John Pecham on Life and Mind

Caleb G. Colley

University of South Carolina - Columbia

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd

Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation


This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
JOHN PECHAM ON LIFE AND MIND

by

Caleb Glenn Colley

Bachelor of Arts
Freed-Hardeman University, 2006

Bachelor of Science
Freed-Hardeman University, 2006

Master of Liberal Arts
Faulkner University, 2009

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in

Philosophy

College of Arts and Sciences

University of South Carolina

2014

Accepted by:

Jeremiah M.G. Hackett, Major Professor

Jerald T. Wallulis, Committee Member

Heike O. Sefrin-Weis, Committee Member

Gordon A. Wilson, Committee Member

Lacy Ford, Vice Provost and Dean of Graduate Studies
DEDICATION

To my parents, who have always encouraged and inspired me. *Et sunt animae vestrae quasi mea.*
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A number of people have spent generous amounts of time and energy to assist in the preparation of this dissertation.

Professor Girard J. Etzkorn, the editor of Pecham’s texts, is not listed as a committee member, but he read my manuscript in its early form and made many helpful suggestions.

My entire committee worked together thoughtfully, eagerly, and patiently to help me succeed, and each member of the committee contributed unique and valuable guidance. Among other things that each individual did are the following:

Professor Wilson has been encouraging of this project. Before a word of the dissertation was written, Professor Sefrin-Weis helped me with Latin and later helped me refine my translations of Pecham. Professor Wallulis helped me structure the project and to creatively consider how the dissertation process could serve me intellectually and professionally.

Professor Hackett has spent much of the past three years showing me this project’s potential and pushing me to achieve it.
ABSTRACT

The interpretive work of analytic philosophers in the Thomist tradition, such as Anthony Kenny and Robert Pasnau, has been significant not only for historical accounts of medieval thought, but also for contemporary philosophy. It is remarkable that in all of this literature, the great opponent of Aquinas in philosophy and theology, John Pecham (d. 1292), is largely omitted. In this dissertation I will examine two Pecham texts that have not been properly studied to date, and that deal with the issues of the life and mind of the human person. The first text is the *Tractatus De Anima*. The *Tractatus* is from the latter part of Pecham’s career, and so stated positions in this work can be treated as his mature views. The second work is the fifth of Pecham’s disputed *Quaestiones De Anima*

---

(probably 1269-1271\textsuperscript{1}), which situates him in the context of debates with Aquinas and Latin Averroism.\textsuperscript{2}

I will show how these two texts support the following thesis: John Pecham’s philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original synthesis of Neoplatonic metaphysics, and is a significant alternative to Aquinas’s anthropology.

Proving this thesis to be correct will involve showing that, in his controversy with Aquinas, Pecham was neither insisting on a minor point nor obviously misguided (as has been alleged in contemporary literature), but was rather working to defend and preserve what he considered to be broadly important truth. By providing an interpretation of central texts and showing Pecham’s distinctiveness, I hope to open the question of his significance.

I will first describe who Pecham was and what he did. To place Pecham in his historical context, I will discuss a movement, Neo-Augustinianism, in which he was a

\textsuperscript{2} Modern usage, following Fernand van Steenberghen, suggests the use of “heterodox Aristotelianism” or “radical Aristotelianism” instead of “Latin Averroism” (\textit{Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism} [Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1980]; \textit{Aristotle in the West: The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism} [Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1955], 204-208; John F. Wippel, \textit{Mediaeval Reactions to the Encounter Between Faith and Reason} [Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995], 14; cf. John Marenbon, \textit{Late Medieval Philosophy} [New York: Routledge, 1987], 73-74). However, I think “Latin Averroism” denotes the movement more clearly. Marenbon writes that Van Steenberghen is “right to stress that the so-called Averroists wished to be Aristotelians, and that they were in many respects distant from Ibn Rushd’s real thought; but the link with \textit{Averroes}—Ibn Rushd as seen through Latin eyes—is essential to their approach” (“Dante’s Averroism,” \textit{Poetry and Philosophy in the Middle Ages: A Festschrift for Peter Dronke}, ed. Marenbon [Leiden: Brill, 2001], 353).
leader. While it is difficult to determine precisely the positions that constituted Neo-
Augustinian philosophy, it is possible to understand generally what the movement was
and how Pecham’s views relate to it. As I explicate Pecham’s philosophical psychology, it
will become obvious that he cannot be construed as being simply an “Augustinian,” but
rather nuances of his positions must be appreciated.
# Table of Contents

DEDICATION ........................................................................................................... iii  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................... iv  
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................... v  
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1  
CHAPTER 1: PECHAM AND NEO-AUGUSTINIANISM ............................................. 37  
CHAPTER 2: EXPOSITION OF *QUAESTIO* FIVE IN PECHAM’S *QUAESTIONES DE ANIMA* ...... 96  
CHAPTER 3: EXPOSITION OF PECHAM’S *TRACTATUS DE ANIMA* ....................... 158  
CHAPTER 4: AQUINAS AGAINST LATIN AVERROISM .......................................... 229  
CHAPTER 5: PECHAM AND HIS SOURCES .......................................................... 304  
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION - PECHAM AND AQUINAS ....................................... 425  
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................... 512
INTRODUCTION

John Pecham was a Franciscan theologian who took both a strongly anti-Thomist position and a strongly anti-Averroist position in late-13th-century debates in philosophy of mind. Following a successful career as a theologian, Pecham was Archbishop of Canterbury from 1279 until his death in 1292. Despite the facts that (1) he represented a viable theological and philosophical perspective in his day, (2) he was involved directly in major debates with Aquinas and other masters at the university of Paris, and (3) a number of his philosophical writings are extant, Pecham has been studied far less than other medieval thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Bonaventure, and the Latin Averroists.

My thesis is this: John Pecham’s philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original synthesis of Neoplatonic metaphysics, and is a significant alternative to Aquinas’s anthropology.

Arguing for this thesis will involve supporting a number of sub-theses, which will be largely based on my exegesis of Pecham’s texts (primarily in chapters two and three of the present study), especially his Tractatus De Anima¹ and quaestio five of his

¹ Ed. P. Gaudentis Melani (Florence: Stabilimenti Grafici Vallecchi, 1948). All references to the Pecham’s Tractatus are to the Tractatus De Anima, unless otherwise noted.
Quaestiones De Anima.\textsuperscript{2} I will also refer to relevant passages in others of Pecham’s works: Quaestiones De Beatitudine Corporis et Animae,\textsuperscript{3} Quaestiones Selectae ex Commentario Super I. Sententiarum,\textsuperscript{4} other portions of Pecham’s commentary on the first book of Peter Lombard’s Sentences,\textsuperscript{5} the Summa de Esse et Essentia,\textsuperscript{6} and Pecham’s Quodlibeta Quatuor.\textsuperscript{7}

It is particularly important to give an exposé of the Tractatus and quaestio five in detail. Both texts are replete with Pecham’s citation of his philosophical and theological sources, and a consideration of how Pecham organizes and uses these sources to advance his agenda is the subject of the fifth chapter of the present study. Both texts contain arguments throughout that will serve as evidence to support claims I make about Pecham’s position in comparison with Aquinas’ position. This is the subject of the sixth chapter. Furthermore, with the exception of Girard Etzkorn’s and Hieronymus Spettmann’s work, the Pecham texts have not been studied in-depth in the scholarship (usually study of Pecham has been done briefly and only to aid in understanding Aquinas’ work). The present study is an effort to begin to correct this oversight. Though the

\textsuperscript{2} Quaestiones Disputatae, ed. Girard Etzkorn, Franciscana Scholastica 28 (Grottaferrata: College of St. Bonaventure Press, 2002). Unless otherwise noted, all references to Pecham’s Quaestiones refers to the Quaestiones De Anima.
\textsuperscript{3} This text is also included in Etzkorn’s Quaestiones Disputatae.
\textsuperscript{4} Johannis Pechami Quaestiones: Tractantes De Anima, ed. Hieronymus Spettmann (Munster: Monasterii Guestfalorum, 1918), 183-221.
\textsuperscript{5} Included as an appendix in Melani’s edition of the Tractatus (129-138).
\textsuperscript{7} Ed. Etzkorn and Delorme, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica 25 (Grottaferrata: College of St. Bonaventure Press, 1989), 171-295. The fourth Quodlibet was edited by Delorme and revised by Etzkorn.
detailed exegesis of the primary Pecham texts serves to support my thesis, the exegesis will also enhance future Pecham scholarship.

In order to facilitate my comparison between Pecham and Aquinas, I must also give an exposé of relevant Aquinas material. I will focus on Aquinas’s arguments against Averroism from the following texts: *Questions on the Soul* (ca. 1269), the *Treatise on Human Nature: Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89*, and *Against the Averroists On There Being Only One Intellect* (ca. 1269). The reader may wonder why so much space is given to the study of Aquinas in a dissertation that is focused on Pecham. There are four reasons why I give so much attention to Aquinas in chapters four and six of the present study:

1. Aquinas’s work represents an important response to a major view of psychology in the 13th century, namely Latin Averroism. Pecham also criticizes Latin Averroism during the same period, thus a careful study of Pecham’s psychology should naturally include some discussion of Aquinas. A comparison reveals stark differences between Pecham’s response and Aquinas’s response. These differences are rooted in basic principles of their understanding of the human person, and so it is unsurprising that a

---

8 On the date of the writing of the *Quaestiones*, see *Quaestiones*, 2-3.
11 In fact, a thorough discussion of *many* aspects of Pecham’s philosophy would include a discussion of Aquinas (see Etzkorn, “Franciscan *Quodlibeta* 1270-1285: John Pecham. Matthew of Aquasparta, and Roger Marston,” *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages*, ed. Christopher David Schabel [Leiden: Brill, 2006], 136-139).
close study of Aquinas’s texts relevant to Latin Averroism is also helpful in understanding Aquinas’ anthropology overall. With a broad understanding of Aquinas’s anthropology, one is in a position to compare Pecham and Aquinas.

(2) While Pecham’s differences from Aquinas on the topic of the eternity of the world have been studied in some depth, the differences between the two thinkers on the topic of the soul and the nature of the human person have been less studied. Pecham has been dismissed as being obviously misguided or as failing to see that the philosophical controversy with Aquinas (especially on the matter of the unity of form) did not amount to much. However, Pecham treats the differences between Aquinas and himself as being very serious. A detailed study of Aquinas’s views on the matter can help us in evaluating whether Pecham or the contemporary scholarship is correct on this point.

(3) Given that the differences between Pecham and Aquinas have been little studied, modern scholarship has failed to consider the possibility that Pecham’s anthropology is comparable to Aquinas’s in consistency and explanatory power. The occasion of this dissertation seemed a good opportunity to begin to correct this oversight.

(4) Purely in the interest of fairness toward Aquinas, I wanted to focus extensively on his own texts just as I have focused on Pecham’s texts. I did not want to rely merely on secondary sources in order to understand Aquinas’s psychology.

I hope that, given these four reasons, the reader will appreciate the necessity of the excursion into Aquinas’s thought in chapters four and six of the present study.
My thesis, as stated above, is supported by various strands of evidence from diverse sources. Therefore, in the rest of this introduction I will summarize the dissertation’s six chapters, showing how the evidence presented throughout each chapter supports my thesis. Here is a broad overview:

- Chapter one is an introduction to Pecham and his work, and a contextualization of his work in the history of philosophy and theology.
- Chapters two, three, and four are expositions of the relevant Pecham and Aquinas texts.
- Chapters five and six are interpretations of the data explicated in chapters two through four. Chapter five will prove the first part of my thesis (i.e., that Pecham’s philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original synthesis of Neoplatonic metaphysics). Chapter six will prove the second part of my thesis (i.e., that Pecham’s anthropology is a significant alternative to that of Aquinas).

**Chapter One**

Three logical conditions for Pecham meriting scholarly attention *at all*, even in a dissertation, are: (1) The study has not already been done. (2) We already know *something* about who he is. (3) We have some idea of his philosophical work. Therefore in this chapter I will begin by briefly reviewing the secondary literature that describes Pecham’s life and work, arguing that there are lacunae in scholarship, where it would have been beneficial to investigate debates between Pecham and Aquinas (the present study will begin to correct these oversights). Second, I will give an overview of Pecham’s life and career, as presented in the secondary literature, in order to contextualize his work. This section will show something of the kind of man Pecham was and that he had

---

12 For brevity, I am using few footnotes in this introduction; many of the introduction’s claims will be supported in the chapters to follow.
basically the same agenda throughout his career—to preserve what he considered to be orthodox Christianity in a world greatly affected by philosophers from the Islamic world and the new Aristotelianism.

Pecham’s work cannot be placed in its historical context unless consideration is given to his role in a movement that developed among the Franciscans in Paris in the 1270s and has come to be known as “Neo-Augustinianism.” Pecham’s conception of orthodoxy, in a European world surrounded by and influenced by an intellectually powerful Islam, centered on positions taken to be representative of Augustine but which were, in fact, conditioned by a number of Neoplatonic, Jewish, and Arabic sources. It has been suggested that Pecham was in some sense a “founder” of Neo-Augustinianism and that Bonaventure and Pecham were seminal figures in the movement. While this appears to be roughly correct, there has been great debate about the philosophical contours of the movement and therefore at this time it is impossible to precisely state Pecham’s role in the movement’s development. Still, evidence from our Pecham texts suggests that he was promoting a particular kind of “Augustinianism.” Pecham refers to Augustinian doctrines in a framework that results largely from his reading of four authors in particular: Avicenna, Avicebron,\(^{13}\) Dominicus Gundissalinus, and Pseudo-Dionysius. Our works place Pecham in a Neoplatonic tradition that gives special credence to what is taken to be Augustine’s position; using a wide array of authors, Pecham endorses emanationist

\(^{13}\) While contemporary usage would dictate I use ‘Ibn Gabirol’ rather than ‘Avicebron,’ I will respect medieval usage and refer to the author of the \textit{Fons Vitae} as Avicebron.
metaphysics, universal hylomorphism, spiritual matter, seminal reasons, and divine illumination.

Finally, I will discuss Pecham’s argumentative approach. The new reader of the *Tractatus De Anima* and *quaestio five* may be put off because Pecham often does not spend much time on each point, but rather presents a series of brief arguments to support his claims. In support of Pecham, I suggest two things: (1) There are plausible ways of reading Pecham that vindicate him of the charge of using an unphilosophical approach. (2) Pecham exhibits (especially in the *Quaestiones*) the ability to write in-depth philosophical criticism that is much deeper than recitation of stock arguments.

**Chapter Two**

This chapter begins a basic task that has yet to be done, i.e., the exposition of Pecham’s psychological texts. In this chapter I will first introduce the literary form of the disputed question, saying something about how it developed and how it was carried out in the philosophical context of the medieval university. I will then give an exposé of Pecham’s psychology as presented in the fifth of his *Quaestiones De Anima*, which has been edited by Girard Etzkorn on the basis of a previous edition by Hieronymus Spettmann. This *quaestio* contains many of Pecham’s arguments against the Latin Averroists.

---

14 Etzkorn says that his edition generally agrees with the former edition by Spettmann (in the *Tractantes De Anima*, 1-104); the main new contribution is the updating of the notes to conform with modern critical editions (*Quaestiones*, introduction, xviii).
Averroes\textsuperscript{15} was not unusual in positing a separate agent intellect, but he was unique in positing a separate material (or passive) intellect. The Averroes translator and editor Richard C. Taylor writes:

Following Aristotle’s suggestions in *De Anima* 3.5 and the explicit accounts of the Greek commentators Alexander and Themistius, and also Avicenna, Alfarabi, and others of the Arabic tradition, Averroes asserts that a separate and transcendent Agent Intellect is needed to bring about the actuality of knowledge experienced by human beings. The “light” of this Agent Intellect fully distills the form from the purified yet still individual intention and actualizes the form as an actual intelligible in the separate Material Intellect. In this process ... individual human beings provide intentions which the separate Material and Agent Intellects process into intelligibles in act. This is a conjunction or conjoining ... which brings about the acquired intellect ... in the individual human being. As a result of this, the individual attains the intellect in a positive disposition of knowledge ... which connects the individual human being in an abiding way with the Material Intellect where the intelligibles in act exist.\textsuperscript{16}

The view that there is one common intellect for all human beings is also called monopsychism. Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia are the most notable exponents of Latin Averroism, and by the late 1260s and 1270s there was already considerable opposition to their views.\textsuperscript{17} Dominicans and Franciscans were not unified in their shared opposition to Averroist doctrines. Yet, Franciscans viewed the Dominicans Aquinas and Albert the Great with almost as much suspicion as they viewed the Averroists, because both groups were integrating Aristotle in what the Franciscans considered to be an unacceptable fashion.\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{16} “Averroes,” 191.


Here then, is a brief summarization of the arguments found in *quaestio* five:

Pecham begins his *responsio* by saying that the Catholic faith supports the view that there is one rational soul for each individual, and that this position has never been doubted by the saints (the *sancti*, or learned doctors of the church). Yet, Pecham says that the Averroist error concerning the common intellect still needs to be destroyed “in its foundations.” Thus, Pecham will argue against what he takes to be the three fundamental erroneous propositions advanced by monopsychism:

1. *The possible [material] intellect is substantially free from matter.* This radical dissociation of the intellect from corporeality has the unfortunate consequences that individuals can no longer be said to have their own proper intellect, and that the intellect is no longer a perfection of each individual human corporeal being. Here, Pecham presents his own view on the connection between the possible intellect and matter: The intellect (active and possible) perfects corporeal matter without being dependent on it for its own very being and without being an epiphenomenon to matter. This leads Pecham to explain not only how the soul perfects the body, but also how the body perfects the soul. Thus, there may be a sense in which Pecham is not a radical dualist with regard to the body/soul unity.

2. *There is only one active intellect for all men.* Pecham objects not only to the doctrine that the possible intellect is singular, but also to the doctrine that the active intellect is singular. For Pecham, each particular human being has his own proper intellect, including his own active intellect. For Averroes to say that a common intellect receives phantasms from individual people, he must deny even that the soul is *inclined* to
a particular body. Furthermore, since understanding occurs at various times and only temporarily, a single intellect cannot perfect many individuals, and a single act of understanding cannot be alike in all people.

(3) The individual human being uses the single, separate intellect. This position actually works against monopsychism because it allows that the individual human being thinks to himself about his own faith and justice, and these are objects that he could not consider by looking outside of his own, particularized experience. Thus, Pecham appeals to phenomenological experience, and looks to Augustine for support. Furthermore, Pecham points to what he believes are inconsistencies in Averroes’ account: Averroes says that the individual human being is defined by universal reason and that universal, common reason perfects the individual, yet monopsychism conflicts with this. If the individual human being is not defined by reason, then he cannot make a rational choice and cannot be held accountable for what he does.

In the contra section of the quaestio, Pecham cites 15 additional arguments against the Averroist position. Some arguments are based squarely on scriptural authority, philosophical authority (Aristotle), or theological authority (Augustine, Gennadius). Some arguments deal with problems that Pecham perceives to be inherent in Averroes’ writing. Still others are based on Pecham’s own presuppositions about the soul. Perhaps the most important arguments from a philosophical perspective are the sixth and seventh, which deal with the suitability of the possible intellect to do what the Averroist position requires it to do. Here, Pecham provides his most detailed understanding of Averroism, and argues that if the possible intellect is united to individuals through the phantasms that
individual corporeal beings supply (as Averroes says), then knowledge cannot be common to all humans. In the seventh argument, Pecham goes further to argue that there is no plausible way for phantasms to serve as the connection between a single possible intellect and multiple psycho-biological individuals. Pecham continues this attack on Averroes’ account of phantasms in the 12th argument.

In the *ostenditur quod sic* section, and in the corresponding *ad argumenta principalia* section, Pecham brings up 25 possible arguments in favor of monopsychism, and responds to almost all of them (perhaps to all of them by implication). Again, some arguments are based on philosophical or theological authority. Some are based on epistemological principles. Still others are based on ontological concerns about plurality, singularity, and individuation, or concerns about generation and corruption. Then, there are problems related to the simplicity of the soul, and to the possibility that there would be an infinity of souls if there were more than one intellect. Of particular interest is the first argument, which states that truth is unified and cannot be numbered, therefore truth can reside only in one mind. Pecham answers by explaining that propositions are known to be true in three ways, each of which must be included in an account of the status of truth in the mind of a knower. The fourth argument in favor of monopsychism is related: If two people understand the same thing, then they must have the same intelligible species in their mind; if there is more than one mind, then the species must be different in some respect, and therefore two people could not both understand exactly the same thing. Pecham responds by saying that intelligible species can be numerically diverse yet
substantially alike. To illustrate this, Pecham compares intelligible species and rays from
the sun.

Chapter Three

In the third chapter I will explicate Pecham’s psychology as presented in his *Tractatus De Anima*, which has been edited by P. Gaudentis Melani. We may take the *Tractatus* as
Pecham’s mature statement about the nature of the soul. In the *Tractatus* Pecham clearly
presents his final synthesis, providing some of his most notable positions and evidence
that he is working within a particular framework. The *Tractatus* is divided into three parts
with multiple chapters in each part. The first part is on the operation of the soul, the
second part on the powers of the soul, and the third part on the substance of the soul, but
it is not always clear how the divisions govern the content. Thankfully the chapter titles
provide clearer structure. Chapter three below contains the exposition of the *Tractatus*, so
in this introduction I will merely mention some major themes that animate the *Tractatus*
and that are particularly helpful in forming basis for my interpretive arguments.

In the *Tractatus* Pecham presents his doctrine of “life,” wherein the fundamental act
of the soul (or “form”) is life. Here, life refers basically to an operation that is prior to the
operation of the nutritive and sensitive aspects of the soul. Life is a drive toward
completion. The life of the ensouled being comes about as a result of an emanation and
an impression whereby the life of the soul “overflows” into the life of the body. The body
is disposed (evidently by its vegetative and sensitive aspects) to receive the rational soul.
Pecham insists that the rational soul can be united only to the human body, because only
the human body has a mediating disposition that is specified by its animal spirits.
On Pecham’s view, a living thing’s fundamental form is life itself, and this principle is irreducible to any other form. The tripartite soul of the human being is responsible for the fulfillment of the potencies of life in the individual. Having equated life with form, Pecham mentions other vital forms, thus making clear his view that there exists a plurality of substantial forms in the person. In addition to the form that is the driving force of life, there is a form of corporeity (forma corporeitatis) in matter, and the

---

19 Franciscans, perhaps inspired by Pecham, adjusted the plurality view and spoke instead of grades of a single form (e.g., Roger Marston, *Quodlibeta Quatuor*, ed. Girard J. Etzkorn and Ignatius Brady [Florence: Quaracchi, 1968], 2:22; cf. Etzkorn, “John Pecham,” *A Companion*, 385; Douie, *Archbishop Pecham*, 280). This can be read as an attempt to reconcile with Aristotle. Unfortunately, Pecham’s major treatment of this issue has been lost (see Etzkorn, “John Pecham, O.F.M.: A Career of Controversy,” *Monks, Nuns, and Friars in Mediaeval Society*, ed. E.B. King, et al. [Sewanee, TN: The Press of the University of the South, 1989], 79). In the *Tractatus* Pecham speaks explicitly about a plurality of forms and does not discuss the “grades” theory, and so I will primarily focus on the more general plurality view without the “grades” refinement. However, Pecham does endorse the grades view in his *Quodlibeta Quatuor* (ed. Etzkorn and Delorme [Grottaferrata: College of St. Bonaventure], 198-199, 230-231): “Dicendum igitur quod sicut coniunctio principiorum—materiae et formae—dat esse, eorumdem indivisio dat unum esse: ‘unum enim est ens quod non dividitur’. Ex prima autem coniunctione formae cum materia causatur unitas, scilicet ex coniunctione formae primae substantialis cum materia prima, quia ‘simul est substantia et haec substantia’. Et ideo superveniens mutatio formarum naturalium in esse physico circa substantiam non mutat identitatem numeralem substantiae vel corporis per se, quia vivum et mortuum nihil faciunt ad essentiam corporeitatis, quamvis mutent esse specificum generis naturalis infimi et quorumdam subalternorum. Sub transmutatione enim simul manent materia, potentia et forma prima substantialis, quia sola materia non est subjectum. . . . Dicendum igitur quod anima rationalis non est forma corporis, secundum quod corpus est, immo praesupponit corporeitatem, cuius forma non corrumpitur per adventum animae, quia nullam habet cum ipsa corporeitatem. Praeterea, corporeitas supponitur in definitione animae, quae est ‘actus corporis organici physici potentia vitam habentis’ . . . Dicendum quod in corpore hominis, secundum quod corpus est, omnes formae quattuor elementorum reductae sunt in unam formam mixti; non cuiuscumque mixtionis, sed illius quae est propria complexionis humanae. Unde nulla est ibi forma elementaris quantum ad formarum simplicitatem. Unde sunt in homine formae plures gradatim ordinatae ad unam ultimam perfectionem, et ideo formatum est unum.”
vegetative, sensitive, and intellective forms. Each form has its own perfection. The rational soul is unique among these forms because, while other forms receive the foundation of their existence from natural generation in matter, the pure, rational intellect does not need matter in order to exist. Although the intellect requires the body in order to accomplish some of its purposes, its primary role is not to be involved in particular bodily events but rather to empower any human activity whatsoever, and to contemplate the divine. On the other extreme of Pecham’s Neoplatonic hierarchy of organisms are the plants, which have “the farthest resonance of life.”

Pecham endorses universal hylomorphism, the view that “all substances except God were composed of matter and form, whereas God is immaterial.” According to universal hylomorphism, everything other than God (including angels and the rational souls of human beings) is composed of both spiritual matter and spiritual form. Pecham takes matter to be the principle of changeability, so matter may or may not involve corporeality. An angel, for example, has spiritual matter, which allows it to change or sin.

The rational soul is marked by the image of God and ordered to intellectual illumination and has matter, but does not have corporeal matter as part of its essence. Pecham does not spell out a detailed illuminationist epistemology here, but does imply that divine light is involved at all levels of life and is required for any knowledge. The sensitive soul receives corporeal forms incorporeally, whereas the intellective soul receives its forms from above. Yet, the intellect has a managerial role over the body such

that numerous potencies are all involved in a single human function. The body allows for the intellect to be “perfected, sanctified, and cleansed.”

As the *Tractatus* is a treatment of every aspect of the soul and not just of the intellectual soul, Pecham gives attention not only to the intellect but also to the sensitive soul. Visual perception of particular objects occurs through a combination of intromission and extramission, and Pecham is evidently operating with a corporeal species model similar to that of Roger Bacon’s *Perspectiva* and *De Multiplicatione Specierum*. For any apprehended thing to be known intellectually, a mental similitude of it must be assimilated to an eternal exemplar. The soul is totally assimilable, yet it is structured in the sense that it is partially responsible for its own transformation into various similitudes or species, just as the wax is potentially in the shape of the seal.

This obviously raises the question of what God contributes to intellection and what is left for man and the objects of intellection to contribute. There are several aspects to Pecham’s answer in the *Tractatus*. (1) Angelic intermediaries assist in human knowledge by providing illuminations. Angels do not impart their own knowledge, but rather remove impediments between the human and knowledge. (2) Human knowledge is never produced from the complete absence of previous knowledge. New knowledge is always based either on some memory or upon some illumination. (3) Divine light cooperates in some sense in the production of intelligible species from corporeal species and in the production of understanding based on the species. Pecham explains by comparing

---

intellectual “vision” to corporeal vision. The light of the sun is required for corporeal vision, and divine light is required for intellectual vision; the intellect has an active power that produces similitudes, but this production is only by virtue of the superior light from God in whom everything is known. In particular, genuine knowledge occurs when the knower comprehends things in light of their “ultimate forms,” which are available only in God. Pecham goes into some detail and illustration about how the intellect is completed through divine light.

Pecham says that there is both a created and an uncreated agent intellect. The uncreated agent intellect is God (or the divine light) and provides the illuminations discussed above, and the human agent intellect is the active power that abstracts species from the phantasms. The individual human being’s active intellect also unites with the individual’s possible intellect, which is the principle of openness/possibility in the intellect whereby it is assimilable to objects. There is also an active and passive aspect of the human memory.

At this point Pecham takes a bit of an excursion—albeit an important one—to explain how love is the appetite which is the basis for all teleology. A creature has a desire (appetitus) for vital movement, and desire gives rise to love, which is the main motivating factor in free choice.\(^\text{22}\) In fact, Pecham portrays love as the principle by which all of the passions are defined. Human love is imperfect because of embodiment (similar

\[^{22}\text{This may be read as a philosophical basis for the prevailing Franciscan view that the will is superior to the intellect; see Bonnie Kent, }\textit{Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century} (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1995).\]
to how the intellect is troubled by the ineptitude of the body), and so love must be purified by the rule of the Holy Spirit in order to function as “divine love.” The passions are functions of both the sensitive and the intellective soul; thus Pecham endorses a doctrine of rational will. Pecham argues that the soul’s conjoining with God (portrayed as a mystical ascent) is accomplished through the will, which must be purified by grace. Therefore the same “father of lights” who makes intellectual illumination and knowledge possible also makes rectitude of will possible.

Pecham now provides a sort of map of the soul, by discussing the soul’s powers. He first shows how the soul is divided into virtual parts. The soul is not a mass, but it can nevertheless be divided according to its various principles. The soul is essentially present in every part of the body; e.g., the sensitive soul perfects the various sense organs by providing the potencies with which they are associated. The intellectual powers, however, are “streamed in by no organ” (nulli organo influuntur). In breaking down the soul’s powers and in mapping the intellect’s connection to the various parts of brain, Pecham follows Avicenna, but takes opportunities to show how his explanation accords with Aristotle. Of particular interest is Pecham’s view that no medium falls between the intellect and itself; nonetheless, because of the instability of corporeal embodiment, the soul cannot have complete, self-identical understanding.

At the end of the Tractatus, Pecham presents a series of 10 arguments for the rational soul’s survival of the body’s death. A number of these arguments are reflective of Augustine’s arguments in On the Immortality of the Soul and of Gundissalinus’ work on
the same subject. There are five arguments that consist of negative responses to arguments in favor of the soul’s annihilation. There are then five arguments that can be read as positive arguments for the soul’s immortality.

Chapter Four

In the fourth chapter I will explicate Aquinas’s arguments against the Averroists as presented in a number of his writings: Questions on the Soul, The Treatise on Human Nature: Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89, and Against the Averroists On There Being Only One Intellect. As with Pecham’s Tractatus, I will not attempt to summarize all of these passages in this introduction, but will merely give a broad overview to make easier the reading of the exposition. There is some repetition among the three works.

In the Against the Averroists, Aquinas insists that he is making philosophical arguments against Averroism instead of basing his objections on theological presuppositions. The first set of arguments deals with Aquinas’s interpretation of Aristotle. At issue is the Averroists’ failure to understand Aristotle, who says that the soul is the first act of a physical, organic body. Thus at least some part of the soul must be inseparable from the body, but Aquinas maintains that Averroes’ position disallows

---


26 Trans. Ralph McInerny (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1993). Unless otherwise noted, all references to Against the Averroists refer to this translation.
inseparability. Aquinas admits that it is possible to argue for a single agent intellect (although Aquinas thinks that Aristotle did not argue for this), but not for the single possible intellect.

A repeated theme in Against the Averroists (and in Aquinas’s Quaestiones) is the difference between Aristotle’s view of the soul, whereby the soul is united to the body as form, and Plato’s view of the soul, whereby the soul is united to the body as mover (or a sailor is united to a ship). Aquinas insists that Aristotle never implies that the intellect is external to the individual human soul. In reality, Aquinas says, the soul is on the border between material and separated forms. Furthermore, Aquinas says that Plato erred in thinking that the soul is a complete species and only accidentally united to the body. For himself, Aquinas maintains that the soul can be the form of the body and yet there can be some power of the soul that is not a power of the body. (The broader principle at work here is that a power might belong to a form not in virtue of its relationship to some matter.) Even though the soul is the form of the body, it retains its being after the death of the body, because intellectual activity is not exercised by a bodily organ. In addressing the passage from Aristotle’s Generation of Animals that says that the intellect enters from outside,27 Aquinas says that every act must correlate to a potency, and so the human must possess intellection potentially before he possesses it actually.

Aquinas provides a series of arguments to prove that the Averroists cannot account for individualized knowledge. Especially, the Averroists’ view of the conjunction between the proposed single mind and the imagination in the individual knower is faulty, because the

27 “[I]ntellect comes only from without and it alone is divine” (736b.27-28).
individual must know by his own power of knowing and not merely because he has contributed some images to an external mind that does the knowing. Phantasms are only “preambles” to actions of the mind, and so phantasms as such cannot differentiate between simultaneous intellectual acts. More generally, Averroists cannot explain the relationship between the species, phantasms, and the intellect. Even if it were allowed that a single intellect for all humans moves the individual man, the Averroists’ problem would not be solved, because the connection between the intellect and man does not explain how the individual man knows anything himself/herself.

Aquinas responds to a number of objections to his view that there are a plurality of possible intellects. Particularly important is his response to the objection that if two people understand the same thing, then there can be only one understanding. Aquinas responds by saying that the object of the mind determines whether there is one understanding, and does not determine the number of intellects. Also, understanding occurs according to the mode of the one who is doing the understanding.

In Aquinas’s response to the first of his *Quaestiones De Anima*, he argues for two important claims: (1) The human soul is both an entity and a form. In fact, the soul is a substance and has being, but apart from the body the soul has an incomplete nature and does not have existence. Both the body and the soul exist when they are together, and they go out of existence when they are separated (although the intellect does not go out of being when the body dies). The rational soul does not have a complete specific nature when separated from the body, however the rational soul has an operation that it carries out when separate from the body. (2) The soul is the form of a living body. One argument
that Aquinas gives for this claim is this: The soul gives being to a body. But to confer being is a characteristic of a form. Therefore, a human soul is the form of the body. Aquinas argues specifically against substance dualism on the basis that such a dualism makes the soul-body relationship accidental so that the separation between soul and body would not be a substantial corruption. Yet death does represent such a corruption, and so the soul completes human nature rather than representing a distinct nature in itself.

Aquinas endorses a plurality of accidental forms, but maintains that there can be only one substantial form for a given organism at a time. Each new form takes the place of a previous form, which is corrupted. Thus Aquinas says that the intellective soul has the powers that the vegetative and sensitive souls had, just as a pentagon has in itself the triangle and the square.

In the second *quaestio*, Aquinas maintains that humans must have a principle of intellectual potency, i.e., a principle that is unspecified with respect to intelligible forms. This indetermination is why the possible intellect can have no bodily organ; if it had an organ, it would be determined to a particular sensible nature. Still, Aquinas insists that the possible intellect is not so unmixed with matter that it is a substance separate from the body. This leads Aquinas to offer a number of criticisms of the Averroist positions about the possible intellect. These arguments are based on the inseparability between form and matter, and the instrumentality of the intellect in bringing about human understanding. The fact that the intellect abstracts universal forms from individuating material principles does not require that the intellect be universal, as the Averroists say it is, but only that that the intellect be immaterial.
In the third *quaestio*, Aquinas adds that species become intelligible only after they have been abstracted from the phantasms and exist in the possible intellect, and so phantasms as such cannot explain for the individuality of knowers. Aquinas also argues that there is no way to account for the multiplication of the operation of understanding if there is only one possible intellect. He insists that Averroism is open to the same objections to which a Platonic doctrine of Ideas is subject; if intellect is what determines human nature, and there is only one intellect (as in a Platonic Ideal realm), then a human intellect exists and is defined through its participation in a single, separate substance.

There are two main sections of Aquinas’s *Treatise of Human Nature* that pertain to Latin Averroism and thus indirectly to the conflict with Pecham. *Quaestio* 76 deals with “The Soul’s Union with the Body,” and *quaestio* 84 asks “What Does the Soul Cognize Bodies Through?” In *quaestio* 76 Aquinas argues for the following claims (among others, some of which I have already mentioned in connection with the other Aquinas texts): (1) The intellect is the principle of rationality, which is the *differentia* of the human being. (2) If someone says that the soul is composed of matter and form, then he could not say that the soul is the body’s form, because form is actuality and matter is potentiality. (3) There can be no more than one soul for each individual body. (4) The sensitive soul is made incorruptible through its association with the intellectual soul. (5) There can be but one substantial form for a body, because Aristotle says that the soul is the actuality of a physical body potentially having life. (6) Matter is the way it is because of form; matter is for the sake of form. (7) There is no innate knowledge, and so knowledge must arise from what the senses provide. (8) The soul has multiple powers,
even though it is one essence. (9) There is no mediating form or matter between a given matter and its substantial form, or between body and soul. (10) The soul is whole in each part of the body.

In *quaestio* 84, the propositions for which Aquinas argues include the following: (1) The intellect cognizes bodies through intelligible species that are drawn from phantasms; therefore, human cognition is not a merely corporeal process. (2) Species do not emanate from separate, immaterial forms, into the soul. (3) Cognition requires both the intelligible species and the light in which the eternal natures are contained. (4) The agent intellect is in some sense separate from the possible intellect, but there is an operation of the human soul in a human being that forms the various images by dividing and composing. (5) The human soul needs recourse to the phantasms in order to actually understand anything (God and incorporeal substances are cognized by comparing them to sensible things).

**Chapter Five**

Pecham’s texts often present themselves as collections of rapid-fire claims and citations with scarce explanation of concepts or support for presuppositions. (Pecham addressed an audience of highly trained philosophers and theologians who knew the various traditions.) Thus, in order to understand Pecham’s psychology one must show that some objective structures his wide-ranging use of arguments and sources. Thus, in the fifth chapter I will seek to address how Pecham organizes his sources, and how he marshals these sources to advance his own agenda. The answers to these questions reveal that Pecham had a definite agenda and that he organized his material strategically.
While a number of sources animate Pecham’s work, one plausible way of reading our texts suggests that, while Pecham was clearly drawing from Augustine and Avicenna, he was inspired also by Avicebron’s *Fons Vitae*, an 11th-century work of Neoplatonic metaphysics that was preserved in the translation of Dominicus Gundissalinus.

Avicebron’s doctrines were also expanded in Gundissalinus’ own works, to which Pecham makes frequent reference. The scholarship is practically unanimous in the view that Avicebron was considered to be the main source of the doctrines of the plurality of forms and universal hylomorphism in 13th century and the later Middle Ages. There are

---

a number of places in Pecham’s work where he seems to be thinking of the *Fons Vitae*.\(^{30}\)

In fact, a reading of the *Tractatus* in comparison with the *Fons Vitae* yields a number of examples of striking similarities in the arguments the authors make.

I will explain Avicebron’s position and how it relates to Pecham’s position in greater detail in the fifth chapter, but to briefly introduce it: Avicebron believes that the initial emanation from the First Author resulted in two substances, universal form and universal matter, and the rest of the development of the universe is the result of the emanative interplay between these two, with the result that both are progressively specified. Pecham does not discuss universal form and universal matter as such in our texts, but does endorse the *forma corporeitatis* and the corresponding doctrine that all substances have both matter and form, as did Bonaventure before him.)

Avicebron endorses a causal hierarchy whereby forms impress themselves on one another. The motions of the soul are due to impressions of form, and the rational soul is the source of the rest of the forms in the human being. In this way form itself is diffused among all things that exist. The First Author is characterized by no form, but every intermediary between the First Author and the human being does have a form, and the human being has a plurality of forms. Each form is simple. Both Pecham and Avicebron use sunlight as a metaphor for emanation, to illustrate how a whole substance confers its form to another substance which is in the mode of receiving form. In discussing the mode of the human body’s receptivity in particular, both Pecham and Avicebron say that the

body’s configuration, and especially its blood, constitute a disposition toward the impression of the rational soul. Pecham and Avicebron also ground knowledge in the impression of purely intellectual emanations.

Pecham is willing to call matter, form, and their combination “substance.” This is not unexpected given Avicebron’s insistence that spiritual substance permeates all being. In both Pecham and Avicebron, substances are differentiated based on their subtlety and density, two opposites. The more dense a being is, the more perceptible it is to the senses. However, density hides the perceptibility of being itself, whereas subtlety reveals being. Pecham illustrates subtlety with the example of fire. Further examples of similarities between Pecham’s thought and Avicebron’s thought, and areas in which the two complement or expand on one another, include the following:

- There is immaterial addition such that adding immaterial conceptual parts has no effect on a substance’s simplicity.
- Animal spirits are the vehicles of animal powers and are intermediaries between soul and body.
- Love is a central metaphor for metaphysics and natural philosophy.
- Individuation of particular human beings is based on distinct contributions from form and matter. (Here Pecham also shows his debt to Bacon and Bonaventure, but also independence of thought.)
- Emanation functions in the human being’s intellection, being, and existence.
- The soul is “everywhere in the body.”
- Human knowledge is the result of a conjoining to God, rather than to the 10th and lowest of separate intellects (as in Avicenna). Perfect human knowledge involves a mystical ascent.

It may be impossible to determine to what degree these ideas (or approximations) were available to Pecham in texts other than the *Fons Vitae*; it is certainly impractical for the
present study to attempt such a judgment. Nonetheless, this high number of connections between Pecham and his Neoplatonic forbearer shows that reading Pecham as part of a tradition that was heavily influenced by the *Fons Vitae* is a promising interpretive strategy.

Nonetheless, I will have to provide plausible reasons why Pecham seldom cites Avicebron directly, because Pecham cites the *Fons Vitae* directly only once. Actually, at one point Pecham seems to attribute the doctrine of spiritual matter to Augustine rather than to Avicebron. Yet as Dales explains, Pecham had in mind a doctrine that Avicebron taught:

> When Pecham says the soul is ‘immaterial,’ however, he means only that it is not involved in corporeal matter, for, like Bonaventure and William of Baglione, he bases his position on Avicebron’s teaching that the soul is composed of matter and form, both spiritual, a view he attributes to Augustine and even Averroes. The rational soul does indeed contain matter, though spiritual rather than corporeal. Therefore it is free of transmutable matter, ‘but has something similar to matter itself through which it is a ‘this,’ through which there is a natural distinction in separated substances.’ (It is this that confirms his true source to be Avicebron, not Augustine, for Augustine’s reason for positing something like spiritual matter was specifically to guarantee the mutability of spiritual substances.)

---

31 *Quaestiones*, 451.
33 *The Problem of the Rational Soul*, 128, parenthetical item in orig.; cf. Pecham, *Quaestiones*, 379. It is curious that Aquinas, who does not believe in spiritual matter, attributes his own view to Augustine (*Treatise*, 11), however, Augustine has a view of something *like* spiritual matter (see chapter five of the present work; cf. Mary T. Clark, *Augustine* [New York: Continuum, 2005], 31). Pecham cites Augustine in support of spiritual matter and uses Averroes’ comments as further evidence (see *Quaestiones*, 347, 379).
Dales’ conclusion that Pecham’s sources for the spiritual matter excluded Augustine is inconclusive since Pecham also motivates the doctrine of spiritual matter with the principle of mutability.

I will offer four reasons why the scarcity of direct Pechamian citations of the *Fons Vitae* does not mean that Pecham was not influenced heavily by the *Fons Vitae*: (1) There are plausible explanations for why Pecham would have infrequently cited the *Fons Vitae* explicitly, even though the text influenced him. (2) The scholarship on the subject of the philosophical background of the 13th century is practically unanimous in the traditional conviction that Avicebron inspired two central doctrines that Pecham adopts in his anthropology, i.e., universal hylomorphism and the plurality of forms. (I will respond to two writers who object to the traditional view.) (3) There are obvious philosophical commonalities between Pecham and other Franciscan writers who advocated for Avicebron’s ideas. Thus, in Pecham we find not only the direct influence of Avicebron/Gundissalinus, but also the indirect influence of the *Fons Vitae* tradition through prior Franciscan philosophers. (4) Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas recognized Avicebron as a primary source of the doctrines of hylomorphism and plurality of forms, and treated Avicebron’s philosophy as a serious problem.

Next we must ask what such an interpretive strategy would yield as an answer to the question: “What is Pecham’s project?” Here, I reflect on the data gathered to this point and attempt to say with more precision what Pecham’s project is. I suggest that Pecham’s project is to design an answer to the following question: “Given that Avicebron and Avicenna are right about metaphysics, what kind of natural philosophy and epistemology
account best for how things are?” Then, I suggest that in addition to his own original
teaching on the subject, Pecham uses three tools at hand to answer the question. The first
is Avicenna’s account of the human person and cognition. The second is a set of
Aristotelian principles that he takes to be valid limitations on any anthropology of
epistemology. The third is a divine illumination theory, which goes back at least to
Augustine. This is probably why Pecham has been called an exponent of “Avicennized
Augustinianism.”

In the conclusion to chapter five I acknowledge that, to show in detail how Pecham
differs from every philosopher who espoused doctrines such as universal hylomorphism
would require a separate study. Yet I point to the possibility that in every case of
comparison with Pecham, his distinctiveness could be amply illustrated in the existing
scholarship. These conclusions about Pecham’s project support the claim in my thesis
that Pecham’s philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original synthesis of
Neoplatonic metaphysics

Chapter Six

The aspect of my thesis that will not have been supported by the end of the fifth
chapter is the claim that Pecham’s anthropology is a significant alternative to that of
Aquinas. Thus, in the sixth chapter I will compare and contrast Pecham’s views (as
presented in chapters two, three, and five) with Aquinas’s views (as presented in chapter
four), showing (1) that Pecham’s view is not obviously subject to some objections that
are problematic for Aquinas; (2) that Pecham and Aquinas are both dualists in some
sense; and (3) that Pecham has philosophical arguments in the controversy with
Averroism that are interesting independent of their value to theology. I will also discuss Pecham’s philosophical motivation for taking the plurality of forms position, showing how Pecham’s metaphysical starting point leads him to theological and philosophical conclusions which he sees as far superior to the consequences of Aquinas’s position.

First, I will notice areas in which Pecham’s and Aquinas’s views are similar due to their shared religious commitments. For example, they agree that God creates individual rational souls *ex nihilo* and infuses them into particular bodies. Aquinas and Pecham both agree that the soul is the form of the body in some sense. They both think that the individual human has, in some sense, his/her own agent intellect. Aquinas agrees with Pecham that humans cognize things truly in the illumination of divine light, i.e., in their eternal natures, exemplars, or reasons. Finally, Aquinas and Pecham both think that monopsychism is opposed to central tenets of both philosophy and Christianity. Undoubtedly this list of similarities could be expanded.

Second, I will show that there are at least two significant differences between Aquinas’s view and Pecham’s view:

1. Pecham orients his discussion of the soul around the concept of life in a way that Aquinas does not. Of course, both Pecham and Aquinas associate the soul with life, but whereas Aristotle and Aquinas more or less say that the nutritive power is fundamental to life, Pecham wants to find a principle that is ontologically prior—a result of emanation that is present before nutrition.\(^{34}\) Furthermore, the concept of life is also central to

---

Pecham’s account of how the various forms in the human being cooperate. And, of course, (2) Pecham believes in the plurality of substantial forms, whereas Aquinas does not. The debate concerning the plurality of forms was the precise point of issue between Pecham and Aquinas, and Pecham condemns the unity of form in 1286 (although a number of decisive events precede the 1286 condemnation).

While Aquinas denies that there is a plurality of substantial forms in the human being, it is not at all clear that Aquinas avoids dualism given his presuppositions. Recent work in Aquinas’s psychology, reflecting on the Aquinas texts I have studied, has shown that Aquinas thinks of the human body as precisely the kind of body that is suited for the human soul. That is, the body that befits the soul is one that is composed of contrary elements and is corruptible. But this presents problems for Aquinas’s position that the soul is naturally incorruptible. Aquinas is free, of course, to ground the soul’s immortality in theology, but it is not obvious that he can use Aristotle to support this strategy. Aquinas scholarship has also presented two additional roadblocks between Aquinas and a purely theological solution to the problem of immortality: (1) Aquinas has argued that soul and body are both naturally immortal. (2) Aquinas has affirmed that the soul and body are two different kinds of things, thus it would be difficult to develop an account that would be consistent with Aquinas’s theological principles and yet maintain the soul’s necessary connection to a naturally mortal body. In response to problems like these, Aquinas scholarship has suggested that while Aquinas’s Aristotelian psychology is consistent and plausible as an account of human nature, Aquinas simply fails to show how immortality is consistent with Aristotelian psychology. This would have been unsatisfactory to
Aquinas and remains so for interpreters who would like an Aristotelian psychology that allows for immortality. So, Aquinas scholarship has also suggested the possibility that Aquinas solves the immortality problem by actually endorsing dualism himself in some way. Perhaps this is the correct strategy, but then Aquinas is lost as the pioneer of non-dualism in the Middle Ages, and modern Thomists have also lost a major reason for considering Aquinas’s psychology to be principally distinct from and superior to that of Pecham.

Pecham’s dualism is explicit right from the start of our texts. He calls the human being an aggregate. This does not prohibit Pecham from considering the human being as one thing or a “third nature.” It is the aggregate or the third nature that is dissolved at death. It is interesting that *Aquinas* scholarship has admitted that universal hylomorphism may apply very well to the human soul, and that the addition of some kind of “spiritual matter” would solve a difficulty for *Aquinas* even though it would also place him in the camp of those who subscribe to the plurality of forms.

In addition to Pecham’s conviction that the human being is an aggregate, he also introduces a way in which the soul itself can be thought of as being simple. The soul’s simplicity results from the addition of forms, but is not the result of a combination of contraries. Pecham feels justified in taking this position for at least two reasons: (1) Just because one must have a number of concepts in mind prior to having a full understanding of the pluralist soul does not mean that the pluralist soul cannot be simple when considered from another perspective. (2) There is a sense in which the intellect is the substantial form for the human being. This becomes evident in Pecham’s account of how
the various forms relate to one another. Some are ordered to nutrition, some to sensible perception, some to intellection, and some to all three acts. All are united by their involvement in life. Each form strives for its perfection in order to further the cause of the human being’s life and highest function, intellection. Pecham illustrates this principle with regard to the human eye. The eye is necessary for apprehension, but the question of apprehension is properly about the soul and not about the eye, because a psychological process is at work: The intellect transforms itself by receiving forms that have been abstracted from perceptions that the eye has helped to produce. The rational soul is the form that allows the previous form (the sensitive soul) to complete its function. Pecham uses the word *substantia* in various ways in our texts, but does not insist that the vegetative and sensitive forms are themselves *substantiae*. Rather, diverse potencies can be present in a single substance.

In contemporary Thomism, there have been at least two basic responses to the controversy between Pecham and Aquinas. (1) Pecham is wrong because he implies that the introduction of the rational soul is the introduction of an accidental change. But, from the perspective of the “third nature” (the human being), it does not follow that the introduction of the intellect is accidental. In fact, if the intellect were not infused, the substance we know as the human being never would exist at all. (2) The problem is philosophically uninteresting, because Pecham’s position merely involves the choice of calling various aspects of the soul “forms” instead of “potencies.” This response is remarkable given that Pecham and many others were greatly concerned that the pluralist position prevail. If a mere shift of grammar could have solved the problem, would not
someone in the 13th century have noticed? Furthermore, there are a number of significant philosophical consequences that hinge on the debate between Pecham and Aquinas, and these consequences have evidently gone unnoticed in contemporary Thomism:

(1) Pecham’s plurality of forms view is part and parcel of a Neoplatonic metaphysics that includes particular views of matter and form, so what is at stake is not a minor grammatical distinction, but rather an entire philosophical system that accounts for all of physical and spiritual reality in its own way.

(2) Pecham thinks the perfection of man is neither nutritive nor sensitive, but intellectual. So, the nutritive and sensitive aspects must have their own distinct, subservient perfections. If we take it that Pecham thinks of substantial form as specifying a perfection or completion, then Pecham is simply saying that the intellect is the highest of the substantial forms and has the highest degree of perfection. To say otherwise requires not just a grammatical shift, but a shift in the overall understanding of the human being, for if the perfection of one man is exclusively a function of his highest aspect, the intellect, then the vegetative and sensitive aspects simply cannot be man’s highest perfection.

(3) The plurality position allows the body to retain its corporeal form after death, and thus its identity as belonging to an particular corporeal individual. A clear implication of the plurality view is that the dead body of Christ in the tomb retains its identity as the body of Christ for the three days until the resurrection, not taking on any other substantial form. (The plurality view provides similar answers to questions about dead bodies of
saints, the Incarnation, and the Eucharist; theological issues surrounding the debate over plural forms made the controversy intense.)

(4) The plurality position avoids whatever problems may be associated with positing that previous forms are corrupted or displaced during the development of the embryo, as Aquinas taught.

Pecham takes the plurality of forms position not only because of his allegiance to a particular tradition but also and primarily because he believes his positions are more reasonable than the opposing views taken by Aquinas. The plurality view, according to Pecham, has greater explanatory power than Aquinas’s unitarian view. In fact, Pecham thinks that Aquinas’s metaphysical starting point, which involves certain definitions of matter, form, and substance, leads to unacceptable consequences of theological and philosophical significance. These consequences concern the relationship between the soul and the body in general, including the problem of the identity of the dead body of Christ in the tomb, the Eucharist, the creation of the first man (Adam), the development of the embryo, and the inheritance of sin.

The overarching reason for which Pecham sees himself as opposed to Aquinas, even though they agree that Averroism should be opposed, is that Pecham’s immediate focus is on the defense of theological convictions which he believes can be defended philosophically, whereas he believes Aquinas’s focus is on the defense of naturally revealed truth and only secondarily on the defense of theological truth. Pecham believes this is particularly problematic because the philosophical positions that result from Aquinas’s approach endanger certain centrally important theological convictions. Yet
Pecham’s purely philosophical arguments deserve consideration independent of any
disagreement with Aquinas for at least the reason that Pecham’s texts contain interesting,
non-theological arguments against Averroism which Aquinas does not make in the texts I
have studied, and which are interesting independent of debates with Averroism. These
include arguments about the assimilation of the intellect to intelligible species, the
perfection of human beings, purely abstract thought, inherent diversity in intellects, and
the sensation of lesions in the body. Some of these arguments also would have been
available to Aquinas given his presuppositions.
CHAPTER 1
PECHAM AND NEO-AUGUSTINIANISM

Introduction

Three logical conditions for Pecham meriting scholarly attention at all, even in a
dissertation, are: (1) The study has not already been done. (2) We already know
something about who he is. (3) We have some idea of his philosophical work. In the
present chapter I will briefly review the small amount of secondary literature on Pecham,
showing that (1) is the case. Then I will summarize Pecham’s life and career as
documented in that literature, to fulfill (2). Next I will explain what Neo-Augustinianism
is and how Pecham figures into it, to fulfill (3). In doing so, I will draw on the secondary
literature and the Pecham texts that are the focus of the present study to show how
Pecham promoted the ideals of the Neo-Augustinian movement. Finally I will suggest
that readers of Pecham should bear in mind that he has a certain argumentative style. As a
historical survey of Pecham’s work and the philosophical movement in which he was
involved, this chapter serves to facilitate an appreciation for the intensive exposition that
occupies the following two chapters.
Secondary Literature on Pecham

In 1942 M.D. Knowles provided an overview of the progress of the scholarship concerning Franciscans in general, and John Pecham in particular.¹ Franciscan authors have been published from presses at Quaracchi, Assisi, and Rome.² Philosophers and historians who shed light on Pecham’s work prior to Knowles included A. Teetaert,³ Hieronymus Spettman,⁴ A.G. Little,⁵ D.E. Sharp⁶ and Charles Lethbridge Kingsford.⁷ Teetaert’s article includes a complete list of Pecham manuscripts, and Victorin Doucet attempted a complete list of Pecham’s works in 1933,⁸ but a more current list was made in 2006 by Etzkorn.⁹ And, since Knowles wrote his summary, there have been a number of developments, especially the well-researched Pecham biography by Decima Douie.¹⁰

² Ibid., 1.
³ “Pecham, Jean,” Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, 12:100-114.
⁹ “Franciscan Quodlibeta,” 136-139.
¹⁰ Archbishop Pecham.
Among others, Etzkorn, Ignatius Brady, Roland J. Teske, Gordon Wilson, and Benjamin Thompson have written articles about Pecham’s ecclesiastical work, theology, and philosophy. Richard C. Dales’ book on the problem of the rational soul in the 13th century includes a brief section on Pecham’s psychology and is particularly helpful because it describes in some detail the genealogy of the views of those predecessors that Pecham would adopt and modify. According to David C. Lindberg, the editor of Pecham’s work on optics, the richest source of biographical information on Pecham is Douie’s biography. Indeed, while a number of brief summaries of Pecham’s life and/or work are available, Douie’s remains the only extensive overview; however it is not

---

primarily a philosophical biography. In this book\textsuperscript{19} and in Lindberg’s sketch of Pecham’s life,\textsuperscript{20} we find much insight as to who Pecham was and what kind of work he was doing.

Here is one example of the relative lack of attention paid to Pecham in scholarship in the history of philosophy and theology where it would have been relevant to discuss his philosophy or publish his writing: In 1965, Marquette University Press published the second edition of a translation of three medieval authors’ writings on the issue of the world’s eternity.\textsuperscript{21} Pecham’s text on the same issue was left out of the compilation, even though Aquinas’s text was probably directed against Pecham.\textsuperscript{22} (Pecham’s text was edited by Ignatius Brady in 1974 but was not published in translation until 1993.\textsuperscript{23} Etkorn updated the Latin text as part of his edition of Pecham’s \textit{Quaestiones Disputatae} in 2002.\textsuperscript{24}) Furthermore, Pecham’s response to Averroism in \textit{quaestio} five of the \textit{Quaestiones De Anima}, while contemporary with Aquinas’s \textit{Against the Averroists on the Unity of the Intellect}, has never been systematically compared to it (chapters four and six of the present study are designed to correct this oversight).

\textsuperscript{19} Douie draws her biographical information from Pecham’s letters and other sources. Pecham’s letters are available in the three volumes of \textit{Registrum Epistolatarum Fratris Johannis Peckham, Archiepiscopi Cantauriensis}, ed. Charles Trice Martin (New York: Kraus Reprint), 1965.
\textsuperscript{22} Ignatius Brady, “John Pecham and the Background,” 11-71.
\textsuperscript{24} See Etkorn, introduction, xix-xx.
Twentieth- and 21st-century Aquinas scholars have paid little attention to Pecham’s work. Consider some prominent examples: In 1934 Anton C. Pegis wrote *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century*.\(^{25}\) As helpful as Pegis’ book is in devoting 50 pages to Bonaventure’s psychology,\(^{26}\) Pegis mentions Pecham only once in the text—in a list with other Franciscans—and in two footnotes.\(^{27}\) (Pegis does not mention Neo-Augustinianism by name, as the term was probably yet to be coined.)

In his 1992 book, *The Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, Brian Davies suggest that Aquinas’s Aristotelianism makes him the leading medieval proponent of non-dualism, or that Aquinas’s position is “midway between the extremes of Dualism and Physicalism.”\(^{28}\) Although Anthony Kenny’s 1993 book *Aquinas On Mind* attaches some plausibility to the plurality of forms position, he quickly sides with Aquinas’s position and does not mention Pecham.\(^{29}\) Furthermore, Kenny does not show how Pecham’s pluralism might seriously enter a controversy with Aquinas’s position. In a 1995 article on Aquinas’s psychology, Eleonore Stump mentions briefly the controversy over substantial forms.\(^{30}\) She casts Aquinas as the foil of later substance dualists such as Descartes, but largely overlooks that there were respected dualist positions during

\(^{25}\) Toronto: St. Michael’s College.
\(^{26}\) On the connections between the philosophy/theology of Bonaventure and that of Pecham, see Fernand Van Steenberghen, *Aristotle in the West*, 143-162,
\(^{27}\) *St. Thomas and the Problem*, 44, 58, 68.
Aquinas’s own time.31 In Robert Pasnau’s 2002 book, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*, we again find that Aquinas has explained the problem of the soul well, and Pasnau adds that there was a merely grammatical difference between Pecham and Aquinas.32 Finally, in 2013, Denys Turner praises Aquinas for his balanced view of matter and form, and for opposing those “Platonist-Augustinians” who go almost entirely nameless in Turner’s chapter on the soul.33

As chapter six of the present study highlights, in Aquinas scholarship generally, Pecham’s views are only briefly mentioned alongside those of Aquinas, but Pecham as a philosopher and theologian is either unmentioned, dismissed, or the significance of the controversies themselves is called into question, while Aquinas is hailed as having produced a “balanced” synthesis.34

---

32 *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*, 127-130. On Pasnau’s view, Aquinas’s account “explains the unity of soul and body in a way that allows for the human soul’s peculiar autonomy relative to the body. Indivisibility is analyzed in one direction: the substance and its parts cannot exist without the form, but it remains possible for the form to exist without the substance. This leaves room for Aquinas to reply to the seemingly insurmountable objections of 76.1. . . . First, it is entirely consistent for the rational soul to be united with the body and yet be able to operate and exist independently of the body (ad 1, 4, 5). Second, the soul can be united to the body without itself becoming material (ad 2, 3). Third, the soul’s immortality does not stand in the way of soul and body’s being *unum simpliciter* (ad 6). Even though the soul can exist without the body, the body remains inseparable from the soul, in that it cannot exist without the soul. So despite being part of a unified material substance, the soul preserves the autonomy necessary for immortality and abstract thought” (ibid., 94-95, parenthetical items in orig.).
Overview of Pecham’s Life and Career

David Burr, writing about late-13th-century Franciscans, says that Pecham “was an extremely influential figure whose teaching career extended from Paris to Oxford and to the papal court, and whose later activities as Archbishop of Canterbury form a major chapter in the history of English Aristotelianism and its critics.” Similarly, Knowles says that Pecham is a “great figure in the intellectual life of Europe” due to his “significance at Paris, at the papal court, and wherever friars or theologians met”. Even if none of Pecham’s letters or literary works had survived, his record as the teacher of a number of important Franciscan thinkers and leaders at Paris would be suggestive of his wide influence: Matthew of Aquasparta, Peter John Olivi, John of Murrovalle (all three his students), Richard of Middleton, Bartholomew of Bologna, and Vital du Four. Pecham also taught Roger Marston, who borrowed material from him, and Marston’s

work provides a kind of link between Pecham and Duns Scotus.\textsuperscript{42} To what degree this large influence was due to philosophical skill rather than effective exposition and presentation of traditional material is a question in the literature.\textsuperscript{43} Knowles says that the scientific works of Pecham show him to be

in the full tradition of Oxford as begun by Grosseteste and continued by the Franciscans; he shows traces of the influence of Roger Bacon. . . . His metaphysical and psychological views, also, show many affinities with earlier Franciscan thought at Oxford, though here the exact limits of dependence are not easy to assign, since before the rise of the Averroists and Christian Aristotelians there was little division between the schools of Paris and Oxford, or between the masters of the Preachers and the Minors. In general, he stood in the full stream of tradition, and in his latest years gloried in this. His works show him to have had a capacious and versatile mind and great industry, but he was not a speculative theologian, nor was he a great metaphysician, like his predecessor at Oxford, Thomas of York. His high reputation among contemporaries would seem to have been due to his gifts of exposition, and perhaps also to his very lack of profundity and the eminently ‘safe’ character of his teaching.\textsuperscript{44}

Knowles is correct about Pecham’s “capacious and versatile mind,” particularly considering that Pecham added to scientific knowledge in the West.\textsuperscript{45} And, although Pecham had what Lindberg calls a “conservative attitude toward philosophy and the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{42} Spruit, \textit{Species Intelligibilis}, 235; Douie, \textit{Archbishop Pecham}, 13.
  \item \textsuperscript{43} See Lindberg, “Biographical Sketch,” 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} “Some Aspects. I,” 5.
\end{itemize}
philosophical novelties that were appearing in the latter half of the thirteenth century,”
this study will show that Pecham’s anthropology represents an original synthesis. I am
not the first to notice originality in Pecham’s philosophy; in fact, Gordon Wilson has
observed:

Although discussions between Franciscans and Dominicans on [the issue of the
unicity of form] are known to be quite acrimonious after the condemnations of
1277 and charges of theological heterodoxy would be exchanged, Pecham was a
sharp critic of Thomas’s unicity theory in Thomas’s lifetime.\[48\]

This assessment indicates that Pecham was not so completely indebted to his forbearers
and contemporaries that we should ascribe to him as little originality as Knowles and
others have done. Even if Knowles is correct in saying that Pecham’s reputation at Paris
and Oxford was built upon his (as yet unedited) scriptural commentaries and less
technical literary work,\[49\] to which Douie would add his scientific work in Oxford,\[50\] the
present study will demonstrate why Pecham was a far more original thinker than his or
our contemporary scholars believed.

---

\[45\] “Biographical Sketch,” 8. Pecham’s view of the young artists at Paris appears to have
been similar to that of Roger Bacon, who also wrote a critique of Latin Averroism in the
1240s (see Jeremiah Hackett, “Roger Bacon,” Stanford University, \url{http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/roger-bacon/} [2013]). For Bacon, all learning is subordinated to
making explicit the truth of God in scripture. Indeed, the theme of his \textit{Opus Maius} 2 is
that all truth is revealed by God, and philosophy helps in eliciting truth: “Dico igitur,
quod est una scientia dominatrix aliarum, ut theologia, cui reliqua penitus sunt
necessariae, et sine quibus ad effectum pervinere non potest. . . . una tamen est sapientia
perfecta, quae in sacra scriptura totaliter continetur, per jus canonicum et philosophiam
explicanda, et expositio veritatis divinae per illas scientias habetur” (ibid., 33).

\[46\] As will become clear, this refers to Aquinas’s theory that there is only one substantial
form for the human being; Pecham’s view is that there is a plurality of substantial forms
for the human being.

\[47\] “The Critique,” 423-431, emp. and bracketed item added.


\[49\] \textit{Archbishop Pecham}, 35.
The date of Pecham’s birth is uncertain.\(^{51}\) He received early education with the Benedictines at the priory of Lewes, for which he always maintained affection.\(^{52}\) He probably departed to study at Paris at a young age.\(^{53}\) Bacon may have been influential (along with Adam Marsh, surely) in Pecham’s decision to join the Franciscan order, probably in the 1250s.\(^{54}\) At any rate, Bacon and Pecham were both among the group of English friars in Paris.\(^{55}\) Pecham seems to have been a dedicated Franciscan for the rest of his life.\(^{56}\) In 1258 he was sent back to Paris to complete his theological studies.\(^{57}\) Until he became Archbishop, in 1279, Pecham studied and taught at Paris, Oxford, and the Papal Curia.\(^{58}\) Pecham is of particular interest because of the diversity of his intellectual history alone. Furthermore, the scientific and mathematical emphases at Oxford and Paris would have given scope for Pecham’s interests.\(^{59}\)

Here is how Pecham’s career unfolded, according to Lindberg’s chronology:\(^{60}\)

- 1260s: Pecham matriculates in the faculty of theology at Paris, receiving the magister in theology (equivalent to our doctorate) in 1269.

\(^{54}\) Ibid., 4-5, 6. This is not to suggest that Pecham had no strictly philosophical or theological motivations for joining the Franciscans. Quite the contrary (see ibid., 5-6).
\(^{55}\) Ibid., 9.
\(^{57}\) Hughes, introduction, 78:6.
\(^{60}\) Lindberg, “Biographical Sketch,” 5-8.
• 1269(70)- 1271: Pecham serves as University Regent Master in theology at Paris and as lector to the Franciscan friary.

• 1271(ca.)-1274(5): Pecham serves as 11th lecturer in the Franciscan school at Oxford.

• 1275-1277: Pecham serves as ninth provincial minister of the Franciscan order in England.

• 1277-1279: Pecham serves as lecturer in theology at the papal university (studium) in Viterbo.

• 1279: Pecham is consecrated as Archbishop of Canterbury, succeeding the Dominican Robert Kilwardby in this position.

Etzkorn thinks that Pecham was probably chosen to succeed Eustachius of Arras as regent master, and that before Eustachius could complete his tenure, he was called to accompany Louis IX in the crusades. During Pecham’s years as regent master (1269-1271), he reached his intellectual maturity and completed many of his works, including biblical commentaries, the commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, and perhaps the Quaestiones De Anima (among other disputed questions). Also while at Paris, Pecham defended the mendicant orders against the secular clergy; the poverty of the evangelists was often at issue during Pecham’s career. Pecham also defended the

63 “John Pecham, O.F.M.,” 71.
64 Lindberg, “Biographical Sketch,” 5-6; Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 11. Dales thinks that Pecham composed the Tractatus during his years at the papal university, 1277-1279 (The Problem of the Rational Soul, 127). For more information on the Paris period, see Etzkorn, introduction, ix-x.
orders against claims, made by the diocesan cleric and University Master Gerard of Abbeville and others, that the friars were inducing naive youths to join their orders.66

Pecham was in Paris when the controversies over Averroism and the unity of form were intense. Franciscans (and the majority of masters in theology) opposed Aquinas on the issue of the unity of form as early as 1270 (and William of Baglione may have

66 Etzkorn, “John Pecham, O.F.M.,” 73; cf. Pecham, Quaestio De Pueris Oblatis, in Quaestiones Disputatae; Leff, Paris and Oxford, 265, 267. Roger Bacon had made an accusation of this kind: “I will here expound at least some of those things which are done publicly and are known to all men, though few turn their hearts to regard either this or other profitable considerations, by reason of those causes of error which I here set forth, and whereby almost all men are basely blinded. These are boys who are inexperienced in the knowledge of themselves and of the world and of the learned languages, Greek and Hebrew, which (as I will prove later on) are necessary to study; they are ignorant also of all parts and sciences of the world's philosophy and of wisdom, when they so presumptuously enter upon the study of theology, which requires all human wisdom, as the saints teach and as all wise men know. For, if truth be anywhere, here is she found: here, if anywhere, is falsehood condemned, as Augustine says in his book Of Christian Doctrine. These are boys of the two Student-Orders, as Albert and Thomas and others, who in many cases enter those Orders at or below the age of twenty years. This is the common course, from the English sea to the furthest confines of Christendom, and more especially beyond the realm of France; so that in Aquitaine, Provence, Spain, Italy, Germany, Hungary, Denmark, and everywhere, boys are promiscuously received into the Orders from their tenth to their twentieth year; boys too young to be able to know anything worth knowing, even though they were not already possessed with the aforesaid causes of human error; wherefore, at their entrance into the Orders, they know nothing that profits to theology” (Compendium Studii Philosophiae, in Opera quaedam hactenus inedita, ed. J.S. Brewer [London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1959], 425-426, bracketed item in orig.; translated in “Roger Bacon: Despair over Thirteenth Century Learning,” Fordham University, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/bacon1.asp [1996]).
expressed concern as early as 1266), probably during the Easter Disputation. M.-D.

Chenu writes about this incident:

In the course of the solemn assemblies of Advent and Lent in which the current problems of the times were reviewed, Thomas defended the consubstantial unity of human body and soul with all the psychological and epistemological consequences that follow, in contrast to the idealist position of the Augustinians. It was doubtless at one of these gatherings that Thomas in 1270 suffered the severe attack leveled by John Peckham, a Master of the rival school, fiercely accusing him of contaminating philosophy with naturalism. This event took place before the whole university in the presence of Master Stephen Tempier who had become the bishop of Paris (who later oversaw the condemnation of 1277).

---

67 Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 19; cf. Dales, Problem of the Rational Soul, 120ff.; Brady, “Background of the Condemnation of 1270: Master William of Baglione, O.F.M.,” Franciscan Studies 30:5-48; Wippel, “The Parisian Condemnations of 1270 and 1277,” A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 66. M.F.W. Stone writes, “By 1269 it was clear that the views of magisteri like Siger were causing a great deal of disquiet, particularly in the theology faculty. For instance, it had long been known that Bonaventure ... attacked some of the views held by Siger’s group in his Lenten Conferences of 1267-1268. Other Franciscan Masters of theology, most notably William of Baglione (fl. 1260) and John Pecham [sic] also put forward strong criticisms of the unicity of the intellect. William’s discussion of this issue, for instance, indicates that he already had first-hand knowledge of Averroes’ Commentary on the De anima” (“The Soul’s Relation to the Body: Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant and the Parisian Debate on Monopsychism,” History of the Mind-Body Problem, ed. Tim Crane and Sarah Patterson [New York: Routledge, 2012], 45, parenthetical item in orig.).

68 For a record of the evidence for this chronology, see Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 889.

69 Aquinas and His Role in Theology (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2002), 82-83, parenthetical item added.
In Pecham’s first Quodlibet, he made a public attack on Aquinas, and some thought that Aquinas recanted his theory of the unity of form. And Pecham’s condemnations of 1284 and 1286 were directed partially at the unicity view of Aquinas and his English

70 See Etzkorn, “John Pecham, O.F.M.,” 73; cf. Pecham, Quodlibeta Quatuor, 1-73. The degree to which Aquinas changed his position is unclear. Pecham reports that he defended Aquinas because Aquinas abandoned his position: “Quin potius ei, de quo loquitur, cum pro hac opinione ab episcopo Parisiensi et magistris theologiae, etiam a fratribus propriis argueretur argute; nos soli eidem asitimus ipsum prout salva veritate potuimus defensando, donec ipse omnes positiones suas, quibus possit imminere correctio, sicut doctor humilis subjicit moderamini Parisiensium magistrorum” (Registrum, 3:899; cf. Knowles, “Some Aspects. I,” 12). However, Douie says that Pecham’s account “differs from the one given fifty years later at the canonization process, where the meekness and humility of Aquinas are contrasted with his adversary’s violence. . . . [A] formal expression of deference for the opinions of an assembly of distinguished theologians could easily have given rise” to the view that Aquinas recanted (Archbishop Pecham, 15-16). Testimony to this effect was given by the Dominican Bartholomew of Capua, who “represented the saint as violently attacked by Pecham, and replying with serene good temper” (Knowles, ibid.). “Item dixit dictus testis se audivisse a pluribus fratribus Predicatoribus, fide dignis, quod quando idem frater Thomas, una vice, disputabat Parisius ubi erat frater Iohannes de Pizano, ordinis fratum Minorum, quia fuit postea archiepiscopus Cantuariensis, quantumcumque dictus frater Iohannes exasperaret eundem fratrem Thomam verbis ampullosis et tumidis nunquam tamen ipse frater Thomas restrinxit verbum humilitatis set semper cum dulcedine et humanitate respondit” (Corpus Thomisticum: Liber de inquisitione super vita et conversatione et miraculis fratris Thomae de Aquino, ed. M.H. Laurent, http://www.corpustumisticum.org/bprcneap.html [2011]).
representatives. Pecham’s 1284 renewal of Robert Kilwardby’s condemnation became a “dead letter” by the end of the 13th century.

Just as Pecham defended what he considered to be orthodoxy against Averroism and Thomism at Paris, it is also clear that he was at Oxford during a critical period of its intellectual history, wanting to defend what he considered to be orthodoxy against both Averroism and Thomism. Pecham succeeded Thomas Bungay as the Franciscan

---


73 Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 36.
provincial minister of England, and very little record of Pecham’s work survives from the Oxford period.\textsuperscript{74} Knowles observes that Pecham, at Oxford, argued against Kilwardby’s position on poverty.\textsuperscript{75} This debate had to do with the divergent conceptions of religious poverty held by the Dominicans and Franciscans. Douie says that, when one compares his selection of authorities with the selections of Thomas of York and Richard Rufus, it seems clear that Pecham’s positions were influenced by the masters at Oxford.\textsuperscript{76} Furthermore, there was the competition between Dominicans and Franciscans for recruits from among the masters, bachelors, and students.\textsuperscript{77}

We may assume that Pecham’s reputation continued to grow during his time in England, for Pope Nicholas III summoned Pecham to be the \textit{Lector sacri palatii}.\textsuperscript{78} Pecham’s work at the papal university probably included lecturing, but he would also “prepare young men in theology for priesthood and give the occasional lecture to groups of ecclesiastics.”\textsuperscript{79} Douie discusses the significance of Pecham’s work during this period:

The two years which he spent at the Curia as lector in theology at the papal university were ... valuable, since they ensured that he was acquainted with the four popes under whom he worked as archbishop, and that many of the cardinals were his personal friends. First-hand knowledge of the machinery of papal

\textsuperscript{74} Knowles, “Some Aspects. I,” 17. Still, Etzkorn writes: “At what time was Pecham’s \textit{Quodlibet III} debated? The present state of research seems to give us no clues in this regard. It could have been debated at Paris in 1271 or at Oxford during Pecham’s tenure there between 1272-1275” (introduction to Pecham, \textit{Quodlibeta}, 25).
\textsuperscript{76} Douie, \textit{Archbishop Pecham}, 7.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 39.
\textsuperscript{78} Knowles, “Some Aspects. I,” 17.
\textsuperscript{79} Hughes, introduction, 6.
administration was also a useful preliminary to the government of one particular province in the great medieval Church-State.  

As documented by Agostino Paravicini-Bagliani, Pecham accomplished much during his time at the papal court:

Peckham had been called ... to teach theology at the Studia curiae. The great scholar and future archbishop of Canterbury appears to have used his time there ... to complete the revision of his Perspectiva minor (Lesser Optics). A decade before Peckham’s arrival in Viterbo another leading English scientist, the famous Franciscan Roger Bacon, had sent Pope Clement VII [sic] a treatise on optics, his *On Rays* (*De radiis*). In the decade 1267-77, the papal court at Viterbo was therefore the principal European center for the production and transmission of works devoted to optics. The ruling pope himself, John XXI (1276-77), was a specialist in problems of vision. Peter of Spain [John XXI] was in fact the author of one of the most important medieval treatises on opthalmology, *On the Eye* (*De oculo*). It is probable, moreover, that he finished the work during the long period at the curia before ascending to the pontificate.

