences this
project highlights two specific policy debates as the dependent variables of interest:
affirmative action laws and criminal justice reforms. In order to conceal, to a degree, the
project’s goal of linking meta-stereotypes to racial policy preferences, subjects are also
questioned regarding their opinions on race-neutral policy issues as well. When pressed
to provide their opinions on the policies in question, subjects are provided the following
range of options: “I am very supportive”, “I am somewhat supportive”, “I do not have an

14 The GSS asked respondents about welfare stereotypes in 1990, violence stereotypes in
1990 and 2000, and laziness and unintelligence stereotypes every other year from 1990 to
2012.
15 The full range of policy issues presented within the survey instrument, and the
questions’ corresponding wording, can be found in the Appendix C.
opinion”, “I am somewhat opposed”, and “I am very opposed”. This five-point scale is representative of the typical scoring of public opinion data and, if the situation calls for it, can later be collapsed into a three-point scale of overall support, overall opposition, or not having a stance one way or the other on an issue.

Affirmative action laws were selected as one group of policy preferences to examine based on the direct link between the issue and race. While affirmative action programs are designed to combat other forms of discrimination—gender discrimination, ethnic discrimination, and discrimination of the handicapped, for example—affirmative action is, nonetheless, still chiefly considered a program aimed at helping the Black community first and foremost. Because subjects might have diverging opinions on affirmative action in the workplace, compared to affirmative action in universities, two questions were asked concerning affirmative action policies:

What are your feelings about affirmative action programs that attempt to increase diversity in the workplace through hiring and promotion practices?

What are your feelings about affirmative action programs that attempt to increase diversity in university settings through admissions and scholarship practices?

Criminal justice policies were selected as another group of policy preferences to examine based on their link to race as well; however, the connection between the issues falling under the criminal justice umbrella and the persistence of racial prejudice is not as obvious as it is for affirmative action because criminal justice policies are designed to be race-neutral. Despite the race-neutral promise of these policies, however, research routinely shows that racial prejudice still exists at all stages of the criminal justice process—from the police officer making arrests, to prosecutor assigning charges, to the jury handing down a verdict, to the judge formulating a sentence, racism is still
institutionalized in the criminal justice system, even if the actors involved are unaware of their racial biases. This project looks at four specific aspects of the criminal justice system, and the questions designed to measure policy preferences of those four aspects appear below:

What are your feelings about the federal government’s War on Drugs?

What are your feelings about the use of the death penalty in the U.S. criminal justice system?

Some states have enacted “Three Strikes Laws” which require mandatory life sentences for those who are convicted of serious criminal offenses on three or more separate occasions. What are your feelings regarding the adoption of Three Strikes Laws?

Racial profiling refers to the use of an individual’s race or ethnicity by law enforcement personnel as a key factor in deciding whether to engage in enforcement (such as making a traffic stop or an arrest). What are your feelings regarding the use of racial profiling by law enforcement in the following situations?

The last question mentioned—regarding racial profiling—differs from the first three questions in the criminal justice battery because it is directly linked to race; in fact, it is the only policy question that makes explicit reference to race.\(^\text{16}\) Although the survey included questions about three different types of racial profiling, only the following question is pertinent to the scope of the current project since it may easily be inferred that

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\(^{16}\) Questions measuring a subject’s perception of the consequences of affirmative action policies—used as a control variable—also refer explicitly to race; however those questions are asked after a subject responds to the questions measuring their policy preferences.
the profiling in question would directly impact the Black community, whereas the same cannot be said of the other two profiling questions.  

Stopping suspicious individuals in their car to see whether they have drugs in their vehicle?

Although random assignment to treatment groups should counter any sort of systematic demographic and attitudinal bias in the distribution of subjects, the survey also asks subjects to respond to a number of questions that may serve as control variables using certain kinds of methodological analyses. For example, because the bulk of literature on racial beliefs’ and attitudes’ effects on racial policy preferences has looked at the role of individuals’ own stereotypes—as opposed to their meta-stereotypes—the survey included questions designed to measure subjects’ own stereotypes (and, after merging the stereotypes into a composite score, uses prejudice as well) as a control variable. In order to measure these control variables, the survey included questions designed to capture individuals’ levels of stereotyping and overall prejudice of various racial and ethnic groups: whites- non-Hispanic, Hispanics, African Americans, Asians

\[\text{\textsuperscript{17}} \text{ The other two racial profiling questions ask about stopping suspicious individuals in the airport to see whether they have weapons or explosives (a policy directed mainly toward Arab or “Arab-looking” Americans) and stopping suspicious individuals in their cars to see whether they are in the country legally (a policy directed mainly toward Hispanic Americans).} \]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{18}} \text{ Although the survey did include questions measuring subjects’ own stereotypes, these variables were ultimately left out of the analyses in Chapter 5. Subjects’ admission of stereotyping was not in line with the stereotypes reported within the data of other survey research (see Chapter 4) which indicates that a social desirability factor may have been in play. Because the stereotypes did not attain significance when they were included in the models, and because the results of the other factors did not change with their inclusion, this potential control variable was left out of the reported analyses. Additionally, the survey included an Implicit Association Test (IAT) in order to combat the potential social desirability factor; however, the IAT test was in “Beta mode” and a number of subjects experienced problems with the test and so those results are not included in the analyses either.} \]
and Arabs. Survey respondents were asked to indicate, on a seven-point scale, how applicable certain stereotypes are to each specific group: being lazy, being violence-prone, being unintelligent, and preferring to live off welfare. These specific stereotypes were chosen for two reasons: First, these stereotypes have been used in a litany of previous research on racial and ethnic stereotyping; as such, the results from this project will be able to be compared to those from previous works. In fact, the wording used for this section of the survey mirrors that used in the General Social Surveys. Second, these four specific stereotypes, when applied to the Black community, may conceivably be linked to the policy preferences being measured later in the survey.

For example, when hiring or admitting applicants, employers and admissions counselors look for hard-working, intelligent and self-supporting individuals; if Black applicants are stereotyped to the point that the assumption is that they have failed to attained those requirements to the same degree as white applicants, discriminatory hiring and admissions practices are bound to crop up. Because a number of studies have shown such discrimination to be precisely the case, the policy of affirmative action has been offered up as a potential solution, aimed at evening out the playing field for members of those groups on the receiving end of discrimination. While those groups may include women, the disabled, and other racial and ethnic groups, when Americans think of the policy, it is often linked inextricably to the Black community.

Likewise, individuals who are perceived as being lazy and violence-prone may not fare as well in the criminal justice system, and indeed research backs up claims that racial discrimination exists within all stops of the justice system—from the police officers who perform searches and arrests, to the prosecutor who decides the charges and
potential plea bargains, to the jury who hears a case and passes down a verdict, to the judge who doles out a sentence, racial prejudice, no matter how subtle or subconscious, pervades the justice process and unfairly burdens the Black community. Because of this, a number of criminal justice reforms have been offered to counteract the discrimination encountered in our supposedly color-blind justice system. Efforts to repeal “three-strikes laws” and the death penalty often focus in on the way discrimination by each of the actors in the criminal justice system negatively affect Black defendants, and efforts to end the “war on drugs” also include some discussion of the disproportionate effect on the Black community given the prevalence of drug use across all racial and ethnic groups, especially the white community. The links between negative stereotyping and racial profiling is likely more evident to Americans than the apparent links between stereotyping and the other policies aforementioned; racial profiling, by definition, targets individuals of certain racial and ethnic groups solely due to those demographic factors, and due to the overarching acceptance that individuals of those races or ethnicities are more “suspicious” for various reasons, usually backed up by wide-spread stereotypes based on pop culture or a limited number of high-profile, real-world cases.

While this project is interested specifically in those stereotypes subjects held against Black Americans, requiring the subjects to answer about a range of racial and ethnic groups serves two purposes: first, it allows for comparison of racial attitudes held across groups, and therefore even those individuals who do not rank as holding overt stereotypes (i.e. answering toward the “most Blacks” end of the spectrum) may still be uncovered as holding stronger stereotypes against that community than they do against other racial or ethnic groups; second, it allows for subjects to positively stereotype other
racial and ethnic groups which may make them more comfortable providing negative stereotypes of other groups, as though positive counterbalances the negative. And although there is a very strong risk of a social desirability factor coming into play as respondents answer questions pertaining to their own stereotypes, past GSS research indicates that many Americans are willing to admit to their own racial and ethnic prejudice by way of these four stereotypes (Smith, Marsden, Hout & Kim 2013).

In addition to testing for a respondent’s level of racial stereotyping and prejudice, questions were included in the survey in order to control for a respondent’s level of group attachment. As was discussed in chapter two, past research indicates that those who identify more strongly with a group will be more apt to support policies that benefit that group; in this case, respondents were asked solely about their group attachment to the five racial and ethnic groups that are included as groups within the study’s stereotype and meta-stereotype questions: white, non-Hispanics, Hispanics, African Americans, Asians, and Arabs. To gauge their degree of attachment to each group, respondents were asked the following:

On a scale of 0-10, where 0 represents having no feeling of group attachment and where 10 represents feeling extremely linked to the group in question, please place where you fall on the scale for each group.

Respondents were also asked three questions concerning their perception of the consequences of affirmative action policies, and those answers will also be built into a composite score to be used as a control variable when looking at meta-stereotype’s effect on the policy of affirmative action, specifically.  Given economic theories of political

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19 The questions gauging respondents’ perceptions of the counterproductive consequences of affirmative action appeared after the battery of policy preference questions; thus, unlike the other control variables, these questions were found within the
behavior, that emphasize weighing perceived costs against perceived benefits, these
questions are introduced because it is possible that individuals who perceive high levels
of stereotyping and prejudice, and who would then be expected to support a policy like
affirmative action, may nonetheless be hesitant to support such policies if they perceive
the negative fall-out of the program to outweigh the positive gains that the program
strives for. Thus, the three questions gauging perceived consequences are measured on a
five-point scale, ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”, and focus on the
following potential consequences:

Do you agree or disagree: Affirmative action programs cause white
Americans to think that minorities are incapable of making progress in
the workplace and university setting without these policies in place?

Do you agree or disagree: Affirmative action programs cause white
Americans to think that anyone who is a minority and is hired, promoted,
accepted, etc. is a product of affirmative action policies rather than
because they earned it?

Do you agree or disagree: Affirmative action programs cause white
Americans to be resentful of minorities?

As is standard with most social science research, a number of demographic
variables are used as control variables as well. Many of these demographic variables
may prove to be of theoretical importance given the policies measured in the dependent
variables, and given the nature of a study that focuses on racial stereotyping. For
example, gender may end up not having an effect; however, it is possible that, due to the
past research on a gender-gap between women and men on criminal justice policies
(Applegate, Cullen & Fisher 2002; Cochran & Sanders 2009), gender may prove to have
some effect on the dependent variable. Political ideology and partisanship are measured

body of the survey as opposed to in the set-up prior to the treatments or at the conclusion of the survey with the typical, wide-ranging demographic questions.
because of the obvious link between those variables and policy preferences in general, and specifically the divisions between the Democrat and Republican parties regarding the specific policy preferences being measured in this project, both at the elite and mass levels.\textsuperscript{20} Also included as potential demographic control variables are questions indicating whether respondents currently live in the South and/or grew up in the South since the southern region is known for enduring racial prejudices and for its conservative roots, both of which may impact the dependent variable.\textsuperscript{21} Respondents’ current employment status and their incomes (personal and household) are included since either variable may account for perceptions of the job market and the work force, which may then impact feelings toward affirmative action programs. Lastly, respondents’ level of educational achievement and age are taken into consideration as well since past research indicates a growing level of tolerance as individuals scale up the educational ladder and as generational replacement occurs (Stouffer 1955; Nunn, Crocket & Williams 1978; Bobo & Licari 1989; Golebiowska 1995).

\textbf{VIII. Data analysis}

In order to measure the effects of meta-stereotyping on individuals’ racial policy preferences, and in order to measure the effects of meta-stereotypes on white (majority in-group) individuals and Black (minority out-group) individuals, this project uses an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to compare the average

\textsuperscript{20} Both ideology and partisanship were measured using the typical seven-point scales. 
\textsuperscript{21} Questions inquiring about connections to the American south were scored in the following ways: respondents were asked to select up to three states that they had lived in within the past 12 months, and also to select up to three states in which they grew up; for each variable if the respondent selected a southern state (as determined by standard political science conventions) than they were coded as either living and/or growing up in the south.
treatment effects. This data analysis procedure allows the researcher to compare means of multiple groups in order to gauge whether or not a hypothesized effect exists. ANOVA tests for between-subjects experiments, like this one, compare the means for each treatment group, and in doing so can test to see whether the causal mechanism attains significance using an F-score which is calculated by comparing two estimates of variance: the first is the within-group variance, which should be unaffected by the random assignment of treatment conditions; the second is the between-group variance, which should, if hypotheses are correct, vary and will differ in degree based on the strength of treatment effects. The F-score, then, divides the between-group variance (the effect variance) by the within-group variance (the error variance).

In order to determine whether statistical significance has been achieved using this method, three assumptions must be taken into account: the observations must be independent, the observations are normally distributed, and the homogeneity of variances. Because this experiment is a between-subjects design, and because it relies on the random assignment of treatment conditions, the first assumption is met; no observation on the dependent and independent variables of interest are impacted in any way by another observation in the data set because questions are not repeated within the survey, and thus each subject only contributes one score (data point) for the same self-reported variables (for example, a pre-treatment score and a post-treatment score). The data will need to be checked in accordance with the central limit theorem in order to confirm that the second and third assumptions are met. Using the aforementioned hypotheses
(see chapter two), a series of planned comparisons can follow-up the ANOVA analyses by conducting a linear contrast analysis and trend analysis of the data as well. Additionally, OLS regression analyses can be conducted in order to observe any relationships between the hypothesized independent and dependent variables in the occasion that no causal mechanism is found; a statistically significant relationship could potentially occur where a causal mechanism is not identified, especially if the priming and framing effects were not strong enough to affect the independent variable at hand (meta-stereotypes or the composite score of perceived prejudice).

IX. Limitations of the research

While the use of an experimental survey better gauges meta-stereotypes’ causal effects on policy preferences, as opposed to mere correlations between the independent and dependent variables that would result from a non-experimental survey, there are still limitations to this method of analysis. Though experimental studies can generally be more confident that their measured effects come from a designed intervention, they still must make sure that their confidence is justified by the experiment’s internal validity. Campbell and Stanley (1966) identify nine threats to internal validity: selection, history, maturation, repeated testing, instrumentation, regression towards the mean, mortality, experimenter bias, and interaction effects. On the whole, most of these threats to internal validity are avoided within this project: the short-term (thirty minute) nature of this study likely avoids the problem of maturation, the single-test nature of this study avoids the problem of testing, the reliance on objective, non-wavering survey measures
(as opposed to subjective measures, or interviewer effects based on tone, wording, etc.) avoids the problems of instrumentation and experimenter bias, the between-subjects design combats regression to the mean which can occur when analyzing repeated measures in a within-subjects design, the study has a fairly low mortality rate, especially when compared to other current methods and other current studies, and a careful statistical analysis should look for hidden explanations due to interaction terms to attempt to avoid the problem of interaction effects.

A few of these threats to internal validity do remain potential problems, though they are not expected to have large effects on the answers provided within this project. Participants are asked to give the survey their full attention and they must answer all the questions in one sitting; these two provisions, however, cannot be forced on the subject because he/she is not in a controlled laboratory setting. Thus, the researcher has given up a degree of control that would otherwise combat the problems of history and contamination because subjects may shift their attention around during the survey. If subjects lose focus after the treatment has been provided, but before measuring the effects of that treatment, some internal validity may become lost because they may no longer be thinking about the treatment. Additionally, since the researcher loses control over what else the subject is doing while taking the study, it is possible (though not likely) that some subjects would feel moved to use the internet during the survey to explore some of the issues being asked within the survey. Lastly, there may be some sort of difference in the way the treatments are received and absorbed during the survey depending on the time of day that the survey is taken, or the
amount of distractions in the subjects’ environment, which might make it harder for some subjects to focus than others.

Additionally, if subjects try too hard to figure out the purpose of an experiment, internal validity may be threatened. In some cases individuals may attempt to answer in a way that they believe the researcher expects them to answer—not because of the normal pressures associated with social desirability factors (though that, too, is a potential threat) but because they feel the need to be “right” and prove the researchers’ argument for them. On the other hand, some individuals may attempt to thwart the research agenda if they feel manipulated, or if they are skeptical about the researchers’ motivations, and answer in ways that are not in accordance to their “true” beliefs, attitudes, opinions, etc. Because this project tackles controversial attitudes regarding race and ethnicity, the motivations of this study may be questioned by some subjects and, if so, the latter reaction could prove problematic for the study’s internal validity. In order to gauge whether the latter has occurred, subjects will be able to provide open-ended comments at the end of the survey; those who have a bone to pick with the perceived research question and the motivation behind it might decide to make those feelings known to the researcher.

The threats to this project’s external validity are more problematic than the tempered threats to internal validity. While researchers always hope to combat both types of threat, it is most important to thwart internal validity threats first because “if random or systematic error makes it impossible for the experimenter even to draw any conclusions from the experiment, the question of generality of
the conclusions never arises” (Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmitth & Gonzalez 1990). A potential sampling bias, such as the one made up of volunteers within a predetermined subject pool, may not accurately reflect the population as a whole, which could then make the project less generalizable. Likewise, the restricted subject population of this study—focusing only on meta-stereotypes’ effect on Black and white individuals—is limited due to practical considerations (chiefly the costs associated with recruiting and distributing the survey to enough members of other racial or ethnic groups to make their inclusion statistically sound); however, those limitations may make generalizing any findings regarding the effects of meta-stereotypes on racial policy preferences more difficult when we’re talking about the way they impact the Hispanic population in America, the Arab population in the United States, etc. It is possible that a longer and deeper history of discrimination against Black men and women in America, and a stronger socialization process acknowledging that discrimination in the Black community, would unearth effects in this study that would be larger than those that might be found if other racial and ethnic minority groups were tested. The perception that this survey is a mere “trivial” matter, and the artificial setting, could also threaten external validity if subjects don’t take the survey questions seriously, or if the way the treatment effects are presented within this study don’t mirror the way those treatments exist in the real-world. Specifically, the latter threat could be seen as a significant problem since the way meta-stereotypes exist in the real-world is much different than they way they are primed and framed within this study. In reality, people are not asked to consciously deliberate on and
then recall their meta-stereotypes; instead, it is something they have likely previously formulated and can easily access, but which is done subconsciously. Thus, although this project tries to introduce the treatments as a way of facilitating subjects’ consideration of meta-stereotypes, questions asking them to recall those meta-stereotypes in a conscious manner may resemble the design of more manipulative studies nonetheless.

The careful construction of this project’s survey instrument does, however, attempt to alleviate the problem of mediating variables. Still the internal validity of the survey can only do so much to assuage some of the resulting threats to external validity and, as is the case for any experimental study, the strength of a study’s external validity can really only be realized after careful replication across diverse groups, under diverse circumstances (McDermott 2011). For the purposes of this study, an emphasis is placed on preserving internal validity first and foremost, and the relatively high degree of control over the way subjects are assigned to groups, and the way treatments are introduced in an otherwise identical scenario to that of the other groups subjects are compared against, allows for statistical analyses within the subject population that can later be replicated within a more random sample, and while including in the study other racial and ethnic groups.

A final limitation that applies not only to this project specifically, but to experimental studies in general, is the criticism that although an experiment may highlight a causal effect, the causal effect still leaves a number of questions to be answered since causal effects are distinct from causal mechanisms (Imai, Keele,
Tingley & Yamamoto 2011). However, scholars also must recognize the inherent value of experimental studies, such as this one, that highlight causal effects while failing to attempt to discover the precise mechanism that drives the effect.

Scholars note that finding a causal effect is nothing to shrug at (Green, Ha & Bullock 2010); designing a study that can find a causal effect through experimentation is, in and of itself, a difficult procedure, and the findings of such experiments can further drive research on the topic. Green et al. (2010) point out that “the practical progression of an experimental agenda makes it impractical to examine mediators until a causal relationship is firmly established” (202). They also point out that holding up experiments that derive causal mechanisms up as those with the most value is inherently risky since it is extremely difficult to control for every potential mediator (whether due to resources, complexity, or even our own ability as researchers to think of all the potential confounding mediators) and that if researchers fail to do so they may risk falsely attributing an effect to a certain causal mechanism. Thus, Green et al. (2010) conclude that “one can learn a great deal of theoretical and practical value simply by manipulating variables and gauging their effects on outcomes, regardless of the causal pathways by which these effects are transmitted” (207). This project acknowledges the contributions of experiments focusing on causal effects at the immediate expense of locating a causal mechanism, and is merely a starting point for a broader discussion of the effects of meta-stereotypes on individuals’ policy preferences.
CHAPTER 4:

CURRENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE PREVALENCE OF PREJUDICE IN 21ST CENTURY AMERICA: A DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT OF THE DATA

This chapter is broken into three distinct sections in order to better understand the meta-stereotypes held by individuals in the United States’ Black and white communities. Ultimately, the descriptive accounts of the data in this chapter should better put the analysis of meta-stereotyping’s potential effects of racial policy preferences into context. In doing so, this chapter will also paint a clearer picture of Americans’ proclivity to accept the post-racial narrative on its face, or to remain skeptical concerning the narrative’s claims that a post-racial mentality has materialized in twenty-first century America.