It was also during the period just before Pecham was archbishop that Pope John XXI (the philosopher Peter of Spain) ordered Bishop Étienne (Stephen) Tempier to make a doctrinal enquiry into the university of Paris, and it is generally accepted that this papal

---

80 *Archbishop Pecham*, 35. Pecham was also not a stranger to serving the interests of the authorities: “In May, 1275, at the King’s appointment, Oliver d’Eyncourt, Prior of Oxford, and John Pecham decided a suit at the University which had long been pending in the Chancellor’s court” (Hinnebusch, *Early English Friars*, 470). Yet, Pecham’s ideal was for the Franciscans to remain focused on preaching rather than the execution of royal affairs: “Archbishop Pecham’s Register frequently testifies to the activity of the Welsh Dominicans in political and ecclesiastical affairs which demanded great tact and discrimination. Pecham noted that they and the Franciscans had almost alone remained faithful to their true vocation of teaching the word of God to the faithful” (Hinnebusch, *Early English Friars*, 473; cf. Pecham, *Registrum*, 1:367-368, 2:403-404, 488, 742-743).

81 *The Pope’s Body*, 197, parenthetical items in orig., bracketed item added. It was actually Pope Clement IV, Guy le Gros de Foulque, to whom Bacon sent the treatise (see Hackett, “Roger Bacon”).

53
order was the basis for Tempier’s condemnation of 219 philosophical and theological propositions (1277).\textsuperscript{82}

Pecham was known for his austere and orthodox personal habits, but by the time he was nominated to be archbishop, he was dubious about the appointment due to his ill health.\textsuperscript{83} The controversy over the unicity of form “haunted him during the years of his episcopacy at Canterbury when he came into conflict with the Dominicans [at Oxford] who … espoused the views of St. Thomas.”\textsuperscript{84} Another significant event from Pecham’s archbishopric occurred in 1281, when Pecham’s Council of Lambeth drafted the Lambeth Constitutions, or the Ignorantia Sacerdotum, which has been edited with various other works in the Lay Folks’ Catechism.\textsuperscript{85}

Thompson describes Pecham’s work as archbishop:

Pecham was thorough in including monasteries in his visitations, and he issues many sets of injunctions for correction, aimed at religious [sic] who neglected their offices and adopted secular lifestyles, so blurring the boundary between the cloister and the world through their frequent presence outside the convent, and the systematic intrusion of the laity within. As ever, he urged religious to keep their calling of worship at the centre of the picture, and to devote their resources as effectively as possible to that end: hence his opposition to the Benedictines’ decision in 1277-9 to pare down accretions to the divine office, and his restoration of the full traditional opus dei at monasteries he visited: hence also his attempts to replace or supplement the rule of ineffective superiors, and especially to encourage financial stability, the latter no doubt informed by his personal

\textsuperscript{82} Thijssen, “Condemnation of 1277.”
\textsuperscript{83} Lindberg, “Biographical Sketch,” 7-8.
\textsuperscript{84} Etzkorn, “John Pecham, O.F.M.,” 79, bracketed item added. Not all Dominicans espoused Aquinas’s views. Robert Kilwardby, for example, who objected to the doctrine of the unity of form, is not included among those with whom Pecham contended (Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy, 175-176; Van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West, 144-146).
experience of the deleterious effects of debt on the performance of duties. His own monastery at Christ Church, Canterbury, with its centralized treasury, provided the model that he successfully encouraged others to adopt.

Pecham’s opposition to the foundation of a monastic house of study at Oxford was based on a deep suspicion of Thomism there. The Dominicans, led in Oxford by Richard Knapwell, had responded to the Franciscan corrections to Aquinas with their own *correctoria*, and were capturing the minds of the university: the reiteration of much of Pecham’s old material by his pupil Roger Marston, Knapwell’s Franciscan opponent, was hardly likely to stem the popularity of Thomism. Unity of form was once more the central issue, and Pecham highlighted the danger of its theological implications when he renewed Kilwardby’s condemnations of 1277 on 29 October 1284. . . .

Kingsford thinks that Pecham’s ecclesiastical policy was “marred by blundering zeal and an inclination to lay undue stress on the rights and duties of his office.” In addition to his controversies with those in his own order, Pecham was also involved in conflicts with the king. Pecham died on December 8, 1292, from causes that are unclear.

A statement from one of Pecham’s letters, from 1285, provides insight into his orientation toward the debates in which he was involved:

86 “John Pecham,” 367.
87 “John Peckham,” 192.
88 See Southern, *Western Society*, 195-198; cf. 211. “Peckham’s letters are full of examples of what this meant in practice. The king forbade the archbishop’s council to discuss matters touching his Crown, his person, his dignity, or the business of the royal council. The king summoned bishops to appear in his court in cases concerning ecclesiastical patronage. The king forbade the archbishop’s court to hear cases alleged to belong to the field of royal jurisdiction. Wherever he turned Peckham found himself confined within a jurisdictional system which limited his freedom in unexpected ways. He would have needed to be either very wise or very lax to keep his sense of direction in this maze. He was neither of these things, so he failed. He could neither acquiesce in, nor see his way through, the tangle; and the issues were too complicated to be solved by heroic measures in the manner of Thomas Becket. Peckham was driven to the safer but even more annoying course of perpetual complains, which achieved nothing except a general nervous exhaustion” (ibid., 195).
I do not in any way disapprove of philosophical studies, insofar as they serve theological mysteries, but I do disapprove of irreverent innovations in language, introduced within the last twenty years into the depths of theology against philosophical truth, and to the detriment of the Fathers, whose positions are disdained and openly held in contempt. Which doctrine is more solid and more sound, the doctrine of the sons of St. Francis. . . . or that very recent and almost entirely contrary doctrine, which fills the entire world with wordy quarrels, weakening and destroying with all its strength what Augustine teaches concerning the eternal rules and the unchangeable light, the faculties of the soul, the seminal reasons included in matter and innumerable questions of the same kind; let the Ancients be the judges, since in them is wisdom; let the God of heaven be judge, and may he remedy it.\textsuperscript{90}

Pecham saw the doctrines of both the Averroists and Thomas Aquinas as threats to a theological orthodoxy that was oriented around interpretations of the work of Augustine—interpretations both selective in their use of sources and conditioned by various philosophical views.\textsuperscript{91} This nuance in Pecham’s work has led scholars to associate him not simply with “Augustinianism,” but with “Neo-Augustinianism.”

**Pecham as a Neo-Augustinian**

In this section I will address two questions: (1) To what movement do scholars refer when they use the term “Neo-Augustinianism”? (2) What was Pecham’s role in the development of Neo-Augustinianism? In answering these questions I will consult briefly

\textsuperscript{90} The translation is from Potter, introduction, ix-x; cf. Pecham, *Registrum*: “Praeterea noverit ipse quod philosophorum studia minime reprobamus, quatenus misterii theologicis famulantur; sed prophanas vocum novitates, quae contra philosophicam veritatem sunt in sanctorum injuriam citra viginti annos in altitudines theologicas introductae, abjectis et vilipensis sanctorum assertionibus evidenter. Quae sit ergo solidior et sanior doctrina, vel filiorum Beati Francisci. . . . vel illa novella quasi tota contraria, quae quicquid docet Augustinus de regulis aeternis et luce incommutabili, de potentiss animae, de rationibus seminalibus inditis materiae et consimilibus innumeris, destruat pro viribus et enervat pugnas verborum inferens toti mundo? Videant antiqui in quibus est sapientia, videat et corrigat Deus coeli” (3:901-902).

\textsuperscript{91} On Aquinas as an innovator, see Quinn, *The Historical Constitution*, 72-73.
the secondary literature and the Pecham texts that are under consideration in the present study.

A number of scholars have described a movement called Neo-Augustinianism among the Franciscans in Paris in the 1270s. The movement has also been called simply, “Augustinianism.” Yet this nomenclature/terminology is misleading for, as Stephen P. Marrone has noted in his work on Augustinian divine illumination theory in the 13th century, all scholastics were in a sense Augustinians. In 1966 Fernand Van Steenberghen, seeing this difficulty in classification as arising from the theological rather than philosophical commonalities amongst 13th-century philosophers, was the first to use the name “Neo-Augustinianism”; he refers to Bonaventure as the inspiration for the

---

92 Mourant, “Augustinianism,” *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 1:207: “Augustinianism may be described as that complex of philosophical ideas which reflected to a greater or lesser degree the philosophy of Augustine. Many of the philosophers who came after Augustine not only restated his leading ideas but also frequently modified them with their own interpretations. Such interpretations were often the result of the impact of other schools of thought, notably the Avicennian and the Aristotelian. Occasionally doctrines that were only implicit in Augustine—for instance, the plurality of forms and universal hylomorphism—were made explicit and assumed considerable importance. Thus there originated in the medieval period what has been termed the Augustinian tradition, which in the later years of its development was closely identified with the Franciscan order. . . . After Aquinas it gradually disintegrated owing to the impact of Thomism and a resurgent Aristotelianism, and no longer represented a distinctive school or tradition. However, it continued to be influential to the extent that it inspired or characterized in varying degrees later medieval and modern philosophers.” Cf. Stone, “Augustine and Medieval Philosophy,” *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 256. For an overview of Augustine’s doctrines, see Gareth Matthews, *Augustine* (Malden: Blackwell, 2005).

movement and Pecham as its founder. Marrone prefers to refer to the movement differently:

The focus here is on the conservative party, thinkers not just carried along on the Aristotelianizing wave but also partially engaged in reaction against it. Van Steenberghen chose for them the name “Neo-Augustinians,” but they are perhaps better identified simply as a particular instantiation of the longer-term … current of thought labeled … the “Augustinian school.” Not immune to Aristotelian ideas—the very impulse towards philosophical clarity and consistency being an effect of the attraction to Aristotle—they were engaged in an effort to build a system of thought cleaving as close to Augustine as could be contrived. Ambivalence thus lay at the heart of their endeavor, and the reality of their achievement was as much a matter of polemics as substance. They constituted a corps of thinkers aiming to create a collective identity under the aegis of Augustine’s name; it was in this modest sense that they were Augustinian, not that they represented pure Augustine or that Augustine’s influence was not pervasive in other circles as well.

As Marrone indicates, the Neo-Augustinians have a complex relationship to Aristotle. As will become obvious, they were not opposed to citing the authority of Aristotle when they felt that this authority was on their side.

It has been argued that

neo-Augustinianism is a broadly confused complex of heterogeneous theses often erroneously accepted on the authority of Augustine, which actually derived from Neoplatonic, Jewish, and Arabic sources, though generally considered to be in accord with Catholic belief. It is not surprising that a heterogenous movement arose, given the heavy influence of Neoplatonism upon the Latin psychology through Arabic sources (especially Avicenna).

96 Spruit, Species Intelligibilis, 202.
and other authors, including Avicebron, Pseudo-Dionysius and the author of The Book of Causes (and thus, indirectly, The Theology of Aristotle).

In the first half of the 13th century, the reception of Aristotle’s De Anima was in fact more of a reception of Avicenna’s De anima and Averroes’ Long Commentary on the De anima (than of Aristotle’s De Anima). . . . Evidence for the predominant presence of Arabic thought in the 13th century accounts of the soul, perception and intellect is abundant.

While the scholarship makes it clear that Neo-Augustinians were drawing on a variety of sources in the philosophical tradition, the scholarship has not revealed that the use of any set of sources or profession of any single set of doctrines was consistent across the

---

97 See Weisheipl, “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism.”
100 Luis Xavier López-Farjeat and Jörg Alejandro Tellkamp, introduction to Philosophical Psychology in Arabic Thought and the Latin Aristotelianism of the 13th Century, ed. López-Farjeat and Tellkamp (Paris: Vrin, 2013), 11, 12, parenthetical item added. Dales comments on this general phenomenon: “It was the acquisition of a number of Muslim, Jewish, and Greek works during the twelfth century that cast the subject in a new light and made evident a large number of problems that had not been considered before. By the time Aristotle’s De Anima became generally known in the early thirteenth century, much of its teaching was already familiar to Latin scholars ... but it had acquired a good deal of Neoplatonic baggage in the process of transmission” (The Problem of the Rational Soul, 5).
movement. Thus I cannot state precisely the necessary or sufficient conditions for a philosopher to meet in order to be considered a Neo-Augustinian. However, there is enough data to give a rough idea of the movement.

\[101\] Wippel writes of the beginnings of Neo-Augustinianism: “By 1270 ... another movement was also coming into being. Owing much of its inspiration to St. Bonaventure, its leader around 1270 seems to have been John Pecham. Later in that same decade it would find a powerful spokesman in the person of Henry of Ghent (master from 1276 until 1292)” (“The Condemnations,” 174, parenthetical item in orig.). Wippel and Allan B. Wolter discuss the achievement of Neo-Augustinianism as follows: “The condemnation of 1270 did not halt this movement of radical Aristotelianism at Paris [Latin Averroism, which will be the topic of sections of the present study]. In 1277 Pope John XXI asked the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, to investigate the situation. Apparently going beyond his mandate, Stephen assembled a commission of sixteen theologians who hastily drew up a haphazard list of 219 propositions. These were condemned on March 7, 1277. Directed in large measure against Siger [of Brabant], Boetius [of Dacia], and their party, they also extend to Aristotelianism in other forms and include some perfectly orthodox Thomistic theses. The prohibition was a local reaction on the part of certain churchmen and theologians against the autonomous concept of philosophizing fostered by Siger and his group and also marked the triumph of a Neo-Augustinian movement inspired by Bonaventure and founded by John Peckham (d.1292). Although primarily directed against heterodox Aristotelianism, it also symbolizes a growing opposition to the balanced synthesis so recently worked out by Thomas Aquinas. Thomistic theses were also included in prohibitions at Oxford in 1277, 1284, and 1286” (introduction to Medieval Philosophy, 23-24, parenthetical item in orig., bracketed items added); cf. Kelley, introduction, 11.
Clearly, Bonaventure, William of Baglione, Roger Bacon, Alexander of Hales, Eustachius of Arras, Walter of Bruges, and Pecham are seminal figures in the movement. Bonaventure was, in 1267 and 1268, among the first to express concerns about Latin Averroism. In the introduction to his study of Bonaventure’s philosophy, John F. Quinn provides a summary of the late-19th- and 20th-century literature concerning the development of philosophy in the 13th century. This summary is especially valuable because it illustrates how one’s philosophical perspective of the relationship among various movements at Paris, Oxford, and elsewhere can dictate how

102 William “reveals himself as one of the more prolific and philosophic Franciscan Masters between Bonaventure and Matthew of Aquasparta,” and William does directly address the controversy with Averroism (Brady, “Background,” 7ff.).

103 See Hackett, “Roger Bacon.”

104 Alexander of Hales established a Franciscan presence in the theology faculty at Paris (see Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 27). “Undoubtedly a traditionalist whose prime sources are Augustine, John of Damascus, and Pseudo-Dionysius, and whose thought is close to the scholastic traditions of his predecessors, Alexander nonetheless surpasses his contemporaries in the breadth and profundity of his questions and in the new problems and tracts he introduced into theology. To this extent he was an innovator who helped open the way for the scholastic renaissance of the mid-thirteenth century. In particular, as head of the friars’ studium at Paris, he initiated a certain approach that came to characterize such representatives of the Franciscan school as Odo Rigaldus, Bonaventure, and Matthew of Aquasparta” (Brady, “Alexander of Hales,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1:74).

105 Eustachius was a disciple of Bonaventure (See Maurice De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, trans. P. Coffey, 3rd ed. [London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1909], 293); cf. Timothy B. Noone, “The Problem of the Knowability of Substance: The Discussion from Eustachius of Arras to Vital Du Four,” Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages, 66ff.

106 See Kent, Virtues of the Will, 95; Russell L. Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology Among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250-1350 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 101.

107 Wippel, “The Condemnations,” 177. For Pecham’s response to Latin Averroism, see the second chapter of the present study.

one views Neo-Augustinianism. There are at least two major issues that bear on how one views Neo-Augustinianism: (1) How one takes philosophy to have related to theology in the 13th century, and (2) the kind of significance that one attaches to a variety of historical events. For example, there is a long-term dispute about what kind of “Christian philosophy” existed in the 13th century. One might partially summarize the relevant history by saying the following:

- In 1942 Van Steenberghen said that Augustinian philosophy was not present in the theology faculty at Paris in the mid-13th century, but rather a Neoplatonizing

---

109 Consider the following samples: “In 1932, [Maurice] De Wulf delineated four movements of philosophy in the thirteenth century. The first movement was Augustinianism, which endured from 1220 until 1260, when Thomism came to the fore. Having a conservative spirit and a love of tradition, Augustinianism contained authentic doctrines of Augustine; however, it compromised them by blending them with the new Aristotelianism. As a consequence, the doctrines of Aristotle were used to explain St. Augustine’s teaching on such questions as the creation of the world, seminal reasons, the human soul and human knowledge. . . . Speaking of the thirteenth-century Augustinians, [Étienne] Gilson said that they all subscribed to three doctrines. The first doctrine concerned the human soul, which they defined as a spiritual substance; but none of them upheld “the view that the very essence of this substance was to be the form of a body,” Their [sic] position went back to St. Augustine. . . . The second doctrine was a corollary of the first and had to do with the divine illumination. . . . The third doctrine dealt with the nature of matter. . . . In his account of the principal events leading to the condemnation of 1277, Van Steenberghen said that St. Thomas had understood better than any other theologian that philosophy necessarily formed the central framework of the sciences. . . . Because his new system departed on many points from the traditional teaching of theology, the conservative theologians saw it as an ally, and then as an accomplice, of radical Aristotelianism. Thus, in 1270, the innovations of St. Thomas provoked the attack on him by those theologians, particularly by John Peckham. Inspired by St. Bonaventure, who apparently encouraged Peckham’s opposition to Thomism, he founded the philosophical school of Neo-Augustinianism: this was new from an adoption of Aristotelian, Arabian and Jewish doctrines; it was an Augustinianism because of a deliberate attachment to Augustinian doctrines in the traditional theology” (Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 36, 68-69, 72-73, bracketed items added; emp. in orig.).

110 See Cullen, Bonaventure, 32-35.
Aristotelianism was there. Thus the conflict between Aquinas and the Franciscans did not represent a conflict between Aristotelian and Augustinian philosophies.\footnote{Quinn, \textit{The Historical Constitution}, 90-91; cf. Van Steenberghen, \textit{Siger de Brabant d’apres ses oeuvres inédites}, Les Philosophes Belges 12-13 (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie, texts issued in 1931 and studies issued in 1942); ibid., \textit{Aristotle in the West}, 130ff.}

- Also in 1942, Étienne Gilson responded to Van Steenberghen and said that Augustine had developed a Christian philosophy as did Aquinas. Because medieval theologians and philosophers were creative in their theological function, their philosophy cannot be separated from their theology. Thus the movement in which Pecham is involved can be properly called Augustinianism.\footnote{Quinn, \textit{The Historical Constitution}, 92; cf. ibid., 44; Gilson, \textit{Bulletin Thomiste} (Le Saulchoir: La Société Thomste), 6:23-29; ibid., \textit{Le Thomisme: Introduction à La Philosophie De Saint Thomas d’Aquin} (Paris: Vrin, 1986). Cullen writes on this point: “Gilson argued consistently that there was authentic philosophical thought to be found in the Middle Ages, but that its approach during that time was distinctive, because it was in the context of Christian faith. He called this ‘Christian philosophy,’ a term he borrowed from Leo XIII’s encyclical \textit{Aeterni Patris} (1879). . . . Gilson found a particularly clear example of Christian philosophy in the thought of Bonaventure” (\textit{Bonaventure}, 32, 33, parenthetical item in orig.).}

- Also in 1942, Patrice Robert contended that Bonaventure developed \textit{medieval Augustinianism}. Bonaventure respected Aristotle and his authority, which motivated him to complete his Augustinian Platonism with Aristotelianism, complementing Augustinianism with Aristotle’s scientific precision.\footnote{Quinn, \textit{The Historical Constitution}, 92; Robert, “St. Bonaventure, Defender of Christian Wisdom,” \textit{Franciscan Studies} 3 (1943): 159-179.}

This is merely a brief account of what occurred during one representative year in scholarship that bears on the issue. It is not the purpose of the present study to adjudicate these matters, but it is worth noting that the interpretive story goes on: In 1959 Joseph Ratzinger proposed that Bonaventure never intended to be an Augustinian but rather sought exclusively to acknowledge the historical positions of Augustine and Aristotle in
the development of human thought.\footnote{Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 96; Ratzinger, Die Geschichtstheologie des Heiligen Bonaventura (München und Zürich: Schnell & Steiner, 1959); ibid., The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1989); Cullen says that “Ratzinger’s study does not make a sharp distinction between Aristotelianism and Averroisim” (Bonaventure, 194; cf. ibid., 113-117).} And, Philotheus Boehner has argued that Franciscans in the 13th century were more Augustinian than Aristotelian.\footnote{“The Spirit of Franciscan Philosophy,” Franciscan Studies 2 (1942): 217-237; cf. Marrone, The Light. Volume One, 19.} Marrone maintains that, while it was not the Franciscans’ primary goal to provide an accurate interpretation of Augustine’s text, they were committed to preserving what they believed to be threats against orthodoxy; they did so “under the aegis of Augustine’s name”.\footnote{The Light. Volume One, 11ff.}  

**Secondary Literature on Pecham’s Role**

Quinn says that Pecham “inspired” the school of Neo-Augustinianism, thus echoing the position taken by Van Steenberghen.\footnote{The Historical Constitution, 68; cf. ibid., 73.} On what basis is Pecham called the inspiration of the movement? Just as the secondary literature does not facilitate a precise definition of the Neo-Augustinian movement, it also fails to show that Pecham founded the movement. One wonders whether the literature could possibly show that Pecham was the founder, given that Pecham and others like him did not label themselves as Neo-Augustinians.

Nonetheless, one feature of the history is particularly supportive of the idea that Pecham played a decisive role. While Van Steenberghen does not say that Pecham founded the movement (in fact, Van Steenberghen calls Pecham [and Bonaventure,
tacitly] representatives of “eclectic Aristotelianism”\textsuperscript{118}, he nonetheless brings up several points that can be marshaled in support of such a claim.\textsuperscript{119} Pecham was regent master of the Franciscan school in Paris from 1269-1271, and there is no official record of philosophical or theological dispute between the Dominicans and Franciscans before that date.\textsuperscript{120} Aquinas’s “innovations” prompted Pecham to oppose him on the issues of the unicity of form and the eternity of the world in 1270, and no one is known to have done so prior to Pecham. Roberto Zavalloni therefore places Pecham at the origins of the controversy over the plurality of forms.\textsuperscript{121}

**Evidence from Pecham’s Texts, concerning His Role**

Pecham’s texts also yield evidence that he was promoting a particular kind of “Augustinianism.” Here, I will consider select passages from Pecham’s work where he makes clear what his sources are, and then I will consider examples of Pecham’s doctrines which have roots in Augustine’s works but have been modified by other, especially Greek, Arabic, and Jewish, Neoplatonic, influences. It will become clear that Pecham refers to Augustinian doctrine in a framework that results largely from his reading of three authors in particular: Avicebron, Avicenna, and Pseudo-Dionysius.

Due to the scholarship of Ignatius Brady, it is widely accepted that Aquinas wrote his *De Aeternitate Mundi* against a presentation that Pecham made at his *inceptio* (i.e., when

\textsuperscript{118} Van Steenberghen, *Aristotle in the West*, 146-162.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 234-235.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 233-234.
he received the doctorate) around 1270.\textsuperscript{122} The position that Pecham takes in his own 

*Questions Concerning the Eternity of the World* is directly traceable to Augustine:

During Thomas’ second regency at Paris, Pecham seems to have been the 
spokesman for a group that claimed that their view of creation was continuous 
with a tradition of orthodoxy going back to Augustine, particularly in the *De 
civitate Dei* XII and in *Super Genesim* VIII.\textsuperscript{123}

However, while Pecham cites Augustine often in the text of the *Questions Concerning the 
Eternity of the World*,\textsuperscript{124} he also expresses what he takes to be Augustine’s doctrine in the 
context of other philosophers and interpreters. Consider the following examples:

- Pecham cites Avicenna’s point that “the metaphysical philosophers do not mean 
by ‘agent’ only the principle of motion, as the naturalists mean, but the principle 
and giver of existence, as in the case of God with respect to the world. . . [t]hat 
which bestows existence is a principle of motion.”\textsuperscript{125}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{122} Brady, “John Pecham and the Background”; cf. Potter, introduction, xv-xvi; Turner, 
Thomas Aquinas, 190-191; Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), 11-12
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{123} Potter, introduction, xv; cf. Augustine, City of God, trans. Marcus Dods, Nicene and 
Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series 2, 12.10-14; The Literal Meaning of Genesis, On 
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{124} E.g., 11, 13, 14, 16, etc.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{125} Pecham, Questions, 7; cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics, 6.1. Unless otherwise noted, all 
citations from Avicenna’s Metaphysics are from The Metaphysics of the Healing, trans. 
Michael E. Marmura (Provo: Brigham Young, 2005).
\end{flushright}
• Pecham cites Pseudo-Dionysius to argue that the divine being is more fundamental than every other perfection, and Pecham says that this is Avicenna’s opinion as well.\[^{126}\]

• Pecham cites Avicenna’s position that “When a thing has non-esse of itself, then it follows that its esse is after non-esse and it comes to be after it had not been.”\[^{127}\] Pecham is here arguing against the view that the world could be eternal.

• Pecham cites various theological authorities to make points that are (to my knowledge) not stated in exactly the same way in Augustine.\[^{128}\]

Pecham’s debt to Neoplatonic sources is even more evident in the Tractatus, where he takes a foundational principle of his psychology from the De Motu Cordis by Alfred of

---

\[^{126}\] Pecham, Questions, 11; cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names, 820B. Unless otherwise noted, all citations of Pseudo-Dionysius are from The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibheid (New York: Paulist, 1987); Avicenna, Metaphysics, 9.4: “It is impossible that there should, in any manner whatsoever, be for Him a principle and a cause—neither [the cause] from which [something] comes to be, [nor the cause] either in which or by which [something] comes to be, nor [the cause] for [the purpose] for which [a thing] is, whereby He would be for the sake of something. For this reason it is impossible for the existence of all things [proceeding] from Him to be by way of intention—like our intention—for forming the whole and for the existence of the whole, so that He would be intending for the sake of something other than Himself (bracketed items in orig.); cf. ibid., 6.2.

\[^{127}\] Questions, 25; cf. ibid., 18; Avicenna, Metaphysics, 6.1: “To this [latter] thing there would [occur] existence, and to that [same] thing [also] belongs [the fact] that it did not exist. It does not derive from the agent [the fact that] it did not exist, nor that it came to be after nonexistence, but from the agent it derives only its existence” (bracketed items in orig.).

\[^{128}\] Pecham cites Richard of St. Victor on the point that every nature must come from God, since there is nothing prior to God (Questions, 9). Pecham again cites Richard to show that “what exists of itself is necessarily eternal” (ibid., 28). Similarly, Pecham cites Hugh of St. Victor to support the view that nothing could be coeternal with an omnipotent being for purposes of aiding in creation (ibid., 10). Pecham cites Hugh again in arguing that there had to be a moment when the world began to be, since the world does not produce infinitely (ibid., 33). Pecham cites John Damascene and Anselm as he argues that anything that is brought from non-being to being cannot be naturally co-eternal with one who is without beginning (ibid., 33).
Sareshel (calling it the *Fons Vitae*): “The first act of life occurs earlier or more generally than the others, because just as it is said in the book *The Fount of Life*: “Life is the first and equal act.” This is not to say, however, that Pecham was unfamiliar with Avicebron’s text itself. In fact, as I will show in the fifth chapter of the present study, Pecham appears to have been carrying out the project of adapting and extending the tradition inspired by the *Fons Vitae*. The *De Motu Cordis* was used as a philosophy text

---

129 *Tractatus*, 4-6; See Alfred of Sareshel, *Shrift De Motu Cordis* [Münster: Verlag Der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1923]. For a summary of the life Alfred of Sareshel and a report on the scholarship related to him, see James K. Otte, “The Life and Writings of Alfredus Anglicus,” *Viator* 3 (1972): 275-292. Callus writes: “Still more important in introducing the new Aristotle into England is Alfred of Sareshel, called the Englishman, Alexander Nequam’s friend, to whom he dedicated his *De Motu Cordis*, written not later than 1217 (the date of Alexander’s death). Besides this he translated from the Arabic the Pseudo-Aristotelian (Nicholas of Damascus’s) *De Vegetabilis*, or *De Plantis*, and the last three chapters of the *Meteorology of Avicenna*, which he added to Book IV. But above all Alfred was the pioneer in the long list of medieval commentators on the *libri naturales*. . . . The most solid foundation of Alfred’s reputation was, however, the *De Motu Cordis*. About the middle of the thirteenth century, it was introduced into the curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Paris as a textbook for the last part of the ‘scientia naturalis inferior’. . . . Moreover, Alfred’s definition of the soul soon gained general acceptance, and was quoted among the current definitions by Philip the Chancellor, John de la Rochelle, St. Albert the Great, Bartholomew the Englishman, and others. This wide reputation earned for Alfred in the pages of the *Summa Philosophiae* (generally but wrongly ascribed to Robert Grosseteste) a distinguished place among the philosophers” (“Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford,” *Proceedings of the British Academy* 19:11, 12, parenthetical items in orig.).


by the arts faculty at Paris by 1250, and is now known for the view that what moves the
heart is not nature, but the soul. Pecham again cites the De Motu Cordis (as the Fons
Vitae) in making the point that nutrition and sensation cannot be the first act of life,
because old men whose powers of sensation are diminishing have life just as a young
man does. The De Motu Cordis comes up again when Pecham says that the soul is
“incorporeal substance, intellective, and of the illuminations which are from the First, in
the last relation are perceptive.” It is interesting that in his Quaestiones Pecham
essentially repeats this statement, but locates it this time in the Fons Vitae itself.

I have already noted Avicenna’s influence in the Latin west. References to
Avicenna abound in the Tractatus. Dag Nikolaus Hasse has written what is now the
standard account of the reception of Avicenna’ De Anima in the Latin west. Michael E.
Marmura has pointed out that for Avicenna,

The human soul is an emanation from the active intellect [the last celestial
intelligence in the series of intelligences emanating from God]. It is an immaterial
substance that is individuated only when it joins the body. This individuality,

132 Otte, introduction to Alfred of Sareshel, Alred of Sareshel’s Commentary on the
Metheora of Aristotle, ed. Otte (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 6; Roger French, Medicine Before
Science: The Business of Medicine from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 68.
133 Pecham, Tractatus, 5; Alfred of Sareshel, De Motu Cordis, chapter 1.
134 Pecham, Tractatus, 8; Alfred of Sareshel, De Motu Cordis, prologue.
135 Quaestiones, 451; cf. Avicebron, Fons Vitae, 4.10.
136 For further details, see Jon McGinnis, Avicenna (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010), 251ff.
137 Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of
Avicenna was himself the recipient of a long commentary tradition that focused on
harmonizing Plato with Aristotle (Robert Wiznovsky, “Avicenna and the Avicennian
Tradition,” The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. Peter Adamson and
however, is retained, so that with the death of the body the human soul survives as an individual. The task of the soul in this life is to control and manage bodily appetites, ideally through the acquisition of theoretical and practical knowledge. . . .  

Avicenna said that the agent intellect was not part of the human substance but rather a single, cosmic entity. He identified it with the 10th and lowest celestial sphere, and said that the agent intellect completes abstraction in order to bring about understanding. Then, Gundissalinus, the interpreter of both Avicebron and Avicenna, identified Avicenna’s agent intellect with God.

Hasse describes Pecham’s *Tractatus* as both exceptional in its time as a work that takes Avicenna’s *De Anima* as its model, and illustrative of the failure of Avicenna’s faculty psychology to take hold in Western philosophy more broadly:

This work, written between 1270 and 1279, contains a section on the soul’s powers which presents the full range of Avicennian faculties. Pecham tries to establish a concordance between Aristotle and Avicenna, for instance by saying that both philosophers attribute three faculties to the vegetative soul (which is correct only for Avicenna) and that Aristotle calls Avicenna’s ‘intellectus accomodatus’ the active intellect (which is not correct either, since for Avicenna the acquired intellect is a status of the human intellect, whereas the active intellect is separate). One can see that this is not a convincing strategy: Pecham is not writing a commentary on Aristotle, but neither does he develop Albertus’s diligent account of Peripatetic philosophy into a post-Avicennian direction. In contrast to what happened in the Arabic East, where Avicenna’s philosophy eclipsed that of

Aristotle and dominated Islamic philosophical thought for many centuries, it did not determine the direction of Western philosophical writing after 1250. As will become obvious in this chapter and in the third chapter of the present study, Hasse is correct that Pecham sought to utilize the authority of Augustine, Aristotle, and Avicenna in the *Tractatus*. However, Hasse is too quick to assume that Pecham is wrong in comparing Aristotle and Avicenna. We can find in Aristotle’s description of the nutritive soul principles that correspond to Pecham’s *nutrivam*, *augmentativam*, and *generativam* powers. Pecham would have been clearly wrong about the *intellectus accommodatus* only if it is clear that Aristotle believed the agent intellect to be a principle separate from the human intellect; for Pecham to have taken a position in a notoriously difficult controversy of Aristotelian interpretation is hardly reason to say that Pecham’s

---

142 *Avicenna’s De Anima*, 74-75, parenthetical items in orig. Hasse says that further evidence of the subordination of interest in Avicennian psychology to Averroist psychology and other concerns is that very few psychological theses of Avicenna are included in the condemnation of 1277 (ibid., 76). But see Arthur Hyman and James Walsh, “The Condemnation of 1277,” *Philosophy in the Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions*, 2nd ed., ed. Hyman and Walsh (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1973), 589, where one condemned proposition reads: “That the agent intellect is a certain separated substance superior to the possible intellect and that it is separated from the body according to its substance, power, and operation and is not the form of the human body.” Hasse presents two major reasons why Avicenna did not determine the direction of Western philosophical writing after 1250: (1) The growing influence of Averroes (*Avicenna’s De Anima*, 75); (2) A shift in intellectual interest toward disputes over doctrines about the intellect (e.g., the unicity of the possible intellect, universal hylomorphism, plurality of forms, the theory of intellection, etc.) and away from physiology and faculty psychology in general (ibid., 76).


144 In support of the position that Aristotle did think this, see Myles F. Burnyeat, *Aristotle’s Divine Intellect* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2008), especially 37-43.
project of finding correspondence between Avicenna and Aristotle is unpromising.\textsuperscript{145}

Even if Hasse is correct to criticize Pecham for misunderstanding his sources, it does not follow that Pecham’s approach to psychology is itself unpromising or would have been looked upon as being so among his contemporaries. Furthermore, Hasse observes in the late-13th-century writers a turn away from faculty psychology and toward debates over doctrines of the intellect, but does not also criticize this turn for representing an unconvincing strategy.\textsuperscript{146} One might read Pecham’s \textit{Tractatus} alongside his \textit{Quaestiones} as being a perfect representation of the very turn that Hasse notes. If so, then we require a more substantial explanation as to why Pecham’s approach is unpromising and not a nuanced procedure for dealing with philosophical and theological problems that were pressing in Paris at the time.

Consider in further detail how Avicenna’s influence on Pecham makes itself clear in the \textit{Tractatus}. As Hasse observes, Pecham’s breakdown of the souls’ various potencies reflects directly his reading of Avicenna.\textsuperscript{147} Pecham claims the authority of Avicenna for the view that the conjoining of the soul with the body is for the purpose of the contemplative intellect’s perfection, sanctification, and cleansing.\textsuperscript{148} Similarly, Pecham cites Avicenna for support for the position that the soul is united to the body by a desire to

\textsuperscript{145} See Pecham, \textit{Tractatus}, 39.
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Avicenna’s De Anima}, 76-77.
\textsuperscript{147} Hasse, \textit{Avicenna’s De Anima}, 74-75; cf. Pecham, \textit{Tractatus}, 31-39; Avicenna, \textit{Liber De Anima} (Leiden: Brill, 1968), 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 4.1, 4.2.
\textsuperscript{148} Pecham, \textit{Tractatus}, 8: “Obligatio animae cum corpore est propter hoc ut perficiatur intellectus contemplativus et sanctificetur et mundetur.” Melani did not find the quotation that Pecham uses here; cf. Avicenna, \textit{De Anima}, 5.6.
govern it. Avicenna “carefully says” that the conjoining of soul and body is facilitated by both cognition and motion. Pecham agrees with Avicenna’s view that the intellect needs bodily organs only for acquiring knowledge, just as a sailor needs a ship only when he wants to be brought to port. Pecham also cites Avicenna for the view that the rational soul’s perfection occurs when it makes the world intelligible. On Pecham’s view, Avicenna is correct to say that the understanding occurring in humans is a function of the radiation of intelligible forms onto human intellects from the agent intellect. Thus, Pecham says, we should apply our own intellects to the separate agent intellect. (However, as I will discuss later, Pecham thinks that there is both a human agent intellect and a divine agent intellect.) Augustine does not speak of the agent intellect per se, but

153 Pecham, Tractatus, 20; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 5.5. “Avicenna’s epistemology is emanative. Theoretical knowledge involves the reception from the active intellect of two types of intelligibles, primary and secondary. The primary consists of primitive concepts, such as that of ‘the existents’ and of self-evident logical truths. These primary intelligibles are received ‘directly,’ in the sense that they are received without the need of any preparatory activities of the soul such as perception, imagination, or cogitation. The secondary intelligibles consist of complex concepts and inferences and normally requires these preparatory activities for their acquisition” (Marmura, “Avicenna,” 88).
154 Tractatus, 20. Pecham says that Avicenna rightly teaches that in the collection of human powers, one power can impede another (Tractatus, 25; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 5.4). This can distract us from the agent intellect. Pecham also cites Avicenna for the view that animal spirits are vehicles for animal powers, which trouble the soul (Tractatus, 26-27; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 5.8).
the Franciscans clearly associated a kind of Augustinian divine illumination with the role of the agent intellect.

Twice in the *Tractatus*, Pecham evidently refers to the fifth-/sixth-century Neoplatonist theologian Pseudo-Dionysius\(^ {155} \) for reinforcement: (1) Pseudo-Dionysius says that the plants have the “farthest resonance of life” (*ultimam resonantiam vitae*).\(^ {156} \) Pecham presents this point as part of his explanation of a scale of illumination that ranges from the “Principal” on one extreme, to the plants on the other.\(^ {157} \) (2) Pecham finds in Pseudo-Dionysius support for his definition of love: “life and life coming together” (*vita et vita copulans*).\(^ {158} \)

Twice in the *Tractatus*, Pecham references the *Book of Causes*, one of the principal sources of the eclectic tendency of Arabic and Jewish metaphysics. . . . Its official ratification as a fundamental source for philosophical studies ... took place on March 19, 1255, when it became, according to new statutes, a text for required reading at the Faculty of Arts at Paris. . . . [I]t was St. Thomas who signaled the true origin of the opuscule: he recognized in it theses extracted from Proclus’ *Elements of Theology*. Three quarters of a century of confusion was thus ended. But the fact that it was no longer reckoned among the writings of Aristotle did not diminish the authority or the importance of the *Liber de causis*. It continued to be, along with Avicenna, Ibn Gabirol, Pseudo-

---


\(^ {156} \) Pecham, *Tractatus*, 7; cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, *Divine Names*: “All life and living movement comes from a Life which is above every life and is beyond the source of life. From this Life souls have their indestructibility, and every living being and plant, down to the last echo of life, has life” (856B).

\(^ {157} \) *Tractatus*, 7-8.

\(^ {158} \) *Tractatus*, 22: cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, *Divine Names*, 712Cff., 721C-724B. “Even the person who desires the lowest form of life still desires life and a life that seems good to him; thus he participates in the Good to the extent that he feels a desire for life and for what—to him at least—seems a worthwhile life. Abolish the Good and you will abolish being, life, desire, movement, everything” (ibid., 720C).
Dionysius, and St. Augustine, one of the principal sources of the Neo-
Platonism. . . .159

Pecham cites the Book of Causes to make the point that “Life is proceeding out of the first being, quiet and eternal and the first motion. . . .”160 For a connected point, Pecham cites what he takes to be Plato’s doctrine: “the soul moves itself and that movement is

159 Bazán, Carlos B., foreword to The Book of Causes, 1, 2. The Book of Causes has been called “an epitome of pagan Neoplatonism. The work covers many topics, but especially the Neoplatonic doctrine of causality and participation, the nature of the triads, the plenitude of being, the sovereignty of good, the superessentially of the first cause ... and the nature of intelligence” (Hackett, “Roger Bacon,” Dictionary of Literary Biography 115, 93.

Pecham cites the *Book of Causes* again in his discussion of the soul's self-reflection: “Everything knowing its essence is returning above it by complete bringing continuous.”

161 *Tractatus*, 6; cf. Plato, *Phaedrus*, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, 245c-246a; unless otherwise noted, all citations of Plato are from *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). However, Pecham must have taken this principle not from Plato’s text directly, since it was almost certainly unavailable to him, but rather from a source such as Cicero. See *Tractatus*, 6, footnote 5; Cicero, *On Old Age*, chapter 21 (unless otherwise noted, all citations from Cicero are from *The Basic Works of Cicero*, ed. Moses Hadas, trans. various [New York: Modern Library, 1951]); cf. Spade: “In the case of Plato, the Middle Ages for all practical purposes had only the first part of the *Timaeus* (to 53c), hardly a typical Platonic dialogue, in a translation and commentary by a certain Calcidius (or Chalcidius). . . .” (“Medieval Philosophy,” Stanford University, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-philosophy/ [2009], parenthetical items in orig.). For a list of Plato’s texts and commentaries available during the Middle Ages, see Raymond Klibansky, *The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition During the Middle Ages* (London: Warburg Institute, 1950), 52-58. The *Meno* and *Phaedo* were available in translations by Henricus Aristippus (cf. Bernard G. Dod, “Aristoteles Latinus,” *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann, et al. [Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1982], 56; cf. Marenbon, *Late Medieval Philosophy*, 194-197). See also Stephen Gersh, “The Medieval Legacy From Ancient Platonism,” *The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: A Doxographic Approach*, ed. Stephen Gersh and Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002), 3-30, especially the following remark: “Macrobius’ *Commentarius in Somnium Scipionis* represents an interpretation of the final section of Cicero’s treatise on the ideal commonwealth in terms of the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and Porphyry. During the execution of this project, the fifth-century Latin writer has plenty of opportunity to cite Plato, although it is impossible to determine with any certainty whether the citations have been made directly from the original text. The *Phaedo* is cited for the notion that philosophy is a meditation upon death, the depiction of the soul’s confusion upon entering the body, and the notion of our varying rewards and punishments in the afterlife. Macrobius cites the *Phaedrus* for the teaching that soul is a self-moving principle, and the *Gorgias* for the notion of man’s varying rewards and punishments in the afterlife” (10); see Macrobius, *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio*, trans. William Harris Stahl (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 225-226. Pecham also cites Macrobius in *quaestio* four of his *Tractatus De Sphaera*, but the statement that Pecham cites is not found in Macrobius’ *Commentary* (personal email communication from Etzkorn, editor of the forthcoming critical edition of Pecham’s *Tractatus De Sphaera*).
Furthermore, it is likely that Pecham’s view of the agent intellect is partially a result of his reading of the following principle from the *Book of Causes*: “And indeed, Intelligence is an intellectual substance; therefore, after the mode of its own substance it knows the things it acquires from above and the things of which it is the cause.”

Pecham does not think that the human intellect is the cause of the external objects that the sensory soul knows (i.e., it is not the case that “the knower and the known are one thing”), but he does think that the individual human being’s mind is productive, as I will discuss below.

In Pecham’s *Quaestiones*, we again find him citing Augustine often and discussing doctrines which have roots in Augustine’s writings but have now been re-interpreted. For example, Pecham advocates universal hylomorphism, another doctrine that cannot obviously be taken from the writings of Augustine but that was adapted from Avicebron and his Latin interpreters and grafted onto Augustine’s doctrine in the 13th century.

James Weisheipl has argued that the universal hylomorphism that Pecham defends actually is derived from Avicebron, and I will corroborate Weisheipl’s position in the fifth chapter of the present study. (It is interesting to note that, while Pecham claims to be...)

---

162 *Tractatus De Anima*, 43; Aquinas, *Commentary on the Book of Causes*, 98. The Latin text, which Pecham approximates, is: “Omnis sciens qui scit essentiam suam est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa” (*Liber de Causis*, 14.5-6).


166 “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,” 239-260.
supporting doctrines that are traditional, the doctrines of universal hylomorphism and the plurality of forms had a limited history at the time when Pecham discussed them.  

Sarah Pessin has a helpful discussion of the universal hylomorphism of the *Fons Vitae*:

Matter and form ... are, along with the doctrine of Divine Will, cornerstones of the *Fons Vitae*. In particular, the *Fons Vitae* teaches (rather unusually within the history of ideas) that all things—including spiritual simples such as soul and intellect (but not God)—are comprised of matter and form. . . . This doctrine of Universal Hylomorphism emerges as a central theological and philosophical point of contention between Augustinian Franciscans (who embrace it) and Aristotelian Dominicans (who reject it).  

Yet even though universal hylomorphism finds a full articulation in Avicebron, it has been suggested that the underlying concept of spiritual matter is already found in Augustine.  

This idea is based on passages in Augustine’s *Confessions* and *On Genesis*, where Augustine seems to use “formlessness” to describe matter with a kind of obscure

---


169 Roland Teske, “William of Auvergne’s Debt to Avicenna,” *Avicenna and His Heritage: Acts of the International Colloquium, Leuven, September 8-11, 1999*, ed. Jules Janssens and Daniel De Smet (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2001), 163; Michael B. Sullivan, “The Debate over Spiritual Matter in the Late Thirteenth Century: Gonsalvus Hispanus and the Franciscan Tradition from Bonaventure to Scotus,” Doctoral Thesis (Catholic University of America. 2010), 15-21. James J. O’Donnell says that Augustine actually discusses matter with reference to eight different items or senses: (1) *caelum*: the spiritual, celestial creature; (2) *caelum et terram*: together the confusion of unformed matter; (3-8) *terra invisibilis et incomposita*: the unformed matter of corporeal things; the unformed matter of corporeal heaven and earth; unformed matter from which would come intelligible heaven and corporeal heaven and earth; unformed matter from which would come heaven (spiritual creature) and earth (corporeal creature); pre-existent informity that would be the matter out of which corporeal heaven and earth would be drawn (*Augustine Confessions, Volume 3: Commentary, Books 8-13*, [Oxford: Oxford University Press], 317).
form.\textsuperscript{170} (I will discuss the issue of universal hylomorphism in Augustine further in the fifth chapter of the present study.) Universal hylomorphism also involves the Aristotelian idea that matter is the principle of continuity in change;\textsuperscript{171} Bonaventure and Pecham will thus argue that any mutable substance must have a material component, even if this matter is spiritual rather than corporeal, as in the case of the separated substances.\textsuperscript{172} And, Pecham’s discussion of the soul’s simplicity expands upon what we find in the \textit{Fons Vitae}.\textsuperscript{173}

From the Stoics and Augustine, Bonaventure and Pecham derive the doctrine of seminal reasons (\textit{rationes seminales}) or principles embedded in matter which account for changes in nature.\textsuperscript{174} This doctrine is clearly found in Augustine:

Augustine’s account of seminal reasons was derived, in part, from Stoic natural philosophy. Many of his Franciscan supporters were unaware of this genealogy, and thus construed the doctrine as affirming the superiority of the completeness of divine creation over the Aristotelian conception of the pure potency of matter. They understood Augustine to teach that God had infused into matter, at the moment of creation, intelligible patterns that could be actualized over time. Bonaventure, for example, held that the souls of non-rational animals and of plants were created not \textit{ex nihilo} and not simply out of pre-existing matter, but rather in the manner of a seed. In other words, these souls were created by actualizing an active potency in matter. After the moment of creation, animal

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
  \item See Sullivan, “The Debate,” 16ff. O'Donnell writes on the concept of \textit{informem materiam} in Augustine’s \textit{Confessions}: “He will insist (at 13.33.48) that though matter was without form, form was created simultaneously with matter, and that the order here is logical but not temporal. . . . The subject first appears in [On Genesis Against the Manichees] when Augustine comes to handle Genesis 1:2. . . . (Confessions, Volume 3, 305, parenthetical item in orig., bracketed item added).
  \item See Aristotle, e.g., \textit{Metaphysics}, 1028b.33-1029b.13.
  \item See Cullen, \textit{Bonaventure}, 44-45.
  \item \textit{Quaestiones}, 387.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
souls were reproduced without divine intervention by the natural actualization of these “semenal reasons.”

In On the Trinity, Augustine provides a theological background for this view: “Because therefore the Word of God is One, by which all things were made ... all things are simultaneously therein, potentially and unchangeably; not only those things which are now in this whole creation, but also those which have been and those which shall be.”

Augustine's doctrine of matter as being more than a pure potency was motivated by his debate with the Manicheans, who taught that evil was material substance, co-eternal with God. Seminal reasons account for how God guides his creation, and Augustine refers to them as the condition of physical growth over time. While it is unclear whether Augustine thinks that each rational soul is created ex nihilo, existed prior to embodiment,


Frederick Van Fleteren, “Matter,” Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 548: “Although matter is not mentioned as such in Confessions 7.9.13-7.21.27, it forms part of the philosophical framework which Augustine uses in his polemic against the Manichees, who rejected Genesis along with the rest of the Old Testament. They also ridiculed the apparent contradictions within the creation account itself. Augustine uses the concept of matter as almost nothing (prope nihil) to help refute the Manichean notion of evil as a material substance. . . .” (parenthetical item in orig.).

or is contained in the seminal reasons,\(^{179}\) it is clear that Pecham believes in the rational soul’s creation *ex nihilo* and seems to think that Augustine believed it too.\(^{180}\)

For Pecham, as well as for Bonaventure and Bacon, every part of the person except for the rational soul arose ultimately from seminal reasons.\(^{181}\) Corporeal matter itself is therefore not a “nothing” or a mere lack, but rather has its own essence consisting of the *forma corporeitatis* and the seminal reasons, which are substantial forms in a potential state, awaiting an external force to educe them.\(^{182}\) Matter is thus a *principium* for substance and not merely the potency for a particular form’s act, but an active potency.\(^{183}\)

For some thinkers who believe in seminal reasons, light is the first form that is united with matter, and this view evidently influenced Pecham. Bonaventure’s position is an example, as Christopher Cullen explains:

> [A]ll of being is luminous, reflecting its source. Light is then an active principle in bodies shining forth in the activities of corporeal things, which flow from the basic operation of light, including sensible and intellectual cognition. . . . the celestial bodies participate in the form of light, even though each one has its own form. Earthly bodies participate in an embodied light, which is not a substantial


\(^{180}\) *Quaestiones*, 378.


\(^{182}\) Crowley, *Roger Bacon*, 103-106; Pecham, *Tractantes*, 143-144; *Quaestiones*, 186-187; *Quodlibeta*, 175-176; Bonaventure does not explicitly mention the *forma corporeitatis*, but it would fit well in his conception of corporeal matter as having the seminal reasons (see Cullen, *Bonaventure*, 53).

\(^{183}\) See Pereira, “Materia naturalis”.

81
form, but is a virtual disposition to become colored under the influence of external light.\textsuperscript{184}

This approach has been called a metaphysics of light, because it holds that light is part of every structure, and could have been derived from Alfarabi, Averroes, Avicenna, and the \textit{Book of Causes}.\textsuperscript{185} Lindberg has shown the pervasive usage of light metaphors in early Greek literature and philosophy, late antique writers and early church fathers, and in Islamic philosophy.\textsuperscript{186}

Consider the case of Avicenna on light and intellectual vision in particular. Jon McGinnis has recently argued for two theses about Avicenna’s interpretation of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{184} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{185} See Patrick J. Aspell, \textit{Medieval Western Philosophy: The European Emergence} (Washington: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1999), 120-121; Aquinas, \textit{Commentary on the Book of Causes}, 45ff.; Herbert A. Davidson, \textit{Alfarabi, Avicenna, & Averroes, on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, & Theories of Human Intellect} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), introduction.
\item \textsuperscript{186} Lindberg emphasizes Avicebron's influence (introduction to Roger Bacon, \textit{Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature}, trans. and ed. Lindberg [New York: Oxford University Press, 1983], xxxv- liii; cf. Lindberg, introduction to Bacon, \textit{Roger Bacon and the Origins}, xxv-xxxvii). “Given the limited knowledge of optical phenomena, it is perhaps clear (but the point is worth stressing) that there existed no ‘discipline’ of \textit{perspectiva} or optics during the early Middle Ages. This is not to deny that scholars of the early medieval period had opinions about the nature of light and the act of vision, but simply to insist that these opinions did not constitute a school subject, a discipline, or a ‘science’ to which a name was attached and to which a scholarly career might be devoted. If these opinions were affiliated with any specific subject-matter, it would most generally have been with cosmology, meteorology, psychology or metaphysics: cosmology because the principal sources of light were celestial bodies; meteorology because of the presence of striking luminous phenomena such as the rainbow and halo in the atmosphere; psychology because of the pre-eminence of sight among the five external senses; and metaphysics because of the ubiquity of light as an analogue and metaphor in the works of Neoplatonic metaphysicians. Light also figured in theological discussions, owing to its prominence in the creation account in Genesis, the biblical use of light metaphors, and the close connection between theology and metaphysics” (ibid., xxv-xxvi, parenthetical item in orig.).
\end{itemize}
Aristotle’s *De Anima*, 3.5 (410a.10-17): (1) Avicenna’s interpretation provided a new theoretical model for vision, differing widely from Aristotle’s account. (2) Avicenna’s theory of vision has interesting parallels to his theory of intellection. 187 McGinnis finds five such parallels:

- The active intellect is like the Sun: it is both intelligible substance in itself and a source of intelligibility in the sub-lunar world.188

- Just as light radiates from the Sun and combines with potential color, there radiates from the active intellect “intellectualizing forms” which mix with potential intelligibles to produce actual intelligibles in the potential intellect.189

- A preparatory motion is needed for both cognition and vision; locomotion must occur for light to reach the potentially colored object, and the rational intellect must take control of the imagination.190

- The intellect’s focus on the essential qualities of the thing that is perceived is like a perceiver turning to face the actually colored object in order that the object may project a sensible image of itself onto the eye.191

187 “New Light on Avicenna: Optics and its Role in Avicennan Theories of Vision, Cognition and Emanation,” *Philosophical Psychology in Arabic Thought*, 41-57. McGinnis says that, according to Avicenna, “Light is of two types. There is luminous light, which belongs to certain bodies like the Sun and fire, and by which these bodies are visible in themselves. Additionally, there is radiant light, which radiates from luminous bodies and mixes with the potential colors of certain other types of bodies. What is potentially colored but not actually colored only becomes actually colored through a certain motion or alteration; however, the alteration or motion does not take place in the transparent medium, which is always actually transparent for Avicenna, but by some motion that brings the potentially colored object into the presence of a radiant light. Thereafter the mixture of radiant light and potential color form a ray, which when it is connected with a perceiver that is facing the visible object, that visible object projects a sensible image of itself that is seen as actual color” (ibid., 51-52).

188 Ibid., 53.
189 Ibid., 54.
190 Ibid., 54-55.
191 Ibid., 55.
• Just as when radiant light mixes with potential color to make it actual color and to form rays, emanating intellectualizing forms radiate and mix with the potentially intelligible object to make it actually intelligible.¹⁹²

For Avicenna, knowledge acquisition involves two kinds of reception from the active intellect, one of which requires preparatory activities on the part of the individual human knower, including perception, imagination, and cogitation.¹⁹³

Because Pecham inherits Avicenna’s faculty psychology and also has a theory of illumination, it is to be expected that similar Pechamian analogues between vision and intellectual knowledge would result from a comparative study between Pecham’s statements about light and vision (particularly in his *Perspectiva¹⁹⁴*) and his statements about intellectual activity. While a detailed comparison is beyond the scope of the present study, we do find Pecham utilizing Avicenna’s method in our texts and citing Avicenna in support of the view that the relationship between intelligence and the human mind is like the relationship between the sun and vision.¹⁹⁵ The fifth chapter of Pecham’s *Tractatus* makes the same general kind of analogy that McGinnis finds in Avicenna’s *De Anima*. In

¹⁹² Ibid., 55-56.
¹⁹⁴ John Pecham and the Science of Optics.
¹⁹⁵ *Quaestiones*, 395; *Tractatus*, 12; cf. Avicenna, *De Anima*, 5.5, 5.6. Jacques Derrida discusses the metaphor of the sun (“heliotrope”) to illustrate the complexity of metaphor even in philosophical texts (“White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy,” *New Literary History* 6, no. 1 (1974): 5-74). Derrida suggests the appropriateness of the medieval metaphor: “We have long known that value, gold, the eye, the sun and so on, belong to the development of the same trope. Their interchange is dominant in the field of rhetoric and of philosophy. . . . It reminds us that an object which is the most natural, the most universal, the most real, the most clear, a referent which is apparently the most external, the sun—that this object, as soon as it plays a role in the process of axiological and semantic exchange (and it always does), does not completely escape the general law of metaphorical value: ‘The value of just any term is accordingly determined by its environment. . . .’” (ibid., 17, parenthetical item and emp. in orig.).
fact, a number of statements in Pecham’s texts suggest that his aims were similar to Avicenna’s in comparing light and vision to intellectual activity:

- In the second quaeestio Pecham endorses a kind of emanationism when he does not disagree with the following basis of an objection: A bright light gets more corrupted the further it is from its source, and by the same token, the further a human is from its source (of being, presumably), by so much it is corruptible.  

- In the Tractatus Pecham says that the visive power is the perfection of the eye just as the soul is the perfection of the whole body.  

- In the fifth quaeestio Pecham bases an argument on the idea that there is a singular, uncreated light manifested by every created thing.  

- In the sixth quaeestio Pecham cites Ephesians 5:9 in support of the view that there is one light of truth that is common to all.  

- Also in the sixth quaeestio Pecham says that the truth of a proposition is “like the formal, namely the truth of the proposition, and that seized from eternal light.” This is part of the view that in a true cognition the operation of the intellect is like something material and the proposition itself is like something formal (taken from eternal light). Pecham cites Avicenna in support of this point.  

- In the Tractatus’ discussion concerning how human understanding occurs Pecham says that, properly speaking, the cause of understanding is eternal light. Like Avicenna, Pecham says that the intelligible is not light, but is capable of being enlightened.

---

196 Quaestiones, 334.
197 Tractatus, 12.
198 Quaestiones, 383.
199 Ibid., 392; Ephesians 5:9: “(for the fruit of light is found in all that is good and right and true),” (parenthetical item in orig.); all quotations of the English Bible are from the English Standard Version (Wheaton: Crossway, 2001).
200 Quaestiones, 409.
201 Ibid., 409.
202 Ibid., 409.
203 Tractatus, 10; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 5.6.
204 Tractatus, 11.
• Pecham says that an angel is related to cognition as the person who opens a
window to let in sunshine is related to the illumination of the room.²⁰⁵

Pecham expands this analogy in his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences.²⁰⁶ Here,
he says that there are three things that allow the eye to see: moving species, light that is
connatural to the eye, and the light of the sun. And, there are three corresponding things
required for intellectual vision: intelligible species to move the intellect in its possibility,
the light of the intellect of the creative agent, and the divine light shining on the
intellect.²⁰⁷ Pecham explains this process somewhat in the Tractatus.

Pecham adapts this Avicennian epistemological perspective to suit his own
theological views. Pecham says that we see principles of knowledge in the eternal light,
thus reflecting Bonaventure.²⁰⁸ Pecham also cites Avicenna in his discussion of the

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 12.
²⁰⁶ An excerpt from Pecham’s commentary is included as an appendix in the Tractatus
(131-138). From that appendix: “Dicendum igitur, quod sicut in corporali visu tria sunt,
per quae videtur aliquid ab oculo, videlicet species movens, lux oculi connaturalis
splendens, dicente Philosopho, De Anima: ‘Visus non tantum patitur, sed agit
quemadmodum splendida’, et lux solaris, irradians super utrumque; ita in intellectu est
species intelligibilis movens intellectum in sua possibilitate, sicut species visibilis oculum
in sua perspicacitate, et lux intellectus creati agenti [sic], quo forte est vis formativa
specierum, vel vis transformativa animae in omnium similitudinem, et lux divina
irradians super intellectum, sicut superius tactum est in quaestione: An sit Deus. Unde
intelligens istam: omne est majus sua parte, habet species intelligibiles totius et partis ut
determinatas rationes cognoscendi; attingit etiam rationes aeternas ex parte et obscure,
oculo lippienti in quibus cernit harum habitudinem incommutabilem et propositionis
veritatem” (135).
²⁰⁷ Cf. Hackett, “Roger Bacon and the Moralization of Science: From Perspectiva
through Scientia Experimentalis to Moralis Philosophy,” I Francescani E Le Scienze
(Spoleti: Italiano di Studi sull’Alto Medioevo, 2012), 369-392.
²⁰⁸ Ibid., 17. “Et adhuc restat in cognitione intellectuali quod sit amplius admittendum.
Sicut enim sciunt qui in libris eximii Doctoris Augustini sunt experti, omnia, quae
intelligimus per lucem aeternam et in illa cognoscimus, in ipsa cognoscimus scientialia
principia, in ipsa videmus quae sunt post principia ex principiis deducta.”
intelligible forms: intelligible forms shine from God and we then apply ourselves to the agent intellect.\textsuperscript{209} Perhaps the most helpful thing Pecham does for the readers of his \textit{Tractatus} in connection with this question is to direct them to his commentary on Peter Lombard’s \textit{Sentences}.\textsuperscript{210} In this text Pecham explains one way in which divine light mediates between God and the human intellect:\textsuperscript{211} Just as the eye uses species to see color yet does not see the species themselves, the intellective soul is informed by divine light and yet does not have divine light for its object; rather, it is by attaining the \textit{propositiones incommutabiles} that the mind attains the eternal light.\textsuperscript{212} Also in the \textit{Sentences} commentary, Pecham presents various arguments against the view that divine light is the immediate cause of cognition:\textsuperscript{213}

\textsuperscript{209} Ibid., 20: “Et hic est de quo Avicenna dicit quod intelligere sit in nobis, per hoc quod formae intelligibiles irradiant super intellectum nostrum ab intelligentia agente, hoc est esse ingeniosum hanc aptitudinem applicandi intelligentiam suam intelligentiae agenti”; cf. Avicenna, \textit{De Anima}, 5.5.
\textsuperscript{210} \textit{Tractatus}, 131-138.
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid., 134, 135: “Sunt qui dicunt quod lumen eternum non est informans intellectum, sed efficiens tantum cognitionem intellectualem non in quantum informans vel formaliter ostendens, sed mediante aliqua luce creatu. . . . ipsi in dicta auctoritate pervertunt mentem Augustini, sicut patet in capitolo praecedenti, ubi patet ex praedictis expresse quod loquitur de luce incommutabili, quae est supra mentem. Quidquid autem est supra mentem est Deus.”
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid., 135-136: “Sed sicut species sensibilis ostendit rem, cuius est, et non ostendit se ipsam, nisi in quantum ducit ad alteram, cuius est species,—unde video colorem per species suam et speciem non video, quoniam penitus sit, ignoro—sic intelligendo propositiones incommutabiles attingo lucem aeternam ut rationem cognoscendi; nec hoc adverto nisi quantum ratione colligo et super eas reflector; et non attingo eam lucem ut obiectum; hoc enim est praenium [sic] Beatorum. Et hoc sentit Augustinus dicens, \textit{De libero arbitrio} II. . . .”
\textsuperscript{213} These arguments are presented as representing Pecham’s own position. There is no \textit{responsio} in Melani’s edition.
• Infidels can have knowledge even though they cannot have such in divine light.214

• Insofar as the divine light pertains to cognition, it does not shine all around us, but merely through the mirror of the creature (per speculum tantummodo creaturae).215

• If everything true is seen in eternal light, then natural cognition would not differ from prophetic cognition. Similarly, if we were to know something about the future in the context of eternal reasons, then we would know the future certainly.216

• If cognition always occurs through something greater that is known, then it would not be possible to doubt that God is. Yet it seems that it is less doubtable that every whole is greater than its part than that God exists.217

Beyond Pecham’s adaptation of the Avicenna’s light and vision metaphors, there are differences between Pecham and Avicenna. Pecham differs from Avicenna about whether

214 Ibid., 133: “Augustinus, loquens de rationibus aeternis, De Trinitate, XII, c. 14, dicit: ‘Ad quas pervenire paucorum est’. Sed certudinaliter cognoscere omnium est. Ergo rationes aeternae non sunt communes rationes cognoscedi. Item, I De Trinitate, c. 8: Mentis humanae acies invalida in tam excellenti luce non figitur nisi per iustitiam fidei mundata vegetetur. Sed certum est quod mens infidelis defigitur in lumine; quod est ratio cognoscedi. Ergo, etc.”

215 Ibid., 133: “Item, Dionysius dicit in Angelica Hierarchia: ‘Impossibile est nobis aliter splendere thearchicum radium nisi varietate velaminum circumvelatum’. Ergo per se non splendet nobis, sed per speculum tantummodo creaturae.”

216 Ibid., 133: “Item, si omne verum videretur in luce aeterna, tunc cognitio naturalis non differret a prophetica. . . . Item, rationes aeternae certae sunt repsectu futurorum contingentium, sicut respectu necessariorum. Ergo si mens nostra vera, quae videt, videt in rationibus aeternis, eque [sic] certudinaliter cognoscit futura contingentia sicut necessaria.” Pecham may be distinguishing between cognizing a truth and cognizing truth in light of the eternal reasons. The former would lead to purely natural knowledge. The latter, representing a deeper way of knowing truth, would be available only to one thinking as a Christian. Bonaventure has a similar distinction, related to the difference between the illumination of science and the illumination of wisdom (see Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 547).

217 Tractatus, 133: “Item, omnis ratio cognoscedi est cognitio per magis nota, sicut principium est notius quam conclusio. Ergo si lux aeterna esset ratio cognoscedi alia, ipsa inter omnia esset magis cognita, igitur non videretur per speculum et nullus posset dubitare de ista: Deus est; sicut nec potest de ista: omne totum est majus sua parte.”
there is just one, created, agent intellect. Pecham sides with what he takes to be Aristotle’s and Augustine’s position, that there is a “created light,” or an agent intellect that is part of each individual’s soul.218

218 Quaestiones, 401-402, 403: “Alii fuerunt, sicut Avicenna et sui, ponentes pluralitatem intellectuum materialium, sed intellectum agentem esse unum et creatum. Iuxta quod ponit Avicenna animam mundi influere super omnes animas humanas, docens VI Naturalium: ‘Addiscere non est nisi inquirere perfectam aptitudinem coniungendi se intelligentiae agenti quousque fiat ex ea intellectus’. Sed quia substantiae separatae nihil agunt nisi per intentionem, impossibile est eas cognitio naturali simul pluribus intendere. Impossibile est aliquam substantiam separatam vel coniunctam, si esset, super omnes—immo nec super duos diversos—cadere.—Item, angelus adest ubi operatur, et ita si esset agens, non posset simul esse agens respectu alterius. . . . Est . . . in anima intellectus hic agens sicut motivum in moto, cum tamen ipsa anima habeat aliquid activum, sed non alii de quo vere sunt praedictae proprietates. . . . Cum enim intelligere sit coniuncti ex anima et corpore, multo magis nullum erit intelligere animae secundum unam partem quod non sit ei scire secundum aliam. [Secus] impossibile est lucem aliquam naturalem posse intellectum humanum constituere in actu intelligendi. . . . Ideo est quarta positio dicentium quod Deus perficit omnem intellectum et in actu constituit intelligendi, non per se, sed per aliquod lumen creatum. Quod etiam probare se credunt per verbum Augustini dicentis, De Trinitate XII cap. 15” (bracketed item in orig.); cf. Tractatus, 20: “Sed adhuc dicam apertius qualiter per lucem illam intellectus compleatur. V.g. anima intelligit et invisibiliter videt quasi omne totum majus est sua parte et hoc videt opitulante imagine veritatis hius enuntiabilis: in toto enim enuntiabilis et in nulla eius parte certum est quod, cum anima habet rationem totius effigiatam, non habet simul effigiatam partis rationem, quia non potest diversis simul configurari. Igitur, anima in se nunquam habet simul rationem totius et partis in actu, et tamen simul videt horum habitudines et veram esse istam: ‘omne totum’; ergo ubi sunt simul videt et attingit. Anima igitur, per species efficacias discurrens secundum apicem sui, rationes earaundum partium in luce aeterna attingit et ibi veritatem enuntiabilis immobilem cerinit et inde veritatem haurit, sicut dicit Augustinus, De Trinitate, XII, c. ultimo, et De libero arbitrio in pluribus locis et De vera religione, et hic est intellectus agens, quem dicit Aristoteles simul omnia intelligere, et hic est de quo Avicenna dicit quod intelligere sit in nobis, per hoc quod formae intelligibiles irradiant super intellectum nostrum ab intelligentia agente, hoc est esse ingeniosum hanc aptitudinem applicandi intelligentiam suam intelligentiae agenti. Duplicem enim pono intelligentiam agentem, increatam et creatam, ut iam patet, et hoc est intellectum agentem species a phantasmate abstrahere et intellectui possibili unire. . . .”; Avicenna, De Anima, 5.6; Augustine, On the Trinity, 12.15.24.
In the *Quaestiones* Pecham draws from some of the same authors who were influential in the *Tractatus*. Pecham cites Avicenna in reference to a variety of topics, e.g., in support of the view that the single soul can be virtually divided according to its potencies.\(^{219}\) Also, Pecham reports that Avicenna proved the immortality of the soul and took the position that the soul cannot be perfect unless separated from the body.\(^{220}\) Avicenna’s proof the immortality of the soul was “from the dignity of its substance” (*ex dignitate suae substantiae*) and “from the reason of the perfecting of virtue” (*ex ratione virtutis perficientis*).\(^{221}\) In the *Quaestiones* Pecham indicates that his view of abstraction will be inspired by Avicenna: “[T]he soul has two operations, as Avicenna distinguishes ... One is through comparing to the body in abstracting from phantasms; another has the nearer role by understanding of abstract things.”\(^{222}\)

It is striking that Pecham often cites Cicero’s *On Old Age* and *Tusculan Disputations* often in the second *quaestio*, which deals with whether the rational soul is immortal. Cicero would have been a helpful philosopher to cite on this topic, due to his emphasis on immortality:

---

\(^{219}\) Pecham, *Quaestiones*, 327; *Tractatus*, 29; cf. Avicenna, *De Anima*, 1.2.


\(^{222}\) *Quaestiones*, 348: “[D]uplex est animae operatio, ut distinguuit Avicenna ... una est per comparationem ad corpus in abstrahendo a phantasmatibus; aliam habet interiorem intelligendo res abstractas”; cf. Avicenna, *De Anima*, 4.2.
• Pecham cites Cicero in support of the point that the soul is not made up of contraries, and so it cannot be broken apart.²²³

• Pecham cites Cicero’s statement to the effect that the immortal gods provide the human heart the capability to care for the earth.²²⁴

• Pecham cites Cicero and other Stoici in support of a view about the soul’s memory, which Pecham also attributes to Plato.²²⁵

²²³ Pecham, *Quaestiones*, 344-345; cf. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, trans. Robert Black, 1.29: “Now, as to knowledge of the soul, we cannot doubt, unless we be dullards in the study of natural philosophy, that in souls there is nothing composite, concrete, conglomerate, joint, or duplex. And if that be so, it certainly cannot be separated, divided, dismembered, sundered; and, therefore, it cannot perish. For perishing is, as it were, a separation, division, sundering of what before the perishing was held together by some sort of junction.”; cf. ibid., chapter 27).


²²⁵ Pecham, *Quaestiones*, 340, 342; cf. Cicero, *On Old Age*, chapter 21: “I believe that the immortal gods implanted souls in human bodies to provide overseers for the earth who would contemplate the heavenly order and imitate it in the moderation and constancy of their lives. To this belief I have been impelled not by reason and arguments alone, but by the distinguished authority of the greatest philosophers. I learned that Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, virtually our countrymen and sometimes called Italian philosophers, never doubted that our souls were emanations of the universal divine intelligence. I was impressed also by the discourse on the immortality of the soul delivered on the last day of his life by Socrates, whom the oracle of Apollo had pronounced the wisest of men. I need say no more. This is my conviction, this my belief: Such is the rapid movement of souls, such their memory of the past and foresight of the future, so many are the arts, so profound the sciences, so numerous the inventions, that the nature which embraces these things cannot be mortal; and since the soul is always active and has no source of motion because it is self-moving, it can have no end of motion, for it will never abandon itself, it is indivisible and hence cannot perish. Furthermore, it is a strong proof of men knowing many things before birth that boys studying difficult subjects grasp innumerable points so quickly that they seem not to be receiving them for the first time but to be recalling and remembering them. This, in substance, is Plato’s argument.”
• Pecham cites Cicero’s view that the soul is self-moving.226

• Pecham cites Cicero’s point that sometimes a body of poor disposition coincides with a mind that is genius.227

Pecham also cites Cicero in the *Tractatus*. Cicero presents the argument that if there were no meritorious retribution after death, then the unjust life would be more “free” (*liberius*) than the just life.228 This collection of citations is illustrative of stoicism’s influence on Pecham. A number of authors have dealt with the prominence of Stoic ideas in the medieval period, notably Gérard Verbeke229 and Marcia L. Colish.230

226 Pecham, *Quaestiones*, 343; cf. Cicero, *On Old Age*, chapter 21; ibid., *Tusculan Disputations*, chapter 23: “But if it be beyond even soul itself to know the nature and quality of soul, may it not know, pray, so much as that it is, that it moves? This is the question out of which arose that argument which is set forth by Socrates in Plato’s *Phaedrus*, and is cited by me in the sixth book of my *Republic*. The substance of it is on this wise: ‘That which is ever moving is immortal. . . . So, then, the first principle of motion resided in that which is self-moved. . . . It being evident, then, that that is immortal which is self-moving, who would deny that this is the natural attribute of souls? For soul-less (inanimate) is all that is moved from without; soul-ful (animate), all that is moved from within: for that is the peculiarity and innate property of soul. And if it is the only thing in the world which is self-moving continually, it certainly is not generated, and certainly is immortal’” (parenthetical items in orig.); cf. ibid., *On Old Age*, chapter 21. At the end of Cicero’s *Republic*, as part of Scipio’s dream, there is a similar argument (trans. Cyrus R. Edmonds and Moses Hadas).

227 Pecham, *Quaestiones*, 348; cf. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, 1.33: “For many things appertaining to the body contribute to sharpen the intelligence, many to blunt it. Aristotle says that all men of genius are melancholic; so that, for my part, I am not sorry to be of rather a dull temperament.”

228 Pecham, *Tractatus*, 50; cf. Cicero, *On Old Age*, chapters 21-23. “Nothing in our experience so resembles death as sleep; and it is in sleep that souls manifest their divine nature, for being free and unfettered they foresee the future. This indicates what souls will be when they are entirely liberated from the shackles of the flesh. . . . Were it not that souls are immortal, men’s souls would not strive for undying fame in proportion to their transcending merit” (ibid., chapter 22, 23).


230 *The Stoic Tradition*, volume 2.
In this section, I have provided evidence from secondary literature and from Pecham’s own texts to show that Pecham played an important role in the Neo-Augustinian movement. In giving examples of how Pecham utilized his sources, I provided further content to the idea of Neo-Augustinianism, i.e., I showed how Pecham and his movement were indebted to a Neoplatonic tradition (I will say more about this in the fifth chapter). Now, as a final preparation for the exposition of Pecham’s texts, I will say something about Pecham’s argumentative approach.

**Pecham’s argumentative approach**

Pecham’s *Tractatus* suggests that he was using a polemical style in order to defend positions associated with the Neo-Augustinian movement. Typically, in the *Tractatus*, Pecham elaborates little on each point, but rather presents a series of brief arguments and authorities to support his claims. A charitable reading of Pecham would bear in mind three points: (1) Pecham is citing arguments and passages with which his readers would have been familiar, and so it was unnecessary for him to develop the details of the discussions. After all, Pecham was writing to trained theologians. (2) Standard medieval literary forms, and the “disputed question” format in particular, lent themselves to Pecham’s style (I will discuss this point further at the beginning of the next chapter). (3) Pecham’s use of various sources to promote his own agenda is itself an original contribution, particularly when one considers that Pecham’s positions are not altogether

---

the same as any of those thinkers who influenced him (I will discuss this point further in
the fifth chapter).