The first section observes whether the meta-stereotypes regarding the Black community are accurate; that is, that the proportion of white Americans assumed to hold each stereotype actually accurately matches up with the proportion of white Americans who admit to holding each stereotype. This section, therefore, looks at the perceptions of racial prejudice in America and contrasts it with the data from this project’s survey to see whether perception matches reality. It is worth noting that the “reality” measured in this survey and others are susceptible to a social desirability factor; therefore, an alternative way of looking at levels of prejudice using self-reported data is also included in this section.
The second section reports levels of meta-stereotyping within the Black and white subsamples by contrasting those perceived to be held against the Black community with those perceived to be held against other minority communities, specifically the Hispanic, Asian and Arab populations in the United States. Like the first section, this second section also looks at how accurate meta-stereotypes are when they are measured regarding these other groups; doing so allows this project to investigate whether the potential inaccuracies regarding meta-stereotypes of Black Americans is unique or whether Americans similarly overestimate the prevalence of prejudice against other minority racial and/or ethnic groups.

The third section reports the mean meta-stereotypes regarding the Black community within this project’s Black and white subsamples. It then breaks down each subsample into further demographic groups—such as partisanship, ideology, age, education and region—to see whether those aspects affect levels of meta-stereotyping.

The fourth section will use the answers provided by this project’s framing treatment group to compare subjects’ meta-stereotypes—itself a relatively abstract concept, especially as it is measured in this project’s survey using a 101-point scale—to those same subjects’ answers regarding the prevalence of prejudice in more clear-cut hypothetical real world scenarios. Additionally, this section will compare subjects’ answers to the 101-point meta-stereotype question to that of the dichotomous meta-stereotype question. Comparisons on both counts should put into context the complexity of measuring individuals’ perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice.
I. How do Americans view the prevalence of racial prejudice today?

This section begins by reporting the meta-stereotypes regarding the Black community and then proceeds to compare these meta-stereotypes to supplemental data in two specific ways: first, this projects’ subjects’ meta-stereotypes are compared to the actual self-reported stereotypes within this survey; second, these meta-stereotypes are compared to the same respondents’ meta-stereotypes of the white (majority) community and three distinct minority communities (Hispanics, Asians and Arabs). In doing so, this section follows-up on Sigelman and Tuch’s 1997 investigation of how accurately Black individuals perceive prejudice held against them; however, it also expands the scope of their work by including white subjects and can, therefore, also investigate how accurately white individuals perceive the prejudice their own in-group holds against their Black compatriots.

In describing the accuracy of meta-stereotypes, this project is not interested in whether or not the original stereotype (i.e. laziness, violence-prone, etc.) can actually be attributed to members of a specified group. Instead, accuracy in this sense looks to compare whether or not perceptions of the prevalence of stereotyping against specific groups is in line with the actual amount of stereotyping being cast by members of the white, majority community. Sigelman and Tuch documented a wide gap between Black subjects’ meta-stereotypes and the actual stereotypes admittedly endorsed by white subjects, and this project finds a similarly large gap between subjects’ meta-stereotypes and the actual levels of stereotyping reported by the study’s participants. This study, however, documents this gap not only in the perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice held by Black subjects, but also by the white subjects in the study. Thus, while Sigelman
and Tuch’s work left readers in the dark about whether Black Americans’ proclivity to over-exaggerate the prejudice held against them was indicative of their unique station in American society, or whether such over-exaggerations were held by members of the white majority as well, this project begins to paint a clearer picture by putting the Black community’s level of meta-stereotyping into context vis-à-vis the white community’s level of meta-stereotyping.

This project measured meta-stereotypes in two different ways: the first measure was modeled after the *Time*/CNN survey of Black Americans used by Sigelman and Tuch; the second measure was designed specifically for this study and allowed subjects to respond with a full range of options. Specifically, the first measure, a dichotomous measure of meta-stereotyping, asked subjects to answer the following question: “Do you think that most white Americans think that Black Americans are lazy?” (also, violence-prone, unintelligent, and prefer to live off welfare). The second measure, an interval measure of meta-stereotyping, provided subjects with a 101-point scale and asked them to answer the following question: “Please GUESS: What percentage (0-100%) of white people do you think would say that each group is lazy?” (also, violence-prone, unintelligent, and prefer to live off welfare).

The percentage of actual white subjects who endorsed a stereotype is reported based on whether subjects answered the self-reported stereotype questions on the affirmative side of the scale—i.e. when asked where, on a seven-point scale, they’d rank Black Americans in terms of being lazy, violence-prone, unintelligent, and preferring to live off welfare, those white subjects coded as endorsing a stereotype answered 5, 6 or 7 (where the question wording indicated that a 1 meant that they think all people in a given
group exhibit the positive characteristic in the pair, that a 7 meant that they think all people in a given group exhibit the negative characteristic in the pair, and that a 4 meant that a given group was not toward one end of the scale or the other).

Table 4.1 reports the inaccuracies inherent in subjects’ ability to perceive the prevalence of racial stereotyping using the first, dichotomous, measure. As the table indicates, no single stereotype netted a self-reported endorsement rate (by white subjects) that topped thirty-three percent. Despite the low self-rated admission of stereotype endorsement, a majority of the same white subjects believed that “most whites” do stereotype the Black community as violence-prone and preferring to live off welfare, while over forty percent of those same white subjects believed that “most whites” do stereotype the Black community as being lazy and unintelligent.

The rates of Black subjects reporting similarly exaggerated perceptions are also documented in the table, though it is worth noting that Black overestimations were even more exaggerated than the overestimations of white subjects. Specifically, at least 70 percent of Black respondents answered affirmatively when asked whether “most whites” endorsed the specific negative stereotypes in all four questions. Like the white sample, Black subjects perceived “most whites” to hold the stereotypes of Blacks as violence-prone and preferring to live off welfare at the highest rates. The overestimation of these two specific stereotypes by both white subjects and Black subjects may be due to the salience of those stereotypes since both negative stereotypes are staples of political rhetoric, news coverage, and even entertainment.
The last column in Table 4.1 reports the difference in the percentage of Black and white subjects who answered affirmatively to the dichotomous, “most whites” questions for each stereotype. Because white subjects overestimated the percentage of white individuals who believe that Black Americans are violence-prone (75% answering affirmatively vs. 33% who actually admitted to endorsing the stereotype), the gap between Black and white subjects is the smallest regarding that specific negative stereotype. Still, the gap between the two groups’ assessment is a full 10 points. The gap between the two groups when assessing the other three stereotypes all top 20 points. Thus, Black subjects appear to hold much higher meta-stereotypes than their white counterparts, even while those white individuals are themselves holding onto moderate to high stereotypes. Given what we know about the political socialization process of Black and white Americans as it pertains to issues of racism, the discrepancy is not particularly shocking, though it does indicate that many white Americans have not been socialized to adopt a purely post-racial narrative.

Table 4.2 reports that similar inaccuracies abound when using the second, interval, measure. Once again, both Black and white subjects overestimated the prevalence of white stereotyping against the Black community. In doing so, Table 4.2 reports the average meta-stereotype score (0-100%) reported by this project’s white subjects, as well as the size of the gap between subjects’ perception of the prevalence of prejudice for each stereotype and the self-reported “reality” described previously (shaded in light gray). The gap between average guesses offered by Black and white subjects is reported in the last column, shaded in a darker gray.
Like the dichotomous, “most whites” measure, answers to questions using the interval, 101-point scale indicate that both white and Black subjects are overestimating the rate at which white Americans hold each negative stereotype against Blacks (at least, when those guesses are compared to the self-reported endorsements of each stereotype by this project’s white participants). This measure allows for the direct comparison of the actual percentage of white subjects who endorsed a stereotype to the percentage of white Americans guessed, on average, by white and Black subjects, and therefore provides a specific gap between perception and “reality;” these gaps are reported in the two columns shaded in a lighter gray.

Although the violence-prone stereotype was the most overestimated stereotype of the four when assessing white and Black subjects’ perceptions using the dichotomous, “most whites” measure, it is surprisingly the stereotype garnering the lowest level of overestimation when using the 101-point scale measure (although it is still the stereotype with regards to which both groups guess the highest level of negative stereotyping, and although it is still overestimated by both groups). The overestimations for the white subjects still exists on all four counts of stereotype questions, and at a rate of between 19 percent and 36 percent depending on the question, yet like the dichotomous measure their degree of overestimation is dwarfed by those held by this project’s Black subjects. Worth noting, however, is that while Black subjects still overestimate the percentage of white Americans holding negative stereotypes against Blacks, the gap between the two groups’ assessments is much smaller when using this measure than when using the dichotomous one. Indeed, while the gap between Blacks’ and whites’ perceptions of the prevalence of stereotyping topped 20 percent for three of the four stereotypes when using
the “most whites” question, when using the more nuanced measure, the gap between the two groups’ perceptions shrinks considerably. The gap between the two remains steady at 10 points higher for Black subjects than white subjects when looking at the violence-prone questions using both measures, the gap for the other three measures drops to below a 10-point difference. Thus, the difference in perceptions seems less extreme when using the 101-point scale to measure those perceptions in a more specific, more nuanced way.

Not only are the rates at which Black and white subjects perceive whites to hold negative views against Blacks overestimated when looking at their mean meta-stereotypes, but even when looking at the lower-quartiles of the data (see Figure 4.1) both Black and white individuals overestimate the prevalence of negative stereotyping. Indeed, for both the Black and white subjects in this study, over 75% reported holding meta-stereotypes that approached or topped forty percent in many instances despite the “reality” (using self-reported endorsements) which fell far short of those expectations.

Of course, there is likely a large disconnect between objective reality and the “reality” measured using self-reported endorsements of stereotyping; after all, social desirability factors, while mitigated to a degree through the use of non-face-to-face survey mechanisms, may very well be in play here. But measuring prejudice against Black Americans solely by looking at which side of the seven-point stereotype scales a white subject indicated their beliefs lie is itself limiting the way we might understand prejudice. It is possible that subjects who rate low on the seven-point scale may, nonetheless, demonstrate some degree of prejudice against Black Americans, and the degree to which such stereotyping occurs can be uncovered by comparing their placement along the seven-point stereotyping scales when rating Black Americans to the placement
of white Americans along the same scale. Thus, a subject might indicate that they do not believe Black Americans to be toward one end of the scale or the other (rated as a 4) when asked about a specific stereotype pair (and would, therefore, not be coded as holding that specific stereotype), but the same subject might also rate white Americans as a 3 on that same scale which would indicate that they are, to a small degree, prejudiced against Black Americans. While investigating endorsements of prejudicial stereotypes this way does not eradicate social desirability factors, the data from this project’s survey indicates that it does diminish the social desirability factor to a degree and that many subjects admit to more positive stereotypes of white Americans than Black Americans, while at the same time refraining from labeling Black Americans with a negative stereotype.

Table 4.3 reports the difference in the percentage of white subjects who admitted holding a negative stereotype of Black Americans (by ranking them a 5, 6 or 7 on the stereotype scales) and the percentage of those same white subjects who seem to endorse some degree of stereotyping by ranking Black Americans more negatively than their white counterparts. The second, alternative, measure is then reported alongside subjects’ meta-stereotypes regarding white prejudice held toward the Black community (0-100%), and includes the difference gap between perception and this measure of “reality.”

When using this alternative measure of stereotype endorsement, white subjects appear to be slightly more prejudiced than they are when measuring prejudice as a product of assigning negative attributes outright to the Black community. The difference between admission of stereotyping shouldn’t be very surprising given the hovering threat of social desirability factors, and also because individuals can hold positive stereotypes
more assertively for one group than another, as is implied by the use of a seven-point scale measuring stereotypes in the first place. Thus, some white individuals may rate Blacks as mostly positive and appear unprejudiced, but they may rate them as being slightly less apt to display the positive trait as a group on the whole than they rate the white community on the same stereotype question. Likewise, some white individuals might rank both whites and Blacks as being mostly negatively maligned with a stereotype, but they might believe Blacks are more likely to embody the negative trait on the whole than whites are. Any individuals who fall into the latter group are captured in the original measure of stereotype endorsement, however, since they self-report an admitted negative stereotype in the first place. Thus, the difference between the two measures (reported in the last column) are indicative only of the former group—those who rate Blacks as a group mostly positively, but to a lesser degree than they do whites.

Using the alternative measure, at least a quarter of white subjects demonstrate some degree of stereotyping on all four stereotype questions, although it is worth noting that using this measure less white individuals appear prejudiced regarding the violence-prone stereotype than when using the original measure. This indicates that white subjects see violence as being more of a widespread, and evenly spread, characteristic than the other three stereotype traits. Because of this, the difference between the two measures is actually in the negative direction for the violence-prone stereotype, but the gap between the two measures holds at around a positive 10 points for the other three stereotypes.

Because the alternative measure of stereotype endorsement indicates higher levels of prejudice than does the original measure, the differences between white and Black subjects’ perceptions of the prevalence of each stereotype and the reality of the
prevalence of stereotyping now appear to be smaller (see Table 4.4). However, white subjects still overestimate the percentage of white Americans who likely possess each stereotype (by almost twenty points on the closest guess, and by twenty-six points on the furthest guess), as do Black subjects (by twenty-eight points on the closest guess, and by thirty-four points on the furthest guesses).

Ultimately, then, it seems that despite the emergence of the post-racial narrative, many—if not most—Americans actually overestimate the prevalence of racial prejudice. These findings are similar to those documented by Sigelman and Tuch in the late 1990s; while their study only looked at Black meta-stereotypes and only by using the dichotomous, “most whites” measure, the meta-stereotypes documented in their study nearly 25 years ago indicates exceedingly high rates of meta-stereotyping, just as this projects’ Black sample did. These similarities are documented in Table 4.5. The last column indicates that meta-stereotypes held by Black individuals today—when measuring using the dichotomous, “most whites” variable—are remarkably similar to those held by Black individuals in the early nineties (as measured by the 1991 Time/CNN survey). In fact, while fewer Black subjects in this project indicated that they thought “most whites” believe Blacks to be unintelligent than those who answered the question in 1991, the Black subjects in this project indicated a higher rate of meta-stereotyping on the three other stereotype questions. Still, the difference between the two scores is very small, ranging from a three point difference to a six point difference, depending on the stereotype in question.

While it is not surprising that Black subjects continue to hold high meta-stereotypes, it is somewhat surprising that the rate at which they believe white Americans
hold each stereotype against the Black community has remained so steady—that the Black meta-stereotypes have remained as high as they have. After all, Table 4.6 documents that the percentage of white subjects who endorse the stereotypes in question has decreased for each one over the past twenty years. The data reported in the first two data-filled columns is from the 1990 and 2010 General Social Surveys (GSS).

Unfortunately, the GSS stopped asking about the violence-prone and preferring to live off welfare stereotypes prior to the new millennium; however, the trend between the two data points is one that indicates decline. This trend could represent improved race relations over the span of the past two and a half decades; however, it could also represent white Americans’ shift to more subtle or implicit forms of prejudice. Additionally, the GSS survey is vulnerable to the same social desirability factor that this project’s survey likely was, which would seem to alleviate—to a degree—the level of exaggeration the meta-stereotypes displayed by this projects’ white and Black subjects.

It is also worth noting that the self-reported endorsement of negative stereotyping is higher for the subjects in the GSS 2010 survey and those subjects in this project; again, this alleviates—to a degree—the level of exaggeration the meta-stereotypes displayed by this projects’ white and Black subjects.

This section’s findings also indicate that such overestimations are not unique to the Black community, as even members of the white majority over-exaggerate the rates at which their fellow white citizens stereotype Black Americans.
II. Examining levels of meta-stereotyping regarding Black Americans and other minority racial and/or ethnic groups

This section takes a similarly investigative approach to the question of subjects’ meta-stereotype accuracy as did the first section; however, this section looks at the rates of accuracy when subjects are asked about white prejudice against other minority racial and/or ethnic groups—specifically, this section looks at the previously unveiled levels of white self-reported endorsements of stereotypes against the Black community in relation to white self-reported endorsements of stereotypes against the Hispanic, Asian and Arab population in the United States, as well as against white stereotyping against their own in-group.

Table 4.7 reports the level at which this project’s white subjects positively and negatively stereotyped each group in question. Subjects were coded as endorsing positive\(^\text{22}\) stereotypes (columns are not shaded) if they answered on the end of the seven-point scale indicating that most members of a group were hard working, are not violence-prone, are intelligent, and do not prefer to live off welfare (1, 2 or 3 on the scale). As in previous sections, a subject was coded as holding a negative stereotype (columns are shaded in a light gray) if they answered on the end of the seven-point scale indicating that most members of a group were lazy, violence-prone, unintelligent, or that they prefer to live off welfare (5, 6 or 7 on the scale). Neutral responses (4 on the scale) to each stereotype-pairing are not reported in this table.

\(^{22}\) The usage of the term “positive” here is not meant as a normative statement; applying this terminology is not meant to suggest that stereotyping groups to hold seemingly positive attributes is unproblematic, it is merely used as a way of indicating that subjects apply those positive attributes to the groups in question.
Results indicate that white individuals assign positive characteristics to Blacks at the lowest rate of all five racial and/or ethnic groups measured, on all four stereotype questions (they have been inserted in bold font, and are in the unshaded Black column). Likewise, white individuals assigned negative characteristics to Blacks at the highest rate of all five racial and/or ethnic groups measured, again on all four stereotype questions (they have been inserted in bold font, and are in the lightly shaded Black column). Because there was a neutral option along the seven-point scale which was used to code negative and positive stereotyping, these two findings did not have to exist simultaneously; however, on all four stereotype counts that is exactly how things played out.

Specifically, when it came to rating Blacks as hardworking, the gap between whites’ positive stereotype for Blacks and whites’ positive stereotype for the next closest group—whites—was 14 points. For the not violence-prone stereotype, the gap between whites’ positive stereotypes and the next closest group—this time Arabs—was only 2 points, though there was a bit more distance between whites’ positive stereotypes in this instance and the next two closest groups (7 points compared to Hispanics, 9 points compared to whites). For the intelligent stereotype, a similar story played out—positive stereotypes were held to a similar degree for Blacks and Hispanics (38% to 41%), but remained a bit further in comparison to Arabs (46%—an 8 point difference) and much further in comparison to whites and Asians (56% and 62%—10 point and 12 point differences, respectively). Finally, whites’ were far less likely to positively stereotype Blacks as preferring to be self-sufficient when compared to the next closest group—in this case Arabs; the difference between the two groups was a full 15 points.
When looking at negative stereotypes held by white subjects toward each group, similar trends persist. Not only do whites rate Blacks more negatively on all four stereotype questions than any of the other racial and/or ethnic groups, but they do so to a fairly large degree on some of the measures. Fifteen percent of white subjects rated Blacks as lazy, while the next closest group—whites, Arabs and Hispanics, tied—were only rated as lazy by five percent of those subjects. Thirty-three percent of Black subjects were rated as violence-prone by white subjects, while Arabs—the next closest group—were rated as being violence-prone by “only” twenty-five percent of white subjects (a difference of 8 points). On the unintelligent stereotype question, white subjects negatively stereotyped Blacks at a rate of fifteen percent, while the next closest group—Hispanics—were negatively stereotyped by ten percent (a 5 point difference; the smallest gap between Blacks and the next closest group on any of the four negative stereotype questions); when compared against the other groups, the gap on the negative side of the intelligence-unintelligence scale become more pronounced (9 point difference between Blacks and Arabs, and a 12 point difference between Blacks and both Asians and whites). Finally, there was a thirteen point difference between the rate at which white subjects’ negatively stereotyped Blacks as preferring to live off welfare and the next closest group (Hispanics), and a whopping difference of between 17 and 21 points between Blacks and the other three racial and/or ethnic groups.

While Figure 4.2 indicates that Black subjects correctly predict the general trends regarding white stereotypes held against the five racial and/or ethnic groups on most counts. Black subjects’ meta-stereotypes are higher as they pertain to white stereotyping of the Black community than are their meta-stereotypes for any other group; this parallels
the reality expressed in Table 4.7, wherein white individuals do hold negative stereotypes against Blacks to a higher degree than the other four groups. Likewise, Black meta-stereotypes regarding white stereotypes against the Hispanic community are ranked higher than the Arab, Asian and white groups, except in the case of being violence-prone which is the sole case of Black subjects having a higher meta-stereotype for a group (other than Blacks) than Hispanics. Again, both of these aspects of Figure 4.2 mirror the realities expressed in Table 4.7. Additionally, while Black subjects overestimate the rate at which white Americans negatively stereotype their own in-group, they also overestimate the rate at which those negative stereotypes are applied by whites to all other groups. Yet, despite that exaggeration, the gist of the pecking order in the hierarchy of white stereotyping is preserved in their meta-stereotype assessments.