Pecham’s style is no less polemical in the Quaestiones, and again we find Pecham
making lists of arguments in support of his position. For example, in the second quaestio,
Pecham produces seven proofs for the immortality of the soul from the Bible and other
sources, including Anselm, Avicenna, and Augustine. Pecham discusses each of these
arguments only briefly. Yet in Pecham’s responsio in the fifth quaestio (the subject of
chapters three and five of the present study) we find an in-depth philosophical criticism
of the Latin Averroists’ position. Pecham’s discussion is far from a mere recitation of
stock arguments. Rather, he discusses three fundamental errors involved in
monopsychism, and argues that in the case of each foundation, Averroes has failed to
give a consistent account of how knowledge could result if the possible intellect were
separate from individual knowers. The first has to do with Averroes’ misunderstanding of
spiritual matter (he has failed to differentiate spiritual matter from matter considered
more broadly, and thus has gotten wrong the soul/body relationship generally). The
second has to do with Averroes’ misunderstanding of the power of the possible intellect
(he wants to account for the particularization of knowledge to individual humans, but his
presuppositions disallow this). The third has to do with the operation of the active
intellect (he equivocates on the view that rational soul is the perfection of “man”). In this

232 Quaestiones, 339-346.
233 Quaestiones, 378-383.
234 Pecham takes Averroes as the main representative of monopsychism and evidently
writes the arguments as if they are directed at Averroes.
section, Pecham occasionally references Aristotle and Augustine, but is clearly laying out what he personally sees as the main philosophical and theological problems with Averroism. Furthermore, the three foundations of Averroes’ error are connected in their philosophical content. Only at the very end of the quaestio, in the discussion of the third foundation of Averroes’ error, does Pecham develop the theological objection concerning personal moral responsibility.

Conclusion

In this chapter I first introduced John Pecham by surveying his life and work. I then contextualized his work by placing him in the Neo-Augustinian movement. This involved saying something about how Pecham utilizes his sources. (I will return to this subject in detail in the fifth chapter of the present study, where I make a case for a particular way of understanding Pecham’s project.) Finally, I suggested that when one reads Pecham it is helpful to bear in mind that Pecham is writing with a certain argumentative style. In this way I have facilitated an appreciation for the intensive exposition that occupies the following two chapters.
CHAPTER 2

EXPOSITION OF QUÆSTIO FIVE IN PECHAM’S QUÆSTIONES DE ANIMA

This chapter is an exposition of Pecham’s fifth quæstio, which is “whether there is one possible intellect in all men.” By way of introducing this text and those of which give an exposé in chapters three and four, I will do three things: First, I will discuss the various medieval literary methods to which I will refer throughout the present study. Second, I will discuss the broader context of the medieval tradition of writing de anima. Third, I will discuss the specific historical occasion for Pecham’s fifth quæstio.

The Quaestiones De Anima represents one set of John Pecham’s Disputed Questions (Quaestiones Disputatae). M.-D. Chenu provides a helpful summary of how the quæstio method developed as a “procedure of exposition” of texts in the Middle Ages.¹ I will now follow Chenu’s overview of the three medieval forms of expression which followed progressively upon one another: the lectio, the quæstio (eventually with its accompanying disputation and quodlibet), and finally the summa. I will also consider the basic unit of the quæstio, the articulus (article).²

The lectio, or reading, was the institutionalized foundation of medieval pedagogy, which centered around the reading of texts. The professor “read” his text, gave a course called a lectio, and was himself called the lector. The method including not only reading,

² Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, 80.
but *emendatio* (similar to our textual criticism and criticism of style), *enarratio* (exposition), and *judicium* (general review and final aesthetic judgment of the work).\(^3\) The *lectio* method of instruction is a testament to the medievals’ desire to recover the literary treasures of antiquity. Texts and a growing number of commentaries were made available by booksellers, and gradually the number of available texts began to multiply. Thinking developed around *auctoritates*, or texts held to be authoritative expressions of their topics. It has been said that, in the long term, the intellectual effect of the medieval attachment to *auctoritates* stifled speculation.\(^4\)

When in the course of pursuing a *lectio* the reader encountered a difficult question, he had an occasion for active research and elaboration. Thus the *lectio* gave rise to *quaestiones* that went beyond exposition of a text, although the text still functioned as the substance with which the question dealt.\(^5\) The 13th century, in particular, is characterized by increased inquisitiveness in theological matters and in philosophical questions raised by the entrance of Aristotle’s full corpus. With the *quaestiones* method for dealing with

---


\(^4\) Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas*, 80-85. Chenu says that the *lectio* method became a source of intellectual “stagnation”: “Instead of being the means to open the mind to a knowledge of objects, of realities, the tendency was to consider them themselves as the ‘objects’ of learning. Thus, science in medicine meant to know, not the human body, but the Canon of Avicenna. Knowledge in grammar was to know, not the actual living speech of men but Priscian. Philosophical knowledge meant to learn Aristotle, instead of trying to discover the laws that govern the phenomena of nature, and the causes that explain all being. . . . The commentator allowed himself to be taken in by his own game. Having lost little by little his power of discovery, he condemned in principle anyone so imprudent as to find anything in contradiction to his book. . . . Scholasticism died under the annihilating load of its texts” (ibid., 83).

\(^5\) Ibid., 85-88.
these problems, scholasticism reached the peak of its philosophical and theological development; ideas were analyzed in themselves and were not regarded merely as the fruit of textual exegesis.

Kenny describes the literary formalization used for a quaestio of Aquinas’s (the same formalization also generally applies to disputed questions such as Pecham’s):

First, reasons are given for taking the view which is opposed to that which Aquinas is going to defend. Sometimes … the reason will be an authoritative text which takes the contrary view. More commonly … it will be a philosophical argument which makes no appeal to authority but which is derived from an analysis of the concepts involved in the proposition which is up for question. . . .

Second, there follows the sed contra, a reason for taking the view which Aquinas thinks correct. In those works which are records of live disputations, the initial arguments are followed by a set of arguments of prima facie equal weight in the contrary sense. . . .

Third, there is the body of the article, introduced by the phrase Respondeo dicendum [in the case of Pecham’s Quaestiones Disputatae, the body is titled Responsio]. Here, commonly, the main reasons for Aquinas’ position are stated in detail. . . .

Finally come the answers to the objections initially stated. Quite frequently the answers to objections offer a crucial clarification of issues which have remained ambiguous or undecided in the body of the article. Often, too, they go a long way to accommodate the opposite view which has been stated initially in the objections.6

The sed contra section (called simply contra in Pecham’s Quaestiones), as Chenu notes, is not necessarily a statement of the author’s opinion or of reasons that support the author’s own position.7 It is rather the presentation of the position alternative to the one advanced in the first part of the quaestio. The part of the article that is the author’s own response to the first part of the article is the responsiones ad obiecta section, or what is called in Pecham’s Quaestiones the Responsio auctoris ad argumenta principalia. Very

---

6 Aquinas on Mind, 21-22, bracketed item added.
7 Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, 95.
often the author’s responsio to the question, where he states and defends (at least in some measure) his own position, does not altogether dismiss the position that was taken at the beginning of the article. Rather, at some point in the article (for Pecham, it is usually during the responsio ad argumenta principalia) the author will show what aspects of that first viewpoint accord with his own.

As the quaestio method urged discussion of new philosophical problems, settled convictions were philosophically analyzed for deeper understanding: “Does God exist?” “Should a person honor his parents?” Etc.\(^8\) The quaestio method also revised the role of the professor or master; beyond exegesis he now had the task of “determining” or resolving a question not just by appeal to authority, but by the giving of reasons and the evaluation of them.

Discussions of questions were eventually isolated from the lectio format and given their own period for special exercise and wider audience within the university. The disputatio thus represents a final break with the authoritative text as the substance for the discussion.\(^9\) Two or more masters, whether in agreement on the question or not, would participate in positing and resolving the questions, perhaps delegating some responsibility to an appointed student.\(^10\) A lively disputation would be held, followed one or more days later by the presentation of the master’s determination in a second oral session.\(^11\)

---

\(^{8}\) Ibid., 87.

\(^{9}\) Ibid., 88-90.


\(^{11}\) Wippel, “Quodlibetal Questions,” 158-163; Sweeney, “Literary Forms.”
Often the discussion of the quaestio was recorded in a collection of quaestiones disputatae (beginning with Robert of Melun around 1145). Eileen Sweeney provides further details about the disputed question as a medieval literary form:

Disputations took place both privately between a master and his students, and publicly or “solemnly” at an event that replaced regular classes at the university and was attended by the larger university community. The latter practice was eventually codified by university statute, which prescribed that masters would hold a certain number of disputations at various times of the year, sometimes as frequently as once a week. Most scholars agree that the process came to be divided into two sessions. In the first session, supporting and opposing arguments for a given thesis or question were brought forward, and, in a preliminary way, clarified and determined by a student serving as the respondens under the supervision of the master. During the second session, the master himself would make the determination, give his answer and respond to all the opposing arguments. Some disputed questions we have in written form are clearly taken from different stages in this process, either a reportatio of the first day's session, some abbreviation of the debate, or one reflecting the master's answer and response to opposing objections, redacted after the second day's debate. . . . A question is tied to a specific textual problem or conflict, but has, like the disputation, arguments on opposing sides and the response or resolution and replies to opposite objections by the master. The disputation is centered around a systematic rather than a textual question, and the supporting and opposing arguments are supplied by students.

The institutionalization of learning can be clearly seen in the fact that, in the mid-13th century, the master’s responsibility included legere (to read), disputare (to dispute), praedicare (to preach).

12 Chenu’s example is that of Pecham and Aquinas: “One recalls here the famous incident in the career of Saint Thomas at the moment when the intellectual crisis, centered around the condemnation of Aristotelianism, had reached a peak of acuteness at the University of Paris. Brother John Peckham, master regent of the Friars Minor, rose up against Brother Thomas Aquinas, master regent of the Friar Preachers, and in the presence of all the masters and bachelors, sharply criticized ‘in pompous and inflated terms’ the account he had just given of the Aristotelian theory of the unity of forms” (Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, 89). I will discuss this controversy between Pecham and Aquinas in the sixth chapter of the present study.

13 “Literary Forms.”
I have already mentioned that Pecham has not only *Quaestiones Disputatae*, but also four *Quodlibeta*. A quodlibet grew out of an oral quodlibetal disputation, or a disputation about anything.\(^{14}\) Such discussions occurred twice a year, near Christmas and Easter,\(^{15}\) in the faculties of arts, law, medicine, and especially theology. Quodlibets were discussions at which members of the audience could raise any problem they liked.\(^{16}\) Many masters refused to risk themselves in such disuations, but from those masters who did participate we have many written accounts of important questions, such as are found in Pecham’s own *Quodlibeta*.

In John F. Wippel’s substantial work on the nature and history of quodlibetal questions, he notes five differences between quodlibetal disputations and other disuations.\(^{17}\) I have already mentioned all of these differences but one: Wippel finds that that the presiding master of a quodlibetal disputation was expected to develop a plan

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 91-93.
\(^{15}\) See Wippel, “Quodlibetal Questions,” 171-172.
\(^{16}\) See Palémon Glorieux, *La Littérature Quodlibétique II*, Bibliothèque thomiste 21 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1935), 10-11: “The session began around the hour of Terce perhaps, or of Sext; in any case, quite early in the morning, since there was the risk that it would go on for a long time. In fact, what characterized it was the capricious and off-hand manner in which it unfolded, along with an ever-present uncertainty hovering over the proceedings. . . . In ordinary disputes, the master had announced beforehand the subjects everyone would be occupied with; he had had time to mull them over, and to prepare them. In the quodlibetal dispute, it was everyone’s privilege to raise any kind of problem. . . . The questions or objections could come from every direction, and it mattered not at all if they sprang from hostility, simple inquisitiveness, or cunning. One could question the master in all good faith, simply to know his opinion, but one could also try to have him contradict himself, or oblige him to give his own views on burning subjects he would prefer never to touch upon. . . . Anyone, therefore, willing to hold a general disputation must have a presence of mind quite out of the common, and a competency almost universal in scope.” (As translated by Landry and Hughes in Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas*, 92-93.)
\(^{17}\) “Quodlibetal Questions,” 165-172.
of organization prior to making his determination.\(^{18}\) Wippel follows Palémon Glorieux’s identification of the following five distinctive organizational plans:\(^{19}\)

- **The Quodlibet *Ordinaire.*** The master indicates with no theoretical justification the general headings or categories under which the questions originally posed are now to be placed. This is the most widely adopted form.

- **The Quodlibet *ex Abrupto.*** Even the simple listing of appropriate general headings is missing.

- **The Quodlibet with an Introduction.** The master gives some justification for his divisions and subdivisions.

- **The Quodlibet with a Summary.** The master begins by presenting not only the main general headings which he will later subdivide, but also by mentioning all of the questions to be determined. “This amounts to an introductory essay … which lists and in some way justifies all of the divisions and subdivisions.”\(^{20}\)

- **The Quodlibet with a Prologue.** The master begins with a literary flourish, often by citing scripture or the church fathers, before moving on to a division of the particular questions.

The majority of Pecham’s *Quodlibeta* fall clearly into Glorieux’s first category, although Pecham’s headings are quite brief.\(^{21}\) Pecham’s fourth Quodlibet, however, has a prologue which outlines the questions to follow and cites Augustine.\(^{22}\)

The unit of thought in which the scholastics wrote is the *articulus* (article).\(^{23}\) Properly speaking, an article just is a *quaestio*, but to call the question an article denotes that it is one of a plurality of articles that all contribute to settling one particular question. The

---

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 166-170.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 166-170; Glorieux, “Le Quodlibet et Ses Procédés Rédactionnels,” *Divus Thomas* 42 (1939): 77-93.

\(^{20}\) Wippel, “Quodlibetal Questions,” 170.


\(^{22}\) Pecham, *Quodlibeta*, 173. Thus, it seems that there is a mistake in the report that Pecham’s third Quodlibet is an example of a quodlibet with a prologue (Wippel, “Quodlibetal Questions,” 170; cf. Glorieux, “Le Quodlibet,” 80-81).

\(^{23}\) Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas*, 93-96.
article begins with a question of doubt about a proposition (e.g., Circa primum quaeritur utrum, where the question’s point of departure is utrum [whether]).

Before leaving this overview of medieval literary styles, consider that many articles were organized into larger questions in medieval summae (summaries). In fact, Aquinas’s Treatise on Human Nature, which I will discuss in subsequent chapters, is a selection of 15 quaestiones from his Summa Theologiae. As a literary genre, summae can be considered the invention of Avicenna. Yet Avicenna’s summae vary greatly in format and methodology. By the high Middle Ages, the summa method had itself been formalized as an encyclopedic set of quaestiones—formatted as the quaestiones disputatae are and sorted topically into articles—on a particular topic. A summa’s questions are artificial, i.e., carefully composed imitations of disputations, not tied to an oral discussion.

In addition to works organizes into questions or articles, and beginning with John Blund’s Treatise De Anima in the first decade of the 13th century, there is a tradition of writing treatises on the soul (de anima). These works typically discuss earlier works on

25 Bertolacci, “Arabic and Islamic Metaphysics.”
26 Sweeney, “Literary Forms.”
the subject.\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Summae de anima} by Philip the Chancellor\textsuperscript{30} and John of LaRochelle,\textsuperscript{31} Richard Rufus’ commentary on Aristotle’s \textit{De Anima},\textsuperscript{32} Pecham’s \textit{Tractatus} and \textit{Quaestiones De Anima}, Aquinas’ \textit{Quaestiones De Anima}, as well as many anonymous writers \textit{de anima},\textsuperscript{33} are in this tradition. Among the previous medieval texts \textit{de anima} which influence these 13th-century works are Costa Ben Luca’s \textit{De Differentia Spiritu Animae et Spiritus},\textsuperscript{34} Avicenna’s \textit{Liber De Anima}, Dominicus Gundissalinus’ \textit{De Anima} and \textit{De Immortalitate Animae},\textsuperscript{35} Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle’s \textit{De Anima},\textsuperscript{36} and Alcher of Clairvaux’s \textit{De Spiritu et Anima}.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{29} See Hasse, \textit{Avicenna’s De Anima}, 18; Dunne, “Introduction to the New Edition,” ix-xxix.
\textsuperscript{32} See Rega Wood, “Richard Rufus’ De anima Commentary: The Earliest Known, Surviving, Western Commentary,” \textit{Medieval Philosophy and Theology} 10 (2001): 119-145. There is currently an effort to prepare critical editions of Rufus’s extant works at the Richard Rufus of Cornwall Project at Stanford University (see “The Richard Rufus of Conwall Project,” Stanford University, rrp.stanford.edu [2013]).
\textsuperscript{33} E.g., \textit{Anonymi Magistri Artium Quaestiones Super Librum De Anima}, ed. Paola Bernardini, Corpus Philosopherum Medii Aevi. Testi e studi 23 (Florence: Sismel, 2009).
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{De Differentia Animae et Spiritus. Intellectus vero et cogitatio et providentia et cognitio fit per spiritum, qui est in ventribulo} (ed. Carl Sigmund Barach [Innsbruck: Verlag der Wagner’schen Universitaets-Buchhandlung, 1878]). Charles Burnett and Judith Wilcox are producing a forthcoming edition or John of Seville’s version of \textit{De Differentia Animae et Spiritus}.
\textsuperscript{35} Ed. Georg Bülow, \textit{BGPMA} 2, no. 3: 1-145.
Etzkorn’s revision of Spettmann’s edition of the Quaestiones will be used as the basis for my interpretation in this chapter. Before turning to Pecham’s text, consider some historical background information which is suggestive of the significance of this particular quaestio. By the 1260s, some in the arts faculty at Paris were advocating the position they derived from Averroes, that there is only one intellect for all men.38 Richard C. Dales has suggested that, in the controversy over Latin Averroism, Pecham “was not a worthy opponent on the philosophical level for the young artists.”39 The present chapter will help determine whether, or in what ways, such an assessment is accurate. In particular, quaestio five provides the best evidence for deciding whether Pecham provides a coherent critique of Latin Averroism. The present chapter will also provide further basis for a comparison between Pecham’s and Aquinas’s positions on anthropology (this comparison is the topic of chapter six in the present study). In discussing this disputed question, I will first discuss the Responsio Pecham ad quaestionem, in order to express Pecham’s position. Then, I will follow the arguments Pecham provides for both sides of the issue, first in the contra section and then in the ostenditur quod sic and its corresponding ad argumenta principalia.

**Responsio Pecham ad quaestionem**

In the responsio to the quaestio, utrum sit unus intellectus in omnibus hominibus, Pecham uses four main arguments against monopsychism.40 Each of the first three is based on what Pecham sees as an erroneous philosophical “foundation” (fundamenta) for

38 See Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 13.
39 The Problem of the Rational Soul, 131.
40 Quaestiones, 378-383.
the doctrine. The last is a kind of *reductio ad absurdum*, namely that Averroes’ doctrine deprives each individual man of his own proper reason and therefore deprives each individual person of his reward for making the right moral choice.

Pecham begins his response by saying that both the Catholic faith and the opinions of saints (*sanctorum*) support the view that there is one rational soul for each individual person, and that the individual soul is infused. Pecham says that not one of “the saints” (presumably patristic and medieval theological authorities, especially Augustine) has ever doubted this view, even if it is conceded that some saints wavered about the origin of souls, i.e., whether the souls of people are created from nothing or are passed on from the parents. The error of monopsychism has to be destroyed “in its foundations” (*ut error destruatur in fundamentis*), because the testimony of the saints has a greater foundation—a foundation in eternity. The overall foundation of the error has to do with the substance of the possible intellect.

The first aspect of the foundation (hereafter the “first foundation”) of the error is the claim that the possible intellect is substantially free from matter. This mistake, which Pecham sees as radically dissociating intellect from corporeally embodied people, has two unfortunate consequences. First, the possible intellect is no longer “something of particular beings” (*non esse aliquod entium particularium*). Second, the possible intellect

---

41 *Quaestiones*, 378.
42 See Knowles, “Biographical Sketch,” 8.
43 *Quaestiones*, 378: “utrum scilicet singulorum animae creentur de nihilo, an a parentibus traducantur, sicut supra patuit in quaestione de hac facta.”
44 I.e., the *substantia intellectus possibilis* (ibid.).
46 *Quaestiones*, 379.
intellect is no longer a perfection of this particular man. Pecham says that the way to avoid the first error is by understanding that even when something lacks corporeal matter, it may still have spiritual, intelligible matter (*materia spiritualis intelligibilis*). On this point Pecham claims the authority of Augustine, who says that “... God has made everything from nothing, since also if everything formed were formed from this formed matter, nevertheless this matter is made from nothing.” Pecham observes that Averroes has come close to admitting that spiritual matter is involved in the intellect, noting the following passage from Averroes’ *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle*:

> For just as sensible being is divided into form and matter, so too intelligible being must be divided into things similar to these two, namely, into something similar to form and into something similar to matter. This is [something] necessarily present in every separate intelligence which understands something else. And if not, then there would be no multiplicity in separate forms.

Pecham emphasizes that he is citing Averroes’ own words. Pecham freely admits that the possible intellect is free of “changeable matter” (*materiae transmutabilis*), but argues that the intellect nonetheless has something similar to matter. There is thus both corporeal matter and spiritual or intelligible matter.

---

47 James Weisheipl argues that Pecham’s universal hylomorphism is derived from Avicebron (“Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism”). I will support Weisheipl’s position in the fifth chapter of the present study.


50 *Quaestiones*, 379: “Est igitur immaterialis per exclusionem materiae transmutabilis. Sed habet aliquid simile ipsi materiae per quam est hoc, per quam est distinctio numeralis in substantiis separatis, ut ipse dicit. Amplius, ex hoc non sequitur quod intellectus sit ita penitus a materia absolutus quin sit perfectio materiae corporalis, sed quod essentialiter non dependit a materia.”
It is in virtue of this something (*aliquid*), this spiritual matter, that the possible intellect is a “this thing” and that there is numerical distinction among separate substances. Here, Pecham says that individuation relies on the material principle, but he will shortly say that individuation is reliant not exclusively upon a material principle.\textsuperscript{51} Before doing so, he will say more about the materiality of the intellect.

Pecham clarifies how he interprets the relationship between the possible intellect and corporeal matter: “Moreover ... it does not follow that the intellect is already so thoroughly separated from matter that it cannot be the perfection of corporeal matter, but that it does not depend essentially on matter.”\textsuperscript{52} Pecham develops a hierarchy of beings that have matter: The angels are entirely free from corporeal matter “in being and perfecting” (*in essendo et perficiendo*), i.e., they receive all of their perfections from above. The souls of animals are on the opposite end of the spectrum, since they are conjoined in being and perfecting and receive complete perfection from matter. The human soul is in-between. As an intermediate spirit it does not depend on the body for its essence but is united with it “by perfecting” (*perficiendo*), so that it acquires perfection partly from above and partly from below.\textsuperscript{53} Pecham claims the authority of Avicenna for this position and for the metaphor that the intellect is not only perfected, but also sanctified and cleansed by the connection with the body.\textsuperscript{54} A general principle is,

---

\textsuperscript{51} See Delorme, “La *Summa*,” 65-66, for Pecham’s longer discussion of individuation.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 379: “Amplius ... non sequitur quod intellectus sit ita penitus a materia absolutus quin sit perfectio materiae corporalis, sed quod essentialiter non dependit a materia.”

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 379-380: “ita est medius qui non dependet in essendo, unitur tamen perficiendo, ut et ipse partim a superiori partim ab inferiori perfectionem acquirat.”

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 380; cf. Avicenna, *De Anima*, 1.5.
“through the exercise in some body, through splendor of wisdom, the cleanness may be increased”.\textsuperscript{55}

Here Pecham discusses several ways in which the body perfects the soul: The rational soul has more potency than an angel has, because the rational soul has the potency to be conjoined. The intellect will be better able to understand when it is separated from the corporeal body and united to the glorified body. Due to the rational soul’s “inferior powers” it is inclined to the body and strives to be illuminated by sensible mediation.\textsuperscript{56}

Pecham cites Aristotle as authority for the view that the body falls in the definition of the soul,\textsuperscript{57} and notes that Augustine calls the soul a “substance, participating in reason, arranged for governing the body.”\textsuperscript{58} And just as it is impossible to define the soul without making reference to the body, so there is no way to reference the human body without referring to the soul (otherwise one would be speaking of the \textit{human body} only equivocally).\textsuperscript{59} Viewed this way, body and soul are not two separate things. Pecham says that it is for this reason that Aristotle observes how difficult it is to explain the cause of the connection between the soul and body if the two are considered separate things.\textsuperscript{60}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{55} Quaestiones, 380: “per exercitium in corpore cui per splendorem sapientiae munditia augeatur.”
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Quaestiones, 380.
\textsuperscript{60} See Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, 403b.16-19: “[A]ffections of the soul … are inseparable from the natural matter of animals. . . .”
\end{flushright}
Matter is not the sole principle (*tota causa*) of individuation, since there is “one matter” distributed throughout all things.\(^{61}\) Form complements matter in determining individuation.\(^{62}\) Pecham cites the authority of Avicenna on this point: “The name of the soul is not imposed because it is substance, but because it is that which rules bodies and is concerned with them.”\(^{63}\) Insofar as the soul is included in discussions about “matter and motion” (*materiam et motum*), the soul can be included in discussions of nature.\(^{64}\) This is why the treatment of the soul, as in Pecham’s *Tractatus* (the subject of the next chapter), represents in part a study of natural science.

Pecham concludes this section on the first foundation of the error by saying that a person can be a particular being even though the person has something through which there is a multitude of separate substances.\(^{65}\) Presumably the point here is that there is that a particular being can have qualities which other particular beings have, and still all the beings are not one or common; Pecham has already argued that every angel has a material principle.\(^{66}\)

Pecham says that the second aspect of the foundation of the Averroist error (hereafter the “second foundation”) concerns the power of both the possible and active principles of  

---

\(^{61}\) *Quaestiones*, 381. For information concerning the debate over the unity of matter, see Crowley, *Roger Bacon*, 89ff.


\(^{63}\) Ibid., 381: “Nomen animae non imponitur ex hoc quod est substantia, sed ex hoc quod regit corpora et refertur ad illa”; cf. Avicenna, *De Anima*, 1.1.

\(^{64}\) *Quaestiones*, 381.

\(^{65}\) Ibid.: “Amplius, nec sequitur quod non sit aliquod ens particulare quia habet illud per quod est multitudo in substantiis separatis, sicut ipse fatetur.” Pecham does not cite a passage from Averroes here.

\(^{66}\) Ibid., 379.
the human intellect.\textsuperscript{67} Here we find that Pecham objects not only to the doctrine that the possible intellect is common to all human beings, but also to the doctrine that the active intellect is common.\textsuperscript{68} Pecham understands Averroes to be teaching that the active intellect communicates itself to many “through the mode of perfection” (\textit{per modus perfectionis}) and likewise receives many things from many individual people. Pecham responds initially by saying that Averroes’ position that the single mind takes and receives from individual people produces two errors:\textsuperscript{69}

First, Averroes’ position conflicts with the position that the soul is inclined to a single body, which he has already admitted is the case. There is a sense in which the intellect is indeterminate, but this is only because it is not understanding a vague, particular thing; the intellect is particularized when it is understanding an abstracted concept. After all, the human intellect is not a more abstracted essence than an angel, and an angel is particularized. Like an angel, the intellect cannot operate in more than one place at a

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 381.
\textsuperscript{68} In this study’s next chapter, which deals with Pecham’s \textit{Tractatus}, I will discuss passages where Pecham takes the view that the active intellect is transcendent in a sense, yet is also conjoined to the individual human being (e.g., \textit{Tractatus}, 7).
\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Quaestiones}, 381.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 381-382.
time. John of Damascus confirms this when he says that angel is more communicable according to how much simpler it is. Second, Averroes erred when he said that the soul could perfect many individuals. Aristotle negates this when he says that a number of movables are multiplied by a number of movers—not by a single mover. Averroes errs in supposing that acts of understanding can be alike in all, since understanding occurs in diverse people and at different times and in diverse ways, and so the human intellect understands continuously but only temporarily.

The third aspect of Averroes’ error (hereafter the “third foundation”) has to do with the operation of the intellect. Pecham says that Averroes’ position is that man understands only during the continuation of the intellect’s act (per continuationem intellecti cum eo in actu). Pecham agrees that the intellect can understand only when it

71 Ibid. In the Damascene’s chapter on angels, he does not say exactly what Pecham says here. He says: “Seeing that they are minds they are in mental places. . . . [T]hey impart brightness to one another, because they excel one another in rank and nature. And clearly the higher share their brightness and knowledge with the lower. . . . [T]heir nature is endowed with such celerity that wherever the Divine glance bids them there they are straightway found. . . . They take different forms at the bidding of their Master, God, and thus reveal themselves to men and unveil the divine mysteries to them” (An Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, trans. E.W. Watson and L. Pullan, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series 9, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace [Buffalo: Christian Literature, 1899], 2.3).

72 See Averroes, Long Commentary, 318-320.
73 See, e.g., Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1072a.19ff.
74 Quaestiones, 382.
75 Ibid., 382-383.
76 Ibid., 382: “Amplius, tertium fundamentum contingit in operatione intellectuali, de qua dicit quod homo non est intelligens in actu nisi per continuationem intellecti cum eo in actu”; cf. Averroes, Long Commentary, 304-305.
is in act, and that Averroes is right to oppose Aristotle’s view that the intellect is “conjoined” (coniuncti) to the body. Yet one of Averroes’ positions, namely that man “uses the intellect” (utitur intellectu experimento) actually works against monopsychism, because the position shows that man thinks to himself about his own faith and justice—these are objects that a man could not possibly consider by looking outside of his own, particularized experience. Averroes has failed to take stock of the phenomenological data.

Pecham finds support in Augustine, who says: “In what way, after all, is the understanding observed but by understanding? So too charity, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, restraint (Gal. 5:22-23) and the rest, by which one draws near to God, and God himself.” Pecham uses this argument as a starting point to discuss two further Averroist errors associated with the phenomenon of individualized experience:

• Averroes thinks that man is defined and perfected by reason, and yet monopsychism conflicts with this view.

• Averroes’ position implies that a particular man is not defined by reason and so he cannot perform natural, rational choice (electionem naturalem rationalem).

---

77 Quaestiones, 382: “Cum certum sit quod nihil est in homine quod possit attingere intellectum in actu nisi vis intellectiva. Unde hic est recte contrarius Philosophe qui ponit intelligere esse coniuncti”; cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 408b.12-15: “Yet to say that it is the soul which is angry is as if we were to say that it is the soul that weaves or builds houses. It is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks, and rather to say that it is the man who does this with his soul. . . .”

78 Quaestiones, 382; cf. Literal Meaning of Genesis, 12.24.50, parenthetical item in orig.; Pecham’s quotation is: “Quonam modo ipse intellectus nisi intelligendo conspicitur? Et caritas et gaudium, pax, longanimitas, fides et huiusmodi, quibus propinquatur Deo, et ispi Deus” (Quaestiones, 382).

79 Quaestiones, 382.
Therefore, man cannot be rewarded for his right choices and punished for his wrong ones. Under these circumstances, injustice is better than justice.

Pecham concludes his responsio by saying that the Averroist heresy is to be rejected, and that only one who is a madman (freneticus) or a thoroughly ignorant (penitus ignarus) would view Averroes’ doctrine as being anything other than improbable.

Contra

In this section, Pecham cites 15 arguments against the Averroistic position. (I am taking it that each new argument is marked by the introductory word item in the text.) In some cases, Pecham does not spell out how the argument might contradict an Averroist thesis, but instead leaves the reader to deduce. Pecham’s arguments are influenced by a wide variety of sources. The first five, eighth, and 15th arguments are drawn directly from the authority of Scripture, philosophers, or theologians. The sixth, seventh, ninth, 10th, 11th, and 12th arguments deal with problems that Pecham perceives to be inherent in Averroes’ position. The 13th and 14th arguments are based on Pecham’s own presuppositions about the soul.

1. Pecham cites Psalms 33:15, which says that God “formed their hearts one by one.” Pecham takes this to mean that God creates each soul separately from nothing.

---

80 Ibid., 382-383.
81 Ibid., 383.
82 Ibid., 373-378.
83 Ibid., 373: “Qui finxit sigillatim corda eorum.” The passage from Psalms actually says: “he who fashions the hearts of them all and observes all their deeds.” The passage (in isolation) might be taken to support Averroes’ position, because the word translated “all” (yachad) could be translated “alike” (Francis Brown, et al., Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon [Peabody: Hendrickson, 1996]).
and that there is not just one soul that began when Adam was created and continues to live in all people currently.

2. Pecham cites a statement by Augustine, in the dialogue called *The Free Choice of the Will*:

   Augustine: What about reason? Each person has his own, does he not? Sometimes it happens that I understand something when you do not understand it, and you are not able to know whether I understand, whereas I do know.

   Evodius: It is clear that each person has his own rational mind. Pecham does not comment on this quotation, presumably because he takes the relationship between Augustine’s claim and the Averroist controversy to be self-explanatory. However, Pecham does cite what he takes to be a companion passage in Peter Lombard.

3. Pecham cites Augustine’s statement to the effect that the soul did not pre-exist the body: “It ought not be taken ... that the soul lived [here] or there, whether in the body or apart from the body at any time”. Pecham draws from this statement the point that every soul totally begins with the body (anima omnis incipit cum corpore).

---

85 *Liber Secundus Sententiarum* (Florence: Quaracchi, 1885), 2.18.7. This passage asserts that the soul of woman was not taken from the soul of man, because souls do not come through transduction.
87 *Quaestiones*, 374.
4. Pecham cites (but does not directly quote) a statement from one of Augustine’s letters to the effect that single souls are created and joined to single bodies. Pecham says that while Augustine doubted about the origin of the soul (i.e., whether each soul is created *ex nihilo* or given from the parents), he was certain that there is not just one soul for all.

5. Pecham cites a passage from Gennadius’ *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, chapter 13: “The souls of men are not from the beginning among other intellectual creatures, nor created simultaneously, but created and infused when the body is informed.” Pecham does not comment on the passage, but it is obvious that the meaning of the passage agrees with Pecham’s interpretation of the Augustine passages that he has been considering.

6. The sixth argument deals with the suitability of the possible intellect to do what the Averroist position requires, that is, to maintain both the singularity of the intellect and the particularization of instances of knowledge according to individual human beings.

---

88 Ibid. The statement Pecham is referencing seems to be the following statement from a letter to Oceanus: “The difficulty which perplexes some in regard to this question, ‘How God can justly bestow souls on the offspring of persons guilty of adultery?’ does not embarrass me, seeing that not even their own sins, much less the sins of their parents, can prove prejudicial to persons of virtuous lives, converted to God, and living in faith and piety. The really difficult question is, if it be true that a new soul created out of nothing is imparted to each child at its birth, how can it be that the innumerable souls of those little ones, in regard to whom God knew with certainty that before attaining the age of reason, and before being able to know or understand what is right or wrong, they were to leave the body without being baptized, are justly given over to eternal death by Him with whom ‘there is no unrighteousness!’” *(Confessions and Letters of St. Augustin with a Sketch of His Life and Work*, ed. Philip Schaff, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church Part 1 [Whitefish: Kessinger, 2004], letter CLXXX).

89 *Quaestiones*, 374: “Animas hominum non esse ab initio inter ceteras intellectuales creaturas, nec simul creatas, sed formato corpore creari et infundi.”

90 Ibid., 375.
setting up the argument, Pecham provides the most detailed explanation of his understanding of Averroes’ position.\textsuperscript{91} Averroes has argued that the agent intellect has the same relationship to the possible intellect that light has to something that is transparent.\textsuperscript{92} Furthermore, Averroes has argued that the possible intellect is neither substantially nor formally united to the body, but is connected to the individual human being through the phantasms which the senses supply via imagination to the intellect.\textsuperscript{93} Pecham takes this to mean that the possible intellect, in receiving a phantasm, understands “in” the different singulars and thereby understands various things. This view also entails that the agent intellect is composed from the possible intellect and the intelligible species, where the intelligible species are numbered and joined with the individual on the basis of formal species rather than on the basis of material species. Pecham says that, given the understanding of the intellect described here, if the intellect were to receive some species in a particular man (\textit{in isto homine}) then the species must be converted into received species.\textsuperscript{94} And, if the intellect is simple, then the whole intellect must be totally converted on each occasion when a species is received. Such a conversion could not take place in any one person. Therefore, the Averroist position entails that all knowledge must be common to all humans, held in the single mind which all access by the conjunction with their phantasms. Each concept in the single mind must be in each person.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 374-375.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 374; Averroes, \textit{Long Commentary}, 328.
\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Quaestiones}, 375.
An objector might respond by saying that the intellect’s conversion is passive, and it is unproblematic for one and the same thing to suffer a number of changes at once.\textsuperscript{95} Pecham responds by saying that no understanding occurs unless the intellect is assimilated perfectly and actively to the intelligible. For support, Pecham refers to Aristotle’s discussion of pure thought: \textit{Sed impossibile est quod simplex secundum idem in actu simul assimilaretur diversis}.\textsuperscript{96} Pecham says that when we consider thought itself we find that the intellect—active or passive— cannot be converted to many objects at the same time.\textsuperscript{97} That is, we have no experience that suggests that the intellect can do this, but we do have philosophical authority to the contrary.

It might be suggested that if the intellect can receive the species of one object then the intellect can also receive another species of the same object, and therefore it can receive infinite species from various objects at the same time.\textsuperscript{98} Pecham responds to this argument by citing a statement of Aristotle’s about the impossibility of multiple bodies being in the same place: “But the Philosopher says that if two bodies can be in the same place, then there can be three, and by the same reason an infinite number.”\textsuperscript{99} Thus, if Averroes wants to claim that the intellect can receive infinite species, he is going run counter to Aristotle and to a physical principle that only one thing can be in a place at a

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Quaestiones}, 375; cf. Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, 1074b.28-35.
\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Quaestiones}, 375.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.: “Sed dicit Philosophus quod if duo corpora possunt esse in eodum loco, et tria, et eadem ratione infinita”; cf. Aristotle, \textit{Physics}, trans. R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, 213b. 20-22: “[I]t is impossible for two bodies to be together. Evidence of this they find also in what happens to ashes, which absorb as much water as the empty vessel.”
time. Pecham’s response makes sense in light of his doctrine of species, which I will discuss briefly in the next chapter.

Again, someone could respond, Pecham says, by saying that the intellect understands in receiving (*recipiend*o*) and can receive from an infinite number of things.*100 Pecham responds to this argument by saying that understanding is both passive and active. The intellect is passive in that it receives the species and is active in that it converts itself, by means of the species, into a likeness of the thing perceived (*agit convertendo se supra rem per speciem*). There must be a power by which the mind converts itself, and an infinite number of conversions would require an infinite power. Unless the Averroists are prepared to ascribe to the intellect infinite power, then their conception of the mind as infinitely convertible is contradictory.

7. The seventh argument deals with the ontology of the phantasms and how the possible intellect relates to them. Pecham says that if a single possible intellect is connected with man, it has to be connected in the same way in which the agent intellect is connected.101 If anything, the single possible intellect must be *closer* to the particular, corporeal man than the agent intellect is, because the possible intellect is material in the sense that it is determinable, and something that is changeable is closer to man than to the divine.102 Therefore, if the possible intellect is joined to man by means of the phantasms, then there are three possibilities as to how this connection works.

---

100 *Quaestiones*, 375.
101 Ibid., 375-376.
102 Ibid., 375: “Prior dicitur naturaliter copulatio intellectus possibilis, qui materialis est, et materiae propinquier cum homine quam agentis.”
• The phantasms may be some kind of images (i.e., images of objects in the external world). Pecham says that this first way is impossible, because phantasms have being in material images which are altogether different from intellectual substance. In refuting this first possibility, Pecham sees no reason to even reach the stage of discussing the connection to man.

• If the phantasms are not images of external objects, then the possible intellect may join to man through the phantasm as already purified (depuratum) and connected to the intellect. Apparently Pecham thinks of a “purification” in this context to mean abstraction, for he says that a purified phantasm is already intelligible and has nothing in common with matter. Thus, the purified phantasm is not the object of the intellect as possible, but of the intellect as active, and so it is impossible to base a connection with a particular man upon already-purified phantasms.

• Finally, the phantasm may shine (radiat) into the possible intellect. Pecham argues that this third possibility is impossible, because a phantasm must have already been moved by the agent intellect in order to shine on the possible intellect. Thus, the agent intellect would already be united with the human being before the possible intellect is united with the human being, which goes against Averroes’ stated view.

---

103 Ibid., 375-376.
104 Ibid., 376.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
Pecham is alert to an argument that the agent intellect cannot be already united to man by means of something that is moving.\textsuperscript{107} Pecham’s response is not entirely clear, but the gist of it appears to be this: The possible intellect is united to man not by the phantasm’s shining, but rather only as a mover, and a mover that must be united to the particular man in a way that is prior to the way in which the active intellect is united to him. But the third possible model of the phantasm’s role above still requires that the agent intellect be united to man as a mover before the possible intellect is so united. Pecham maintains the impossibility of this order.

8. Pecham bases the eighth argument on Aristotle’s authority for the position that this particular man understands, and that understanding is to be attributed to a composite (\textit{homo intelligit, et quod intelligere est coniuncti}).\textsuperscript{108} The “composite” refers generally to the combination of soul and body, but the composite seems to refer more specifically to the joint activity of intellectual and sensitive powers. There is some essential part of the human being that elicits (\textit{elicit}) an operation in the understanding. Yet there is no sensitive power that can cause an intellectual operation that deals with an intellectual object, since such an object is immaterial and purely abstract (\textit{pure abstractum}).\textsuperscript{109} The intellectual power must be responsible for such operations. Therefore, Pecham says,

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.; cf. Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, 408b.12-18: “Yet to say that it is the soul which is angry is as if we were to say that it is the soul that weaves or builds houses. It is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks, and rather to say that it is the man who does this with his soul. What we mean is not that the movement is in the soul, but that sometimes it terminates in the soul and sometimes starts from it, sensation e.g. coming from without, and reminiscence starting from the soul and terminating with the movements or states of rest in the sense organs.”
unless the (possible) intellect is considered to be a part of the human being, it cannot be said that a particular man understands.\textsuperscript{110}

There is the possible objection that that a sensory object does in fact attain to intelligible being (\textit{atingit secundum supremum esse intelligible}).\textsuperscript{111} The example cited in support of this objection is that if color had the power of seeing, its would attain its species equally in the eye, even though color is beneath the level abstracted being in the intellect. Pecham brushes this objection aside quickly on the basis that it has not dealt with a fundamental distinction between the operation of the senses and the operation of the intellect: “Therefore in the same way no sensible power could participate in the act of understanding, or reach the intelligible species.”\textsuperscript{112}

9. The ninth \textit{contra} argument is another \textit{reductio}.\textsuperscript{113} Pecham reminds his readers that if the intellect is, as the Averroists say, united to man according to the intellect’s form, then this uniting has to occur according to intelligible species (from the phantasms) rather than according to the intellectual substance itself.\textsuperscript{114} This view has two problematic implications: First, the intellect is only accidentally united to man. Second, the perfection of an individual existing man is never the intellect in first being (\textit{in esse primo}).\textsuperscript{115} I take this to be an insistence that the human intellect must be united to a human being because

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{110} Quaestiones, 376: “Nec attingit proprium obiectum intellectus quod est pure abstractum. Ergo nisi intellectus sit vere pars hominis, homo nullatenus intelligit.”

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.: “Ergo a simili nulla vis sensibilis poterit vel actu intelligendi participare vel attingere speciem intelligibilem.”

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 376-377.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 376.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 377.
\end{flushleft}
it is a human intellect (i.e., at “first being”), and not due to an accidental reception of phantasm.

10. The 10th argument deals further with the relationship between the rational soul and the individual knower. The intellect is united to the individual either as perfection and form, or only as a mover. Both of these two kinds of connection are problematic for the Averroist position: If the connection between the intellect and the individual is as a perfection/form, then the intellect must be multiplied according to the multiplication of matter (secundum multiplicationem materiae), since a form requires its own matter. Pecham further says that it is not possible for “just any soul” (quamlibet animam) to enter “just any body” (quodlibet corpus). An implication of this is that the number of human intellects is determined by the number of physical human beings. If the connection between the intellect and the individual is as mover to moved, then “the same thing must be”. Pecham does not explicitly say to what “the same thing” refers here, but it seems to refer to the state of affairs in which the number of intellects in the world (not necessarily in the afterlife) is determined by the number of physical human beings. Pecham cites the

---

116 Ibid.
authority of Aristotle’s principle that movers are numbered according to the number of motions.\textsuperscript{117}

11. The 11th argument is based on Averroes’ admission that “it is impossible that the same mover uses many instruments to the same end.”\textsuperscript{118} Pecham says that, based on this view, if the intellect is one for all men, then it could make use of only one man. Therefore, there are necessarily as many men as there are intellects.

12. The 12th argument is based on a quote from Averroes: “[T]he diversity of the nature of the received thing causes the diversity of the nature of the thing receiving. . . .”\textsuperscript{119} The intellect obviously receives diverse things, and so the intellect itself must be diverse in nature. Pecham observes that Averroes could respond by saying that the diversity in phantasms is sufficient to account for the diversity in thoughts, but not a diversity of intellects.\textsuperscript{120} But Pecham notes that Averroes also says that the intellect understands some things through intelligible impressions rather than through mediating

\textsuperscript{117} Aristotle says: “For how will there be movement, if there is no actual cause? Matter will surely not move itself—the carpenter’s art must act on it; nor will the menstrual fluids nor the earth set themselves in motion, but the seeds and the semen must act on them. . . . If, then, there is a constant cycle, something must always remain, acting in the same way. And if there is to be generation and destruction, there must be something else which is always acting in different ways. This must, then, act in one way in virtue of itself, and in another in virtue of something else—either of a third agent, therefore, or of the first. But it must be in virtue of the first. For otherwise this again causes the motion both of the third agent and of the second. Therefore it is better to say the first. . . .” (\textit{Metaphysics}, 1071b.29-31; 1072a.9-15).
\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Quaestiones}, 377; cf. Averroes, \textit{Long Commentary}, 307-308.
species. If Averroes is right about this, and there is one universal mind, then any thoughts that are independent of phantasms would also be common to all, and so if one man received a prophetic vision, then all men would receive it and therefore be prophets. This clearly does not happen.

Pecham continues his attack based on intellectual diversity by challenging that the Averroistic account could even allow for diversity in received phantasms. Pecham says that species are understood when they are united to the intellect and stripped of their material conditions, a principle that would be consistent with Averroes’ position. In fact, this abstraction from all material conditions is a prerequisite for understanding. Therefore, Pecham says, if there were but one intellect, then every species would need to be in the same relation to the phantasms. The problem with this, although it goes unstated in Pecham’s argument, is that not all people are in the same spacial and sensible relationship with the same set of objects at the same time.

13. The 13th contra argument is based on the soul’s relationship to the entire, single body. The soul, being whole in every part of the body, senses every bodily lesion no matter where in the body it is. And, the soul is unimpeded by the phantasms drawn from another sense. This presents a problem of cognitive location for the Averroists: “Therefore, if there is one intellect in all men, when to understand is to undergo,

---

121 Quaestiones, 377; cf. Averroes, Long Commentary, 308.
122 Quaestiones, 377.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid., 377-378.
125 Ibid., 377.
whatever it cognizes in whatever place, it cognizes in any other place.”126 The universal mind would not be cognizing the pain as relating to a particular part of the body (presumably, this is because it is not by a phantasm that such pain is cognized), yet we do focus on the particular locale of a given pain.

14. The 14th contra argument is based on the distinction between the angelic soul and the rational soul.127 Pecham says that all the saints and philosophers hold that the angel and the rational human soul are differentiated based on the fact that the rational soul is unitable to the corporeal body, whereas the angelic soul is not.128 If this account is correct, then the possible intellect is either a principle in an angelic being, or “formally unitable” (formaliter unibilis) and therefore capable of being multiplied according to the matter with which it is united. This argument does not include an argument that the possible intellect is truly particularized, but if it shows that the possible intellect is in principle unitable with matter, then it would preempt many Averroistic arguments about why there must be a universal intellect.

15. Pecham bases the 15th contra argument on the authority of Aristotle.129 We can say that a man understands because his intellect is joined to him individually, but this

---

126 Ibid., 377-378: “Ergo, si est unus intellectus in omnibus, cum intelligere sit pati, quidquid intelligit in quocumque, intelligit in alio quocumque.”
127 Ibid., 378.
129 Ibid.
joining is actualized by the mediation of his form (sed actus est coniuncti mediante forma sua), therefore the form of a particular man is the intellect.\textsuperscript{130}

\textit{Ostenditur quod sic, and the corresponding Ad argumenta principalia}

By my count, Pecham brings up 25 possible arguments in favor of monopsychism, and he responds, at least in brief, to almost all of them (perhaps to all of them by some implication). The first three arguments and the seventh through ninth arguments are based on philosophical or theological authorities. The fourth, fifth, sixth, and 14th arguments are based on epistemological principles. The 10th through 12th arguments deal with ontological concerns related to the concepts of plurality and singularity. The 13th argument deals with concerns about generation and corruption. The 15th argument compares the intellect to separate substances. The 16th, 17th, and 18th arguments deal with ontological problems associated with individuation. The 19th argument deals with both the simplicity of the soul and with a problem related to time. The 20th argument is about the sensitive soul, and the 21st through 25th arguments deal with problems related to the infinity of souls that might be thought to obtain if there were more than one intellect.

\textsuperscript{130} Pecham responds to a possible objection based on his reading of Alexander of Aphrodisias: “Si dixeris cum Alexandro quod intellectus materialis est generatus et virtus facta ex complexione, — Ad illud improbandum sufficiant quae supra dicta sunt de immortalitate animae” (Quaestiones, 378; cf. Averroes, Long Commentary, 310). Pecham also mentions Alexander in connection with the immortal soul in the second quaeestio (Quaestiones, 339). There are a number of arguments in the second quaeestio to which Pecham may have been responding. See especially the “proof of the immortality from the dignity of its substance” (ibid., 344-345).
1. The first argument in favor of monopsychism is based on Augustine.\textsuperscript{131} Truth is unified, and so truth must be unified in the subjects who know the truth, and anyone who acknowledges that something is true cannot fail to understand the changeless character of the truth. If a truth known in common is not numbered, then it must not be in numbered subjects. Furthermore, Averroes says that the material intellect must have the natural, first principles that are common to the whole species (principiis, naturalibus communibus) in order to receive understanding from the agent intellect.\textsuperscript{132}

The answer that Pecham provides for this argument is that propositions are known to be true in three ways, and all three ways must be included in an account of understanding.\textsuperscript{133}

- “Every whole is greater than its part” is known to be true by virtue of the material parts that are observed.

- “Every whole is greater than its part” is known to be true by virtue of its formal being, which constitutes a \textit{habitus} which can also be called the intellect.

- “Every whole is greater than its part” is known to be true by virtue of the shining of eternal light.

Pecham says that the first and second instances of knowledge are numbered according to a principle of the knowing subjects, whereas the third is not so numbered. In the third instance, it is not that the intellects are one, but that the light that shines on these propositions and makes them known is singular. The sun is a fitting model for God’s role in man’s coming to know, for we can say of the sun “that it is,” “that it shines,” and “that

it makes other things to be understood. . . .”134 Pecham takes it that Augustine has confirmed this approach.135 Thus, the first argument in favor of monopsychism fails due to a misunderstanding of how truth is known and of Augustine’s discussion of the subject.

2. The second argument in favor of monopsychism136 is also based on a passage where Augustine finds it difficult to pronounce a judgment about how many souls there are due to the his audience’s possible responses:

As to the number of souls, I do not know what to respond to you. For if I say it is one you will be confused, since in one it is happy, in another unhappy. Nor can one and the same thing be both happy and unhappy at the same time. If I should say that it is one and many at the same time, you will laugh, and I will not find it easy to make you restrain your laughter. But if I say only that it is many, I will laugh at myself.137

The Averroist argument is that Augustine would not have a reason to laugh at himself if it were the case that there are many souls. (Yet Augustine plainly avoids deciding the matter in the immediate context.)

The answer that Pecham provides for this argument138 is neither that Augustine refuses to take a position in the text, nor that there are passages where Augustine argues

---

134 *Quaestiones*, 383.
135 Ibid.; see Augustine, *Soliloquies*, 1.15; ibid., *On the Trinity*, 9.6.11: “We judge therefore of those particular things according to that [form of eternal truth], and discern that form by the intuition of the rational mind. But those things themselves we either touch if present by the bodily sense, or if absent remember their images as fixed in our memory, or picture, in the way of likeness to them, such things as we ourselves also, if we wished and were able, would laboriously build up: figuring in the mind after one fashion the images of bodies, or seeing bodies through the body; but after another, grasping by simple intelligence what is above the eye of the mind, viz., the reasons and the unspeakably beautiful skill of such forms” (bracketed item in orig.).
136 *Quaestiones*, 365-366.
137 *Greatness of the Soul*, 32.69.
138 *Quaestiones*, 383-384.
for personal immortality or individual responsibility. Rather, Pecham says that Augustine
never doubted about the issue of the soul’s individuality, but was rather trying to mix a
“moral” (*moralem*) unity with a “natural” (*naturali*) unity. Augustine was concerned with
how God could make one soul from many souls and one body from many bodies.
Similarly, Augustine was concerned with understanding the relationship between the
members of the Trinity, and unity in plurality in general.\textsuperscript{139} In fact, Pecham takes
Augustine’s statement that “if I say only that it is many, I will laugh at myself” to mean
that plurality and unity are not mutually exclusive in every sense.

3. The third argument in favor of monopsychism\textsuperscript{140} is based on a quotation from
Richard of St. Victor, who says: “Your doctrine can be another, and mine another,
although on either side, as much in the person learning as in the person teaching, there is
one science, his, which if that is his substance, it could be that both was one
substance.”\textsuperscript{141} The argument is that the teacher and the student must in some sense have
the same soul since the learning is the same in both of them.

The answer that Pecham provides for this argument\textsuperscript{142} is that the example is
insufficient to prove that the teacher and the student have the same soul. The teacher and

\textsuperscript{139} See Augustine, *Homilies on the Gospel of John 1-40*, ed. Allan Fitzgerald, Boniface
\textsuperscript{141} *Quaestiones*, 384: “[Q]uod una scientia est in doctore et discente obiective, non
formaliter, quia habitus est alius et alius, et alia numero grammatica in me et in te. Tamen
lux manifestans principia omnium actuum est una in omnibus. Quia igitur mens discipuli
excitatur ad istam lucem per doctorem, ideo dicitur una scientia, et tamen nata ista de illa.
Quidquid tamen formaliter est in utroque, numeratur in utroque; unde proculs dubio
exemplum non est sufficiens.”

130
the student possess the same knowledge or science objectively, but not formally. The teacher and student have numerically different instances of science in their respective intellects. It is through the teacher that the student’s mind is “summoned” (excitatur) to the one light that Pecham mentioned in his answer to the first argument. Pecham goes on to say that even what is formally in each of the two people is numbered in each of them, although he does not here defend this position.

4. The fourth argument in favor of monopsychism is that if two people understand the same thing, then the same species must be in both of them. Identical species are required because if two cognitions are predicated of diverse species, then there is one of two results, neither of which is possibly correct: (1) The species are totally different, and thus two totally different objects will be cognized. (2) The species are only partly different. In either case, there is no longer equal understanding between the two knowers.

The answer that Pecham provides for this argument involves adapting the second horn of the dilemma. He says that all species are numerically diverse, just as two rays from the sun are distinct even if they are alike. Two numerically different species, whether they be corporeal species from the sun or intelligible species in the intellect, can be alike and yet each maintain its singular being (singuli esse). For example, when

---

143 Ibid., 366.
144 Pecham quotes Averroes in support of this position: “Si ponamus intellect esse multa, continget ut res intellecta apud me et apud te sit unum in specie et duo in individuo, et sic res intellecta habebit rem intellectam, et sic procedit in infinitum” (ibid., 366; cf. Averroes, Long Commentary, 328).
145 Quaestiones, 384.
Peter and Paul both know something, then each of them can have the same species substantially and yet differ in individual substance.\textsuperscript{146}

5. The fifth argument in favor of monopsychism is based on the principle that the intellect is like the intelligible in some way, and that this identity is “truer” (\textit{veriori}) than the identity by which matter and form makes a species, or that this identity makes it so that the intelligible in the mind is the same as the form which is in matter.\textsuperscript{147} The argument does not include an explanation of how the intellect incorporates its external object, but merely the conviction that in each case of knowing an object, the knower’s intellect must be informed by the same form that informs the matter outside the mind.\textsuperscript{148} Claims that a knower cognizes external forms by virtue of merely similar forms lead to a contradiction, because the knower would already need to be aware of the similarity, and thus he would have to know the form to which the second form was similar. This could lead to an infinite regress.\textsuperscript{149}

The answer that Pecham provides for this argument\textsuperscript{150} is that a universal species always accompanies a singular species. There cannot be the species of a particular stone without the general species of stone, even though there can be the species of stone without the species of a particular stone. Thus in a case where there are two particular species of stone, these species have the universal species of stone in themselves. Pecham

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.: “Unde totaliter differt in singulari esse et totaliter convenit in speciei similitudine, sicut est in Petro et Paulo qui conveniunt in speciei vel in substantia communi speciei et differunt in substantia individuali.”
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 366-367.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 367.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 385.
argues that there is no infinite regress involved because there is nothing simpler in the
kind under consideration (in illo genere) than a universal species; it is impossible to
abstract any more general species from the universal species of stone. In discussing the
next argument, Pecham will augment this response by addressing the question of the
identity between the corporeal form and the form in the intellect.

6. The sixth argument in favor of monopsychism starts with the premise that a
universal must be in the soul as an object is in a subject. However, there is only one
universal that stands for each group of objects (e.g., “man,” “horse”). Thus, when human
knowers understand something, they all have the same universal as their object. This
universal must be in the soul, otherwise it would be material and hence multiplied.
Therefore the single universal object is either in a single intellect or it is nowhere.

The answer that Pecham provides for this argument is based on the principle that
intelligible species are essentially different from the form that is in corporeal matter. An
intelligible species leads to cognition because of its similarity, but not its identity, to the
material form. The similarity of the intelligible species is not required to be foreknown by
the knower, because understanding is not necessarily the result of a comparison of

151 Pecham notes here that it is possible to abstract, in the mode of a second intention, the
ratio of the species of the stone from the species of the individual stone, but nothing more
abstract can be abstracted from the ratio. Pecham does not here elaborate on what he
means by ratio.

152 Ibid., 367.

153 Pecham references Averroes in support of this position: “Prima materia neque
cognoscens neque distinguens est, quia recipit formas individuales; intellectus autem
recipit formas universales. Et ex hoc apparet quod non est aliquid hoc, neque corpus
neque virtus in corpore” (ibid., 367; cf. Averroes, Long Commentary, 304).

154 Quaestiones, 385.
various species; in some cases the intellect may confer species upon the stone. Pecham says that there is an analogue for this process in perception, although he does not say what it is.

7. The seventh argument in favor of monopsychism (along with the two that follow it) is designed to prove that there are no singulars in the intellect, in an attempt to conflate universals as objects of the mind with the universality of the mind itself. It is based on a statement from Averroes that “The definition of the material intellect is that it is that which is in potency all the intentions of universal material forms, and is not actually any of the beings in act before the intellect understands any of them.”  

And Aristotle says in the Metaphysics that each person has his own being and cognition. Just as cognition begins as undetermined toward everything, so also is the essence of the mind undetermined to any particular kind of being. Whatever is received in the intellect is universal, because it is not in the intellect under individuating conditions; the universal is an accident as far as the intellect is concerned, and a formation of the intellect. It is also clear, the argument says, that the object of the intellect is a universal, because if a singular species is in one mind and another similar species is in another mind, then from these two species a third species could be abstracted. Presumably this third species would

---

156 Quaestiones, 367. In the Metaphysics passage to which Pecham evidently refers, Aristotle actually says: “Therefore the principles of eternal things must be always most true; for they are not merely sometimes true, nor is there any cause of their being, but they themselves are the cause of the being of other things, so that as each thing is in respect of being, so it is in respect of truth” (993b.26-30).
157 Quaestiones, 367.
158 Ibid., 367-268.
have something in common with both of the original species. Similar abstractions could go on to infinity; each new abstraction would be simpler because it would be more distant from matter.

The answer that Pecham gives to the seventh argument\(^{159}\) is based on the principle that, properly speaking, the universal itself is not in the soul, but rather a particular similitude of the universal, which is instantiated in the particular sensed object. The soul receives a species of a particular that carries with it the universal species (*ita nec species singularis sine specie universalis*). Thus it is true that the intellect cognizes particulars, but

\(^{159}\) Ibid., 385-386; cf. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1.76.2: “Individuality of the intelligent being, or of the species whereby it understands, does not exclude the understanding of universals; otherwise, since separate intellects are subsistent substances, and consequently individual, they could not understand universals. But the materiality of the knower and of the species whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. For as every action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent acts, as heating is according to the mode of the heat, so knowledge is according to the mode of the species by which the knower knows. Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principle which comes from the matter. Therefore if the form, which is the means of knowledge, is material—that is, not abstracted from material conditions—its likeness to the nature of a species or genus will be according to the distinction and multiplication of that nature by means of individuating principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing in general will be impossible. But if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the nature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of the universal” (all quotations of the *Summa Theologiae* are from the Fathers of the Dominican Province translation, unless otherwise noted).
not immediately.\textsuperscript{160} If the universal itself were really in the intellect, then the intellect would be universal. Pecham cites Aristotle in support of this response.\textsuperscript{161} The universal is “one in many and of many”, and so the total substance (\textit{substantia}) of a genus goes along with whatever particulars are in that genus.\textsuperscript{162} There is no particular substance without matter and form (and instances of a universal occur only in “this matter” and “this form”), therefore even if we were to think of a universal as excluding matter in its substance, then it cannot be in the soul according to substance, but only according to similitude. Furthermore, the universal, by being represented in the intellect, does not become anything other than a universal, because being in the intellect it inherently lacks the individuating conditions of the “here and now.” A universal is in matter in the sense that the matter of the intellect is formed through the universal, but whatever is received in

\textsuperscript{160} See Etzkorn, “John Pecham, O.F.M.,” 77. In the 10th of his \textit{Quaestiones} Pecham presents a principle that is fundamental to his argument: cognition is always cognition of an intelligible (429). Pecham says in the \textit{Tractatus}: “Sed quaeris forsitan: Anima transformat se in similitudinem rei cuius species est in organo, quaero aut scien aut non scien? Si scien, non indiget specie; si nescrien, casu cognoscit. Rursus, cum scientia in anima studentis nascitur, quaeo: utrum in anima scientis aut nescientis nascatur? Si nescientis, casu discit, si scientis, prius scit. Ad hoc respondetur quia prima acquisitio scientiae est naturalis expressio notitiae a mente vel a memoria vel luce aeterna, ut sic studiosus sciendo, alius discat, si in sciendo intelligatur adeptio scientiae prima nesciendo vero addiscat si in sciendo intelligatur rei, quae addiscitur, aggregatio nec tamen casu, quia acquisit intentione animi circa cognitionem satagentis. Similiter ex parte ista dico quod anima transformatur in similitudinem illius quod visui praesentatur scientis, idest scientiam acquirrens. . . .” (14).

\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Quaestiones}, 386; cf. Aristotle, \textit{Posterior Analytics}, trans. Jonathan Barnes, 100a.6-8: “And from experience, or from the whole universal that has come to rest in the soul (the one apart from the many, whatever is one and the same in all those things), there comes a principle of skill and of understanding—of skill if it deals with how things come about, of understanding if it deals with what is the case” (parenthetical item in orig.).

\textsuperscript{162} \textit{Quaestiones}, 386: “[U]niversale est unum in multis et de multis.”
the intellect is a particular. Yet that particular object which the intellect receives can be universal with respect to objects outside the intellect.

8. The eighth and ninth arguments in favor of monopsychism are brief developments of the seventh argument, i.e., further attempts to reason from the universality of the contents of the intellect to universality of the intellect itself. The eighth argument is that if the universal in the intellect is accidental for the intellect (as is suggested in the previous argument), then whatever attributes characterize the universal (as in a species) also characterize the accident. The answer that Pecham gives in response to the eighth argument is based on a principle of order in the understanding. First, the intellect is perfected by itself through its own form and matter. After the intellect is perfected in itself (i.e., in first being, or in being what it is), then it can be perfected through intelligible species (i.e., in second being, or in understanding). Until the intellect understands, it is still imperfect according to its second being, but not according to its first being. Therefore, the singularity or plurality of the intellect is established prior to its formation by intelligible species.

9. The ninth argument in favor of monopsychism starts from the premise that a singular thing and a universal thing are not the same. When Aristotle says that the universal is one in many, he is saying that the universal is instantiated in many particular

---

163 Ibid., 368.
164 Ibid., 386.
165 Ibid., 368.
things. The answer that Pecham provides to the ninth argument is to refer the reader to the citation from Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* that is included in the answer to the seventh argument (above). Pecham’s point is that the universal is not actually in the intellect, but rather a similitude of the universal that is instantiated in the particular sensed object.

10. The 10th, 11th, and 12th arguments in favor of monopsychism are based on the premise that plurality comes only through matter. If the intellect has no matter, it must be undivided. (A final answer from Pecham on the subject of materiality comes in the response to the 14th argument, which I will discuss below.) Pecham cites Averroes and Aristotle as supporting the view that a form/matter combination is potentially intelligible through abstraction, but is not already actually intelligible. In order for understanding to take place, the material must become immaterial, and immateriality (i.e., abstraction from corporeal conditions) precludes plurality. Pecham provides a joint answer to the 10th and 11th arguments, and I will discuss it after the discussion of the 11th argument.

11. The 11th argument in favor of monopsychism is a *reductio ad absurdum* based on the materiality of the intellect. If the intellect were material (which, based on argument 10, would be required for plurality), then the intelligible species would not

---

167 Quaestiones, 368, bracketed item in orig. This quotation is from Porphyry, *Isagoge*, trans. Edward W. Warren (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1975), 40.
168 Quaestiones, 386.
170 Quaestiones, 368-369.
172 Quaestiones, 369.
“represent” (*indicaret*) the whole substance of the intellect. For a material intellect to represent the whole of a substance that includes an intellectual component would be contrary to what Augustine says: “[W]hen the mind knows and approves itself, this same knowledge is in such way its word, as that it is altogether on a par and equal with it, and the same. . . .” The “word” of the intellect would seem to be clearly immaterial, and therefore would be excluded by a plurality of material intellects.

The answer that Pecham provides to the 10th and 11th arguments\(^\text{174}\) is that the universal is not truly a thing “different from a particular in some way” (*differens a particulari aliquo modo*).\(^\text{175}\) It is not merely accidental that various particulars within a species have the same nature, and thus to take the position that universals occur only in “designated” (*signato*) individuals is not to oppose the idea that the universal—but still “designated”—similitude could be in an individual’s intellect.\(^\text{176}\)

12. The 12th argument in favor of monopsychism seeks to prove that even if we were to posit that the intellect includes some matter, the intellect still would not be plural.\(^\text{177}\) The argument starts from the premise that if the intellect is in matter, then it must be in the whole matter of one particular being and in no other being. But if a form totally occupies a given material being, then similarly a form cannot inform more than one species any more than it can inform more than one being. Thus even if the intellect is associated with some matter, it is still singular.

\(^{173}\) *On the Trinity*, 9.11.

\(^{174}\) *Quaestiones*, 386-387.

\(^{175}\) Ibid., 386.

\(^{176}\) Ibid., 386-387.

\(^{177}\) Ibid., 369.
The answer that Pecham gives to the 12th argument\textsuperscript{178} is that it “concludes well” (bene concludit) that the intellect can inform only one person, given what has already been said about universals in the intellect. Pecham reminds his readers that the universal is, properly speaking, not an accident or the formation of the intellect, but actually a different thing from the singular, just as a whole is different from a part. The universal is represented in the intellect, but does not inform the intellect by itself. Otherwise it would have been pointless for Aristotle to have distinguished between number, species, and genera, and it would be permissible to call the same thing both subject and accident.\textsuperscript{179}

13. The 13th argument in favor of monopsychism is based on the principle that material things are generated and corrupted.\textsuperscript{180} If the intellect is numbered according to the number of individual knowers, then it would be generated and corrupted along with each one. The only other alternative is that the man is not generated and corrupted as he appears to be, but rather goes through only accidental changes. Averroes is cited in support of this argument.\textsuperscript{181}

The answer that Pecham gives “to the 13th argument” is: \textit{de differentia singularis et universalis, concedo}.\textsuperscript{182} Presumably Pecham means to concede that the argument is

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 387.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.; cf. Aristotle, \textit{Topics}, trans. W.A. Pickard-Cambridge: “First of all we must determine the number of ways we talk of sameness. Sameness would be generally regarded as falling, roughly speaking, into three divisions. We generally apply the term numerically or specifically or generally. . . .” (103a.7-9).
\textsuperscript{180} \textit{Quaestiones}, 369.
\textsuperscript{182} \textit{Quaestiones}, 387.
correct insofar as it suggests the possibility that the intellect is not corrupted, but he does not explain how the difference between singulars and universals is supposed to help. It would seem, then, that Pecham’s response “to the 14th” is better suited to answer the 13th argument in favor of monopsychism. This response starts by saying that the proposition that the intellect is immaterial can be understood in three ways: (1) The intellect does not share at all in matter. But this is false, as is shown in the first section of Pecham’s responsio (see above). (2) The intellect is not the perfection of corporeal matter. But this is false and heretical, because the intellect gives being to matter and is the substantial form of matter insofar as “first being” is concerned. (3) The intellect does not operate through bodily mediation. This is the correct understanding, for intellect has an operation that depends on no organ. An example is when, in an act of second being, “[the intellect] is reflected on itself” (cum in se reflectatur).

14. The 14th argument in favor of monopsychism is a reductio ad absurdum based on the singularity of an individual’s intellect. A single intellect, numbered according to an individual, has the potency to understand (“in potency to the intelligible” in the words of the present argument) but is not actually understanding. However, nothing is intelligible unless it is abstracted from individuating conditions. Therefore, if the mind is in potency to the intelligible, then it would also be “in potency to receive itself” (in potentia

---

183 Ibid., 387-388.
184 Ibid., 387.
185 Ibid., bracketed item added.
186 Ibid., 369.
recipiens se ipsum), and so it would have to be both actual and potential in respect to the same thing.\footnote{Ibid.}

It appears that part of Pecham’s response “to the 14th,”\footnote{Ibid., 387-388.} reviewed just above, is his response to this argument. In fact, the intellect may be said to be both in potency and in act.\footnote{Ibid., 387.} The intellect is in potency because it does not always actively understand. If someone says that the intellect must be potentially intelligible because it has both form and matter, then Pecham will respond by saying that this applies only to corporeal form/matter compounds. The intellect is in act and present to itself because it understands itself and does not abstract in order to achieve such knowledge; the intellect is in potency because it may not always actively understand itself.\footnote{Ibid., 388; cf. Augustine, \textit{On the Trinity}: “[T]he mind … always remembers itself, and always understands and loves itself” (14.6.9).} (Pecham cites Augustine’s explanation of the mind’s ability to recall from memory objects that had been known before.\footnote{\textit{Quaestiones}, 387-388; cf. Augustine, \textit{On the Trinity}, 14.6.8.}) Furthermore, the only circumstance in which we could say that an \textit{intelligible} is “in potency” (\textit{in potentia}) would be when the intelligible is \textit{essentially} potential, as in the case of forms of material things.\footnote{\textit{Quaestiones}, 388.}

15. The 15th argument in favor of monopsychism seeks to show that there can be only one intellect by using a comparison to the angelic species.\footnote{Ibid., 369-370.} The universal intellect, as we might expect, is like the separated substances in that there is only one individual in
each species.\textsuperscript{194} Therefore in the species of the human intellect, there can be only one common intellect.\textsuperscript{195}

It seems that Pecham’s response to this argument comes in his response “to the 16th”.\textsuperscript{196} This argument is, in short, that the intellect occupies all of the matter of an individual, but not the whole of the species. He says that forms occupying the whole of a species’ matter cannot be multiplied. For example, the sun occupies all of the matter in its species, and thus there can be only one sun. The human soul, on the other hand, occupies the whole matter of the individual by act and potency. This response does not directly address the 15th argument. Perhaps Pecham thinks that his response to the 15th argument, combined with the response “to the 16th,” suffices. The response “to the 15th” says that “a species which is produced is of the whole composite. Or if this is not suitable, it can be said of the form only, of which, however, ‘equal species’ is said only insofar as it is equal in nature to itself. . . .”\textsuperscript{197} The idea seems to be that the species of human beings is constituted by individual form/matter combinations; one cannot isolate the substantial form that these individual combinations share and then, because they all share the same form, conclude there is only one member of the species “human intellect.”

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 369. The view that each angel is its own species was held by Aquinas (\textit{Summa Theologiae}, 1.50.4) and generally denied by Franciscans, following Pseudo-Dionysius (\textit{The Celestial Hierarchy}; cf. Cullen, \textit{Bonaventure}, 109, 131-132). On Bonaventure’s view, angelic souls lack the unibility that human souls possess, but this does not cause individual angels to be their own species (Cullen, \textit{Bonaventure}, 54).
\textsuperscript{195} \textit{Quaestiones}, 369-370.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., 388. It is not clear to which argument Pecham’s response “to the 15th” applies.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.: “[S]pecies quae gignitur est totius aggregati. Vel si hoc non placet, potest dici esse formae tantum, quae tamen ‘species aequalis’ dicitur pro tanto quia est sibi in aequali natura. . . .”=
\end{flushright}
16. The 16th argument in favor of monopsychism seeks to prove that there is no coherent account of how the intellect is numbered according to individual members of the human species.\textsuperscript{198} Such individuation cannot be caused by an intellect, for the intellect is neither a body nor the power of a body. And, an intellect cannot be appropriated to a body because such appropriation would require the intellect to have either a receptive potency or an active potency. Such a potency could not be receptive, because a receptive potency would be indifferent to making a connection with a body. Nor could the potency be active, because an active potency appropriates something to itself only by reducing from some other potency of matter. According to this argument, there is no available potency that can appropriate the intellect to a body.

Someone might say that there is an appropriation of soul to body on the basis of “proper organic dispositions of the body desiring this soul and not another. . . .”\textsuperscript{199} But, according to argument 16, This suggestion is incompatible with the view that the soul is immediately united to matter. Furthermore, the view that each soul is appropriated to a single body is itself problematic: The bodies of various species do not differ in their substantial and elementary differences, but only in their accidental differences. But the substantial appropriation of an immaterial form that is completely freed from matter cannot be according to accidents. Therefore, there is never a complete appropriation.

\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., 370.
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid.: “per dispositiones proprias corporis organici appetentis hanc animam et non aliam. . . .”
The answer to argument 16 appears to come in Pecham’s response “to the 17th”.\textsuperscript{200} This response is that individual numeration can be understood in two ways. The numeration can be considered either as the efficient cause, or as an occasion (\textit{occasio}) for the operation of another cause.\textsuperscript{201} The first way is incorrect, but the second way is true, because the multiplication of bodies is the occasion for which God creates and infuses souls. Also, because the human body naturally desires the rational soul, human reproduction cannot be understood as a merely biological function (\textit{“natura generantis non quiescit in aliquo quod a virtute seminis producatur”}\textsuperscript{202}), but must also include the infusion of the rational soul. Pecham does not here take a position about whether the intellect is immediately or mediately united to the body, but he will take a position on this issue in the responses “to the 22nd and 23rd and 24th” arguments (below) and later, in the \textit{Tractatus}.

Someone might respond by asking how a true material unity that results from natural reproduction can also include the infusion of the rational soul.\textsuperscript{203} Pecham deals with this objection by saying that the God is the founder of nature and thus has wide freedom in dealing with nature. In this context he cites Augustine’s statement: “For what he — who is the source of all the measure, number, and order of nature — does will be natural to each thing.”\textsuperscript{204}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{200} Ibid., 388-389.
\item \textsuperscript{201} Ibid., 388.
\item \textsuperscript{202} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{203} Ibid., 389.
\end{itemize}
17. The 17th argument in favor of monopsychism has to do with what happens to the individual body when the rational soul enters and departs.\textsuperscript{205} Suppose that, prior to the entrance of the rational soul, matter already has some form. This form can only be the form of man. If a substance’s prior dispositions and forms disappear whenever the rational soul enters, then when the rational soul departs at death, only prime matter would remain. However, it appears that when someone dies, the matter that remains is not prime matter but the \textit{forma corporeitatis}.\textsuperscript{206} Evidently the point here is supposed to be that, since the body already has the \textit{forma corporeitatis}, there is no role for the intellect as the form of the individual human body, and so there is no need for the intellect to be individualized.