Not to be outdone, on most counts, white subjects also correctly aligned their meta-stereotypes with the patterns grounded in the reality of Table 4.7—even if, like Black subjects, these meta-stereotypes were overestimations (see Figure 4.3). White subjects did exhibit meta-stereotypes suggesting that they believe whites stereotype Arabs as violence-prone to roughly the same degree as Blacks, instead of a little less likely (as was the case for this project’s sample), but again, the general pattern of Blacks being on the receiving end of white stereotypes the most, followed by Hispanics and Arabs, and finally whites and Asians, stays true to the form outlined in Table 4.7.
III. Looking at levels of meta-stereotyping across various demographic groups

The previous two sections indicate that Black and white Americans tend to overestimate the pervasiveness of prejudice against all racial and ethnic groups tested for in this project’s survey, but that meta-stereotypes were higher regarding white perceptions of Blacks than they were for any other group. The first section also indicated that the accuracy gap between Blacks’ and whites’ perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice (meta-stereotypes) and the self-reported reality of racial stereotyping against Blacks was larger for this project’s Black subsample than for the white subsample. This section builds on the previous sections by examining whether the difference between the Black and white subjects is statistically significant, and also explores whether levels of meta-stereotyping differ across other demographic groups at statistically significant rates.

i. Race

While sections 1 and 2 indicated that Black subjects held higher meta-stereotypes with regard to the rates at which Blacks are negatively stereotyped by whites, the question of whether the differences between the two groups’ perceptions is significant lingered. Using a t-test to conduct a difference in means test, Table 4.8 reveals that the difference between Black and white meta-stereotypes are, indeed, significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Table 4.8 reports the difference in means results based on the meta-stereotype composite score (built of meta-stereotype responses to all four individual stereotype questions) and also for the four individual stereotype questions; the results suggest that we can be confident that there is between a seven and nine point difference.
between Black and white meta-stereotypes depending on which specific stereotype is the stereotype of interest.

ii. Gender

Table 4.9 indicates that there does not appear to be a significant relationship between subjects’ gender and the level at which they perceive white Americans to hold negative stereotypes against Blacks for the white subsample. However, the relationship between gender and level of meta-stereotyping does appear significant at the 95 percent confidence level for the black subsample. The results of these t-tests are presented in Table 4.9, and are indicative of higher rates of meta-stereotyping by Black women than by Black men. These results are driven by the violence-prone and unintelligent meta-stereotypes, both of which achieve statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence level; significance was not attained for differences in Black women and men’s meta-stereotypes regarding being lazy and preferring to live off welfare.

iii. Region

Although t-tests were conducted to detect potential impacts of all four regions on subjects’ levels of meta-stereotyping, the main region of interest is the south due to the history and enduring legacy of overt racial prejudice and discrimination in that region. In order to look at this relationship, subjects were asked to name up to three states wherein they grew up, and the three most recent states that they have lived in. However, regionalism had no impact on levels of meta-stereotyping for the white subsample, and only attained significance (95 percent confidence) when looking at whether subjects in the Black subsample grew up in the south (see Table 4.10).
Substantively, the t-test indicates that Black subjects who did not grow up in the south have higher levels of meta-stereotyping. This is interesting because one might expect that Black subjects who grew up in a more overtly racially hostile part of the country would hold higher meta-stereotypes. This does not appear to be the case, however, and although it is unclear why those who grew up outside the south would perceive higher levels of white stereotyping against Blacks, it could be speculated that either those who did grow up in the south learned to adopt racial prejudice as the norm and, therefore, did not notice it as much, compared to those who were on the receiving end of more “subtle”—yet still noticeable—forms of prejudice in regions that were supposedly less prone to such negative racial attitudes, or that the socialization of Black individuals in the non-south take a different trajectory when it comes to U.S. race relations than those who grew up in the southern states.

Difference in means tests were also conducted for Black and white subjects who lived and/or grew up in the deep south; however, that demographic breakdown did not achieve significance for either racial group.

iv. Ideology

When comparing the difference in means between multiple groups (more than two), such as subjects’ political ideology, an ANOVA was used instead of a t-test. The results of the ANOVA comparing ideology of white subjects across three groups—liberals, conservatives and independents—are reported in Table 4.11, and indicate that there is a significant difference in means (at the 95 percent confidence level) between at least two groups. The dependent variable in this ANOVA analysis was the composite
meta-stereotype score (built as the sum of each of the four individual meta-stereotypes in question—lazy, violence-prone, unintelligent, and preferring to live off welfare).

In order to determine which of the groups’ means are significantly different, a Bonferroni test was conducted and those results are reported in Table 4.12. While the difference in means between the liberal and independent groups do not attain significance, nor do the difference in means between the conservative and independent groups, the difference in means between the liberal and conservative groups do reach significance with 95 percent confidence.

While the difference in means occurring between two distinct and opposing ideological groups is not that surprising, what is surprising is that substantively the mean of the conservative group was forty points higher than the liberal group. This is surprising because conservatives are often cited in popular politics and/or culture as stubbornly rejecting the reality that racism is still a problem in the 21st century. What these results indicate is that we may hear the loudest, angriest voices denying racial prejudice coming from conservatives, but that they are not representative of conservatives as a whole. It may also indicate that liberals—who on the whole are more apt to value multi-culturalism, yet are socialized to avoid real race-talk (see Chapter 2)—find themselves buying into the notion that racial prejudice is on the decline thanks to their efforts and/or avoidance of the topic all together.

It is also possible that the results are skewed due to the disparities in raw numbers of subjects in this project that identified as liberal versus conservative (for white subjects
it was a 205 to 34 split, liberals to conservatives, with an additional 33 independents in the mix).

The results of an ANOVA comparing the difference in means between the three ideological groups within the *black subsample* are found in Table 4.13. While the difference in means are not significant at the traditional 95 percent confidence level, they did attain significance at the 90 percent confidence level and are, therefore, worth exploring.

Although the ANOVA indicated a significant difference between at least two groups at the 90 percent confidence level, the Bonferroni Test indicates that no such difference panned out (see Table 4.14). Thus, the level at which Black individuals perceive that whites negatively stereotype their in-group (Blacks) does not appear to be impacted by their ideology.

v. Partisanship

Much like the ANOVA investigating whether *white subjects’* ideology had a significant impact on their meta-stereotype levels, the ANOVA in Table 4.15 indicates that there is a significant relationship worth exploring more when it comes to the link between partisanship and meta-stereotypes (only the partisanship ANOVA only attained significance at the 90 percent confidence level). Again, the dependent variable in this ANOVA was the composite meta-stereotype score built of the four individual meta-stereotype questions (lazy, violence-prone, unintelligent, and preferring to live off welfare).
Again, like the ideology ANOVA, it appears that Republicans’ meta-stereotypes are higher than their Democratic counterparts (and that the difference in means between any other partisan group pairing failed to achieve significance; see Table 4.16). While such a result is still somewhat surprising (see discussion in ‘subsection c’), these results make sense given the similar relationship between conservativism and meta-stereotypes in this projects’ white subsample.

It is worth noting that the number of subjects who identified as Republican was very small in this project’s white subsample, however; much like the conservative group which only had 34 subjects, the Republican group only had 25 subjects (compared to 146 Democrats and 101 Independents).

An ANOVA investigating a partisan relationship for Black subjects failed to attain significant results. Once again, it seems as though there is no relationship between Black individuals’ partisanship and the rates at which they perceive whites to negatively stereotype Blacks (see Table 4.17). This makes sense given the strong correlation between ideology and partisanship, and the lack of significance pertaining to Black subjects’ ideology and meta-stereotype levels in ‘subsection c’.

vi. Age, education and employment

Although ANOVAs were conducted to detect whether the difference in means between these types of demographic groups were significant, none of them attained significant results. Therefore, it does not appear that individuals’ meta-stereotypes—whether white or Black—are impacted by their age, level of educational attainment, or employment status.
IV. Comparing measures of meta-stereotypes

In addition to this project’s main focus on extending our understanding of meta-stereotyping’s potential effects on individuals’ racial policy preferences, the survey design also sought to extend our understanding of meta-stereotypes by introducing a 101-point interval variable to augment—or perhaps replace—the dichotomous measure analyzed by Sigelman and Tuch in 1997. Additionally, the survey was designed to include hypothetical scenarios which not only serve as a framing treatment, but which also allows for the comparison of subjects’ answers to meta-stereotype questions when asked in a more abstract way against questions that put meta-stereotypes in a real world context.

i. Dichotomous vs. interval

The term “most”—which is used as the operative condition in agreeing or disagreeing with the dichotomous question posed by the Time/CNN poll—is a subjective term; as such, it is impossible to know what, exactly, subjects thought about the prevalence of stereotyping using the dichotomous measure. This question asked subjects whether they thought “most white Americans hold the following perceptions of Black Americans or not.” Common definitions of the term “most” include “greatest in amount, extent or degree,” “in the greatest number of instances,” “a great majority of; nearly all,” and “the superlative of many or much.” Still, even these definitions are subjective; after all, even if all subjects agreed that “most” means “a great majority of; nearly all,” for example, the terms “great” and “nearly” leave room for interpretation.
A closer look at this project’s data indicates that this subjectivity persists when subjects consider the question of “most” white Americans’ prejudices. Because definitions like “a great majority of; nearly all” remain subjective in and of themselves, a comparison using a more simplistic conceptualization of “most” is charted in Table 4.18.

Table 4.18 compares the percentage of subjects who answered affirmatively to this survey’s question “do you think most white Americans think that Black Americans are lazy?” (also, violence-prone, unintelligent, and preferring to live off welfare) with the percentage of subjects who indicated a meta-stereotype above 50%. Thus, the second column for each stereotype represents a simple majority and casts out subjective parts of the definition, like “great” and “nearly all.” Table 4.18 indicates that subjects’ conceptualization of the term “most” is not always synonymous with even a simple majority, let alone the more subjective dictionary definitions like “a great majority of; nearly all” or “in the greatest number of instances.”

More specifically, Table 4.19 breaks down the percentage of subjects who answered consistently versus those who did not, and includes a breakdown of which direction the inconsistency was in—subjects who said “most” white Americans do hold a specific stereotype, but who also hold meta-stereotypes under fifty percent (less than a simple majority), and subjects who said “most” white Americans do not hold a specific stereotype, but who also hold meta-stereotypes over fifty percent (at least a simple majority).

Although there were a number of subjects who said “most whites” did not hold specific stereotypes, but who nonetheless guessed that over fifty percent of white
Americans held that stereotype in the follow-up 101-point meta-stereotype question, it was more often the case that subjects answered affirmatively to the “most whites” question yet guessed that less than fifty percent of white Americans held that same stereotype. Thus, for many subjects, when conceptualizing “most” they are not thinking in terms of a simple majority, let alone a super majority. The percentage of Black subjects showing inconsistency in this manner was particularly pronounced and steady, hovering around one-fifth of all Black subjects.

Thus, this study indicates that there may be important limitations to consider when using a dichotomous measure of meta-stereotyping. When treating subjects whose answers simultaneously affirmed and rejected the notion that “most” white Americans held specific stereotypes as though their perceptions are equally comparable to all other subjects who responded in a corresponding fashion (affirming or rejecting “most” in both measures), researchers risk losing not only the nuance of this project’s interval measure, but risk interpreting those subjects’ attitudes and beliefs incorrectly.

The assumption that everyone who believes that “most” white Americans hold a stereotype also believe that the degree of stereotyping is the same is unwarranted; and, in fact, such an assumption could potentially lead researchers to assume that subjects who answer “yes” and “no” to the “most” questions hold opposing views when a more thorough investigation of their meta-stereotypes could reveal just the opposite. Therefore, scholars who rely solely on the dichotomous measure of variables may not only interpret the meaning of their measure incorrectly, but their interpretation may also confound our understanding of meta-stereotyping’s impact on whatever variables those researchers study.
ii. Abstract vs. hypothetical

In addition to investigating whether meta-stereotypes affect racial policy preferences, this project was designed to see whether the strength of potential effects is stronger for subjects receiving framing treatments than those receiving priming treatments or those placed in a control group without priming or framing treatments. While the analytical aspects of this design will be interpreted in Chapter 5, this section investigates whether meta-stereotypes in the abstract sense (as measured by the 101-point scale and the dichotomous “most” question) match up with individuals’ assessments of the likelihood that prejudice is a factor in real world hypothetical scenarios. Because the previous subsection indicated that individuals do not always hold consistent meta-stereotypes depending on how they are measured, there is reason to investigate the assumptions that subjects’ perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice are consistent across abstract measurements of meta-stereotyping and assessments of prejudicial thoughts and behaviors when applied to a less abstract, real world scenario.

Subjects who were randomly assigned to the framing treatment group were further divided into three framing sub-groups. The three possible hypothetical scenarios were designed to relate to both a specific stereotype measured in this project’s survey, and also to a specific outcome that the racial policies in the survey aim to combat. The three hypothetical scenarios read as follows:

Hypothetical Scenario 1
Related stereotype- violence-prone
Related racial policies- death penalty, three strikes laws

Case A: Imagine a court case wherein the defendant is a Black male. The defendant has been charged with assault, but has pleaded ‘not guilty’ and
the prosecution has failed to produce any solid evidence against the defendant. The jury in this case consists of twelve white individuals.

Case B: Imagine that in a similar court case a white male has been charged with assault. Like the other case, this defendant has pleaded ‘not guilty’ and the prosecution has failed to produce any solid evidence against the defendant. Again, the jury in this case consists of twelve white individuals.

Question 1: Which defendant do you think is more likely to be viewed by the all-white jury as violence prone?

Question 2: Which defendant do you think is more likely to be found guilty by the all-white jury?

Hypothetical Scenario 2
Related stereotype- lazy; indirectly perhaps preferring to live off welfare
Related racial policies- drug war, three strikes laws, racial profiling

Case A: Imagine that on a suburban street corner, during typical work hours, two Black males are loitering—hanging around, talking and laughing—but generally minding their own business. A business owner called the police complaining about loiterers. The police officers patrolling that particular block are two white officers.

Case B: Imagine that on a similar suburban street a few blocks away, also during typical work hours, two white males are also loitering—hanging around, talking and laughing—but generally minding their own business. Like the other case, a business owner has called the police complaining about loiterers. Again, the police officers patrolling their particular block are two white officers.

Question 1: Which pair of loiterers do you think is more likely to be viewed as lazy by the police officers patrolling the area?

Question 2: Which pair of loiterers do you think is more likely to be stopped by the police officers and searched for drugs?

Hypothetical Scenario 3
Related stereotype- Unintelligent
Related racial policies- Affirmative Action

Case A: Imagine that a company is hiring for an entry level position. The interviewer is a white individual and the person applying for the job is a Black male.

Case B: Imagine that a similar company is hiring for an entry level position as well. Again, the interviewer is a white individual, but this time the person applying for the job is a white male.
Question 1: Which job applicant do you think is more likely to be viewed as unintelligent by the interviewer?

Question 2: Which job applicant do you think is more likely to be hired for the job?

When answering the stereotype questions paired with their framing treatment, subjects were provided five possible answer choices; depending on the specific scenario at hand, these answer choices were written to designate that (a) the Black individual in question was much more likely to be stereotyped in a certain way, (b) the Black individual in question was somewhat more likely to be stereotyped in a certain way, (c) neither the Black nor the white individuals in question were likely to be stereotyped in a certain way, (d) the white individual in question was somewhat more likely to be stereotyped in a certain way, and (e) the white individual in question was much more likely to be stereotyped in a certain way. A similar range of answers was provided when asking questions about the potential consequences in the hypothetical scenarios for the Black and white individuals in question. The range of options, therefore, allowed respondents to indicate whether the Black or white individuals in question were much more likely or somewhat more likely to be found guilty/be stopped and searched for drugs/be hired for the job (depending on which framing treatment they received), or whether neither the Black or white individual in question was likely to face any of those consequences.

Table 4.20 documents the inconsistency between subjects’ answers to the dichotomous, “most whites” question, and their answers to questions regarding the likelihood of Blacks experiencing stereotyping in a hypothetical real-world scenario.
For *white subjects*, the vast majority of those who answered negatively (“no”) to the questions asking if “most whites” view Blacks as being lazy and violence-prone still answered the hypothetical scenario’s question assessing the likelihood of stereotyping by indicating that the Black individual in the scenario (loiterers or defendant, respectively) were at least “somewhat more likely” to be stereotyped than the white individual in question; a good portion (41% in the lazy frame, and 25% in the violence-prone frame) even said that the Black individual was “much more likely” to be stereotyped. White subjects were more consistent when they answered affirmatively to the “most whites” question. White subjects who answered negatively to the “most whites” question fared more successfully if they were assigned to the unintelligence frame, though alternatively those white subjects in the unintelligence frame who had answered affirmatively to the “most whites” question were largely unsuccessful. In comparison, *Black subjects* reported answers that were more consistent than their white counterparts; however, they, too, were susceptible to inconsistencies and those inconsistencies—though not as pronounced as in the white subsample—trended in the same directions as did the white subjects’ responses.

Thus, it appears that not only do people have a difficult time being consistent between the two measures of stereotyping themselves, but that they also have a difficult time being consistent when applying meta-stereotypes to real-world scenarios, with many more individuals assessing a higher likelihood of stereotypes impacting Black Americans when asked about specific, hypothetical real-world scenarios than when they are merely asked about the notion of stereotyping in a more abstract way, without any sort of context to guide their thought-process.
Table 4.1: Meta-stereotypes based on dichotomous, “most” question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Actual % of white subjects who admitted to endorsing the stereotype</th>
<th>% of white subjects saying “most whites” endorse stereotype</th>
<th>% of Black subjects saying “most whites” endorse stereotype</th>
<th>Difference between % of Black and white subjects saying “most whites” endorse stereotype</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lazy</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>+28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence-prone</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintelligent</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>+26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer to live off welfare</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>+23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Meta-stereotypes based on interval, 101-point scale question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Actual % of white subjects who admitted to endorsing the stereotype</th>
<th>Average guess of white subjects</th>
<th>Difference between white subjects’ guesses and % actually endorsing stereotype</th>
<th>Average guess of Black subjects</th>
<th>Difference between Black subjects’ guesses and % actually endorsing stereotype</th>
<th>Difference between guesses for Black and white subjects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lazy</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>+36</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>+44</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence-prone</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>+19</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>+29</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintelligent</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>+32</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>+39</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer to live off welfare</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>+28</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>+37</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4.3: Difference in % of self-reported white stereotypes using the negative side of the scale vs. % who demonstrate some degree of negative stereotyping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of white subjects who admitted to endorsing the stereotype by rating Blacks on the negative side of the scale</th>
<th>% of white subjects who demonstrated some degree of stereotyping by ranking Blacks more negatively than whites</th>
<th>Difference between % of white subjects demonstrating some degree of stereotyping and those who endorsed stereotyping by rating Blacks on the negative side of the scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lazy</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence-prone</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintelligent</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer to live off welfare</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.4: Meta-stereotypes based on interval, 101-point scale question compared against percentage of white subjects demonstrating some degree of stereotyping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of white subjects who demonstrated some degree of stereotyping by ranking Blacks more negatively than whites</th>
<th>Average guess of white subjects</th>
<th>Difference between white subjects’ guesses and % actually endorsing stereotype</th>
<th>Average guess of Black subjects</th>
<th>Difference between Black subjects’ guesses and % actually endorsing stereotype</th>
<th>Difference between guesses for Black and white subjects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lazy</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>+26</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>+34</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence-prone</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>+24</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>+34</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintelligent</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>+22</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>+29</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer to live off welfare</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>+19</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>+28</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.5: Comparing levels of Black meta-stereotyping between 1991 and today

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stereotype</th>
<th>% of Black subjects saying “most whites” endorse the stereotype in 1991</th>
<th>% of Black subjects saying “most whites” endorse the stereotype in this project</th>
<th>Difference between the % of Black subjects saying “most whites” endorse the stereotype in 1991 vs. today</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lazy</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence-prone</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintelligent</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer to live off welfare</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6: Comparing levels of white stereotype endorsements between 1990, 2010 and today

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stereotype</th>
<th>% of white subjects who endorsed the stereotype in 1990</th>
<th>% of white subjects who endorsed the stereotype in 2010</th>
<th>% of white subjects who endorsed the stereotype in this project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lazy</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence-prone</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintelligent</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer to live off welfare</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.7: Self-reported white positive and negative stereotypes across racial and/or ethnic groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ar +</th>
<th>Ar -</th>
<th>As +</th>
<th>As -</th>
<th>B +</th>
<th>B -</th>
<th>H +</th>
<th>H -</th>
<th>W +</th>
<th>W -</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hardworking (+) - Lazy (-)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not violence-prone (+) - Violence-prone (-)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligent (+) - Unintelligent (-)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer to be self-sufficient (+) - Prefer to live off welfare (-)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

W = White
H = Hispanic
B = Black
As = Asian
Ar = Arab

Table 4.8: Difference in means for Black and white subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Difference in means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Composite meta-stereotype score</td>
<td>233.37</td>
<td>200.07</td>
<td>33.30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[221.10-245.65]</td>
<td>[189.57-210.57]</td>
<td>[17.25-49.35]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(255)</td>
<td>(272)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy</td>
<td>58.49</td>
<td>50.74</td>
<td>7.75*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[55.14-61.84]</td>
<td>[48.10-53.38]</td>
<td>[3.53-11.98]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(255)</td>
<td>(272)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence-prone</td>
<td>61.53</td>
<td>52.44</td>
<td>9.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[58.13-64.92]</td>
<td>[49.72-55.16]</td>
<td>[4.77-13.39]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(255)</td>
<td>(272)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintelligent</td>
<td>54.19</td>
<td>46.67</td>
<td>7.52*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[50.73-57.66]</td>
<td>[43.84-49.50]</td>
<td>[3.08-11.96]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(255)</td>
<td>(272)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer to live off welfare</td>
<td>59.16</td>
<td>50.22</td>
<td>8.94*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[55.63-62.69]</td>
<td>[47.26-53.18]</td>
<td>[4.37-13.51]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(255)</td>
<td>(272)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates 95% confidence that the means are significantly different
### Table 4.9: Difference in means for male and female subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Difference in means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White subjects’ Composite meta-</td>
<td>201.33 (123)</td>
<td>199.03 (149)</td>
<td>2.30 [-23.42-18.84]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stereotype score</td>
<td>[185.60-217.05]</td>
<td>[184.77-213.30]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black subjects’ Composite meta-</td>
<td>217.46 (103)</td>
<td>244.16 (103)</td>
<td>-26.70* [1.85-51.55]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stereotype score</td>
<td>[198.93-235.98]</td>
<td>[227.89-260.43]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates 95% confidence that the means are significantly different

### Table 4.10: Difference in means for Southern and non-Southern subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Has not lived in the south</th>
<th>Has lived in the south</th>
<th>Difference in means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White subjects’ Composite meta-</td>
<td>196.13 (184)</td>
<td>208.31 (88)</td>
<td>-12.18 [-34.61-10.26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stereotype score</td>
<td>[183.75-208.51]</td>
<td>[188.48-228.13]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black subjects’ Composite meta-</td>
<td>238.44 (126)</td>
<td>228.60 (127)</td>
<td>9.84 [-14.85-34.54]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stereotype score</td>
<td>[222.69-254.20]</td>
<td>[209.44-247.75]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates 95% confidence that the means are significantly different

### Table 4.11: ANOVA between ideological groups—liberals, conservatives and independents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White subjects</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sum of squares</td>
<td>Degrees of freedom</td>
<td>Mean square</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Significance Prob &gt; F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>48270.92</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24135.46</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>0.0436*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>2048036.75</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>7613.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2096307.67</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>7735.45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi2(2)=1.3717
Prob>chi2=0.5040

*Indicates 95% confidence that means are significantly different between at least two groups
Table 4.12: Bonferroni Test comparing means between ideological groups—liberals, conservatives and independents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>White subjects</th>
<th>Liberals</th>
<th>Independents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>10.26</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>40.44</td>
<td>30.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0390*</td>
<td>0.4740</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates 95% confidence that means are significantly different between specified two groups

Table 4.13: ANOVA between ideological groups—liberals, conservatives and independents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Black subjects</th>
<th>Sum of squares</th>
<th>Degrees of freedom</th>
<th>Mean square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Significance Prob &gt; F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>46560.77</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23280.38</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>0.0951†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>2470522.84</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>9803.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2517083.61</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>9909.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi2(2)= 0.6461
Prob>chi2= 0.7240

†Indicates 95% confidence that means are significantly different between at least two groups

Table 4.14: Bonferroni Test comparing means between ideological groups—liberals, conservatives and independents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Black subjects</th>
<th>Liberals</th>
<th>Independents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>-20.63</td>
<td>0.4680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>-33.72</td>
<td>-13.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.1440</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates 95% confidence that means are significantly different between specified two groups
### Table 4.15: ANOVA between partisan groups—Democrats, Republicans and Independents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White subjects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sum of squares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>42139.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>2054168.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2096307.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi2(2)=1.1703
Prob>chi2=0.5570

†Indicates 90% confidence that means are significantly different between at least two groups

### Table 4.16: Bonferroni Test comparing means between partisan groups—Democrats, Republicans and Independents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White subjects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>42.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0750†</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†Indicates 90% confidence that means are significantly different between specified two groups

### Table 4.17: ANOVA between partisan groups—Democrats, Republicans and Independents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black subjects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sum of squares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>9764.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>2507319.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2517083.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi2(2)=0.0251
Prob>chi2=0.9880

*Indicates 95% confidence that means are significantly different between at least two groups
Table 4.18: Comparing rates at which subjects believe “most” white Americans hold each stereotype and those believing that a simple majority of white Americans hold each stereotype

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% answering affirmatively to the “most” questions about each stereotype</th>
<th>% who guessed that over 50% held each stereotype</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White subjects</td>
<td>Black subjects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence-prone</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintelligent</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer to live off welfare</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.19: Consistency between subjects’ answers to questions asking if “most” white Americans hold specific stereotypes and asking them to guess the percentage who hold the stereotypes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of subjects who said “most” white Americans hold stereotype, but who also guessed that &lt;50% hold that stereotype</th>
<th>% of subjects who answered in a consistent fashion between the “most” and meta-stereotype, guessing questions</th>
<th>% of subjects who said “most” white Americans do not hold stereotype, but who also guessed that &gt;50% hold that stereotype</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White subjects (n=272)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy</td>
<td>22 (8%)</td>
<td>217 (80%)</td>
<td>33 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence-prone</td>
<td>74 (27%)</td>
<td>190 (70%)</td>
<td>8 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintelligent</td>
<td>52 (19%)</td>
<td>185 (68%)</td>
<td>35 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer to live off welfare</td>
<td>49 (18%)</td>
<td>204 (75%)</td>
<td>19 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black subjects (n=255)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy</td>
<td>53 (21%)</td>
<td>181 (71%)</td>
<td>21 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence-prone</td>
<td>60 (24%)</td>
<td>184 (72%)</td>
<td>11 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintelligent</td>
<td>63 (25%)</td>
<td>174 (68%)</td>
<td>18 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer to live off welfare</td>
<td>63 (25%)</td>
<td>181 (71%)</td>
<td>11 (4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.20: Consistency between subjects’ answers to questions asking if “most” white Americans hold each stereotype and their answers to questions asking whether Black individuals in hypothetical scenarios are more/less likely to be stereotyped than their white counterpart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Answer to question asking if “most” white Americans hold the stereotype</th>
<th># of subjects who provided the neutral or “less likely” answers to the hypothetical question concerning stereotyping</th>
<th># of subjects who indicated that the Black individual was “somewhat more likely” to be stereotyped in the hypothetical scenario</th>
<th># of subjects who indicated that the Black individual was “much more likely” to be stereotyped in the hypothetical scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>White subjects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy (n=53)</td>
<td>Yes (n=32)</td>
<td>6 (19%)</td>
<td>13 (41%)</td>
<td>13 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No (n=21)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>7 (33%)</td>
<td>14 (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence-prone (n=56)</td>
<td>Yes (n=16)</td>
<td>6 (38%)</td>
<td>6 (38%)</td>
<td>4 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No (n=40)</td>
<td>3 (8%)</td>
<td>23 (58%)</td>
<td>14 (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintelligent (n=53)</td>
<td>Yes (n=28)</td>
<td>20 (71%)</td>
<td>7 (25%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No (n=25)</td>
<td>9 (36%)</td>
<td>14 (56%)</td>
<td>2 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black subjects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy (n=52)</td>
<td>Yes (n=40)</td>
<td>5 (13%)</td>
<td>9 (22%)</td>
<td>26 (65%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No (n=12)</td>
<td>5 (42%)</td>
<td>4 (33%)</td>
<td>3 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence-prone (n=52)</td>
<td>Yes (n=41)</td>
<td>4 (10%)</td>
<td>8 (20%)</td>
<td>29 (71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No (n=11)</td>
<td>6 (55%)</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintelligent (n=49)</td>
<td>Yes (n=32)</td>
<td>13 (41%)</td>
<td>4 (12%)</td>
<td>15 (47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No (n=17)</td>
<td>8 (47%)</td>
<td>4 (24%)</td>
<td>5 (29%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4.1: Comparing Black & white meta-stereotypes (white stereotypes against Blacks)

Figure 4.2: Black meta-stereotypes-- average guesses concerning prevalence of white stereotypes
Figure 4.3: White meta-stereotypes-- average guesses concerning prevalence of white stereotypes
CHAPTER 5:

INVESTIGATING WHETHER PERCEPTIONS OF THE PREVALENCE OF PREJUDICE IN 21ST CENTURY AMERICA IMPACT RACIAL POLICY PREFERENCES: ANALYZING THE EXPERIMENTAL DATA

This chapter tests the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2. Specifically, this chapter will investigate the sub-hypotheses (H2 & H3) regarding the different effects meta-stereotyping may have on Black respondents compared to white respondents, and regarding the effectiveness of the experimental treatment groups, in order to assess the validity of the main hypothesis of interest (H1) which expects that individuals who demonstrate a higher level of meta-stereotyping will also be more apt to support racial policies designed to combat the consequences of racial prejudice and discrimination.

As described in Chapter 3, and as dictated by this project’s experimental design, this chapter’s analyses will begin by conducting ANOVAs for each of the two racial subsamples (H2), using the five treatment groups (control, priming, and three framing groups) as the factor variable (H3) while investigating respondents’ level of support for, or opposition to, the various racial policies aimed at correcting injustice (specifically, affirmative action and an assortment of criminal justice policies). Should these ANOVA analyses reveal significant differences between the treatment groups in a way that corresponds to H3, there will also be reason to accept the main hypothesis (H1) regarding
the relationship between meta-stereotyping and racial policy preferences as being valid. However, should the ANOVA analyses provide null results, the main hypothesis (H1) can be further tested using regression analysis; doing so would not be able to lead to any findings of causation, but could point toward a potential non-causal relationship.

I. Investigating the relationship between meta-stereotyping and racial policy preferences using a causal approach

In order to determine whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis for this project’s main hypothesis (H1), which states that individuals’ with higher meta-stereotypes will be more apt to support injustice-correcting policy measures, an experimental study was conducted. The experimental components of the survey randomly assigned subjects to one of five groups, either a control group, a priming group, or one of three framing groups (each of which used a different real world hypothetical scenario to transform the abstract concepts of meta-stereotyping into a more concrete application of the concept of prejudice and discrimination). As discussed in greater length in Chapter 3, the purpose of this experimental design was two-fold: first, by attempting to prime some subjects (those in both the priming and the framing groups) to consider their meta-stereotypes prior to answering questions about racial policy preferences, the experiment tries to manipulate subjects’ thought-processes in such a way that it isolates, and therefore highlights, meta-stereotyping as a causal mechanism; second, by adding the framing treatments, the study can also investigate whether perceptions of prejudice might have an effect when measured in a different way than the abstract, often subconscious, process of meta-stereotyping.
As this section investigates the treatment groups’ potential effects on racial policy preferences, analyses will not only be broken down to look at one specific policy at a time, but it will also separate these analyses as they pertain to the Black and white sub-samples. Therefore, this section will be able to determine whether the effects of meta-stereotyping on racial policy preferences manifest at the same levels for the Black and white communities, or whether these effects are stronger for Black individuals (H2).

To begin gauging whether an individual’s level of meta-stereotyping can be accepted as a causal mechanism, an ANOVA was conducted between the three overarching treatment groups (the framing groups were not separated for this initial analysis) and measured for potential effects on the composite scores for the project’s two racial policy areas: the criminal justice reforms policy area includes scores attained from questions asked about the war on drugs, the death penalty, three strikes laws, and racial profiling; the affirmative action policy area includes scores pertaining to college admissions and workplace promotions. Table 5.1 reports the results of this initial ANOVA for the white sub-sample and indicates that there were no treatment effects that reached significance. Not reported in the table are the scores for the Bartlett’s test for equal variance; however, in both instances, the ANOVA passed the assumption check—i.e. we can assume the variance between the groups to be equal—and therefore the ANOVA test remains an appropriate test to use. At this point, the initial results suggest that we should be prepared to fail to reject the null hypothesis (H3) regarding treatment effects for the white sub-sample, which also signals that the main hypothesis (H1) regarding meta-stereotyping’s potential effects on racial policy preferences may not hold, at least not as a causal mechanism for the white community.
However, it was expected that the meta-stereotypes of the Black community may have a more pronounced impact on their racial policy preferences, given their inclination to aid their own in-group, than those hypothesized effects on the white community. Thus, although the white sub-sample did not indicate the expected results vis-à-vis treatment effects and policy preferences, H2 may hold in the sense that an ANOVA of the Black sub-sample could indicate the expected causal relationship. Table 5.2 reports the results of this initial ANOVA for the Black sub-sample; however, again, like the white sub-sample, the treatment effects fail to produce a significant difference in the means of the three groups. Thus, these initial results indicate that we should be prepared to fail to reject the null hypothesis for H3 for the Black sub-sample as well, and also that we should prepare to fail to reject the null hypothesis for H2 since neither sub-sample indicates that treatment effects have a significant effect. Again, the initial results for the Black sub-sample also casts doubt on the validity of the main hypothesis (H1) regarding meta-stereotyping’s role as a causal mechanism pertaining to racial policy preferences. Like the previous analysis, the score of Bartlett’s test of equal variance (while not reported) indicates that the analysis passes the assumption check and that the use of an ANOVA was appropriate. In fact, for all the analyses reported in this chapter, the Bartlett’s test of equal variance indicates that ANOVA is an appropriate mode of analysis.

However, because the framing component of the experimental design included three different issue frames, it is possible that we may see significant treatment effects when the treatment groups are separated into five groups. Thus, before we fail to reject the null (H3) regarding treatment effects, ANOVAs were conducted in a way that
matches the specific policies with specific framing groups (rather than using composite scores for each policy area and factoring by a framing group that includes all three issue frames at once). The results for both sub-samples (Black and white) are reported in Tables 5.3-5.5 with each table representing a different combination of a specified framing group and specified policies.

Table 5.3 specifically reports the results of ANOVAs that featured the control, priming, and hiring framing groups as the factor variable when comparing the mean level of support for affirmative action in universities and the workplace between the three treatment groups. The hypothetical hiring issue frame makes sense to use in this set of analyses because it directly relates to the issue of affirmative action. Individuals in this framing group were given the following pair of hypothetical scenarios to consider, and were then asked to rate how much more/less likely the Black applicant was to be viewed as unintelligent when compared to the white applicant, and also how much more/less likely the Black applicant was to be hired for the job when compared to the white applicant:

Case A: Imagine that a company is hiring for an entry level position. The interviewer is a white individual and the person applying for the job is a Black male.

Case B: Imagine that a similar company is hiring for an entry level position as well. Again, the interviewer is a white individual, but this time the person applying for the job is a white male.

While the priming effects have not yet panned out, thus casting doubt over whether meta-stereotyping has a significant impact on racial policy preferences, these analyses allow us to consider whether individuals need the idea of meta-stereotyping to be put into a more concrete, less abstract context. Thus, instead of relying on the 101-point measure of
meta-stereotyping, these analyses use individuals’ answers pertaining to hypothetical real-world scenarios to measure the potential impact of perceived prejudice and discrimination on those same racial policy preferences.

However, under these more specified conditions the effects of the treatment conditions still fail to reach significance, and thus we must fail to reject the null as it pertains to the potential causal effects of perceived prejudice on affirmative action policies, and that the null remains for both the white and Black communities in this specific instance.

Similarly insignificant trends are reported for both sub-samples in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 which look at the effects of the treatment conditions on individuals’ levels of support for a variety of criminal justice reforms. Unlike the affirmative action example in Table 5.3, the criminal justice policies are less “racialized” (meaning that they are supposed to be “colorblind” unlike affirmative action cases which purposely use race as a central factor) and are also, therefore, less directly related to the hypothetical scenarios in question. Still, research on the criminal justice system (see Chapter 1) indicates that whether or not Americans notice the racial components of these policies, Black Americans are nonetheless impacted at disparate rates due to prejudice and discrimination within the system. Thus, even if the relationships between the two hypothetical scenarios in these analyses and the criminal justice policies aren’t always clear, they do exist.

Table 5.4 specifically reports the results of ANOVAs that featured the control, priming, and loitering framing groups as the factor variable when comparing the mean
level of support for the war on drugs, for racial profiling (specifically racial profiling pertaining to searches & seizures after stopping “suspicious” motorized vehicles), and three strikes laws. The hypothetical loitering issue frame makes sense to use in this set of analyses given that being stopped and searched by police officers is the first stop in a criminal justice system that has a disparate effect on Black Americans (see Chapter 1). If individuals feel that Black individuals are more apt to be stopped and searched by the police officers in the hypothetical scenario than one way of remedying that type of prejudice and discrimination would be to oppose racial profiling, to oppose the war on drugs, and to oppose the three strikes laws (both of which impact minorities disproportionately due to racial profiling, whether that profiling is done consciously or subconsciously, and due to other problems with the system; see Chapter 1). Individuals in this framing group were given the following pair of hypothetical scenarios to consider, and were then asked to rate how much more/less likely the Black loiterers were to be viewed as lazy when compared to the white loiterers, and also how much more/less likely the Black loiterers were to be stopped and searched for drugs by the police officers when compared to the white loiterers:

Case A: Imagine that on a suburban street corner, during typical work hours, two Black males are loitering—hanging around, talking and laughing, but generally minding their own business. A business owner called the police complaining about the loiterers. The police officers patrolling the block are two white officers.

Case B: Imagine that on a similar suburban street a few blocks away, also during typical work hours, two white males are also loitering—hanging out, talking and laughing, but generally minding their own business. Like the other case, a business owner has called the police complaining about loiterers. Again, the police officers patrolling their particular block are two white officers.
Like the previous analyses regarding the hiring issue frame, this frame allows us to investigate the impact of perceptions of prejudice and discrimination in a less abstract way than the 101-point meta-stereotype scale.

Also like the previous analyses regarding the hiring issue frame, this loitering issue frame fails to produce significant results. These results are reported in Table 5.4 and require us to fail to reject the null as it pertains to the potential causal effects of perceived prejudice on various criminal justice reform policies, and that the null remains for both the white and Black communities in this specific instance.

Table 5.5 specifically reports the results of ANOVAs that featured the control, priming, and criminal defendant framing groups as the factor variable when comparing the mean level of support for the death penalty and three strikes laws. The hypothetical criminal defendant issue frame makes sense to use in this set of analyses given that the determination of guilt by a jury of our peers is a crucial step in the criminal justice procedure, and one that is not free from prejudice and discrimination (see Chapter 1). If individuals feel that Black individuals are more apt to be found guilty of violent crimes in the hypothetical scenario than one way of remedying that type of prejudice and discrimination would be to oppose the death penalty and three strikes laws, since the outcomes of jury deliberations have a direct impact on whether a defendant is impacted by those two policies. Individuals in this framing group were given the following pair of hypothetical scenarios to consider, and were then asked to rate how much more/less likely the Black defendant was to be viewed as violent when compared to the white defendant, and also how much more/less likely the Black defendant was to be found guilty by the jury of all-white males:
Case A: Imagine a court case wherein the defendant is a Black male. The defendant has been charged with assault, but has pleaded ‘not guilty’ and the prosecution has failed to produce any solid evidence against the defendant. The jury in this case consists of twelve white individuals.

Case B: Imagine that in a similar court case a white male has been charged with assault. Like the other case, this defendant has pleaded ‘not guilty’ and the prosecution has failed to produce any solid evidence against the defendant. Again, the jury in this case consists of twelve white individuals.

Like the previous analyses regarding the hiring and loitering issue frames, this frame allows us to investigate the impact of perceptions of prejudice and discrimination in a less abstract way than the 101-point meta-stereotype scale.

Also like the previous analyses regarding the hiring and loitering issue frames, this criminal defendants issue frame fails to produce significant results. These results are reported in Table 5.5 and require us to fail to reject the null as it pertains to the potential causal effects of perceived prejudice on various criminal justice reform policies, and that the null remains for both the white and Black communities in this specific instance.

II. Investigating whether there is a relationship between meta-stereotyping and racial policy preferences using OLS regression analysis

While the results in the previous section mean that we must fail to reject the null hypothesis for H3, and though these results should at least give pause to the hypothesized relationship between levels of meta-stereotyping and support for policies designed to correct racial injustice, it does not automatically follow that we must also fail to reject the null hypothesis for H1. Although the experimental design of this study was not able to locate meta-stereotyping as a causal mechanism, there may still be a relationship between an individuals’ level of meta-stereotyping and their support for, or opposition to, various
racial policies. Additionally, it should be kept in mind that treatment conditions—no matter how carefully constructed—do not always materialize as expected; thus, the priming effects may have simply been too subtle in this design, or the meta-stereotypes of the control group may have been subconsciously driving answers even without the priming treatment. Still, because the framing groups—which were less subtle—failed to produce significant results, there remains a healthy dose of skepticism about whether a more refined experimental design would capture different results.

In order to test whether there is a non-causal relationship between meta-stereotyping and racial policy preferences, this section uses OLS regression analyses. OLS is used instead of a maximum likelihood technique because the dependent variable has enough categories to sufficiently represent a continuous variable, and each category is likely interpreted by subjects’ as being equally distanced apart; given these justifications, and coupled with the fact that OLS techniques are generally preferable to MLE methods when given the choice, the analyses herein reflect an OLS approach. The analyses include the composite score of all four meta-stereotypes (lazy, violent, unintelligent and prefer to live off welfare) as the independent variable of interest. The standard battery of control variable is included in each regression as well (age, gender, education, ideology, partisanship, and personal and household income). Additionally, a score measuring the difference in an individual’s group attachment toward Blacks and whites is included in each model as a control variable since group attachment is associated with the theoretical concept of linked fate. For the analyses with support for, or opposition to, affirmative action as the dependent variable, a score measuring
individuals’ perceived negative—albeit unintended—consequences of affirmative action is also included as a control variable.

Table 5.6 reports the results of regressions measuring meta-stereotyping’s potential effect on individuals’ levels of support for, or opposition to, affirmative action policies; the table includes analyses for both the Black and white sub-samples. Like the results in the previous section, the results from these initial regression analyses indicate that we must fail to reject the null (H1) and indicates that meta-stereotyping does not have the hypothesized effect on policy preferences. Though these tables report the main independent variable (meta-stereotyping) as a composite score, separate regressions were run for each specific meta-stereotype as well. Similarly, none of the specific meta-stereotypes were shown to indicate an effect on the white sub-sample’s affirmative action preferences, and only the meta-stereotype regarding violence achieved significance for the Black sub-sample (though it only retained significance at the 90% confidence level, which falls short of the more strident and typical 95% confidence level). Still, it is interesting to note that perceptions of violence had an effect of any significance when perceptions of other traits failed because characteristics like hard working and intelligence seem more directly linked to hiring and admissions practices.

Instead, factors like ideology, partisanship and perceptions that affirmative action has negative (even if unintended) consequences for Blacks are significant factors for the white sub-sample. The direction of these factors is as expected; for example, as individuals become more conservative they become less apt to support affirmative action. Additionally, as individuals increasingly disagree with statements that reflect the opinion that affirmative action is, despite its intention, actually bad for Blacks, they are also more
likely to support the policy (or, stated differently, as individuals increasingly believe that affirmative action actually does harm to Blacks, they are more opposed to the policy). In terms of the difference in group attachment when comparing attachment towards Blacks and whites, the regression indicates that as the gap between positive attachment towards Blacks and positive attachment towards whites grows, the level of support for affirmative action also grows. This is unsurprising given that the alternate way of viewing the same factor would indicate that as individuals’ admit a greater attachment to whites than Blacks, their level of opposition to affirmative action increases. For the Black sub-sample, ideology is a significant factor (as individuals become more conservative they are less supportive of affirmative action policies) and as their level of education increases so too does their level of support for affirmative action; this may be an indicator that these individuals have either experienced first-hand the benefits of affirmative action, or that they have seen the benefits of a college education even if they themselves didn’t benefit from the policy.