Someone might suggest that another form is generated in the body (or that the body generates another form) through transmutation when death occurs.\textsuperscript{207} This is basically Aquinas’s position. According to argument 17 this suggestion is problematic because if we want to say that the rational soul alone is the substantial form, then it is either generated from something, or from nothing.\textsuperscript{208} If the rational soul is generated from nothing then the only way for it to perish would be through a miracle.\textsuperscript{209} If the rational soul is generated from something other than prime matter, then it must be from some other potency. This potency must be identified with another form in matter besides the rational soul. Therefore there must be some principle other than prime matter that is

\begin{footnotes}
\item[205] Quaestiones, 371.
\item[206] This is indeed Pecham’s position (Delorme, “La \textit{Summa},” 66-67).
\item[207] Ibid., 370.
\item[208] Ibid., 370-371.
\item[209] Ibid., 371.
\end{footnotes}
associated with the body when it is apart from the rational soul. So, we are left with the conclusion that matter has the *forma corporeitatis*, and there is no reason why there cannot be one intellect for all.

At this point Pecham provides two responses that do not appear to belong with the 17th argument. First, consider the response “to the 18th”: If there were one universal substance, the intellect (including its possible aspect) would not always understand itself in act, but it could understand itself. Is the intellect in act or in potency? Pecham says (as he has before) that there is a sense in which the intellect is both active and passive. And yet, the intellect could not be essentially in potency to understand itself just as it is in potency in respect of material forms. Second, there is the response “to the 19th”, which is simply this: “per interemptionem respondendum. Item, nec est omnino a materia separatus.” It is not obvious to which argument this response is directed.

Pecham does address the plurality of substantial forms in the human being in the *Tractatus*, and says more about the *forma corporeitatis*. So, while Pecham may not answer this 17th argument in favor of monopsychism here, he attempts to do so elsewhere.

18. The brief 18th argument in favor of monopsychism seeks to show that if the rational soul were to enter the individual human being, that rational soul would be at once corrupted. If we suppose that when the rational soul enters, the other forms are

---

210 Ibid., 389.
211 Ibid.
213 *Quaestiones*, 371.
corrupted, then they can be corrupted only into contraries. “Therefore, the rational soul will stand with its contrary form to the disposition which is to itself. But effects of contraries are contraries. Therefore, just as it comes in through the disposition, so after the coming in it recedes immediately due to the contrary form.”\footnote{Ibid.: “Ergo, cum anima rationali stabit forma contraria suae dispositioni quae est ad ipsum. Sed contrariorum contrarii sunt effectus. Ergo, sicut advenit per dispositionem, sic post adventum statim recedet per formam contrariam.”} Given that the rational soul is a contrary form to the forms that already have informed the body but now recede, the rational soul will also recede.

The answer that Pecham gives to this argument (“to the 20th”)\footnote{Ibid., 389-390.} starts from the principle that the rational soul is appropriated \textit{simpliciter} to the human body.\footnote{Ibid., 389.} The body itself is “of the most noble and most equal complexity \textit{[complexionis]}” and the soul is united to it substantially as its substantial form. A particular soul is united to a particular body because of differences in complexion \textit{(complexionis)} and the combination is not accidental. Even though the differences among various souls and bodies and combinations may be accidental, this does not mean that the coming together of a particular soul with a particular body is itself accidental.\footnote{Pecham reiterates this point in his answer “to the 21st” (ibid., 390).} Peter Lombard confirms that among souls there are degrees of subtlety, and thus there can also be diversity of bodies within the limits of species.\footnote{Ibid., 389-390; cf. Lombard, \textit{Liber Secundus}, 2.32.8.}

19. The 19th argument in favor of monopsychism returns to the topic of simplicity, although the principle under consideration here is different from the principle discussed\footnote{Ibid.: “Ergo, cum anima rationali stabit forma contraria suae dispositioni quae est ad ipsum. Sed contrariorum contrarii sunt effectus. Ergo, sicut advenit per dispositionem, sic post adventum statim recedet per formam contrariam.”}
in the seventh argument (above).\textsuperscript{219} The present argument says that the more simple something is, the more it is of communicable existence.\textsuperscript{220} The argument seeks to show that if the rational soul is essentially simple in the same way in which an angel is simple, then the rational can in fact be be in many. This is particularly interesting because previous arguments sought to show that the universal mind could not be “in” individual knowers. That the rational soul can be in many is proved in three ways: (1) God is simple and yet can be in all things. If the intellect participates in divine simplicity, then the intellect also participates in any and all effects of divine simplicity. Therefore the single human intellect can be in all men. (2) The spirit has a more communicable existence than that of the body. If there is one body that makes all bodies perfect by containing and illuminating them, therefore there could also be a spirit that perfects and contains all bodies. (3) If a single accident can be numerically in many beings, then so much more is a single spirit communicable to many beings: “[E]rgo magis potest esse unus spiritus in omnibus corporibus”.\textsuperscript{221}

Someone might suggest that time is in the movement of the prime mover as a subject, and that time is in other beings only insofar as they are measured by the prime mover. This response would seem to challenge argument (1) in the above paragraph: When a being participates in God’s simplicity the being does not necessarily “have” simplicity in the same way, nor does the being necessarily have the other divine attributes. But there is

\textsuperscript{219} Quaestiones, 371.
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid.: “[Q]uanto aliquid est simplicius, tanto aliquid est communicabilioris exsistentiae.”
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid., 371.
the counterexample that if heaven stood still and the potter’s wheel moved, then time would be measured according to the wheel. However, the movement of heaven does not preclude the wheel having its own movement.\textsuperscript{222} As it is, says argument 19, time is measured according to heaven and there is only one time.\textsuperscript{223} In fact, even if there were multiple heavens there would be only one time, because any motion at all is sufficient for there to be time (time is sufficiently measurable according to the movement of either heaven or the potter’s wheel). This argument about time is evidently meant to suggest that attributes have the same meaning—at least analogically—wherever they are found, e.g., wherever we find spiritual simplicity, it is in some sense the same. If we can say that the human intellect shares in God’s simplicity in any sense, then, there can be only one intellect.

Pecham’s text does not seem to provide a single response that works as an obvious answer to this argument. However, Pecham has already said enough in his \textit{responsio} to give an idea about what his response would be: The intellect, as a form/matter composite itself, does \textit{not} share in God’s simplicity. Here, I will consider what Pecham says in the various remaining responses as possible answers. In Pecham’s responses “to the 22nd and 23rd and 24th”\textsuperscript{224} he says that the soul is not immediately united to the body, but rather there is a sense in which similarities and differences mediate between the body and soul. Therefore (quoting from Alcher of Clairvaux),

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., 371-372.  \\
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid., 372; cf. Augustine, \textit{Confessions}, 11.29-30.  \\
\textsuperscript{224} \textit{Quaestiones}, 390.
\end{flushright}
the soul which truly is spirit, and flesh which is body are easily and conveniently united in their outermost parts, that is in the imaginary knowledge which is not body, but is like the body and the sensuality of the flesh which is truly spirit because without the soul it could not happen.225

In the answer that Pecham provides “to the 26th” argument,226 he says that a body is not united to a soul unless the soul flows into the body. Yet it is possible that one spirit may flow into all others who by themselves are not subject to its influence. That is, individual knowers can accept the influence of Christ’s soul while still maintaining their own individual souls. In the cases of someone being converted to Christ, the soul of Christ may be said to “come into” the convert’s body.

Pecham deals with the issue of time in the response “to the 28th”.227 Time follows different motions according to how it is united by the “flowing in” (influendo). Just as many lines can come together at one point, and yet there is a point that has a line as its subject, so also many motions that exist simultaneously are one subject of time. This is not because all the motions are one subject essentially, but they are one subject through their flowing together [confluentiam]. Yet in this discussion of time, Pecham does not respond directly to any of the 19th argument’s implications about the soul.

20. The 20th argument in favor of monopsychism is based on the idea that the sensitive soul can be in many at one time.228 Therefore, so much more can the rational

________________________________________________

225 Ibid.: “Itaque anima quae vere spiritus est, et caro quae est corpus in suis extremitatibus facile et convenienter uniuntur, id est in phantastico scientiae quod corpus non [est], sed simile corpori et sensualitati carnis quae vere spiritus est, quia sine anima fieri non potest” (bracketed item in orig.); cf. Alcher of Clairvaux, De Spiritu et Anima, 789.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid., 390-391.
228 Ibid., 372.
soul be in many at once. The argument claims the support of both Augustine and Aristotle: (1) Augustine says that the phantasm of a man may appear (mistakenly, in this case) in various people at the same time.\(^{229}\) (2) Aristotle says that the world is eternal and continually generates humans, animals, and plants.\(^{230}\) However, Aristotle denies that there can be an actual infinite.\(^{231}\) Thus, if each individual has his own rational soul, there would be an actual infinity of souls, which Aristotle denies.

Someone might suggest that Aristotle allowed for the actual infinite in principle, and objected only insofar as an actual infinite would overfill all places.\(^{232}\) This response is not damaging to the 20th argument, because if an actual infinity of souls is allowed at all, then it must also be allowed that God could in principle give a body to each soul. This situation would result in all places being overfilled anyway, and so it provides no help to those who want support from Aristotle for the view that there could be an infinite number of humans, each with his own intellect.

Again, there does not appear to be a single response that works as an answer to this argument, arguing directly that a plurality of intellects does not imply an infinity of individual people, yet Pecham’s responses “to the 29th” and “to the 30th”\(^{233}\) (the last two responses of the *quaestio*) discuss evidence from Augustine and from Aristotle,

---


\(^{230}\) Cf. Pecham, *Questions Concerning the Eternity of the World*.

\(^{231}\) See Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 82b.38-39: “[O]ne cannot go through indefinitely many things ... it is necessary that the things predicated in what something is are finite.” Also, Aristotle, *On the Heavens*: “Now the infinite cannot be traversed, and if the body is infinite the interval between the radii is necessarily infinite: circular motion therefore is an impossibility. Yet we see that the heavens revolve in a circle. . .” (272a.2-6).

\(^{232}\) *Quaestiones*, 372.

\(^{233}\) Ibid., 391.
respectively. In these responses, Pecham uses these authorities to deny the possibility of an actual infinity of individuals to begin with. Pecham says that Augustine’s point is not that the phantasm of a man may go into the various knowers’ minds essentially. It is merely that a man appears similarly to various knowers. Pecham begins his response “to the 30th” by saying that “that was never the intention of the Philosopher.”234 By this

234 Ibid.
Pecham evidently means that Aristotle did not support the idea of an eternal world. Yet even if we posit the eternity of the world, Pecham says, the Averroist might still suggest

---

235 In fact, Pecham appeals to “every philosophy” (omni philosophiae) for support in refuting the possibility that there has been an actual infinity of men in history (Questions Concerning the Eternity of the World, 26-27; cf. Dales, Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World [Leiden: Brill, 1990]). In the same context, Pecham appeals to Aristotle in arguing against the idea that souls are rotated successively from body to body (ibid.). Aristotle says that “[T]here must always be an underlying something, namely that which becomes. . . . [T]here must be something underlying the contraries. . . . The underlying nature can be known by analogy. For as the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the matter and the formless before receiving form to any thing which has form, so is the underlying nature to substance” (Physics, 190a.14-15, 191a.4-5, 9-11). On the situation in the 13th century concerning Aristotle’s position on the eternity of the world, consider Potter’s comment: “Both Franciscan and Dominican theologians rejected the Averroist position on the world’s eternity but for rather different reasons. To understand the issues in this three-sided debate, it would be well to recall some of the basic tents of ‘radical’ or ‘integral’ Aristotelianism. First, the Latin Averroists assumed (with Aristotle and all the ancient Greeks) that whatever is, always was, and always will be is necessary, that is, not contingent. Second, they held as self-evident the principle ‘From nothing, nothing comes,’ understood in the sense that every coming-to-be requires a material cause and so generation is the only conceivable kind of coming-to-be. Hence if the world ever is, it always was and always will be. If there ever is any coming-to-be, there must be an infinity of comings-to-be a parte ante and post. The upshot of these two assumptions is that the world is ontologically necessary, hence non-contingent, hence not at all created in the orthodox Christian sense. . . . The Franciscans adopted the contrary position to the Averroists: namely that it can be demonstrated that the world had a beginning (and perhaps also an end). The Dominicans adopted the contradictory position to the Averroists: namely, that it cannot be demonstrated that the world had no beginning. They also contradicted the Franciscans in that they denied one could demonstrate that the world had a beginning. . . . Thomas Aquinas held that neither the ‘eternity’ nor the ‘non-eternity’ of the world is demonstrable by reason alone. Thomas was convinced that faith required Christians to hold that in fact the world is not eternal, but this comes solely from faith and not from reason” (introduction to Pecham, Questions Concerning the Eternity of the World, xi, xii-xiii, emp. and parenthetical items in orig.). It should be noted that later Franciscans, such as William of Ockham, allowed for the philosophical possibility of an eternal world (see Dales, Medieval Discussions; ibid., “The Friars and the Eternity of the World,” Monks, Nuns, and Friars, 63-70; cf. Francis of Marchia, Francisci de Marchia Opera philosophica et theologica, Volume 1, ed. Girard Etzkorn, et al. [Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2008], introduction).
the seemingly impossible situation where any given soul can go into any (suitable) body. Without a suitable body, however, the spiritual substance would remain idle.

The text does not provide responses to the final five arguments in favor of monopsychism. However, all five arguments deal with the implications of infinity, and perhaps Pecham thought that he had already dealt with this issue sufficiently in the text, having argued that a plurality of intellects does not imply an infinity of individual people. After all, Pecham says that if we posit an eternal world with infinite humans, then further impossibilities follow:

But it is not surprising if from one impossible proposition another follows. However, in no way is it to be believed that [Aristotle] posited an infinity in act at the same time. And if in some way [Averroes] will have posited a revolution, he erred without a doubt, because one error cannot be sustained without another.”

Creationism would not allow the Christian to believe in an infinity of souls, and so arguments in favor of monopsychism that are based on the impossibility of an infinity would be unconvincing to many anyway.

21. The 21st argument in favor of monopsychism is based on the principle that each good creature adds something to the total goodness in the universe. Therefore, if there were an infinity of souls, then the universe would be infinitely good. The unstated minor premise is that the universe is not infinitely good. The unstated conclusion is that there cannot be an infinite number of souls. The unstated corollary (from argument 20) is that there can be only one rational soul.

236 Quaestiones, 372-373.
237 Ibid., 391: “Sed nec est mirum si ex uno impossibili sequatur aliud. Nullo tamen modo credendum ipsum posuisse simul infinita actu. Et si aliquo modo revolutionem posuerit, procul dubio erravit, quia error unus sine alio sustineri non potest.”
238 Ibid., 372.
22. The 22nd argument in favor of monopsychism seeks to prove that if there were an infinity of souls, then any given individual soul would itself have infinite properties.\textsuperscript{239} A given individual member of a species differs from other members of the species, but differs more from members of other species.\textsuperscript{240} Therefore, if one individual differs from an infinite number of others, then the individual must have infinite reasons for its differences.\textsuperscript{241}

23. The 23rd argument in favor of monopsychism is based on problems that arise concerning the numbers of parts and wholes when an infinity of things is posited.\textsuperscript{242} If there is an infinity of things, then there are just as many parts as there are wholes. In fact, the part is equal to the whole not only numerically but in every way. It is not made clear how it is proved that parts become equal to wholes “in every way” (\textit{non solum numero sed omnimode}) in the context of an actual infinity.

24. The 24th argument in favor of monopsychism is based on spatial and geometrical problems associated with an infinity of things.\textsuperscript{243} If there were an infinite number of things in the whole world (\textit{mundo toto}), then the center would be in the middle of the world. In this case, an infinity would have a middle point, which is impossible. Someone might respond to this argument by saying that such an infinity would not be in a place at all, thus it is a mistake to speak of an infinity occupying a whole. A response to this

\textsuperscript{239} Ibid., 372-373.
\textsuperscript{240} Ibid., 372.
\textsuperscript{241} Ibid., 373.
\textsuperscript{242} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{243} Ibid.
objection is that souls could operate in various parts of the universe, and since each of these parts would be infinitely divisible, the argument holds.

25. The 25th and final argument in favor of monopsychism is that where there is an actual infinity of individuals, there cannot be order among the individuals.244

Conclusion

The fifth of Pecham’s *Quaestiones De Anima* is critical to understanding his approach to controversies not only with the Latin Averroists of his day, as is obvious from the text of the fifth *quaestio* alone, but also with Thomas Aquinas on the issue of substantial forms. In the fifth chapter, I will use data from this exposition to draw conclusions about Pecham’s strategy. In the sixth chapter, will show how the *quaestio* functions in the comparison with Aquinas’s anthropology.

244 Ibid.
CHAPTER 3

EXPOSITION OF PECHAM’S TRACTATUS DE ANIMA

Melani’s edition of Pecham’s Tractatus was originally published in 1948, and will be used as the basis for this chapter. The purpose of this chapter is the exposition of Pecham’s arguments whereas evaluation of many of these arguments will be presented in chapters five and six. This exposition will provide a partial basis for that comparison with Aquinas’s arguments against Latin Averroism. Furthermore, an understanding of the Tractatus is essential for understanding how Pecham deals with his sources, which I will discuss in the fifth chapter.

The Tractatus is especially interesting because in it Pecham presents his own psychological anthropology while avoiding direct discussion of controversies that were prominent at the time.\(^1\) Pecham addresses such controversies directly in the Quaestiones, which I discussed in the previous chapter and to which I will continue to make reference, particularly concerning Pecham’s disagreement with Aquinas.

\(^1\) Tractatus, 3. While Pecham states in the prologue that he wants to discuss the substance, power, and action of the rational soul, in the second part of the Tractatus he discusses all of the capacities of the soul. This is significant in connection with Pecham’s view that the rational soul is the form of the body (cf. Pecham, Quaestiones, 333, 349, 363-364).
Prologue

Pecham makes a number of statements in the prologue that provide insight into the nature of his project. First, Pecham motivates the study of the soul not by saying that the soul needs to be understood in order to defend a Franciscan party line at Paris or so that heresies can be criticized, but simply by stating his own personal wonder at the soul and its operation.² Pecham does not question whether humans have individuated souls.³ Indeed, Pecham takes for his starting point the intuition that the soul observes its own wondering.⁴ Pecham also recognizes the paradox that a person’s soul is more present to that person than anything else; it is very present and intimate to itself, and yet not well known to itself.⁵ The soul is obscure because it is concealed by phantasms; the eye of the soul is turned toward fleshly matters even though it is capable of turning toward spiritual things.⁶ This view is similar to Avicenna’s doctrine of the soul’s “two faces,” which Pecham may have adopted due to the influence of Alexander of Hales, John of La

² Tractatus, 3.
⁴ Tractatus, 3: “Mirabilis est sibi anima mea, et miratur se mirantem cetera, nonnulla sine admiratione decernentem. Quomodo enim non sibi notissima, quae sibi praesentissima, sibi intima, sibi simillima? Qualiter in ceteris acuta et sibi obtusa?”
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ This does not mean that Pecham thinks that phantasms are necessary for every cognition, as Aquinas does. For Pecham there are not only those species which are derived from sensible perceptions, but also “innate” (innatam) and “impressed” (impressam) species, which occur without phantasms (e.g., Quaestiones, 430).
Rochelle and other Paris Franciscans.⁷ “Two faces” has reference to Avicenna’s division of the human intellect—conceptually at least—into two aspects,

the practical and the theoretical intellect. As an image to help grasp the relation between the practical and theoretical intellects, Avicenna likens them to two faces of the human soul. . . . [T]he practical intellect is turned downward toward the management of the body, being influenced by the body and material needs and desires, while the theoretical intellect is turned upward toward the higher principles and causes, which are the source of all knowledge and understanding.⁸

Pecham does not make explicit in the prologue whether he is borrowing from Avicenna. It is clear, however, that Avicenna and Pecham (as we shall see) both think of the psychological powers as forming a hierarchy.⁹ And, as Pecham will soon make clear, he thinks of God’s intellect and the individuated human intellect as being jointly responsible for human understanding.¹⁰

Second, Pecham’s description of the process whereby the soul can be understood reminds one of mystics such as Meister Eckhart: “But let me take of little by little the tunic of the phantasms, let me take off, let me uncover [the veil] of sensible scales; let me see, the Lord leading me, my more secret places, and I will drive the flock of my thoughts.

---

⁸ McGinnis, Avicenna, 95.
⁹ Ibid.
¹⁰ Tractatus, 11-12: “Sic igitur cognoscit omnia, quae sunt naturali potentiae subjecta visua, scilicet, transformativa in eorum similitudines; alia quae naturalem facultatem excedunt, quorum cognitio a Patre luminum descendit super intellectum, a virtute superiori causatur in intellectum, unde solus Deus potest sic animam illuminare” (cf. ibid., Quaestiones, 401-403).
to the hidden desert if perhaps the consoler of my soul would appear to me.” Pecham has a doctrine of divine illumination, but it is another question as to whether portions of Pecham’s work could be categorized alongside medieval mysticism. On the one hand, Pecham relies heavily on Pseudo-Dionysius in both the *Tractatus* and in the *Quaestiones*. He also discusses a delight in God’s love that can occur only when cognition ceases. On the other hand, however, Pecham consistently presents his doctrine primarily as the joint product of reason (citing Aristotle often) and Christian teaching, and at no point as a product of spiritual experience as such. For Pecham, the result of the journey into the hidden desert is a doctrine that is “without conflict of reasonings” (*sine rationum conflictu*) and one that he takes to be free of conflict with Aristotle. Pecham provides no further explanation regarding the nature of the hidden desert, and so one is safe in assuming that Pecham’s view of the soul’s contact with God is best understood in light of his discussions of illumination later in the *Tractatus* and in the *Quaestiones*.

**Part One. Chapter One.**

The first major division (or “part”) of the *Tractatus* deals with the operation or working (*operatione*) of the soul, although it cannot be said that any part of the *Tractatus*


12 *Tractatus*, 45.

13 Ibid., 3.

14 This becomes evident in the *Quaestiones*, but is less evident in the *Tractatus*. 
avoids discussion of the soul’s operations. Pecham begins by saying that life is the “first and equal act,” of the soul. Notice that Pecham cites a work that he calls the *Fons Vitae* for support on this point. As I mentioned in the first chapter of the present study, Pecham’s citation is not from Avicebron’s *Fons Vitae*, but rather from the *De Motu Cordis* by Alfred of Sareshel. It may be that Pecham was not mistaken about the authorship of the *De Motu Cordis*; rather, he may have considered Alfred’s text to be a kind of *fons vitae*. In the fifth chapter of the present study, which focuses on Pecham’s use of his sources, I will discuss in some detail the influence of the *De Motu Cordis* in the *Tractatus*.

Pecham also makes a clear distinction between the life of the body and the life of the soul. The life of the soul overflows into the life of the body. The critical point is that Pecham associates the soul with life, and then explains the implications he draws from this position. Pecham will later clarify by saying that there is a drive that is “the life of the soul”. Pecham appeals to Avicenna for the view that the rational soul is both an impression and emanation for the body instead of simply “the life of the body.” Pecham does not here explain his understanding of emanation. Avicenna accepted an emanationist cosmology, but also rejected the theory of a pre-existent soul. Thus, if Pecham is following Avicenna in these areas, then Pecham is espousing (1) that person is individuated upon the soul’s combination with the body, and (2) that the rational soul is

---

16 *Tractatus*, 8: “... vigor, qui est vita animae. . . .”
also the result of an emanation rather than a creation. However, there is reason to doubt that Pecham espoused (2), due to his stated position to the contrary in the first of the *Quaestiones*, which answers in the negative the question of whether the soul is given from the parents, and due to his insistence that souls are created and infused one by one.

Pecham’s emphasis on life also reflects the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius, who associates life with being as such rather than with a particular level of ensoulment:

All beings, to the extent that they exist, are good and come from the Good and they fall short of goodness and being in proportion to their remoteness from the Good. In the case of other qualities such as heat or cold the things which have experienced warmth can lose warmth. Indeed there are things which have no life and no mind. True, there is God who is on a level above being and is therefore transcendental. But with entities generally, if a quality is lost for them, or was never there in fact, it is still the case that these entities possess being and subsistence. However, that which is totally bereft of the Good never had, does not have, never shall have, never can have any kind of being at all. Take the example of a person who lives intemperately. He is deprived of the Good in direct proportion to his irrational urges. To this extent he is lacking in being and his desire is for what has no real existence. Nevertheless he has some share in the Good, since there is in him a distorted echo of real love and of real unity.\(^\text{18}\)

Pecham starts with Pseudo-Dionysius’ framework but provides more specification concerning how life functions.

Pecham has said that the rational soul is an impression, and immediately mentions a particular understanding of “impression” that is not limited to the rational aspect of the soul.\(^\text{19}\) He says that the biological processes of the body, specifically the blood, jointly constitute a disposition toward the impression. Pecham thinks this position must be right because of Leviticus 17:14, which Pecham quotes as follows: “The life and soul of all

\(^\text{18}\) *Divine Names*, 720B-C; cf. ibid., 825C-857C.

\(^\text{19}\) *Tractatus*, 4.
flesh is in the blood.” At this stage Pecham has left available the option of viewing of
the soul-body connections such that (at least) the body is disposed by its sensitive and
vegetative aspects to receive the rational soul, or (at most) the rational soul is directly
involved in the preparation of the body.

Having stated that the soul is integrally related to the concept of life, Pecham
proceeds to explain the soul-life relationship. He asks, what is “the first and per se act of
life in the soul?” It is obvious that Pecham is discussing not only the rational soul at this
point, because he considers understanding, sensation, and vegetation as answers to the
question about the soul’s first act of life. Pecham rejects these three possible answers as
follows: Understanding or knowledge cannot be the per se act of the soul, because
Aristotle says that “all men desire to know,” thus desire precedes understanding.
Furthermore, we are alive in various instances in which we are not actively understanding
(e.g., during sleep). Neither vegetation nor sensation can be the per se act of the soul,
because vegetation and sensation involve not only living, but “giving life” to another.

20 Pecham’s quotation of Leviticus 17:14 is not a literal translation of the Vulgate, which
reads: “Anima enim omnis carnis in sanguine est unde dixi filiis Israhel sanguinem
universae carnis non comedetis quia anima carnis in sanguine est et quicumque comederit
illum interibit.” All citations from the Vulgate are from Biblia Sacra: Iuxta Vulgata
Versionem (Stuttgart: Gesamtherstellung Biblia-Druck, 1994).

21 Pecham will take an intermediate position in his Quaestiones. In the first quaestio,
Pecham says that rational souls are created and infused individually (323). In the13th
quaestio Pecham says that it is natural for the material form to “strive to
perfect” (“appetere perficere”) and that the soul has a desire to be embodied in order to
carry out its natural progress toward perfection (450-452).

22 Tractatus, 5.
23 Ibid., 5-6.
24 Cf. Metaphysics, trans. W.D. Ross, 980a.21, emp. added; cf. Augustine, On the Trinity,
9.12.
Something must already be alive before it can give life to another, and so life must precede even nutrition. To “give life” on this view seems to be the fulfillment of a condition for bodily integrity. Pecham evidently thinks that even though the vegetative and sensitive aspects of the soul are required for bodily integrity, the presence of the vegetative and sensitive functions must itself be explained. Life is the active principle or force that provides this explanation. Furthermore, Pecham notes that old age corrupts the body, but says that it not therefore right to say that an old man is less alive than a young man. If the gradual diminishing of various physical powers is not a reduction in life, then the normal operations of such powers cannot be a measure of life as such. A further implication is that a thing is either alive or it is not—there is no in-between stage.

As he begins the next chapter Pecham will conclude from this discussion that the primary act of life in the soul is “the first act of form”.

Part One. Chapter Two.

This first act of form is a “continuous drive” that is the common cause for vegetative, sensitive, and rational life. All creatures have this cause in a similar or analogous way. Pecham claims as additional authority a statement in the Book of Causes: “Life is

---

25 This is opposed to the view of Aristotle, who says: “This power of self-nutrition can be separated from the other powers mentioned, but not they from it—in mortal beings at least. The fact is obvious in plants; for it is the only psychic power they possess. This is the originative power the possession of which leads us to speak of things as living at all. . . .” (De Anima, trans. J.A. Smith, 413a.32-413b.2).
26 Tractatus, 5-6.
27 Ibid., 6. Pecham says that this point comes from the Fons Vitae of Avicebron, however the phrase is really in the De Motu Cordis (chapter 1).
28 Tractatus, 6.
proceeding out of the first Being, quiet and eternal and the first motion. . . .”

Pecham also cites Plato’s idea that the soul is self-moving. This first principle, which Pecham has so far called a motion, an act, and a form, is more readily identified with an efficient cause than any other of the four Aristotelian causes. Pecham says that this form is “structurable from itself and can complete its own fulfillment.” It is not the _forma corporeitatis_, for Pecham makes clear that the first principle is neither any combination of elements nor anything separate from the elements themselves, nor the specification of any of the elements, nor any principle that specifies the species of the creature. Rather, it is the elementary life-form, which moves the living thing “to the perfecting of its fulfillment.” In other words, the form is just life itself, and is irreducible to any other form. Pecham cites as a good summary of his view the statement of Alexander of Hales: “The actuality of vigor is instilled by the Creator in creatures, and by means of this they are efficaciously ordered towards their complement and in achieving this in themselves

29 Ibid.: “... vita est procedens ex Ente primo, quieto et sempiterno et primus motus”; cf. Thomas Aquinas, _Commentary on the Book of Causes_, 111, bracketed items in orig.
31 _Tractatus_, 6: “… ex se ordinabilis est et potest perficere ad sui complementum.”
32 Ibid., 6-7: “Actus enim formae elementaris vita non est, quoniam nec supra formam elementarem aliquid est, quod requiratur ad speciem elementi, nec infra aliquid quod speciei sufficiat. . . .”
33 Ibid., 7: [S]ed in rebus viventibus vigor est continuus et ex vigore oriens appetitus excitans et promovens rem viventem ad consequendum sui complementum.”
34 Ibid.
they are at rest.”

The role of the Creator as the direct contributor of the rational soul will be developed in some detail by Pecham in the first of his *Quaestiones*. (Pecham clearly intends to avoid problems associated with double vegetative and sensitive souls.36)

Having established that the *per se* act of the soul is life and that this is equivalent to the first form, Pecham now mentions the other human forms, making explicit his view

---


36 *Quaestiones*, 323-324: “dicendum animas singillatim creari de nihil cotidie, et formatis infundi corporibus. Cuius ratio sumitur ex parte divinae operationis, et a parte operationis naturalis, et a parte originalis, sive rationis causalis vel seminalis. . . . Quod si ponatur facere animam rationalem natura cooperante, hoc est ponere animam rationalem habere rationem seminalem, et posse per virtutem naturalem educi de potentia in actum, quod est impossibile. Quoniam operatio naturalis est operatio virtutis corporalis quae non [potest] attingere [ nisi] ad formam corporalem, vel quae extenditur in corpore vel dependet a corpore, quod non est intellectus” (bracketed items in orig.); See Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul*, 30-31, 103-104. “The dualism of body and soul was maintained by all masters prior to Aquinas, and except for Roland of Cremona, Peter of Spain, and Albert the Great, required that the body, as body, had a form of its own. Whether this was identified with the sensitive soul (Fishacre, William of Auvergne) or as the corporeal form (Alexander of Hales), it comes perilously close to the position of Averroes, and even more so when a double vegetative-sensitive soul is admitted, as it was by Alexander of Hales, Richard Rufus, and Bonaventure” (ibid., 194, parenthetical items in orig.).
that the human being has a plurality of forms. According to the view that Pecham advocates, and which his predecessor at Canterbury had advocated, there is a “pluralism of vegetative, sensitive, and intellective forms” in the single human being. As will become clear, Pecham thinks there is also the form of corporeality in addition to the form that is the driving force of life. The rational soul is a form which subsists in corporeal matter, but does not need such matter in order to live. The intellect does not live in itself only by contributing life to something else. In this the intellect is the same as the separated substances. Other forms are unlike the rational soul because they receive their “foundation of existing” (fundamentum existendi) in matter, and thus necessarily

37 Tractatus, 7-8; cf. ibid., Quodlibeta, 256: “Quia licet anima rationalis sit forma immaterialis, tamen complet omnes formas materiales et perficit eas, ut esse et operari possint operationes consonas speciei.” Aristotle holds that there is but one substantial human form, yet describes in hierarchical terms the soul’s various powers: “The primary form of sense is touch, which belongs to all animals. Just as the power of self-nourishment can be separated from touch and sensation generally, so touch can be separated from all other forms of sense. (By the power of self-nourishment we mean that part of the soul which is common to plants and animals: all animals whatsoever are observed to have the sense of touch.) What the explanation of these two facts is, we must discuss later. At present we must confine ourselves to saying that soul is the source of these phenomena and is characterized by them, viz. by the powers of self-nourishment, sensation, thinking, and movement. Is each of these a soul or a part of a soul? And if a part, a part merely distinguishable by definition or a part distinct in local situation as well? In the case of certain of these powers, the answers to these questions are easy, in the case of others we are puzzled what to say. Just as in the case of plants which when divided are observed to continue to live though separated from one another (thus showing that in their case the soul of each individual plant was actually one, potentially many), so we notice a similar result in other varieties of soul, i.e. in insects which have been cut in two; each of the segments possesses both sensation and local movement; and if sensation, necessarily also imagination and appetition; for, where there is sensation, there is also pleasure and pain, and where these, necessarily also desire” (De Anima, 413b.4-24, parenthetical items in orig.). Furthermore, just as Pecham does not make value judgments about the various levels in the hierarchy of forms, Aristotle refrains from making value judgments about the various levels of powers (De Anima, 413a.21ff).

contribute life to something else. These forms “die” simultaneously with the body and “arise from the principles of the body” (oriuntur a principiis corporis). The only such form that does not perish when the body dies is the forma corporeitatis. Pecham emphasizes that the primary role of the intellectual soul is not to be involved in any particular bodily events—although it will be integrally involved in many such events and even needs the body to accomplish some of its purposes—but rather to provide the “power” that explains any human events whatsoever.

Pecham groups all of the forms, diverse as they are, into the category of “vital forms.” Thus every human form, including the intellect, is ordered to human life and perfection, even though the various forms have diverse objects: “Again, since some of the vital forms are ordered by the drive of life toward fulfillment, some are ordered to purely spiritual fulfillment, some to purely corporeal fulfillment, some to both ways.”

Here, Pecham offers three examples of vital forms: On one extreme, the vegetative soul or form tends to perfection by physical multiplication, as Pseudo-Dionysius confirms: Pecham takes the Neoplatonic position that the plants have “the farthest resonance of life.” On the other extreme is what Pecham calls “the first substances,” which are separate from matter. (Given that “matter” [materia] refers to corporeal matter, then this statement does not represent an exception to the universal hylomorphism that Pecham elsewhere

---

40 Tractatus, 7: “Rursus, quia formarum vitalium quae vigore vitae ad complementum sunt ordinatae, quaedam ordinantur ad complementum pure spirituale, quaedam ad complementum pure corporeale, quaedam utroque modo.”
41 Divine Names, 856B.
endorse.

Pecham does not here identify the first substances as angels here; they do have “the serenity of supernal clarity.” Somewhere between these two extremes is the rational soul, which is “marked by the image of God” (*insignita Dei imagine*). The rational soul, or mind, is ordered to the same illuminations as are the “first substances” just mentioned. Here is the first appearance of Pecham’s illuminationism. He does not spell out a detailed epistemology at this point, but does imply that divine light is involved at all levels of life, i.e., all creatures receive the “divine brightness” (*divina claritas*). The mind is “touched on the inside” with this brightness, which is required for any knowledge. Insofar as the mind is separated from matter, it is touched in a “prior and purer and more efficacious mode” as it perceives illuminations. Yet because the same soul is also the administrator of the body, there is a lower perceptive mode.

Pecham sees a reflexive relationship between intellect and body. The soul is “inclined to the perfection of the body” (*ad perfectionem corporis inclinatur*) because the body allows for the intellect to be perfected, sanctified, and cleansed. Here, the managerial role of the intellect is used to explain how there is a single, unitary human being, and in subsequent chapters (three, four, and seven) of the *Tractatus* the intellect’s involvement with the body will exemplify how there can be numerous potencies that are involved in a single human function. Thus Pecham’s pluralism is an attempt to broadly explain human substance and function.

---

42 E.g., *Quaestiones*, 347.
43 *Tractatus*, 8: “Priori ... et puriori et efficaciori modo perceptiva.”
At this point Pecham introduces his view of the sensitive soul’s role in human knowledge, which he develops in the next chapter of the *Tractatus*. He says that the sensitive soul is “perfected by corporeal forms received incorporeally.”\(^{44}\) He takes this to be the position of Aristotle, who says that “a sense is what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter, in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet ring without the iron or gold. . . .”\(^{45}\) Here Pecham says that the sensitive soul is ordered strictly to the corporeal good, even though the corporeal good can be “lifted to another” level. Pecham takes this also to be the position of Aristotle, who says that “what actual sensation apprehends are the individuals, while what knowledge apprehends are universals, and these are in a sense within the soul itself.”\(^{46}\) In other words, the sensitive soul has a purely corporeal operation, the result of which is taken up (in humans) by the higher form, the intellect. The “sensitive cognition” (*sensitiva cognition*) is an intellectual principle in the sense that the intellect lifts it to the higher level.\(^{47}\)

Pecham concludes the second chapter by summarizing what he has said thus far.\(^{48}\)

The first act of life is for a thing to be in force, i.e., to strive toward perfection, or to

\(^{44}\) Ibid.: “Anima autem sensibilis perficitur corporalibus formis incorporaliter receptis.”

\(^{45}\) *De Anima*, 424a.18-21.

\(^{46}\) *De Anima*, 417b.22-24.

\(^{47}\) *Tractatus*, 8. Compare this position to Augustine’s, as described by O’Daly: “[S]ense-perception is ... a psychological process. There is in fact interaction of body and soul in sense-perception. . . . so perception is an activity exercised upon the sensory stimulus rather than a passive reception of the latter. . . . The awareness of such activity or motion in the soul is precisely the Augustinian definition of perception (*Augustine’s Philosophy*, 84, 86). See Augustine, *On Music*, trans. Robert Catesbury Taliaferro, in *The Immortality of the Soul*, . . . , 4.9-10.

\(^{48}\) *Tractatus*, 8-9.
persist in being what it is. Immediately following this force is the act of the vital form, which is present in all living things and is still prior to understanding (apprehensione).50 This distinction is a greater specification than was previously given, and the two principles—life and the vital form—are difficult to distinguish. Pecham’s discussion lends itself to the conclusion that either principle can be called “life itself.” He reminds his readers that man naturally desires to know, i.e., man can desire to understand prior to his having understood.51 At lower levels of life there is merely the resonance of understanding, by which living things can draw to themselves what is fitting and repel other things.52 Now it has become clear that Pecham sees life as the primary principle (sometimes he calls it a “form”) of any substance. It is ontologically prior to all forms, but it directly gives rise to the vital form or continuous power of perfection. The critical point is that life itself precedes the activities of the vegetative, sensitive, and rational activities. The force of life, or “life itself,” derived from the original source of all life (God), is evidently sui generis.

Part One. Chapter Three.

For the topic of the third and fourth chapters of the Tractatus,53 Pecham focuses on apprehension, which is an “act of life” and involves the vegetative and sensitive souls.54

49 Based on the foregoing, I am using “following” and “prior” in an ontological sense as opposed to a temporal sense.
50 Ibid., 8.
51 Ibid., 8-9.
52 I take this to be the meaning of Pecham’s statement that at the stage of apprehension, “est tamen quaedam apprehensionis resonantia, qua convenientiora attrahat et reiciat contraria. . . .” (ibid., 9).
53 9-17.
54 Ibid., 9ff.
Pecham names apprehension as the first act following the general force of life. Yet, the subject matter of chapters three and four includes intellectual knowledge, so Pecham thinks of apprehension as encompassing far more than what a person could do during the earliest stages of life. And one can only conclude that Pecham refers here to the active life of a human or another animal, for vegetative souls do not allow the kind of apprehension that he discusses. Pecham’s view of sensible apprehension of external objects appears to be similar to that of Roger Bacon, although Pecham’s position on the agent intellect is a little different from that of Bacon. Bacon had already followed Alhacen in his discussion or “sensory knowledge,” or distinct knowledge of singulars, which all animals have. That Pecham is teaching a multiplication of species doctrine like that of Bacon is confirmed when Pecham states: “The soul transforms itself into the similitude of the thing the species of which is an organ. . . .” We find further confirmation of Pecham’s view in his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences and in his Perspectiva Communis. Lindberg describes Bacon’s view:

No longer does ‘species’ apply merely to the perceptual realm; now it denotes the likeness of any object, emanating from the object, whether or not a percipient being is present to receive it. . . . the species is, of course, the similitude of the object from which it emanates, but it is more than that; it is the force or power by

55 For further discussion of apprehension, see the sections on the 10th and 12th chapters of the Tractatus, below.
56 However, Pecham says that vegetables have “a certain resonance of apprehension” (ibid., 9).
57 See Hackett, “Roger Bacon.”
which any object acts on its surroundings. . . . It is apparent that Bacon attributes all natural causation to the multiplication of species.\textsuperscript{60}

For Bacon, sensory knowledge is caused by the multiplied species acting on the sensory organs. And, while Bacon does not provide a theory that accounted for intellectual knowledge via intelligible species, he planned to provide such a theory:

Likewise, if a thing acts on the intellect, it will produce only its species, just as when it acts on sense or on its contrary. But how, in general and in particular, species are produced in various recipients, both spiritual and corporeal, will be revealed below. Here, though, I deal with recipients only from the standpoint of the agent producing in them the same first effect, no matter what recipient it acts upon.\textsuperscript{61}

Bacon does not ignore intellectual knowledge in his work, but rather focuses on the scientific theory of sensible perception.\textsuperscript{62} And Pecham does not provide a detailed account of intellectual species here, either. Elsewhere Pecham says that, while sensible species do not impress on the intellect, the intellect forms similitudes based on the similitudes in the senses.\textsuperscript{63}

Perhaps Pecham thought that Augustine had set the bounds of the discussion of sense knowledge when he wrote in \textit{The Literal Meaning of Genesis}, a book that Pecham quotes often and cites here:

\begin{quote}
There can, after all, be no bodily vision without the spiritual, seeing that the moment contact is made with a body by a sense of the body, some such thing is also produced in the spirit, not to be exactly what the body is, but to be like it; and
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{60} Introduction to Bacon, \textit{Roger Bacon’s Philosophy}, lv, lvi.  
\textsuperscript{61} Bacon, \textit{Roger Bacon’s Philosophy}, 19.  
\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Quodlibeta}, 151: “Dico ad præsens quod impossibile est speciem corporalem imprimere in animam rationalem, sicut Augustinus, VI \textit{Musicae}. Sed excitatur a sensu et format in se de se similitudines spirituales illorum quorum similitudines corporales sunt in sensu, illustrante luce aeterna.”
\end{flushright}
if this were not produced, neither would there be that sensation by which extraneous things present are sensed.64

According to Bacon and Pecham, humans are the only creatures who have intellective souls, and the connection between sensory knowledge and intellectual knowledge is complex. Pecham’s conviction that the rational soul may in a sense be called the form of the body (although obviously not in an Aristotelian sense) is illustrated here by his position that the fulfillment of the soul’s natural desire to understand everything is partially contingent upon the what is provided by the senses.65

For any apprehended thing to be intellectually known, it must be assimilated to an eternal exemplar.66 Thus everything is known by its representation of a higher exemplar, and the highest exemplar exemplifies itself. This activity, which occurs in the context of “eternal light,” is the end result of the process begun by apprehension.67 The process of intellection involves a “plenitude of eternal and perfect wisdom stretched out in the plenitude of knowledge, accompanying its origin.”68 Clearly the discussion of the apprehension implicates the senses but also leads directly to a discussion of the sensitive

65 *Tractatus*, 9. In his *Quaestiones* (especially the second and fourth), Pecham explains his position about the soul’s relationship to the body as its substantial form.
66 *Tractatus*, 9: “Habet enim anima desiderium naturale cognoscendi omnia, ut perfectio universi, quae exterius est materialiter, sit in ipsa suo modo spiritualiter, ut sic assimiletur aeterno exemplari, in quo sunt omnia unita vel vita, omnia simplicissime repraesentata, omnia perfectissime adunata, sic et ipsa summum exemplar imitetur repraesentando ipsum, non solum in gradu suae essentiae sed in plenitudine scientiae omnia complectendo, et quae extra ipsam sunt materialiter in ipsa sint spiritualiter et acquiratur ei plenitudo essendi. . . .”
67 “Sed causa scientiae est lux aeterna. Nec enim species rerum corporalium animae illabuntur vel animae imprimitur” (ibid., 10).
68 Ibid.: “[I]n plenitudine scientiae praetendatur quaedam plenitudo aeternae et perfectae sapientiae, sua origine comitante.”
soul and even the rational soul. Pecham follows the principle that a greater cannot be the passive subject of a lesser. In this he claims to follow Aristotle: “[T]he soul is all things in a certain way, because sense is all sensible things, the intellect all intelligible things, and because the intellect is the species of species, just as the hand is the organ of organs.”

The soul has its own part to play, and similitudes may have a source other than the sense perception of objects in the world. Pecham says (citing Augustine) that images of bodies are not the bodies themselves, and the soul cannot be the material subject of the body. Taking his cue from Aristotle’s comparison between the soul and the hand, Pecham says that the soul is in potency to receive everything. The soul is created “in bareness” (in nuditate) and is thus totally assimilable, yet the soul is responsible (vigore ... suo et vi) for its own transformation into various similitudes (similitudines) or likenesses. Pecham is at once rejecting two views of knowledge: (1) The view of cognition where sense data is somehow directly responsible for knowledge without intelligible species or reference to the eternal reasons. This can never occur because the mind, in cooperation (of some kind) with the eternal reasons, contributes something of itself to the cognition. (2) The view of cognition that excludes sense data altogether. Sometimes sense data does provide content for similitudes, and yet such should be viewed as only a subordinate contribution to cognition.

69 Ibid., 11: “anima est quodammodo omnia, quia sensus omnia sensibilia, intellectus omnia, intelligibilia [sic], et quia intellectus est species specierum, sicut manus est organum organorum”; cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 432a.1-3.
70 The Literal Meaning of Genesis, 12.16.33: “[W]hile spirit comes before body, and the image of a body comes after the body, still nevertheless, because that which is last in time comes to be in that which is first in nature, the image of a body in the spirit outclasses the actual body as it is in itself.”
Pecham brings in Aristotle’s illustration of the seal in the wax. Aristotle’s text reads as follows:

Generally, about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter, in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or gold; what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or gold, but not qua bronze or gold: in a similar way the sense is affected by what is coloured or flavoured or sounding not insofar as each is what it is, but insofar as it is of such and such a sort and according to its form.\footnote{De Anima, 424a.17-23.}

Pecham emphasizes the wax’s potentiality to be formed in the shape of the seal.\footnote{Tractatus, 11.} The figure on the seal is not changing, whereas the wax does undergo a change. Thus Pecham thinks that, properly speaking, the form of the wax is attributable to the wax itself rather than to the seal. The illustration about the wax leads Pecham to make three arguments about the nature of corporeal species and their relation to knowledge.

1. The first argument starts with the assumption that the similitudes are active accidents that were formerly in potency. If the formal species were put into the soul from some perceived object outside the soul, then the species would already be in act. And, given Pecham’s assertions about the wax figure, the placing of the species in the soul would then be a process whereby an accident would move its subject. Pecham sees such a result as impossible, even though his position does not require that the intellect is totally responsible for its own knowledge of perceived objects.

2. Does Pecham’s principle that intelligible species cannot be put into the soul from outside (in the first argument just above) have an analogue that applies to corporeal

\footnote{Tractatus, 11.}
species? Pecham’s second argument seems to present such an analogue: Corporeal things are “utterly incomparable” (*penitus improportionalis*) to spiritual things, and a finite power cannot make a spiritual thing from a corporeal thing. But a corporeal species in an organ is corporeal and measured by the dimensions of the organ (Pecham takes this to be obvious from the fact that everything that is seen is seen from an angle, or from a certain perspective). This means that it is impossible for a spiritual species to be made entirely from a corporeal species already existing in the soul. This conclusion is also obvious from the fact, Pecham says, that an effect cannot be more noble than its cause. Rather, “intelligible species is not the light but the illuminable.” Divine light is thus implicated in the production of intelligible species from corporeal species.

3. The third argument has to do with the soul’s simplicity and provides further information about the illumination to which Pecham refers in the second argument. If corporeal species were added to the “material” of the soul, then the soul would no longer be simple, and the soul’s understanding would not be due to its own strength, but rather the soul would decrease in simplicity. Pecham says that divine light does not destroy the soul’s simplicity; it does not produce a mixture when it cooperates with the human soul to produce knowledge.

Pecham now distinguishes between those things that are naturally the subjects of the intellect (due to the intellect’s own natural potency) and those things that are not, because they exceed the intellect’s natural potency. In the case of those things that exceed the

---

73 Ibid.: “[S]pecies intelligibilis non est lux sed illuminabilis.”
74 Ibid., 11-12.
intellect’s power, understanding itself descends from the “Father of lights” (*patre luminum*). Yet the cognition is also said to be caused by a superior power in the intellect. Properly speaking, God is responsible for cognition, but there is activity on the side of the human intellect as well. This raises the question of what God contributes in human intellection and what man contributes. Pecham will deal with this issue in some detail in the next chapter of the *Tractatus*, but he first mentions his belief that angelic intermediaries assist in human knowledge by providing illuminations. He cites Augustine as an authority for this, which is plausible in light of what Roland J. Teske says about Augustine’s view of angels:

> [I]t seems that Augustine at one time early in his career held that there was a soul of the world such that the world is an animal. He later regarded the claim that the world is an animal as rash, that is, not as false, but as without sufficient foundation in either reason or Scripture. But even after he surrendered his previous claim that the world is an animal, he still—even to the end of his life—maintained a single living spiritual power that adorns and administers the world under God in angels and holy souls. That is, he maintained to the end a living spiritual power that is both one and many, a spiritual creature with which individual souls and angels are one.

What exactly does Pecham think that angels do for us as we come to know? The angels do not impart their own knowledge to the knower, but rather the angels provide “excitations of the souls so that they are turned to the divine ray.” An angel removes impediments to cognition, orders the phantasms, and serves as a channel through which the divine light can shine. Pecham adds another metaphor: “[J]ust as the person has who

---

76 *Tractatus*, 12.
77 *To Know God and the Soul: Essays on the Thought of Saint Augustine* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 222.
78 *Tractatus*, 12: “… excitationes animarum ut convertantur ad divinum radium.”
opens the window of the house to the illumination of the sun.” Such metaphors add little detail to our understanding of the process. Perhaps Pecham considers the operation of angelic intermediaries to be an unavoidably nebulous topic.

**Part One. Chapter Four.**

The fourth chapter continues the discussion of apprehension by considering how the soul transforms itself into the similitudes of things, and the method is largely a response to challenges concerning the soul’s understanding in the next life. As vision and light have previously served as literal and metaphorical bases for Pecham’s discussions about perception and understanding, vision is again the topic here. The visive power and the eye constitute one “essence and potency of seeing.” The visive power is the perfection of the eye, just as the whole soul is the perfection of the whole body. This is a key principle for understanding Pecham’s natural teleology. Prior to seeing anything the eye is uncolored or “in a certain middle and indifference to all colors and visible intentions,” which means that it is capable of perceiving all colors.

In the act of seeing, the soul is equally involved as the eye is. Pecham says that when Aristotle says “Sense is in potency to all sensibles,” that such potency refers not just to

---

79 Ibid.: “… sicut se habet qui aperit ad illuminationem domus fenestram a sole.”
80 Pecham does not seem to think that angels are involved in every instance of human cognition, for he says in the *Quaestiones* that God can show to man things that no angel knows (396); cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, *The Celestial Hierarchy*. 
82 Ibid., 12: “Vis enim visiva et organum oculi unam constituunt essentiam et videndi potentiam.”
83 Ibid., 13: “in medietate quadam et indifferensia ad omnes colores et intensiones [sic] visibles.”
84 See Aristotle, *De Anima*, 431b.18-432a.13. Augustine also gives attention to the active nature of sense perception (see O’Daly, *Augustine’s Philosophy*, 84ff.).
bodily passion, but to bodily compassion. That is, sensation is an act of the soul in conjunction with the sensory apparatus. Pecham reminds his readers of the general principle that the soul is united to the body by the soul’s desire to govern the body, citing the authority of Avicenna. Pecham cites Augustine as saying that the addition of one star in the celestial orbit would require the labor of the Mover of the world, suggesting that the soul as the mover of the body is necessarily aware of bodily involvement in the acquisition of sensory knowledge. Indeed, it is by both cognition and movement that the soul/body relationship is explained, or at least exemplified.

Pecham next deals with a possible objection to the theory of knowledge by similitudes. The objection says that if we suppose that the soul transforms itself into the similitude of a species of a thing in order to produce knowledge, then we must ask whether the potential knower already had knowledge of the thing. If he already had knowledge, then he would not need a similitude, and if he did not have previous knowledge of the thing, it would only be by accident that he would make the connection between the similitude and the object that is to be known. Pecham responds to this argument by saying that the non-knower’s first acquisition of knowledge is either the mind noticing something that is stored in the memory or is from divine light. Although

---

85 See Avicenna, De Anima, 1.3.
86 However, this position is not stated in Augustine’s On Music, as Pecham claims. It is found in Marston, Quodlibeta, 411, but in the footnote the editor (Etzkorn) notes that the position is found in neither Augustine, nor Aristotle, nor in the Latino-Graeco translation of Averroes. Etzkorn thinks the statement was probably a note that got incorporated into the text (personal email communication).
87 Tractatus, 14.
88 Cf. Plato’s discussion of a similar problem (Meno, trans., G.M.A. Grube, 80d-100b).
this does not prevent the knower from learning something that seems new to the knower, there is never a time when knowledge is produced from no previous knowledge whatsoever, since there is a previous *a priori* knowledge in either the mind of the knower or in the mind of God.

Recall that, in the first chapter of the *Tractatus*, Pecham affirms that “all men desire to know.”89 Does Pecham believe in innate human knowledge or not? He clearly does in some sense, but does not explain in detail. Perhaps he takes himself to have already dealt with this issue in the *Quaestiones De Anima*, where he connects the formal and efficient causality of divine illumination with human cognition.90 However, here Pecham focuses on the naturalistic aspect of coming to know. What Pecham says here does not commit him to the view that man has innate knowledge prior to the contribution of knowledge from God’s mind. Furthermore, Pecham’s position in the first chapter could be read as meaning that desire usually precedes knowledge. Pecham denies that knowledge can be acquired by chance as the objection stated, because understanding occurs only when the intention of the soul is “moving around the cognition” (*circa cognitionem satagentis*).91

This is the transformation of the soul into the similitude, or what Pecham calls the natural collection of the intellect to what is unchanged. The objector has evidently misunderstood the role of the similitudes—they are not pictures that may or may not conform to reality outside the mind (such that the knower would have to assess the conformity), but rather the abstraction of some data from the corporeal species.

---

89 *Tractatus*, 5.
91 *Tractatus*, 14.
Cognition is, for Pecham, evidence of how closely the soul and body are related to one another:

Nor is it surprising if the body and soul are joined together, since they seem to go together better than the incidental and reflected angle, which always are equal. Whence when a ray is falling on the smooth body, while the body is moved and the incidental angle itself is varied to a greater or lesser degree, it is necessary that the reflected angle vary or change.92

Pecham says that he learned his view from “the Saints” (sanctis, learned doctors of the church) and “Philosophers,” all of whom he takes to be in agreement: Augustine, Boethius, and Aristotle.93 Pecham urges his readers not to take his views to the unlearned, because they will ridicule his position.

Pecham now responds to the objection drawn from the idea that the separated soul cognizes solely by immediate divine illumination “in the higher world” (in mundo superiori).94 Some have claimed, Pecham says, that the human intellect is the last in a chain of radiated intelligences,95 and the separated soul receives its understanding from a higher intelligence and therefore needs no senses. This amounts to a challenge to Pecham’s emphasis on the integral role of the sensitive soul in the production of human

---

92 Ibid.: “Nec mirum si sibi cohaerent corpus et anima cum magis se comitari videantur, quam angulus incidentiae et reflexionis, qui semper sunt aequales. Unde radio cadente super corpus politum moto corpore, et angulo indicentiae seu in maiorem seu in minorem variato, necesse est angulum reflexionis variari vel commutari.”

93 Ibid.: “Haec sunt verissima, quae didici a Sanctis et Philosophis, quos credo haec ipsa concorditer ipsos sentire Augustinum, Boetium, Aristotelem. Haec insuper illustrissimorum doctorum collatione probavi et examinavi.”

94 Ibid., 14-15.

knowledge, and thus to his emphasis on body/soul unity. Pecham objects to this view, because it makes the soul rely totally on other intelligences for natural knowledge. On the other hand, others have said that the separated soul takes with it its sensitive powers, or that the sensitive powers are conjoined to the separated soul by reason. Pecham acknowledges that a statement of Augustine’s could be cited in favor of this view: “For the body does not sense but the soul through the body, which it uses as an instrument to forming in itself what rests on the exterior.” Furthermore, a statement of Aristotle’s to the effect that sense is a “movement of the soul through the body” might concord with the objection. Those who make this objection say that the soul, when conjoined to the corporeal body, senses only by bodily mediation. Pecham’s response includes the following four points:

- The separated soul does not need bodily mediation or a medium in order to gain knowledge from the senses, as the soul does when it is conjoined to the body.
- The pseudo-Augustinian book De Spiritu et Anima (by Alcher of Clairvaux) says that “the soul takes along with it the imaginative, concupiscible, and irascible”

---

96 *Tractatus*, 15.
97 Ibid. Pecham will, in this context, cite Augustine and Alcher of Clairvaux as proponents of the first position, and Bonaventure is an example of the second position (see Quinn, *The Historical Constitution*, 341-342).
100 *Tractatus*, 15.
101 Ibid., 15-16.
aspects.\textsuperscript{102} And, the imaginative power is identified with the sensitive power (Pecham will discuss the imagination in chapter 10). Therefore the separated soul itself can sense, but not through bodily mediation.

- Some have tried to compromise by saying that the separated soul takes with it the intellect without the sensitive potencies, but that the intellect is still able to cognize all particulars.\textsuperscript{103} This cannot be right, for the act of understanding is the act of the intellect conjoined to the phantasms just as the eye joins itself to colors. The intellect requires phantasms, but this does not mean that the only source for the phantasms is corporeal vision. A sensitive potency is not equivalent to the operation of a corporeal sense organ.

- The separated soul can cognize through its own visive power without the corporeal species that are necessary for vision by the corporeal body, and can transform itself into similitudes.\textsuperscript{104}

Here, Pecham does not describe in detail how the separated soul’s sensation works.

Pecham does, however, respond to the view that the species that emanate from the objects do not represent the object’s accidental qualities, but rather its substance.\textsuperscript{105} The separated soul receives this special kind of species. Pecham tentatively disagrees, saying that the separated soul cognizes not only the quiddities of things, but also the same quantities and qualities which sense discerns.\textsuperscript{106}

Someone might respond that species may represent the essences of the accidents themselves. Pecham’s solution is that anything the intellect receives is received through

\textsuperscript{102} The precise quotation from the \textit{De Spiritu et Anima} is: “Si vero distemperata et confusa fuerint, invita recedit anima, secum trahens omnia; sensum scilicet, imaginationem, rationem, intellectum, intelligentiam, concupiscibilitatem, et irascibilitatem: et ex his secundum merita afficitur ad delectationem, sive ad dolorem” (\textit{PL} 40, 791).

\textsuperscript{103} See Bonaventure, \textit{Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi}, Opera Omnia, ed. College of St. Bonaventure [Rome: College of St. Bonaventure, 1887], 4.50.2.1.

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Tractatus}, 15-16.

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 16.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
the mode of the receiver.\textsuperscript{107} Thus Pecham concludes that the separated soul requires for
cognition the excitation of some sensory capacity by species, albeit incorporeal.

Furthermore, this process occurs as the soul occupies a place in a spiritual way so that no
other spirit can be in that place.

There is yet another opinion to which Pecham thinks he must respond. Some have
minimized the role of sensation by eliminating the need for corporeal species in the
following way: they say that a spirit is in a place only in the sense that it is operating, but
not according to a quantity of dimension.\textsuperscript{108} Pecham sees this view as presenting an
ontological difficulty.\textsuperscript{109} A thing must be in a place before it can operate in a place; in the
present world at least, the intellect can receive species and thus transform itself into

\textsuperscript{107} Cf. \textit{The Book of Causes}: “Therefore, the effect is in the cause after the mode of the
cause, and the cause is in the effect after the mode of the effect. . . .” (30).
\textsuperscript{108} Roger Bacon, for example, takes the position that the soul is literally nowhere, even
though it is operating (see R. James Long, “Roger Bacon on the Nature and Place of
Angels,” \textit{Vivarium} 35, no. 2 (1997): 271-277). Another example is Thomas Aquinas,
Schaff and Henry Wace (Buffalo: Christian Literature, 1899), 2.3; Bonaventure,
\textit{Commentary on the Sentences} (Florence: Quaracchi, 1882-1902), 1.37.3.ad.2. This
position was condemned in 1277: “52A. That the separated substances, in so far as they
have a single appetite, do not change in their operation. 53A. That an intelligence or an
angel or a separated soul is nowhere. 54A. That the separated substances are nowhere
according to their substance.—This is erroneous if so understood as to mean that
substance is not in a place. If, however, it is so understood as to mean that substance is
the reason for being in a place, it is true that they are nowhere according to their
substance. 55A. That the separated substances are somewhere by their operation, and that
they cannot move from one extreme to another or to the middle except in so far as they
can will to operate either in the middle or in the extremes.—This is erroneous if so
understood as to mean that without operation a substance is not in a place and that it does
not pass from one place to another” (“The Condemnation of 1277,” \textit{Philosophy in the
Middle Ages}, 587).
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Tractatus}, 16-17.
similitudes only by “communicating itself to place by altering the species of corporeal things”. Pecham finishes the fourth chapter by reminding his readers that when the soul is separated from its earthly body, it will be more “free” to cognize than when it is conjoined to the corporeal. This is because the corporeal body brings with it corruption that aggravates the soul. The separated sensitive soul, embodied differently after this life (particularly with some new kind of visive power) is not so obstructed. Pecham will discuss the glorified body further in the eighth chapter.

Part One. Chapter Five.

The fifth chapter is Pecham’s discussion about intellectual cognition through illumination. Pecham begins by identifying his view with that of Augustine, rather than with Aquinas, Bonaventure, and others who espouse the view that the separated soul occupies a place only by operating. The major premise of what Pecham takes to be the relevant portion of Augustine’s position is: “[E]verything which we understand we cognize through eternal light and in it. In it we cognize the scientific principles, in it we see the things which are deduced after the principles from the principles.” Divine light is therefore associated with fundamental principles that allow for scientific knowledge. Pecham offers to clarify this by comparing cognition to vision. Perceptual vision is a model for intellectual cognition.

---

10 Ibid., 17: “... communicando se loco speciebus rerum corporalium alterando. . . .”
11 Cf. Wisdom 9:15: “For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things” (King James Version).
12 Tractatus, 17-21.
13 Ibid., 17: “[O]mmia, quae intelligimus per lucem aeternam et in illa cognoscimus, in ipsa cognoscimus scientialia principia, in ipsa videmus quae sunt post principia ex principiis deducta.”
A number of things are required for corporeal vision: “Transparency in the eye, brightness of the natural eye, and the light of the sun shining on the eye, medium, and object, positing the visible species in the act of multiplication.” Pecham explains why each of the first three items is necessary. Transparancy is necessary because without it, the eye could not receive the species. The brightness of the natural eye is necessary because, as Aristotle has said, that the eye is not only passive but also “acts in a splendid manner” (agit quemadmodum splendid). Pecham illustrates the necessity of the eye’s activity by noticing that a person’s “prominent” or stronger eye sees poorly at long distance, whereas a person’s “dense” (profundus) or weaker eye sees well from long distance. If the eyes were inactive in receiving the species, it would not matter which eye is stronger or weaker; the species would all be received just the same so long as there was an eye there to receive at all. Furthermore, vision is undivided because the two eyes

114 Ibid., 17-18: “Ad hoc ut visus sit in effectu tria concurrunt, scilicet: perspicuitas in oculo, splendor oculi naturalis et lux solaris radians super oculum, medium et obiectum, ponens species visibles in actu multiplicationis.”; This might be read as a summary of Roger Bacon’s theory of vision (see Bacon, Roger Bacon and the Origins of Perspectiva, 1ff.). For example: “[T]he first or principal multiplication is straight, refracted or reflected; and it comes [directly] from the agent, as we have established above. But the accidental or secondary radiation comes not from the agent but from the principal species. This is the case when light reaches the corners of a house from a solar ray falling through a window; and this secondary ray is weaker than the principal ray beyond comparison, nor does it connect the eye to the object from which the multiplication originated. Thus a man in the corner of a house, receiving the secondary species of solar light in his eye, does not see the sun, but rather the ray falling through the window” (ibid., 83, bracketed items in orig.).

115 Ibid., 18.


assist one another. Pecham says there is no difference between saying that the eye sees and saying that vision goes out to the thing seen.  

Pecham has here indicated that his position on vision is a blend of the intromission and extramission theories of vision. Now he notes that there is division between those who subscribe to the intromission theory and those who subscribe to extramission. According to Pecham, Plato—against Aristotle—posited the extramission theory, as did the authors of the books on vision (presumably Al-Kindi\textsuperscript{119}). The philosophantes are confused about the subject, evidently not understanding that prominent authorities believed with Pecham that intromission plays an important role. It has been said that “rays spring forth from the eye” and fall on the visible things.\textsuperscript{120} The rays are “dipped and dashed on the visible form,” “soak” the visible form, and then are reflected to the eye from the visible thing.\textsuperscript{121} Pecham holds that the model as stated is false.

Pecham briefly presents his own theory of vision, which is, like that of Bacon, a blend of the intromission and extramission theories, and in which he uses the word “rays” (\textit{radii}) as synonymous with species.\textsuperscript{122} Rays, or the species of the visible forms,

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Tractatus}, 18.


\textsuperscript{120} For a discussion of the meaning of “philosophantes,” see Gilson, “Les ‘Philosophantes’,” \textit{Archives D’Histoire Doctrinale Et Littéraire du Moyen Age} 19 (1952): 135-140.

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Tractatus}, 18: “Ponebant siquidem radios ab oculis emicare et super visibiles cadentes intingi et illidi formae visibili, et sic extinctos et illisos ad oculum reflexos de visibili oculo nuntiare, quod falsum est.”

come to the eye but are not automatically proportional to the eye. Rather, the species must be “tempered to the eye by the connatural light of the eye.”

How does the eye’s intervention work? Pecham explains that the eye does indeed send out rays and that these rays observe visible species, but do not take hold of and saturate them as the previous philosophers had said. This is clear because rays emitted by different species of animals have different levels of potency. Some animals do not need sunlight in order to see (lion, snake, cat), even though all animals need the general celestial power working on the elements. Human vision is no different in requiring “superior illumination” (superiore illustratione). Pecham thinks that his account, by incorporating intromission, explains how species can transcend the faculty of the eye, as when light is too bright. In cases where the eyes are overwhelmed “the visible species transcends the faculty of the eye.”

Having explained something of his theory of vision, Pecham is now in a position to discuss the comparison between corporeal vision and intellection. The intellective soul has “so to speak a transparency of the mind as possibility, which is transformable to the similitudes or differences of all forms, and this power, just as I believe, is called the possible intellect. . . .” The intellect also has an active power which produces the

---

123 *Tractatus*, 18: “... nisi a lumine oculi connaturali contemperentur oculo. . . .”
124 Ibid., 19.
125 Ibid., 18: “… transcendit species visibilis oculi facultatem. . . .”; Pecham cites Aristotle’s *Generation of Animals* (5.1) for confirmation on this point.
127 Ibid., 19: “Habet enim quasi perspicuitatem mentis possibilitatem, qua in omnium formarum similitudines vel differentias est transformabilis, et haec vis, sicut credo, dicitur, intellectus possibilis. . . .”
similitudes by virtue of the superior light, the divine illumination in which everything is known. In making contact with the divine light the active intellect contacts the “reason of seeing” (rationem videndi) which is apart from what can be found in the object. Pecham does not develop the theory of divine reasons here. However there is a tradition of divine reasons, inspired by Augustine and adapted by Bonaventure, and given what Pecham has already said about exemplars in the present work, we may assume that Pecham has this tradition in mind. If this assumption is correct, we may say that, generally speaking, Pecham thinks knowledge occurs by comprehending things in light of their ultimate explanations, which are available only in God. Pecham says elsewhere that man has access to the divine reasons by virtue of innate, noncomplex “first impressions,” which are principles such as “being” and “good,” i.e., transcendentals.

Pecham goes into some detail about how the intellect is “completed” through the divine light. He offers the example that the human soul intuitively understands that the whole is greater than its parts, but that when the soul has an image of a whole, it does not also have an image of all of the parts and therefore lacks understanding of all of the relevant reasons. Thus the soul “never has in itself in actuality the reason of the whole

---

130 *Tractatus*, 20.
and of the part simultaneously.”¹³¹ Yet the soul’s knowledge that the whole is greater than its parts is precisely what allows the soul to understand that the eternal light is necessary for true understanding:

Thus the soul, running to and fro through portrayed species according to its highest end, touches the reasons of the same parts in eternal light and there discerns the unchanging truth of the utterable and from there drinks up the truth, just as Augustine says. . . .¹³²

Pecham says that the agent intellect is responsible for accessing the eternal reasons.

Given that Pecham has just mentioned the human possible intellect, there is no reason to presuppose that the agent intellect here, in the human person, must refer to God or some intelligence higher than man. Yet Pecham cites Aristotle and Avicenna here in order to reference a higher intelligence as the agent intellect which radiates onto the human intellect: Aristotle says the agent intellect can understand all things at once, and “Avicenna says that to understand is in us, through this which intelligible forms radiate on our intellect from the agent intellect.”¹³³ Pecham clarifies his position immediately by stating that there is both a created agent intellect an an uncreated agent intellect.¹³⁴ The divine agent intellect provides the illumination discussed above, whereas the human

¹³¹ Ibid.: “Igitur, anima in se nunquam habet simul rationem totius et partis in actu. . . .”
¹³³ Tractatus, 20: “… Avicenna dicit quod intelligere sit in nobis, per hoc quod formae intelligibiles irradiant super intellectum nostrum ab intelligentia agente. . . .”; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 5.5; Aristotle, De Anima, 430a.10-18.
¹³⁴ He says that he is reiterating (Duplicem ... pono) something that he already said about this, but there is no prior statement on the issue in the Tractatus. Pecham does state his position on the twofold agent intellect elsewhere (Quaestiones, 343, 403, 415).
agent intellect abstracts species from the phantasms and unites with the human possible intellect, which is activated or excited by the phantasms and is “multiply assimilable” (*multipliciter assimilabilis*). Action and passion must both be involved in cognition at the level of the individual human being. The memory is also included as an active and passive power.\(^{135}\)

Pecham says that he has explained further how everything is seen in the divine light in his *Quaestiones* on Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*.\(^{136}\) In a passage from that text, Pecham asks two questions. The first is “Whether God is the reason of cognizing everything cognized by the intellect with certitude.”\(^{137}\) Pecham’s answer to the first question is summarized: “the created *habitus* does not suffice to illustrate the soul, without the flowing in of the uncreated light.”\(^{138}\) The second question is: “Whether everything false is cognized in eternal light through itself.”\(^{139}\) Pecham’s answer to the second is: “[A knower] would not see the falsity of the cognition unless in these reasons, by which all things are made.”\(^{140}\) It is not that the divine light conveys false information, but that all cognition (even if it results in a false judgment) requires divine illumination to begin with.\(^{141}\) And, only divine light makes it possible to recognize falsity.

\(^{135}\) *Tractatus*, 20-21.

\(^{136}\) Ibid., 21.

\(^{137}\) Ibid., 131: “Utrum Deus sit ratio cognoscendi omne cognitum certitudinaliter ab intellectu”.

\(^{138}\) Ibid., 136: “Praeterea, habitus creatus non sufficit animae illustrandae, nisi luce increata superinfluente.”

\(^{139}\) Ibid., 134: “Iuxta hoc quaeritur utrum omne falsum cognoscatur in luce aeterna vel per ipsam”.


\(^{141}\) See ibid., 136-136.
Before concluding chapter five, Pecham summarizes the discussion of intellection to this point. The summary includes the following major points:

- To understand is to discern the habitudes (habituidines) of things in the reflection of eternal light.
- To judge is to examine what is understood with reference to the eternal reasons.
- The memory is the repository of knowledge.

In this summary Pecham also adds details about memory. It is a two-fold act: (1) The treasury of intelligence, which is to hold the things pertaining to knowledge; (2) The representation of the treasury’s content to the intellect. There is also a difference between intellectual and sensible memory (Pecham will elaborate on this difference in chapter 10). In one way knowledge is temporally prior to memory, but in memory’s proper use it runs ahead of knowledge and memory is the “parent” (parens) of the intellect. This would seem to refer to God as the source of some of the memory’s contents.

Part One. Chapter Six.

The sixth chapter is nominally Pecham’s discussion of the quiddity of love, but it also includes a discussion of the passions generally, and concludes the longer section on “the acts of the soul and the cognitive and affective motions.” Love troubles the soul when the beloved is absent, and refreshes the soul and is at rest when the beloved is present.

Pecham interprets a statement from Augustine as meaning that love is a kind of life that

---

142 Ibid., 21.
143 I take the eternal light here to refer to the eternal reasons, per Pecham’s discussion above (ibid., chapters three and five).
144 Tractatus, 21.
145 Cf. Augustine, Confessions, 10.10.17ff.
146 Tractatus, 24.
147 Ibid., 21.
occurs when two come together in the context of desiring one another. Pecham takes literally the principle that “love is life and life coming together” by applying it to the vital movement or appetite by which a living thing seeks a complement. Thus love is involved at the foundational level of formed life, as discussed earlier in the Tractatus. Love is not per se the appetite to know, even though cognition can determine the object of desire and thus make the appetite inclined more efficaciously to its object. Pecham says that this point is not merely the result of abstract reasoning about love and the beloved, but is also prompted by phenomenological observation: “So indeed it is the desire that afflicts if the desired thing is moved away; it loves too much if it is shown as desired.” It is also separate from the process of cognition as described in the context of intelligible and corporeal species. It is clear that love can be included in the process of intellection only as the motivation of the process. It is through the life of the soul that desire is “specified” (specificatur) and it is by desire that cognition is “drawn together, ... fortified, and quieted.” On this view, love can be called the unitive, transformative, and assimilative power.

---

148 Ibid., 22; cf. Augustine, On the Trinity, 13.10. This statement has to do with the love of God that motivates his giving of the gifts of the Holy Spirit.
149 Pecham cites Augustine (On the Trinity, 9.12) and Pseudo-Dionysius (The Divine Names, chapter 4) in connection with this principle.
150 Pecham’s view of love as permeating living this is reflective of Pseudo-Dionysius (see Eric D. Perl, “Pseudo-Dionysius,” A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 542-544).
152 Tractatus, 22: “... contrahitur, fortificatur et quietatur.”
Having defined love, Pecham now moves to a problem associated with human desire. Love does not automatically rest as it should, but rather the soul can be “hurt,” “as if weakened,” and “moved by loving.” Corruption and aggravation result from corporeal embodiment, thus human love is imperfect. The divine love that rests in man must be purged by connection with the rule of love, i.e., the rule of the Holy Spirit. Pecham says that a human may love in accord with this rule and thus have what Pecham calls the disposition and inhering form of divine love. The framework of species multiplication comes up again in the discussion of this habitus of love: “And by how much the power of love is stronger, the passion of love is so much more intense and by the multiplication of the act of love on the beloved, a disposition of love is established and from the multiplied passion the affect of love is born, which is the ground of all affections.” This is why, according to Pecham, “Augustine says: affections are good if the love is good, bad if the love is bad.” On Augustine’s view, which Pecham seems to be adopting here, good love refers to the love of a worthy object, and bad love to the love of an unworthy object.