Table 5.7 reveals the results of regressions measuring the relationship between each independent factor and subjects’ levels of support for criminal justice reforms aimed at correcting injustice. Again, a number of control variables impact levels of support for these reforms, and for the most part the direction of each impact is as expected. Again, in both sub-samples, as individuals become more conservative they become more supportive of the “tough on crime,” status quo criminal justice measures which have been found to disparately impact the Black community (oddly, however, as Black subjects became more Republican they also became more opposed to the typical “tough on crime” policies; this is highly unexpected, but could be the result of so few Black subjects—less
than 3%— actually identifying as Republicans in the first place). Similarly, as the gap between positive group attachment for Blacks compared to whites increases, so too does opposition to those “tough on crime” policies; this occurs in both the Black and white sub-samples regarding criminal justice policies (whereas it only occurred at significant levels for the white sub-sample regarding affirmative action). However, less clear are the reasons why Southern Black individuals would be more supportive of the “tough on crime” policies. There is literature to insinuate conflicted feelings toward “tough on crime” policies within the Black community, so these effects may occur because Black individuals who witness more crime or are in closer proximity to it may set the priority of fixing the crime problem ahead of fixing the discrimination within the criminal justice system. Still, there is plenty of crime in other parts of the country so it is still unclear why Southern Blacks, in particular, would be more susceptible to this effect.

Finally, it was hugely unexpected that as levels of meta-stereotyping in the white community increased that the level of opposition to the “tough on crime” policies would occur; thus, not only can we fail to reject the null of H1, but the effect was the exact opposite of what was hypothesized. The actual impact is quite small, as the coefficient is a mere five-thousandths of a point, but the direction is still significant and unexpected. It is possible that in answering the meta-stereotype questions, many white subjects were not viewing the prevalence of prejudice as being problematic, which is an assumption made when formulating this project’s hypotheses. Nonetheless, these unexpected findings are not the result of one meta-stereotyping driving the policy preferences more than others, as all four meta-stereotypes were found to be significant in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized when they were separated out. The meta-stereotype scores (whether
composite or separated out) had no significant impact one way or the other on the criminal justice policy preferences for the Black sub-sample.

Although the individualized OLS reports are not reported here, when separated out into four different criminal justice policies (rather than a composite criminal justice score) it became apparent that the only policy driving the findings for the white sub-sample in Table 5.7 is support for three strikes laws, while racial profiling, the war on drugs and the death penalty fail to reach significance (the death penalty actually does attain significance at the 90% confidence level; however that is not the standard for rejecting the null in general, so it won’t be held as the standard herein either). For the Black sub-sample, none of the four policy areas reach significance on their own either (opposition to racial profiling reaches the 90% confidence level but falls short of the standard bearer). Whether looking at the significant effects on the white sub-sample’s composite score or preferences regarding the three strikes law specifically the coefficient, while in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized, is nonetheless very small and thus is not as substantively important as a number of the control variables.

Slightly different patterns emerge when using the old dichotomous measure of meta-stereotyping (in these analyses a composite score was built of the four “most whites” questions). Whereas meta-stereotyping did not have a significant impact on levels of support for, or opposition to, affirmative action when using this project’s 101-point measure, it is significant when using the “most whites” question wording. What’s more, unlike the significant effects regarding the impact of the white sub-sample’s meta-stereotypes on criminal justice reform preferences when using this project’s interval measure, these effects of meta-stereotyping on affirmative action preferences are
significant in the hypothesized direction. Thus, white subjects who affirmed that “most whites” held the four stereotypes were more apt to support affirmative action policies. The pattern between the interval measure and the dichotomous measure are the same when comparing meta-stereotyping’s effects on criminal justice reform preferences—in both cases results suggest that meta-stereotypes do have a significant effect, however these results ran in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized. Thus, the results for H1 are conflicting for the white sub-group—whereas they have the expected impact on affirmative action policies when using the dichotomous measure, they do not have a significant impact when using the interval measure; and when the results are examined for the criminal justice policies the results using both measures are significant, but are significant in a direction that runs counter to H1. The results for these regressions are reported in Table 5.8.

The old dichotomous measure does not change the results for the Black sub-sample though; like the findings regarding the interval measure of meta-stereotyping, affirmative Black responses to the “most whites” questions do not significantly impact their level of support for, or opposition to, affirmative action policies or criminal justice reform policies.

Somewhat different patterns emerge, however, when separating out the four different criminal justice policy measures. Whereas the white sub-sample’s significant results when using the interval measure were driven by the impact on preferences regarding three strikes laws (and the death penalty if using the 90% confidence level), when using the dichotomous measure the results are driven by the three strikes laws and racial profiling but not the war on drugs or the death penalty (although the war on drugs
did achieve significance at the lower 90% confidence threshold). And whereas there is continuity for the Black sub-group in the sense that none of the specific policies achieved significance at the traditional level while using the interval measure and also when using the dichotomous measure, there are inconsistencies if expanding the threshold to the 90% confidence level because using the interval measure only racial profiling neared significance, and when using the dichotomous measure only preferences regarding three strikes laws neared significance.

The lack of continuity in the findings between the effects of meta-stereotyping when using the old dichotomous measure, and this project’s interval measure (for this study’s Black sub-sample at least) indicates that individuals have a hard time grasping the abstract concept of meta-stereotyping and that the way researchers choose to measure this concept is, therefore, vital.

III. Using hypothetical scenarios to investigate whether there is a relationship between perceptions of prejudice and racial policy preferences using OLS regression analysis

Given the analyses in the first two sections of this chapter, there is no evidence to suggest that meta-stereotyping impacts individuals’ support for, or opposition to, policies designed to correct racial injustice. However, the 101-point measurement used in this project is admittedly gauging a more abstract concept. While it was hypothesized that meta-stereotyping would have a positive effect on levels of support for racial policy preferences nonetheless, it was also noted that the abstract nature of meta-stereotyping when asking about group attitudes toward another group as a whole could factor into
whether or not the hypothesized results came to fruition. In order to determine whether perceptions of prejudice affect those same racial policy preferences when individuals think about them in a less abstract, more concrete way, the framing treatment conditions included questions measuring perceptions of prejudice in a different way. Thus, while these questions do not measure meta-stereotypes in the traditional way, they still measure the individuals’ perceptions regarding the likelihood that white members of society negatively stereotype Black members of society.

After members of the three framing sub-groups read through the hypothetical scenarios, they were asked to answer the following questions (depending on which of the three groups they were assigned to):

- **Criminal defendants issue frame**- Which defendant do you think is more likely to be viewed by the all-white jury as violence prone?
- **Loitering issue frame**- Which pair of loiterers do you think is more likely to be viewed as lazy by the police officers patrolling the area?
- **Hiring issue frame**- Which job applicant do you think is more likely to be viewed as unintelligent by the interviewer?

Thus, the questions are phrased quite differently than the meta-stereotype measures used in this project or other projects, but they still get at a similar concept. Instead of asking how many white Americans think about Black Americans with regards to a specific stereotype, it instead asks how likely Black Americans are to be on the receiving end of the stereotyping than their white counterparts. In this sense, the questions are still measuring perceptions of the prevalence of racism, only they are doing so in a concrete comparative fashion as opposed to an abstract numerical fashion. In this section, regressions are run with the specific aim of pairing up the appropriate hypothetical scenario with the policies that are related to that issue area.
Table 5.9 reports the effects of white subjects’ responses to the aforementioned questions on their preferences regarding affirmative action in the workplace and the university setting (increased perceptions of prejudice in the hypothetical scenario bore no significant effects for the Black sub-sample on either policy measure). In the white sub-sample the perception that the Black applicant is more apt to be viewed as unintelligent by the interviewer is significantly related to their increased level of opposition to affirmative action in the workplace; again, the direction of this relationship is opposite of what was hypothesized in H1. These perceptions of increased prejudice did not significantly affect preferences regarding affirmative action in university admissions one way or the other; this could be a product of the issue frame, which specifically asked subjects to imagine scenarios regarding hiring practices in the workplace.

Also included in these regressions were questions gauging subjects’ perceptions of the prevalence of discrimination; these questions asked subjects to indicate whether they thought a negative outcome in the hypothetical scenario was more or less apt to be inflicted upon the Black characters in question than the white characters. These questions specifically asked subjects to consider the following:

Criminal defendants issue frame- Which defendant do you think is more likely to be found guilty by the all-white jury?

Loitering issue frame- Which pair of loiterers do you think is more likely to be stopped by the police officers and searched for drugs?

Hiring issue frame- Which job applicant do you think is more likely to be hired for the job?

Although perceptions that the Black applicant was more apt to be considered unintelligent had no effect on white subjects’ levels of support for affirmative action, the perception that the Black applicant was less likely to be hired for the job in question did
have a significant impact—as individuals perceived higher discriminatory outcomes for the Black applicant (i.e. that the white applicant was more likely to be offered the job) they also became more apt to support affirmative action in both the workplace and the university setting. Thus, while perception of prejudice may not be a significant factor, it seems that perception itself still may play an important role in policy preferences. Not only is the perception of increased discriminatory outcomes significantly linked to increased support for affirmative action policies, but the substantive impact of this variable is also quite large; in fact, it is the largest of all the potential factors in these regressions and is more substantively impactful than the variables measuring difference in group attachment toward Blacks and whites, and also the perceived negative consequences of affirmative action for the Black community, both of which have proved to be significantly important factors in other regressions. What’s more, the regression results regarding affirmative action in university admissions processes also indicate that the increased perception of a discriminatory outcome in the hypothetical hiring issue frame increases the likelihood of supporting affirmative action for college applicants, even though increased perceptions of prejudice in the hypothetical scenario did not. The affirmative action preferences of the Black sub-sample, however, were unmoved by both the perception of increased prejudice toward the Black applicant, and also the perception of an increased discriminatory outcome for the Black applicant.

Unlike the significant effects of white subjects’ perceptions regarding the unequal stereotyping of the Black and white applicants in the aforementioned hypothetical hiring issue frame, subjects’ perceptions regarding the unequal stereotyping of Black and white defendants in the hypothetical criminal defendant issue frame failed to produce a
significant impact on levels of opposition to the death penalty and three strikes laws (both of which are more directly related to questions of court room justice) in the white sub-group. However, the regression for the Black sub-group indicates a significant impact on levels of opposition to three strikes laws which would lend some degree of credence to H1, but failed to produce significant results regarding preferences regarding the death penalty. The Black sub-group also shows significant effects of increased perceptions of prejudice against the defendants on their levels of opposition to the war on drugs, which while related to general racial problems in the criminal justice system, is not directly related to the hypothetical in question, and which is certainly less directly related to the hypothetical scenario than was the issue of the death penalty. In both cases reported in Table 5.10, increased perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice were not only significant in the hypothesized direction, but also were substantively impactful as well.

When considering the likelihood of increased prejudice in the case of the hypothetical loiterers, subjects in both the Black and white sub-groups failed to have their criminal justice reform preferences moved. That is, despite increased perceptions that the police would view the Black loiterers as lazy, subjects did not moderate their preferences regarding the war on drugs, racial profiling or three strikes laws on those perceptions’ account. However, as reported in Table 5.11, white subjects’ likelihood of opposing three strikes laws was significantly impacted by increased perceptions of discriminatory outcomes (in this case, that the Black loiterers would be more apt to be stopped and searched by police) and were moved in the hypothesized direction with those more likely to perceive a discriminatory outcome for the Black loiterers (in this case, being stopped and searched for drugs) also being more opposed to three strike laws. However,
perceptions of the prevalence of increased discriminatory outcomes did not impact the Black sub-group.

The fact that only one policy within the criminal justice reform issue area was impacted by perceptions of increased discrimination against Blacks (three strike laws) suggests some disparity between white subjects’ proclivity to consider perceptions of discriminatory outcomes in the case of affirmative action but not criminal justice reform. This may be because affirmative action policies are more directly linked to race in the American consciousness, whereas criminal justice policies are “colorblind” in their design and adoption, even if they are not so “colorblind” in practice. It is also possible that some white subjects are more inclined to believe that Black loiterers are up to no good and should be searched by the police (the questions do not ask subjects whether they find the increased likelihood of discriminatory outcomes to be problematic), whereas they are not so inclined to believe that Black individuals are unfit for entry level positions. Thus, individuals, even with the prodding of a hypothetical scenario pointing out racial disparities, may be less apt to apply the theoretical logic of this study to criminal justice reform policies as a whole.

Additionally, while Black subjects were moved by increased perceptions that they are more violence-prone, they were unmoved by increased perceptions that they are more lazy. This may have been due to the specific stereotype measured within this hypothetical scenario (laziness) if subjects fail to see that specific trait as the reason that a cop is more likely to stop and search the hypothetical Black characters. It is unclear why they would remain unmoved by increased perceptions of discriminatory outcomes in both
hypothetical scenarios, but the results are at least consistently in accordance with failing to reject the null.

IV. Discussion

Taken as a whole, the analyses in this chapter provide scant evidence to believe that individuals’ levels of meta-stereotyping impacts their racial policy preferences. In all but a few specific cases the analyses pertaining to meta-stereotyping’s potential effects on these preferences resulted in a failure to reject the null hypothesis.

In order to gauge the causal effects of meta-stereotypes ANOVA analyses were conducted in accordance with the experimental design of this project’s survey instrument. However, neither the policy preferences of the priming group or the framing group were impacted by their treatment conditions; thus, these analyses provide a firm rejection of meta-stereotyping as a causal mechanism (and, therefore, a firm rejection of H3). Table 5.12 provides a recap of the tested relationships and the consistent failure to reject the null.

Because it was possible that the experimental design simply failed to have the treatment conditions manifest in the consciousness (or sub-consciousness) of the subjects, a series of OLS regressions were undertaken in order to look for relationships between individuals’ levels of meta-stereotyping and their racial policy preferences. After all, rejecting meta-stereotypes as a causal mechanism (H3) does not automatically equate to a rejection of the overarching hypothesis (H1) that posited that higher levels of meta-stereotyping would lead to increased support for racial policies designed to correct racial injustices.
However, the results of these regressions yielded few significant instances of meta-stereotyping’s impact on racial policy preferences, and when significant results did arise they were of a mixed variety—sometimes impacting white subjects, and other times Black subjects; sometimes having an impact in the hypothesized direction, and other times having an impact in the direction opposite of the hypothesis; sometimes results would appear significant when using one measure of meta-stereotyping and not the other measures. A recap of these results appears in Tables 5.13-5.15.

Thus, while the analyses in this chapter suggest we must reject H3 in its entirety, the few instances wherein meta-stereotypes did reach significance cannot make up for the general sense of discord when analyzing meta-stereotyping’s potential impact on these policies and so we must reject H1 as well. It is true that in certain situations meta-stereotyping may be a significant factor leading to increased support for policies designed to correct racial injustice (for example, for the white sub-sample’s support for affirmative action when using the dichotomous measure, or the Black sub-sample’s support for certain criminal justice reforms when looking at perceptions of the increased likelihood that Black defendants will be viewed as more violence-prone), however, for each instance where significance was achieved there are a multitude more instances where significance was not achieved, or was achieved in a way that led to opposition to the policy in question (even the same policy; such as opposition to affirmative action when using perceptions of prejudice based on the hypothetical hiring scenario). The results are, therefore, too inconsistent to accept that meta-stereotyping, as a generalizable concept, is significantly playing a role in a broad array of racial policy preferences.
Additionally, we must reject H2 as well since it appears that white individuals’ meta-stereotypes are more likely to have an impact on their racial policy preferences (whether in the hypothesized direction or not). The Black sub-sample, after all, only saw their racial policy preferences shift with regard to two specific criminal justice reform policies and only with regard to the perception that the hypothetical Black character in the criminal defendant issue frame was more apt to be viewed as violence-prone. While the Black sub-sample did attain significance in the hypothesized direction at the 90% confidence threshold in a few other cases, the lowered threshold does not justify a rejection of the null.

Ultimately, more research may need to be conducted on the topic of meta-stereotyping’s potential impact on racial policy preferences, and two specific alterations could be made to the research design: first, a more ideologically diverse sample could be used, as the vast majority of subjects in both the Black and white sample identified as independents or liberals (and also independents or Democrats) rather than conservatives (or Republicans); second, questions could be added to the questionnaire in order to gauge whether respondents believe the prevalence of prejudice/stereotyping is actually problematic. Future investigation into whether the priming and framing treatment conditions take effect when the issue at hand is meta-stereotyping would also add to the discussion, since it is currently unknown how readily accessible meta-stereotypes are to white individuals and since this project’s experimental design is built upon the assumption that the priming and framing treatment conditions caused at least a subtle shift in the thought process of subjects.
However, although perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice failed to produce significant results in most cases (and certainly failed to do so in a steady, consistent fashion), thus resulting in the failure to reject the null (H1), perception itself does seem to play a part for white subjects when the perception in question is the prevalence of discriminatory outcomes (not simply prejudice), especially for overtly racial policies like affirmative action. Table 5.16 recaps the findings of the OLS regressions pertaining to the effects of subjects’ perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice when it is measured as the perception that hypothetical Black characters are more or less likely to be on the receiving end of discrimination (hence leading to discriminatory outcomes).

Increased perceptions of discriminatory outcomes in the hypothetical hiring issue frame led to significant and substantive changes to the increased level of support for affirmative action in both the workplace and the university setting for the white sub-sample. Additionally, this is the first analysis that produced significant results in the hypothesized direction for a criminal justice reform policy within the white sub-sample (although, still, the majority of criminal justice reforms were unaffected at a significant rate in either direction using this measure). Thus, there is reason to believe that even though meta-stereotypes cannot be accepted as a factor in determining individuals’ levels of support for policies aimed at correcting racial injustice based on this project’s sample and analyses, the role of perceptions of the prevalence of discrimination may nonetheless be important, especially when the policy in question is of an overtly racial nature, such as affirmative action practices. These effects are not seen within the Black sub-sample, which provides yet another reason we must fail to reject the null for H2.
When taken together, then, this project ultimately fails to reject all three hypotheses set forth at the start of the study. It cannot be accepted that meta-stereotyping plays a causal role in mediating individuals’ levels of support for policies aimed at correcting racial injustice, nor can it be accepted that they even play a generalizable role through non-causal relationships. Yet the project may still be instructive in some respects for both racial justice advocates and social scientists.

Racial justice advocates might take away the importance of highlighting the racial nature of specific policy issues, and also explain how the proposed policies aimed at correcting the racial problem would be an actual solution. Amongst the white sub-sample—which are typically those who need to be won over by activists and politicians—subjects were more apt to be moved by meta-stereotypes in the hypothesized way and by perceptions of the prevalence of discriminatory outcomes when the issue at hand was overtly racial and when the proposed policy solution was clearly identifiable as correcting the racial injustice. It is possible that these effects would switch to becoming significant (either at all, or in the hypothesized direction when they do occur) for white Americans’ preferences regarding criminal justice reforms if those policies were more clearly linked as a solution to the racial strife documented within that system. Racial justice advocates might also do well to move away from arguments surrounding whether or not somebody’s intentions were motivated by prejudice (since meta-stereotyping didn’t yield enough steady and consistent results to accept that they are an important factor in whether individuals support racial policies aimed at correcting injustice, even if that injustice stems, in part, due acknowledged prejudices) and to instead embrace an issue frame that highlights discriminatory outcomes as the end-game that needs
correcting. Combining these two strategies could lead to the desired levels of support for measures designed to combat racial injustice in a variety of settings.

To give racial justice advocates a better understanding of how these strategies would work, future studies might choose to provide a brief explanation of how reforms to the death penalty, the drug war and three strikes laws would provide a direct solution to the problem of racial injustice that most white subjects admitted existed in our current legal system (by way of their answers in the hypothetical criminal defendant and loitering scenarios) so that they view the policies as being connected to the problem of discriminatory outcomes in the first place. This project assumed that the connection could be made, and that assumption may not have been warranted. They may also include a wider battery of meta-stereotypes if framing the issue with hypothetical scenarios because this project was limited in investigating perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice in those analyses because each hypothetical group was only asked about one potential stereotype—thus, if individuals don’t feel that laziness leads to police officers’ interactions with Black individuals, but they do believe that other negative stereotypes lead to negative interactions, such relationships remain hidden in this project’s analyses; likewise, if individuals don’t view lack of intelligence to be a motivating reason for interviewers’ to negatively stereotype and discriminate against Black applicants, but they do view other negative stereotypes to have an impact, those relations also remain hidden in this project’s analyses.

Additionally, future research could look also try to obtain a more ideologically diverse sample; as it is, it is unclear whether a more conservative sample would have led to a wider range of answers regarding their perceptions of perceived prejudice and
discrimination after reading the hypothetical scenarios (although subjects were provided the option of electing that the hypothetical white characters would be stereotyped more and negatively affected by discrimination more, the vast majority of subjects in both subsamples chose the neutral option or answered that the Black hypothetical characters would be on the receiving end of more prejudice and discrimination; this may simply be a reflection of the realities that are documented in Chapter 1, but it may also be the product of a more ideologically liberal sample that more readily acknowledges racism).