154 *Tractatus*, 23: “Sed quia ex coniunctione cum corpore corrupto laesa est anima. . . .”
155 Ibid., 22-23.
156 Ibid., 23.
157 Ibid.: “Et quanto vis amoris est fortior, tanto et passio amoris intensor et multiplicatione actuum amoris super amatum, amoris habitus firmatur et ex passione multiplicata affectio amoris nascitur, quae radix est omnium affectionum.”
158 Ibid.: “… dicit Augustinus: bonae sunt affectiones si bonus est amor, malae si malus est amor.”
159 *City of God*, 14.7.
Pecham now specifies his discussion of love by considering the four particular human passions: joy, hope, fear, and pain.\textsuperscript{160} Each relates to love in a different way. Pain occurs when love is offended, and pain is greater according to how intensely the absent object of love is desired.\textsuperscript{161} Joy occurs when love is at rest because the beloved has been obtained. Hope and fear both relate to the future. Hope “opens wide to obtain what it expects” (and presumably desires) whereas fear “mistrusts to let go” of the beloved.\textsuperscript{162} “[W]e advance when we desire or hope, we flee when we fear.”\textsuperscript{163} Pecham offers examples: There is a certain diffusion of the soul when rejoicing occurs, a diffusion which Pecham calls exultation (\textit{laetitia}) as well as joy (\textit{gaudium}). Pecham thinks that the passions are alike in humans and animals. The difference in the human being is that the rational soul rules the passions, in a better or worse way depending on how much the rational soul abounds in virtues.\textsuperscript{164}

Pecham says that the \textit{philosophantes} have erred by saying that the passions are to be ascribed only to the sensitive soul, but in reality the passions relate in some way to the intellect as well.\textsuperscript{165} Pecham sees the passions as gifts from God and as necessary to carry out righteous acts rather than as seductions to sin.\textsuperscript{166} Passion that obeys the intellect

\textsuperscript{160} \textit{Tractatus}, 23-24.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., 23.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.: “Spes enim inhiat obtinere quod expectatur, timor amittere suspicatur.”
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.: “... progredimur cum appetimus vel speramus, fugimus cum timemus.”
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 24.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 23-24. On this point Pecham cites Augustine, \textit{City of God}, 9.2 and 9.5. Pecham cites the authority of Augustine for two views: (1) Even demons have passions that trouble them. (2) God provides the passions to facilitate the exercise of virtues, not to tempt us.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 24.
allows a person to choose rightly even when difficult consequences accompany the choice. Thus, the martyrs had not only “love regulating choice,” but also the “intoxicating love of affections.” On this view love is not, properly speaking, one of a plurality passions, but it is the main factor determining which action will be chosen, and it is conditioned by an interrelation of belief and feeling. Pecham explains that love is in the rational part of the soul, whereas in the irrational part of the soul the passions reside alongside concupiscence (*concupiscentia*), which is similar to love in that it involves desire.

**Part One. Chapter Seven.**

Pecham has already said that the soul is troubled by embodiment, and chapter seven develops this theme. The chapter also discusses more broadly the relationship between soul and body.

The intellect is made for contemplation and needs the body not for its operation, but for assistance in acquiring some material for thought and then using it (presumably also putting the material to practical use in the corporeal world). The intellect needs the body only in the sense that a sailor needs a ship only until he is brought to port. Specifically, reason needs the help of the phantasms in order to reach the intelligibles, just as a set of

---

167 Ibid.: “Habuerunt enim martyres non solum amorem regulantem electionem, sed amorem inebriantem affectionem. . . .”
168 Ibid., 25-27.
equal lines that reach from inside a circle to its circumference require the center of a
circle as a starting point.\textsuperscript{171}

However, even when the intellect has its knowledge, it is still entangled
(\textit{praepediuntur}) due to the ineptitude of the body, and this restricts (although it does not eliminate) a person’s freedom of choice. Pecham says that Avicenna is correct in saying that this restriction occurs because one power impedes another and all of these powers are part of the same essence.\textsuperscript{172} The most obvious example of this is when a person gets tired of contemplation and must rest.\textsuperscript{173} During sleep the natural operations of the body are the strongest, and the intellect is at its weakest, although the intellect’s operations are not fully obstructed (some people seem to think logically when asleep). Still, Pecham says that sleep impedes cognition and abstraction, for something must be cognized before it can be loved. That is, because a person’s affections are not necessarily the same in sleep as they are in wakefulness, we can trust that the person’s normal cognitive activity has been interrupted. Citing Avicenna, Pecham observes that changes in the various humors can affect the “spirits” (\textit{spiritus}) or “vehicles of animal powers” (\textit{vehicula virtutum animalium}), and thus problems with principal organs can negatively affect intellectual powers, even to the point of madness.\textsuperscript{174}

The spirits are critical to Pecham’s understanding of the soul’s coming together with the body. Pecham argues that because the rational soul is united not to every kind of

\textsuperscript{171} \textit{Tractatus}, 26.
\textsuperscript{172} See Avicenna, \textit{De Anima}, 5.7.
\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Tractatus}, 26-27; cf. Avicenna, \textit{De Anima}, 5.8. Pecham will call these spirits “dispositions” (\textit{Tractatus}, 27).
body, but only to the human body, the body must have a subsisting, mediating disposition. 175 This spiritual disposition Pecham calls the most noble of all the bodily spirits. This disposition itself is not intellectual, but ministers to the intellect’s operation; the spirits are not vehicles of intelligence, but rather a compartmentalization (comportionatum) of the body. By positing this kind of connection between the soul and body, Pecham does not take himself to be ruling out purely supernatural knowledge. 176 The source of such knowledge is not the individual knower’s active intellect or senses, but rather an impression(s) from the superior divine mind onto the inferior mind. 177 This distinction is the first aspect of Pecham’s account of revelations in dreams. The second aspect is God’s inspiration through both the respiration of the knower and the provision of phantasms via the angelic ministry. 178 This inspiration occurs most frequently in those who are mad and near death, because the souls of such people are freer from the restrictions of the body and may even be pulling away from the body. 179 As a general rule, the more the senses are obscured, the more likely it is that a person will receive an impression from above.

175 Tractatus, 27: “[A]nimia rationalis aliquam requirit dispositionem, mediante qua in corpore subsistat. . . .”
176 Ibid., 27-28.
177 Ibid., 27.
178 Ibid., 28.
179 Cf. Pecham, Quodlibeta, 254: “Alio modo aptatur ad receptionem superioris influentiae per aversionem a sensibus, et hoc vel per alienationem factam ab aliquo spiritu bono vel malo; vel per violentiam morbi, sicut patet in epilepticis, ut dicit Algazel, in quibus ipse sensus habetur [sic] et spiritus debilis retrahitur ad interiora, et tunc aptatur anima ad recipiendum a substantiis separatis, et hoc secundum varia genera morborum, ut de phreneticis et puero patiente dolorem genitalium narrat Augustinus, XII Super Genesim, cap. 5”; Etzkorn, “Franciscan Quodlibeta,” 140.
Pecham concludes the first part of the *Tractatus* by saying that his positions have been taken without any prejudice based on the opinions of someone more prestigious than himself.

**Part Two. Chapter Eight.**

The second part of the *Tractatus* deals with the powers of the soul. What is the difference between the “powers” of the soul and what Pecham calls the “operations” of the soul (the topic of the first part of the *Tractatus*)? The two words are misleading labels for Pecham’s structure. Pecham’s discussion of the operations of the soul concerns the broad discussion of the soul’s definition, its relationship to God and to the sensible world, as well as its potencies. However, the discussion of the soul’s powers is a narrower discussion of the various aspects of its potencies and how they are activated.

Pecham begins the second part, in chapter eight, by discussing the soul’s power broadly.¹⁸⁰ The soul cannot be measured as if it were some quantity in mass.¹⁸¹ Rather the soul is incorporeal, a simple essence which has a quantity only potentially.¹⁸² This explains how the soul takes on incorporeal things and corporeal things incorporeally.¹⁸³ Pecham’s example here is the line: When a line is drawn onto paper, it has width and is not perfectly straight. However, when the line is represented in the soul, it is perfectly straight and need not have width. The soul can receive “spiritual things in a spiritual

---

¹⁸² *Tractatus*, 28, 29.
¹⁸³ Ibid., 28.
mode and things made in matter are true in the soul.” The intellect “abstracts its intelligible from measurement and position,” since nothing that exists in a body lacks dimension and situation. The soul has no physical parts, but it has what Pecham calls virtual parts, or parts in principle. Pecham uses the idea of virtual parts to explain how a single soul can communicate itself as the whole soul to any part of the body and perfect the various potencies that are associated with the diverse organs.

Pecham says that this has been difficult for some to understand, because they take the soul’s simplicity to indicate a very small point or dot. Such a point, however, could not be communicated to the whole quantity of the body. Intellectual simplicity is not spatial smallness, but rather a communicable unity. The soul is one kind of thing wherever it is, unlike corporeal bodies, which are heterogenous.

The soul is essentially in the whole body, but the various potencies of the soul are the perfections of the body’s diverse organs. Perfection (perfectio) refers to the fulfillment of the organs’ potencies (potentiarum). For example, the human soul is the perfection of the eye insofar as it brings together species, making possible the visive power. The same essence that provides for the fulfillment of the eye’s function also provides for the

---

185 Ibid.: “Iterum, intellectus suum intelligibile abstrahit a dimensione et situ.”
186 Ibid., 28-29.
187 Ibid., 29.
188 Pecham uses the distinction between intensive dimensionality and extensive dimensionality to explain this distinction (Tractatus, 29). He notes Augustine’s view of the glorified body (cf. Augustine, Magnitude of the Soul, 15.25-16.28; Immortality of the Soul, 16.25).
189 Tractatus, 30.
fulfillment of the ear’s and nose’s functions, providing the visive, auditive, and olfactory potencies to the correct organs. Pecham responds to the materialists’ objection that the organs contain within themselves the various potencies by saying that the intellectual powers “are streamed in by no organ” (nulli organo influuntur). On this point he cites Aristotle, crediting him with the view that the intellect is not part of any act of the body. Pecham’s view of the intellect applies to all of the soul’s powers: “all powers, which are under the intellect, are applied by the organs.

Pecham notes Augustine’s view of the glorified body, which might imply that there is a problem for Pecham’s view of the soul’s relation to the various physical organs: One might suppose that just as the head is different from the foot, so it has a different immortality from that of the foot. This would contradict the view that Pecham endorsed in chapter four of the Tractatus. Pecham responds by saying that immortality “has intension with extension.” I take this to mean that immortality can subsist in a physical, extensive body, and also in an incorporeal, intensive body. This allows the soul, no matter what body in which it resides, to be one and the same in the whole and in the parts of that body, whether corporeal or glorified.

190 Ibid.
191 See Aristotle, De Anima, 413b.25-414a.3.
192 Tractatus, 30 (emp. added): “Omnes autem vires, quae sunt sub intellectu, organis applicantur.”
193 Ibid., 29-30.
194 Ibid., 29.
195 Ibid., 30.
Part Two. Chapter Nine.

The ninth chapter begins the discussion of the makeup of the soul in terms of its potencies, and provides a breakdown of the nutritive potency.\textsuperscript{196} As already mentioned, there are three primary divisions of the soul: vegetative, sensitive, and intellective.\textsuperscript{197} Some ensouled beings only have the vegetative aspect of soul, and some have more. The human being has presented a special problem for philosophers, some of whom—most of all the \textit{philosophantes}—have said that the human has three substances (the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective) that make up one soul, just as matter and form are different natures that make up one substance.\textsuperscript{198} This is similar to how some people say that lights in the medium are plural, but that there is only one act of the medium. Pecham observes Aristotle’s statement to the effect that “only the intellect enters from outside,” and that the theologians agree with this.\textsuperscript{199} In this connection, Pecham says that it seems that the fetus is an animal prior to being a man.\textsuperscript{200} Pecham says

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., 30-33.  \\
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 30.  \\
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid., 31: “... solus intellectus intrat ab extrinseco. . . .”; cf. Aristotle, \textit{Generation of Animals}: “It remains, then, for the reason alone so to enter and alone to be divine, for no bodily activity has any connexion with the activity of reason” (736b.26-28).  \\
\textsuperscript{200} \textit{Tractatus}, 31: “Cui videtur concordare quod fetus prius tempore animal est quam homo. . . .”
\end{flushleft}
that a particular law about accidental abortion can only apply to those fetuses that are “formed.”

Others have taken the position that the rational soul, although created by God, includes within itself the three potencies and that these potencies are not themselves substances. The principle that might support this view is that whatever a lower power can do a higher power can also do, but not the other way around. Indeed, animals have sensitivity and also have the power of vegetation. Pecham says that the views of the “doctors and theologians” are more in line with this account than the view according to which the human being is a structure of three substances. While Pecham takes clearly takes the pluralist position with regard to the substantial plurality of forms elsewhere, even allowing them to be called substances, he does not argue for that position at this

---

201 Pecham does not say to which law he refers. Melani’s footnote says that the law under consideration is the law of Moses in Exodus 21:22, yet Pecham’s statement of the law is not the same as the law as recorded in Exodus 21:22-25: “[S]i rixati fuerint viri et percusserit quis mulierem praegnantem et abortivum quidem fecerit sed ipsa vixerit subiacebit damno quantum expetierit maritus mulieris et arbitri iudicarint. Sin autem mors eius fuerit subsecuta reddet animam pro anima. Oculum pro oculo dentem pro dente manum pro manu pedem pro pede. Adustionem pro adustione vulnus pro vulnere livorem pro livore.”

202 Pecham cites the De Spiritu et Anima for support of this view (cf. PL 40, 808).

203 E.g., Tractatus, 7; Quaestiones, 327-328.
juncture. Pecham says that his own view of the vegetative soul agrees with Aristotle and Avicenna who say that within the vegetative aspect of the soul there are various powers: nutritive, augmentative, and generative. In support of each of these powers are various “subministers” (subministrantes) or sub-powers. First Pecham discusses the nutritive power, which generates nourishment in the body perpetually and provides for bodily warmth. In this way the nutritive power is a condition for the augmentative and generative powers. The ministers for the nutritive power are the expulsive, retentive, digestive, and attractive. Pecham does not describe in detail what these ministers do, but he does note that doctors say that these powers thrive in the stomach.

The augmentative power is responsible for physical growth, taking the nutrition that has been generated and applying it to other parts of the body. The ministers for the augmentative power are the extensive, unitive, and ablative. The extensive extends the

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{204} It is also interesting to note that, while it seems that Aristotle explicitly divorces himself from dualism (e.g., De Anima, 412a.1ff), he nonetheless does not avoid using language that could be read as lending support to a dualist position: “Since the expression ‘that whereby we live and perceive’ has two meanings, just like the expression ‘that whereby we know’—that may mean either knowledge or the soul, for we can speak of knowing by either, and similarly that whereby we are in health may be either health of the body or some part of the body; and since of these knowledge or health is a form, essence, or account, or if we so express it an activity of a recipient matter—knowledge of what is capable of knowing, health of what is capable of being made healthy (for the activity of that which is capable of originating change seems to take place in what is changed or altered; further, since it is the soul by which primarily we live, perceive, and think:—it follows that the soul must be an account and essence, not matter or a subject” (De Anima, 414a.4-14).} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{205} Tractatus, 31; Aristotle, De Anima, 415a.22ff; Avicenna, De Anima, 1.4.} \]
parts of the body “according to the aptitude of augmentation” (*secundum aptitudinem augmentati*). The unitive organizes what the nutritive power has generated. The unitive governs the growth according to the perfections of quantity that apply to the individual. Pecham claims Augustine as an authority on this point, saying that when infants are born they are already either short or long, but some body parts that are short will be long and vice versa. The ablative power governs the moving of nutriment from one part of the body to the part that needs it. This explains why the proportions between the sizes of the various body parts do not remain the same throughout life.

The generative power “overflows in the individual” and through reproduction is responsible for the conservation of the species. Pecham calls the ministers for the generative power the decisive and informative, but does not describe their roles. He concludes the ninth chapter by observing that the sub-powers are not typically considered to be diverse powers, but rather diverse duties of the multi-faceted instruments involved in the nutritive, augmentative, and generative powers, i.e., we tend to associate human potencies with the parts of the body through which the potencies are exercised.

---

206 See Augustine, *City of God*, 12.24. Pecham also cites a view of Avicenna’s on this point, saying that the nutritive power cannot bring in more sustenance unless what has already been brought in has been “resolved” (*resolvitur*) by a power other than the nutritive. This is called the delative (*delativa*) power (Tractatus, 32; cf. Avicenna, *De Anima*, 1.4; cf. ibid., 2.2).

207 *Tractatus*, 32.

208 Ibid., 33.
Part Two. Chapter Ten.

The 10th chapter treats the sensitive soul in greater detail. There are two parts, the motive and apprehensive, and each part has two “differentia”: the aspects that govern motion and those that produce motion. The concupiscible and the irascible aspects govern motion. If an apprehended thing is agreeable (conveniens), the concupiscible impels a person to draw near to the thing, but if the apprehended thing is disagreeable (disconveniens), the irascible repels the person from the thing.

Pecham takes the sensitive soul’s involvement in pain as an example, albeit a difficult one. The motive power causes the contraction and relaxation of ligaments. (Some have associated the motive power with the vegetative, but Avicenna numbers it among the sensitive powers, and so Pecham does as well.) The soul senses the body’s pain even though the soul requires “sensing matter.” This is obvious to Pecham because he takes it that Augustine has defined pain as not inherently an efficient motion, but rather something that is perceived. Pecham cites Avicenna as saying that perception of pains pertains to the sense of touch. However, Augustine says that apprehension alone is not pain, but rather the undoing of a good disposition of the body, to which the “ruling motive power” of the body must attend. The irascible and concupiscible are not only in

---

209 Ibid., 33-38.
210 Ibid., 33.
211 Ibid.; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 1.5.
212 Tractatus, 33-34.
213 Ibid., 34; cf. See Augustine, Immortality of the Soul, 3.4.
214 De Anima, 1.5.
215 Augustine argues that the soul must be an efficient mover in order to avoid infinite regress in an account of the human being (Immortality of the Soul, chapter 3).
the sensitive soul, but also pertain to the intellect (as the saints say), and are not corporeal at all.\textsuperscript{216}

The apprehensive powers can be divided into those that apprehend externally and those that apprehend internally. Pecham discusses the external apprehensive powers first. They are the five senses with which we today are most familiar: vision, hearing, taste, smell, and touch. Pecham points to Augustine’s explanation of how each of the senses flourishes in a different kind of medium.\textsuperscript{217} This diversity fits the diversity of organs. Fire is the exception, because fire penetrates all mediums. The movement of all senses begins, in a sense, with fire:

In vision it reaches to its light through repressed color; in hearing it penetrates to the purer, airy, strength and heat of fire; in smell it traverses the pure air and comes through to the exhalation that is to be had; but in taste, going through, it comes to the more corpulent humor and further on in earthly gravity, to the final advance.\textsuperscript{218}

All these, Pecham says, are the opinions of Augustine. Touch is unique in that it can sense the objects of other senses, i.e., it can discern between hot and cold, humid and dry, hard and soft, rough and smooth.\textsuperscript{219} Pecham notes Avicenna’s view that touch is the only sense “of general variety” (\textit{varietate generis}).\textsuperscript{220}

\begin{flushright}
\textit{Tractatus}, 33.
\end{flushright}
\begin{flushright}
\textit{Tractatus}, 34: “In visu represso colore pervenit ad eius lucem; in auditu ad puriorem aerem calorem ignis et vigorem penetrat; in olfactu transit aerem purum et pervenit ad habendam exalationem; in gustu autem transiens pervenit ad humoren [sic] corpulentiorum et ultra in terreà gravitate, in ultimum progressum.”
\end{flushright}
\begin{flushright}
\textit{Ibid.}, 35.
\end{flushright}
\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}
Now Pecham turns to the internal apprehensive powers, following Avicenna in numbering these powers as five and in describing them. Each of the first three are is called imagination under a distinct aspect. First, Pecham discusses what he calls imagination as common sense (*sensum communem*). Common sense is the “center of all senses … in which all senses are rooted.” The common sense is ordered to the first concavity of the skull and receives through itself every form that is from the five senses, distinguishing between things such as white and sweet.

Second, Pecham discusses what he calls imagination as the retainer of data that the common sense receives from the five senses. This second imagination is what we commonly call “memory.” Pecham says that this power is necessary because something that receives does not necessarily retain well. Pecham’s example is that water is easily shaped, but does not retain its figure.

Third, Pecham discusses imagination as the power to compose and divide by using the “estimable intentions” or images in the imagination. This power occurs only in man, is located in the middle concavity, and is usually known as the cogitative sense. The cogitative sense’s manipulation of images can result in compositions that do not

---

221 Tractatus, 35-38; Avicenna, De Anima, 1.5; cf. Alfred Ivry, “Arabic and Islamic Psychology and Philosophy of Mind,” Stanford University, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arabic-islamic-mind/#Avi (2012). Pecham’s division is also the same as that of Roger Bacon (Roger Bacon and the Origins, 1.1.2-5).
222 Tractatus, 35: “ … centrum omnium sensuum … in qua omnes sensus radicantur. . . .” The discussion of the common sense goes back at least to Augustine’s discussion in On the Free Choice of the Will, ed. King, 2.7.19.76ff.
223 Tractatus, 35: “ … retinens quod recipit sensum communis a quinque sensibus. . . .”
224 Ibid., 35-36. Pecham prefers to call it phantasia because he thinks of reason as cogitative (ibid., 36).
225 Ibid., 36.
reflect external reality, such as a man with two heads. This operation is a prerequisite for most intellectual function, since intellection usually requires estimable images. (So Pecham, like Aquinas, will use “cognition” or “cogitation” to refer to both sensitive and intellectual activity, as well as the combination of the two.\textsuperscript{226}) The \textit{phantasia} functions differently in wakefulness and sleep, or according to how much the cogitative sense and reason is hindered.\textsuperscript{227} Whether in wakefulness or sleep, species are always required. Dreams are simply an overflow of cogitations and typically do not impart knowledge. In cases where dreams do impart knowledge the knower is more reliant on impressions received from a superior mind, and noble souls are more receptive to such impressions. Dreams that impart knowledge need to be interpreted. There are also dreams that have “natural or voluntary causes” (\textit{causas naturales vel volutarias}). For example, people who have devious schemes, get drunk, have physical infirmities or sorrows seldom have revelatory dreams, because their dreams regularly result from a flux of phantasms produced by a deformed disposition.\textsuperscript{228} Those who have a temperate complexion, on the other hand, often receive true dreams, because bad digestion or severe movements of the

\textsuperscript{226} E.g., Aquinas, \textit{Treatise}, 134-137; Pecham, \textit{Tractatus}, 17, 20. Pecham thinks that to call this power the cogitative sense is correct because, while cogitation is properly a rational activity, the intellect requires this power to operate fully in the body (see ibid., 36, 8): “Restat igitur quod sine mediatione organi corporalis operetur. Amplius intellectus vel eius operatio nullius organi corporalis est obiectum. Cum igitur intellectus in se redeat et suam operationem in se videat et quantum ad vim cognitivam et affectivam, necesse est ut eius operatio libera sit in a corporali organo, nisi subministrando, ut supra visum est” (ibid., 42). Also, “… qua sic est multipliciter assimilabilis, secundum sensum et intellectum rebus cognitis, vim—inquam—cognitivam, in qua est actio et passio, vim etiam memoritivam, vim insuper motivam et regitivam corporis vocat Augustinum numeros. . . .” (ibid., 20-21).

\textsuperscript{227} See Avicenna, \textit{De Anima}, 4.2.

\textsuperscript{228} \textit{Tractatus}, 36-37.
humors seldom interfere. It is generally difficult to interpret dreams because of the difficulty in determining whether dreams derive from natural or supernatural causes, or from good spirits or bad.

The fourth power is the estimative faculty, which is located in the middle concavity. It apprehends not sensitive intentions from the five senses, but rather intentions that are conjoined to sensations and that convey friendship or enmity. The estimative faculty provides natural caution, e.g., the sheep fears the wolf, the dog fears someone who makes a motion to throw a stone, and a hurt animal seeks things that will soothe pain. The estimative faculty in animals is not the same as memory in man, because memory involves the additional step of recalling what has been forgotten.

The fifth power is memory itself, or the “box of intentions”, which is located in the posterior concavity of the skull. This memory retains the estimative apprehensions, and is thus connected to the estimative faculty as the imagination is connected to the common sense. Memory is an innate power that is found only in man. Pecham cites Augustine in support of the view that some animals have a kind of memory as well. There is a merely sensitive kind of memory which animals and man share, and an intelligible kind of memory which only man has, and which will come up in the next chapter of the *Tractatus*, which deals with the division of the intellective powers. Pecham thinks it is clear that these two kinds of memory cannot be the result of the same faculty, because it

---

229 Ibid., 37.
230 *On Music*, 1.4.8. Augustine here notes various examples of animals seeming to act on the basis of memory, and artisans doing precise, repetitive actions out of practice but not merely out of memory (a non-artisan remembers perfectly well seeing the artisan do the action, but cannot repeat it); cf. Bacon, *Roger Bacon and the Origins*, 1.1.4-5.
is very rare to find a man who has excellent sensitive memory and excellent intelligible memory. Pecham says the ability to remember is contingent upon the texture of the humor involved. It is essential that an impressed humor become dry and hard so that an impression will last. Young boys have moist humors and so they cannot remember well, although boys seem to be able to remember more things because their minds are little occupied.

Part Two. Chapter Eleven.

Whereas the 10th chapter dealt with the divisions of the sensitive powers, the 11th chapter deals with the divisions of the intellective powers. Pecham says that just as the sensitive and motive powers control apprehension and motion, the intellect also controls these activities. Pecham says that he will follow Aristotle’s division of the intellect into “agent and possible, speculative and practical” (agentem et possibilem, speculativum et practicum) and that Aristotle is right to call the intellect the habitus of principles. And just as Pecham followed Avicenna in the divisions of the sensitive soul’s powers, Pecham says that he is following Avicenna in the divisions of the rational soul’s powers as well.

There are five powers of the intellect. The first power is the material intellect, which is like prime matter in physics. The material intellect has no species essentially—it

231 Tractatus, 38.
232 Ibid., 38-41.
233 Ibid., 38.
234 See Aristotle, De Anima, 414b.21-415a.13; 430a.10-27; 433a.9-433b.30. Pecham calls the second power of the intellect the habitus of principles.
235 Avicenna, De Anima, 1.5; 2.1.
236 Tractatus, 38-39.
is like a blank slate (*tabula rasa*). Aristotle calls this the possible intellect.\textsuperscript{237} The second power is the intellect in *habitus*, or the state of the intellect when it is attending to intelligibles that it has noted. The third power is the intellect in effect, or the obtained intellect. This is intelligible memory or the second of the two memorative powers mentioned in the previous chapter of the *Tractatus*.

The fourth power is the accommodated or agent intellect. Pecham claims Avicenna’s authority for the view that the agent intellect is always in act, and that it imprints on the potential intellect. Presumably “potential intellect” [*intellectus in potentia*] refers to the material or possible intellect, the first intellectual power.\textsuperscript{238} In his introduction to Avicenna’s *Long Commentary*, Richard C. Taylor says of the distinction between the material intellect and the active intellect: “The Arabic tradition accepted that Aristotle’s distinction between active and receptive aspects of intellect in De Anima 3.5 was a distinction between a distinct active, separate, intellectual entity and a receptive human power of understanding.”\textsuperscript{239} Pecham says that if Avicenna thought of the soul as resembling a world or as being a created intelligence that is separate from the human being, he erred. Rather, Augustine takes the correct position in saying that eternal light is the “giver or illustrator of all intelligence.”\textsuperscript{240} Nonetheless the individual, human agent intellect cannot formulate species on its own.

\textsuperscript{237} *De Anima*, 429a.10-430a.9.  
\textsuperscript{238} Avicenna, *De Anima*, 1.5.  
\textsuperscript{239} xix-xx.  
The fifth power is the practical or operative intellect, which is perfected by art or prudence. Art is the perfection of the practical intellect with regard to objects that can be formed. Prudence is the perfection of the practical intellect with regard to the use of formable things.\textsuperscript{241}

Pecham points out that he differs with Augustine—at least on the surface—about how to divide the intellect.\textsuperscript{242} Pecham describes Augustine’s division of the intellect as the division between “the superior and inferior reason.”\textsuperscript{243} However, Pecham says that Augustine is not distinguishing among powers, but among duties or roles (\textit{officiorum}).\textsuperscript{244} The “superior reason” that Augustine discusses consults eternal reasons whereas the inferior reason tends to inferior things, although still in a superior way. Pecham allows that the intellect can be variously named or informed according to the dispositions involved in various cases. The agent intellect may be said to have the “sapientials” (\textit{sapientiales}) whereas the possible intellect has the “scientials” (\textit{scientiales}). Pecham does not say more about this division, presumably because of what he admits next: He does not care much about how the different powers

\textsuperscript{241} It is not obvious that Spettmann’s citation of Aristotle in this instance refers to a passage that Pecham could have been using in this connection. Chapter 34 of the \textit{Sophistical Refutations} does say that there is a need both to select material for arguments and to then use the correct arguments (trans. W.A. Pickard-Cambridge, 183a.27-184b.8); Pecham may be using this Aristotelian discussion as a metaphor for the relationship between the information supplied by the first four powers of the intellect and the use that is made of that information by the practical intellect.

\textsuperscript{242} \textit{On the Trinity}, 12.3.

\textsuperscript{243} \textit{Tractatus}, 39-40.

\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., 40.
are arranged, since it is better to say that there is one intellective potency that is designed to “catch” all inferior and superior intelligibles according to various aptitudes and duties.

In addition to the five aforementioned powers of the intellect is the “motive intelligence” or the rational will, which Pecham seems to consider as a separate power of the intellect. Pecham says that Aristotle divides the will into the irascible and concupiscible, but that this is contrary to what we find in the book *De Spiritu et Anima*, i.e., that one can account for the entire soul by including “rationability, concupiscibility, and irascibility, just as the trinity itself.” Pecham says that these three powers must all pertain to the rational soul, even though the rational soul is not the only part of the soul. This is obvious to Pecham because wrath, while being the passion of the irascible aspect of the sensitive soul, also has a role in the intellectual soul, as in the case of demons (and the same is true of concupiscibility and irascibility). An implication of this view is that any affect of the rational soul is bipartite—its rules both thought and motion.

Before concluding the chapter, Pecham discusses freedom of choice. It is not a third faculty beyond intellect and will but is rather the faculty of the rational will to strive for or not to strive for what the appetite presents to the reason. This differentiates free choice from the result of the “irrational appetite” (discussed in chapter 10) which the human necessarily desires (e.g., food). The only thing that can stop a person from following the irrational appetite is to be “terribly repelled” by something. Similarly, sensitive powers

---

247 *Tractatus*, 40-41.
248 Ibid., 41.
cannot avoid sensing, because these powers are completely tied to their organs and thus
to their objects. Even the intellect is unavoidably passive, in the sense that it can be
forced by God. Only the will cannot be forced by anything.

Part Two. Chapter Twelve.

Chapter 12 is about the soul’s self-reflection.\textsuperscript{249} The intellect can reflect on itself
directly, but only indirectly on the soul’s other powers.\textsuperscript{250} No medium falls between the
intellect and itself, whereas there is a medium between the sensitive soul and any of its
possible objects.\textsuperscript{251} Vegetative powers are completely immersed in the body.\textsuperscript{252} They are
not cognitive, but have some resonance (\emph{resonantiam}) of cognition, insofar they may be
said to discern what things in nature will be good for the subject. The vegetative powers
are remote from the “eye of the interior soul,” even though the rational soul could direct
its attention to the vegetative operations via the sensory capacities. Anything that the
sensitive soul apprehends, on the other hand, is apprehended in a medium. There is no
medium between the intellect and itself, and no corporeal organ senses the intellect’s
operation.

Only in a supportive or ministering way can any corporeal organ be considered
operative in the intellect’s self-reflection.\textsuperscript{253} No sensitive power is reflected on itself, yet
the sensitive soul can sense itself sensing by the use of the common sense. None of these

\textsuperscript{249} Ibid., 41-44.
\textsuperscript{250} Ibid., 41.
\textsuperscript{251} Ibid., 42.
\textsuperscript{252} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{253} It seems this way because, e.g., the body can become weak along with the mind after
much study (see \emph{Tractatus}, 26).
powers governs itself, i.e., the imagination does not imagine itself to be imagining, not

does the estimative sense estimate itself to be estimating. Pecham says that this is why
Plato posited a circle in the intellective soul, but not in the souls of brutes.\textsuperscript{254}

Pecham says that some doubt his view of the intellect’s self-reflection, and so here he
clarifies his position.\textsuperscript{255} He cites the \textit{Book of Causes}: “Everything knowing its essence is
returning on it by complete reduction.”\textsuperscript{256} Because the intellect is conjoined to the earthly
body it cannot, properly speaking, understand itself transparently.\textsuperscript{257} Because of the
mediating phantasms involved in many instances of knowledge, the soul cannot have a
complete understanding of itself and sometimes thinks itself to be something that it is not.
Nor can the embodied soul be altogether ignorant about itself since it is most present to
itself. In order to have a perfectly transparent understanding of itself, the soul would
require what Pecham calls the “stable effect” (\textit{stabilem affectum}) which angels have. An
angel is unchangeable in the same sense in which the human soul will be stabilized in the
next life.

Pecham says that while Anselm and Plato have taken the view that the soul is self-
moving, Aristotle has said that everything that is moved is moved by another.\textsuperscript{258} On

\textsuperscript{254} See Plato, \textit{Timaeus}, trans. Donald J. Zeyl, 44c-d.
\textsuperscript{255} \textit{Tractatus}, 43.
\textsuperscript{256} The Latin in the \textit{Liber de Causis} is: “Omnis sciens qui scit essentiam suam est rediens
ad essentiam suam reditione completa.”
\textsuperscript{257} \textit{Tractatus}, 43.
\textsuperscript{258} \textit{Tractatus}, 43-44; See Anselm, \textit{On the Harmony of God’s Foreknowledge,
Thomas Williams (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007), 3.3; Plato, \textit{Laws}, trans. Trevor J.
Saunders, 894d-896a; Aristotle, \textit{Physics}, 256a.4-258b.9; \textit{De Anima}, 415b.22-27. Pecham
has his own discussion about the soul as a self-moving number, a discussion which is
included as the second appendix in Spettmann’s edition of the \textit{Tractatus} (143-144).
Pecham’s interpretation of this latter view, the mover is in act in respect of which the mobile is in potency, but nothing is both in act and in potency at the same time. To alleviate this problem, Pecham explains his own view according to which the soul is self-moving. Revisiting the subject matter of previous chapters, he says that the life of the soul is the root of essence (radix essentiae), in which every human capability is united. This allows us to say that the whole man sees, walks, and wills. The common root of the soul itself leads first to apprehension, which in turn allows for the intelligence to be excited, and then a person can will in favor of one outcome or another. The will is clearly not ontologically prior to all other faculties, yet there is a way in which the will in particular can be called self-moving. The will “is reflected on itself and is the end of its proper act; and it moves in the reason of imposing and is moved as it is imposed. Also the choice moves and the affection is moved.”

Part Two. Chapter Thirteen.

Chapter 13 continues the discussion of the will by focusing on the soul’s perfection through grace. Pecham says that every creature has the defect of changeability, unless lifted up and freely held in God’s hand. The rational soul has not only changeability, whereby it would go out of existence if not preserved by God, but also the defect of choosing, whereby it chooses evil when grace is absent. The soul is weakened by its

---


260 Tractatus, 44: “... supra se et est terminus actus proprii; et movet in ratione imperantis et movetur ut imperata. Electio etiam movet et affectio movetur.”

261 Ibid., 44-46.

262 Ibid., 44.
conjunction with corruption and is prone toward bodily concerns unless elevated by grace and regulated by the highest rectitude.\textsuperscript{263} This elevation occurs when the soul is conjoined with the stable life, the impression of which is the grace that proceeds from the father of lights.

The father of lights is the same one who is responsible for providing humans with the various psychological powers which work together so that the human being might desire properly. This conjunction between the powers and the stable life begins with cognition, advances in the strength of life, and fails at some stage. Nonetheless, the stable life uses human frailty as an occasion to “exceed in love” (\textit{excedit in amorem}), as various biblical passages show.\textsuperscript{264} The highest kind of love occurs when cognitive operation ceases and a person experiences “the highest apex of love in the delight of God.”\textsuperscript{265} Such experiences of being united with God in affection cannot be interpreted into human explanation, but can be said to lead to elevated desire, and to occur after the purification of the intellect.\textsuperscript{266} Pecham does not elaborate on the purification that is a prerequisite for the kind of experience he is discussing, but presumably we can associate the process with obeying the rule of love discussed in chapter six of the \textit{Tractatus}.

\textbf{Part Three. Chapter Fourteen.}

The third part of the \textit{Tractatus} is said to deal with the substance of the soul. If the righteous soul moves toward God as chapter 13 indicates, then we want an account of the

\textsuperscript{263} Ibid., 45. 
\textsuperscript{264} E.g., Daniel 10:19. 
\textsuperscript{265} \textit{Tractatus}, 45. 
\textsuperscript{266} Ibid., 45-46.
the soul’s movement. Chapter 14 is, therefore, a further discussion of efficient causation.\textsuperscript{267} Pecham notes that Aristotle has described how the ancients defined the soul according to apprehension and motion.\textsuperscript{268} Some thought that similars are cognized from similars, and that therefore the soul must consist of everything (\textit{consistere ex omnibus}) in order that everything would cognize. Others thought that the soul was fire, since the soul could easily move. Pecham says that the soul is an incorporeal substance in cognitive potency of all things, and is transformable into the similitude of all things, just as wax has a “transformable aptitude”.\textsuperscript{269} Here Pecham introduces the principle that the mover of every corporeal thing is ultimately an incorporeal thing. He cites Gregory: “Take away what is not seen in the body, and soon only immobile things will remain.”\textsuperscript{270} Pecham also claims the authority of Augustine for the view that corporeal causes are only derivatively called efficient, since they derive their efficiency from spirits.\textsuperscript{271}

Pecham argues further for his view of efficient causation, again drawing from his interpretation of Augustine.\textsuperscript{272} Only a thing that possesses something can give it to

\textsuperscript{267} Ibid., 46-48.
\textsuperscript{268} Ibid., 46; see Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, 403b.20-411b.31.
\textsuperscript{269} \textit{Tractatus}, 46-47.
\textsuperscript{271} See Augustine, \textit{City of God}, 5.9: “Material causes, therefore, which may rather be said to be made than to make, are not to be reckoned among efficient causes, because they can only do what the wills of spirits do by them.”
\textsuperscript{272} See \textit{Immortality of the Soul}, 16.25. Augustine here discusses the superiority of the rational over the irrational, and the doctrine that the soul must be everywhere in the body.
another.\(^\text{273}\) Therefore, if a mover gives a place to a body, then the mover must have itself have place. On this basis we conclude that mover of all things must be in different places or in different parts of the body’s place. More technically, the body includes various parts of different places, so nothing that is like the body in the sense of being so varied could move the whole body. Only a spiritual substance could, for example, be in both the posterior part and the anterior part at the same time and move both of them.

Furthermore, the mover of each thing is actualized prior to its natural movement. The corporeal form (\textit{forma corporeitatis}) of the body is supported by the corporeal matter in which it is extended (the whole body).\(^\text{274}\) Therefore it cannot actualize the movement of the body by itself, and as the mover of the various parts of the body, the soul cannot be supported entirely by the whole body.

The rational soul as an incorporeal, spiritual substance is required to move the whole body. The soul is constituted by its own matter and form. On this point, Pecham cites

\(^\text{273}\) Cf. Aristotle, \textit{Sophistical Refutations}, 178a.36-178b.4: “Also there is the argument that a man may give what he has not got; for he has not got only one die. But he has given, not what he had not got, but in a manner in which he had not got it, viz. just the one. For the word ‘only’ does not signify a particular substance or quality or quantity, but a manner of relation, i.e. that it is not coupled with any other. It is therefore just as if he had asked ‘Could a man give what he has not got?’ and, on being given the answer ‘No’, were to ask if a man could give a thing quickly when he had not got it quickly, and, on this being granted, were to deduce that man could give what he had not got. It is is quite evident that he has not deduced this point; for to give quickly is not to give a thing, but to give in a certain manner. . . .”

\(^\text{274}\) For a helpful summary of the significance of the \textit{forma corporeitatis} to Pecham, see Decima Douie, \textit{Archbishop Pecham} (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952), 20-22; cf. Pecham, \textit{Quaestiones}, 323-324.
Gundissalinus (incorrectly as Boethius) and Avicenna. Pecham cites Avicenna as saying that the essence of evil is a potency that occurs through matter. The implication of this, Pecham says, is that every angel and rational soul is composed from both form and matter. (Otherwise how could angels and men sin?) Pecham says that he will take up the question of the rational soul’s immortality in the next chapter.

Part Three. Chapter Fifteen.

Chapter 15 is a series of 10 arguments for the rational soul’s survival of the body’s physical death. The first set of five arguments consists of negative responses to arguments for the soul’s annihilation. The second set of five arguments can be read as a collection of positive arguments for the soul’s immortality.

Pecham’s first argument is about the cause for a thing’s destruction:

- A thing cannot be destroyed simply because it reasons to its own destruction. (A substance’s own power cannot destroy it, because that would be contrary to nature.)
- The rational soul reasons properly to the conclusion that the body of man must die, because of divine justice. However, the rational soul’s own destruction is a separate issue.
- Conclusion (unstated): The death of the body cannot cause the death of the soul.

---

276 For further information about Pecham’s view of universal hylomorphism and spiritual matter see Pecham, Quaestiones, 347, 379; cf. Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 128.
277 Tractatus, 48-51. Not all Franciscans after Pecham were in agreement that the immortality of the soul can be proved by reason independent of revelation (see, e.g., Russell L. Friedman, Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010], 135-136; Alfred J. Freddoso, “Ockham on Faith and Reason,” The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. Paul Vincent Spade [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 326-349).
278 Tractatus, 48-49.
Pecham claims the authority of Augustine for his second argument:\textsuperscript{279}

- The rational soul is capable of holding unchangeable truth, whereas the sensitive soul is capable only of accidental, variable truth.

- There must be a proportion of power between a potency and its object. If a potency’s object exceeds the object of another potency, then by that much the first potency’s power exceeds that of the second potency.

- By however much incorruptible exceeds the corruptible, the rational soul is greater than the sensitive soul.

- Conclusion: (unstated) The rational soul is incorruptible.

The second argument says that the rational soul is “capable” of truth, but says nothing about \textit{how} the soul attains truth. So, Pecham adds a third argument for the soul’s immortality, and this one is based on how the rational soul comes to know truth. For this argument Pecham cites the authority of Aristotle:\textsuperscript{280}

- Truth is not apprehended through a mediating sensory organ. When truth is wholly abstracted from material things, it is understood in the context of divine light, as discussed above.

- A potency that works without an organ must be without an organ, since its operation must be from its form, which gives being, and it must be independent of body.

- Conclusion (unstated): The rational soul, with its greater potency that makes possible knowledge of incorruptible truth, is free from corporeal corruption.

Pecham gives a brief fourth argument that presupposes the third argument:

- It is greater to operate than to merely be.

- The rational soul can operate without the body (from the third argument).

- Conclusion: The rational soul does not require the body for its own being.

Pecham’s fifth argument is based on the difference between act and potency:\textsuperscript{281}

\textsuperscript{279} Ibid., 49; see Augustine, \textit{Immortality of the Soul}, chapters 5-7.

\textsuperscript{280} See Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, 429a.10-430a.10.

\textsuperscript{281} \textit{Tractatus}, 49-50.
• An act is always an act of a potency, and according to its own mode.

• If an act is indefectible (*indefectibilis*), so also is its potency.

• The rational soul’s act is indefectible, as can be shown through three experiences:

  1. The first experience comes from considering the rational soul’s object (truth). A rational soul is not weakened by the excellence of its object or from the number of objects cognized over time, but rather these things make the rational soul stronger. Such strengthening does not occur in the cases of the defectible (*defectibiles*) objects of defectible organs, such as the eye.

  2. The second experience comes from considering the subject. The intellective potency is not debilitated in age, but rather enhanced.\(^{282}\)

  3. The third experience has to do with the delight (*delectatio*) produced by contemplation. This delight has neither a contrary nor an excess. The corporeal body, unlike this delight, consists of contraries and is corrupted through excess.

• Conclusion: The act of the rational soul fails neither because of the excellence of its object, nor because of its own deficiency as subject, nor because of the violence of contraries.

Pecham’s sixth argument is based on the theoretical possibility of unending intellectual growth.\(^{283}\)

• A power that is not weakened by continual use can go on to infinity.

• The intellect’s capacity for receiving intelligible forms is not diminished by use. Nor is the intellect’s capacity for understanding reduced because it has understood better or because it has understood more things. Rather, the more the intellect understands, the greater its capacity for understanding.

• Conclusion (unstated): The rational soul can go on infinitely.

Pecham’s seventh argument is based on the nature of a corporeal form.

• If a corporeal form that perfects matter is incorruptible, then so much more is a spiritual form that perfects a body incorruptible.

\(^{282}\) Pecham cites Job 12:12 here: “Wisdom is with the aged, and understanding in length of days.”

\(^{283}\) *Tractatus*, 50.
• (unstated) The *forma corporeitatis* is incorruptible,\(^{284}\) although the body itself is corruptible.

• The most noble of all forms is the rational soul.

• Conclusion (unstated): The rational soul is incorruptible.

The eighth argument, for which Pecham cites Pythagoras, is a *reductio* based on a defect:\(^{285}\)

• A virtuous man is always less restricted than a vicious man.

• If there were no eternal life after this earthly life, then there would be no retribution. Thus, injustice would be less restricted than justice, and the just would receive no advantage over the unjust.

• Conclusion (unstated): There must be an eternal life after this earthly life.

Pecham does not argue for the claim that eternal life is the exclusive method of ultimate retribution.

The ninth argument is based on the end (*finis*) of man:\(^{286}\)

• The end of man is the rational soul’s immediate conjunction with the unchangeable God, or the highest good.

• The conjunction with the highest good occurs through love.

• Contraries are contrary to a cause, and so hatred is the prevention of the conjunction with God, or the cause of separation from God.

• If the soul becomes full of hate, then it is contrary to the highest good. If anything can destroy the soul’s being, it is the soul’s own opposition to the highest good.

• People who love God die just as people who hate God. Thus death is no indication of whether someone’s soul is destroyed by hatred of the highest good.

• Conclusion: The rational soul cannot be destroyed.

---


\(^{286}\) *Tractatus*, 51.
This argument contrasts love (amor) and hatred as contraries, whereas Pecham said in the fifth argument (above) that delight (delectatio) has no contrary. A charitable reading of this apparent contradiction might be to assume that Pecham means to say that love has no parts and thus cannot be divided, even though hatred is indeed its contrary in a sense.\footnote{287}

The 10th argument is a reductio based on different ways in which the soul could be “sent away” or “lost” (amitteret). Evidently, to be “sent away” means “to cease to be.”

- The rational soul’s cessation could occur only through natural corruption (a change into another kind of thing) or through corruption to non-being.
- Natural corruption would be either corruption in or with the corruption of its subject (the body) or corruption of itself and in itself. The first is impossible since the rational soul does not depend on the body for operation or being.\footnote{288} The second is impossible since the rational soul is not composed of contraries; it has neither a contrary nor a nature that is subject to change.
- The soul cannot be corrupted to non-being, because the soul’s being does not imply the loss of anything through change. A change to non-being would indeed be a special kind of change, one that the soul could not facilitate on its own. The inability to self-determine being or non-being is due to the soul’s total dependence on God.
- Conclusion: God does not give the soul non-being, because annihilation is most remote from God.\footnote{289}

The conclusion of chapter 15 is that the rational soul is “the immortal substance from the benevolence of the Creator, persevering sempiternally in received being.”\footnote{290}

\footnote{287} See Pecham’s reference to contraries in the tenth argument (ibid., 51).
\footnote{288} Cf. ibid., 30.
\footnote{290} *Tractatus*, 51: “... rationalis substantia immortalis ex benignitate Creatoris in esse accepto sempiternaliter perseverans.”
Conclusion

Pecham’s *Tractatus* contains his mature statement concerning philosophical anthropology. Thus, an understanding of the text is essential for the evaluation of his thought on the subject, which I will attempt in the fifth and sixth chapters of the present study. Such an understanding is also essential for a comparison between Pecham’s anthropology and Aquinas’s.
CHAPTER 4

AQUINAS AND LATIN AVERROISM

In this chapter I will explicate Aquinas’s arguments against Latin Averroism, with the goal of facilitating a comparison (in chapter six) between Aquinas’s and Pecham’s arguments against Latin Averroism. I will consider especially Aquinas’s Against the Averroists On There Being Only One Intellect, his Quaestiones De Anima, and his Treatise on Human Nature. A comment on the chronology of these two works, and a brief introduction to Latin Averroism, can be found in the introduction to the present study.

Aquinas’s Against the Averroists On There Being Only One Intellect

Against the Averroists is a treatise in five chapters. This work is explicitly not a theological polemic designed to demonstrate Averroism’s opposition to Christianity, but rather a philosophical refutation.

There is no need to show that the foregoing position [that there is but one intellect] is erroneous because repugnant to Christian faith; a moment’s reflection makes this clear to anyone. Take away from men diversity of intellect, which alone among the soul’s parts seems incorruptible and immortal, and it follows that nothing of the souls of men would remain after death except a unique intellectual substance, with the result that reward and punishment and their difference disappear. We intend to show that the foregoing position is opposed to the principles of philosophy every bit as much as it is to the teaching of faith. And, Latin writers on this matter not being to the taste of some, who tell us that they prefer to follow the words of the Peripatetics, though of them they have seen only the works of Aristotle, the founder of the school, we will first show the foregoing position to be in every way repugnant to his words and judgments.1

1 Against the Averroists, 19, bracketed item added.
Thus, Aquinas orients his project in *Against the Averroists* as being outside the realm of religious dogma.

The first set of arguments has to do with the interpretation of Aristotle, who says that the soul is “the first act of a physically organized body.”\(^2\) Thus some part of the soul must be inseparable from the body, but Aquinas maintains that Averroes’ position disallows all such inseparability.\(^3\) Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not commit himself to a separated soul.\(^4\) According to Aquinas’s reading of Aristotle, the various parts of the soul (vegetative, intellective, locomotive) are united to the body as form or act rather than as a sailor is united to a ship.\(^5\) The vegetative soul is that whereby the person first lives, the sensitive soul that whereby the person senses, the locomotive that whereby the person moves, and the intellective soul that whereby the person understands. The soul, then, is an account or essence rather than a matter or subject.\(^6\)

Aquinas says that Aristotle’s discussion of the intellect in *De Anima* book three militates against the Averroist position. Aristotle says that the intellect is the part of the

\(^2\) Ibid., 21; Aristotle, *De Anima*, 412b.5.
\(^3\) *Against the Averroists*, 21; cf. Aristotle, *De Anima*, 413a.4-7. Aquinas says in his *Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics*: “[W]hat is one is said to be an indivisible or undivided being” (trans. John P. Rowan, rev. ed. [Notre Dame: Dumb Ox, 1995], 10.3.1974). Pasnau comments on Aquinas’s position: “[T]he substantial form is indivisible from the matter it actualizes, in the sense that if that form is destroyed, the substance as a whole is destroyed, as is each of its individual parts. Because substantial forms are thus inseparable from their matter, they make up one thing with their matter, *unum simpliciter* (*Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*, 93).
\(^4\) On Aquinas’s view, when Aristotle discusses the separability of the soul, he is referring not to separability from the body, but rather separability from the other parts of the soul by abstraction (*Against the Averroists*, 29).
\(^6\) Ibid.
soul whereby the soul knows, and says there is a difference between the account of the imagination and the account of the speculative intellect.\footnote{De Anima, 429a.10-12.} Aquinas says that Aristotle does not intend to distinguish the possible intellect from the active at this juncture because he has not yet said that there are two such principles.\footnote{Against the Averroists, 35.} And in any case Aristotle attempts to differentiate the intellect from the other aspects of the soul only insofar as the operation of the intellect differs from the operations of the other aspects.\footnote{Ibid., 38-39.} Aquinas insists that Aristotle never implies that the intellect is external to the individual human soul, which the act of a physical body.\footnote{Ibid., 37.}

On Aristotle’s view the intellect is capable of receiving the intelligible form of its object and is in this sense in potency (“Thought must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible”).\footnote{Ibid., 39; Aristotle, De Anima, 429a.16-18.} The intellect is capable of knowing all things whatsoever; therefore it must be unmixed.\footnote{Against the Averroists, 41.} The fact that the intellect does not have its own determined nature implies that it cannot be mixed with a body.\footnote{Against the Averroists, 39; Aristotle, De Anima, 429a.18-19.} With this background in mind, Aquinas says, it is clear that when Aristotle says that the intellect “is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing,” he cannot be speaking of a substance separate from the individual knower.\footnote{Ibid.; Aristotle, De Anima, 429a.24.}
Sense and intellect are not the same in every way. Sense is destroyed by an excessive sensible, but intellect is not destroyed by an excessive intelligible.\textsuperscript{15} Intellect is separate from sense because, according to Aquinas,

sense has an organ, but intellect does not.

Quite obviously, therefore, and without any doubt so far as the text of Aristotle is concerned, it is clear that his view is that possible intellect belongs to the soul, which is the act of body, such that the soul’s intellect has no bodily organ, as the other powers of the soul certainly have.\textsuperscript{16}

Aquinas will return to his interpretation of the \textit{De Anima}, but he first explains on his own terms how it can be that the soul is the form of a body, and yet some power of the soul is not a power of the body.\textsuperscript{17} Aquinas says that forms in general have powers that are greater than the matter with which they are associated. A form is the act of a body of mixed elements and yet has a power associated with no particular element. A power might belong to a form because of a higher principle such as a celestial body (Aquinas’s example is that the magnet has the power to attract iron). Furthermore, the natural philosopher considers form only insofar as it is in matter just as the physician considers the nerve only insofar as the nerve contributes to health.\textsuperscript{18} Just because a philosopher considers a thing in one context does not mean that the thing has no role in another context. Aquinas concludes this consideration by saying that the soul is on the border between material and separated forms.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Against the Averroists}, 43.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 45; cf. ibid., 61.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 45.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 49.
Aquinas argues that the incorruptibility of the soul does not prove that the soul cannot be the form of a body. Aristotle taught that only the active intellect is incorruptible. Yet one might wonder how something that is incorruptible at all could be the form of a body; it might seem that the form of a body would necessarily be destroyed when the body is destroyed. After all, Aristotle believes that forms come to be in matter. Aquinas responds to this by interpreting a statement by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* as meaning that nothing prevents the intellective soul from remaining after the body dies, because nothing prevents the intellect from being prior to corporeal embodiment either. Furthermore, Aquinas says, the intellect is unique from other forms because the intellect does not exist simply in virtue of the existence of the composite ... but rather the composite exists in virtue of its existence. Therefore, the composite being destroyed, a form that exists thanks to the existence of the composite is destroyed, whereas a form through whose existence the composite exists, not vice versa, need not be destroyed when the composite is destroyed.

Aquinas admits that there are passages in which Aristotle speaks of the intellect “problematically”, “as one inquiring”, and credits intellectual activities to the composite and not to the mind as such. However, even if we were to take Aristotle to be speaking decisively in such passages, there would still remain a solution: Understanding can be called the accidental act of the composite insofar as its object, the phantasm, is in a bodily

---

19 Ibid., 51ff.
21 Against the Averroists, 51.
22 Ibid., 53, 55; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1069a.20-22: “For if the universe is of the nature of a whole, substance is its first part; and if it coheres by virtue of succession, on this view also substance is first, and is succeeded by quality, and then by quantity. At the same time these latter are not even beings in the unqualified sense, but are quantities and movements—or else even the not-white and the not-straight would be. . . .”
23 Against the Averroists, 57.
24 Ibid., 59; cf. Aristotle, *De Anima*, 408b.5-6.
organ, but not because the intellectual activity is exercised through a bodily organ.\textsuperscript{25}

When the soul is separated it has a different way of understanding—a way similar to that of separate substances.\textsuperscript{26} It is essential to the soul that it be united to a body, and this union may be accidentally impeded by bodily corruption just as a light thing is naturally up but may accidentally be pulled down.\textsuperscript{27}

Before concluding the first chapter, Aquinas responds to the Averroists’ argument based on the following statement by Aristotle in the \textit{Generation of Animals}: “[I]ntellect comes only from without and it alone is divine.”\textsuperscript{28} The Averroists say that the Aristotle passage teaches that the intellect is neither part of the human soul nor the form of the body, because the intellect is not educed from the potency of matter.\textsuperscript{29} Aquinas says that the passage does not prove that the intellect cannot be the form of the body. His response is in three parts:\textsuperscript{30} (1) Potency is a correlative of act, and so a thing must be in potency in the same respect that it is later in actuality.\textsuperscript{31} Aquinas points out that Aristotle also says in \textit{Generation of Animals}: “For at first all such embryos seem to live the life of a plant. And it is clear that we must be guided by this in speaking of the active and sensitive and rational soul. For all three kinds of soul must be possessed potentially before they are possessed actually.”\textsuperscript{32} (2) No soul is caused by the mingling of elements, as the Averroists

\textsuperscript{25} Against the Averroists, 59.  
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 61.  
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 61-63.  
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 63; Aristotle, \textit{Generation of Animals}, 736b.27-28.  
\textsuperscript{29} Against the Averroists, 63.  
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 65-69.  
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 65.  
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 65; Aristotle, \textit{Generation of Animals}, 736b.12-15.  

234
say. All souls have a connection with matter that is different from and more divine than
the so-called elements. (3) It is possible that some forms are wholly educed from matter,
whereas others are not. Aquinas takes it that Aristotle leaves undecided whether the
intellect differs from the other parts of the soul in its subject or location or merely in its
definition. But even if Aristotle were saying that all parts of the soul were in the same
subject, it would still be the case that the vegetative and sensitive are in the intellective
“as triangle and square are in the pentagon.” Aquinas provides a more literal way of
explaining his position: The intellective soul has the powers had by the vegetative and
sensitive souls, which are produced by inferior agents. Aquinas thinks that his position
about the connection between these three aspects of the soul holds even if the vegetative
and sensitive souls are from the same extrinsic source that produces the intellective soul.

In the second chapter Aquinas discusses the Averroists’ conflict with other
Peripatetics, including Greeks and Arabs. The thrust of the chapter is that not only Latin
writers, but also writers in the Greek and Arabic traditions have thought that the intellect
is a power and faculty of individual souls, each of which is the form of a body. Thus the
Averroists have no right to claim that their doctrine is derived from true Peripatetic
philosophy. Aquinas reports what he takes to be the views belonging to Theophrastus,
Themistius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Avicenna, and Algazel. I will now summarize
Aquinas’s reports.

33 Against the Averroists, 67.
34 Ibid., 67-69.
36 Against the Averroists, 69.
37 Ibid., 71-79.
Themistius says that the possible intellect is “more connatural to the soul” than the agent intellect is. The active intellect supervenes on the potential intellect, becoming one with it. Themistius’ view emphasizes that a human is what it is, not because of the sensitive soul—as the Averroist position implies—but because of the active intellect, the principal part. On Themistius’ view it is misleading, Aquinas says, to say that what is in potency and what is in act are two different things. If such were the case a person would be different from his own existence. The intellect composed of potency and act carries out the act of writing, but only insofar as that intellect is active. What it is for a human to exist comes from the human soul, but not from every part of it. The sensitive soul is the matter to the imaginative aspect of the soul, and the imaginative is the matter for the possible intellect. The possible intellect is the matter for the agent intellect, and what it is for a human to exist comes only from the agent intellect. Nature can be said to “stop” with the agent intellect, and so in short “we are the agent intellect.”

Theophrastus says that we should not understand the intellect as having been added from outside as if it were something accidentally conjoined or temporally prior. The

---

39 Against the Averroists, 73; cf. Themistius, *Commentaire*, 233-234.73-79, 88-90.
40 Against the Averroists, 73.
41 Ibid.; Themistius, *Commentaire*, 228.79-85.
42 Against the Averroists, 73; Themistius, *Commentaire*, 228.79-85.
43 Against the Averroists, 73; Themistius, *Commentaire*, 228.79-85.
44 Against the Averroists, 73; Themistius, *Commentaire*, 228.89-91.
45 Against the Averroists, 75.
intellect is there from the first coming-into-being, “as containing and comprehending human nature.”

Alexander says that the possible intellect is the form of the body. Aquinas says that Averroes had claimed that when Alexander said that the possible intellect is the preparation in human nature for the agent intellect and for the intelligibles, this meant that the intellect is not associated with a particular body because no preparation is associated with a body. Aquinas says that this is a perverse understanding of Alexander.

Avicenna holds the intellect to be a power of the soul and the form of a body, although he says that the “contemplative intellect” is a power separate from the human being. The intellect nonetheless needs the bodily powers for its own actions. Algazel says that the soul is a form more beautiful than the forms that arise from the elements, and that this highest form is given from “the giver of forms”. The soul is still related to body as form, according to Algazel’s position. And, Algazel makes it clear that the “knowing power” of the human soul does not operate through a bodily organ.

---

47 Against the Averroists, 75.
48 Ibid., 77; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 5.2.
49 Against the Averroists, 77; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 5.2.
51 Against the Averroists, 77; cf. Algazel’s Metaphysics, 172.
In the third chapter Aquinas considers the nature of the intellect in the abstract. A passage from Aristotle’s *De Anima* is the starting point for a series of arguments designed to show that the Averroist position cannot account for individualized knowledge. Aristotle says that the soul is “that whereby we first live and understand; therefore it is a certain form and species” of a body. Aquinas says that it must be true that “this singular man understands,” because individuals would not ask for an explanation about the intellect unless they themselves had understanding.

That whereby a human being first does anything is his form, and so whatever it is that primarily accounts for a singular man’s understanding must be his form: “Anything acts insofar as it is in act; anything is in act through its form; therefore that through which something first acts must be its form.” Aquinas says that if one rejects the view that the intellect is the form of the individual, then he will have to find another way to explain how the act of an intellectual principle can be the act of an individual man. Averroes says that the possible intellect is a part of the soul only equivocally. On his view, the intellect is a separated substance. The separate substance’s understanding is the individual’s insofar as the possible intellect is joined to the individual through the phantasms. An intelligible species that becomes one with the possible intellect has two subjects: the phantasms and the possible intellect.

---

52 *Against the Averroists*, 79-101.
53 Ibid., 79.
54 Ibid.; *De Anima*, 414a.12-14.
55 *Against the Averroists*, 79-81.
56 Ibid., 81.
Aquinas says that there are three ways of refuting Averroes’ position about the conjunction between the individual man and the phantasms.\(^{57}\) (1) The union of intellect and man would not come into being at the moment when a man comes into being, because a man would not have an intellect “from generation”, but only through the operation of sense.\(^{58}\) (2) Intelligible species exist in the possible intellect only when they have been abstracted from phantasms.\(^{59}\) But on Averroes’ view the possible intellect is separated from phantasms, and so the phantasms can no longer explain the union between intellect and body. The union cannot be explained by an analogy with the mirror’s representation of a man, because such a representation would be the mirror’s act and not the man’s act. (3) Even if it were granted that numerically one and the same species were both the form of the possible intellect and in the phantasms at the same time, such a conjunction would not explain how “this man understands”.\(^{60}\) When sensation occurs, something happens through an individual’s sensitive species, but also through his sensitive power. Thus, knowledge occurs not only through intelligible species, but also through the individual’s power. (Similarly, a wall has color “in it” which is being sensed, but this does not mean that the wall senses, because the wall does not have the power of sensation.)

Next, Aquinas criticizes the view that the Averroists can explain how “this man thinks” by saying that the intellect is united to the body as its mover, i.e., the operation of

\(^{57}\) Ibid., 83-85.  
\(^{58}\) Ibid., 83.  
\(^{59}\) Ibid.  
\(^{60}\) Ibid., 85.
the intellect is attributed to this man just as the operation of the eye is attributed to this man.\textsuperscript{61} Aquinas first attempts to reduce this view to absurdity on the basis that it cannot explain what a given man, Socrates, is:

(1) Suppose Socrates is composed of both the vegetative and sensitive soul.\textsuperscript{62} Aristotle says that a substantial unity must have a cause for its unity.\textsuperscript{63} An Averroist might respond by saying that Socrates is not one thing absolutely, but is rather the result of the coming together of mover and moved.\textsuperscript{64} Incoherencies follow this assertion, however. If Socrates is just the coming together of a mover and a moved, then he is not a being in a species and genus. Furthermore, he could not act, because he would not be a human being. And, his understanding is really the activity of the intellect using the body of Socrates, as the sailor uses a ship.\textsuperscript{65}

(2) Suppose Socrates is just a body that is animated by a vegetative and sensitive soul.\textsuperscript{66} On this view, the intellect’s action cannot be attributed to Socrates, because Aristotle says that the movement is in the thing being moved; when there is no product of the activity other than the actuality, the actuality can be located only in the agent (the intellect) and not thing moved (the body).\textsuperscript{67} It is no help for the Averroist to say that the understanding itself and not the intellect is the act of the body, because there can be no

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 85-95.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 87.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Ibid.; cf. Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, 1045a.8-14.
\item \textsuperscript{64} \textit{Against the Averroists}, 87.
\item \textsuperscript{65} In the fifth and sixth chapters of the present study, I will explain how Pecham thinks of the rational soul as \textit{both} the mover and the form of the human body, and how he accounts for the human being as one thing.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 87-89.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Ibid.; cf. Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, 1050a.30-36.
\end{itemize}
understanding that is not the act of the intellect (just as there can be no seeing apart from
sight). This is clear because the proper act of a mover is attributed neither to the
instrument nor to that which is moved, but to the mover itself (e.g., the saw does not
make the artifact). Even in transitive activities, Aquinas says, actions are attributed in
opposite ways to movers and moved things (e.g., thanks to the action of building the
builder builds and the building is built). Sometimes the action of a mover passes into the
thing moved, as when the heated thing heats. But still the heated thing requires heat
from another, primary source before it can heat a third thing. Aristotle says that Socrates
primarily understands, and by virtue of an intellect that is potentially all things.
Therefore, a separate intellect moving Socrates could not be void of determinate nature at
the moment when it moves Socrates, and so Socrates could not just be the body that is
moved by the intellect.

(3) Suppose Socrates is just an intellect. Gregory of Nyssa has attributed this
position to Plato, and Macrobius attributes the position to Plotinus. The position may
seem close to that of Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where he says that man is the
intellectual element. However, Aquinas says that Aristotle’s position is that man is the

---

68 *Against the Averroists*, 89.
69 Ibid., 91.
71 *Against the Averroists*, 91.
72 Ibid., 93-95.
73 Ibid., 93; Nemesius, *De Natura Hominis*, *Patrologiae Graeca* (hereafter *PG*), ed.
Jacques-Paul Migne, 40 (Paris: Migne, 1863), 593.
J.O. Urmson, 1166a.15-17. Actually, Aristotle says that the intellectual element “is
*thought* to be the man himself. . .” (emp. added).
intellect only in the sense that the intellect is the “chief thing in man.” Aquinas presents three reasons why man is not intellect or soul alone: First, as Gregory points out, a tunic and its wearer cannot be one thing. Second, Aristotle says that “man and horse and the like” are not forms alone, but are forms that are correlated to some individuating matter. No part of the body can be defined independent of soul. Third, since the intellect moves only through the will, as Aristotle says, then if man were only an intellect he could remove his body whenever he wished.

Next, Aquinas argues that, even if the intellect were Socrates’ mover, this would not advance the claim that Socrates understands. A particular man is in some species, but species is derived from form, so that through which Socrates has a species is his form. But each thing has its species from that which is the principle of the species’ proper activity. Man’s proper activity is intellectual, and so the intellect must be united to the body as form. Furthermore, Aquinas says, it is in our power to will, and Aristotle says that the will is in the intellect. This is obvious from observing that separate intelligences have wills, and from the fact that some things are universally loved and hated. But if intellect cannot be attributed to an individual man, then neither can the will be so attributed, and man would no longer have “dominion” over his acts.

75 Against the Averroists, 93.
76 Ibid., 95; cf. Nemesius, De Natura Hominis, 593.
77 Against the Averroists, 95; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1035b.27-31.
78 Against the Averroists, 95.
80 Against the Averroists, 95.
81 Ibid., 97.
82 Ibid.; cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 432b.5.
83 Against the Averroists, 97.
Next, Aquinas refutes a positive argument designed to prove that the Averroist position allows for individual knowledge.\[^{84}\] The Averroists’ argument is that if the possible intellect is not one for all, then the possible intellect would have to be a material form.\[^{85}\] But this is false, Aquinas says, because understanding results from abstraction after the intellect receives a material form. The soul is not the form the body according to the intellective power, but rather the soul is immaterial and receives immaterially and understands itself.\[^{86}\] Someone might object by saying that a power of the soul cannot be more immaterial or simpler than its essence.\[^{87}\] Yet Aquinas says that the human soul exists not merely in a state of dependence on other forms that have no existence apart from the body and are “immersed in matter.” The human soul as a form is too dignified to be a merely capacity of matter.

In concluding chapter three, Aquinas argues that if the intellect existed separately from the soul, then it would always be understanding and understood all by itself.\[^{88}\] In fact, it would not need to use intelligibles in order to understand. Rather, such a separate intellect would understand just as other separate substances do. Higher substances do not require lower substances for their own principal perfection.

\[^{84}\] Ibid., 99.
\[^{87}\] *Against the Averroists*, 99.
\[^{88}\] Ibid., 101.
In chapter four Aquinas discusses the problems that follow from claiming that there is one intellect for everybody.\(^9^9\) Aquinas admits that it is plausible to claim that there is one agent intellect for everybody, because several things can be perfected by a single agent (e.g., the sun allows all animals to see).\(^9^0\) He points out, however, that it is not Aristotle’s intention to teach that the agent intellect is separate from the individual soul, though Aristotle does compare the agent intellect to light, as Plato does. Before returning to his discussion of Aristotle, Aquinas brings up a number of reasons why it is implausible to think that there is one possible intellect for everybody.\(^9^1\)

If individual human beings understand by virtue of a single possible intellect, then there are three possibilities:\(^9^2\) (1) A man who understands is the intellect. But if this is the case, then there would be only one man. (2) The intellect formally inheres in the man as a power of the soul. But if the intellect inheres in a human knower formally, then there must be different forms for different bodies and there would necessarily be multiple intellects. (3) The intellect relates to the individual as a mover. But this view was refuted in the third chapter.

To expand on his rejection of (3), Aquinas uses an illustration involving sight and the eye to show that even if the intellect were the body’s mover, then the Averroist position still could not explain how this particular man thinks: Suppose that the intellect could relate to Socrates as a mover.\(^9^3\) In this case Socrates thinks because his intellect thinks, in

\(^{89}\) Ibid., 103-119.  
\(^{90}\) Ibid., 103.  
\(^{91}\) Ibid., 103ff.  
\(^{92}\) Ibid., 105.  
\(^{93}\) Ibid., 107.
the same way in which a man sees because his eye sees. And suppose there is one eye for all men. At this point we can ask whether there is one seeing entity, or multiple seeing entities. In answering this question, we must keep some principles in mind:

- If many men are using a single instrument, then there are many agents.
- If the chief agent is singular but uses many instruments, then there is still one agent.

So, if the eye is principal in man, then many people using the same eye would constitute one seeing thing. However, if the eye were not principal in man, then the reverse would be true (i.e., many things capable of seeing would use the the single eye as an instrument). Now, the intellect is obviously the principal in man, so if there were only one intellect, then there would be only one knower and one agent who wills. But in this case, there would be no more moral science, which is natural to man.

Next, Aquinas argues that the Averroist position destroys the particularity of intellectual objects and acts. If all men understand by using one intellect (however it may be united to the individual men), then there could be only one object of understanding at a time, and only one act of understanding at a time. Phantasms are only “preambles” to intellectual acts, and so if there were only one intellect, the phantasms could provide no differentiation between simultaneous intellectual acts.

Aquinas now returns to Aristotle. Aquinas says that, when Aristotle asserts that the possible intellect is separate and potentially all things, he is referring to the state of an

---

94 Ibid., 109.
96 Against the Averroists, 111.
97 Ibid., 113.
individual’s intellect prior to active thought. The intellect is in potency prior to learning or discovery; it is like a tablet on which nothing is yet written. The “habit” of science is the first act of the possible intellect. Through learning, the possible intellect becomes actual. Aquinas says that this process of coming to know would be impossible if there were but one intellect for all people in all times.

Next, Aquinas discusses intelligible species, with the aim of showing that the Averroist position cannot explain the relationship between the species, the phantasms, and the intellect. Species are conserved in the intellect because the intellect is the place of forms, and science is a “permanent habit”. Thus, if a teacher knows something by virtue of the one possible intellect, then it would be impossible for the student to come to know that same thing by virtue of the possible intellect.

Someone might object by saying that, according to Aristotle, since there have always been men there would never have been a first man who understood. Therefore, according to the objector, intelligible species are not acquired through any one person’s phantasms. But the objection implies that Aristotle vainly posited an agent intellect to make potentially intelligible things actually intelligible, and that Aristotle vainly posited that phantasms are due to the possible intellect as colors are to sight. (If phantasms contribute nothing to the possible intellect, why did Aristotle think that human knowers need them?) Anyway it is irrational to suppose that a separated substance should need our

99 Against the Averroists, 115.
100 Ibid., 115ff.
101 Ibid., 115.
102 Ibid., 117.
phantasms or that it cannot understand itself save through the learning of particular humans.

Someone might say that Aristotle’s discussion had to do with the possible intellect only as it is united to humans and not as it is in itself. But, Aquinas says, Aristotle speaks of the possible intellect in terms of what is proper to it insofar as it is distinguished from the agent intellect. For the sake of argument, however, suppose that the single possible intellect has intelligible species eternally through which it is made one with individual knowers according to their phantasms. These intelligible species would need to be related to the individual knower’s phantasms by one of three means: (1) The intelligible species in the possible intellect are taken from the phantasms in the individuals. But this is ruled out a priori by the position under consideration (i.e., that the possible intellect has its intelligible species eternally). (2) The intelligible species are not taken from phantasms, but are “shining upon our phantasms” (irradiantes supra fantasmata) just as if there were species in the eye that shine upon the colors in the wall. There are several problems with the idea that the intelligible species shine on the phantasms to produce individualized knowledge. First, it implies that phantasms come to be actually intelligible not through the agent intellect but through the possible intellect. Second, such a shining could not make phantasms actually intelligible, for phantasms become actually intelligible only through abstraction. Third, any reception occurs according to the nature of the receiver, and the phantasms that would receive the shining

---

103 Ibid.
104 Ibid., 119.
would be in a sensible and material mode. Material illumination could not directly provide understanding. (3) The third possibility about the relationship between the possible intellect and the individual knower’s phantasms is that intelligible species are neither received in the possible intellect from the phantasms nor do they imprint something on the phantasms. But in this case, the intelligible species in the possible intellect would have nothing at all to do with the individual’s understanding.

In the fifth chapter Aquinas responds to five objections to the view that there is a plurality of possible intellects. In some cases the responses include extended discussions.

The first objection is this: Whatever is multiplied according to matter is a material form, which is why substances that are separate from matter cannot be members of the same species. So, if there were a plurality of intellects in numerically different men, then intellect would be a material form. Form freed from matter is not one of a number of members of a species, because numeration is caused by matter. It would therefore be a contradiction for God to make many intellects of the same species in diverse men.

Aquinas has a number of responses to this objection:

• The Averroists have misunderstood unity. In fact, “unity” can describe a member of a species that has multiple members, and so the objection represents a misunderstanding of Aristotle’s words that “the essence of each thing is one in no merely accidental way.” Aristotle also says that things which have no matter have no cause of being or of being one thing. There are four kinds of unity on

---

105 Ibid., 121-145.
106 Ibid., 121.
107 Ibid., 123.
109 Against the Averroists, 123; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1045b.35-36.
Aristotle’s view: numeric, specific, generic, and proportional. If every case of numeration is caused by matter, it would not have made sense for Aristotle to search for the number of the immaterial, separated substances, which he did. A separate substance is both singular and individuated, since it has an operation, although it is immaterial. Matter is the principle of individuation in material things insofar as matter is not shareable by many. Matter is the “first subject not existing in another.”

Aristotle argues against Plato by saying that a separate Idea will not be predicated of many, nor will it be more definable than other individuals that are unique in their species, such as the sun and the moon.

Someone might respond to this last argument by saying that souls multiplied according to bodies could not remain when the bodies have been destroyed. However, Aquinas says, it has already been explained how the individualized intellect can continue after the death of the body, and each soul will remain in its unity.

The second objection to the plurality of intellects is: It would be contradictory for God to bring about many intellects.

Aquinas has two (similar) responses to this objection:
• Even if it is granted that intellect is not essentially multiplied, it does not therefore follow that the multiplying of intellect involves a contradiction. A first thing can get something from a second thing that is not natural for the first thing to have (e.g., a heavy thing is lifted high by another thing). If the intellect were naturally one for all because it had no natural cause of multiplication, then a supernatural cause could still multiply it without contradiction.

• The same argument that the objector uses to prove that it would be contradictory for God to bring about many intellects could just as well be used to prove that God could not raise the dead or restore vision to the blind.

The third objection to the plurality of intellects is this: If you and I understand the same thing, then there is only one understanding.\textsuperscript{121} If understanding in two people is numerically two but specifically one, then there is really one thing that is understood, because there is one quiddity through which the understanding takes place. Then there must also be a quiddity through which the first quiddity is understood, and so on to infinity, which is impossible.

Aquinas has two responses to this objection:\textsuperscript{122}

• If a thing is understood, then nothing needs to be abstracted from it in order for it to be understood. On the basis of the objection, there can be only one thing understood. This would mean not only that our intellect is a separate substance, but also that the separate substance is God.

• An object of the understanding does not take its species from the act or power of the intellect, but rather the other way around. Thus the understanding of a stone is one thing in all intelligences.