Additionally, the project can be viewed by researchers as a warning over the difficulties in isolating meta-stereotyping as a possible causal mechanism, and also as a warning over the difficulties in how to conceptualize and measure meta-stereotyping in the first place. The descriptive statistics in chapter 4 documented the inconsistencies between subjects’ answers regarding the prevalence of prejudice when measured using the three different types of variables, and the analyses in this chapter point to the fact that such inconsistencies in answers will lead to inconsistencies in whether or not those variables impact the dependent variables of interest (in this case, racial policy preferences). Less clear is how to remedy this problem of inconsistencies between measures of meta-stereotyping, but knowing that it is something that must be grappled with is a valuable contribution in and of itself. Additionally, researchers who are interested in perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice may also want to include measures of perceived levels of discriminatory outcomes in their studies, since the latter seems to have a strong impact for white Americans if the findings for this project’s white sub-sample can be extrapolated more broadly. Although scholars of racism in the United States know that individual prejudices can subconsciously lead to more institutionalized
forms of discrimination, such a link may not be obvious to citizens who don’t often think about racial issues in a scholarly way, and so both measures may contribute to researchers’ better understanding of the phenomena they are investigating while using meta-stereotyping as a potential factor.
### Table 5.1: Effects of three treatment groups on composite criminal justice reform and affirmative action policy areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy area</th>
<th>White subjects</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sum of squares</td>
<td>Degrees of freedom</td>
<td>Mean squared</td>
<td>Degrees of freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal justice reforms</td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>23.28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.64</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>3420.77</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>12.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3444.06</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>12.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action</td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>9.52</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>1740.42</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>6.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1749.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level

### Table 5.2: Effects of three generic treatment groups on composite criminal justice reform and affirmative action policy areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy area</th>
<th>Black subjects</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sum of squares</td>
<td>Degrees of freedom</td>
<td>Mean squared</td>
<td>Degrees of freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal justice reforms</td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>17.38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.69</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>2552.72</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>10.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2570.10</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>10.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action</td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>1043.96</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1049.86</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level
Table 5.3: Effects of treatment groups on support for affirmative action policies when the framing group is presented with a hypothetical scenario featuring two similar job applicants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>White subjects</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sum of squares</td>
<td>Degrees of freedom</td>
<td>Mean squared</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College admissions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>295.52</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>298.26</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workplace promotions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>278.01</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>280.01</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black sub-sample</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College admissions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>186.34</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>191.97</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workplace promotions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>188.02</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>190.83</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level
Table 5.4: Effects of treatment groups on support for specified criminal justice reforms when the framing group is presented with a hypothetical scenario featuring two similar pairs of loiterers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>White subjects</th>
<th>Sum of squares</th>
<th>Degrees of freedom</th>
<th>Mean squared</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War on drugs</td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.4361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>311.59</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>315.75</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial profiling</td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.6250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>213.88</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>215.14</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three strikes laws</td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>0.1713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>318.61</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>325.72</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>2.01</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Black sub-sample</th>
<th>Sum of squares</th>
<th>Degrees of freedom</th>
<th>Mean squared</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War on drugs</td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>8.27</td>
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<td>4.13</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>0.1066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>274.79</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>283.06</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial profiling</td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.18</td>
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<td>0.5257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>275.36</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>1.82</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>277.71</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three strikes laws</td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.3243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>300.40</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>304.91</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level.
Table 5.5: Effects of treatment groups on support for specified criminal justice reforms when the framing group is presented with a hypothetical scenario featuring two similar defendants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>White subjects</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sum of squares</td>
<td>Degrees of freedom</td>
<td>Mean squared</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death penalty</td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>367.11</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>368.08</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three strikes laws</td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>333.08</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>333.40</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black sub-sample</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death penalty</td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>298.79</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>299.58</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three strikes laws</td>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>308.40</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>309.06</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level
Table 5.6: OLS regression of meta-stereotyping’s effects on affirmative action policy preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White sub-sample</th>
<th>Black sub-sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meta-stereotype level</td>
<td>.0002</td>
<td>.0017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.3028</td>
<td>.1819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.0965</td>
<td>.2701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.0714</td>
<td>.0840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal income</td>
<td>-.0022</td>
<td>.1428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>-.1590</td>
<td>.1162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-.2590*</td>
<td>.1149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>-.2293</td>
<td>.1262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in south</td>
<td>-.3766</td>
<td>.3671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grow up in south</td>
<td>.1356</td>
<td>.3677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference in group attachment</td>
<td>.1587**</td>
<td>.0561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences of affirmative action</td>
<td>.2973**</td>
<td>.0532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.8906**</td>
<td>.9847</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=272  Prob>F=.0000  R-squared=.3077  n=253  Prob>F=.0001  R-squared=.1447

*Indicates confidence at the 95% level; ** Indicates confidence at the 99% level
Table 5.7: OLS regression of meta-stereotyping’s effects on criminal justice reform preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White sub-sample</th>
<th></th>
<th>Black sub-sample</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard error</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meta-stereotype level</td>
<td>-.0054*</td>
<td>.0021</td>
<td>Meta-stereotype level</td>
<td>.0004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.3108</td>
<td>.2337</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.0243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1.1371**</td>
<td>.3474</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.4521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.4109**</td>
<td>.1081</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.1772</td>
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<td>.1839</td>
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<td>.0094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>-.2394</td>
<td>.1496</td>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>-.3338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-.7351**</td>
<td>.1466</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-.2589*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>-.2355</td>
<td>.1623</td>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>.4973**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in south</td>
<td>-.5307</td>
<td>.4720</td>
<td>Live in south</td>
<td>-1.1085*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grow up in south</td>
<td>.6535</td>
<td>.4731</td>
<td>Grow up in south</td>
<td>.5818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference in group attachment</td>
<td>.3111**</td>
<td>.0716</td>
<td>Difference in group attachment</td>
<td>.1880**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>13.9300**</td>
<td>1.0134</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>7.8666**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates confidence at the 95% level; ** Indicates confidence at the 99% level
Table 5.8: OLS regression of meta-stereotyping’s effects on affirmative action and criminal justice reform policy preferences (White subjects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Affirmative Action</th>
<th></th>
<th>Criminal Justice Reforms</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard error</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Most whites” meta-stereotype</td>
<td>.1961*</td>
<td>.0919</td>
<td>“Most whites” meta-stereotype</td>
<td>-.3491**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.3249*</td>
<td>.1806</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.3527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.1023</td>
<td>.2678</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1.1508**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.0813</td>
<td>.0833</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.4097**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal income</td>
<td>.0067</td>
<td>.1409</td>
<td>Personal income</td>
<td>-.0263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>-.1515</td>
<td>.1150</td>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>-.2312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-.2582*</td>
<td>.1137</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-.7143**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>-.2304</td>
<td>.1251</td>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>-.2290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in the south</td>
<td>-.4350</td>
<td>.3649</td>
<td>Live in the south</td>
<td>-.4561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grew up in the south</td>
<td>.1661</td>
<td>.3646</td>
<td>Grew up in the south</td>
<td>.5767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference in group attachment</td>
<td>.1882**</td>
<td>.0544</td>
<td>Difference in group attachment</td>
<td>.3108**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences of affirmative action</td>
<td>.3270**</td>
<td>.0531</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>13.7498**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.2074**</td>
<td>.9443</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=272  Prob>F=.0000  R-squared=.3197  
n=272  Prob>F=.0000  R-squared=.4211

* Indicates confidence at the 95% level; ** Indicates confidence at the 99% level
Table 5.9: OLS regression of increased perceptions of prejudice and discrimination in a hypothetical hiring scenario on affirmative action policy preferences (White subjects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workplace Hiring</th>
<th>University Admissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception that Black applicant is more unintelligent</td>
<td>-.5868* .2696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception that Black applicant is less likely to get job</td>
<td>.6017* .2394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.2257 .1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.4591 .2834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.0685 .0987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal income</td>
<td>-.0185 .1420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>-.0819 .1142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-.2219 .1413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>.1268 .1492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in the south</td>
<td>-.6507 .3828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grew up in the south</td>
<td>-.3958 .3293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference in group attachment</td>
<td>.1101 .0577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences of affirmative action</td>
<td>.1230* .0538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.6909 1.4037</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=53
Prob>F=.0005
R-squared=.5653

* Indicates confidence at the 95% level; ** Indicates confidence at the 99% level
Table 5.10: OLS regression of increased perceptions of prejudice and discrimination in a hypothetical criminal defendant scenario on preferences regarding three strikes laws and the war on drugs

(Black subjects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Three strikes laws</th>
<th>War on Drugs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception that Black defendant is more violence-prone</td>
<td>.7433*</td>
<td>.3547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception that Black defendant is more likely to be found guilty</td>
<td>-.3411</td>
<td>.3673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.0570</td>
<td>.2666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.6787</td>
<td>.4338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.1951</td>
<td>.1332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal income</td>
<td>-.6043*</td>
<td>.2773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>.2766</td>
<td>.2486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-.1082</td>
<td>.1242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>.0435</td>
<td>.1748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in south</td>
<td>-.0816</td>
<td>.6463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grow up in south</td>
<td>-.0282</td>
<td>.6286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference in group attachment</td>
<td>-.0096</td>
<td>.0785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.3296</td>
<td>1.8480</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=52  
Prob>F=.2267  
R-Squared=.2949  

N=52  
Prob>F=.2429  
R-Squared=.2900

* Indicates confidence at the 95% level; ** Indicates confidence at the 99% level
Table 5.11: OLS regression of increased perceptions of prejudice and discrimination in a hypothetical loitering scenario on preferences regarding three strikes laws (White subjects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perception that Black loiterers are more lazy</td>
<td>-.4709</td>
<td>.2981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception that Black loiterers are more apt to be searched for drugs</td>
<td>.7667*</td>
<td>.3133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.2165</td>
<td>.2282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.3671</td>
<td>.3755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.0771</td>
<td>.1326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal income</td>
<td>.3787</td>
<td>.2342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>-.1722</td>
<td>.1674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-.2966</td>
<td>.1638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>-.0906</td>
<td>.1891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in south</td>
<td>-1.1540**</td>
<td>.4253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grow up in south</td>
<td>1.0868*</td>
<td>.4634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference in group attachment</td>
<td>.1004</td>
<td>.0780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.7317</td>
<td>1.3728</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=53, Prob>F=.0010, R-squared=.3793

* Indicates confidence at the 95% level; ** Indicates confidence at the 99% level
Table 5.12: Recap of ANOVA analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White sub-sample</th>
<th>Black sub-sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Composite scores for racial policy areas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative Action</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Justice</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothetical hiring scenario</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action-Workplace</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action-University</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothetical loitering scenario</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War on Drugs</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial profiling</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three strikes laws</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothetical criminal defendant scenario</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death penalty</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three strikes laws</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

☒ indicates a failure to reject the null

✓ indicates a rejection of the null
Table 5.13: Recap of OLS regressions using the interval 101-point measure of meta-stereotyping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composite scores for policy areas</th>
<th>White sub-sample</th>
<th>Black sub-sample</th>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>White sub-sample</th>
<th>Black sub-sample</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td></td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal justice</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>Significant in opposite direction of hypothesis</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual policies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action - Workplace</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td></td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>Significant in hypothesized direction at 90% confidence level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action - University</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td></td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death penalty</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td></td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War on Drugs</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td></td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial profiling</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td></td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>Significant in hypothesized direction at 90% confidence level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three strikes laws</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>Significant in opposite direction of hypothesis</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

☒ indicates a failure to reject the null
✔ indicates a rejection of the null
### Table 5.14: Recap of OLS regressions using the dichotomous, “most whites” measure of meta-stereotyping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composite scores for policy areas</th>
<th>White sub-sample</th>
<th>Black sub-sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal justice</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>Significant in opposite direction of hypothesis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual policies</th>
<th>White sub-sample</th>
<th>Black sub-sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action-Workplace</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action-University</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>Significant in hypothesized direction at 90% confidence level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death penalty</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War on Drugs</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial profiling</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>Significant in opposite direction of hypothesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three strikes laws</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>Significant in opposite direction of hypothesis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

❌ indicates a failure to reject the null
✔️ indicates a rejection of the null
Table 5.15: Recap of OLS regressions using “more/less likely” to be stereotyped answers regarding hypothetical scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perception that Black defendant is more likely to be viewed as violence-prone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death penalty</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td></td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War on Drugs</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial profiling</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td></td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Strikes Laws</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception that Black loiterers are more likely to be viewed as lazy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death penalty</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td></td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War on Drugs</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td></td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial profiling</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td></td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Strikes Laws</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td></td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception that Black applicant is more likely to be viewed as unintelligent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action-Workplace</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Significant in opposite direction of hypothesis</td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action-University</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td></td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

❌ indicates a failure to reject the null
✓ indicates a rejection of the null
Table 5.16: Recap of OLS regressions using “more/less likely” to receive discriminatory outcome answers regarding hypothetical scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception that Black defendant is more likely to be found guilty</th>
<th>White sub-sample</th>
<th>Black sub-sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Death penalty</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War on Drugs</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial profiling</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Strikes Laws</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception that Black loiterers are more likely to be stopped and searched for drugs</th>
<th>White sub-sample</th>
<th>Black sub-sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Death penalty</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War on Drugs</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial profiling</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Strikes Laws</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception that Black applicant is less likely to be hired for the job</th>
<th>White sub-sample</th>
<th>Black sub-sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action-Workplace</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action-University</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

✗ indicates a failure to reject the null
✓ indicates a rejection of the null
CHAPTER 6:

FINAL THOUGHTS AND FUTURE FRONTIERS

This project used an original experimental survey in order to investigate the potential impact of meta-stereotyping on individuals’ racial policy preferences. Previous chapters sought to provide an account of the importance of such an exploration—Chapter 1 introduced the break in reality between the American post-racial narrative and the enduring racial injustices of the twenty-first century in order to justify the project’s normative, real-world importance, while Chapter 2 introduced the theoretical considerations underpinning such an investigation and the subsequent hypotheses in order to justify the project’s place in the broader social science literature and its extension of our knowledge of meta-stereotyping’s consequences into the realm of political science, thereby justifying its importance as an academic pursuit.

The logic behind the use of an experimental procedure was discussed in Chapter 3, as was the design of the original survey instrument, followed by a descriptive account of the data gleaned from the survey in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 used ANOVA analyses to statistically deduce whether or not to reject the null hypotheses (outlined for the first time in Chapter 2) and, failing to find significance on account of any of the three hypotheses, moved to using OLS regression analysis to investigate whether a relationship between meta-stereotyping and racial policy preferences exists.
While most of the data produced insignificant results, and though the significant results were often inconsistent, this project did produce a few interesting findings. This chapter, therefore, is broken into two sections—the first section asks what we might take away from this project based on its normative, real-world implications; the second section provides future avenues for researchers to explore by briefly discussing some of the potential limitations of the research and by speculating about potential explanations for the project’s inconsistent findings.

Below are the main findings of interest which will be alluded to in subsequent sections:

- Members of both the Black and white communities over-exaggerate the prevalence of prejudice based on the self-reported stereotype scores within this project and when compared to the data within similar surveys. However, members of the Black community over-exaggerate this prevalence at a higher degree. This is not surprising given the different types of socialization experienced by Black and white Americans. When using a 101-point measure of meta-stereotyping, however, the gap between Black and white responses shrinks compared to the gap when using the dichotomous, “most” measure of meta-stereotyping. The rate of meta-stereotyping amongst the Black community has held relatively stable over the past twenty years; white meta-stereotypes were not measured in the 1991 study, so no assessment can be made regarding the levels of levels of whites’ meta-stereotypes over time. Despite the levels of meta-stereotypes remaining fairly consistent in the Black community, self-reported
levels of stereotyping in the white community have decreased during that twenty
year period.

- Both Black and white subjects reported higher levels of meta-stereotyping when
  asked about white attitudes regarding Blacks than when asked about white
  attitudes toward any other racial or ethnic group (Hispanic, Asian, Arab and
  White). While their meta-stereotypes were over-exaggerated, they do reflect the
  reality that white subjects’ self-reported higher levels of negative stereotyping
  (and lower levels of positive stereotyping) when the stereotypes were applied to
  Blacks as a group.

- Surprisingly, white subjects who identified as conservative and Republican
  reported higher levels of meta-stereotyping than did their white counterparts who
  identified as liberal and Democratic. This finding was not expected since
  conservatives are generally thought to be more likely to accept the American post-
  racial narrative. Ideology was also found to be related to the likelihood that an
  individual would support policies aimed at correcting racial injustice (in the
  expected direction, with liberals being more supportive of such policies), which
  may have counteracted the impact of the meta-stereotypes and, therefore, be
  partly responsible for the null results in the OLS regressions.

- There were noticeable inconsistencies between subjects’ answers to the three
  meta-stereotype questions; this was true of both the Black and white sub-samples.
  In both groups, subjects tended to report higher meta-stereotypes when asked the
  dichotomous, “most” question than when they were asked the 101-point measure.
  Inconsistencies were also displayed when answering questions pertaining to the
hypothesised scenarios (assessing whether the Black characters in the scenarios were more or less likely to be stereotyped) and the dichotomous, “most” measure. In those cases, both Black and white subjects were more likely to say that the Black character in question was somewhat more or much more likely to be negatively stereotyped than they were to report that they thought “most whites” held the stereotype; this directional trend was true for the violence-prone and laziness questions, however the direction was reversed for the unintelligence question.

- The ANOVA analyses failed to produce significant results; thus, meta-stereotypes cannot be accepted as a causal factor in determining individuals’ racial policy preferences. While this could have been a product of poor survey design, the OLS regressions looking for a non-causal relationship also fail to produce significant results in most cases and when significant results were achieved in the white community they trended in the opposite direction as was hypothesized more often than not.

- When looking at the impact of perceptions of the likelihood that Blacks are actively discriminated against more than their white counterparts (by way of hypothetical scenarios, and in comparison to perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice), white subjects’ racial policy preferences were finally consistently impacted in the hypothesized direction, although significant results were still produced in only a handful of the possible scenarios.
I. What can we take away from this project?

“Do you think your Republic colleagues in Congress are racist?”

“Not all of them. Of course not… [But] To a significant extent, the Republican base does have elements that are animated by racism.”

- CNN Correspondent Candy Crowley & Congressman Steve Israel (Schwartz 2014)

On April 13th 2014, Representative Steve Israel (D-NY) not-so-boldly proclaimed that “not all” Republicans are racist. In doing so, however, Israel interjected race into the political discourse, implying that in many instances his political opponents are, in fact, racially prejudiced. His remarks echoed those made by other Democratic figures Eric Holder (Attorney General) and Nancy Pelosi (House Minority Leader), who indicated that racism often infects the Republican way of thinking about current political issues. On cue, opponents on the right accused Israel and his liberal brethren of playing the “race card;” a catch-all phrase that insinuates that race, and its accompanying prejudice and discrimination, is no longer really a part of the equation, and that a solution, therefore, need not take racial history or current realities into consideration. The back-and-forth in this recent scenario is predictable; after all, as described in Chapter 1, the U.S. is currently in the crux of an ongoing debate concerning the validity of the American post-racial narrative, wherein many—especially, though not limited to, those on the left—see racial prejudice and discrimination as an enduring presence in twenty-first century America, and many others—particularly, though, again, not limited to, those on the right—see racism as a problem that the U.S. has finally, successfully put behind us.

This project, however, suggests that time and effort spent debating the merits of the post-racial narrative may be misplaced. Just as an individuals’ belief, or lack thereof,
in the post-racial narrative is inconsequential to whether or not racial injustice persists as a reality, such beliefs counter-intuitively seem inconsequential to whether or not individuals support policy preferences aimed at correcting the persisting racial injustices. This isn’t to say that racial justice advocates should turn against the facts (see Chapter 1) and cede the debate to those who firmly accept the post-racial narrative, but this project does suggest that a new strategy may be needed for those who wish to see policies aimed at correcting racial injustices backed by the American public and enacted by politicians.

While such an appraisal may be somewhat overstated given the unrepresentative nature of this project’s sample, the project leaves much room to doubt the importance of meta-stereotyping when deducing individuals’ levels of support for, or opposition to, two specific policy areas designed at combating the problems of racial prejudice and discrimination: affirmative action and criminal justice reforms. Meta-stereotypes were used in this project as a way of operationalizing subjects’ belief in the post-racial narrative; they measure an individual’s perception of the prevalence of prejudice currently held by white Americans against their Black compatriots.

Meta-stereotypes have been previously documented to affect individuals in the out-group (on the receiving end of prejudice) in a variety of psychological and sociological ways (see Chapter 2); however, no research had been conducted to investigate whether they also manifest in political ways. After using an original experimental survey to try and isolate meta-stereotyping as a causal mechanism that impacts individuals’ racial policy preferences, no evidence was found for a political manifestation of meta-stereotypes’ consequences (see Chapter 5). Even when looking at the potential impact of meta-stereotypes as a non-causal factor, as opposed to a causal
factor, the results of this project failed to predict any consistent and meaningful role for subjects’ increased meta-stereotypes as they relate to the hypothesized increased level of support for policies aimed at correcting for racial injustice (see Chapter 5). Depending on the measure of meta-stereotyping, the racial group being investigated, and the specific policy in question, results at times proved significant and at other times insignificant; likewise, at times results trended in the direction hypothesized, while at other times results trended in the direction opposite this project’s hypotheses.

Instead, levels of support for affirmative action policies, and levels of opposition to current racially-biased criminal justice policies, were impacted by a number of expected variables, including political ideology and the difference in subjects’ levels of group attachment for Blacks and whites. Considering the policies tested in this project are directly aligned with the policy platforms of Democrats, it is not surprising that political ideology would play a role, with those who are more liberal being more inclined to support affirmative action and oppose current criminal justice practices. Additionally, given the theoretical speculations regarding the role of linked fate (see Chapter 2), it is not particularly surprising that levels of group attachment would yield significant results either, with those who reported a larger gap in their levels of attachment for Blacks and whites being less apt to support policies aimed at correcting racial injustice.

Additionally, however, a move away from examining perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice to an examination of subjects’ assessments of the likelihood that discriminatory outcomes exist (in a direction that is unfavorable to Black Americans) indicates that white Americans may allow these perceptions to impact their racial policy preferences in a more consistent fashion than do their perceptions of prejudice (see
Chapter 5). Investigating perceptions of the proclivity of Blacks to be victimized by discriminatory outcomes is the first measure to produce significant results (for the white sub-sample) that trend in the hypothesized direction and only the hypothesized direction. Additionally, it is the first time that a criminal justice measure produced significant results in the predicted direction—white subjects allowed their level of opposition for three strikes laws to raise as they reported a higher likelihood that the Black characters in the hypothetical scenario were more likely to be stopped and searched by police. This specific scenario may have been viewed by subjects as being more directly pertinent to the discriminatory outcome at hand than the scenario concerning the death penalty; it is somewhat unexpected that opposition to racial profiling would not be moved by a perception that there is an increased likelihood of the Black characters being approached by police, however that may be a result of the vast majority of subjects (90%) indicating that they were either neutral toward, or opposed to, racial profiling when police officers suspect individuals of possessing drugs.

While the Black subjects’ racial policy preferences remained unmoved by their assessments of likely discriminatory outcomes, the Black community is generally less apt to need convincing to support policies aimed at correcting racial injustice in the first place, so politicians and activists may wish to adopt a strategy that is capable of moving white public opinion regarding racial policy preferences more anyway. Thus, Democrats in office, such as Israel, Holder and Pelosi, may benefit more by shifting their focus away from alleging prejudice or “name calling”—by calling people, groups, actions, etc. “racist”—and instead move toward focus on highlighting the outcomes experienced by members of the Black community. In other words, politicians and activists may benefit
by shifting away from a more accusatory tone, focused on the perpetrators’ motivations, and instead focus more on highlighting the experiences of the victims, and therefore promoting a clearer sense of why solutions are needed and what is motivating policies aimed at correcting racial injustice in the first place.

Additionally, such a shift would allow members of the American public to envision concrete, real-world scenarios when formulating their opinions on racial policies, instead of making appeals that are built upon the more subjective and abstract concepts of racial prejudice. After all, when individuals like Donald Sterling—owner of the Los Angeles Clippers, who insisted his girlfriend stop bringing Black people to their games—can state, with confidence and seeming sincerity, that he is not racist (Grad 2014), and “I’m not racist/prejudiced, but…” is accepted by many as a valid, mitigating preposition to a derogatory statement, it becomes increasingly obvious that phrases like “prejudiced” and “racist” have lost much of their meaning in American political discourse. And because Americans may not be identifying prejudiced attitudes as such, it may help explain why there is a seeming disconnect between perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice and perceptions that Black Americans are more apt to suffer discriminatory outcomes. What’s more, adopting such a strategy would paint a clearer picture of how policies are related to the issue of race, thereby alleviating, or at least diminishing, “race card” accusations, thus opening up the possibility of a more honest debate.
II. Where can the findings in this project take us?

Although the results of this project regarding meta-stereotyping’s causal effects proved null, the results of this project pave way for further exploration of the role of perceptions—either perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice or discrimination—on racial policy preferences. Much speculation has been stated in this chapter’s previous section, and that speculation should be tested before politicians and activists make any decisions about how to approach garnering support for policies aimed at correcting racial injustice, especially those policies that aren’t immediately, obviously linked to racial prejudice and discrimination.

Additionally, given the inconsistencies in subjects’ levels of meta-stereotyping depending on how the concept is measured, and given the inconsistencies that were wrought as a consequence when determining the impact of those meta-stereotypes on racial policy preferences, scholars have reason to extend this research in ways that allow us to better understand what Americans’ perceptions regarding the prevalence of racism really look like. After all, it is difficult to make any real headway on the potential effects of meta-stereotyping if it is unclear that we are getting accurate depictions of individuals’ meta-stereotypes based on the way questions have been phrased. This point is important for not only understanding possible political consequences of meta-stereotyping, but also to make sense of the research that has been conducted in other fields using a limited measure of meta-stereotypes.
i. **How does the socialization process impact meta-stereotypes?**

One possible avenue for further exploration is an investigation of how meta-stereotypes form in the first place within the white community. Researchers have investigated the role of socialization in the Black community; however, this project had to speculate over whether the levels of meta-stereotyping would differ between the two racial groups because little has been done to link various socialization mechanisms to levels of white meta-stereotypes. Indeed, as was expected given the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2, Black subjects reported higher levels of meta-stereotyping than did subjects in the white sub-sample; however, it is unclear how much of this difference is due to the experiences of Black subjects (in comparison to the lack of racialized experiences of white subjects) and how much of this difference is due strictly to the socialization process dictated by family, friends, and other societal institutions. Given some of the inconsistencies between some white subjects’ tempered meta-stereotypes and their increased proclivity to acknowledge discriminatory outcomes, it would also be worth exploring how the socialization process is linked to perceptions of the likelihood of discrimination against Blacks, as opposed to perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice against Blacks.

Because Black subjects, who were likely socialized to reject the post-racial narrative, failed to have their racial policy preferences moved by their levels of meta-stereotyping, it is possible that any results indicating an impact on white subjects’ preferences (whether in the hypothesized direction or not) were driven by those white subjects who had not received any socialization on the topic. It is also possible that the white subjects who were moved by their meta-stereotypes were socialized to reject a
post-racial narrative, and that they merely needed their meta-stereotypes activated in a way that was unnecessary for Black individuals who readily have meta-stereotypes on their minds. Alternative, it is worth investigating whether the white socialization practice of ignoring race or denying it as a central component of life in contemporary America is linked to this project’s results that link increased meta-stereotyping with decreased support for policies aimed at correcting racial injustice, a development that countered this project’s main hypothesis. If white individuals are socialized to believe one thing, and are later asked to consider another, they may become more defensive and policy preferences could reflect a backlash of sorts.

Thus, further research on the socialization process of white Americans regarding the topic of race and racism may allow for a clearer understanding of whether the process works in a similar way as it does in the Black community, or whether the socialization process manifests differently in the minds of white Americans and Black Americans, and therefore impacts levels of meta-stereotyping and the consequences of those meta-stereotypes differently in the two racial communities.

**ii. Is there a difference in the way meta-stereotypes come into play when dealing with issues directly tied to race and those that are only indirectly tied to race?**

Because this project only tested two broad policy areas—affirmative action and criminal justice reform—it is difficult to make generalizations about the findings herein; however, it does seem that those policies that are more clearly linked to race (in this case affirmative action) are more apt to be significantly impacted by meta-stereotypes and
perceptions of discriminatory outcomes (whether in the hypothesized direction or not), and so future researchers may wish to test such speculation by including more issue areas, and possibly by using an experimental nature to frame those issues that are less directly related to race in the public imagination in a way that makes the relationship abundantly clear. Thus, it would be beneficial to include hypothetical scenarios pertaining to more than just a few issues, and that address those issues in more than just one hypothetical manner since no issue can be boiled down to a single, specific type of encounter with the real-world. For example, discrimination in the work place not only happens in an interview setting, but also in recruiting, sifting through resumes, and in promotions. Discrimination within the educational system—the justification for some affirmative action programs—was not tested in this study at all. As for criminal justice reforms, the death penalty (one issue tested for in this project) results not merely from the decisions of a potentially racially biased jury, but also due to a host of other factors within the criminal justice system (see Chapter 1); the same holds true for other criminal justice outcomes as well.

Additionally, researchers who use such a framing technique may want to offer a wider range of meta-stereotypes for inclusion, as the hypothetical scenarios in this project asked subjects about only one meta-stereotype for each scenario. For example, those in the hypothetical hiring scenario were asked whether the Black or white applicant was more/less apt to be viewed as unintelligent, and those who were in the hypothetical loitering scenario were asked which pair of loiterers were more/less apt to be viewed as lazy. However, in both cases subjects may have felt that there were other negative stereotypes that dictated an increased likelihood that the Black applicant and loiterers
were more apt to be discriminated against. This, too, may help explain some of the disconnect between subjects’ answers to the meta-stereotype and discriminatory outcome questions that is discussed below.

### iii. Can we make sense of the disconnect between perceptions regarding the prevalence of prejudice and those regarding differences in discriminatory outcomes?

A third avenue for further investigation is the seeming disconnect between Americans’ perceptions regarding the prevalence of prejudice and their perceptions regarding the likelihood of discriminatory outcomes affecting racial groups at different rates. This disconnect (documented in Chapter 4) seems to point to a dampened ability of Americans to see problematic racial attitudes when compared to their ability to see problematic racial actions, and such a disconnect could be partly responsible for the mixed results when investigating racial preferences using this project’s measure of individuals’ assessments of the likelihood of prejudice and discrimination occurring in hypothetical scenarios.

It is important to better understand this disconnect—to know whether it is truly a disconnect that is more generalizable to the white community as a whole, or whether it is an artifact of this particular survey sample, and also to know why such a disconnect exists (is it a product of the scenarios and questions themselves, or does it point to a disconnect that occurs outside of the research setting and into the real world?)—so that researchers better know how to approach these concepts and so that politicians and activists can choose appropriate strategies in their outreach efforts.
Part of this disconnect may be related to a shift in the way racial discourse is presented in American politics and even within our day-to-day lives. Whereas the old-school racism of the mid-twentieth century is usually reserved to small, extreme and/or older portions of the U.S. population, and is generally frowned upon by the vast majority of Americans, new forms of racism continue to persist. Sometimes called symbolic or modern racism (Henry & Sears 2008) and other times called laissez-faire racism (Bobo & Smith 1998), racism in America has shifted from being overt and unapologetic to being masked in rhetoric that blames racial inequalities on supposed cultural deficiencies that violate the traditional white American values that are necessary for success; the latter, while still racist, is more palatable to modern voters. Politicians and the public also know how to use racially coded language that underlies these new forms of racism while avoiding actual racial words. For example, when Congressman Paul Ryan (R-WI) proposed legislation that would address poverty by focusing on men “in the inner-cities” who demonstrate a “real culture problem” (Volsky 2013), he was able to avoid bringing race into the conversation directly, while painting imagery that was racial nonetheless. Comments like Ryan’s are often greeted with as much acceptance and encouragement, as they are outrage or condemnation, such as that displayed by Representative Israel. It is possible that those who accept these modern forms of racism as valid points in political discourse are less aware of the prevalence of prejudice because they are so constantly surrounded by it, and because most people do not consider themselves or their friends to be prejudiced; the status quo may, therefore, lead to a type of blindness. And if that is the case, it may explain why politicians who approach racial political problems from the standpoint that prejudice or racism is a root cause are deemed to be playing a “race card”
rather than speaking to reality, and why such appeals therefore fall on deaf ears in many cases.

Additionally, it may prove fruitful to investigate whether the seeming disconnect exists more for those individuals who don’t believe in the institutional nature of racism. The hypothetical scenarios offered within this project’s survey asked about very specific cases, which is potentially different than the way individuals may think about institutionalized racism outside of a research setting. Even though institutions are made up of individuals, and even though prejudiced individuals, when aggregated, would seem to create an institutionalized form of racism, it is possible that the disconnect between seeing prejudice and seeing discrimination, also extends to a disconnect between seeing discrimination in specific instances and seeing discrimination as a general trend. Because only three of the racial policies observed within this project came back significantly affected by an increased perception of the likelihood that Black characters would experience discriminatory outcomes, it is worth investigating whether those who were impacted were more apt to link the specific scenarios with broader institutional problems.

iv. Can we remedy the inconsistencies between subjects’ levels of meta-stereotyping when using various measures?

Another inconsistency that needs investigating is the inconsistency with which subjects’ answered the three different types of meta-stereotype questions (see Chapter 4). This trajectory is perhaps the most important of those listed within this section since these inconsistencies led to inconsistencies when looking at the relationship between meta-stereotypes and their impact on racial policy preferences as well. Thus, understanding
what individuals really think about the prevalence of prejudice in twenty-first century America is vital to understanding anything about its consequences, and those potential consequences are really what are of normative importance given the underlying issues that accompany the post-racial narrative.

While the inconsistencies between subjects’ answers to the more abstract questions and the questions that followed the more concrete, real-world hypothetical scenario were more expected (hence the inclusion of the framing effects via the hypothetical scenarios in the first place), the inconsistencies between subjects’ answers to the old, dichotomous “most” questions and this project’s 101-point measure were somewhat surprising given the degree to which these inconsistencies occurred. To sort out these inconsistencies follow-up questions pointing out the inconsistencies may be necessary, whether those questions come via indirect surveys or face-to-face interviews.

Additionally, some of the inconsistencies may have occurred due to respondents’ proclivity to answer quickly, without really thinking about their answers, or their inclination to disengage from questions of a somewhat controversial nature, so a research design that asks subjects to be more invested in the answers they provide could alleviate the inconsistency problem. One potential way of addressing this issue would be to introduce some sort of incentive for correctly identifying the percentage of white Americans who hold each stereotype in question; under such a set-up subjects would likely give more time and thought to their answers, and would respond in ways that really reflect what they feel the true rate of stereotyping is, and not an answer that they may deem more socially desirable or that may have been politically motivated. If researchers get a better grasp of whether or not the meta-stereotypes in this study, using the 101-point
scale, accurately reflected subjects’ actual levels of meta-stereotyping then it becomes easier to identify which measure of meta-stereotyping is the root of the inconsistencies. Doing so would then allow researchers to grapple with how to explain those inconsistencies, and would also provide researchers with an indication of which measure would be most useful for studying the potential consequences of meta-stereotypes in future studies, whether those consequences pertain to politics or other psychological or sociological issues.

v. Final thoughts

Although this project casts doubt on the expectation that meta-stereotyping impacts individuals racial policy preferences, there are enough mixed signals to warrant further exploration. Such exploration should begin with sussing out what measure of meta-stereotyping best reflects individuals’ actual perceptions regarding the prevalence of prejudice, and whether individuals even have fully formed, consistent meta-stereotypes in the first place. If future research indicates that individuals consistently formulate meta-stereotypes, research should then shift to whether meta-stereotypes are equally accessible to the white community as they are to the Black community. From there, researchers can choose what particular political consequences may be impacted by the presence and levels of individuals’ meta-stereotyping. While this study looked at racial policy preferences, other political consequences could include things such as political efficacy and trust, levels of political participation, and differences in the types of political activities individuals engage in. If future research finds that racial meta-stereotypes do have political consequences then researchers may choose to expand the scope of meta-stereotype research to include other racial and ethnic groups, as well as the way they may
affect political issues pertaining to religion, gender and sexuality. However, if this 
project demonstrates anything it is that researchers interested in the topic of meta-
stereotyping have an uphill climb, as gauging accurate levels of subjects’ meta-
stereotypes is no easy feat, albeit one that may prove to be important in understanding 
certain political phenomena if social science research in other areas is any indication.
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**APPENDIX A—EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN**

Table A.1: Visited pages per experimental group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Group 1: Control Group</th>
<th>Group 2: Priming Group</th>
<th>Group 3: Framing Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Demographic questions</td>
<td>Demographic questions</td>
<td>Demographic questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Demographic questions (cont.)</td>
<td>Demographic questions (cont.)</td>
<td>Demographics questions (cont.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Self-characterization questions</td>
<td>Self-characterization questions</td>
<td>Self-characterization questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Stereotype questions</td>
<td>Stereotypes questions</td>
<td>Stereotypes questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Policy Preference questions</td>
<td>Meta-stereotype questions- Dichotomous “most whites” measure</td>
<td>Meta-stereotype questions- Dichotomous “most whites” measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Consequence questions</td>
<td>Meta-stereotype questions- Interval, 101-point scale measure</td>
<td>Meta-stereotype questions- Interval, 101-point scale measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Meta-stereotype questions- Dichotomous, “most whites” measure</td>
<td>Policy preference questions</td>
<td>Meta-stereotype questions- Ordinal, hypothetical “more likely” measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Meta-stereotype questions- Interval, 101-point scale measure</td>
<td>Consequence questions</td>
<td>Policy preference questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Self-identity and Group attachment questions</td>
<td>Self-identity and Group attachment questions</td>
<td>Consequence questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Implicit Association Test</td>
<td>Implicit Association Test</td>
<td>Self-identity and Group attachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>Implicit Association Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Debriefing</td>
<td>Debriefing</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Debriefing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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## APPENDIX B: SUBJECTS’ DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Table B.1: Demographic information for white and Black subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White subjects</th>
<th>Black subjects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=267</td>
<td>n=255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>123 (46%)</td>
<td>103 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>144 (54%)</td>
<td>152 (60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>155 (58%)</td>
<td>45 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44</td>
<td>68 (25%)</td>
<td>123 (48%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>36 (13%)</td>
<td>74 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>8 (3%)</td>
<td>13 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Ideology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very liberal</td>
<td>55 (21%)</td>
<td>37 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>102 (38%)</td>
<td>69 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly liberal</td>
<td>46 (17%)</td>
<td>34 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>33 (12%)</td>
<td>70 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly conservative</td>
<td>10 (4%)</td>
<td>20 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>15 (6%)</td>
<td>17 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very conservative</td>
<td>6 (2%)</td>
<td>8 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White subjects n=267</td>
<td>Black subjects n=255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partisanship</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Democrat</td>
<td>31 (12%)</td>
<td>80 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>65 (24%)</td>
<td>81 (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Democrat</td>
<td>49 (18%)</td>
<td>29 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>98 (37%)</td>
<td>55 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Republican</td>
<td>6 (2%)</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>15 (16%)</td>
<td>4 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Republican</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (&lt;1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Live(d) in the South</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>178 (67%)</td>
<td>126 (49%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>86 (33%)</td>
<td>127 (51%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grew up in the South</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>186 (70%)</td>
<td>126 (49%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>81 (30%)</td>
<td>129 (51%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes - Full time</td>
<td>145 (54%)</td>
<td>93 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes - Part time</td>
<td>60 (22%)</td>
<td>41 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No- But looking</td>
<td>26 (10%)</td>
<td>48 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No- And not looking</td>
<td>28 (10%)</td>
<td>35 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No- Retired</td>
<td>8 (3%)</td>
<td>38 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White subjects</td>
<td>Black subjects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=267</td>
<td>n=255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some high school</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school/GED</td>
<td>11 (4%)</td>
<td>59 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade school</td>
<td>1 (&lt;1%)</td>
<td>1 (&lt;1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>69 (26%)</td>
<td>77 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associates Degree</td>
<td>24 (9%)</td>
<td>28 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelors Degree</td>
<td>83 (31%)</td>
<td>54 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some graduate school</td>
<td>22 (8%)</td>
<td>9 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters Degree</td>
<td>42 (16%)</td>
<td>21 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Degree</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
<td>2 (&lt;1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>7 (3%)</td>
<td>1 (&lt;1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;$25,000</td>
<td>125 (47%)</td>
<td>121 (47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,001-$50,000</td>
<td>73 (27%)</td>
<td>72 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,001-$75,000</td>
<td>36 (13%)</td>
<td>31 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$75,001-$100,000</td>
<td>22 (8%)</td>
<td>22 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100,001-$250,000</td>
<td>8 (3%)</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$250,001-$500,000</td>
<td>2 (&lt;1%)</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;$500,001</td>
<td>1 (&lt;1%)</td>
<td>1 (&lt;1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>White subjects n=267</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;$25,000</td>
<td>41 (15%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,001-$50,000</td>
<td>76 (28%)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,001-$75,000</td>
<td>60 (25%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$75,001-$100,000</td>
<td>43 (16%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$100,001-$250,000</td>
<td>42 (16%)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$250,001-$500,000</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;$500,001</td>
<td>2 (&lt;1%)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C—SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Introduction & Consent

Study of Social & Political Attitudes

Estimated time is 25 minutes

This study is interested in your attitudes toward a variety of social and political issues.

Before taking this study, you must agree to the following:

You are being asked to complete this survey because your social and political attitudes will help us understand the attitudes held by Americans as a whole. The following survey is being administered for use in a political science dissertation. Therefore, it is important that you answer each question as accurately as possible. All information provided will remain anonymous, including all answers to the questions asked within. It is important that you answer each question in the survey. If you feel you need to further explain an answer you have provided, we welcome you to provide open-ended explanations at the end of the survey.

In accordance with University of South Carolina at Columbia’s human subjects guidelines, as outlined by the Institutional Review Board of the Office of Research Compliance and the Investigator’s Handbook, you, as a volunteer for the Dissertation Study of Political Attitudes, fully understand that you retain the following rights and agree to the following stipulations:

(1) The study is completely voluntary and thus you have the right to refrain from participating at the outset or to discontinue your participation at any point during the survey.
(2) This study requires all participants to be over the age of 18.
(3) This study requires all participants to identify racially as white, Black/African American, or mixed-race wherein Black/African American is one of the options selected.
(4) On average this study will take approximately 25 minutes, but individual times may vary;
(5) Any information provided will be completely anonymous. As such, any research publications or presentations associated with this study’s data will ensure the anonymity of the study’s subjects.
(6) Some participants may feel mild stress or discomfort when answering questions dealing with controversial subjects. However, it is our hope that you find this experience to be interesting and worthy of your time and effort.
(7) Participants may contact the Principal Investigator to request a copy of the
dissertation when it becomes available; the dissertation will include the results of this study.

Refer any and all questions to the Principal Investigator, Alexandra Reckendorf:

PoliDissertationStudy@gmail.com

(803) 777-3109

Department of Political Science, Gambrell Hall, 817 Henderson St., Columbia, SC 29208.

You may also direct questions to Dr. Thomas Coggins, Director, Office of Research Compliance:

(803) 777-4456.

For your information, Dr. David Darmofal, University of South Carolina, is serving as an advisor to this study.

Thank you very much for your participation in this study.

Once you click agree, the study will begin. It must be completed in one sitting.

<<Cancel>>    <<Agree>>
Self characterization questions

This section is interested in understanding more about the adjectives you might use to describe yourself. For each adjective, you will be shown a seven-point scale in order to judge how well each adjective describes you.

1. On the following seven-point scale, 1 means that you think you are “hard working,” 7 means that you think you are “lazy”, and a score of 4 means that you are not toward one end or the other. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

2. On the following seven-point scale, 1 means that you think you are “not violence prone,” 7 means that you think you are “violence prone”, and a score of 4 means that you are not toward one end or the other. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

3. On the following seven-point scale, 1 means that you think you are “intelligent,” 7 means that you think you are “unintelligent”, and a score of 4 means that you are not toward one end or the other. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

4. On the following seven-point scale, 1 means that you think you “prefer to be self-supporting,” 7 means that you think you “prefer to live off welfare”, and a score of 4 means that you are not toward one end or the other. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
Stereotype questions

This section will ask you questions about different groups in our society. For each question, you will be shown a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of people in a group can be rated. Remember that your responses are anonymous.