Aquinas says that someone\textsuperscript{123} might respond to this last argument by saying that the thing understood is one immaterial species existing in the intellect, and deny that there can be a

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 129.
\textsuperscript{123} I.e., someone among those who “unwittingly slide into the teaching of Plato” (ibid., 131).
science of sensible things.\textsuperscript{124} Because Plato taught that the Forms are themselves subsistent, he could maintain that multiple intellects derive knowledge of one truth from one separate Form. The Averroists, however, believe that the immaterial forms are the immaterial objects of the intellect and thus the Averroists cannot allow for multiple minds.

Admittedly, Aristotle says that an object of the understanding is a quiddity or nature of a thing, although the sciences are about the particular things rather than about the understood species (otherwise I could not know the stone, but only a species abstracted from the stone).\textsuperscript{125} However, if understanding were a transitive action, like burning or moving, then it would follow that understanding exists in the way that the nature of a singular thing exists in it.\textsuperscript{126} As it is, understanding occurs according to the mode of the person who is doing the understanding; the intellect understands the universal nature after abstracting it from individual principles. Two people understand the same thing by virtue of numerically different intelligible species. Materiality—not singularity—is repugnant to intelligibility.\textsuperscript{127} Thus it is clear how the same science can be in the teacher and in the learner. Each has his own intelligible species. And, just as health comes about by the capacity of nature and not by the power of the physician, so knowledge is not caused in the learner by the power of the master, but rather by the capacity of the learner.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 133.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 135.
The fourth objection to the plurality of intellects is this: If there are individuated intellects, then when the bodies of humans are destroyed, many intellectual substances would remain, and this possibility is opposed to Aristotle’s teaching.\textsuperscript{128}

Aquinas has two responses to this objection:

- While Aristotle did think that it would be futile for there to be separate substances (in addition to the heavenly bodies) that are not moving bodies, he did not say that it was necessarily false that there are separate substances.\textsuperscript{129} In fact, Aristotle says that if a substance is immune from change, it has attained its best state.\textsuperscript{130} A thing is futile if it does not attain the end for which it is designed. The movement of bodies cannot be the purpose of separate substances, which have a higher end.

- The human soul, separated from the body, does not have the ultimate perfection of its nature, since the soul is part of human nature. Still, the soul is not frustrated. The end of the human soul is not to move the body but rather to understand, as Aristotle says in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}.\textsuperscript{131}

The fifth objection is this: If there were many incorruptible intellects, and Aristotle is correct in saying that the world is eternal, then there would be an infinity of intellects.\textsuperscript{132} But Algazel says that if there is an absence of either quantity or order, then it is impossible to show that there is not an infinity.\textsuperscript{133} Algazel concludes from this that since souls are neither numbered nor ordered, there is an infinity of souls.\textsuperscript{134} The unstated

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.; cf. Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, 1074a.18-22: “If there can be no spatial movement which does not conduce to the moving of a star, and if further every being and every substance which is immune from change and in virtue of itself has attained to the best must be considered an end, there can be no other being apart from these we have named, but this must be the number of the substances.”

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Against the Averroists}, 135.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 137.


\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Against the Averroists}, 139.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.; cf. \textit{Algazel’s Metaphysics}, 107.

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Against the Averroists}, 139; cf. \textit{Algazel’s Metaphysics}, 107.
implication is that a plurality of intellects implies that there is an infinity of intellects, and
such an infinity is offensive to reason.

Aquinas has three responses to this objection:135

- The objection causes no concern to Catholics, who hold that the world began.136
- Not only Latins but Arabs, such as Algazel (as already discussed) and Avicenna, have taught that the soul is numerically many, though of one species.137
- Themistius, a Greek, says that the agent intellect is multiple.138 He says that the “first illuminator is one”, a separate substance which Catholics call God.139 Avicenna calls this being the ultimate intelligence.140 Themistius makes it clear that Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus all believed the possible intellect to be multiple as well. Averroes has distorted Themistius’ and Theophrastus’ reports.141 Some people unfortunately read only Averroes and then claim to report the common views of all philosophers.

Aquinas concludes the final chapter by saying that it is unfortunate that some accuse Latins of rejecting the unity of the intellect merely “because their law is contrary to it.”142

It is also unfortunate, however, that some claim to believe Averroes according to reason and to believe the opposite position according to faith. Such a position suggests that faith concerns things whose contraries are concluded necessarily.

Aquinas’s First Quaestio

In James H. Robb’s introduction to the Quaestiones, he says that “Question 1 can be seen as a map for understanding St. Thomas’ view of the human being as an incarnate

135 Against the Averroists, 139-141.
136 Ibid., 139.
137 Ibid.; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 5.3.
138 Against the Averroists, 141; cf. Themistius, Commentaire, 430a.25, 235.7-11.
139 Against the Averroists, 141; cf. Themistius, Commentaire, 430a.25.
140 Against the Averroists, 141; cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics, 9.3.
141 Against the Averroists, 141.
142 Ibid., 143.
spirit. It presents in broad lines the whole of his doctrine; questions 2 and 3 add a number of clarifications and precisions.”\textsuperscript{143} The first question is “Whether a human soul can be both a form and an entity”,\textsuperscript{144} the second is “Whether a human soul is separate from its body in existence”,\textsuperscript{145} and the third is “Whether the possible intellect or the intellective soul is one for all human beings.”\textsuperscript{146}

In Aquinas’s own response to question one, he argues for the view that the human soul is both an entity and the form of a living body.\textsuperscript{147} Aquinas argues for these two major claims in turn. First, he argues that the soul is an entity in the Aristotelian sense, i.e., that the soul has the following two qualifications: (1) The soul is “an individual in the genus of substance.” (2) The soul is “complete in a given species and genus of substance.”\textsuperscript{148} To deny that the soul meets these qualifications is to say that the soul cannot subsist \textit{per se} but is instead “simply a form like other material forms.”\textsuperscript{149} And, to assert that the soul meets the qualifications is not to assert that the soul is an entity “in the sense of being a complete substance which possesses its specific nature but rather in the sense of being part of a being which has complete specific nature. . . .”\textsuperscript{150} Existence is a single property

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Quaestiones}, 21.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 42.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 53.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 65.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 46-47. Aquinas must mean that the soul is the form of a \textit{living} body, for he says: “Therefore the soul is that by which a human body actually exists; but to confer being is a characteristic of a form. Therefore, a human soul is the form of its body. . . . [W]hen the soul leaves its body, the individual parts of the body do not retain their original names except in an equivocal sense” (47).
\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Quaestiones}, 46.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 49.
\end{flushright}
that the body and soul share, and which they lose upon their separation (the soul continues to exist after the separation).\textsuperscript{151}

Although some have denied that the soul satisfies the two qualifications, Aquinas maintains that even the vegetative aspect of the soul meets the qualifications since the vegetative soul’s operations “must possess a principle which transcends active and passive qualities, which in the process of nutrition and growth are instrumental qualities only.”\textsuperscript{152} The denial that the rational aspect of the soul meets the two qualifications is even more untenable, for two reasons. (1) The rational soul has operations that “consist in abstracting species, not only from matter but also from all individuating, material conditions, and these operations are required for knowing a universal.”\textsuperscript{153} (2) In the essential operation of the intellect “no bodily organ has any share, so that there would be a corporeal organ of understanding in the way that an eye is the organ of seeing, as is proved in Book III of the \textit{De Anima}.”\textsuperscript{154}

Having established that the rational soul has an operation that is separate from the body, Aquinas observes that forms which have an act of existing that depends on matter

\textsuperscript{151} See ibid., 50-51.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 46; cf. Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, 407b.27-408a.28; Nemesius, \textit{De Natura Hominis}, 553.
\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Quaestiones}, 46.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.; cf. Aristotle: “Thus that in the soul which is called thought (by thought I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body: if so, it would acquire some quality, e.g. warmth or cold, or even have an organ like the sensitive faculty: as it is, it has none. It was a good idea to call the soul ‘the place of forms’, though this description holds only of the thinking soul, and even this is the forms only potentially, not actually” (\textit{De Anima}, 429a.22-29, parenthetical item in orig.).
do not have *per se* operations.\(^{155}\) For example, heat itself does not act, but rather something that is hot acts.\(^{156}\) Thus Aquinas concludes that “[I]t is necessary that an intellective soul operate *per se*, inasmuch as it possesses an essential operation in which the body does not share.”\(^{157}\) Aquinas cites the authority of both Plato and Aristotle for this position, but distinguishes Plato’s position on the basis that

Plato goes further and holds that a soul not only subsists *per se* but even that it possesses in itself the fulness of a specific nature. For he held that the full nature of the species is in the soul, defining a human being not as something composed of soul and body but as a soul using a body, and thus the relation of the soul to its body is that of a sailor to his ship or of a clothed man to his garments.\(^{158}\)

In a passage from the *Alcibiades*, Socrates says that man is that which “rules the body” and that which rules the body must be the soul.\(^{159}\) Aquinas specifically denies the view, ascribed here to Plato, that the soul “possesses in itself the fulness of a specific nature”:

“Although a human soul is able to subsist *per se*, still it does not *per se* possess a complete specific nature. Whence it would not be possible that separated souls would constitute a distinct grade of beings.”\(^{160}\) Aquinas disagrees with what he takes to be Plato’s position on the basis that “that by which the body lives is its soul,” that the being of a body comes from the soul.\(^{161}\)

---

\(^{155}\) *Quaestiones*, 47.  
\(^{156}\) Ibid.  
\(^{157}\) Ibid.  
\(^{158}\) Ibid.; cf. Aristotle: “But thought seems to be an independent substance implanted within us and to be incapable of being destroyed” (*De Anima*, 408b.18-19). Aquinas says that Plato thought the soul was shown to be “immortal and *per se* subsistent from the fact that it is self-moving. For Plato took motion in a broad sense to apply to any kind of operation, and thus it is to be understood that an intellect moves itself because it operates through itself” (*Quaestiones*, 47; cf. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 245c-246a).  
\(^{159}\) Trans. D.S. Hutchinson, 129e-130c.  
\(^{160}\) *Quaestiones*, 49.  
\(^{161}\) Ibid., 47.
Having argued for his first claim (i.e., that the soul is an entity), Aquinas now argues for his second major claim, i.e., that the soul is the form of a living body: 162

- The soul gives being to a body.
- To confer being is a characteristic of a form.
- Therefore, a human soul is the form of its body.

Aquinas provides a second argument, directed against the dualist position already mentioned: 163

- If the soul were in its body as a sailor is in a ship, then the soul would not give “specific nature” to the body or to its parts. 164
- But we know that the soul does give specific nature to the body and its parts, because when the soul leaves the body, the individual parts do not retain their original names except in an equivocal sense.
- (Unstated conclusion): The soul gives specific nature to the body and to its parts.

And a third argument, also against dualism: 165

- If the soul were in the body as a sailor is in a ship, it would follow that the union of soul and body is accidental.
- If the soul-body union were accidental, then the separation of soul and body would not be a substantial corruption.
- But the soul-body separation is a substantial corruption.
- Therefore, the soul is an entity, able to subsist per se but not as possessing in itself a complete specific nature, but rather as completing human nature insofar as it is the form of its body; and thus at one and the same time it is a form and an entity.

---

162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
Aquinas now illustrates his view of the soul as both entity and form by considering “the order of natural forms.”\(^{166}\) This hierarchy includes the following levels:\(^{167}\)

- The forms of “lower bodies” (e.g., elements) which possess no operation exceeding active and passive qualities. These forms are “closest to matter” and possess no operation that exceeds active and passive qualities of matter such as “rarified” and “compact”.

- The forms of “compounds,” which have an operation that is derived from a celestial nature. For example, “magnets attract iron, not because of heat or cold or any quality of this sort, but because they participate in some fashion in celestial power.”

- The forms of plants (at this level Aquinas begins to refer to forms as “souls”) which are like not only celestial bodies but also the movers of the celestial bodies, since the souls of plants belong to beings that move themselves.

- Animal souls, which are also like the substances that move the heavenly bodies, but in a yet higher way, since the souls of animals are capable of knowledge. Animal knowledge is of material things only and occurs in a material way. Therefore animal souls need bodily organs for all of their functions.

- Human souls, which bear an even closer likeness to the knowledge of the higher substances, since humans are able to know immaterial things. Human souls differ from the higher substances in that humans use knowledge that comes from sensing material things in order to acquire the aforementioned knowledge of immaterial things.

Aquinas believes that from this hierarchy the mode of the human soul’s existence can be known.\(^{168}\) Consequently he makes the following argument:\(^{169}\)

- The soul has an operation that transcends material things, and so its existence does not depend on its body.

- The soul acquires its immaterial knowledge from what is material.

- Therefore, the soul’s nature can be fulfilled only in conjunction with the body.

\(^{166}\) Ibid., 47-48.
\(^{167}\) Ibid., 48.
\(^{168}\) Ibid.
\(^{169}\) Ibid.
Aquinas immediately uses this conclusion as the basis for a further claim that does not straightforwardly or obviously follow:

[T]herefore, a human soul *insofar as it is united to its body as its form* still possesses an act of existence which is elevated above the body and does not depend on it; clearly then this soul is constituted on the boundary line between corporeal and separate substances.\(^{170}\)

Now Aquinas has provided two separate justifications for the claim that the soul is the form of the body. These two arguments seem to lead to two understandings of form. First, Aquinas said that we know the soul to be the form of the body because we can see that the body parts have a different being when the soul leaves the body.\(^{171}\) Second, Aquinas said that we know the soul to be the form of the body because the soul requires data that can arise only in conjunction with the work of the bodily organs.\(^{172}\) The first argument reflects the view that the soul is related to the body along the lines of some combination of the four Aristotelian causes (soul as giver of shape, soul as efficient mover, etc.). The second argument implies that the body is informed by the soul in the sense that the body conduces or produces information for the soul.

Fortunately, this is not all Aquinas has to say on the topic of form in the first *quaestio*. There are at least two additional explanations or justifications of the soul’s role as form in the human being. (1) Recall that Aquinas has already asserted that form provides the species for any given substance,\(^{173}\) and in the *ad contra* section he provides further application of this general principle to the particular case of human beings.\(^{174}\) If and only

---

\(^{170}\) Ibid., emp. added.
\(^{171}\) Ibid., 47.
\(^{172}\) Ibid., 48.
\(^{173}\) Ibid., 46.
\(^{174}\) Ibid., 45.
if a being is rational is it a member of the human species, and therefore the rational soul
is the essential form of a human being. (2) The soul is the form of its body because the
soul is related to the body as act to potency. However, Aquinas maintains that when the
body dies the soul does not cease to have the property whereby it is a form: “When the
body ceases to be through corruption, the soul does not lose that essential feature by
which it is appropriate to the soul to be a form, although the soul does not actually perfect
matter so that it is a form.” What is corrupted when death occurs is not the matter or
form, but the composite:

The body’s existence is said to be corruptible insofar as the body through the
process of corruption loses that act of existing which was shared by it and the
soul, and which remains in the subsistent soul. For the same reason the act of
existing of the body can be said to consist of parts because it is so constituted by
its parts as to be able to receive existence from the soul.

Aquinas’s Second Quaestio

Aquinas’s second question is “Whether a human soul is separate from its body in
existence.” Aquinas’s position, as already seen his response to the first question, is that
the soul is not separate from the body in existence. Aquinas’s response to the question
begins from the principle that anything that can be in act or not must have a principle of
potency. Humans are potentially active in sense and intellect, and so “we must admit that

175 Ibid., 49; cf. ibid., 51: “Sometimes in the definitions of forms the subject is said to be
without form, as when one says that motion is the act of that which exists in potency.
Sometimes the subject is said to be informed as when it is said that motion is the act of
the movable thing and light is said to be the act of a physical, organic body, because a
soul makes the body to be an organic body just as light causes something to be
luminous.”
176 Ibid., 50.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid., 53.
there is in a human being an intellective principle which is in potency to intelligible things." Aquinas says that Aristotle calls the principle of potentiality the possible intellect. Aquinas then compares the possible intellect to the pupil of the eye, which has no color but is capable of “receiving all colors.” One of Aquinas’s explanations of the possible intellect in the *quaestio* is in an *ad contra* argument. Here Aquinas says that the possible intellect possesses an intelligible form only in potency but not in act. This does not mean that the possible intellect is one for all men, but rather that it is one with respect to all intelligible forms, “just as prime matter is one with respect to all sensible forms.” This is an interesting comparison because Aquinas thinks that prime matter (i.e., matter without any form) has being only in thought, whereas he thinks that possible intellects exist in reality.

This complete possibility associated with the possible intellect is also Aquinas’s reason why the possible intellect cannot have any bodily organ: “For if it possessed a bodily organ, the possible intellect would be determined to a particular sensible nature; just as the power of sight is restricted to the nature of the eye.” However, Aquinas is quick to add that the possible intellect is not entirely separate from the body as some

---

179 Ibid., 57.
180 Ibid.; cf. Aristotle, *De Anima*, 429b.30-430a.2: “Have we not already disposed of the difficulty about interaction involving a common element, when we said that thought is in a sense potentially whatever is thinkable, though actually it is nothing until it has thought? What it thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writing-table on which as yet nothing actually stands written: this is exactly what happens with thought.”
181 *Quaestiones*, 57.
182 Ibid., 62-63.
184 *Quaestiones*, 57.
suggest: “Now other men ... fall into the opposing error. For they hold that the possible intellect is so devoid of any sensible nature and so unmixed with body that it is a substance separate in existence from the body so that it should be in potency to all intelligible forms.”

Thus begins Aquinas’s direct criticism of the Averroist position (Aquinas names Averroes as “a follower of this position”). Here are the first three arguments that Aquinas presents against the Averroist position in the second *quaestio*:

- Aristotle says that the soul (including the intellect) and body are one as the wax and its shape are one. The shape of the wax cannot be separated from the wax in any way. Therefore the intellect in its existence cannot be separated from the body. The soul/body relationship is just an instantiation of a larger principle: “[N]o form is separate in existence from its matter. But the intellective soul is the form of its body. Therefore, it is not separate in its existence from matter.”

- If the possible intellect were a separate substance, it would be impossible for a human being to understand by means of it, as Aristotle says man does. If one substance performs an operation, then this operation cannot be attributed to another substance.

---

185 Ibid.
186 Ibid., 58.
187 Ibid., 56; cf. Aristotle, *De Anima*, 412b.6-7; 429a.10-13, 22-29.
188 Quaestiones, 56.
189 Ibid., 57; cf. Aristotle, *De Anima*, 429a.10-13, 22-24: “Turning now to the part of the soul with which the soul knows and (whether this is separable from the others in definition only, or spatially as well) we have to inquire what differentiates this part, and how thinking can take place. . . . Thus that in the soul which is called thought (by thought I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing” (parenthetical items in orig.).
190 Quaestiones, 57. Aquinas clarifies: “For although one of two substances can be the cause of operation in the other as principal agent in relation to its instrument, still the action of the principal agent is not one in number with the action of the instrument, for the action of the principal agent consists in moving the instrument while the action of the instrument consists in being moved by the principal agent and in moving something else.”
If the possible intellect were a substance that is separate from this human being or that, then the possible intellect’s act of understanding could belong to either human being.\footnote{Ibid., 57-58.} Thus, no human being at all would understand anything.\footnote{Ibid., 58.}

Aquinas says that Averroes tries to avoid the problem implied in the third argument by positing the “conjunction-theory.”\footnote{Quaestiones, 58.} According to this theory the possible intellect is “conjoined to man through the mediation of phantasms.” According to the Averroists,\footnote{See Averroes, \textit{Long Commentary}: “Since it was explained among the doubts mentioned earlier that it is impossible for the intelligible to be united with each human being and be numbered in virtue of the numbering of these by way of the part which belongs to it as matter, namely, the material intellect, then it remains that the conjoining of intelligibles with us human beings is through the conjoining of the intelligible intention with us (these are the imagined intentions), namely of the part which is related to it in us in some way as form. For this reason the statement that a boy is intelligent in potency can be understood in two ways, one because the imagined forms which are in him are intelligible in potency, the second because the material intellect which is naturally constituted to receive the intelligible of that imagined form is receptive in potency and conjoined with us in potency” (320, parenthetical in orig.).} Aristotle says that phantasms relate to the possible intellect as sensible objects relate to the senses or as colors relate to sight,\footnote{See Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, 431a.15-16.} so an intelligible species exists in two ways: (1) In the mode of intelligible being in the possible intellect; (2) In the mode of real being in the knower. Thus the intelligible species are in both the individual human and in the one possible intellect, but in different modes.

Aquinas offers the following responses to the conjunction-theory:

- Someone is not capable of knowing something simply because knowable species are present to him, but because he has a power of knowing.\footnote{Quaestiones, 58.}
• The analogy with color and sight is mistaken, because the fact that a wall has colors “in it” does not mean that it has the power of seeing those colors. Similarly, the mere presence of phantasms is insufficient for understanding; a power is also required.

• Intelligible species are understood only when they are abstracted from phantasms; the possible intellect has the intelligible species only insofar as the species have already been abstracted from phantasms and exist in the possible intellect. Thus intelligible species cannot be both in the phantasms and in the possible intellect. And if intelligible species are present to individual humans only as phantasms, i.e., as only potentially understood, then it still could not be said that individual humans understand.

• The conjunction-theory is wrong because of the nature of separate substances. Separate substances have a high degree of perfection and thus cannot depend on material things for their own essential operations. Since the possible intellect is in potency to the species of sensible things, and its operation requires bodily phantasms, the possible intellect cannot be a separate substance.

From this Aquinas concludes that the possible intellect is a potency of the human soul, and offers a response to possible objections to the effect that the soul’s function as a form prevents any aspect of the soul from being separable:

Although the human soul is a form united to a body, still it is united in such a way that it is not entirely contained by the body as if immersed in it, as are other material forms, but rather it surpasses the capability of all corporeal matter and because of the fact that its power exceeds corporeal matter, there is grounded in it the potential for intelligible objects, and this potency belongs to the possible intellect; however, insofar as the soul is united to its body, it possesses operations and powers in which the body shares, such as the powers of the nutritive and sensitive parts of the soul.

197 Ibid.
198 Ibid., 58-59, 69-70.
199 Ibid., 59.
200 Ibid.
202 Quaestiones, 59.
Aquinas concludes his own response to the question by saying that his view concords with that of Aristotle, because while the possible intellect is not grounded in a bodily organ, the possible intellect “is located in the essence of the human soul,” which is also the form of a human body.\textsuperscript{203}

In the \textit{ad contra} section Aquinas offers further arguments against the separate possible intellect and further explanation of his own view of the possible intellect.\textsuperscript{204} In these arguments we find a number of emphases. (1) Aquinas stresses that the soul transcends the body, even though the soul is the form of the body.\textsuperscript{205} Thus, the fact that the soul is the act of an organic body should not be taken to mean that the body is the soul’s principle for \textit{all} of its operations.\textsuperscript{206} The possible intellect is the highest principle in the soul.\textsuperscript{207} (2) Universals are not the same as intelligible species.\textsuperscript{208} Intelligible species are those \textit{by which} the intellect understands and not the object of intellectual understanding (the only exception occurs when the intellect reflects on its own understanding). Intelligible species received in the possible intellect from the active intellect are individuated because they inhere in the various possible intellects, but as

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{203} Ibid.; cf. Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, 429a.10-29.
\item \textsuperscript{204} \textit{Quaestiones}, 59-63.
\item \textsuperscript{205} Ibid., 60.
\item \textsuperscript{206} Ibid.; cf. ibid., 63.
\item \textsuperscript{207} Elsewhere, however, Aquinas says that there is an actualized or “agent” aspect of the human intellect (\textit{Treatise}, 84-89, 146, 151).
\item \textsuperscript{208} \textit{Quaestiones}, 61.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
immaterial they are still the means by which we know universals.\textsuperscript{209} (3) The fact that the intellect abstracts universal forms from individuating material principles does not require that the intellect be universal, but only that it be immaterial.\textsuperscript{210}

(4) There is also an emphasis on the unity of substantial form. Of all the \textit{ad contra} arguments, the one perhaps most instructive for purposes of comparison with Pecham has to do with the various aspects of the soul:

The likeness which the Philosopher notes between geometrical figures and parts of the soul bear upon this point, that just as a quadrilateral possesses whatever a triangle has and something more, and as a pentagon has whatever a quadrilateral has, so the sensitive soul possesses whatever the nutritive soul does and the intellective soul possesses whatever belongs to the sensitive soul and more. It does not follow from this that the nutritive and sensitive differ essentially from the intellective, but rather that one of them includes the other.\textsuperscript{211}

Here we have a clear statement of Aquinas’s anti-pluralist position: the intellect \textit{includes} the other forms, i.e., there is only one substantial form for the human being. And Aquinas

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid., 60. Aquinas explains here that, properly speaking, a thing is understood because it is immaterial, not because it is universal. A universal is intelligible because it is abstracted from individuating material principles (cf. ibid., 73). Aquinas seems bound to hold this distinction because separate substances are actually intelligible even though they are individuals. Aquinas discusses this issue further in the third \textit{quaestio}, where he attacks an argument to the effect that individuated species cannot be understood because only universals and not individuals can be understood. Individuated intelligible species that are received in an individual human’s intellect are actually understood, on Aquinas’s view (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{210} \textit{Quaestiones}, 61; cf. ibid., 73.

\textsuperscript{211} Ibid., 61.
\end{footnotesize}
explains his position further as he comments on Aristotle’s statement that in the
generation of a human being, the animal precedes the man:\footnote{212}{See Aristotle, \textit{Generation of Animals}, 736b1-4: “As they develop they also acquire the sensitive soul in virtue of which an animal is an animal, . . . For e.g. an animal does not become at the same time an animal and a man or a horse or any other particular animal. For the end is developed last, and the peculiar character of the species is the end of the generation in each individual.”}

Just as animal and human being are not conceived at one and the same time, so
neither are animal and horse. . . . Consequently, the necessary meaning of the
statement is not that there is in a human being one substantial principle, namely,
the sensitive soul, by which he is an animal, and another principle, the intellective
soul, by which he is human, since one cannot say that in a horse there are diverse
principles by one of which the horse is an animal and by another of which it is a
horse. Rather the statement means that in the embryo there first appear less
perfect operations and afterwards more perfect operations appear, just as all
generation involves a change from the imperfect to the perfect.\footnote{213}

Aquinas does not here explain the ontology of the changes, but only says that the changes
occur.\footnote{214}

(5) A fifth emphasis in the \textit{ad contra} section has to do with the soul’s difficulty in
corporeal embodiment. In response to the claim that God could not have created the
human soul as being connected with the problems of embodiment, Aquinas says that
Origen is responsible for the view that souls were originally created without bodies and
were later punished by embodiment.\footnote{215}{But Origen was mistaken, Aquinas says, because
he followed Plato in believing that the soul is a complete species and is united to the body
accidentally. Aquinas’s position is that “[I]t is no loss to a soul to be united to its body,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{212}{See Aristotle, \textit{Generation of Animals}, 736b1-4: “As they develop they also acquire the sensitive soul in virtue of which an animal is an animal, . . . For e.g. an animal does not become at the same time an animal and a man or a horse or any other particular animal. For the end is developed last, and the peculiar character of the species is the end of the generation in each individual.”}
  \item \footnote{213}{\textit{Quaestiones}, 61.}
  \item \footnote{214}{For further discussion of Aquinas’s view of embryonic substantial development, see Pasnau, \textit{Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature}, 100-130.}
  \item \footnote{215}{\textit{Quaestiones}, 62; cf. Origen, \textit{Peri Archon}, \textit{PG} 11, 229, 330.}
\end{itemize}
but rather the union perfects the soul in its nature.”\textsuperscript{216} On this view embodiment as such is not harmful to the soul, but the corruption of the body as punishment for sin is what is damaging.

(6) A sixth emphasis is that the flesh’s lust against the spirit indicates the soul’s affinity for the body.\textsuperscript{217} Aquinas takes “spirit” here to refer to “the superior part of the soul by which a human being surpasses other animals,” thus distinguishing between soul and spirit.\textsuperscript{218} The flesh can be said to lust in the sense that the parts of the soul that are united to flesh desire things that please the flesh, and sometimes these desires are at war with the spirit.

In other ad contra arguments of the second quaestio Aquinas provides greater detail about how the various psychological operations are integrated.\textsuperscript{219} Two substantial units that are “complete in their own species and nature” cannot unite to form a substantial unit.\textsuperscript{220} The soul and body are not substances in this sense, because they are parts of human nature. They can jointly become a substantial unit. And, the soul cannot be brought about from the potency of matter through motion or mutation, as are other forms that are immersed in matter.\textsuperscript{221}

\textsuperscript{216} Quaestiones, 62.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid.; cf. Augustine, On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees, 2.8.10.
\textsuperscript{219} Quaestiones, 62-63.
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid., 62.
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid.
Aquinas’s Third Quaestio

Aquinas’s third quaestio, similar to the second, is whether the possible intellect, or the intellective soul altogether, is one for all human beings.222 In the ad contra section, we find a statement that could serve as a summary for many of Aquinas’s arguments in this quaestio:

A human being understands by his possible intellect: for in Book III of the De Anima it is said that the possible intellect is that by which the soul understands. Consequently, if the possible intellect were one in all human beings, it follows that whatever one human being understands, any other human being would understand, and this is obviously untrue.223

Aquinas adds here a description of the two ways in which he conceptualizes the soul’s relationship to the body.224 The soul relates to the body as form to matter and as mover to instrument. “Now every form demands determinate matter and every mover requires determinate instruments. Therefore it is impossible that there be only one intellective soul in diverse human beings.”225 (Aquinas admits that the soul moves the body, but not through its existence in virtue of which it is united to the body as form.226)

Aquinas begins his response to the question by saying that if the possible intellect is separate from the body in its existence, then there can be only one intellect.227 He then introduces the principle which causes philosophers to posit the possible intellect: “[I]t is clear that the possible intellect is related to the perfections found in the sciences as a first

---

222 Ibid., 65-75.
223 Ibid., 69; cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 429a.23.
224 Quaestiones, 69.
225 Ibid. Aquinas has a nuanced view about how the soul relates to body as mover. The soul moves the body according to particular actions but not according to the existence of the human being (see Aquinas, Treatise, 280).
226 Ibid., 35.
227 Quaestiones, 69.
perfection is related to a second perfection, and that through the possible intellect we are potential knowers."\textsuperscript{228} This principle about perfections not only serves as the rationale for positing the possible intellect, but also provides Aquinas with a basis for arguing that the possible intellect must be plural.\textsuperscript{229} If a second perfection of humans is the state of possessing scientific knowledge, and individual humans possess various degrees of scientific knowledge, then it is impossible that an identical first perfection (i.e., the potentiality for scientific knowledge) gave rise to such a diversity of perfections on the second level of perfection. Aquinas says that this is an application of the general principle that a subject cannot be both in act and in potency with respect to the same form.

Aquinas here repeats some of the discussion about intelligible species from the second \textit{quaestio}.\textsuperscript{230} In the present \textit{quaestio} Aquinas emphasizes that the diversity of phantasms, used by the Averroists to account for the numerical difference in understanding among knowers, has no bearing on the number of perfections in the order of knowledge.\textsuperscript{231} This is for two reasons: (1) Species are not intelligible unless they have been abstracted from the phantasms and exist in the possible intellect.\textsuperscript{232} (2) Habitual scientific knowledge is not a subject of the sensitive soul, as the Averroist position implies.\textsuperscript{233}

\textsuperscript{229} Quaestiones, 69.
\textsuperscript{230} Ibid., 69-70.
\textsuperscript{231} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{232} Ibid., 70.
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid.
Next, Aquinas introduces a lengthy argument about the relationship between the diversity among the objects of understanding and the number of intellects. If for the sake of argument we overlook the fact that a separately existing possible intellect denies knowledge to individual human beings, then we must still ask how the operation of understanding is multiplied given a single possible intellect for all individual knowers.

There are two ways to attempt to account for this multiplication without positing individual minds. The first is from the side of the objects toward which understanding is directed, and the second is from the point of view of time. In other words, if we acknowledge that understanding a horse is different from understanding a man, then we can think of the operation of the possible intellect as being multiplied according to the objects of understanding. Or, if we acknowledge that an act of understanding that occurs today is numerically different from an act of understanding that occurred yesterday, then we can think of the operation of the possible intellect as being multiplied according to intervals of time. Aquinas points out in response that a differentiation between knowers based on circumstantial principles external to the the knowers could actually prohibit the very operational multiplicity that was sought, for it fails to take into account the numerical diversity of multiple understandings at the same moment: “[I]f there are two human beings who understand one and the same thing, at one and the same time, it is necessary that their act of understanding be one and the same in number, and this is

---

234 Ibid., 70-71.
235 Ibid., 70.
236 If we are beginning the argument by presupposing that the possible intellect is singular, then it is no longer possible to account for operational multiplicity based on the operational principle itself.
clearly impossible.” Aquinas acknowledges that the possible intellect could be alike—although numerically diverse—in diverse knowers, but denies that the possible intellect can be one and the same in all or for all knowers. “For one cause can move diverse agents to perform their operations; but it is utterly impossible that diverse agents should function formally in virtue of a single principle.”

Next, Aquinas argues the Averroist doctrine is open to the same objections to which a Platonic doctrine of Ideas is subject. If we take it that species of things are known according to their essential operations, and that the essential operation of a human being is to reason and understand, then the intellect is that which puts a being in the human species. This principle cannot be the sensitive soul or one of its powers. If the intellectual principle is taken to be one for all human beings, like a separate substance, then all human beings would be one through a single, separate substance. To this claim Aquinas opposes his own view about how operational multiplication occurs: If something is multiplied according to a “common, essential feature,” then the common feature is multiplied numerically even though the species remains the same. The human soul is, by virtue of its essential capability to unite with the body,

multiplied numerically and not specifically, just as this whiteness differs from another whiteness numerically because it belongs to this or to that subject of whiteness. Still the soul differs from other forms in this respect: that its existence does not depend upon the body; consequently neither does its individuated

---

237 Ibid., 71.
238 Ibid.
239 Ibid.; cf. ibid., 74.
240 Ibid., 71.
existence depend upon its body. For insofar as some thing is one, it is undivided in itself and is distinct from other things.\(^{241}\)

With this Aquinas concludes his *responsio*.

Aquinas makes clear in the *ad contra* section that he does not believe the soul’s indviduation to be due to the possible intellect. Rather, indviduation occurs “according to the multiplication of the substance of the soul whose power the possible intellect is.”\(^{242}\) In other words, “[O]ne possible intellect is specifically like any other possible intellect.”\(^{243}\) Aquinas believes that corporeal matter is the principle of individuation.\(^{244}\) In Aquinas’s replies *ad contra* we find additional arguments against the Averroists’ claims and explanations that support his own position:

- Truth is the intellect’s conformity to a thing.\(^{245}\) So, when diverse human beings understand one thing, this is because their conceptions conform to the thing.

---

\(^{241}\) Ibid., 72.

\(^{242}\) Ibid.

\(^{243}\) Ibid. Aquinas adds: “Not all forms have their individuating principles as part of their essence; this is true only of forms that are composites” (ibid., 74).

\(^{244}\) Ibid., 74: “The First Mover of the heavens is wholly separate from matter, even in existence; hence it can in no way be multiplied numerically. But the same is not true of the human soul. . . . Separated souls do not differ in species; but they differ numerically because they are unitable to one body or to another. . . . Although the possible intellect exceeds the body, it does not transcend the whole substance of the soul, which is multiplied according to its relation to diverse bodies.” Pecham is opposed to this view, as will become clear in the following two chapters. Of course, Pecham is not alone among the Franscicans in opposing the position of Aquinas concerning individuation (see Gracia, *Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150-1650* [New York: SUNY Press, 1994]; Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul*, 122-127).

\(^{245}\) *Quaestiones*, 72.
• A statement by Augustine, which Pecham also discusses, should be interpreted to mean that there are many souls, but each soul must be correlated to only one body.246

• The possible intellect’s lack of understanding of itself does not prevent it from being multiplied according to diverse knowers, because the intellect in fact does come to a knowledge of itself through its own operation.247

• The fact that the intellect is the site for species does not mean that there is only one intellect that is able to receive all species.248 Senses can be called the “site of species”, but this means something different than what we mean when we call the intellect the site of species, because the senses require an organ in order to receive species.249 The senses, it will be remembered, provide phantasms with which the intellect works.

• The possible intellect can be said to operate everywhere because its operation potentially has to do with things that are everywhere, not because it is actually located everywhere.250

• The intellect does not have matter as a part of itself, yet since the intellect is the form of a body, its essence involves a relation to its material body.251

---

246 Ibid. Augustine says, “As to the number of souls, however,—seeing that you thought this relevant to the problem in hand—I do not know what answer to give you. I would be more inclined to say that the question should not be brought up at all or at least that you should postpone it for the time being rather than that I should say that number and multitude have no connection with quantity, or that I am presently equal to the task of solving such an involved problem for you. For if I should tell you that there is only one soul, you will be at sea because of the fact that in one it is happy, in another unhappy; and one and the same thing cannot be both happy and unhappy at the same time. If I should say that it is one and many at the same time, you will smile; and I would not find it easy to make you suppress your smile. But if I say simply that it is many, I shall have to laugh at myself, and it will be harder for me to suffer my own disapprobation than yours” (The Greatness of the Soul, chapter 69; cf. Pecham, Quaestiones, 365-366. I covered Pecham’s discussion of this passage in the third chapter of the present study).

247 Quaestiones, 72.

248 Ibid., 73.

249 Ibid.

250 Ibid.

251 Ibid., 74.
Aquinas’s *Treatise on Human Nature*

I will give an exposé of those passages of the *Treatise* that are most relevant for a comparison between Aquinas and Pecham on the issue of Latin Averroism. The main discussion comes in Aquinas’s *quaestiones* 76 (“The Soul’s Union with the Body,” in eight articles) and 84 (“What Does the Soul Cognize Bodies Through?,” in eight articles).

In *quaestio* 76.1, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Is the intellective principle united to the body as its form?” Aquinas makes a number arguments to show that the intellect is the form of the body.

First, Aquinas gives an argument based on classification. A *differentia* is drawn from the form of a thing. But the differentia that gives rise to the human being is “rational,” which is ascribed to a human being on account of the intellective principle. Therefore the intellective principle is the form of a human being.

Second, Aquinas gives an argument based on an operational definition of form. That through which a thing first operates is its form. For example, the body is healed through health, and so health is a form of the body. There are two steps in the argument to show that the intellect can be called the form of the body: (1) That through which the soul first knows is knowledge, so knowledge is a form of the soul. (2) That through which the body first lives is the soul, for the soul is the first thing through which we are nourished and carry out human functions. In turn, the intellect informs the soul, which is the

---

253 Ibid., 20.
254 Ibid.
principle of the life of the body. Therefore the intellect can be called the form of the body by virtue of the soul’s broader relationship to the body.

Third, Aquinas gives a reductio argument to the effect that any view of the intellect that prohibits its being the form of the body must explain how “this man thinks.”\textsuperscript{255} Aquinas says that there are only three ways for an action to be attributed to something: (1) An action is attributed to something in respect of the thing’s whole self (e.g., the doctor, \textit{qua} doctor, heals). But this is not the sense in which we say that the human Socrates thinks, because Socrates \textit{qua} human also senses and does other things. (2) An action is attributed to something in respect of a thing’s part (e.g., one sees through one’s eyes). This is the sense in which we say that Socrates thinks, because he thinks using the soul which is somehow united to his body. (3) An action is attributed to something in respect of a thing’s actions (e.g., something white builds if the builder happens to be white). This is not the sense in which we say that the human Socrates thinks, because Socrates’ thinking is essentially predicated to him by virtue of the fact that he is a human being.

The fourth argument is a direct answer to Averroes’ statement that the union of soul and body takes place through the intelligible species, and that these species have two subjects: the possible intellect, and the phantasms that exist in corporeal organs.\textsuperscript{256} Aquinas says that this kind of connection via the intelligible species is insufficient to

\textsuperscript{255} Ibid., 20-21.
\textsuperscript{256} Ibid., 21.
justify calling an intellectual act Socrates’ act, because phantasms are to intellect just as colors are to sight.

Others want to say that the intellect is united to the body as its mover. But Aquinas says that this approach is mistaken for five reasons:

- The intellect moves the body only through appetite, which presupposes intellectual operation (e.g., because Socrates thinks, he is accordingly moved by the intellect).
- Socrates is an essence composed of matter and form. If intellect is not his form, then it falls outside of his essence and could not move him. Intellectual actions do not pass from one thing to another as heat does.
- If the intellect moves Socrates as mover, then Socrates is merely the soul’s instrument, and this is contrary to Aristotle.
- Action that is attributed to the whole can still be attributed to a part, but if the intellect moves Socrates, then he is not unconditionally one thing. Rather, “this particular human being thinks because the intellective principle is his form.”
- The defining operation of the human being is to think. Thus, a human must obtain its species in accord with the principle of its operation.

Still, the fact that the intellect is a form for matter rather than a mover does not restrict the intellect from being loftier than matter, dominant over it, and less immersed in it. Aquinas lists three reasons for the intellect’s prominent position:

- The form of a mixed body has an operation that is not caused by the elemental qualities.

---

257 Ibid.
258 Ibid., 21-22.
259 Ibid., 21.
260 Ibid.
261 Ibid.
263 Treatise, 22.
264 Ibid., 23.
• The intellective power is not the power of any corporeal organ, in the way that visual power is the actuality of the eye. The soul is in matter inasmuch as the soul to which the intellective power belongs is the form of the body.

• The human soul is the ultimate in loftiness among forms.

Having addressed the soul’s position among the forms, Aquinas argues against those who believe that the soul is composed of matter and form. If someone believes that the soul has matter, then he could not also maintain that the soul is the body’s form. Form is actuality, whereas matter is solely potential being, and so the actuality of the soul’s matter could not also be the actuality of the human body.

At the end of the article, Aquinas says that the soul is suited to be united to a body, just as a lightweight body is suited to be up high. And just as a light body remains light even after it has been pulled down from its proper place, so the human soul continues in its existence even after it has been separated from its body, and maintains its natural inclination for embodiment. And, since the soul is the body’s form, the human body does not have existence apart from the soul.

In quaestio 76.2, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Is the intellective principle numerically multiplied according to the number of bodies? Or is there a single intellect for all human beings?” Aquinas’s response may be divided into three parts.

265 Ibid.
266 Ibid., 24.
267 In quaestio 79.1 of the Treatise, Aquinas clarifies his position by saying that “the intellect is one of the soul’s capacities and not the soul’s very essence. For the essence of the thing operating is the immediate basis of its operation only when that operation is its existence. For just as a capacity is related to its operation as to its actuality, so essence is related to existence. But only in God’s case is his intellective operation the same as his existence. Consequently, it is only in God’s case that his intellect is his essence; in created beings, the intellect is a capacity of the creature using it” (ibid., 78-79).
268 Ibid., 24-29.
First, Aquinas argues that it is impossible for all humans to share in the same intellect, whether one subscribes to Plato’s psychology or to Aristotle’s.\textsuperscript{269} If Plato were correct in saying that human beings essentially are their intellects, then Socrates and Plato could not share the same intellect.\textsuperscript{270} On the other hand, Aristotle says that the intellect is a part or capacity of the soul that is a single human being’s form; it is impossible that numerically different things share in a single form, just as it is impossible that they share in a single existence.

Second, it is impossible for a single intellect to be united to all people no matter how one understands the connection.\textsuperscript{271} Aquinas again uses an argument about agency and instrumentality, but in this case with different illustrations.\textsuperscript{272} If there were a principal agent and two instruments, one could speak unconditionally of a single agent, but of several actions (e.g., a human touches different things with each hand). If there were a single instrument and different agents, then there would be several agents but a single action (e.g., many people pull a ship with one rope, or many see with one eye). But if there were a single principal agent and a single instrument, there would be a single agent and a single action (e.g., a blacksmith strikes with a single hammer). The intellect is principal among the various things that pertain to a human being (the other powers obey and serve the intellect). Thus, if there is a single intellect, then no matter how different the various instruments of the intellect are, there is still only one thinker.\textsuperscript{273}

\textsuperscript{269} Ibid., 25-26.
\textsuperscript{270} Ibid., 26.
\textsuperscript{271} Ibid., 26-27.
\textsuperscript{272} Ibid., 26.
\textsuperscript{273} Ibid., 26-27.
Third, different phantasms can produce various intellectual actions for the possible intellect, but phantasms cannot change the form of the possible intellect, because the possible intellect’s form comes through the intelligible species which are abstracted from the phantasms.²⁷⁴ A single intellect abstracts only a single intelligible species from different phantasms of the same kind (e.g., a single thinker abstracts a single intelligible species of stone from various phantasms of stones). Conversely, a common principle is distinguished and multiplied by individuating principles that come from matter. The species is abstracted from those material conditions and is then a likeness of the nature without the things that distinguish and multiply the nature.²⁷⁵

In *quaestio* 76.3, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Does a body whose form is the intellective principle have any other soul?”²⁷⁶ Aquinas’s response may be divided into three parts.

First, Aquinas contrasts what he takes to be Plato’s view of the soul with what he takes to be Aristotle’s, and this leads to a discussion about the number of forms in the single human being.²⁷⁷ Plato posited multiple souls in the same body (i.e., the nutritive

²⁷⁵ See *ibid.*, 28: On Aquinas’s view, things that differ in having different forms can be made like the same thing, and the same thing can be cognized by different cognizers (e.g., many people see the same color in virtue of different likenesses, and many intellects understand a single intellectual object). Still, it is the stone that is understood, and not the species of the stone. Otherwise our knowledge would not be about things in the world, but about intelligible species. Aquinas adds that a statement of Augustine’s, to which Pecham also refers (“if I were to say only that there are many human souls, I would laugh at myself” [Augustine, *The Greatness of the Soul*, chapter 69; cf. Pecham, *Quaestiones*, 365-366]), means that it is not only the case that there are many souls. It is also the case that they were made one in their specific nature.
²⁷⁶ *Treatise*, 29-33.
soul in the liver, the concupiscible in the heart, the cognitive in the brain), but Aristotle
discredits this view on the basis that some animals continue to live after they are cut
apart.\textsuperscript{278} Aristotle leaves open the question of whether the intellect is separate only
contceptually from the soul’s other parts, or spatially as well.\textsuperscript{279}

Plato’s position could be upheld if the soul is united to the body only as its mover, for
various movers can move the same object, especially if each mover moves different
parts.\textsuperscript{280} But if the soul is united to the body as its form, then it is still impossible for
several different souls to be in the same body. Aquinas brings up three arguments to
support this claim:\textsuperscript{281} (1) An animal with several souls would not be one thing
unconditionally.\textsuperscript{282} A thing is one unconditionally through only the form by which that
thing has existence. If a thing has multiple forms, then a human would not be one thing
unconditionally.\textsuperscript{283} If there are different souls in the same body, then we must ask what
“contains” them. They cannot be united by the body’s unity, because the soul contains the
body and not vice versa. (2) Things that are drawn from different forms are predicated in
one of two ways, either accidentally (e.g., when we say that a white thing is sweet), or

\textsuperscript{278} Ibid., 30; cf. Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, 413b.13-24; Plato, \textit{Timaeus}, 69c-72d;
\textsuperscript{279} \textit{Treatise}, 30; cf. Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, 413b.24-29.
\textsuperscript{280} \textit{Treatise}, 30-31.
\textsuperscript{281} Ibid., 31-32.
\textsuperscript{282} Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid. Aquinas says that Aristotle uses this argument against Plato in \textit{Metaphysics},
1045a.14-20. Aristotle says: “What then is it that makes man one; why is he one and not
many, e.g. animal—biped, especially if there are, as some say, an ideal animal and an
ideal biped? Why are not those Ideas the ideal man, so that men would exist by
participation not in man, nor in one Idea, but in two, animal and biped? And in general
man would be not one but more than one thing, animal and biped.”
There are two types of *per se* predication. *Per se* predication can occur where the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject. For example, “animal” is predicated of “human being” because it is through the same form that something is an animal and through which it is a human being. Or, *per se* predication can occur where the subject is contained in the definition of the predicate. For example, a surface is a prerequisite for color. If something is said to be an animal because of one form and human being because of another form, then it would follow that either one of the forms could be predicated of the others only accidentally, or by the second type of *per se* predication, where one soul is a prerequisite for another. (3) We find that one intense operation of the soul impedes another. This could not occur if the source of the actions were not a single essence.

Second, species and forms of things differ in terms of being more or less complete (e.g., human souls are more complete than plant souls). There are also different levels among the individual aspects of the soul, just as there are differences between species of shapes. The intellective soul contains virtually the sensory soul and nutritive soul, just as the pentagonal shape contains the tetragonal.

---

284 *Treatise*, 31-32.
285 Ibid., 31.
286 Ibid., 32.
287 For details concerning Aquinas’s view of the relationship between substantial form and predication, see his *quaestio* 77.6 in the *Treatise*.
288 Ibid., 32.
289 Ibid.
Third, the sensitive soul is made incorruptible not because it is sensitive, but rather by being intellective.\(^{290}\) When a soul is merely sensory it is corruptible, but when it has the intellective with the sensory it is incorruptible.\(^{291}\) The composite is classified by genus and species. A human being is corruptible just as other animals are.\(^{292}\) Thus the incorruptible aspect of the human being does not require that the human being be placed in a genus different from that of other animals.\(^{293}\) After all, a human embryo first has a soul that is merely sensitive. When a more complete soul arrives, one that is both sensory and intellective, the merely sensitive soul is displaced. The intellective soul virtually contains whatever the sensory soul had.

In *quaestio* 76.4, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Is there any other substantial form in such a body?”\(^{294}\) Aquinas’s response is in four parts.

First, if the soul were united to the body only as a mover, then it would be necessary to posit another substantial form in the human being.\(^{295}\) A substantial form differs from an accidental form in that an accidental form does not give being unconditionally but rather “being such.”\(^{296}\)

Second, if there were some other substantial form in matter prior to the intellect, through which the soul’s subject were actually existent, then the soul would not make a thing to be unconditionally.\(^{297}\) Consequently the soul would not be a substantial form.

\(^{290}\) Ibid., 32-33.
\(^{291}\) Ibid., 32.
\(^{292}\) Ibid., 32-33.
\(^{293}\) Ibid., 33.
\(^{294}\) Ibid., 33-36.
\(^{295}\) Ibid., 34-35.
\(^{296}\) Ibid., 34.
\(^{297}\) Ibid., 35.
Aquinas notes that there are various levels of perfection in matter, such as existing, living, sensing, and thinking, but maintains that the presence of the various perfections does not constitute the presence of various forms.

Third, the intellective soul “brings about whatever it is that less perfect forms bring about in other things.”

Fourth, Aristotle says that the soul is the actuality of not just any body, but “of a physical body with organs ... potentially having life.” The soul is included in that of which it is said to be the actuality, in the same way that heat is said to be the actuality of what is hot.

In *quaestio* 76.5, Aquinas deals with the following question: “What sort of body should have the intellective principle as its form?” Aquinas’s response is in four parts.

First, Aquinas says that matter exists for the sake of form. Thus form must be the reason why matter is as it is, and not vice versa.

Second, the human intellect is the lowest of the intellectual substances and does not have knowledge of truth naturally given to it. The intellect must accumulate such knowledge from divisible things through sensory means. So, nature saw to it that the intellective soul had the power for sensation and a body with which to sense. Touch is the fundamental sense because all other senses are founded on touch. The organ of touch

---

298 Ibid.
300 *Treatise*, 35.
301 Ibid., 37-39.
302 Ibid., 37.
303 Ibid., 37-38.
304 Ibid., 38.
is required as an intermediary between the contraries that touch apprehends (e.g., hot and cold, wet and dry, etc.). The more touch is of a balanced complexion, the better it can sense. Thus the soul needs a mixed body, and the human body above all other bodies allows the soul to sense best through touch. Still, because the intellect can grasp universals, it has power to apprehend an infinite number of things.

Third, there are two conditions in matter. One is selected because it is appropriate to the form, and the other is selected due to the matter’s prior disposition. For example, a craftsman selects iron for the form of a saw because iron is suitable for cutting hard things. But the fact that the saw can become dull is due to the necessary corruptibility on the part of the matter. Likewise the intellective soul should have a body that has a balanced complexion, but because such a body is material, it is necessarily corruptible. The body is suited to the intellective soul not on account of the intellectual operation per se, but on account of the sensory power. The balanced complexion of the body gives it a kind of excellence that makes it similar to a celestial body.

Fourth, although the intellective soul is one essence, nevertheless, due to its perfection it has multiple powers. Hence, for its various operations it needs various dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is united.

---

305 Ibid., 38-39.
306 Ibid., 38.
307 Ibid., 29.
308 Ibid., 39.
309 Ibid., 40-41.
In *quaestio* 76.6, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Is the intellective principle united to such a body through the mediation of any accident?” Aquinas’s response is in three parts.

First, if the soul were united to the body only as mover, then it would be necessary for there to be certain dispositions serving as intermediaries between the soul and its body. On the soul’s side there would have to be a capacity through which it would move the body. On the body’s side there would have to be an aptitude of some sort through which the body would be movable by the soul.

Second, Aquinas says that the soul does move the body, but not through its existence in virtue of which it is united to the body as form. The soul moves the body through its potential for producing movement, the actualization of which presupposes a body already actualized by soul. The soul is the part of the composite that produces motion due to its motive power, whereas the ensouled body is the part of the composite that is moved.

Third, there cannot be any accidental disposition between form and matter. Thus, since the intellect is united to the body as substantial form, then there cannot be any accidental disposition between body and soul. There is a certain order in which matter is potentiality for all actualities, and in this order whatever is unconditionally first among actualities must be conceived of first in matter. But the first among all actualities is

---

310 Ibid., 40.
311 Ibid., 35.
312 Ibid., 40-41.
313 Ibid.
existence.\textsuperscript{314} For this reason we cannot conceive of matter as hot or extended before conceiving of it as actually existing. This existence comes through its substantial form, which provides existence unconditionally. Thus no accidental dispositions exist in matter prior to the substantial form.

In \textit{quaestio} 76.7, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Is the soul united to the body through the mediation of any other body?”\textsuperscript{315} Aquinas’s response is in three parts.

First, Aquinas says that whatever moves something at a distance does so through much closer intermediaries.\textsuperscript{316} So, he acknowledges that if the soul were united to the body only as a mover, then it would be appropriate to say that other intermediary bodies intervene between the human soul and its body. But it is impossible for form to be united to matter through bodily mediation. A thing is one in just the way it is said to exist. But a form all by itself, because it is essentially actual, makes a thing actually exist. It does not provide existence through an intermediary. There is no agency that unites the form and matter, except for the agent that makes the matter to exist.

Second, Aquinas mentions three views that posit material mediation between soul and body, and responds to one of them directly.\textsuperscript{317} (1) Some Platonists, Aquinas says, thought that the intellective soul has an incorruptible body that is naturally united to it, from which it is never separated, and through whose mediation it is united to the corruptible human body. (2) Others said that the soul is united to the body through the mediation of a

\textsuperscript{314} Ibid., 41.
\textsuperscript{315} Ibid., 41-43.
\textsuperscript{316} Ibid., 42.
\textsuperscript{317} Ibid., 43.
bodily spirit.\textsuperscript{318} (3) Others held that the soul is united to the body through the mediation of a material light made of quintessence. But this is impossible because light is not a body, and the unalterable quintessence enters bodies only virtually (not materially). Furthermore, the soul is immediately united to its body as form to matter.\textsuperscript{319}

Third, when the spirit is taken away from the body, then the union between the soul and body is gone.\textsuperscript{320} This separation is not because spirit is an intermediary, but because the disposition is removed by which the body is disposed for such a union.\textsuperscript{321} Spirit can be considered to be an intermediary only in the production of movement, because spirit is the first instrument of movement.

In \textit{quaestio} 76.8, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Is the soul whole in each part of the body?”\textsuperscript{322} Aquinas’s response is in four parts.

First, Aquinas says that if the soul were united to a body only as a mover, then one could say that the soul exists only in one part of the body, and that through that particular part, it moves the other parts.\textsuperscript{323} But because the soul is united to the body as its form, then the soul necessarily exists in the whole body and in each part of the body. The soul is

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{318} This is Pecham’s position (\textit{Tractatus}, 26-27).
  \item\textsuperscript{319} On the view Aquinas criticizes here, the vegetative soul is united to the body through the mediation of light from the sidereal heaven, the sensory soul through the mediation of light from the crystalline heaven, and the intellectual soul through the mediation of light from the Empyrean heaven.
  \item\textsuperscript{320} \textit{Treatise}, 43.
  \item\textsuperscript{321} It should be noted that both Pecham and Aquinas have accounts of bodily disposition for the reception of the soul, and both of them have some explanation of the soul’s relating to the body as mover (e.g., ibid., 35, 40, 43; Pecham, \textit{Quaestiones}, 389).
  \item\textsuperscript{322} Ibid., 44-47.
  \item\textsuperscript{323} Ibid., 44-45.
\end{itemize}
not one of the body’s accidental forms, but rather its substantial form. A substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part. A form that does not give existence to the individual parts of the body is a form that is merely an accidental composition or ordering (e.g., the arrangement of the materials that make up a house). But the soul is both the form and actuality not only of the whole, but of each part. This is why Aristotle speaks only equivocally of an animal or human being once the soul has left the body, and the same equivocation characterizes talk of the hand, eye, flesh, and bones. No part of the body has its proper function once the soul has departed.

Second, the soul is whole in each part of the body. There are three ways of being whole: (1) Some wholes can be divided into parts (e.g., a whole line or a whole body). This is applicable to forms only accidentally (e.g., when whiteness can be whole in a whole object in just the same way in which it can be whole in a part of the original object; whiteness could be accidentally divided). The soul is not a whole in this quantitative sense. (2) Some wholes can be divided into the parts of account (rationis) and essence. This understanding of wholeness applies to the soul as form. (3) Some wholes can be divided into parts based on powers or capacities. This understanding of wholeness is also applicable to the soul as form.

---

324 Ibid., 45.
326 *Treatise*, 45-46.
327 Ibid., 45.
328 Ibid., 45-46.
329 Ibid., 45.
330 Ibid., 46.
331 Ibid., 45.
332 Ibid., 46.
Third, the soul is not whole in every part of the body with regard to each of its capacities (e.g., the soul is in the eye with regard to sight, and the soul is in the ear with regard to hearing).

Fourth, the soul is related to the whole body first and per se, and it is related to the particular parts of that body secondarily, in virtue of their being associated with the whole.

*Quaestio* 84 deals with the following question: “What does the soul cognize bodies through?” In *quaestio* 84.1, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Does the soul cognize bodies through intellect?” Aquinas’s response is in three parts.

First, Aquinas discusses what he takes to be views of the Presocratics and Plato. The earliest philosophers were materialists, believing that bodies are in a constant flux. This meant that there could be no certainty. Plato, however, posited non-bodily Ideas. On Plato’s view, each particular sensible is what it is based on participation with an Idea. Sciences, therefore, pertain to the Ideas and not to sensible things. Aquinas presents two arguments to show that Plato’s view is false: (1) Since the Ideas are immaterial and unchangeable, we could know neither matter and motion nor demonstration through moving and material causes. Yet knowledge of such things is the foundation of natural science. (2) It is ridiculous, in trying to know things, to introduce intervening entities that

---

333 Ibid.
334 Ibid.
335 Ibid., 135-136.
336 Ibid., 135.
337 Ibid., 135-136.
are not the substances we are attempting to know.\textsuperscript{338} Even if we were to get to know the Ideas, we would not know the sensible objects that we were trying to understand when we posited the Ideas. Plato recognized the need for humans to cognize universals, but he erred in thinking that the form of the thing cognized has to be in the knower in the way in which it is in the external thing cognized. The forms inhere in sensible things to various degrees (e.g., in one thing the whiteness is more intense, in another thing it is less intense). Species are received in the intellect immaterially and unchangeably; all species are received according to the mode of the recipient. The soul, “through intellect, cognizes bodies by means of a cognition that is immaterial, universal, and necessary.”

Second, Aquinas explains the conclusion of the foregoing, saying that the intellect does cognize bodies, but not “through bodies”, nor through material and bodily likenesses, but through species that are immaterial and intelligible.\textsuperscript{339} It should not be said that the corporeal senses cognize only bodily things whereas the intellect cognizes only spiritual things, for then it would follow that God and the angels would not cognize bodily things.\textsuperscript{340} Rather, it should be said that a higher power performs in a superior way the operations of a lower power.

Third, nothing prevents us from having unchangeable knowledge of changeable things.\textsuperscript{341} For example, even though Socrates is not always sitting, it is unchangeably true that when he is sitting, he stays in one place.

\textsuperscript{338} Ibid., 136.
\textsuperscript{339} Ibid., 136-137.
\textsuperscript{340} Ibid., 137; cf. Augustine, \textit{City of God}, 22.29.
\textsuperscript{341} \textit{Treatise}, 137.
In *quaestio* 84.2, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Does the soul understand bodies through its essence or through species?” Aquinas’s response is in three parts.

First, Aquinas addresses what he takes to be the views of the ancient philosophers up through the Platonists. The earliest philosophers claimed that the soul cognizes bodies through its essence. They believed in the principle that “like is cognized by like,” and further held that the form of the cognized thing is in the one cognizing in the same way that it is in the cognized thing. They even thought that the material things that are cognized must exist materially in the cognizer. This was consistent with their view that the soul has a material nature that is common to all things (e.g., fire is the principle of all things, and so the soul is made of fire; all things are combinations of the four elements, and so the soul is a combination of the four elements). In sum, cognition was considered to be a material process. Aquinas offers two arguments against this view: (1) Things that will be educed from a principle in matter exist in that principle now only potentially. But a thing is cognized not insofar as it is in potentiality, but only insofar as it is in actuality. The potentiality itself is cognized only through actuality. Thus one cannot attribute material principles, which are associated with potentiality, to the intellect. (2) If a thing cognized has to exist materially in the cognizer, then material things existing

---

342 Ibid., 137-140.
343 Ibid., 138-139.
344 Ibid., 138.
346 Treatise, 138-139.
347 Ibid., 138.
outside the soul would have cognition themselves.\textsuperscript{348} Plato made an advance in that he recognized that the intellective soul is immaterial and cognizes immaterially, however, he went too far in claiming that the forms of the cognized things subsist immaterially.\textsuperscript{349}

Second, Aquinas says that the nature of cognition is correlated inversely with the nature of materiality.\textsuperscript{350} Things that receive forms only materially, such as plants, are in no way cognitive. But the more immaterially that something has the form of the thing cognized, the more perfectly it cognizes. The intellect abstracts not only the species from the matter, but also the form without its matter and without its individual material conditions. This is unlike sense, which also takes on the form of the thing cognized without the matter, but along \textit{with} the material conditions. Among the senses sight is the most cognitive, because it is the least material.

Third, Aquinas says that if some intellect were to cognize all things through its essence, then its essence must have all things within itself immaterially.\textsuperscript{351} But God is the only essence that has all things within itself immaterially.

In \textit{quaestio} 84.3, Aquinas deals with the following question: “If the soul understands bodies through species, are the species of all intelligible things naturally innate in it?”\textsuperscript{352} Aquinas’s response is in three parts.

First, Aquinas says that the principle of an action is a form, so a thing must be related to its form in the same way that it is related to its action (e.g., if a thing is moved upward

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{348} Ibid., 139.
\item \textsuperscript{349} Ibid., 138.
\item \textsuperscript{350} Ibid., 139.
\item \textsuperscript{351} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{352} Ibid., 140-142.
\end{itemize}
because of being light, then what is only potentially lifted upward is only potentially light.\textsuperscript{353} Thus a human is sometimes actually cognizant, and sometimes only potentially cognizant. A cognitive soul can be brought into actuality in two ways: (1) In sensing, through the actions of the sensible things on the senses. (2) In understanding, through instruction or discovery. Sometimes that which actually has a form is unable to act in accord with that form. For example, something light may be impeded from being lifted upward (and the human being may be prevented from understanding).

Second, Aquinas addresses what he takes to be Plato’s view, that the human intellect is naturally filled with all intelligible species but is impeded by the body.\textsuperscript{354} Plato’s position is incorrect for two reasons: (1) If the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it is impossible that the soul would become so forgetful as to not know that it has such knowledge.\textsuperscript{355} Nobody forgets the things that he naturally cognizes (e.g., that a whole is greater than its part), and such forgetfulness is especially absurd if knowledge of all intelligible things is held to be natural to the soul.\textsuperscript{356} (2) When one lacks a sense, one lacks the knowledge of things that are apprehended by that sense (e.g., someone born blind has no knowledge of colors).\textsuperscript{357} This would not be so if the soul already possessed the concepts of all intelligible things.

\textsuperscript{353} Ibid., 141.  
\textsuperscript{354} Ibid., 141-142.  
\textsuperscript{355} Ibid., 141.  
\textsuperscript{356} Ibid., 141-142.  
\textsuperscript{357} Ibid., 142.
Third, human knowers have understanding in common with the angels, but fall short of the eminence of angelic intellects just as lower bodies fall short of the existence of higher bodies.\textsuperscript{358}

In \textit{quaestio} 84.4, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Do species emanate from certain separate immaterial forms, into the soul?”\textsuperscript{359} Aquinas’s response is in three parts.

First, Aquinas addresses what he takes to be Plato’s position.\textsuperscript{360} Plato posited the Forms that subsist on their own without matter, and he said that the soul and material objects both participate in the Forms (the soul for cognition, and material objects for their existence).\textsuperscript{361} Participation by the soul occurs through a likeness of the Idea in the mind that is participating in the Form. Thus, just as Plato claimed that the sensible forms emanate from Ideas as likenesses of them, so he also claimed that the intelligible species in the human soul are likenesses of the Ideas from which they emanate. But, Aquinas says, it is contrary to the nature of sensible things to subsist without their matter, as Aristotle proves in a number of ways.\textsuperscript{362} Furthermore, Aquinas says that Avicenna posited not that the intelligible species of all sensible things subsist on their own without matter,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{358} Ibid. Aquinas says that the matter of lower bodies is not entirely completed by their forms, but rather such matter is in potentiality for various forms. The matter of celestial bodies, on the other hand, is entirely completed by their forms, and so they do not have potentiality for other forms. The intellect of an angel is perfected by intelligible species as part of its nature, whereas the human intellect is in potentiality for such species.
\textsuperscript{359} Ibid., 143-146.
\textsuperscript{360} Ibid., 144-145.
\textsuperscript{361} Ibid., 144.
\textsuperscript{362} See Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, 1039a.24-1041a.5.
\end{flushleft}
but that they preexist immaterially in the separated intellects.\textsuperscript{363} From this intellect, the intelligible species emanate into our souls, and sensible forms emanate into corporeal matter. There are two differences between Plato and Avicenna: (1) Plato said that the Forms subsist on their own, whereas Avicenna located them in an agent intelligence. (2) Avicenna held that intelligible species do not remain in an individual’s intellect after the intellect ceases to understand actually, but rather that the intellect must return again to receive the species anew. So Avicenna did not hold that the soul is naturally endowed with knowledge as Plato did.\textsuperscript{364}

Second, on any view where species come from separate immaterial forms, there is the problem of the body’s role in cognition.\textsuperscript{365} A body seems necessary to the intellective soul for its proper operation, which is to understand. After all, the body is for the sake of the soul. If the soul receives intelligible species solely through an influx from separate principles, then the soul would not need a body in order to understand.

Next, Aquinas responds to two objections to his position about the body’s role:\textsuperscript{366} (1) Someone might say that a human soul needs the body because the senses somehow arouse the soul to consider the species it receives from the separate principles.\textsuperscript{367} But this is false because the intellect needs to be aroused only because the body is stupefied. Platonists go so far as to say that the soul is stupefied \textit{because} of embodiment.\textsuperscript{368} (2)

\textsuperscript{363} See Avicenna, \textit{Metaphysics}, 9.4; ibid., \textit{De Anima}, 5-6.
\textsuperscript{364} \textit{Treatise}, 145.
\textsuperscript{365} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{366} Ibid., 145-146.
\textsuperscript{367} Ibid., 145.
\textsuperscript{368} See Avicenna, \textit{De Anima}, 5.5.
Someone might say, in accord with Avicenna, that the senses are necessary because they arouse the soul to turn toward the agent intellect, from which the soul receives species. But this is false because, if the soul’s nature were to understand through the species in the agent intellect, then the soul could sometimes turn toward the Intelligence through the soul’s own natural inclination. Or, the soul could receive from the Agent Intelligence species of sensibles belonging to a sense that the soul’s body does not have.

Third, Aquinas says that the possible intellect is brought from potentiality to actuality through the agent intellect, which is a power that belongs to the individual’s soul. The possible intellect was not brought to actuality through some separated intellect serving as the proximate cause, although there could be a separate intellect serving as a remote cause.

In *quaestio* 84.5, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Does our soul see all things that it understands in their eternal natures?” Aquinas’s response is in three parts.

First, Aquinas responds to what he takes to be Plato’s position. Plato posited the separate Ideas and participation (as discussed above). But it is contrary to Christian belief that the forms of things should subsist on their own outside of things and without matter. So, Aquinas says that Augustine posited that the natures of all creatures exist in the divine mind. In virtue of these natures, Augustine said, all things are formed and the human soul has cognition of all things.

---

369 *Treatise*, 145; cf. Avicenna, *De Anima*, 5.5.
370 *Treatise*, 146.
371 Ibid., 146-148.
372 Ibid., 147.
373 See O’Daly, *Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind*, chapter 7.
Second, Aquinas says that a thing is cognized in something in two ways:374 (1) An object is itself cognized, as someone sees in a mirror the things whose images are reflected in the mirror. In this sense, the soul cannot see all things in their eternal natures. However, blessed people can see God and see all things in God.375 (2) An object is cognized in something as in the source of the cognition.376 For example, we say that things are seen in the sun because the sun shines on them and allows us to see them. In this sense, the soul does cognize all things through participation in these eternal natures. The intellectual light that is in us participates in the uncreated light, in which the eternal natures are contained.

Third, in order to cognize material things, we require intelligible species that are taken from things.377 We do not have knowledge of material things solely through participation in their eternal natures. Augustine rightly asked how these eternal natures could provide time-sensitive information about issues such as how many kinds of animals there are.378 Augustine also said that not each and every rational soul is worthy of the vision of eternal natures, but only those rational souls that are holy.379

374 Treatise, 147-148.
375 Ibid., 148.
376 Ibid.
377 Ibid.
378 See Augustine, On the Trinity, 4.16.
379 See Augustine, Eighty-three Different Questions, trans. David L. Mosher, Fathers of the Church 70 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press), 46: “These reasons (rationes), as was said, may be called ideas, or forms, or species, or reasons; and while it is the privilege of many to name them what they wish, it is the privilege of very few to see them in their reality” (parenthetical item in orig.).
In *quaestio* 84.6, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Does our soul acquire intelligible cognition from sensation?” Aquinas’s response is a consideration of what he takes to be the views of three prominent philosophers, the last of whom is Aristotle.

First, Aquinas considers Democritus, who said that cognitions are caused solely by images that emanate from the bodies about which we are thinking. He thought this because he (and other ancient philosophers) did not differentiate intellect from sense.

Second, Aquinas considers Plato, who said that the intellect is an immaterial power that does not use a body for its act. Therefore Plato claimed that intellectual cognition is not brought about by an impression from sensible things, but through the intellect’s participation in separate, intelligible Forms. On Plato’s view, the organs of sense are active in that they receive impressions from sensibles; this process rouses the soul to form in itself the species of sensible things.

Third, Aquinas considers Aristotle, who took a “middle route.” Aristotle claimed that the intellect differs from sense, and that sense’s operation is totally shared with the

---

380 *Treatise*, 149-152.
381 Ibid., 149-150.
382 Ibid., 150.
383 Aquinas says that Augustine came close to this view when he said that the soul senses “through the body” (see Augustine, *Literal Meaning of Genesis*, 12.24.51).
384 *Treatise*, 150-151.
body.\textsuperscript{385} Sensing, on this view, is an act of the compound and not of the soul alone.\textsuperscript{386} Thus Aristotle agreed with Democritus insofar as both said the operations of the sensory part are caused by the impression of a sensible on a sense (although they disagreed about whether this occurred due to emanation of atoms), but Aristotle claimed further that the intellect has an operation that it does not share with the body.\textsuperscript{387} He posited the agent intellect, which makes phantasms drawn from the senses actually intelligible by way of abstraction.\textsuperscript{388} Therefore, the sensible cognition is “in a certain way the material of the cause”, but not the whole and complete cause of intellectual cognition.\textsuperscript{389} Humans also require the light of the agent intellect, in which we unchangeably cognize the truth in changeable things, and distinguish the things themselves from the likenesses of things. The agent intellect is in some sense separate, at least from the possible intellect, because “that which acts is loftier than that which is acted upon.”\textsuperscript{390} Similarly, there must be in the power of imagination not only a passive capacity but also an active one, because there is

\textsuperscript{385} Ibid., 150; cf. Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, 427b.6-14: “That perceiving and understanding are not identical is therefore obvious; for the former is universal in the animal world, the latter is found only in a small division of it. Further, thinking is also distinct from perceiving—I mean that in which we find rightness and wrongness—rightness in understanding, knowledge, true opinion, wrongness in their opposites; for perception of the special objects of sense is always free from error, and is found in all animals, while it is possible to think falsely as well as truly, and thought is found only where there is discourse of reason. For imagination is different from either perceiving or discursive thinking, though it is not found without sensation or judgment without it.”


\textsuperscript{388} \textit{Treatise}, 151; cf. Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, 429a.18ff.

\textsuperscript{389} \textit{Treatise}, 151.

\textsuperscript{390} Ibid.

300
some operation of the human soul that forms various images of things by dividing and composing, even producing some images that are not drawn from the senses.

In *quaestio* 84.7, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Does our soul need phantasms in order actually to understand?” Aquinas’s answer is in four parts:

First, Aquinas says that it is impossible for the human intellect, connected to a body that can be acted upon, to actually understand anything without turning toward phantasms. The intellect’s actual understanding—not just producing knowledge anew, but also using knowledge already acquired—requires an act of imagination and of the other powers. This is clear because when we try to understand something, we form phantasms by way of examples and examine the thing we are trying to understand. Similarly, when we are explaining something to someone, we propose examples.

Second, a cognitive capacity is proportioned to what it cognizes. An angelic intellect, entirely separate from any body, has as its proper object an intelligible substance separate from body. A human intellect, which is connected to the body, has as its proper object a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter. Through such natures the human intellect rises to cognize even some invisible things. We apprehend particulars through sense and imagination, but in order for the intellect to actually apprehend its proper object, it must turn toward phantasms to examine the universal nature existing in

---

391 Ibid., 152-154.
392 Ibid., 153.
393 Ibid., 153-154.
394 Ibid., 153.
395 Ibid., 153-154.
the particular.\textsuperscript{396} If the proper object of the human intellect were a separate form, then the intellect would not need to turn toward phantasms.

Third, the species preserved in the possible intellect exists there “dispositionally” when the intellect is not actually understanding.\textsuperscript{397} In order for us to understand actually, we must use those species appropriately for the things of which they are species, i.e., the natures existing in particulars.

Fourth, we cognize God and incorporeal substances by making some comparison to sensible, corporeal things.\textsuperscript{398} We cognize God as a cause, and through the methods of exceeding and subtracting. We cognize the incorporeal substances only through subtracting or through some comparison to corporeal things.

In \textit{quaestio} 84.8, Aquinas deals with the following question: “Is the intellect’s judgment impeded by an impediment to the sensory powers?”\textsuperscript{399} Aquinas’s answer is in two parts.

First, Aquinas says that the intellect’s proper, proportionate object is the nature of the sensible object.\textsuperscript{400} But no complete judgment about a thing can be rendered unless all that pertains to that thing is cognized, and judgment is especially difficult if one fails to grasp “the terminus of the judgment” which requires the phantasm. The end of natural knowledge is to cognize the natures of the things that the \textit{senses} perceive.

\textsuperscript{396} Ibid., 154.
\textsuperscript{397} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{398} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{399} Ibid., 155-156.
\textsuperscript{400} Ibid., 155.
Second, all the things that we understand are cognized by the intellect’s making a comparison to natural, sensible things.\footnote{Ibid., 155-156.} Therefore it is impossible for us to have complete intellectual judgment when there is an obstruction to the senses through which we cognize sensible things.\footnote{Ibid., 155.} For example, the senses are impeded in dreams because the motion of vapors obstructs the senses. Some people even syllogize in dreams, but upon awakening they always find that they have made a mistake in reasoning.

**Conclusion**

An understanding of Aquinas’s anthropology is required for a comparison between his anthropology and that of Pecham. Therefore, in this chapter, I considered in detail three primary Aquinas texts on this subject, to facilitate the comparison that occupies the sixth chapter of the present study. In the following two chapters, I will interpret the material I have explicated in chapters two, three, and four, in order to support my thesis, i.e., that John Pecham’s philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original synthesis of Neoplatonic metaphysics, and is a significant alternative to Aquinas’s anthropology.