1. For the first question, a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people are “hard working.” A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group are “lazy.” A score of 4 means that you think that the group is not towards one end or the other. You may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whites, Non-Hispanic</th>
<th>Hispanics</th>
<th>African Americans</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (Hard Working)</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 (Lazy)</td>
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</table>

2. For the second question, a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people are “not violence-prone.” A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group are “violence-prone.” A score of 4 means that you think that the group is not towards one end or the other. You may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whites, Non-Hispanic</th>
<th>Hispanics</th>
<th>African Americans</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (Not Violence-Prone)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (Violence-Prone)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. For the third question, a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people are “intelligent.” A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group are “unintelligent.” A score of 4 means that you think that the group is not towards one end or the other. You may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whites, Non-Hispanic</th>
<th>Hispanics</th>
<th>African Americans</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (Intelligent)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (Unintelligent)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4. For the last question in this section, a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people “prefer to be self-supporting.” A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group “prefer to live off welfare.” A score of 4 means that you think that the group is not towards one end or the other. You may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whites, Non-Hispanic</th>
<th>Hispanics</th>
<th>African Americans</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (Prefer to be self-supporting)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (Prefer to live off welfare)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Meta-stereotype questions- Dichotomous “most whites” measure

What we would like you to do to begin this section is tell us whether you think most white people think that the following characteristics in each question can be applied to the different groups.

1. Do you think that most white Americans think that Black Americans are lazy?
   a. Yes
   b. No

2. Do you think that most white Americans think that Black Americans are more likely to commit acts of violence?
   a. Yes
   b. No

3. Do you think that most white Americans think that Black Americans are unintelligent?
   a. Yes
   b. No

4. Do you think that most white Americans think that Black Americans would rather live off of welfare than be self-supportive?
   a. Yes
   b. No
Meta-stereotype questions - Interval, 101-point scale measure

What we would like you to do next is **guess** the percentage of white people who you think would say that the characteristics in each question can be applied to the different groups.

5. **Please guess**: What percentage (0-100%) of white people do you think would say that each group is “lazy” (i.e. that they answered 5, 6 or 7 on the scale of “hard working” to “lazy”)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of whites that say each group is Lazy:</th>
<th>Whites, Non-Hispanic</th>
<th>Hispanics</th>
<th>African American</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

6. **Please guess**: What percentage (0-100%) of white people do you think would say that each group is “violence prone” (i.e. that they answered 5, 6, or 7 on the scale of “not violence-prone” to “violence-prone”)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of whites that say each group is Violence Prone:</th>
<th>Whites, Non-Hispanic</th>
<th>Hispanics</th>
<th>African American</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

7. **Please guess**: What percentage (0-100%) of white people do you think would say that each group is “unintelligent” (i.e. that they answered 5, 6 or 7 on the scale of “intelligent” to “unintelligent”)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of whites that say each group is Unintelligent:</th>
<th>Whites, Non-Hispanic</th>
<th>Hispanics</th>
<th>African American</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
8. Please guess: What percentage (0-100%) of white people do you think would say that each group “prefers to live off welfare” (i.e. that they answered 5, 6 or 7 on the scale of “prefer to be self-supporting” to “prefer to live off welfare”)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of whites that say each group Prefers to live off welfare:</th>
<th>Whites, Non-Hispanic</th>
<th>Hispanics</th>
<th>African American</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
</tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

250
Meta-stereotype questions - Hypothetical “more/less likely” questions

For this section, respondents assigned to the framing group will also be randomly assigned to one of the following three hypothetical situations—they will not be asked to answer questions regarding all three hypothetical scenarios.

For this section we would like you to imagine the following hypothetical situations prior to answering the questions below.

**Hypothetical I:**

Case A: Imagine a court case wherein the defendant is a Black male. The defendant has been charged with assault, but has pleaded ‘not guilty’ and the prosecution has failed to produce any solid evidence against the defendant. The jury in this case consists of twelve white individuals.

Case B: Imagine that in a similar court case a white male has been charged with assault. Like the other case, this defendant has pleaded ‘not guilty’ and the prosecution has failed to produce any solid evidence against the defendant. Again, the jury in this case consists of twelve white individuals.

1. Which defendant do you think is more likely to be viewed by the all-white jury as violence-prone?
   a. The Black defendant (Case A) is much more likely to be viewed as violence-prone
   b. The Black defendant (Case A) is somewhat more likely to be viewed as violence-prone
   c. Neither the Black defendant (Case A) nor the White defendant (Case B) is likely to be viewed as violence-prone
   d. The White defendant (Case B) is somewhat more likely to be viewed as violence-prone
   e. The White defendant (Case B) is much more likely to be viewed as violence-prone

2. Which defendant do you think is more likely to be found guilty by the all-white jury?
   a. The Black defendant (Case A) is much more likely to be found guilty
   b. The Black defendant (Case A) is somewhat more likely to be found guilty
   c. Neither the Black defendant (Case A) nor the White defendant (Case B) is likely to be found guilty
   d. The White defendant (Case B) is somewhat more likely to be found guilty
   e. The White defendant (Case B) is much more likely to be found guilty
Hypothetical II:

Case A: Imagine that on a suburban street corner, during typical work hours, two Black males are loitering—hanging around, talking and laughing—but generally minding their own business. A business owner has called the police complaining about loiterers. The police officers patrolling that particular block are two white officers.

Case B: Imagine that on a similar suburban street a few blocks away, also during typical work hours, two white males are also loitering—hanging around, talking and laughing—but generally minding their own business. Like the other case, a business owner has called the police complaining about loiterers. Again, the police officers patrolling their particular block are two white officers.

1. Which pair of loiterers do you think is more likely to be viewed as lazy by the police officers patrolling the area?
   a. The Black men (Case A) are much more likely to be viewed as lazy
   b. The Black men (Case A) are somewhat more likely to be viewed as lazy
   c. Neither the Black men (Case A) nor the White men (Case B) are likely to be viewed as lazy
   d. The White men (Case B) are somewhat more likely to be viewed as lazy
   e. The White men (Case B) are much more likely to be viewed as lazy

2. Which pair of loiterers do you think is more likely to be stopped by the police officers and searched for drugs?
   a. The Black men (Case A) are much more likely to be stopped and searched for drugs
   b. The Black men (Case A) are somewhat more likely to be stopped and searched for drugs
   c. Neither the Black men (Case A) nor the White men (Case B) are likely to be stopped and searched for drugs
   d. The White men (Case B) are somewhat more likely to be stopped and searched for drugs
   e. The White men (Case B) are much more likely to be stopped and searched for drugs
**Hypothetical III:**

Case A: Imagine that a company is hiring for an entry level position. The interviewer is a white individual and the person applying for the job is a Black male.

Case B: Imagine that a similar company is hiring for an entry level position as well. Again, the interviewer is a white individual, but this time the person applying for the job is a white male.

1. Which job applicant do you think is more likely to be viewed as unintelligent by the interviewer?
   a. The Black applicant (Case A) is **much more** likely to be viewed as unintelligent
   b. The Black applicant (Case A) is **somewhat more** likely to be viewed as unintelligent
   c. **Neither** the Black applicant (Case A) nor the White applicant (Case B) is likely to be viewed as unintelligent
   d. The White applicant (Case B) is **somewhat more** likely to be viewed as unintelligent
   e. The White applicant (Case B) is **much more** likely to be viewed as unintelligent

2. Which job applicant do you think is more likely to be hired for the job?
   a. The Black applicant (Case A) is **much more** likely to be hired
   b. The Black applicant (Case A) is **somewhat more** likely to be hired
   c. **Neither** the Black applicant (Case A) nor the White applicant (Case B) is likely to be hired
   d. The White applicant (Case B) is **somewhat more** likely to be hired
   e. The White applicant (Case B) is **much more** likely to be hired
Policy preference questions

For this section we would like to get your opinion on a variety of current political issues. Please pay attention to the detail within each question as some of them seem similar but are actually asking different things. Remember that your answers will be anonymous.

1. What are your feelings about laws that seek to combat the “obesity epidemic” in America by banning the purchase of certain items, such as the ban on cups of soda larger than 16 ounces or the ban on trans fats?
   a. I am very supportive of laws that seek to combat the “obesity epidemic” by banning certain items
   b. I am somewhat supportive of laws that seek to combat the “obesity epidemic” by banning certain items
   c. I do not have an opinion regarding laws that seek to combat the “obesity epidemic” by banning certain items
   d. I am somewhat opposed to laws that seek to combat the “obesity epidemic” by banning certain items
   e. I am very opposed to laws that seek to combat the “obesity epidemic” by banning certain items

2. What are your feelings about laws that seek to limit corporations’ emission of greenhouse gases in order to combat climate change and Global Warming, such as the proposed “cap and trade” policy or the proposed “carbon tax”?
   a. I am very supportive of laws that seek to limit corporations’ emission of greenhouse gases
   b. I am somewhat supportive of laws that seek to limit corporations’ emission of greenhouse gases
   c. I do not have an opinion regarding laws that seek to limit corporations’ emission of greenhouse gases
   d. I am somewhat opposed to laws that seek to limit corporations’ emission of greenhouse gases
   e. I am very opposed to laws that seek to limit corporations’ emission of greenhouse gases

3. What are your feelings about the plan to expand drilling for oil into the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) which would increase the production of domestic (U.S.) oil but would also destroy a natural habitat?
   a. I am very supportive of the plan to expand drilling for oil into the ANWR
   b. I am somewhat supportive of the plan to expand drilling for oil into the ANWR
   c. I do not have an opinion regarding the plan to expand drilling for oil into the ANWR
   d. I am somewhat opposed to the plan to expand drilling for oil into the ANWR
   e. I am very opposed to the plan to expand drilling for oil into the ANWR
4. What are your feelings about affirmative action programs that attempt to increase diversity in the work place through hiring practices?
   a. I am very supportive of affirmative action in the hiring process.
   b. I am somewhat supportive of affirmative action in the hiring process.
   c. I do not have an opinion regarding affirmative action in the hiring process.
   d. I am somewhat opposed to affirmative action in the hiring process.
   e. I am very opposed to affirmative action in the hiring process.

5. What are your feelings about affirmative action programs that attempt to increase diversity in the work place through promotion practices?
   a. I am very supportive of affirmative action in the promotion process.
   b. I am somewhat supportive of affirmative action in the promotion process.
   c. I do not have an opinion regarding affirmative action in the promotion process.
   d. I am somewhat opposed to affirmative action in the promotion process.
   e. I am very opposed to affirmative action in the promotion process.

6. What are your feelings about affirmative action programs that attempt to increase diversity in university settings through scholarship practices?
   a. I am very supportive of affirmative action in university scholarship practices.
   b. I am somewhat supportive of affirmative action in university scholarship practices.
   c. I do not have an opinion regarding affirmative action in university scholarship practices.
   d. I am somewhat opposed to affirmative action in university scholarship practices.
   e. I am very opposed to affirmative action in university scholarship practices.

7. What are your feelings about affirmative action programs that attempt to increase diversity in university settings through admissions practices?
   a. I am very supportive of affirmative action in the university admissions process.
   b. I am somewhat supportive of affirmative action in the university admissions process.
   c. I do not have an opinion regarding affirmative action in the university admissions process.
   d. I am somewhat opposed to affirmative action in the university admissions process.
   e. I am very opposed to affirmative action in the university admissions process.
8. What are your feelings about the legalization of medical marijuana; for example, legalized use by patients with cancer, glaucoma, etc. who have an official prescription from their doctor?
   a. I am very supportive of the legalization of medical marijuana
   b. I am somewhat supportive of the legalization of medical marijuana
   c. I do not have an opinion regarding the legalization of medical marijuana
   d. I am somewhat opposed to the legalization of medical marijuana
   e. I am very opposed to the legalization of medical marijuana

9. What are your feelings about the federal government’s War on Drugs?
   a. I am very supportive of the War on Drugs
   b. I am somewhat supportive of the War on Drugs
   c. I do not have an opinion regarding the War on Drugs
   d. I am somewhat opposed to the War on Drugs
   e. I am very opposed to the War on Drugs

10. What are your feelings about the use of the death penalty in the U.S. criminal justice system?
    a. I am very supportive of the use of the death penalty
    b. I am somewhat supportive of the use of the death penalty
    c. I do not have an opinion regarding the use of the death penalty
    d. I am somewhat opposed to the use of the death penalty
    e. I am very opposed to the use of the death penalty

11. Some states have enacted “Three Strikes Laws” which require mandatory life sentences for those who are convicted of serious criminal offenses on three or more separate occasions. What are your feelings regarding the adoption of Three Strike Laws?
    a. I am very supportive of Three Strike Laws
    b. I am somewhat supportive of Three Strike Laws
    c. I do not have an opinion regarding Three Strike Laws
    d. I am somewhat opposed to Three Strike Laws
    e. I am very opposed to Three Strike Laws

12. Racial profiling refers to the use of an individual’s race or ethnicity by law enforcement personnel as a key factor in deciding whether to engage in enforcement (such as making a traffic stop or an arrest). What are your feelings regarding the use of racial profiling by law enforcement in the following situations?
    a. Stopping suspicious individuals in their car to see whether they have drugs in their vehicle?
       a. I am very supportive of racial profiling
       b. I am somewhat supportive of racial profiling
       c. I do not have an opinion regarding racial profiling
       d. I am somewhat opposed to racial profiling
       e. I am very opposed to racial profiling
b. Stopping suspicious individuals in the airport to see whether they have weapons in their possession?
   a. I am very supportive of racial profiling
   b. I am somewhat supportive of racial profiling
   c. I do not have an opinion regarding racial profiling
   d. I am somewhat opposed to racial profiling
   e. I am very opposed to racial profiling

c. Stopping suspicious individuals in their car to see whether they are in the country legally?
   a. I am very supportive of racial profiling
   b. I am somewhat supportive of racial profiling
   c. I do not have an opinion regarding racial profiling
   d. I am somewhat opposed to racial profiling
   e. I am very opposed to racial profiling
Consequences questions

For this section we would like to get your opinion on a few possible consequences of the policies described in the previous sections.

1. Do you agree or disagree: Affirmative action programs cause white Americans to think that minorities are incapable of making progress in the work place and university setting without these policies in place.
   a. Strongly Agree
   b. Somewhat Agree
   c. Neither Agree or Disagree
   d. Somewhat Disagree
   e. Strongly Disagree

2. Do you agree or disagree: Affirmative action programs cause white Americans to think that anyone who is a minority and is hired, promoted, accepted, etc. is a product of affirmative action policies rather than because they earned it.
   a. Strongly Agree
   b. Somewhat Agree
   c. Neither Agree or Disagree
   d. Somewhat Disagree
   e. Strongly Disagree

3. Do you agree or disagree: Affirmative action programs cause white Americans to be resentful of minorities.
   a. Strongly Agree
   b. Somewhat Agree
   c. Neither Agree or Disagree
   d. Somewhat Disagree
   e. Strongly Disagree
Demographic questions

1. What is your age?
   Drop down box: 17-99

2. What is your gender?
   Drop down box: Female/Male

3. Do you identify as being a person of Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin? <From 2012 U.S. Census>
   Drop down box: No, not of Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin/Yes, Mexican, Mexican American or Chicano/ Yes, Puerto Rican/ Yes, Cuban/ Yes, another Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin (write in)

4. For this survey, Hispanic origins are not races. What is your race? <From 2010 U.S. Census>
   Drop down box: White/ Black or African American/ American Indian or Alaska Native/ Asian Indian/ Chinese/ Filipino/ Other Asian (write in)/ Japanese/ Korean/ Vietnamese/ Native Hawaiian/ Gaumanian or Chamorro/ Samoan/ Other Pacific Islander (write in)/ Some other race (write in)

5. What is your religion?
   Drop down box: Christian/Jewish/Muslim/Buddhist/Unitarian/Hindu/Native American/Atheist, Agnostic or No Religion/Other (write in)

5a. If you selected Christian, do you identify with a specific denomination? (write in)

6. How do you identify ideologically?
   Drop down box: Very Liberal/ Liberal/ Slightly Liberal/ Neither Liberal or Conservative/ Slightly Conservative/ Conservative/ Very Conservative

7. How do you identify politically?
   Drop down box: Strong Democrat/Democrat/ Weak Democrat/ Neither a Democrat or a Republican/ Weak Republican/ Republican/ Strong Republican

8. In which state(s) have you resided within the last 12 months? (Select as many as applicable)
   Drop down box: (All 50 states)

9. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
   Drop down box: Some High School, High School Diploma, Some College, Associates Degree, Bachelors Degree, Some Graduate School, Masters Degree, PhD/Law Degree/Medical Degree, Other (write in)
10. Are you currently employed?
   Drop down box:  Yes, full time/ Yes, part time/ No, looking for a job/ No, not looking for a job but not retired/ No, retired

11. What is your current level of income?
   Drop down box: (breakdowns TBD)

12. What is the current level of your household income?
   Drop down box: (breakdown TBD)
Self-identity & Group attachment questions

For this section we would like to get your opinion on how close you feel to a variety of groups.

1. When you think about yourself, which of your identifying characteristics do you think are most important to understanding who you are as a person? Please rank these characteristics, where a ranking of 1 means it is the most important characteristic, a 2 is the second most important characteristic, etc.

ONLY ONE descriptor (left hand side) per ranking (right hand side)
Click the description on the left and drag it to the corresponding value on the right

Rank order: Age/Gender/Race/Ethnicity/Religion /Social Class

2. When you first meet white people, which of your identifying characteristics do you think that they think are the most important to understanding who you are as a person? Please rank these characteristics, where a ranking of 1 means it is the most important characteristic, a 2 is the second most important characteristic, etc.

ONLY ONE descriptor (left hand side) per ranking (right hand side)
Click the description on the left and drag it to the corresponding value on the right

Rank order: Age/Gender/Race/Ethnicity/Religion/Social Class

3. On a scale of 0-10, where 0 represents having no feeling of group attachment and where 10 represents feeling extremely linked to the group in question, please place where you fall on the scale for each group.
   a. Whites, non-Hispanic
   b. Hispanics
   c. Blacks
   d. Asians
   e. Arabs
Implicit Association Test

Finally, this section asks you to complete seven different tasks. You will receive instructions on each task as you go. The goal is to try to complete these tasks as quickly as possible! Please read the instructions carefully as you work through the tasks. This section should take about five minutes. This is the last section you are required to complete.

The following is a breakdown of the seven tasks respondents will be asked to complete; respondents complete tasks by placing fingers on the E and I keys of their keyboard and matching given stimuli (20 total) to one of two categories as fast as possible.

Task 1: Match faces to the categories “Black” or “White”

Task 2: Match words to the categories “Positive” or “Negative”

Task 3: Match words or faces to the categories “Black or Positive” or “White or Negative”

Task 4: (Repeat Task 3) Match words or faces to the categories “Black or Positive” or “White or Negative”

Task 5: Match faces to the categories “White” or “Black”

Task 6: Match words or faces to the categories “White or Positive” or “Black or Negative”

Task 7: (Repeat Task 6) Match words or faces to the categories “White or Positive” or “Black or Negative”
Comments

This section is optional.

We would like to know whether you have any comments regarding the topics discussed within this survey. Again, your comments will be anonymous. While we welcome and value your comments, they are not required. If you wish to skip this section, please select the “Next” button. Once you have finished this section, the survey will be complete.

<<Finish>>
Debriefing

Thank you for completing this study!

The results from this study are being used in a political science dissertation at the University of South Carolina. The dissertation looks at the link between individuals’ perceptions of the prevalence of racial prejudice in American society and individuals’ levels of support or opposition for policy measures designed to correct racial injustice.

Racial prejudice is still common in American society. Sometimes it is obvious, but many times prejudice is either very subtle or even subconscious. Even individuals who believe in equality and are actively involved in trying to deter discrimination can harbor subconscious levels of prejudice. Because of this many people don’t recognize the prevalence of racial prejudice in 2013.

This project hypothesizes that individuals who perceive higher levels of racial prejudice in the U.S. will also be more apt to support policy measures designed to correct racial injustice. In this study these policies were affirmative action (which is commonly associated with race) and criminal justice reforms (which are less commonly associated with race, although the reforms are proposed and enacted in large part to combat racial discrimination within the system). This project also hypothesizes that those effects will be stronger for Black/African American individuals than for white individuals since Black/African American individuals are the racial out-group on the receiving end of prejudice. This project also hypothesizes that individuals who perceive higher levels of ethnic prejudice against other out-groups (Hispanics and Arabs) will also be more apt to support policy measures designed to correct those injustices (such as the laws requiring individuals to show proof of citizenship in Arizona, or calls for profiling Arabs at airports); however, it is expected that these effects will not be as high for Blacks/African Americans as they were when the policies in question were designed to correct injustices for their own racial in-group.

Participants in this study were broken into three groups: some participants were placed in a control group, while other participants were primed to consider their perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice prior to answering questions about policies, and other participants were primed and also received one of three possible hypothetical scenarios to help frame the policies as having a racial component to consider.

All participants were required to take an Implicit Association Test (IAT). It should be noted that answering tasks incorrectly during this IAT does not mean you are overtly racist or that you are a bad person. In fact, most Americans who take an IAT answer
tasks incorrectly. Instead, the IAT measures subconscious links between negative words and, in this case, Black/African American individuals. You can find more information on Implicit Association Tests if you’d like by doing a simple keyword search using your online browser.

Again, thank you very much for your participation in this study. Hopefully the answers provided by you and your fellow volunteers will begin to help us understand the process by which individuals’ form preferences on policies designed to correct racial injustice. If we can begin to understand the nature of that relationship, we may see an improvement in the way opposing political factions deliberate concerning the means to combat racial injustice in America.

If you have any further questions about this study please feel free to contact the Principal Investigator, Alexandra Reckendorf:

PoliDissertationStudy@gmail.com

803-777-3109

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You may also direct questions to Dr. Thomas Coggins, Director, Office of Research Compliance:

803-777-4456