\footnote{Ibid., 155-156.} \footnote{Ibid., 155.} In this context Aquinas brings up an interesting example concerning dreams (ibid., 156). He says that the senses are impeded in dreams because the motion of vapors obstructs the senses. Some people even syllogize in dreams, but upon awakening they always find that they have made a mistake in reasoning.
CHAPTER 5
PECHAM AND HIS SOURCES

In the three chapters prior to this, I have provided an explication of the relevant Pecham and Aquinas texts. Now I will begin to interpret what I have found in these texts in order to defend my thesis, the first part of which is that Pecham’s philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original synthesis of Neoplatonic metaphysics. (The second part of the thesis is that Pecham’s anthropology is a significant alternative to that of Aquinas.) The present chapter will prove this first part of the thesis to be true, and in the final chapter I will prove the second part of my thesis.¹

As one reads Pecham’s Tractatus and his Quaestiones it becomes obvious that he is indebted to a number of philosophical and theological sources. In fact his explicit or implicit citation of sources in the Tractatus is so pervasive that the reader might be tempted to think that Pecham’s text is merely a hodgepodge of references to other literature, lacking in original aim or careful strategy. Prior to passing this judgment, the reader should look carefully to see if there is an objective that structures Pecham’s...

¹ This chapter is organized into the following five parts:
1. How Does Pecham Organize His Sources?
2. Pecham’s Limited Citation of the Fons Vitae
3. A Reading of Pecham’s Tractatus in Comparison with the Fons Vitae
4. How Does Pecham Marshal His Sources to Advance His Own Agenda?
5. Objections to My Position Concerning the Avicebron/Gundissalinus Influence
use of sources. The following two questions must be asked: (1) How does Pecham organize his sources? (2) How does Pecham marshal these sources to advance his own agenda? Thankfully, answers to these questions yield the conclusion that, while Pecham’s project was conditioned by philosophical and theological presuppositions, it was also creative, distinctive, and oriented in a way that is (as will become clear in chapter six of the present study) almost totally different from the orientation of Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology.

I agree with Hasse that Pecham is advocating an “Avicennized Augustinianism.” I will argue that, while Pecham is concerned to show that his doctrine of matter and form is consonant with theological authority (Augustine) and wishes to defend this authority, he tries to accomplish these tasks with the help of philosophical authority: Aristotle, Avicenna, Avicebron, and Averroes. These are the major influences in the 13th-century psychology. Given the framework provided by these theological and philosophical auctoritates, Pecham wishes to promote the tradition of Avicebron as it has been developed by both Dominicus Gundissalinus and Franciscan theologians. I will make explicit the extent of the Avicebronian influence in the Pecham texts in order to show that Pecham is extending the same metaphysical project we find in Avicebron’s *Fons Vitae*, “which presents a rigorously worked-out Neoplatonic

---

cosmology,”³ as it applies to anthropology. The mediation of Avicebron’s philosophy to the 13th century was accomplished by Dominicus Gundissalinus in his translation of the *Fons Vitae* and in his own works on the soul.⁴ Pecham’s extension of the Avicebron/Gundissalinus project is within the metaphysical schema outlined by Avicenna, Augustine, and Averroes, yet the Avicebron/Gundissalinus tradition cannot be regarded as a secondary source in Pecham’s *Tractatus*.

Finally, I will challenge the position of two scholars who, in addressing 13th century psychology (and discussing Pecham in particular), have attempted to marginalize Avicebron’s influence. They suggest that “Avicebron’s influence on thirteenth-century Franciscans espousing the doctrine of spiritual matter has been significantly exaggerated”⁵ and that the prominence of the doctrines of universal hylomorphism and plurality of forms is *due primarily* to Augustine’s influence. I will argue that this alternative understanding is incorrect and leads to a significant misunderstanding of Pecham's project in the *Tractatus*. This project was, while indebted to Augustine, designed to advance an agenda inspired by other philosophical authorities including Avicebron.

---


⁴ Houser, “Dominicus Gundissalinus,” 247; Gundissalinus, *De Anima; De Immortalitate Animae; De Processione Mundi; De Unitate et Uno*.

Part 1: How Does Pecham Organize His Sources?

Like other medieval writers, Pecham often takes positions without immediately explaining in detail what he means. A plausible reason for this is that Pecham presumes his readers have a level of familiarity with ongoing discussions. A *tractatus* is a *cursus* or a “run-through” of mature doctrines for a very educated audience of peers—older, middle-aged, and younger theologians; Pecham had this kind of audience at the papal *studium*. Given that Pecham was near to becoming Archbishop of Canterbury, one might read his *Tractatus* as a philosophical overview that also had a political component, i.e., to let his theologically educated contemporaries at the Papal Curia know where he stood on important issues.

In the tradition that supports Pecham’s view of matter and form, there are basically two lines of influence. The first line is more remote from Pecham historically, and includes: Augustine, Avicenna, Avicebron, Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux⁶), Alfred of Sareshel, Averroes, Gundissalinus, and Costa Ben Luca. Among these, I will show the particularly significant influence of Avicebron, who is—along with his translator Dominicus Gundissalinus—largely responsible for the prominence of the doctrines of universal hylomorphism and the plurality of forms in the 13th century. The second line of influence is a Franciscan tradition that has already integrated Avicebronian motifs: Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle, Bonaventure, and Roger Bacon. In the process of discussing Avicebron’s influence in

---

⁶ See Melani, introduction to Pecham, *Tractatus*, xlvii.
the paragraphs that follow, I will show that all of these thinkers influence Pecham’s philosophy.

The Traditional View of Avicebron’s Influence

The Jewish philosopher Solomon Ibn Gabirol (Avicebron; ca. 1021-1057) is well known in the history of philosophy for the doctrine that all things—including soul and intellect—are comprised of matter and form. . . . and for his emphasis on Divine Will. Ibn Gabirol is moved first and foremost by the Neoplatonic theological sense that God’s reality infuses all things, and by the concomitant ethical and existential ideal of Neoplatonic Return—the notion that we must strive, through mind and deed, to reclaim our own truest being and likeness to our source.7

James Weisheipl brings to our attention Avicebron’s influence over 13th-century Franciscans and shows that the *Fons Vitae* is a major source for five significant doctrines: (1) The primacy of God’s creative will; (2) universal composition of all created substances from universal matter and universal form; (3) the composition of all spiritual substances, including the human soul, of a spiritual matter, which is the subject of a spiritual form; (4) the possibility of many angels of the same species without corporeal matter, but not without spiritual matter; (5) the plurality of substantial forms in all created substances; and (6) the impossibility of *forma corporeitatis* being divested or corrupted in elemental changes.8 The fact that many scholars share Weisheipl’s basic position, i.e., that Avicebron and Gundissalinus

---
8 “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,” 242, 244, 254-255.
are the primary line of influence for these doctrines, leads me to call his position the “traditional” view.9

As I will show in the following pages, Pecham’s *Tractatus De Anima* and other works support Weisheipl’s position, because Pecham provides an excellent example of the result of the Avicebron/Gundissalinus influence in the 13th century. Pecham advocates for some of the same major ideas of the *Fons Vitae*. I do not mean that Pecham’s doctrines are never traceable to authors other than Avicebron, but rather that the high number of Pechamian principles also finding expression in the tradition coming from Avicebron is suggestive of a strategy on Pecham’s part.

Callus has argued that the doctrine of the plurality of forms was a novelty in the 13th century, stemming from Avicebron and his translator Gundissalinus:10

[T]he main true source from which the pluralist theory has come down to the Schoolmen is undoubtedly Avicebron. . . . As Gundissalinus in his *De anima* made known the unity thesis of Avicenna, so it was he too who in other treatises popularized Avicebron’s theory. In the *De processione mundi* we meet with the same description of matter and form as in Avicebron, whereas in the *De unitate* (wrongly attributed to Boethius) he reproduced almost verbatim Avicebron’s teaching on the various degrees of forms. By bringing these theories to the fore, Gundissalinus contributed considerably to the spread of an utterly un-Aristotelian notion of matter and form which is at the base of all pluralism. Again, by proclaiming that other Avicebronian tenet, that *quaecumque*.

---


intellectus dividit et resolvit in aliquid, compositum est ex his in quae resolvitur, he provided the pluralist with the fundamental principle on which their thesis stands.\textsuperscript{11}

This is not to say, of course, that the positions of Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus were not also novelties.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{Pecham and the Fons Vitae}

Pecham cites the \textit{Fons Vitae} directly only once in his \textit{Quaestiones}.\textsuperscript{13} Before considering the plausible explanations as to why Pecham did not cite Avicebron more frequently, notice that the one citation in the \textit{Quaestiones} is hardly insignificant.

Pecham finds support in the \textit{Fons Vitae} for his view of the relationship between the rational soul and the body:

\begin{quote}
“Perfectio enim creaturae acquiritur per actus nobiles. Sed actus quidam sunt nobiles ex arduitate, quidam vero ex difficultate vel utilitate. . . . Habet [anima] separate actus arduos ex natura; immo, sicut dicit auctor libri \textit{De fonte vitae}: Anima est substantia incorporea intelligibilis illuminationum quae sunt
\end{quote}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{13} 451.
\end{thebibliography}
a primo ultima relatione percepta. . . . ut quae ultima est ordine naturae, posset supremum pertingere per meritum angelorum.”

The rational soul, Pecham continues, communicates “perfection” or “life” to the body, and the soul and body are perfected by being conjoined. Pecham’s citation of the *Fons Vitae* in the *Quaestiones* appears to also be a reference to the *De Motu Cordis* (although the whole idea in Pecham’s statement requires recourse to the *Fons Vitae* as well).

As I noted in the first chapter of the present study, Pecham's citations of the *Fons Vitae* in the *Tractatus* are actually references to the *De Motu Cordis* by Alfred of...
Sareshel. I repeat here that it may be that Pecham was not mistaken about the authorship of the *De Motu Cordis*; rather, he may have considered Alfred’s text to be a kind of *fons vitae*. The fact that Pecham cites the *De Motu Cordis* is significant not only because Alfred provides the basis of Pecham’s doctrine of *life*, as I made clear in the third chapter of the present study, but also for two additional reasons: (1) Pecham’s usage of the *De Motu Cordis* further confirms that Pecham is part of a particular tradition of philosophical anthropology, as Callus has noted:

The most solid foundation of Alfred’s reputation was, however, the *De Motu Cordis*. About the middle of the thirteenth century, it was introduced into the curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Paris as a textbook for the last part of the ‘scientia naturalis inferior’ . . . . Moreover, Alfred’s definition of the soul soon gained general acceptance, and was quoted among the current definitions by Philip the Chancellor, John de la Rochelle, St. Albert the Great, Bartholomew the Englishman, and others. This wide reputation earned for Alfred in the pages of the *Summa Philosophiae* (generally but wrongly ascribed to Robert Grosseteste) a distinguished place among the philosophers.18

---

17 *Tractatus*, 4-6, 8; ibid., “Vita est actus primus et aequalis. . . . vita est primus actus formae” (4, 6); Pecham says that this point comes from the *Fons Vitae*, however the phrase is really in the *De Motu Cordis* (7, 8): “Vitam actu omibus aequaliter inesse necesse est, ceteras neutquam. . . . Prima ergo et aequalis et continua est vita. Primus enim formae actus est. Est enim primus motus ex quieto sempterno fluens.”

18 “Introduction of Aristotelian Learning,” 12, parenthetical item in orig.
I will comment further on this tradition later in this chapter. Pecham’s citation of the *De Motu Cordis* is significant because the philosophical principles that Pecham draws from the *De Motu Cordis* echo principles found in Avicebron.\(^1^9\)

**Table 5.1. Pecham’s References to Alfred of Sareshel.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pecham</th>
<th>Alfred of Sareshel</th>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Tractatus</em>, 4</td>
<td><em>De Motu Cordis</em>, 8</td>
<td>Life as the first act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tractatus</em>, 5</td>
<td><em>De Motu Cordis</em>, 8</td>
<td>Life as an equal act throughout the lifespan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tractatus</em>, 5</td>
<td><em>De Motu Cordis</em>, 8</td>
<td>The corruption accompanying old age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tractatus</em>, 6</td>
<td><em>De Motu Cordis</em>, 6; cf. 56-57</td>
<td>Animal and embryo are equally alive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tractatus</em>, 6</td>
<td><em>De Motu Cordis</em>, 7</td>
<td>Boy and old man are both alive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tractatus</em>, 6</td>
<td><em>De Motu Cordis</em>, 8</td>
<td>Life is the first act of form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tractatus</em>, 7</td>
<td><em>De Motu Cordis</em>, 7, 93</td>
<td>The continuous drive in living things</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{19}\) See Table 5.1; cf. Alfred of Sareshel, *De Motu Cordis*, 8: “Prima ergo et aequalis et continua est vita. Primus enim formae actus est. Est enim primus motus ex quieto sempiterno fluens.” As far as I know there is no passage in the *Fons Vitae* that makes this point in as many words. However, the *Fons Vitae* is designed to give a hylomorphic account of all being—everything that has being, including every living thing, has its being due to form (see *Fountain of Life*, Jacob, 8). Pecham may not be originating a mistake in identifying the *De Motu Cordis* as the *Fons Vitae*; rather, it may be that the *De Motu Cordis* was actually known to Pecham as the *Fons Vitae.*
Note that the last of these ideas for which Pecham cites the *De Motu Cordis* (as the *Fons Vitae*) in the *Tractatus* is basically the same idea for which he cites Avicebron’s *Fons Vitae* (apparently accurately) in the *Quaestiones*. The *De Motu Cordis* and the *Fons Vitae* complement one another in that both texts are about the ontological status of the human being and the source of its life, and both share dualist, emanationist, and illuminationist perspectives. They are both in what can be called *Fons Vitae* tradition or the *Avicebron/Gundissalinus* tradition. (In fact, the *De Motu Cordis* sees the heart as the biological *fons vitae*.)

The *De Motu Cordis* served Pecham’s purpose in the discussion of life for two reasons: (1) The *De Motu Cordis* was seen as an authoritative philosophical text on the human body and could thus lend credibility to Pecham’s positions; and (2) The *De Motu Cordis* has the specific distinctions between the various moments in the

---

20 See Avicebron, *Fons Vitae*, e.g., 109-110, 144.
21 “Cor vero fons innati caloris naturalisque principium ignito quodam fervore in uestionem semper armatur, in sinistro maxime thalamo. In hoc continua est spiritus generatio” (*De Motu Cordis*, 22-23). The third chapter of the *De Motu Cordis* is titled *Quod cor domicilium est vitae* (12).
22 See Otte, “The Life and Writings of Alfredus Anglicus.”
biological life, which Pecham will use to further the plurality of forms doctrine as found in the *Fons Vitae* (I will discuss this later in the present chapter).

Despite the fact that direct citations to Avicebron are few in Pecham, Pecham repeatedly cites Gundissalinus, the translator and conveyor of Avicebron’s thought.  

Table 5.2. Pecham’s References to Avicebron and Gundissalinus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pecham</th>
<th>Avicebron/ Gundissalinus</th>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Tractantes</em>, 183</td>
<td>Gundissalinus, <em>De Unitate et Uno</em>, 6</td>
<td>Spiritual matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tractantes</em>, 186</td>
<td>Gundissalinus, <em>De Unitate et Uno</em>, 5ff.</td>
<td>Spiritual matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Quaestiones</em>, 451</td>
<td>Avicebron, <em>Fons Vitae</em>, 232</td>
<td>The definition of the soul, and the relationship between the rational soul and the body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Quodlibeta</em>, 209</td>
<td>Gundissalinus, <em>De Unitate et Uno</em>, 5ff.</td>
<td>Spiritual matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tractatus</em>, 47</td>
<td>Gundissalinus, <em>De Unitate et Uno</em>, per totum</td>
<td>Spiritual matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tractatus</em>, 48-51</td>
<td>Gundissalinus, <em>Des Dominicus Gundissalinus Schrift Von Der Unsterblichkeit Der Seele (De Immoralitate Animae)</em>, per totum</td>
<td>Immortality of the soul (generally)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tractatus</em>, 50</td>
<td>Gundissalinus, <em>De Immortalitate Animae</em>, 5-6, 35</td>
<td>The rational soul is not weakened by understanding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Table 5.2; *Tractatus*, 47-51; Gundassalinus, *De Unitate*, *PL* 1075-1076; ibid., *De Immortalitate*, 3, 5-6, 19, 26-27, 37-38.
Avicebron and Gundissalinus, alongside Augustine and Avicenna, are clearly important to Pecham. Many of his references to Gundissalinus come in the critical last two chapters of the Tractatus, which deal with the substance of the soul and the immortality of the soul. In Gundissalinus, Pecham finds support for the doctrines of spiritual matter, the immortality of the rational soul, the plurality of forms, and the primacy of the will, doctrines which are also present in the Fons Vitae (as will become clear shortly).

### Part 2: Pecham’s Limited Citation of the Fons Vitae

Lest it be assumed that the scarcity of explicit Pechamian citations of the Fons Vitae means that Pecham was not implicitly promoting doctrines inspired by the Fons Vitae, four points must be borne in mind. I will argue for each of them in turn: (1) There are plausible explanations for why Pecham would have infrequently cited the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pecham</th>
<th>Avicebron/ Gundissalinus</th>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractatus, 50</td>
<td>Gundissalinus, De Immortalitate Animae, 19</td>
<td>The rational soul is the most noble of all forms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractatus, 50</td>
<td>Gundissalinus, De Immortalitate Animae, 3</td>
<td>If there is no eternal life, then no retribution of merits, and injustice would reign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractatus, 51</td>
<td>Gundissalinus, De Immortalitate Animae, 37-38</td>
<td>The end of man is conjunction with God through love.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractatus, 51</td>
<td>Gundissalinus, De Immortalitate Animae, 26-27</td>
<td>The rational soul cannot be corrupted.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fons Vitae explicitly, even though the text influenced him. (2) The scholarship on the subject of the philosophical background of the 13th century is practically unanimous in the conviction that Avicebron inspired two central doctrines that Pecham adopts in his anthropology, i.e., universal hylomorphism and the plurality of forms. (3) There are obvious philosophical commonalities between Pecham and other Franciscan writers who advocated for Avicebron’s ideas. Thus, in Pecham we find not only the direct influence of Avicebron/Gundissalinus, but also the indirect influence of the Fons Vitae tradition through prior Franciscan philosophers. (4) Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas recognized Avicebron as a primary source of the doctrines of hylomorphism and plurality of forms, and treated Avicebron’s philosophy as a serious problem.

(After discussing these four points, I will provide a reading of Pecham’s Tractatus in comparison with the Fons Vitae, particularly focusing on the critical third book of the Fons Vitae, the longest of its five books.24 This reading yields a high number similarities between the two works. )

Now, consider each of the four aforementioned points in turn.

(1) The first reason why the scarcity of direct Pechamian citations of the Fons Vitae does not mean that Pecham was not influenced heavily by the Fons Vitae: There

---

24 The third book of the Fons Vitae, on separate substances, has been translated by Wedeck as The Fountain of Life. While I am considering primarily this portion of the Fons Vitae, I will reference passages from another English translation (also titled The Fountain of Life), by Jacob. Both Wedeck’s translation and Jacob’s are based on Baeumker’s edition of the Latin text (1995), which I also will cite throughout the present chapter.
are plausible explanations for why Pecham would have infrequently cited the *Fons Vitae* explicitly, even though the text influenced him. It cannot be known with certainty why Pecham did not cite Avicebron more than he did, but Pecham is not alone in the oversight. Dales has observed that philosophers in the 13th century often “derived the doctrines of plurality of forms and universal hylomorphism from Avicebron, even while attributing them to Augustine.” T.M. Rudavsky explains why this was the case:

Written in Arabic, [Avicebron’s work] has survived in a twelfth-century Latin translation, *Fons Vitae*, by John of Spain in collaboration with Dominicus Gundissalinus; the author’s name was given as “Avicebrol” or “Avicebron.” Latin Scholastics reading the *Fons Vitae* had no idea that this work was written by a Spanish Jew; the author was thought to be a Muslim. . . . *[Fons Vitae]* is unique among Jewish medieval works in that it contains virtually no references to any other Jewish texts, ideas, or sources: it is wholly lacking in Jewish content. Medieval readers thus had no reason to suspect that the author was the noted Jewish poet Ibn Gabirol. . . . his true identity concealed as a result of his efforts to systematize the basic principles of Jewish thought without recourse to religious dogma.

Given that Avicebron’s emanationism entails a cosmology that is distinct from the Catholic doctrine of creationism and might be read as implying that there is no substantial distinction between the first cause and the rest of the world, it is plausible that many medieval authors feared that direct citation of Avicebron would evoke charges of a pantheism. This is particularly reasonable to assume given that the works

---


26 “Solomon Ibn Gabirol,” 250, 251, bracketed items added.
of Amalric of Bène and David of Dinant were condemned in the early 13th century because of pantheistic teachings. In particular, David had apparently identified God with the prime matter of the universe.

Direct citation of Avicebron would have been complicated by the fact that he was “[t]hought wrongly by centuries of Christian scholastics to be either a Christian defender of Augustine or a Muslim misreader of Aristotle.” (Actually, Pecham also finds support for the doctrine of spiritual matter in both Averroes and Augustine.)

Dales writes as follows about the medieval and contemporary transmission of the *Fons Vitae*:

The doctrine of this work was known to virtually every Latin scholastic of the thirteenth century and was accepted, sometimes with modifications, by many. It is not clear how many actually read the *Fons vitae* itself; only five manuscripts of the work are extant. But most of its teaching was contained in the works of Gundissalinus, which were widely disseminated.

---


29 Pessin, “Solomon Ibn Gabirol.”


Yet even in cases where Melani (editor of Pecham’s *Tractatus*) claims that Pecham was clearly making reference to Gundissalinus, Pecham did not cite him by name, either. While all of the reasons for Pecham’s failure to cite the *Fons Vitae* directly may evade us, we may rest assured that Pecham is not singling out the *Fons Vitae* by intentionally avoiding direct references to it. (As we have seen, Pecham cites texts with various degrees of specificity, and even cites the *Fons Vitae* directly on one occasion.) Nor is Pecham’s failure to cite the *Fons Vitae* directly a strong indication that he was not influenced by the text either directly or indirectly.

(2) The second reason why the scarcity of direct Pechamian citations of the *Fons Vitae* does not mean that Pecham was not influenced heavily by the *Fons Vitae*: The scholarship on the subject of the philosophical background of the 13th century is practically unanimous in the conviction that Avicebron inspired the doctrine of universal hylomorphism and thus also the plurality of forms. Callus, Knowles, Quinn, Theodore Crowley, Weisheipl, Lindberg, Dales, R. James Long, Antonio Perez Esteveez, P. Osmund Lewry, Paul Vincent Spade, John Marenbon, and Magdalena Bieniak have addressed this subject and more or less attribute the doctrines to Avicebron, even if they admit that a minimal version of the doctrine is present in

---

32 E.g., *Tractatus*, 3, 49, 50.
Augustine. Weisheipl has shown that, while further work needs to be done to show how the *Fons Vitae* was transmitted to Paris in the 13th century, the *Fons Vitae* was highly influential there.

Bieniak’s very recent work argues that the 13th-century doctrine she calls “material dispositions,” which implies that the body is formed in such a way as to be disposed to receive further forms, mainly derives from Avicebron. Bieniak’s book is based on a manuscript collection that testifies to the theological debates that took place in Paris during the first decades of the thirteenth century, at the very beginning of the reception of Aristotle’s *libri naturales* and *Metaphysics* on the one hand, and, on the other, of new Hebrew and Arabic philosophical sources, in particular Avicebron’s *Fons vitae* and Avicenna’s *De anima*.

Both of these works were translated by Gundissalinus.

There are two notable exceptions to the traditional view of this issue (Weisheipl’s view) as I have just described it. I will address these exceptions in the final part of

---


34 “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,” 240ff.


36 Ibid., 1.
this chapter, after I have reviewed the evidence in support of my own view, i.e., that
the Avicebron/Gundissalinus influence is not secondary in Pecham’s anthropology.

(3) The third reason why the scarcity of direct Pechamian citations of the *Fons Vitae*
does not mean that Pecham was not influenced heavily by the *Fons Vitae*: There
are philosophical commonalities not only between Pecham and Augustine, but also
between Pecham and a number of other writers who helped to shape the tradition of
viewing form and matter in an Avicebronian fashion. 37 I mentioned above that there
are two strands of such writers, whom Pecham draws together in order to promote his
own doctrine of form and matter. The first strand consists of authors who are more
remote from Pecham: Augustine, Avicenna, Avicebron, Averroes, and also Pseudo-
Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux 38), Alfred of Sareshel, Gundissalinus, and Costa Ben
Luca. Pecham references (either directly or indirectly) not only these writers, but also
what I am categorizing as a second strand of influence for Pecham: four major
Franciscan authors who are also associated with the *Fons Vitae* tradition and who are

37 Melani writes about Pecham’s sources in the introduction to Pecham’s *Tractatus*: “Ex
Patribus, praeter Augustinum, et ex Scriptoribus ecclesiasticis Auctor *De spiritu et anima*,
cui magna auctoritas confertur. . . . Boetius vero, cui false tribuitur liber *De unitate et uno*
Gundissalino restitutus, bis nominatur. . . . Deinde, Pecham ter citat librum, cui inscribitur
*Fons vitae*, erronee tamen, quia doctrina respicit *De motu cordis*. Hic profecto error
amanuensi non debetur, cum ita revera habeatur in alius I. Pecham operibus. Error ergo
forsitan erat in titulo vel in *Incipit* codicis, quo Doctor Ingeniosus usus est. . . . Relatio ad
Gundissalinii opus, cui titulus *De immortalitate animae*, in doctrinis de independentia
animae a corpore, de immaterialitate intellectus in operationibus suis, de duplici faciei
animae, de amore et in argumentis deductis ex impossibilitate corruptionis et
annihilationis et ex fine, necnon in theoria colligiantiae animae et corporis clare
apparet” (xlii-xlili, xlv, xlv). The footnotes in Melani’s edition are very helpful for
tracing the lines of influence for Pecham.
38 See Melani, introduction, xlvii.
closer to Pecham chronologically: Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle, Bonaventure, and Roger Bacon. It is impossible to provide here a detailed study of the textual connections between Pecham and each of these authors. However, in order to provide a sense of how Pecham is organizing his sources, I will now briefly review Pecham’s use of these auctoritates.

I have already pointed out that Pecham cites Augustine in support of spiritual matter, and I will consider Augustine’s influence further after I have discussed the influence of other authors. For the moment, I will move on to discuss Avicenna. Pecham quotes directly from Avicenna extensively in the Tractatus (25 times according to my count, more than the quotations from any other author except Augustine). Drawing on a statement from Avicenna, Pecham explains that while a study of the soul may concern itself with broader metaphysical principles, it must ultimately address natural philosophy:

Also Avicenna Naturalium Book 6: “The name of the soul is not imposed because it is substance, but because it is that which rules bodies and is concerned with them”. And on that account it receives the body in its definition, and therefore the treatise on the soul was about natural science.39

Pecham’s selective usage of Avicenna is itself remarkable, since Avicenna was opposed to Pecham’s view of how the soul and body are united; instead of seeing the soul and body as specifically disposed for one another, Avicenna views the physical, corruptible body in all its parts, including the formal components, as irreconcilably other than the purely immaterial soul, such that

39 Quaestiones, 381: “Et Avicenna VI Naturalium: ‘Nomen animae non imponitur ex hoc quod est substantia, sed ex hoc quod regit corpora et refertur ad illa’. Et idcirco recipit corpus in sui definitione, et ideo tractatus de anima fuit de scientia naturali.”
the latter cannot be an essential form of the former. Rather, the soul is an accidental relation to a particular body. . . . The soul is individuated by the particular nature of its designated body.40

Pecham also cites Avicenna on the issue of hylomorphism and plurality of forms:

- Therefore the soul is neither a body nor a corporeal form, but is spiritual substance, constituted from its own matter and form, just as Boethius teaches expressly, in the book *De Unitate et uno*. Further, Avicenna says, *Metaphysics* Book 9: “No evil follows unless this in whose essence something is in potency, and this occurs through matter”. Therefore every Angel and every rational soul is composed of matter and form.41

- And I call matter and form “principles,” of which each has its essence. Whence Avicenna, Book 1 of the *Physics*, chapter 2: Form is an essence through itself, and *esse* is added on the *esse* which has *hyle*; privation truly does not add *esse* upon *esse*. This is Avicenna. Therefore form gives to matter its specific and complete *esse*, but it does not give to it *esse* of incomplete essence, since the essential principle is from something other than form.42

Pecham also finds support in Avicenna for the view that the soul desires to govern the body: “Therefore the force of the soul perfects and moves the organ that is intimately united to it. . . . it suffers along with the body, to which is united intimately by

\[\text{Ivry, “Arabic and Islamic Psychology.”}\]
affection and by its desire to govern it, just as Avicenna says.”

I will discuss below Avicenna’s extensive influence in Pecham’s conception of the faculties of the soul.

Estevez’s recent work on theories of matter in the 13th century has a chapter on the doctrine of matter in Pecham’s *Quodlibeta*, and sheds light on the influence of Averroes on Pecham. Estevez thinks that it is from Averroes that Pecham takes a strong view of matter having its independent existence, at least in principle. Indeed, Pecham cites Averroes in support of the view that even non-corporeal being must have something similar to form and something similar to matter. Estevez highlights the following statements in Pecham’s *Quodlibeta* which supports the view that matter has its own


44 *La Materia*, 223-246. Concerning Roger Bacon’s theory of natural matter, which is also nuanced, see Pereira, “Materia naturalis”.

45 Estevez, *La Materia*: “Juan Pecham, siguiendo a Buenaventura, va a continuar abriendo un camino intermedio entre estos dos extremos. Ni la materia será la realidad suprema que se identifica con la Divinidad, como quiso David de Dinand, ni ese extraño residuo óntico tomista expresado en la casi incomprensible expresión de *un no-ente que es en potencia*” (227, emp. in orig.).

essence apart from the form to which it will be united, and so God could create matter essentially without form.\(^{47}\)

- Item, certum est quod materia est alia essentia quam forma, cum materia et forma sint duo principia essentialiter differentia. Deus autem omnia essentialiter diversa potest separare, cum eiusdem sit componere et dividere. Possit ergo, si vellet, facere materiam esse sine omni forma. Multoque magis est hoc possibile quam accidentia, quorum “esse est inesse”, esse sine subiecto.\(^{48}\)

- [P]lus esse essentialitatis habet materia, quae est substantia, quam accidentia.\(^{49}\)

- [M]ateria enim est causa omnium accidentium.\(^{50}\)

- [M]ateria est in potentia ad formam, et ista potentia materiae non fundatur in nihilo, sed in ipsa essentia materiae.\(^{51}\)

- Et illum actum essendi non habet a forma, sed a creante, sicut etiam habet essentiam, scilicet a Creatore: essentialae autem est esse sicut lucis lucere.\(^{52}\)

- [S]icut producit materiam de nihilo, non per formam - quam tamen conservat in esse completo mediante forma. . . .\(^{53}\)

- Materia enim habet duo genera partium, quia habet partes quantitativas quae sensibiliter dividuntur; et, circumscripta quantitate, habet partes substantialia. . . .\(^{54}\)

\(^{47}\) All of these quotations are from Pecham’s fourth Quodlibet (Romanum) which, like the Tractatus, dates from his time at the papal studium (Etzkorn, introduction to Pecham, Quodlibeta, 25). As Estevez notes, Pecham believes that once matter has become formed as part of a genus, it would be impossible (short of a miracle) for the matter to remain without a form after a substantial change (236); cf. Pecham, Quodlibeta: “Quia subiectum transmutationis non est materia sola, sed aggregatum, ut dictum est, ex materia et potentia activa. Aliter enim essent formae omnes naturaliter ab extra. . . . impossibile videtur solam materiam manere” (159-160); “Igitur impossibile esset per naturam materiam stare sine forma et corpus sine anima, nisi per infinitam fieret Dei potentiam miraculose continentem materiam sine forma” (ibid., 256).

\(^{48}\) Quodlibeta, 175.

\(^{49}\) Ibid.

\(^{50}\) Ibid., 174.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., 176.

\(^{52}\) Ibid.

\(^{53}\) Ibid., 175.

\(^{54}\) Ibid., 209.
• Ergo differt materia secundum differentiam angelorum quantum ad partes suas substantiales, non dimensionales.\textsuperscript{55}

• Omne subiectum transmutationis est aliquid in actu, sed in potentia respectu ulterioris perfectionis. . . .\textsuperscript{56}

• Dicendum igitur quod anima rationalis non est forma corporis, secundum quod corpus est, immo praesupponit corporeitatem, cuius forma non corruptitur per adventum animae, quia nullam habet cum ipsa corporeitatem.\textsuperscript{57}

• Si igitur corpus fuit formatum prius natura vel tempore quam infunderetur anima, ergo prius habebat materiam et formam.\textsuperscript{58}

Then, Estevez connects Averroes to Pecham’s teaching on matter by showing that Averroes transmits Avicebron’s doctrine of matter to the Franciscans:

Tampoco la materia prima en Avicena puede existir sola sin forma alguna. . . . [L]a extensión de la materia a todo lo creado no es una acquisición de sólo Duns Escoto sino de toda la Escuela Franciscana, qua la hereda de Avicebrón a través de Avicena y de Averroes. . . . Estas expresiones bonaventurianas semejan recoger resonancias lejanas de Avicebrón llegadas a través del eco de Avicena y, sobre todo, de Averroes y que los franciscanos tratarán de ir matizando. La capacidad de la materia de recibir infinitas formas sucesivamente, de transformarse en formas y de extenderse, como sustrato, a todo el universo creado, puede implicar la amenaza o tendencia hacia un panteísmo materialista y monista de signo Avicebróniano, tal como ya había sucedido anteriormente en menor escala con Averroes y. . . .\textsuperscript{59}

Thus, as will become clear in the following chapter on Pecham and his controversy with Aquinas, Pecham will oppose Aquinas’s view of matter as a non-entity, based on the view that Franciscans have already held, i.e., that matter has an autonomous, substantial

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 231.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 230.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{La Materia}, 436, 438, 439.
existence apart from form. For Pecham will see it is as contradictory to think of matter as a non-entity or a “nothing” that is nonetheless characterized by pure potentiality. For Pecham, matter must have some “real possibility” which is the result of its already having some being.

A number of times in the *Tractatus*, Pecham directly references Alcher of Clairvaux’s quasi-Augustinian tract *De Spiritu et Anima*. In this work Pecham finds support for his views that the separated soul has sensitive powers. Pecham also cites the *De Spiritu et Anima* to support the view that the soul has three potencies which do not represent three substances. Similarly, Pecham finds in the *De Spiritu et Anima* support for the view that the human being does not have three souls, but rather only

---

60 Ibid., 444: “Ante esta posición tomista, considerada como excesivamente formalizante, va a reaccionar la Escuela Franciscana. Bajo la influencia de Averroes, dota a la materia de algún tipo de ser autónomo, sustancial y distinto del ser de la forma.”

61 Ibid., 226: “En el otro extremo encontramos la materia prima de Tomás de Aquino, reducida a menos que una sombra, a un residuo óntico, en sí misma, en los confines del no-ente.”

62 Cf. ibid., 454.

63 *Tractatus*, 15: “Sed anima a corpore separata non indiget hoc nuntio vel medio, sicut expresse dicit Auctor libri *De spiritu et anima*, quod ‘anima secum trahit imaginativam, concupiscibilem et irascibilem’.” The precise quotation from the *De Spiritu et Anima* is: “Si vero distemperata et confusa fuerint, invita recedit anima, secum trahens omnia; sensum scilicet, imaginationem, rationem, intellectum, intelligentiam, concupiscibilitatem, et irascibilitatem: et ex his secundum merita afficitur ad delectationem, sive ad dolorem” (*PL* 40, 791). While Bacon and Pecham share a commitment to Neoplatonism, Bacon advocates against the use of the *De Spiritu et Anima* (see Hackett, "Roger Bacon").

64 *Tractatus*, 31: “Aliter tamen dicunt alii, quod scilicet anima rationalis a Deo creat, ista tria in se includit sicut tres potentias et non sicut tres substantias, sicut expresse videtur dicere Auctor *De spiritu et anima*; cui suffragari videtur. . . .”; cf. *De Spiritu et Anima*, 808: “Hanc tripliicem vim animae, id est, sensualem, rationalem et intellectualem, philosophi partes vocaverunt, non integrales, sed virtuales; quia potientiae ejus sunt.”
one soul with various potencies. Pecham also quotes from the same chapter of the
De Spiritu et Anima in his Quaestiones De Anima, this time finding support for his
position that the soul and body are inclined to one another.

Dominicus Gundissalinus is the translator of the Fons Vitae and of Avicenna, and
a main disseminator of the doctrine of universal hylomorphism. Pecham cites
Gundissalinus’ De Unitate et Uno to support the doctrine of universal

65 Tractatus, 40: “Sequitur de intelligentia motiva, quae est voluntas rationalis, quam
quidam dividi non sinunt per concupiscibilem et irascibilem, pro eo quod haec ponuntur
tantum a Philosopho in anima irrationali. Sed huic contrarium est quod dicitur in libro De
anima et spiritu [sic], c. X: ‘Tota animae substantia in his tribus consistit plena atque
perfecta: in rationabilitate, concupiscibilitate et irascibilitate, quasi quadam sua trinitate’.
Et in eodem capitullo, dicit: ‘Potentiae animae sunt: rationabilitas, concupiscibilitas [et
irascibilitas]’” (bracketed item in orig.); cf. De Spiritu et Anima: “Tota namque animae
substantia in his tribus plena et perfecta consistit, id est, in rationalitate, concupiscibilitate
et irascibilitate, quasi quadam sua trinitate; et tota haec trinitas est quaedam animae
unitas, et ipsa anima. . . . Potentiae animae sunt, rationalitas, concupiscibilitas, et
irascibilitas. . . .” (789, bracketed item in orig.).
66 Quaestiones, 390: “[C]oncedo, quoniam anima non immediate corpori unitur, sed sicut
dicit Augustinus, De spiritu et anima, 11 cap.: ‘Sunt quaedam similia, corporis suprema
et spiritus infimum, in quibus sine naturarum confusione, personali unione coniungi
possunt. Similia enim similibus gaudent. Itaque anima quae vere spiritus est, et caro quae
est corpus in suis extremitatibus facile et convenienter uniantur, id est in phantastico
scientiae quod corpus non [est], sed simile corpori et sensualitati carnis quae vere spiritus
est, quia sine anima fieri non potest’” (bracketed item in orig.); cf. De Spiritu et Anima,
789: “Sunt etiam utriusque quaedam similia, corporis scilicet supremum, et spiritus
infimum, in quibus sine naturarum confusione, personali tamen unione facile connecti
possunt. Similia enim similibus gaudent. Itaque anima quae vere spiritus est, et caro quae
vere corpus est, in suis extremitatibus facile et convenienter uniantur, id est, in
phantastico animae, quod corpus non est, sed simile corpori; et sensualitate carnis quae
vere spiritus est, quia sine anima fieri non potest”; Pecham, Quaestiones, 475.
67 See Crowley, Roger Bacon, 82; cf. Houser, “Dominicus Gundissalinus”;
Gundissalinus, The Procession of the World, trans. John A. Laumakis (Milwaukee:
hylomorphism, but attributes it to Boethius, as authors did in the 13th century.

Pecham references ideas that are found in Gundissalinus especially in the *Tractatus’* chapter on the immortality of the soul, including the following points: First, the rational soul is not weakened by understanding and thus does not grow old and die as

---

68 *Tractatus*, 47: “[E]rgo nulla talis potest movere corporaliter; igitur anima neque est corpus neque forma corporalis, sed est substantia spiritualis, ex materia et forma propria constituta, sicut expresse docet Boetius [sic], in libro *De unitate et uno*”; cf. Gundissalinus, *De Unitate*, 1-11. Sullivan comments on Pecham’s use of the *De Unitate* and the *De Spiritu et Anima* of Alcher of Clairvaux (pseudo-Augustine): “In his *Quaestiones tractantes de anima* John Pecham’s position on spiritual matter is similar to that of St. Bonaventure. He takes several arguments positing matter in the human soul from authorities Bonaventure also used, especially *De unitate et uno* and pseudo-Augustine, and gives abbreviated versions of several traditional arguments. The soul separated from the body can be moved, but everything that is per se moved (Pecham takes it for granted that the soul moves itself) is divided into something which is moved and something which moves, which, he claims, can only arise in a composite of matter and form. The soul must have matter because it contains possibility, and possibility is from matter. . . .” (“The Debate,” 142, parenthetical item in orig.).
the body does. Second, The rational soul is the most noble of all forms.

69 Tractatus, 50: “Item virtus, quae operando non lassatur nec diminuitur per usum, agere potest in infinitum. Sed capacitas intellects in recipiendo formas intelligibilis non diminuitur, nec vigor intelligendi minoratur, quia quanto plura intelligit, tanto plura vel melius intelligere potest”; Gundissalinus, De Immoralitate, 5-6, 35: “Amplius. Si essentia intellectus pendet ex corpore, debet, ut confortatio sequatur confortationem et debilitatio debilitationem. Nos autem et contrario totum uidemus, quia debilitatio corporis est in senectute et uigor uirtutis intellectuiae tunc maximus, et intellectus ex omnibus modis suis tunc fortissimus; ex quo manifeste apparat uirtutem intellectuam in senectute iuuenescere. . . . Virtus autem intellectuia sua ipsa duratione proficit et inualescit, ut quanto fuerit diuturnior et antiquior, tanto sit ex omnibus modis suis fortior. Virtus igitur intellectuia immortalis est, et ipsam non solum non posse senescere duratione aut defectui approximare, immo de duratione ipsa eam iuuenescere et a defectu et morte amplius elongari manifestum est. . . . Amplius. Alia diuersitas, quam supra diximus, est inter sensum et intellectum, quia, quanto aliquo fuerint magis sensibilia, tanto magis laedunt sensum; quanto autem uehementius intelligibilia, tanto magis delectant et confortant intellectum. Si igitur ab his passibilis est intellectus, non est nisi confortabilis et delectabilis ab illis. Amplius. Manifestum est, quia, quanto plura et maiora et pluries intelligit uirtus intellectuia, tanto est ad intelligendum expeditior, capacior et fortior; e contrario autem se habet in sensu. Palam ergo, quia non habet finem in operatione sua; ultra finem enim nihil potest quaecunque uirtus. Omnis autem uirtus, quae non habet finem in operatione, non habet finem in tempore. Virtus ergo intellectuia non habet finem in tempore. Omnis enim uirtus infinitae operationis est infiniti temporis; infinita enim operatio non potest perfici in tempore finito. Si ergo uerum est, quod eius operationi non sit finis, ultra quem non extendatur—uerbi gratia, si aliquem numerum intellectorum aut aliquam magnitudinem eorum transire non potest—, quia igitur nullus est ei finis huiusmodi: manifestum est operationi ipsius non esse finem; quare multo fortius neque uirtutis. Si autem uirtus infinita est in operatione naturaliter, multo fortius et in duratione, sicut apparat in uiurtute motiuam, cui, si non esset terminus aut finis in operatione, hoc est in mouendo, nullo modo nec in essendo, nec in durando.”
Third, if there were no eternal life, then there would be no retribution for merits, and injustice would reign. Gundissalinus supports Pecham’s point that man’s highest good occurs through a loving conjunction with God (represented as providing

---

70 Tractatus, 50: “[E]rgo multo fortius aliqua forma spiritualis corpus perficiens. Sed omnium formarum nobilissima est anima rationalis”; cf. Gundissalinus, De Immortalitate, 19: “Amplius. Manifestum est uirtutem istam nobilem aut esse duarum facierum, quarum altera illuminabilis est desuper, a rebus scilicet nobilibus, incorporalibus, scilicet spoliatis a materia et ab appendiciis ipsius, altera illuminabilis a parte inferiori, uidelicet corporalium et sensibilium; aut eadem est uirtus et eadem facies, sed liberum habens uertere se, in quam partem uoluerit, et illuminari siue pungi siue inscribi, a quibus uoluerit. Ad utrumlibet autem se uertat, ad lumen suum et perfectionem suam se uertit. Sed a superiori est nobilior eius perfectio et lumen nobilius. . . . Palam igitur debet esse, quia uirtus ista nobilis non solum non pendet ex corpore, sed etiam obscuratur et impeditur ab ipso et applicatione sui ad illud.”

71 Tractatus, 50: “Item, nihil est irrationabilius quam quod vitium sit libera virtute. Sed si non esset vita aeterna post istam, in qua esset retributio meritorum, liberior esset iniusta, quae nulli subiecta faceret quod vellet, ergo etc.”; Gundissalinus, De Immortalitate, 3: “Propter quod iustitiam creatoris et iudicium futurum radicem probationis immortalitatis animae humanae non nos primi sed ante nos alii posuerunt, si quidem, si anima humana post uitam istam non uiueret, uane hic et frustra deo seruiretur, cum in uita ista dei cultus et religio plurimum sui tormentum habeat et afflictionem, et post uitam istam nulla ist futura eius remuneratio, quia neque uita est animae humanae post uitam istam. Secundum hoc utilius etiam esset animae humanae negare deum omnino et omni uanitati et uoluptati se prostitueret, quam sancte ac iuste uiuere et creatorem debita honorificentia et devotione colere. Si enim curat deus cultores et ueneratores suos, ubi eius potentia, cum nec in uita ista propter hoc sit eis nisi detersus, nec in alia sit eis melius, cum alia non sit futura post istam? Si autem non curat, ubi sapientia eius aut bonitas? Aut enim ignorare, aut non amare uidebitur amatores suos et ueneratores; quorum alterum destruit eius sapientiam, alterum uero bonitatem. Hae est igitur radix, per quam conati sumus aliquando ostendere animae humanae uitam esse post istam. Alia radix erat nobis ipsa dei iustitia, qua posita necesse est futurum esse iudicium, quoniam in hac uita nec malii recipiunt, quod merentur, nec boni, quia et malis hic bene est et bonis male. Vbi [sic] ergo iustitia dei, cum utrique contraria meritis suis recipiant in hac uita, si post uitam istam non est iudicium, quod utique non est, si non uita est post istam?”
a fonte uitae). Pecham expands upon an argument from Gundissalinus to support the view that the soul is immortal.

It is well known that Avicebron’s doctrine of universal hylomorphism “reached the Schools through Gundissalinus’ De Anima.” Yet Callus has shown that in the De Anima of Gundissalinus, there is the influence of not only Avicebron but also

72 Tractatus, 51: “Item, finis hominis est coniunctio immediata cum Deo incommutabili; haec autem coniunctio est per amorem. Igitur cum contrarium contrariae sint causae, sicut coniunctio non est nisi per amorem Summi Boni, sic nec separatio nisi per Summi Boni odium. Sed, si anima in esse deficeret etiam amando Ipsum Bonum, Ipsum perdere posset. Sed hoc est impossibile. Ergo impossibile est animam rationalem in essendo deficere”; cf. Gundissalinus, De Immortalitate, 37-38: “Et hic etiam necesse est ipsum esse immortalem. Si enim quies eius et perfectio ultima in ipsa uita, immo in ipso fonte uitae est, ubi non appropinquat mors neque defectio ulla: manifestum est mentem humanum illuc naturaliter tendere et quiescere, ubi est uitae indefectibilis continuat et nulla morti uel defectioni accessibilitas. . . . omnes cogitationes eius, omnes affectiones in se collegerit et in se traxerit: totaliter illi uiet et totaliter ex illo. Quod exemplo naturalis amoris euidenter appareat, ubi mens amantissimi patris totaliter uiet filio, et totaliter cogitationes et affectiones omnes et operationes etiam forinsecas amor rapit in filium. . . . quoniam uita in apprehensionibus et affectionibus totaliter consistit.”

73 Tractatus, 51: “Item, si anima esse amitteret, aut per mutationem, quae est corruptio naturalis, aut per mutationem, quae est corruptio in nihilum. Primum non potest esse nisi dubous modis: aut quia anima corruptur per corruptionem sui subiecti, aut per corruptionem sui in se. Primum istorum duorum est impossibile, quia, sicut probatum est, anima rationalis non dependet a corpore nec operando nec essendo. Secundum similiter est impossible, quia anima rationalis non componitur ex contrariis nec habet contrarium, nec naturam, quae sit transmutationis subiectum”; cf. Gundissalinus, De Immortalitate, 26-27: “Omne destructibile non est destructibile nisi uno modorum istorum: uidelicet aut diuisione formae suae a materia sua—quod non potest esse nisi aut forma manente, sicut ponimus in homine, qui morte, quae est diuisio formae suae a materia, id est animae a corpore, ita destruitur, quod manet eius forma, hoc est anima ipsa secundum quod nos ponimus; aut destruitur diuisione formae a materia forma ipsa destructa, quae destructio proprie vocatur corruptio—; aut destruitor diuisione partium suarum integralium, quemadmodum domus, cum partes eius ab inuicem separantur, id est ligna et lapides; aut destruitor destructa sustinentis essentia; aut distruietur subtractione causae suae, quemadmodum si dissipato utre uinum deficiat aut destruatur et corpore destructo destruantur ea, quae in eo sunt, aut sole sublato destruatur dies. . . .”

Avicenna, for in this work Gundissalinus surprisingly also supports the unity of the soul and not the plurality of forms.\textsuperscript{75} In other works, however, Gundissalinus affirms the doctrine of plurality of forms and the unity of the soul.\textsuperscript{76}

Pecham had access to the treatise \textit{De Differentia Animae et Spiritus} of Costa Ben Luca (864-923).\textsuperscript{77} Callus writes about the influence of this work:

\begin{quote}
There were, however, other factors which helped to strengthen the pluralist theory. Not least among these was the \textit{De differentia spiritus et animae} [sic] of Costa-ben-Luca, the Constabulinus of the schools. The short treatise exerted no little influence on medieval physiological and psychological thought. From it Gundissalinus in his \textit{De anima} borrowed Plato’s and Aristotle’s definitions of the soul. It helped … to posit an intermediary uniting the soul to the body. The soul is united to the body by means of a corporeal ‘spirit,’ which, inasmuch as it comes forth from the heart, produces life, breath, and beating of the pulse; as proceeding from the brain, it causes sensation and movement. Further, Costa-ben-Luca holds that the three powers of the soul, the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational, are forms and genera of soul, and may at choice be called \textit{animae}.\textsuperscript{78}
\end{quote}

Pecham’s view of the soul differs in some specifics from that of Costa Ben Luca, who writes prior to Avicenna and Averroes, but nonetheless Pecham references the second chapter of \textit{De Differentia Animae et Spiritus} in support of the view that the will is an

\textsuperscript{75} See ibid., 338-355.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 352-355; cf. Gundissalinus, \textit{De Processione Mundi}: “Forma uero prima est substantia constitutum essentiam omnium formarum” (30); ibid., \textit{De Unitate et Uno}: “Quia igitur materia in supremis formata est forma intelligantia, deinde forma rationalis animae, postea vero forma sensibilis animae, deinde inferior forma animae vegetabilis, deinde forma naturae, ad ultimum autem in infimis forma corporis: hoc non accidit ex diversitate virtutinis agentis, sed ex aptitudine materiae suscipientis” (8).
\textsuperscript{77} See Dales, \textit{The Problem of the Rational Soul}, 5-6. John Blund is the first master we know of who wrote a treatise on the soul; on the significance of this work see Hasse, \textit{Avicenna’s De Anima}, 18; Dunne, “Introduction to the New Edition”.
\textsuperscript{78} “Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form,” 272.
organic power insofar as the intellect and cogitation is accomplished through the
spirit in bodily organs.\textsuperscript{79}

In developing his Neoplatonic view of form and matter, Pecham references (either
directly or indirectly) not only these writers, but also four major Franciscan authors
who are also associated with the \textit{Fons Vitae} tradition and whom I will now directly
cite in connection with Pecham: Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle,
Bonaventure, and Roger Bacon. While Pecham is not discussing hylomorphism or the
plurality of forms in each reference to these authors, the sheer abundance of the
references (i.e., on most pages of the \textit{Tractatus}) shows that Pecham is immersed in
the tradition that is characterized by universal hylmorophism. Here, I will briefly
consider each of these authors in turn, and how Pecham uses them.

It will be remembered from the first chapter of the present study that Alexander of
Hales was highly influential in the Franciscan order after already being an established
theatologian at Paris. He taught in the Faculty of Arts at Paris and then in the Faculty of
Theology in the first half of the 13th century.\textsuperscript{80} Pecham contrasts the Christian purity
of Alexander’s teaching with the teaching of those who were introducing

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Quaestiones}, 206: “Item, voluntas est vis organica; ergo potest iuvari per caelum ut
organa. Prima probatur: quia dicitur in libro \textit{De differentia spiritus et animae}: quia
intellectus et cogitatio fit per spiritum qui est in ventriculo”; cf. Costa Ben Luca, \textit{De
Differentia Animae et Spiritus}, 126: “Intellectus vero et cogitatio et providentia et
cognitio fit per spiritum, qui est in ventriculo. . . .”

\textsuperscript{80} See Walter H. Principe, \textit{The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth
“novelties.” Alexander’s view of hylomorphism has been thought to be essentially a restatement of what Augustine says in the *Commentary on Genesis.* But when Pecham makes his most explicit statement of the plurality of forms view, he references Alexander of Hales rather than Augustine:

Sed formarum quaedam sunt quae substentatae in esse non indigent alio, sicut animae humanae, vel ita sunt principia vitae ut etiam vivant a corpore separatae; aliae autem sunt quae, in materia quam vivificant, recipiunt fundamentum existendi et ipsis rependunt complementum vivendi, “in quibus pro certo idem est vivere et vitaem tribuere alteri”, quia simul cum corpore moriuntur et oriuntur a principiis corporis.

---

81 “Quae sit ergo solidior et sanior doctrina, vel filiorum Beati Francisci, sanctae scilicet memoriae fratris Alexandri, ac fratris Bonaventurae et consimilium, qui in suis tractatibus ab omni calumnia alienis sanctis et philosophis innituntur; vel illa novella quasi tota contraria, quae quicquid docet Augustinus de regulis aeternis et luce incommutabili, de potentiis animae, de rationibus seminalibus indicis materiae et consimilibus innumeris, destruat pro viribus et enervat pugnas verborum inferens toti mundo? Videant antiqui in quibuscumque est sapientia, videat et corrigat Deus coeli” (*Registrum*, 3:901).
83 *Tractatus*, 7; cf. Alexander, *Summa*, 2:669: “Quia igitur appetitus vitam non facit in actu, nisi perficiatur, in quibusdam vero non est completus de se, sed aliquo indiget exteriori ut perficiatur, in eis vitam non facit in actu, nisi ei quo indiget coniungatur. Et haec est ratio quare substantia simplex corpori unitur, ut videlicet appetitus suo desiderabili coniungatur et sic in actu vigeat et vita in ea perficiatur. Si enim completus esset in se eiusmod appetitus, nonquam corpori essentialiter uniretur. Per appetitum ergo corpori unitur et inseparabili tertet, nisi sit defectus ex parte corporis, et ut per hoc suo actu coniungatur et vita perficiatur; per appetitum etiam variis motibus movet corpus, ut etiam ipsum perficiat et ipsa perficiatur. Et haec est ratio colligationis animae cum corpore, quamvis haec ratio colligationis multiplex sit et differens in diversis: in quibusdam enim major, in aliis vero minor reperitur vis colligationis. In quibusdam enim quodam modo idem est vivere et vitam alii tribuere.”
When Pecham discusses the option of calling the various powers of the soul “substances,” he evidently references a discussion in Alexander of Hales.\(^8^4\) In this connection, Bieniak has said that, of the many authors she surveys, “only Avicebron clearly maintains the plurality of substances in the soul.”\(^8^5\) Melani, the editor of Pecham’s *Tractatus*, also thinks that Pecham has a text of Alexander’s in mind when discussing the “purified intellect” that is prepared to receive revelations.\(^8^6\)

The early 13th-century Paris philosopher and theologian John of La Rochelle, whose *Summa De Anima* is regarded as the first Franciscan scholastic textbook of psychology,\(^8^7\) develops the substantial unibility theory (which I will discuss in connection with Bonaventure below), and uses the terms “form” and “perfection” interchangeably.\(^8^8\) This can be seen as a prelude to Pecham’s usage of those terms. Pecham often uses principles from John of La Rochelle to support his own positions in the *Tractatus*, particularly in the important discussion of simplicity: “Quia igitur

---


\(^{8^5}\) *The Soul-Body Problem*, 134.

\(^{8^6}\) *Tractatus*, 45-46: “Ad interpretationem non descendunt, elevatum tamen desiderium ducunt non secum sed post se purificatum intellectum et fiunt huius animae revelationes, nec solae deugstantur et soleates”; cf. Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones Disputatae* (Quaracchi: College of St. Bonaventure, 1960), which includes the *quaesitio De raptu Pauli* and its discussion of *Secundum quam potentiam animae raptus fuit Paulus* (1349-1350).


virtutis actus est influere et movere, necesse est virtutem simplicem, non parvitate, sed communicabili unitate, mobili sibi proportionali in ratione moventis, perficiendo influentis, uniri posse, ut tota sit anima in toto et qualibet eius parte.”

Pecham also may find in John of La Rochelle a principle supporting the view that, if there is an incorruptible corporeal form perfecting corporeal matter, there must also be an incorruptible spiritual form perfecting spiritual matter. There are other commonalities between Pecham and John of La Rochelle, on such matters as the

---

89 Tractatus, 29; cf. John of La Rochelle, Summa De Anima, 1.40, de modo unionis. E.g., “Ex anima autem et corpore fit umum secundum substantiam, quod est homo. . . . quae ritur si idem est modus unionis quo unitur anima vegetabilis corporibus plantarum, et ille quo unitur anima sensibilis corporibus animalium, et anima racionalis corporibus hominum. Et cum unio anime racionalis ad corpus humanum sit separabilis, ita quod possit anima manere separata post unionem, aliorum uero unio non est separabilis. . . .”

90 Tractatus, 50: “Item, si aliqua forma corporalis, perficiens materiam corcorporalem [sic], est incorruptible, ergo multo fortius aliqua forma spiritualis corpus perficiens”; cf. John of La Rochelle, Summa De Anima, 1.42. E.g., “Respondeo. Modus essendi anime in corpore est secundum triplicem comparacionem: una est, que est perfectionis ad perfectum. . . . Quedam uero perfectiones sunt, que sunt ita perfectiones tocius quod nullius partis et talis perfectio est anima secundum omnem sui differentiam, scilicet vegetabilis, sensibilis, racionalis. Unde quilibet planta ita est planta quod non aliqua pars eius; ita eciam est de quilibet animali et homine.”

twofold agent intellect,\textsuperscript{91} the independence of the intellectual operation from the body,\textsuperscript{92} the work of angels in human knowledge,\textsuperscript{93} and the sensitive soul.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{91} \textit{Tractatus}, 25: “Et cum, secundum Avicennam, \textit{VI Naturalium}, intellectus in operibus suis non indigeat organo, nisi sicut nauta indiget navi tantum donec perveniatur ad portum, sic secundum ipsum intellectus non indiget organis nisi in acquirendo scientiam”; cf. John of La Rochelle, \textit{Summa De Anima}, 1.43: “Dicto de esse anime in unione ad corpus, et quantum ad esse in corpore, dicendum est de esse ipsius post separationem eiusdem a corpore; de quo querenda sunt quattuor: primo de immortalitate, secundo de passibilitate, tercio de loco, quarto de motu.”

\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Tractatus}, 27-28: “Unde in somniis fiunt frequentuer revelaciones, Deo inspirante in spiratum, inspirante in phantasmatisbus per angelicum ministerium ordinate demonstrante hoc”; cf. John of La Rochelle, \textit{Summa De Anima}, 2.116: “Quia, sicut dicit beatus Dionysius, manifestatores sunt angeli omnes; et eciam ad ipsos pertinent revelationes, ut patet ex Apocalypsi et Daniele. Sed constans est quod huiusmodi manifestatio non sit viurtitii sensitiue, que est per angelos; fit ergo viurtite intellectiiua, sed non nisi per irradiaicionem. . . . Non erit ergo diuina intelligencia intellectus agens respectu anime. Sed cum proporcio sit lucis intelligencia angelica ad uisum intellectus humani, et in proporcionali luce est uidere, erit igitur intelligencia angelica intellectus agens respectu intellectus humani possibilis.”

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Tractatus}, 33, 34. In this chapter (part two, chapter 10) Pecham follows the structure presented by John of La Rochelle in \textit{Summa De Anima}, 2.85: “Consequenter est dicere de ui sensibili que subdiiuiditur primo per cognitiuam et motiuam. Et cognitiua siue apprehensiua duplex est. . . .”; ibid., 2.87: “Apprehensiua uero exterior multiplicatur per quinque, scilicet per uiurtutem uisium, auditiuam, ofactiuam, gustatiuam, tactiuam, secundum quas sunt quinque sensus. . . .”; ibid., 2.103: “Dicto de uiribus sensitiuis apprehensiuuis, dicendum est de motiuis. Virtus autem motiuia sensibilis est duobus modis: nam quedam est motiuia modo naturali, quedam uero modo animali; et motiuiam sensibilem modo naturali dico que nec mouet secundum apprehensionem, nec est subiecta imperio racionis, qualis est uirius uitalis siue pulsatiua. Est autem hec uis in corde siue in organo; et est uis per inspiracionem et respiracionem, principium existens contemperancie caloris cordis et corporis.”
In Pecham’s critical statement about the defense of Augustinian doctrines, he mentions Bonaventure alongside Alexander of Hales. Although Pecham infrequently cites Bonaventure directly, one can see connections between Pecham, Bacon, and Bonaventure particularly concerning the connection between the rational soul and the body, the individuation of the human person, and spiritual matter. And according to Bonaventure, the rational soul’s principle of unibility or disposition (or appetite) for union with body (along with the body’s own unibility) facilitates individuation: “[U]nibility explains how the immaterial human soul is one substance with its body, just as a form is one substance with its matter.” The same could be said about Pecham’s view of the connection between soul and body. It also is plausible that Pecham adopted his account of individuation along the lines of Bonaventure’s view. I will address these issues further in a later section of the present chapter.

Roger Bacon heavily influenced Pecham, as has already been seen in the context of natural philosophy (see chapter three of the present study). Lindberg has placed the

---

95 “Quae sit ergo solidior et sanior doctrina, vel filiorum Beati Francisci, sanctae scilicet memoriae fratri Alexandre, ac fratri Bonaventurae et consimilium, qui in suis tractatibus ab omni calumnia alienis sanctis et philosophis innituntur; vel illa novella quasi tota contraria, quae quicquid docet Augustinus de regulis aeternis et luce incommutabili, de potentii animae, de rationibus seminalibus inditis materiae et consimilibus innumeris, destruat pro viribus et enervat pugnas verborum inferens toti mundo? Videant antiqui in quibus est sapientia, videat et corrigat Deus coeli” (*Registrum*, 3:901).

96 Osborne, “Unibilitas,” 229; cf. Bonaventure: “[U]nibilitas sive aptitudo uniendi cum corpore non est animae accidentalis, sed est ipsi animae essentialis, et ita non potest ab ea separari vel circumscribi, salva ipsius natura” (*In Sententiarum*, 3.5.2.3). For a review of Bacon’s theory of individuation, see Hackett, “Roger Bacon (b. ca. 1214/20; d. 1292),” *Individuation in Scholasticism*, 117-140.
If we are to judge by the early writings of Roger Bacon, the influence of the doctrines of the *Fons Vitae* must have made itself strongly felt in the faculty of arts at Paris in the first half of the thirteenth century. Bacon is a staunch supporter of universal hylomorphism. To determine to what extent his teaching was influenced by Avicebron and Gundissalinus, it is necessary to sketch the arguments he brings forward in support of his thesis. . . . Gundissalinus it was who first introduced universal hylomorphism in an attempt to associate Aristotelianism and Arabic neo-Platonism in explaining in a manner acceptable to Christians the origin of things. But behind the *De Processione Mundi* of Gundissalinus, there is the *Fons Vitae* of Avicebron. . . . The authors that contributed most to the foundation of Bacon’s theory were Aristotle, Avicebron and Gundissalinus. There is no trace of any appeal to the authority of St. Augustine, though Bacon’s conception of the *potentia activa* in matter does not differ greatly from the *rationes seminales* theory of the Augustinians.98

Furthermore, Jeremiah Hackett has recently argued that the abundance of similarities between Bacon and Pecham justifies speaking of a Bacon-Pecham research program, although he also notes that there are differences between Bacon and Pecham.99

---

97 *Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature*: “We must concentrate our attention … on that aspect of the medieval philosophy of light that would be seized by Bacon and made a pillar of his new science—namely, the Plotinian doctrine of emanation. . . . [I]f we look for the doctrine of emanation in sources that were eventually translated into Latin and in forms that might have influenced Bacon’s *De multiplicatione specierum*, another work stands out—the *Fons vitae* of the Spanish Jew (who wrote in Arabic) Avicebron. . . . Bacon’s Aristotelianism was heavily Neoplatonized—and, of course, modified according to the necessities of Christian theology. Among the doctrines that Bacon took from the Neoplatonic tradition were the divine illumination of the intellect, universal hylomorphism, the plurality of forms (properly qualified), and the separability of the soul” (xliii, xlvi, liv, parenthetical items in orig.).

98 Crowley, *Roger Bacon*, 82, 90, 199.

Before leaving this point about Pecham’s influences, it should be noted that Philip the Chancellor is the immediate channel through which speculation about intermediate elements between the rational soul and the body came to the Franciscans in the late 13th century.\textsuperscript{100} While Pecham does not cite Philip directly, Pecham does discuss in some depth topics which Philip also dealt—\textsuperscript{101}—in particular the topic

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{100} See Bieniak, \textit{The Soul-Body Problem}, 119.
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\end{flushleft}
of the so-called animal spirits and the *forma corporeitatis*. This is important because Philip was himself aware of the *Fons Vitae*.

(4) The fourth reason why the scarcity of direct Pechamian citations of the *Fons Vitae* does not mean that Pecham was not influenced heavily by the *Fons Vitae*:

102 Philip the Chancellor, *Philippi Cancellarii Summa de bono*, ed. Nicolas Wicki, 2 vols. (Berne: Francke, 1985), 1:284, 286-287: “[A]nima secundum quid unitur per modum forme, secundum quid per modum substantie; utrique enim est proportionalis. Quod autem opponitur quod forma uniter se ipsa, quare anima se ipsa, secundum hoc dicendum est quod sunt quedam forme prime, quedam ultime, quedam medie. Prime forme cum prime sint, absque medio materie coniunguntur, ut est corporeitas. Ultime forme per medium coniunguntur, et quia ultime non sunt media neque dispositiones materiales ad aliarum coniunctionem. Ultima autem forma naturalium est anima. Medie autem et per medium coniunguntur quandoque et quandoque sunt media et quasi materiales dispositiones; verbi gratia potentia sensibilis per medium coniungitur suo subiecto, scilicet mediante ut dispositione materiali potentia vegetabili; et hoc quando est ultima perfectio. Quandoque autem ipsa eadem in nobiliori subiecto est medium et quasi dispositio materialis, scilicet comparatione anime intellecutive. . . . licet sit ut forma, non tamen per se corpori necesse est coniungi. . . . Item, ex parte corporis similiter inveniuntur dispositiones, que habent convenientiam cum anima rationali. Est enim quoddam corpus simplex, incorruptibile, et quoddam simplex et corruptibile. Simplex et incorruptibile corpus superceleste, quod numquam ab huiusmodi operatione seu generatione separatur. . . . Corpus vero simplex et corruptibile elementum. Exiguntur ergo ad coniunctionem anime rationalis cum corpore anima sensibilis et anima vegetabilis et iterum spiritus, qui est a natura corporis superioris, et calor elementalis. Scieiendum autem quod spiritus triplex est. Est enim quidam animalis, et hic est in cerebro; et est spiritus vitalis, et hic est in corde; et iterum spiritus / naturalis, et hic est in epate. Et cum sint huiusmodi spiritus, ut dictum est iam, a natura corporis supercelestis, quemadmodum corpus superceleste continue movetur, sic et per virtutem spirituum in istis membris principalibus est motus indeficiens et continuus.”

103 “Philip the Chancellor’s *Summa de Bono* reveals the steadily-growing penetration into the West of the philosophy particularly of Aristotle and Avicenna. Although Avicenna is not named, he is an important influence and indeed probably the main channel for Philip’s knowledge of Aristotle; however, Philip also knew Aristotle directly and he quite regularly quotes or refers to most of the Stagirite’s works. The Chancellor appears to have had some acquaintance, whether directly or indirectly, with the thought of Avicebron and of the *Liber de Causis*; Averroes, too, is mentioned at least three times. . . .” (Principe, *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union*, 4:25); cf. Leo W. Keeler, *Ex Summa Philippi Cancellarii Quaestiones de Anima*, Series Scholastica 20 (Münster: Ashendorff, 1937).
Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas recognized Avicebron as a primary source of the doctrines of hylomorphism and plurality of forms, and thus saw Avicebron’s philosophy as a serious problem. Albertus Magnus wrote in opposition to the *Fons Vitae* a number of times.\footnote{“Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,” 248ff.; cf. Albertus, *De Causis*, in *Opera Omnia*, ed. Winfrid Fauser (Aschendorff, 1993), 1.1.5-6. There are two chapters, titled *De opinione Avicebron in libro Fontis vitae* and *De improbatione opinionis Avicebron*, containing an extended argument against Avicebron; see also *Metaphisica Libros I-V*, *Opera Omnia Alberti Magni*, ed. Bernhard Geyer (Aschendorff, 1960), 3.2.10: “Non ignoro autem Avicebron in *Libro Fontis Vitae* istam videri solvere quaeestionem dicendo [quod] ea quae principia sunt et elementa, sicut forma et materia prima, quidem esse eadem omnium proxima aut non esse eadem. Et primam quidem materiam vocat, in qua primae inveniuntur materialis principii proprietates, quae sunt sustinere, recipere, substare, fundamentum esse sive fundare, individuare, participare et huiusmodi, et hanc dicit eadem esse tam corporalium quam spiritualium et tam corruptibilium quam incorruptibilium. Proximam autem esse determinatam forma substantiali secundum gradus ipsius, qui sunt esse, vivere, sentire et intelligere, et determinatam cum forma substantiali aptitudine per tres diametros orthogonaliter se secantes, et hanc secundum suos gradus esse materiam corporum omnium. Et determinatam tertio loco per qualitates primas activas et passivas, et hanc secundum suos gradus dicit esse physicorum transmutabilium materiam. Quid autem istam materiam faciat diversitatem, non dicit. Similiter intendit dicere de principio et elemento, quod est forma. Hoc enim lumen est intelligentiae, sicut saepissime diximus. Et gradus accipimus secundum lumen intelligentiae purum, et secundum lumen intelligentiae, virtuti corporis, quod eius instrumentum est, permixtum. Et tunc secundum gradus illius diversificatur. Quoniam si virtus corporis non determinatur nisi situ, erit forma corporis, et si determinatur etiam qualitate, efficitur forma physici transmutabilis. Et sic unam primam formam ponit in omnibus, et fere tendit hoc ad positionem Platonis. . . . Opinio autem Aristotelis est, quod principium movens idem sit, et cum motus sit actus moventis primi et instrumentum, et motor moveat ad formam, quam habet in seipso, quod forma, quae est in materia potentia” (bracketed item in orig.).} For example, in Albertus Magnus’ discussion of the errors
of Platonizing Stoic philosophers in his *Metaphysica*, he singles out the “strange position” of Avicebron concerning being.\(^{105}\) Weisheipl writes on this issue:

> Neither Albertus Magnus nor Thomas Aquinas could find anything favorable to say about Avicebron’s *Fons vitae*, although clearly both had read the entire Latin translation. . . . Albertus Magnus, who seems to have made a progressive study of the work from his Parisian days in the mid-1240s until his paraphrase of *De causis* (before 1271), found the entire work too “fallacious,” “improbable,” and “ridiculous” to have been written by any serious philosopher at all, but a huge joke perpetrated by undergraduates on an unsuspecting public.\(^{106}\)

As Weisheipl notes, the particular focus on Avicebron by Albertus shows that the doctrine of the *Fons Vitae* was a real problem for Albertus and his contemporaries.\(^{107}\)

\(^{105}\) **Albertus, Metaphysica Libros VI-XIII**, ed. Geyer (Aschendorff, 1964), 11.2.15: “Patet autem in hoc error libri Avicebron, qui ponit omne illud quod recipit formam, materiam existere et materiam esse materiam a potentia recipiendi formam. Materiam autem minoris et artioris potentiae effici per formarum receptionem et eam quae recipit formam, quae est intellectualitas, non esse tam amplae receptionis sicut prius, et ideo intelligentiam dicit esse non tot et talium formarum receptivam sicut materiam, habere tamen intelligentiam materiam sicut subjectum sui, a quo si abstrahatur vel removeatur forma intellectualitatis, dicit relinqui material primam. Et iste est error ex maxima philosophiae ignorantia proveniens, quia si intelligentia dicit materiam, tunc non potest probari, quod aliqua substantia secundum esse sit a materia separata.”

\(^{106}\) “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,” 248-249, parenthetical item in orig.

\(^{107}\) Ibid., 257-258.
In Albertus’ commentary on the *Liber De Causis*, he makes an extended argument against Avicebron’s position.\(^{108}\)

As C.M.J. Vansteenkiste has pointed out, Aquinas references Avicebron no fewer than 20 times.\(^{109}\) In Aquinas’s *Treatise on Separate Substances*, he devotes four chapters to refuting Avicebron’s positions about matter.\(^{110}\) Aquinas saw Avicebron as a proponent of the Platonist dualism which he opposed: “Avicebron maintained in the book, *The Source of Life*, that no body is active, but that the power of spiritual substance, passing through bodies, does the actions, which seem to be done by bodies.”\(^{111}\) Here are samples of Aquinas’s writing against Avicebron concerning the plurality of forms:

---

\(^{108}\) *De Causis*, 1.1.5 is titled *De opinione Avicebron in libro Fontis vitae*, and 1.1.6 is titled *De improbatione opinionis Avicebron*. In 1.1.6, Albertus gives five *rationes potissime* for the falsity of Avicebron’s view: (1) “[Q]uia imperfecta est. Non enim dicit, unde ortum habeat materia, quae quamvis per generationem et corruptionem non producatur in esse, tamen aliquo modo habet esse et sic vel erit principium vel ex principio”; (2) “[Q]uod prima materia incompletissima est omnium materiarum eo quod potentia est ad omnia nihil actu existens”; (3) “[Q]uod intelligi non potest, quod potentia exiens ad actum sine motu perveniat ad ipsum, cum ‘motus non sit nisi actus existentis in potentia’”; (4) “[Q]uod id quod plus et quod plura est in potentia, non uno motu sed pluribus paticipat bonitatem primi”; (5) “[Q]uod contra omnem philosophiam est, quod dicit primum agere voluntate.”


\(^{111}\) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, trans. Vernon J. Bourke, University of Notre Dame Press ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 3.69. It is a question as to whether the *Fons Vitae* teaches this, but one can see how Aquinas might have thought that it does (*Fons Vitae*, 40: “Omnis auctor, excepto primo auctore, in suo opere indiget subiecto quod sit susceptibile suae actionis. infra uero hanc substantiam non est substantia quae sit receptibilis suae actionis, quia haec substantia est ultimum esse et eius finis infimus, et est quasi centrum ad ceteras substantias intelligibiles.—Et etiam, quia quantitas quae circumdat hanc substantiam est causa uetans eam ne agat.”)
• “Some say that matter exists in every created substance and that the matter of all things is alike. The originator of this position seems to be Avicebron, who wrote the Liber fontis vitae, which many people follow.”\textsuperscript{112}

• In Aquinas’s \textit{A Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima}, in the chapter on “How substantial forms actualize beings,” Aquinas writes: “On this basis we can eliminate Avicebron’s position in his book \textit{The Fountain of Life}. He claimed that parallel to the order of genera and species is an order of multiple substantial forms in one and the same thing—e.g., that in this particular human being is one form through which he is a substance, another through which he is a body, a third through which he is a living body, and so forth. But, in keeping with the above discussion, we must say that it is one and the same substantial form through which this particular thing is an individual or a substance and also through which it is a body, a living body, and so forth.”\textsuperscript{113}

• An objection in Aquinas’s \textit{Summa Theologiae} says, “Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its work a subject susceptible of its action. But ‘there is no substance below the corporeal substance which can be receptive of the latter’s action, since it belongs to the lowest degree in beings.’ Therefore corporeal substance is not active.” Aquinas is quoting, more or less verbatim, from Avicebron here.\textsuperscript{114}

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{112} \textit{In Quattuor Libros Sententiarium}, S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia 1 (Stuttgart: Bad Cannstatt, 1980), 2.3.1.1: “Quidam enim dicunt quod “in omni substantia creata est materia, et quia omnium est materia una; et hujus positionis auctor videtur avicebron, qui fecit librum fontis vitae, quem multi sequuntur”; translation by Weisheipl, “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,” 254.
\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Trans. Robert Pasnau} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 124.
\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Summa Theologiae}, 1.115.1; cf. Avicebron, \textit{Fons Vitae}, 40: “Omnis auctor, excepto primo auctore, in suo opere indiget subiecto quod sit susceptibile suae actionis. infra uero hanc substantiam non est substantia quae sit receptibilis suae actionis, quia haec substantia est ultimum esse et eius finis infimus, et est quasi centrum ad ceteras substantias intelligibles.—Et etiam, quia quantitas quae circumdat hanc substantiam est causa uetans eam ne agat.”
\end{flushright}
Quotations such as these, which occur often in Aquinas’s work, show that Aquinas considered Avicebron as a prominent influence during the age of pluralists such as Pecham.115

Part 3: A Reading of Pecham’s *Tractatus* in Comparison with the *Fons Vitae*

A reading of Pecham’s *Tractatus* in comparison with the *Fons Vitae* yields a high number of similarities between the two works.

Avicebron discusses at length the causal hierarchy whereby the plurality of forms operate upon one another:

Now the simple substance [e.g., the soul] is the cause of the compound substance. Therefore all the designs and the figures that appear in the compound substance are impressed [inflicatum] therein by the simple substance. Then to this proposition I add. . . . All that is impressed [inflicatum] by one thing in another thing exists in the thing that impresses it.116


116 *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck, 50, bracketed items added; cf. *Fons Vitae*: “[E]t substantia simplex causa est compositae. ergo quicquid lineamentorum et figurarum apparat in substantia composita, inflicatum est a substantia simplici. deinde huic addam hanc: quicquid inflicatum est ab aliquo in aliud, est in in infligente illud” (121-122).
Avicenon explains that it is the form that does the impressing\textsuperscript{117} and gives some detail about how the impression (impressionem\textsuperscript{118}) works: The motions associated with each aspect of the soul (vegetative, sensitive, and rational) are due to the impressions of forms and in fact come from one another hierarchically, the rational soul being the source for the rest of the forms in the human being.\textsuperscript{119}

Form itself is diffused among all those things that exist, on Avicenon’s view.

Lindberg has described this process:

All substances emanate their forms in imitation of the First Author. This emanation, Avicenon argues, does not involve flow of the substance’s essence, but simply of its force (vis) or ray (radius). . . . And he insists that whatever ‘emanates from something is the image of the thing from which it emanates.’

Avicenon’s chief concern is with emanation from simple substances, and within that context he argues repeatedly that emanation is from superior to inferior: ‘so every simple substance extends its ray and its light and spreads them on that which is inferior.’\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 53; cf. Fons Vitae: “Dicam quod proprietates substantiae simplicis et impressiones sunt in forma quae sustinetur in substantia composita” (124). “Every effect is composed in relation to its cause. And if the corporeal forms are the effects of spiritual forms, it is necessary that they should be compound. Now they are compound. Therefore they are the effects of spiritual forms” (Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 46); cf. Fons Vitae: “Omne causatum compositum est comparatione suae causae. sed si formae corporales fuerint causatae ex formis spiritualibus, debet ut sint compositae. sed compositae sunt. ergo causatae sunt ex formis spiritualibus” (118).

\textsuperscript{118} Pecham uses impressionem, whereas Avicenon uses inflictum. I do not believe that Pecham intends to convey a different idea, because infligo can carry the idea of “imposing upon” (Charlton Lewis, et al., A Latin Dictionary Founded on Andrews’ Edition of Freund’s Latin Dictionary, rev. ed. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956]), which is the concept Pecham conveys in the context.

\textsuperscript{119} Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 105-107. Avicenon also says that the form that all things share is the form of being (Fountain of Life, 97). To my knowledge Pecham does not discuss a form of being as such, but a form such as this could fit within his anthropology.

While the First Author is characterized by no form, every intermediary between the First Author and the human does have a form, and the human being itself must have a plurality of forms because of its involvement with corporeal matter.121 “The forms are simple. Now the simple is anterior to the compound. Therefore the forms are anterior to that which is composed of them.”122 The human being, the result of the diffusion of form, has a high degree of imperfection.123 Since both Pecham and Avicebron use sunlight as a metaphor for emanation,124 perhaps the best way to conceptualize this is by thinking of the diffusion and weakening of light the more distant it is from its source: “[T]he essences of each of these substances are finite and limited ... their rays emanate from them and cross their boundaries and their limits. . . . Just as that, from the sun, is diffused in the air. . . .”125 Similarly, Pecham says that the divine light is most simple and is most remote from human cognition (although it is the cause of human cognition).126 Pessin explains:

[A]s part of the great chain of being, any given existent is saturated through with the reality of the hypostases Soul and Intellect: in this sense, each

121 See Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 47-48.
122 Ibid., 47; cf. Fons Vitae: “Formae sunt simplices. et simplex prius est composito. ergo formae priores sunt his quae componuntur ex eis” (119).
123 “Formae corporales quae sunt infusae in substantia, unitae sunt cum illa. et omnia unita singula non habent tantum uirtutis et perfectionis, quantum forma simplex per se. ergo forma quae est infusa in substantia non est uirtute tanta et perfectione, quanta est forma simplex per se” (Fons Vitae, 119).
124 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 36, 49; cf. Fons Vitae: “[E]t in hoc accipe exemplum a sole qui se non fecit effluentem per se, necdantem radios suos nisi propter hanc causam quod cadit sub prima influxione et oboedit illi” (108); Pecham, Quaestiones, 383.
125 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 120; cf. ibid., 36, 41; Fons Vitae: “essentiae uniuscuiusque harum substantiarum finitae sunt et terminatae ... radii earum fluunt ab illis et excedunt terminos suos et limites. . . . sicut lumen quod effluit a sole in arem. . . . (196).”
126 Quaestiones, 399.
existent has a number of essences, corresponding to the various layers (for Ibn Gabirol, “form+matter” spiritual simples) in the great chain of being.\textsuperscript{127}

The chain of being in Avicebron includes an indefinitely long progression of form-matter composites, the matter of which can be grouped into the following categories, proceeding from most to least simple: general corporeal matter, general celestial matter, general natural matter, particular natural matter, individual matter, and first or prime matter (each is spiritually specified by its form).\textsuperscript{128} The form-matter composites in the chain of being include intellect, soul, celestial bodies, terrestrial bodies, etc.\textsuperscript{129} According to Avicebron, simple substances communicate themselves to other substances. A whole substance (consisting of form and matter) confers its form to another substance (consisting of form and matter) which is in the mode of receiving

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{127} “Solomon Ibn Gabirol,” parenthetical item in orig.
\textsuperscript{128} Rudavsky, “Solomon Ibn Gabirol,” 251; cf. Avicebron, \textit{Fountain of Life}, Jacob, 30-32. The concept of matter is complicated also in Roger Bacon, as a forthcoming study on matter in Bacon’s \textit{Communia naturalium} by Michela Pereira will demonstrate (“Materia naturalis”). For the later Bacon, “(1) Matter is the subject of action as when we say that wood is the matter for the action of the carpenter. (2) In the proper sense of the term, matter is that which, with form, constitutes the composite, as in the case of every created substance. (3) Matter is the subject of generation and corruption and has the property of being an incomplete and imperfect thing in potency to being a complete thing. (4) Matter is the subject of alteration since it receives contrary accidents. (5) Matter can be considered as an individual in relation to the universal, the latter being founded in its individual as in a material principle. (6) Matter is the name for that which is gross, as when we say that earth has more matter than fire” (Hackett, “Roger Bacon,” parenthetical items in orig.).
\end{flushright}
form. Eventually the spiritual substances extend themselves in the extreme and corporeality results. Thus the heavens are an example of “substance which supports the categories”. A substance which supports the nine categories is at “the end of things” or at the extreme of emanation from the First Author. It is “a species with differences, properties, and accidents. . . . [T]he substance that supports the categories differs from other species comprised in the same genus.”

Like Avicebron, Pecham sees a process of causal emanation that results in the soul impressing itself onto matter. Pecham’s doctrine may be also read as an adaptation

---

130 *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck, 13; cf. *Fons Vitae*: “[Sed] Quicquid est quod totum recipit aliquid alid ex alio sine medio alio ab ipso, ipsum est receptibilius illius quam si illud reciperet cum aliqquo medio” (85, bracketed item in orig.); ibid., 12: “[N]ostra intentio fuit speculari de materia uniuersali et forma uniuersali, dicendum nobis est quod id quod est compositum ex materia et forma diuiditur in duo, quorum unum est substantia corporea composita, alid substantia spiritualis simplex. . . .”

131 *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck, 118; cf. *Fons Vitae*: “[E]t sicut anima uniuersalis non coniungitur corporibus nisi per medium caeli quod est medium inter corporalia et spiritualia: similler manifestatur per hoc etiam quod inter substantiam sustinentem praedicamenta et factorem primum sunt substantiae mediae” (194).

132 *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck, 2-3; cf. *Fons Vitae*: “[E]t substantia quae sustinet nouem praedicamenta est ultimo rerum” (75).

133 *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck, 5; cf. *Fons Vitae*: “Substantia quae sustinet praedicamenta est species cum differentiis, propris et accidentibus. . . . substantia quae sustinet praedicamenta differt ab alia specie contenta sub eodem genere communi utrisque” (77).

134 *Tractatus*, 4; *Quaestiones*, 349: “Ad decimum quartum dicendum quod est forma corporis per essentiam ut imprimentem, essentiae ut impressam”; ibid., 410: “Ad octavum dicendum quod lux divina est omnium forma exemplaris et quasi efficiens imprimens omnibus suam similitudinem, sicut sigillum imprimit formam suam cerae”; cf. *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck: “Do you not see that the correlations that I point out to you or the opposition that there is between the forms of the compound substance and the forms of the simple substance prove that the forms of the compound substance emanate from the forms of the simple substance?” (71); cf. *Fons Vitae*: “[N]onne enim uides ex his secundariis quae dixi tibi, id est ex oppositione quae est inter formas substantiae compositae et formas substantiae simplicis, significari quod formae substantiae compositae defluxae sunt a formis substantiae simplicis?” (144).
of Roger Bacon’s species doctrine in the *De Multiplicatione Specierum*, where ‘species’ “denotes the likeness of any object, emanating from the object. . . . it is the force or power by which any object acts on its surroundings.”\(^{135}\) Pecham discusses at length the first act of form which is a kind of force (*vigor*) toward the completion of the substance’s potential.\(^{136}\) Concerning the human being in particular, Pecham adds that the body, and especially its blood, constitute a disposition toward the impression.\(^{137}\)

Avicebron and Gundissalinus also use the language of force (*vis*) to describe emanation of form:\(^{138}\) “The emanation comes from the impulsion: and the impulsion comes from the force. . . . all the more necessary . . . that the spiritual substance, which

---

\(^{135}\) Lindberg, introduction to *Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature*, Iv.

\(^{136}\) *Tractatus*, 6ff., e.g., “Ad huius intelligentiam considera, quia sicut dicit Auctor *Fontis vitae*: vita est primus actus formae. Certum est quod non cuiumcumque formae, sed illius quae ex se ordinabilis est et potest perficere ad sui complementum. Actus enim formae elementaris vita non est, quoniam nec supra formam elementarem aliquid est, quod requiratur ad speciem elementi, nec infra aliquid quod speciei sufficiat, sed in rebus viventibus vigor est continuus et ex vigore oriens appetitus excitans et promovens rem viventem ad consequendum sui complementum. Vita igitur est, sicut bene dicunt quidam: ‘Actualitas vigoris a Creator inditi creaturis, per quem ad sui complementum efficaciter ordinatur et ipso obtento in eo quietantur’” (6-7).

\(^{137}\) *Tractatus*, 4: “In corpore autem dispositio ad hanc impressionem fit et calore et humore, qui in sanguine regnant. . . .”

\(^{138}\) Pecham and Avicebron use two different Latin words, but either can be translated “force” (see Lewis, *Latin Dictionary*). The context suggests that this identical translation is suitable; a case can be made that Pecham’s argument in the first two chapters of the *Tractatus* would have been better served by Avicebron’s word.
is exempt from all quantity, should emanate its essence and its force and its light.”

It is plausible that Pecham identifies a substance’s life force with the force of the emanation it has received from a higher substance, given that Pecham says the life of the soul “overflows” into the body. Pecham also relates emanation to knowledge, saying that there are purely intellectual impressions whereby knowledge is conveyed from God or a spiritual intermediary onto the human mind. This idea could easily have been based on a principle in Avicebron, namely that knowledge occurs by the uniting of one form with another in the soul, without corpororeal matter: “The intelligence and the soul conceive knowledge from the forms of things. . . . [T]heir knowledge of the forms of things is due to the union of their form with the forms of things. . . . forms are in [the soul] without their matter.” If knowledge is accounted for as a form-to-form relationship, then it is perfectly reasonable to think of forms as

---

139 *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck, 38; cf. *Fons Vitae*: “Effluxio est ex impulso; impulsus autem ex ui. . . . quanto magis necessarium est secundum hanc considerationem ut substantia spiritualis, quae immunis est a quantitate. sit effluens suam essentiam et uirtutem et lumen suum” (109, 110); Gundissalinus, *De Processione Mundi*: “Primaria causa est cause efficiens, quoniam ui propria mouet. . . .” (17). Gundissalinus also uses “virtus” and “potentiae,” which Laumakis translates as “power” in *The Procession of the World*, 46; cf. *De Processione Mundi*: “Omnis uero motus est in opere eius, quemadmodum virtus in auctore quidem semper eas componens et resolvent. . . . Quamuis autem indivisibilia sint opera trinitatis, tamen creatio materia ex quaomnia, potentiae, creatio uero formae, per quam omnia, sapientiae, coniunctio uero utriusque connexioni congrue attribuitur, ut etiam in primis suis operibus signaculum trinitatis inueniatur” (18-19, 48).

140 *Tractatus*, 4.

141 Ibid., 28.

142 *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck, 61, bracketed item added; cf. *Fons Vitae*: “Intelligentia et anima concipiunt scientiam ex formis rerum. . . . scientia earum de formis rerum est ex unitione suarum formarum cum formis rerum. . . . Res sensibilis sunt in anima simpliciter, hoc est, quia formae earum sunt in illa sine suis materiis. similiter formae rerum sunt in intelligentia simplicius et communiori esse” (133).
being contributed from an immaterial source. Pecham refers to God and to God’s eternal light as the separate agent intellect; the rays that come from God make it possible for humans to know.143

Universal hylomorphism is based on the Aristotelian idea that matter is the principle of continuity in change. As seen in earlier chapters of the present study, Pecham takes the position that any changeable substance must have a material component, even if its matter is spiritual rather than corporeal, as in the case of the separated substances; Bonaventure takes the same position.144 Universal hylomorphism is discussed in some detail in the Fons Vitae, and in connection with the universal form and the universal matter. Thus there is no question that the First Author actually produced something analogous to “prime matter,” but this is not Aristotelian prime matter.145 The second book of the Fons Vitae deals with the “universal material substance.”146

---

144 See Cullen, Bonaventure, 44-45.
145 Pessin, “Solomon Ibn Gabirol”: “[W]e need to keep in mind that whatever Ibn Gabirol is talking about is not best thought of as Aristotelian prime matter (which is what many readers undoubtedly overtly or covertly think of when they hear the term ‘prime matter’...). First of all, Ibn Gabirol's pure matter is part of an overtly Neoplatonic worldview which, contra Aristotle, privileges spiritual/intelligible substances over sensible/corporeal reality, and which, contra Aristotle and Plato, emphasizes the emanation of the sensible realm from the spiritual realm. Further emphasizing that we are not talking of Aristotelian prime matter is the fact that Ibn Gabirol's use of the Arabic term al-ʿunsur (literally ‘the element,’ and translated by the 13th century Hebrew editor as “yesōd” [foundation]) expressly mirrors a Ps. Empedoclean tradition of a spiritual matter (called al-ʿunsur) immediately outside of God. For these reasons, it is important to avoid Aristotelian resonances when constructing Ibn Gabirol's ontology, and as such, one ought use the term First Matter over ‘prime matter’” (parenthetical items in orig., emp. added).
146 Fountain of Life, Jacob, 27ff.
If the particular form borne by the particular matter subsists in the
substance of the particular soul divested of the matter that it bears, it is also
necessary that the universal form borne by the universal matter, that is, the
form borne by the compound substance, should be borne by the substance of
the universal soul divested of the universal matter, that is, of the compound
substance that bears it. The same assertion must be made of the forms of the
universal soul borne by the substance that is superior to it, until the primal
substance is reached that bears all things: for the case of the universal form is
the same as the particular form.

If everything has a spiritual matter and a spiritual form, it is necessary that
they should exist in everything: and if they exist in everything it is necessary
that there should be in each corporeal substance a spiritual matter and in each
corporeal form a spiritual form. . . . The corporeal forms emanate from the
spiritual forms.\textsuperscript{147}

Avicebron explains that universal form and matter are the exclusive products of
divine creation and that universal matter is the recipient of the action of universal
form:

\begin{quote}
[I]t is necessary that the universal form, made by this power, should also act
by itself. It is therefore a maker and an agent. Similarly it is also necessary
that the first universal matter should receive the action by itself. . . . The
universal form acts necessarily.\textsuperscript{148}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Fountain of Life}, Wedeck, 63; cf. ibid., 71, 127-128; \textit{Fons Vitae}: “Si forma particularis sustentata in materia particulari fuerit subsistens in substantia animae particularis expoliatia a materia quae eam sustinet, debet etiam ut forma uniuersalis quae sustinetur in materia uniuersali, scilicet forma quae sustinetur in substantia composita, sit sustentata in substantia animae uniuersalis expoliatia a materia uniuersali, hoc est substantia composita quae eam sustinet. similter dicendum est de formis animae uniuersalis quae sustinetur in alia substantia quae est altior illa, donec perueniatur ad substantiam primam quae omnia sustnet; quia si forma particularis sic est, etiam forma uniuersalis similter erit. Si omni est materia spiritualis et foma spiritualis, debet ut haec inueniantur in omni; et si fuerint inuenta in omni, debet ut sit in unaquaque substantia corporali materia spiritualis, et in unaquaque forma corporali forma spiritualis. . . . Formae corporales defluxae sunt a spiritualibus formis. . . .” (135, 136).
\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Fountain of Life}, Wedeck, 35; cf. \textit{Fons Vitae}: “[N]ecessae est ut forma uniuersalis facta ab hac uirtute sit etiam agens per se. ergo erit factor et actor. similiter etiam est necessae ut materia uniuersalis prima sit receptibilis actionis per se. . . . Forma uniuersalis agens est necessario” (106, 107).
All of the particular instances of form and matter are emanations from the universal form and matter, and the entire system is maintained by the “First Author”. As will become obvious from what follows, it is essential when reading the writings of those who subscribe to universal hylomorphism to consider to what the terms “form” and “matter” refer, because there are a number of options, and context must be the primary guide.

Form may refer to the *forma corporeitatis*, and there is also a connection between Pecham and Avicebron concerning this issue. In his introduction to the *Fountain of Life*, Theodore E. James writes, “Unlike Avicenna and later Christian universal hylomorphists [Avicebron] does not speak of a form of corporeity but only a ‘matter of corporeity’; corporeity or quantity is the basic corporeal form.” Thus form would be best understood to be a structuring principle, and indeed Jacob translates *forma* as “structure” in various usages. It is clear why matter must be formed, on Avicebron’s view: other than the “First Author,” nothing that exists is formless; the emanation of each created thing implies that the form is impressed on the next thing in the chain of being.

Pecham clearly subscribes to universal hylomorphism and consequently to the doctrine that there is a *forma corporeitatis* in matter (and thus in the formed human body). Pecham believes that, in principle, God could create matter without any

---

149 See *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck, 35-36.
150 *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck, vii, bracketed item added; cf. *Fountain of Life*, Jacob, 28.
151 E.g., *Fountain of Life*, 27.
152 See *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck, 19.
form whatsoever. \(^{154}\) However, Pecham says that nothing created is truly one, \(^{155}\) and that the soul is

neither a body nor a corporeal form, but is a spiritual substance, constituted from its own matter and form. . . . “No evil follows unless this is in whose essence something is in potency, and this occurs through matter.” Therefore every Angel and every rational soul is composed of matter and form. \(^{156}\)

Pecham says in the *Tractatus* that since there is a corporeal form that perfects the material body, then there must also be a spiritual form (i.e., the rational soul) that perfects the spiritual body. \(^{157}\) Furthermore, in stating that there is a kind of matter that is not subject to corruption, Pecham is likely making a passing reference to

\(^{154}\) See Sharp, *Franciscan Philosophy*, 180-182; cf. Pecham, *Quodlibeta*: “Item, certum est quod materia est alia essentia quam forma, cum materia et forma sint duo principia essentialiter differentia. Deus autem omnia essentialiter diversa potest separare, cum eiusdem sit componere et dividere. Posset ergo, si vellet, facere materiam esse sine omni forma. Multoque magis est hoc possibile quam accidentia, quorum ‘esse est inesse’, esse sine subiecto. Ratio autem quare potest facere accidentia sine subiecto est quia accidentia plus dependent a Deo, qui est causa prima, quam a subiecto, quod est eorum causa secunda” (175); *Quaestiones*: “Aut ut intelligatur materia per se divisibilis secundum quod intelligitur abstracta ab omni forma secundum considerationem metaphysicam” (325).

\(^{155}\) *Quaestiones*, 364: “[Q]uod haec unitas sufficit creaturae qua aliquis componitur ex diversis principiis, nullum autem creatum st vere et perfecte unum, sicut patet ex Augustino in pluribus locis.”

\(^{156}\) *Tractatus*, 47-48: “[A]nima neque est corpus neque forma corporalis, sed est substantia spiritualis, ex materia et forma propria constituta. . . . Non sequitur malum nisi hoc in cuius essentia aliquid est in potentia et hoc fit per materiam’. Igitur omnis Angelus et omnis rationalis componitur ex materia et forma.”

\(^{157}\) 50: “[S]i aliqua forma corporalis, perficiens materiam corcorporalem [sic], est incorruptibilis, ergo multo fortius aliqua forma spiritualis corpus perficiens. Sed omnium formarum nobilissima est anima rationalis”; Bonaventure had said the same thing (see Cullen, *Bonaventure*, 54; Quinn, *The Historical Constitution*, 126).
Avicebron’s larger system of form/matter relationships, which is *radically* different from Aristotle's view of form and matter.\(^{158}\)

Not all matter is a cause of corruption, but that which is the subject of privation, which is not in the matter of heaven. Whence the Commentator says that heaven does not have matter, since he does not call something matter unless there is a connection to privation. But he does not deny those, [to have matter]. . . .\(^{159}\)

Pecham's statements about form and matter in isolation may seem *ad hoc* or without clear direction, but far less so if we suppose that Pecham has Avicebron's larger Neoplatonic worldview in the background. His agreement is made explicit in the *Summa De Ente et Essentia*: “[J]ust as this matter and this form constitute this substance, so matter and form constitute substance. . . .”\(^{160}\)

Spiritual matter (and prime matter in particular) is explained at greater length in Avicebron than in Pecham, and Pecham is using the conception of spiritual matter that we find in the *Fons Vitae*. In Avicebron, just as forms are in a hierarchy, the types

\(^{158}\) Pessin notes that Pecham's view of prime matter is that it is “...per se existens, unius essentiae, sustinens diversitatem, dans omnibus essentiam suam et nomen” (‘...existent in and of itself, of a single essence, sustaining diversity, and giving to everything its essence and name’; *Fons Vitae* 1.10, p. 13, lines 15–17). And, in similar manner we learn at the very close of the *Fons Vitae* that it is: ‘...substantia existens per se, sustentatrix diversitatis, una numero; et...est substantia receptibilis omnium formarum’ (‘...a substance existent in and of itself, the sustainer of diversity, one in number; ...it is a substance receptive to all forms’; *Fons Vitae* 5.22, p. 298, lines 13–7...”) (“Solomon Ibn Gabirol”).

\(^{159}\) *Quaestiones*, 347: “[N]on omnis materia est causa corruptionis, sed illa quae est privationi subiecta, quod non est in materia caeli. Unde Commentator dicit caelum non habere materiam, quia non vocat materiam nisi privationi coniunctam. Non autem negat eas, [habere materiam]” (bracketed item in orig.).

of matter are ordered in a hierarchy. Matter is the principle of the possibility for the impression of a different form: “[T]he substance is subject and receptivity, and before the existence of the form in it, it had only the possibility of receiving it from something else.” Everything that is created, including corporeal substances, has a spiritual matter and a spiritual form.

161 Rudavsky, “Solomon Ibn Gabirol,” 251; cf. Theodore E. James, introduction to *Fountain of Life*: “The particular method is to inspect natural sensibles both universal and particular and you will find matter and form. To the four modes of matter: artificial-particular matter, natural-particular matter, natural-universal matter and celestial matter, there correspond four grades of forms. Sensible body is known or perceived by the sensible qualities adhering in it. This sensible body is understood in terms of substance when viewed with the forms; when conceived as receptive of these forms it is designated as matter or hyle” (viii). Viewing Avicebron’s discussion in this way may be a way to solve contradictions that Rudavsky sees in the text: “On the question of how form and matter are interrelated Ibn Gabirol presents two alternative answers. On the one hand, he argues that form and matter are differentiated only according to one’s perspective; both are aspects of simple substance. On the other hand, he emphasizes the complete opposition between matter and form, suggesting that they possess mutually exclusive properties which render impossible a reduction of one to the other. . . . Reflecting the discrepancies in his account of matter and form, Ibn Gabirol’s discussion of creation is also inconsistent. He argues in some places that matter was created bereft of form, for which it yearns. In other contexts, he asserts that matter subsists not even for an instant without form” (“Solomon Ibn Gabirol,” 251).

162 *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck, 67; cf. *Fons Vitae*: “[S]ed omnino substantia iam erat subiecta et recipiens, et ante esse formam in ea non habebat nisi possibilitatem recipiendi eam ab alio” (140).

163 *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck, 63; cf. *Fons Vitae*: “Si omni est materia spiritualis et forma spiritualis, debet ut haec inueniantur in omni; et si fuerint inuenta in omni, debet ut sit in unaquaque substantia corporali materia spiritualis, et in unaquaque forma corporali forma spiritualis” (135).
Pecham does not go this far, but like Bonaventure, William of Baglione, and Roger Bacon, he believes that the rational soul has a kind of matter, although it is spiritual matter:

Although [the possible intellect] lacks corporeal matter, it does not however lack spiritual, intelligible matter. Whence Augustine, On Genesis Against the Manichees: “It is said that God has made everything from nothing, since also if everything formed were formed from this formed matter, nevertheless this matter is made from nothing.” And also the Commentator himself confesses, because it has something similar of matter and something similar of form. Like this he says: “For just as sensible being is divided into form and matter, so too intelligible being must be divided into things closely similar to these two, namely, into something similar to form and into something similar to matter. This is necessarily in every intelligence that understands something else. And if it were not, then there would be no multiplicity in abstracted forms”. These are his words.

Therefore it is immaterial through the exclusion of changeable matter. But it has something similar to matter itself through which it is this thing, and through which there is a numerical distinction in separated substances, as he says himself. Moreover, from this it does not follow that the intellect is

\[164\] See Bacon, Communium Naturalium: “[E]go teneo pro certo quod anima est composita ex materia et forma sicut angeli. . . . Cum ergo anima racionalis sit ultimum complementum embrionis humani quod est compositum, oportet quod hec anima sit composita, ut ejus forma perficiat formam embrionis, et ejus materia compleat materiam embrionis” (291, 293); cf. Hackett, “Roger Bacon”: “In both early and later works, Bacon objects to the idea that matter is one in number in all things. The background to this issue arises from Franciscan discussions at Paris on the nature of the unity of matter. Bacon holds that matter ‘is not numerically one, but in itself and from itself it is numerically distinct in numerically different beings.’ Still, he does not object to some unity of matter. For example, matter as potentiality is the original source of the being of contingent things. This is the non-being of the creature in contrast with the being of the Creator. Thus, Bacon will speak of the matter of both corporeal and spiritual beings, and hence of ‘spiritual matter,’ a concept that Aquinas found to be contradictory.”
already so thoroughly separated from matter that it cannot be the perfection of corporeal matter, but that it does not depend essentially on matter.  

Another major passage from Pecham on spiritual matter is in *quaestio* 15 of the fourth Quodlibet, a discussion about whether angels have matter. Here Pecham introduces three grades of essences:

Just as there are three grades of sciences there are three grades of essences. For the physician considers natural essences and the sensible, material subject to contrariety and quantity. But mathematics (considers) subjects of quantity but not of contrariety, and therefore he considers intelligible and imaginable matter. But the metaphysician considers essences subtracted from contrariety and magnitude, and consequently matter intelligible and not completely imaginable. But to his speculation pertains the consideration of the separate substances, which have intelligible matter by the third mode and not imaginable. But I concede, advised

---

by the reasons and because the authorities of many saints say this, and especially
Boethius, (in) the book *De unitate et uno*. . . .166

Pecham’s 25th quaestio in his commentary on the first book of Peter Lombard’s

Sentences is titled *Quaeritur de simplicitate animae rationalis: utrum sit composita
ex materia et forma*.167 In this quaestio Pecham again cites Gundissalinus’ *De Unitate
et Uno* for support for the view that there is matter in the soul.168 Pecham says that the

separated soul can also be moved, and that it has a motive part and a part that is

moved; this is possible only if the soul is composed of matter and form, because

possibility comes from matter.169 Matter need have no relation to quantity *per se*, but

166 Quodlibeta, 208-209: “Iuxta gradus scientiarum tres sunt gradus essentiarum.
Quoniam physica considerat essentias naturales et materiam sensibilem subjectam
contrarietati et quantitati. Mathematica autem considerat essentias mathematicas
subjectas quantitati sed non contrarietati, et ideo considerat materiam intelligibilem et
imaginabilem. Metaphysicus autem considerat essentias substractas a contrarietate et
magnitudine, et materiam per consequens intelligibilem et non complete imaginabilem.
Ad eius autem speculationem pertinet consideratio de substantiis separatis, quae habent
materiam intelligibilem tertio modo et non imaginabilem. Quod concedo propter rationes
praedictas et quia multae auctoritates Sanctorum hoc dicunt et praecipue Boethius, libro
*De unitate et uno*, ut intuenti patet”; cf. Gundissalinus, *De Unitate et Uno*: “[I]deo creatae
unitati accidit multiplicitas et diversitas et mutabilitas; ita ut in quadam materia sit habens
principium et finem, in quadam vero principium et non finem, quia in quibusdam
subiacet permutationi et corruptioni, in quibusdam permutationi sed non corruptioni. In
quibus enim materia est subtilis, simplex, remota a contrarietate et separatione, parificatur
ei unitas et unitur cum ea sic, ut haec et illa. . . . Sed quia unitas subsistens in materia
intelligentiae est unitas simplicitatis, ideo necessario unitas subsistens in materia animae,
quia infra eam est. . . .” (5-6).

167 Tractantes, 183.

168 Ibid., 183-184: “Boethius in libro: *De Unitate et Uno*, dicit quod ‘unitas subsistens in
materia intelligentiae est unitas simplicitatis. Unitas subsistens in materia animae, quae
infra eam est, crescit et multiplicatur’. Unde expresse dicit materiam in intelligentia et in

169 Tractantes, 184: “Sed omne per se motum dividitur in duo, quorum unum est motum
primum et reliquum movens. Sed hoc non est nisi compositum ex materia et forma. Ergo
etc.”
only to the possibility for alteration: “[T]he metaphysician considers essences subtracted from contrariety and magnitude, and consequently matter intelligible and not completely imaginable.” Pecham also associates matter with possibility: “Item possibilitas est a materia. Anima est possibilis et variatur. Ergo habet materiam.” In the 27th quaestio of the commentary on the Sentences, Pecham makes clear that the spiritual substances have a kind of matter, but not the kind of matter that is subject to transmutation. This marks a difference between what we may call “prime matter,” a created essence as the ground of possibility for taking on forms, and matter that has already become informed to some degree. I will say more about this distinction in the following chapter.

Because Pecham thinks that every creature has form and matter, he also thinks the rational soul itself has its own substantial being and is willing to label the body and the rational soul (and even other aspects of the human being) substances.

---

170 Quodlibeta, 209: “Metaphysicus autem considerat essentias subtractas a contrarietate et magnitudine, et materiam per consequens intelligibilem et non complete imaginabilem” (this translation is by Sullivan, “The Debate,” 146).

171 Tractantes, 184.

172 “Ad primam quaestionem intelligendum quod dicunt quidam animam non componi ex materia et forma, quia universaliter secundum Boethium substantia spiritualis nulli materia innititur fundamento. Dicunt tamen eam componi ex quiditate et esse, et quo est et quod est. Sed frustra Boethio ininitutur, quia ipse a substanziis spiritualibus excludit tantum materiam quae potest esse subjectum transmutationis. Alias sibi a parte contradiceret in libro De Unitate et Uno” (ibid., 186); cf. Gundissalinus, De Unitate et Uno, 5ff. This discussion indicates a difference between what we may call “prime matter,” a created essence as the ground of possibility for taking on forms, and matter that has already become informed to some degree. I will say more about this distinction in the following chapter.
Therefore the soul is divided in the first division by the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective, which, according to that they are in the bodies of diverse species, obviously they are diverse substances.

But in the soul, where the three come together, there is doubt among the wise. For certain ones, most of all the philosophantes, say that in man [the vegetative], sensitive, and intellective are three diverse substances, but nevertheless they are one soul, just as matter and form are diverse natures and nevertheless make one nature or rather one composite substance and one complete substance, just as according to some people many lights in the medium are more lights, but one act of the medium.\textsuperscript{173}

This wide usage of “substance” is mirrored in Avicebron. On Avicebron’s emanationist view, spiritual substance permeates all of being.\textsuperscript{174} On the high end of the spectrum are the “simple substances,” those that are not united to corporeal matter: “But the simple substance, like the soul and the intelligence, is more worthy of the name of substance than the substance that supports the categories.”\textsuperscript{175}

Avicebron says that the simple substances are “more subtle” than compound substances:

\textsuperscript{173} Tractatus, 30: “Anima igitur dividitur prima divisione per vegetativam, sensitivam et intellectivam, quae, secundum quod sunt in corporibus diversarum specierum, planum est quod sunt diversae substantiae. Sed in anima, ubi tres concurrunt, dubium est apud sapientes. Quidam enim, maxime philosophantes, dicit quod in homine [vegetativa], sensitiva et intellectiva sunt tres diversae substantiae, sed tamen sunt una anima, sicut materia et forma sunt diversae naturae et tamen faciunt unam naturam vel magis unam substantiam compositam et substantiam unam completam, sicut secundum quosdam plura lumina in medio sunt plura lumina, sed unus actus medii” (bracketed item in orig.). For a discussion of the meaning of “philosophantes,” see Gilson, “Les ‘Philosophantes’.”

\textsuperscript{174} Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 49; cf. Fons Vitae: “Substantia spiritualis non est terminabilis essentia, quia non est quanta, nec finita. Et quod non fuerit terminabilis essentia, eius essentia extenditur et est in omni loco” (120-121).

\textsuperscript{175} Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 19; cf. Fons Vitae: “sed substantia simplex, ut anima et intelligentia, dignior est ad intentionem substantialitatis quam substantia quae sustinet praedicamenta” (91).
• “Now everything that has every form must be anterior to that which has only some forms and is more subtle than it.”

• “If the substance that supports the categories is the immediate object of the action of the First Author, there is no other substance more subtle than it and anterior to it. But the substance of the intelligence is anterior to it and is more subtle than it. Therefore it is not the immediate object of the action of the First Author.”

• “When we study the cause of the emanation of substances from each other, we shall find still other causes for this phenomenon. One of these is that the form is more subtle than the matter. And since the subtle penetrates and traverses that which is before it and opposes it, it follows necessarily that the form penetrates and traverses all that is before it and opposes it.”

The opposite of subtlety, on Avicebron’s view, is density; the more dense a being is, the more perceptible it is to the senses. However, while density makes a being’s

---

176 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 27; cf. Fons Vitae: “et omne quod sustinet omnem formam, necessarium est ut sit prius et subtilius quam id quod sustinet aliquas formarum” (98).
177 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 28; cf. Fons Vitae: “Si substantia quae sustinet praedicamenta est patiens a primo factore sine medio, non erit aliqua substantia subtilior et prior ea. sed substantia intelligentiae est prior ea et subtilior ea. ergo ipsa non est patiens a primo factore sine medio” (99).
178 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 36; cf. Fons Vitae: “Et cum considerauerimus causam quae fecit necesse ut aliae ex substantiis influerent aliiis, inueniems huis rei alias causas praeter has. Quarum alia est, quia forma subtilior est quam materia. et quia subtile penetrans est et pertransiens per id quod est sibi obstans et oppositum, ideo necesse est ut forma penetret et pertranseat per omne quod obstat sibi et est oppositum” (108).
179 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 127; cf. Fons Vitae: “Et sicut uisus, quo magis penetrauerit colorem et pertigerit ad figuram et quantitatem et substantiam, obscurius fiet ei esse et occultius propter subtilitatem suam, et quo magis redierit et exierit a substantia ad quantitatem et a quantitate ad figuram et a figura ad colorem, manifestius fiet ei esse propter crassitudinem suam: similiter quo magis penetrauerit intellectus id quod est post substantiam quae sustinet praedicamenta, scilicet substantias spirituales, donec perueniat ad materiam primam quae est contra substantiam, obscurius fiet ei esse et occultius propter suam subtilitatem; et e contrario, quo magis redierit a materia et exierit ad propinquorem ex substantiis, declarabitur esse et manifestabitur propter suam crassitudinem. et hoc exemplum quod tibi proposui faciliorem faciet tibi cognitionem ordinis substantiarum spiritualium secundum gradus earum” (203-204).
180 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 127.
qualities sensible, it hides the perceptibility of being itself.\textsuperscript{180} Being is correlated with subtlety.

Pecham uses the language of subtlety as well. In addition to referring to air and fire as being more or less subtle,\textsuperscript{181} Pecham says that “the soul sets in motion the strength of sensing through the more subtle body.”\textsuperscript{182} For Pecham, substances can penetrate one another according to how subtle they are, just as in Avicebron. Pecham says, “But since for diverse powers there must be diverse spirits and the nobler a power is, the more subtle is the spirit of which it is the vehicle.”\textsuperscript{183} The language of nobility also comes up in Roger Marston’s grades theory, which he may have learned from Pecham.\textsuperscript{184}

Even though Pecham is willing to call the various forms of the human being “substances” in a sense, he still wishes to claim that matter and the various forms make the human being to be one simple substance.\textsuperscript{185} “[T]ruly the soul, insofar as it is

\textsuperscript{181} Avicebron also refers to the subtlety of air through which the visual power unites with its external objects, to illustrate how the animal spirit serves as the intermediary through which the human body receives the rational soul (\textit{Fons Vitae}, 194; cf. \textit{Fountain of Life}, Wedeck, 118)
\textsuperscript{182} \textit{Tractatus}, 34: “[S]ic distinguuntur ut in oculis dicatur vigere ignea vis, in auditu aer subtilissimus, in olfatu aer fumosus. . . . Et licet diversitati organorum aptetur diversitas elementorum, ignis tamen omnia penetrat, ut motum in eis faciat, per subtilius enim corpus agitat anima vigorem sentiendi.”
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., 26-27: “Sed quia diversis virtutibus diversi debentur spiritus et quanto virtus nobilior, tanto spiritus, cuius vehiculum est, subtilior.”
\textsuperscript{184} Etzkorn, “The Grades of the Form According to Roger Marston OFM,” \textit{Franziskanische Studien} 44 (1962): 443-444. I will say more about this point below.
\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Tractantes}, 184: “Sed quia [anima] ex simplicitate habet, ut una existens possit se toti corpori communicare, quaeritur an sit in qualibet parte corporis tota” (bracketed item in orig.).
a spirit, has a certain being, but incomplete and inclined to another, to the constitution of a third thing. Whence just as the soul is not numerically the same as the man, so neither is its being the same numerically as the being of man.”

Clearly Pecham does not think the doctrine of the plurality of form harms the unity and singularity of the human being, but he must address how something could be added to a simple thing in order to make it complete. It seems that Pecham has a notion of immaterial addition such that adding immaterial conceptual parts to an immaterial object has no effect on its simplicity. Thus Pecham thinks that it would be impossible to add multiple corporeal forms, but there is no problem adding multiple incorporeal forms.

A possible solution is in the grades theory. In the *Tractatus* Pecham speaks explicitly about a plurality of forms. However, in his *Quodlibeta Quatuor* Pecham briefly presents a refinement of the plurality view, whereby the various forms are not considered as each being a substantial form but rather as being grades of one

---

186 *Tractatus*, 187: “Ad secundum dicendum quod vere anima, inquantum spiritus est, habet esse quoddam, sed incompletem et ad alium inclinatum, ad tertium scilicet constituendum. Unde sicut anima non ponit in numerum cum homine, ita nec esse eius cum esse hominis.”

187 It should be noted that Pecham may have at some point developed the view according to which there are grades of a single substantial form (see Etzkorn, “The Grades of the Form”).
substantial form.\textsuperscript{188} This move is apparently designed to allow Pecham to agree (in a way) with Aristotle’s view that there is but one substantial form. Pecham elaborates little about this position.\textsuperscript{189} Unfortunately Pecham’s treatise on the “grades” theory, 

*De Gradibus Formarum*, has been lost,\textsuperscript{190} but the view is discussed by later Franciscans.\textsuperscript{191} There is uncertainty as to who was first to espouse the grades theory;

\textsuperscript{188} Pecham, *Quodlibeta*, 198-199, 230-231: “Dicendum igitur quod sicut conjunctio principiorum—materiae et formae—dat esse, eorumdem indivisio dat unum esse: ‘unum enim est ens quod non dividitur’. Ex prima autem coniunctione formae cum materia causatur unitas, scilicet ex coniunctione formae primae substantialis cum materia prima, quia ‘simul est substantia et haec substantia’. Et ideo superveniens mutatio formarum naturalium in esse physico circa substantiam non mutat identitatem numeralem substantiae vel corporis per se, quia vivum et mortuum nihil faciunt ad essentiam corporeitatis, quamvis mutent esse specificum generis naturalis infimi et quorumdam subalternorum. Sub transmutatione enim simul manent materia, potentia et forma prima substantialis, quia sola materia non est subiectum... Dicendum igitur quod anima rationalis non est forma corporis, secundum quod corpus est, immo praesupponit corporeitatem, cuius forma non corrumpitur per adventum animae, quia nullam habet cum ipsa corporeitatem. Praeterea, corporeitas supponitur in definitione animae, quae est ‘actus corporis organici physici potentia vitam habentis’ ... [D]icendum quod in corpore hominis, secundum quod corpus est, omnes formae quattuor elementorum reductae sunt in unam formam mixti; non cuiuscumque mixtionis, sed illius quae est propria complexionis humanae. Unde nulla est ibi forma elementaris quantum ad formarum simplicitatem. Unde sunt in homine formae plures gradatim ordinatae ad unam ultimam perfectionem, et ideo formatum est unum.”

\textsuperscript{189} The grades view was criticized on the basis that “nulla forma recipit magis et minus,” a phrase taken from Aristotle (*Metaphysics*, 1044a.10-12; cf. Aquinas, *Treatise*, 36; ibid., *Summa Theologiae*, 1.2.52.1.; cf. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, ed. Gordon A. Wilson and Girard J. Etzkorn, Henrici De Gandavo Opera Omnia 8 [Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2011], 242-292, esp. 242 for references to various discussions of this issue; Giles of Lessines, *De Unitate Formae*, ed. M. DeWulf, *Les Philosophes de Moyen âge*, Première Série, Tome 1 [Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l’Université, 1902], 97). I do not know of a passage where Pecham explicitly discusses this argument, but it would seem that his general arguments about complex simplicity (which I discuss below) would be the basis of a Pechamian response.


\textsuperscript{191} Marston, *Quodlibeta*, 2.22; Etzkorn, “The Grades of the Form.”
if Pecham’s student Roger Marston\textsuperscript{192} was expounding Pecham’s theory, then Pecham was possibly the first to propose it.\textsuperscript{193} In the following chapter of the present study, I will discuss in more detail the implications of the grades theory and the likelihood that Pecham actually subscribes to it. However, because Pecham’s \textit{Tractatus} provides his general plurality view and does not obviously promote the grades view, I will focus here on the general view as opposed to the grades refinement.

So, for purposes of the present chapter, the problem of “complex simplicity” remains. Not surprisingly, the basic idea behind Pecham’s solution to the problem of complexity seems to appear already in Avicebron. Pecham might well be abbreviating a longer discussion of the relation between simplicity and multiplicity in the \textit{Fons Vitae}:

- “One is the root of the multiple. The simple substance is one. Therefore the simple substance is the root of the multiple. The forms that are borne by the compound substance are a multitude. Therefore the simple substance is the root of the forms that are borne by the compound substances.”\textsuperscript{194}

\textsuperscript{192} Wilson, “Roger Marston,” \textit{A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages}, 626.
\textsuperscript{193} The origins of the grades view is a complicated issue. Etzkorn says of Marston’s writing on the grades view: “As far as we know, this is the first version of the grades theory—as distinct from the plurality and unicity of forms theories—which has survived. Richard of Mediavilla’s theory is almost certainly posterior and Pecham gives only a hint of the grades’ [sic] theory. Still we cannot absolutely fix Marston’s as the first grades theory in the Middle Ages because—if Hocedez’ chronology is correct—Giles of Rome wrote his \textit{Contra Gradus Formarum} before Easter of 1278 and this latter date is so close to the period of Marston’s \textit{Quodlibeta} that a definite determination cannot be given until a comparative study of the Augustinian and Franciscan friars’ works is made” (“The Grades of the Form,” 418; cf. Edgar Hocedez, \textit{Richard de Middleton. Sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine} [Louvain:1925], 465-467; Etzkorn, “Franciscan \textit{Quodlibeta},” 1:146).
\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Fountain of Life}, Wedeck, 50-51; cf. \textit{Fons Vitae}: “Vnum [sic] est radix multiplicitatis. substantia simplex est unum. ergo substantia simplex est radix multiplicitatis. formae quae sustinentur in substantia composita multae sunt. ergo substantia simplex radix est formarum quae sustinentur in substantia composita” (122-123).
• “Quantity is multitude. Now multitude is composed of units. Therefore quantity is composed of units. Now units are composed of simple unity. Now simple unity is in the simple substance. Therefore quantity is composed of the unity of the simple substance. The unity in the simple substance is a simple accident. Now the compound accident is composed of the simple accident. Therefore the compound accident is composed of the unity of the simple substance.”

• “[J]ust as the forms of sensible things are in the substance of the universal soul simply, that is, divested of their matter, so there is no reason to be surprised that these forms are plunged into the universal simple substance superior to this substance, or the substance of the intelligence, for the forms of all things are in the substance of the intelligence in a more universal and more simple manner. The forms that are in a superior substance are more united and do not occupy place. Inversely, those that are in the inferior substance are more dispersed and occupy place: the cause of this is the unity of the essence of the corporeal substance: and this occurs only through the union of the essences of the simple substances and the diffusion of the essence of the corporeal substance.”

Multiplicity flows from the simple substances themselves, and compound substances retain the simplicity that has been impressed upon them by the simple substances.

Avicenna pictures simplicity as being like an object that can be handed from one

---

195 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 52; cf. Fons Vitae: “Quantitas est multitude. et multitude composita est ex unis. ergo quantitas composita est ex unis. una autem composita sunt ex uno simplici. ergo quantitas composita est ex uno simplici. unum autem simplex est in substantia simplici. ergo quantitas composita est ex uno substantiae simplicis. unum in substantia simplici est accidens simplex. et accidens compositum compositum est ex accidente simplici. ergo accidens compositum compositum est ex uno substantiae simplicis” (124).

196 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 69-70; cf. Fons Vitae: “[S]icut formae rerum sensibilium sunt in substantia animae uniuersalis simpliciter, id exspoliatae a suis materiis, similiter etiam non uideatur extranea immersio harum formarum in substantia simplici uniuersali quae est superior hac substantia, scilicet substantia intelligentiae, uidelicet quia formae omnium rerum sunt in substantia intelligentiae communius et simplicius. formae enim quae fuerint in substantia altiori, erunt unitiores et locum non occupabunt; et e contrario, quae fuerint in substantia inferiori, erunt dispersiores et occupabunt locum; et hoc non euenit nisi ex unitione essentiarum substantiarum simplicium et diffusione essentiae substantiae corporalis” (142).
substance to another. Thus, no matter how many forms the soul has, there is just the simplicity that has been transferred, and no matter how many forms the individual human being has, he is still just one human being.\textsuperscript{197} The key emanationist principle, again reflected in the \textit{Fons Vitae}, is that “the numerous forms are in the essence of the simple substance,” the rational soul.\textsuperscript{198}

Similarly Pecham does not conceive of the addition of the rational form to the body’s other forms to be like the addition of some matter to some other matter.\textsuperscript{199} In fact, Pecham maintains that the rational soul can be called \textit{the} form of the human being.\textsuperscript{200} In this way Pecham wishes to avoid having matter informed in conflicting

\textsuperscript{197} Consider also that Pecham explains in the \textit{Tractatus} (28-29) that there are two kinds of simplicity: One kind of simplicity is that of a small point, e.g., the result of imagining a simple thing. But Pecham says there is also “intellectual simplicity” or simplicity in the abstract, which does not connote smallness but a “communicable unity” (\textit{unitatem communicabilem}). It is in this second sense of simplicity that the human mind holds a simple when the intellect “abstracts its intelligible from measurement and position.”

\textsuperscript{198} \textit{Fountain of Life}, Wedeck, 83; cf. \textit{Fons Vitae}: “[F]ormae multae sunt inuentae in essentia substantiae simplicis” (156). I will discuss the individuation of the human being further, below.

\textsuperscript{199} \textit{Quaestiones}, 329; cf. Dales, \textit{The Problem of the Rational Soul}, 127-128. In fact, Pecham emphasizes that the soul is only theoretically divided due to the division of bodily activities (\textit{Quaestiones}, 327).

\textsuperscript{200} \textit{Quaestiones}, 357.

\textsuperscript{201} Douie says that Pecham does not regard the rational soul as the substantial form of the body, but rather thinks that the soul is united to the body “by means of the sensitive and nutritive forms. . . .” (\textit{Archbishop Pecham}, 23). It is not obvious what this kind of connection between soul and body is supposed to involve. A weaker assertion along these lines would be that the rational soul uses corporeal organs to sense, an Augustinian principle that Pecham echoes in the \textit{Tractatus} (15). A stronger assertion would be that the intellect is no more the substantial form than the vegetative or sensitive powers. Pecham would deny this stronger claim. In the following chapter of the present study, I will discuss the sense(s) in which Pecham thinks the rational soul is the form of the human body.
ways. I will discuss Pecham’s view of “complex simplicity” further in the next chapter.

Pecham's brief discussion of “animal spirits” finds a fuller explanation in Avicebron. Pecham says that in the body there are various humors that carry the spirits, which are in turn the vehicles of the animal powers. In context, the “powers” to which Pecham refers are evidently associated with the sensible soul. It is plausible that Pecham had in mind Avicebron's discussion of animal spirits as the intermediaries between the soul and body, because Avicebron says that the animal power “flows from the rational faculty, whose abode is in the brain, in the sinews and the muscles—for this power penetrates and spreads in all parts of the body, while in itself the substance of the soul does not spread and does not extend.” The animal spirits function as the vehicle of the emanation of the rational soul’s power throughout the body, supporting Pecham’s principle that the sensitive soul is rational from one perspective. Again, from Avicebron: “[T]he human body receives the action

---

201 Tractatus, 26-27.
202 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 120; cf. Fons Vitae: “[V]is animalis effluit a uirtute rationali, cuiius sedes est cerebrum. in neruos et lacertos, quia haec uirtus est penetrans et diffusa per omnes partes corporis, et substantia animae in se non est diffusa neque extensa. . . .” (196).
of the rational soul through the intermediary of the animal spirit, as man receives intelligence through the intermediary of the rational soul. . . .”\(^{204}\) The animal spirits serve as the link between the intellect and the operation of the body that Pecham wants as he calls the soul the form of the body.\(^{205}\)

Pecham's discussion of love in the sixth chapter of the \textit{Tractatus} appears to have its background in the \textit{Fons Vitae}. Pessin writes on this point:

Ibn Gabirol emphasizes the central motion of desire at the core of the universe. This can be seen throughout the \textit{Fons Vitae} in the dual reminders that (1) all things have matter at their core, and (2) matter's own reality consists essentially in desire (viz. a desiring-after-form). These two simple ideas lead to a much more arresting insight, viz. inasmuch as all things are grounded in matter, and inasmuch as matter is a marker of desire, it follows that all reality is grounded in desire. Desire—in the guise of matter—is in this sense a central principle of Ibn Gabirol's universe.\(^{206}\)

Avicennian repeatedly uses terminology reflecting a metaphor of human relationship for the form-matter conjunction: “[I]t is the nature of the form to unite with the matter, when the matter is ready to receive it. Now all that unites with something that is ready to receive it gives itself to this thing and also gives its form.”\(^{207}\) And,

[W]henever the form of a thing emanates from this thing, this form is reflected by the contrary thing that receives it. Therefore the form of the spiritual substance is reflected by the contrary thing that receives it. . . . every form

\(^{204}\) \textit{Fountain of Life}, Wedeck, 118; cf. \textit{Fons Vitae}: “[C]orpis humanum non recipit actionem animae rationalis nisi per medium spiritus animalis, et sicut non recipit homo intelligentiam nisi per medium animae rationalis. . . .” (194).
\(^{205}\) See \textit{Quaestiones}, 333.
\(^{206}\) “Solomon Ibn Gabirol,” parenthetical item in orig.
\(^{207}\) \textit{Fountain of Life}, Wedeck, 36-37; cf. \textit{Fons Vitae}: “Et etiam, quia de natura formae est ut uniatur materiae, cum parata fuerit materia recipere eam. et omne quod unitur alii quod paratum est ad recipiendum illud, attribuit se illi et formam suam” (108).
reflected by the contrary thing that receives it penetrates the thing that receives it and envelops it, if its substance is a subtle substance.²⁰⁸

Pecham’s discussion of love is more vivid in its metaphorical portrayal of the form-matter relationship, but the same basic idea from the *Fons Vitae* is portrayed in Pecham’s *Tractatus*: “So therefore love is life and life coming together ... a unitive power and consequently the transformative and assimilative, for all things that are inclined are governed by love and ordered. . . .”²⁰⁹ For Pecham, love is the “vital desire” (*amor vitale*) which is “specified by the life of the soul” (*specificatur a vita animae*).²¹⁰ Pecham’s statement that inclination is the result of love could be based on a number of passages in the *Fons Vitae* that discuss the mutual inclination of form and matter for one another. For example,

> What the action is, is this, that a thing gives its form to another thing when both things are apt for this. Now as to how, there is either a conjunction without an intermediary, or a conjunction with an intermediary, or there is a change and diminution of the form of the agent; or, on the contrary, there is no diminution of the quality of the agent; or there is an impression of the power

---

²⁰⁸ Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 48; cf. Fons Vitae: “[E]t omne a quo fluit forma eius, ipsa forma reuerberatur ab opposito quod est receptibile illius. ergo forma spiritualis substantiae reuerberatur ab opposito quod est receptibile illius. . . . quaecumque forma reuerberatur a suo receptibili, ipsa forma penetrans est suum receptibile et circumdans, quando sua substantia fuerit substantia subtilis” (120).

²⁰⁹ Tractatus, 22: “Sic igitur amor est vita et vita copulans ... vis unitiva et per consequens vis transformativa et assimilativa, omnia enim quae inclinata sunt ab amore imperantur et ad amatum consequendum vel perfruendum ordinantur. . . .”

²¹⁰ Ibid.
of the agent upon the passive thing beyond time; or there is an opinion or an imagination, like the loved object on the lover.\textsuperscript{211}

While not every aspect of Pecham’s discussion of love in the sixth chapter of the \textit{Tractatus} is obviously present in the \textit{Fons Vitae}, nevertheless the metaphor of a relationship between two human beings is applied in both the \textit{Fons Vitae} and the \textit{Tractatus}.

I have already noted that the coming together of form and matter results in a third nature, according to Pecham.\textsuperscript{212} The individuation of human persons has a particular kind of explanation in the Neoplatonic framework in which Pecham is working. Pecham’s position according to which form and matter both participate in the individuation of a substance is adapted from Avicebron, Avicenna, and Averroes. Michael B. Sullivan writes on Pecham’s view of individuation:

\begin{quote}
The soul must have matter because it contains possibility, and possibility is from matter; individuation is from matter and the soul is individual. The soul cannot be individuated by the matter of the body, since its individuality remains even when it is separated from the body.\textsuperscript{213}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{211} \textit{Fountain of Life}, Wedeck, 34-35; cf. \textit{Fons Vitae}: “Quid sit esse huius actionis, hoc est, rem dare formam suam alii rei ab ipsa, quando unaquaeque earum coaptatur ad hoc. — Quomodo autem est, quia aut est secundum coniunctionem sine medio, aut secundum coniunctionem cum medio; aut est cum commutatione formae agentis et diminutione, aut e contrario, scilicet sine aliqua diminutione qualitatis agentis; aut cum impressione uiritus agentis in rem patientem sine tempore, aut erit secundum opinionem uel existimationem, sicut actio rei amatae in amantem” (106).

\textsuperscript{212} See Pecham, \textit{Tractatus}, 187; \textit{Quaestiones}, 446.

\textsuperscript{213} “The Debate,” 142; cf. Pecham, \textit{Tractantes}: “Item possibilitas est a materia. Anima est possibilis et variatur. Ergo habet materiam. . . . Item individuatio est a materia. Sed anima a corpore separata est vere individuada. Ergo etc. . . . Si dicas quod individuatur per materiam corporis, cui unitur, contra: Ergo separata a causa individuationis non remaneret individua” (184).
This interpretation of Pecham’s view of individuation overlooks a number of things that Pecham says elsewhere about the role of form in individuation in addition to matter’s role. Pecham cites Avicenna as an authority for his view that “the complement of individuation is from form.” And, Pecham’s illustration about emanation is particularly helpful here:

[T]he species are totally diverse numerically, just as two rays from the sun, and they come together as one individual comes together with another of the same species. Whence it differs totally in singular being and totally comes together in the similitude of species, just as in Peter and Paul who come together in species or in substance of common species and differ in individual substance.

Each ray that comes from the sun, although similar to other rays due to a common source, has its own being. Similarly each form has its own being; assuming that Pecham means to follow Avicebron on this point, we can also say that it is by emanating that forms actually give rise to matter (at least insofar as it is the matter of a particular substance). Thus it is misleading to simply say that Pecham thinks matter alone causes individuation.

Furthermore, Pecham responds to one objection in the Quaestiones by saying that each rational soul is substantially inclined to a particular body.

[T]he appropriation of the rational soul is simply to the human body which is of the most noble and most equal combination, and is united to it substantially as substantial form. But that this soul is appropriated to that body is because

214 Quaestiones, 381; cf. Avicenna, De Anima, 1.1.
215 Quaestiones, 384: “[S]pecies sunt totaliter numero diversae, sicut duo radii a sole, et conveniunt sicut unum individuum convenit cum alio eiusdem speciei. Unde totaliter differt in singulari esse et totaliter convenit in speciei similitudine, sicut est in Petro et Paulo qui conveniunt in specie vel in substantia communi speciei et differunt in substantia individuali.”
of any difference of combination. Which difference, if it consists in accidents, yet that soul is not accidentally of this body insofar as as the rational soul is \textit{substantially} inclined to the body.\textsuperscript{216}

Pecham is concerned to show that, even though a particular intellectual soul can be appropriated to a particular body because of the presence of the right combination of bodily accidents, the conjunction between the particular soul and the particular body is not accidental.

The discussion of individuation to this point shows up the possibility that Pecham is contradictory, saying the individuation is from matter on the one hand, and from form on the other hand. Granted that Pecham could have expressed his position more clearly, it is plausible (as I noted above) that Pecham adopted his account of individuation along the lines of Bacon and Bonaventure’s view. According to Bonaventure’s position, the rational soul’s principle of unibility or disposition (or appetite) for union with body, along with the body’s own unibility, facilitates individuation: “[U]nibility explains how the immaterial human soul is one substance with its body, just as a form is one substance with its matter.”\textsuperscript{217} Thomas M. Osborne argues that even though Bonaventure believes that the soul and body are united and make a third substance, Bonaventure cannot be called a strong dualist because the

\textsuperscript{216} \textit{Quaestiones}, 389: “[A]ppropriatio animae rationalis est simpliciter ad corpus humanum quod est nobilissimae et aequalissimae complexionis, et ei unitur substantialiter ut forma substantialis. Quod autem haec anima illi corpori approprietur, est propter aliquam differentiam complexionis. Quae differentia, [et]si in accidentibus consistat, non tamen anima ista est huius corporis accidentaliter [unita], quia \textit{substantialiter} in quantum anima rationalis ad corpus inclinatur” (bracketed items in orig., emp. added).

\textsuperscript{217} Osborne, “Unibilitas,” 229.
principle of unibility allows for the rational soul to be called the single substantial
form of the body; the soul perfects a particular body.\footnote{218}

Bonaventure in the \textit{Collations on the Hexaëmeron} and elsewhere does not
argue for a plurality of substantial forms in physical bodies, although this
position was held by some thinkers later in the thirteenth century. However,
Bonaventure does state that there have to be in composite substances
dispositions which can become forms when the substantial form of the
composite decays.

A human soul cannot unite itself with dirt or water; instead, there must be
an embryo which is ready to receive the soul. The substantial form of the
embryo is replaced by the rational soul, although the form in some sense
remains as a disposition. . . . Considered by itself, the body is a substance only
in the very loose sense that it has some sort of structure which is generated
before it is united to the soul and then takes some time to decay once it has
been separated from the soul. Strictly speaking, it is one substance with the
soul. When the body and soul are considered separately from each other, then
they are not spoken of as substances in the full sense.\footnote{219}

For Bonaventure, the person comes to be as a result of the combination of a particular
body and a particular soul which are suited for one another specifically.\footnote{220}

\footnote{218}{Ibid., 242.}
\footnote{219}{Ibid., 240.}
\footnote{220}{See ibid., 246-249.}
As in Bonaventure, Pecham thinks that soul gives the act of being to the human body, and the body gives the act of existing (i.e., in place and time). For both Bacon and Pecham matter is not in itself a non-entity, nor is it pure potentiality; instead it has incomplete actual being in the seminal reasons. Pecham says form seeks its matter, and that the soul is united not just to any kind of organic body, but specifically to the human body. Therefore, the rational soul requires its own disposition through which it subsists in the body, and this disposition “ministers to its operation.” We are not told exactly what the “ministration” involves, but we know

---


222 See Quinn, *The Historical Constitution*, 111: “According to Bonaventure, matter is a being (ens) in potency to substantial forms which distinguish it through their acts. . . . Existing with an imperfect form, the original matter of corporeal things was actually one and had incomplete being (esse) from its form. . . . For Bonaventure, then, matter could never be purely passive: as the existing principle and foundation of the being (esse) of substantial forms, matter has always been both active and passive through its seminal reasons, which are its active potencies. They dispose matter to receive the being of substantial forms,” (parenthetical items in orig.); cf. Bonaventure, *In Sententiarum*, 1.1.3.2.: “[D]icendum, quod appetitus materiae ordinatur ad formam tanquam ad perfectionem substantialern, ex qua et materia fit unum; et ideo necesse est, formam esse eiusdem generis cum materia, nec est omnino supra materiam.”

223 *Quaestiones*, 377; *Tractatus*, 27.

224 *Tractatus*, 27: “... suae operationi subministret.”
that it occurs because the intellect “strives to be illuminated by the sensible mediation,”\textsuperscript{225} and Pecham immediately describes the requisite bodily conditions for the life of the human person. This disposition consists of those conditions that make it possible for the soul to be united to the “most nobly disposed body.”\textsuperscript{226}

While Pecham’s view of unibility is similar to Bonaventure’s view, it differs in some important respects. If Bonaventure believed that there is but one form in man (and Osborne argues that this is, in fact, Bonaventure’s position\textsuperscript{227}), then Pecham disagrees with him, as is obvious from the discussion of Pecham’s plurality view in the third chapter of the present study. It seems that, for Bonaventure, forms such as

\textsuperscript{225} Quaestiones, 380: “... appetit naturaliter mediantibus sensibus illustrari. . . .”
\textsuperscript{226} Tractatus, 27: “... ut sicut anima unitur corpori nobilissimo. . . .”
\textsuperscript{227} “Unibilitas,” 238ff. There in an ongoing discussion in the literature about whether Bonaventure subscribes to the plurality view. Étienne Gilson, Anton C. Pegis, Cullen, and Spade think that Bonaventure believed in a plurality of substantial forms, whereas Quinn thinks that Bonaventure believed in the unity of form (see Cullen, Bonaventure, 48ff; Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 315-316, 887; Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure [Paterson: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1965], 253; cf. Pegis, St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul, 39; Spade, “Binarium Famosissimum”). A corollary to the unity of form is that a corpse does not retain its identity as the body belonging to the particular individual who has died after his death. This is particularly problematic in assessing the status of the dead body of Christ during its three days in the tomb prior to the resurrection. Bonaventure says that Christ’s dead body retained its identity through special divine intervention (see Osborne, “Unibilitas,” 241). I will discuss briefly the possible answers to this problem (including Pecham’s) in the following chapter of the present study. Oddly, Bonaventure has a different solution in the cases of other dead bodies: “If somebody makes a stew out of his neighbor and digests the flesh, which person will have this flesh at the general resurrection? Bonaventure argues that God will preserve the flesh secundum speciem so that it will not be divided among two persons. If one person eats another, then he could conceivably be nourished by the person’s flesh ‘secundum materiam’ or even ‘secundum speciem.’ In either case, at the resurrection that flesh will rise again in the one to whom it first belonged. Again, this point emphasizes the importance of the rational soul as the substantial form of a particular body. If the soul were only incidentally connected to a body, then this difficulty would not arise” (Osborne, “Unibilitas,” 242).
the *forma corporeitatis* are subsumed under the intellect (the one substantial form for man) and changed into dispositions. Pecham says nothing about a change from form to disposition. Rather, the first two chapters of his *Tractatus* appear to argue that the fully formed human being really has a plurality of forms, not a single form plus a number of dispositions that were formerly substantial forms. Thus, Pecham would say that the body is formally or substantially disposed for the reception of the rational soul. Still, like Bonaventure, Pecham does wish to say that the intellect is the form of the body; and like Bonaventure (and Avicenna), Pecham thinks of the intellect as *both* the perfection and the mover of the body. This is no more than what Avicebron says in the *Fons Vitae*. However, when Pecham says that the intellect is the form of the body, he evidently means this at least in the senses that (1) the body is inclined to receive the intellect; and (2) the human activities function in order to facilitate the particularly human function, intellection. Pecham refers to the vegetative soul and sensitive soul even though he also thinks of each as a different aspect of one soul. Pecham even goes so far as to say, in a chapter called “On the potencies of the

---

228 *Quaeestiones*, 349: “[D]icendum quod est forma corporis per essentiam ut imprimentem, essentiae ut impressam.”
230 *Quaeestiones*, 376-377; cf. ibid. 342, 359.
231 E.g., *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck, 47-48. Matter can be said to determine the degree of perfection that pertains to the form that is involved in the compound: “Omnis forma sustentata in materia duiersificatur in claritate et perfectione secundum diuersitatem materiae quae eam recipit in claritate et perfectione” (*Fons Vitae*, 119).
soul” (*De potentiis animae*) that the “soul ... is divided ... by the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective. . . .”\(^{233}\)

As I indicated, a unibility view such as that of Pecham or Bonaventure readily finds support in the *Fons Vitae*, where Avicebron says that individuation occurs as a result of the form’s impression in matter. Each simple substance, such as a human soul, is individuated by its own form; corporeal matter (already formed in itself) is responsible for the multiplication of form (in some sense, presumably in space and time) and evidently contributes some accidents specific to the individual. Consider the following statements from the *Fons Vitae*:

- “Either the simple substance has a form that is peculiar to it, or it has not. Now it is impossible that it should not have a form peculiar to it for it would not exist. In fact, the existence of a thing is always due to the form. Furthermore, if the simple substance had no form peculiar to it, it would not be a species different from the others. For every difference comes from the form. Furthermore, it would not perceive any form, for it is by its form that it perceives the forms.”\(^{234}\)

- “The simple substance distinguishes its subject from another subject. Similarly the form distinguishes the compound substance from another substance.”\(^{235}\)

---

\(^{233}\) *Tractatus*, 30: “Anima igitur dividitur prima divisione per vegetativam, sensitivam et intellectivam. . . .”

\(^{234}\) *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck, 94; cf. *Fons Vitae*: “Substantia simplex aut habet propriam sibi formam, aut non habet propriam sibi formam. Non est autem possibile ut non habeat propriam sibi formam, quia non haberet esse. omne enim esse rei ex forma est. Et etiam, quia si substantia simplex non haberet formam sibi propriam, non esset species differens ab alia. omnis enim differentia non est nisi per formam. Et etiam non esset possibile ut apprehenderet formam aliquam ex formis, quia non apprehendit formas nisi per suam formam” (168-169).

\(^{235}\) *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck, 53; cf. *Fons Vitae*: “[S]ubstantia simplex discernit sujectum suum ab alio; similiter et forma discernit substantiam compositam ab alia” (125).
• “The multiplication of the form is due to the matter. Now there is no [corporeal] matter in the simple substance. Therefore the forms in the simple substance do not multiply themselves. Therefore they unite in it.”

• “The substance of the intelligence perceives being in all beings, that is, the unifying simple form, or the genera and the species, while the substance of the soul perceives the non-being, that is, the differences, the properties, and the accidents that the senses attain.”

Presumably, the multiplication of the form (multiplicatio formae) refers to the multiplication of the simple form in the corporeal world via reproduction. Pecham adds that the subtlety of the soul is relevant for individuation: “[A]s the Master (Peter Lombard) teaches, Sentences ... ‘in essence, one is more subtle than others’, ... if it is, there can be a grade of being in the souls of substantial things, and consequently diversity in the bodies of substantial things but inside the limits of species.”

In addition to focusing on how emanation functions in individual humans’ coming to know, Pecham and Avicebron also think that emanation functions in the human’s being and existence. Avicebron’s model of emanation, in which energies, rays, essences, and substances all emanate in various ways, serves Pecham’s anthropology

---

236 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 83, bracketed item added; cf. Fons Vitae: “Multiplicatio formae est ex materia, et in substantia simplici non est materia, ergo in substantia simplici non sunt formae multiplicantes se, ergo sunt in ea unientes se” (156).

237 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 97; cf. Fons Vitae: “[S]ubstantia intelligentiae apprehendit esse in omnibus rebus, scilicet formam unientem simplicem, id est genera et species, et substantia animae apprehendit non-esse, id est differentias, propria, accidentia, quae attinguntur sensibus” (172).

238 This is similar to the teaching of Roger Bacon in the De Multiplicatione Specierum (Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature).

well. Avicebron says: “The form of the simple substance emanates necessarily. Now all that emanates necessarily unites with the thing that is before it. . . . The simple substance contains the compound substance.”

Simple forms have energies that necessarily emanate, and when these energies unite with a compound substance, the result is that a compound substance has sensible forms. This process makes clear Avicebron’s distinction between simple forms that are borne by simple substances, and the forms of compound substances: The simple substances have being apart from corporeal matter, whereas the forms of the compound arise as a result of a union with matter.

Pecham appreciates that, as Avicebron says, the emanationist perspective requires that both being and existence must ultimately be the result of form, although without matter nothing would exist other than God and change would be impossible. Pecham’s view that the life of the soul “overflows” into the life of the body clearly

---


241 *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck, 68.

242 Ibid., 68-69. A more immediate predecessor to Pecham’s natural philosophy is Roger Bacon, who also subscribes to the tradition of Neoplatonist emanationist cosmology of which the *Fons Vitae* is an important part (see Lindberg, introduction to *Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature*, xxxv-liii). Lindberg writes about Bacon’s inheritance of this tradition: There is no mystery about the sources of Bacon’s philosophy. He knew the entire Aristotelian corpus, and himself lectured on a number of Aristotelian books at the University of Paris. He doubtless knew his Augustine well; commented on the *Liber de causis*; and was influenced by Avicebron’s *Fons vitae*, directly and perhaps also through Dominicus Gundissalinus. . . . Bacon cites Avicebron’s *Fons vitae* in his *Questions on Aristotle’s Physics*, his *Questions on the Metaphysics*, and his *Questions on De causis*” (ibid., liv).

243 See *Fountain of Life*, Jacob, 244-246.
marks his emanationist perspective. In the *Quaestiones* Pecham says that the body has being (at least insofar as it is the body of a human being) because of the flowing in of the soul. A personal and eternal emanation is borne in the soul due to the wisdom that stretches from God to man. The soul, *qua* form, gives being to the matter and existence to the human person. This is because the human soul is sustained in being even when separate from the body. Obviously matter has its own function in the existence of the human being, and Pecham does not rule this out in the *Quaestiones*, but he emphasizes repeatedly that a simple, spiritual substance has an existence that is “more communicable”:

---

244 *Tractatus*, 4: “... vita animae in vitam corporis redundat. . . .”  
245 *Quaestiones*, 351; cf. ibid., 387, 390, 440; *Quodlibeta*, 176: “Et dico ‘principia’ materiam et formam, quorum utraque habet suum esse. Unde Avicenna I Physicorum, cap. 2: ‘Forma est essentia per se ipsam, et est additum esse super esse, quod habet hyle; privatio vero non addit esse super esse.’ Haec Avicenna. Forma igitur dat materiae esse specificum et completum, sed non dat ei esse essentiae incompletae, cum sit principium essentialiter aliud a forma”; cf. Avicenna, *Sufficientia*, 1.2. (unedited [see note in Pecham, *Quodlibeta*, 176]); *Fountain of Life*, Wedeck, 94; cf. *Fons Vitae*: “Substantia simplex aut habet propriam sibi formam, aut non habet propriam sibi formam. Non est autem possibile ut non habeat propriam sibi formam, quia non haberet esse. omne enim esse rei ex forma est. Et etiam, quia si substantia simplex non haberet formam sibi propriam, non esset species differens ab alia. omnis enim differentia non est nisi per formam. Et etiam non esset possibile ut apprehenderet formam aliquam ex formis, quia non apprehendit formas nisi per suam formam” (168-169).  
246 *Tractatus*, 9-10: “... ut sicut cum nascitur in anima cuiuscumque rei scientia sequitur, quia laetitia de cognitione parta fit repraesentatio [et] distinctio personalis et aeternarum emanationum sic in plenitudine scientiae praetendatur quaedam plenitude aeternae et perfectae sapientiae, sua origine comitante” (bracketed item in orig.).  
247 Ibid., 49; *Quaestiones*, 387. The existence of the rational soul itself is the direct result of divine creation (ibid., 319-320), even though all being and existence is due ultimately to divine causality (ibid., 404-405).  
248 *Tractatus*, 7, 16-17; *Quaestiones*, 379.
• “The more simple something is, the more it is of communicable existence. . . . [T]he spirit is of more communicable existence than the body.”

• “[T]he spiritual things are of greater power and of more communicable existence than the corporeal.”

• “... according to the saying of the Damascene about the angel who is more in communicating existence as it is simple.”

The soul overflows into the body by virtue of a multiplication of its power. Pecham pictures reproduction as the overflowing of the vegetative power in man.

Avicebron’s view about the receptivity of a whole could support Pecham’s insistence that the soul is everywhere in the body. Avicebron says, “[W]henever a thing is divided into another, the nature of the whole exists in each of its parts. Now the units are parts of the multiple. Therefore the nature of the multiple exists in each of the units.” This could well serve as the theoretical background for background for Bonaventure’s principle that the soul moves the body through the vegetative power fundamentally and therefore the soul perfects the whole of the body and all of

---

249 Quaestiones, 371: “[Q]uanto aliquid est simplicius, tanto aliquid est communicabilioris existentiae. . . . communicabilioris existentiae est spiritus quam corpus.”

250 Ibid., 394: “Sed maioris sunt virtutis et existentiae communicabilioris spiritualia quam corporalia.”

251 Ibid., 381: “Amplius, non potest simul esse in diversis, dicente Damasceno de angelo qui est tanto communicationis existentiae quanto simplicioris.”

252 Ibid., 447, a statement in one of the contra arguments: “Amplius, virtus supernaturalis in anima separata stat in ipsa, in [non]-separata redundat in corpus. Ergo per omnia virtus eius [magis] multiplicatur quando coniungitur quam quando separatur, et ita per consequens minus est intensa et valida ad operationes suas” (bracketed item in orig.).

253 Tractatus, 31-32.

254 See Avicebron, Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 13-14; cf. Tractatus, 29.

255 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 51; cf. Fons Vitae: “[E]t quicquid diuiditur in aliquid, natura totius est in singulis partibus eius. et una partes sunt multitudinis. ergo natura multitudinis est in singulis unis. et formae quae sustinentur in substantia composita sunt multitudo” (123).
Pecham’s view as presented in the first two chapters of the *Tractatus* is that the act of the soul in the body as form is more fundamental than the working of the vegetative soul. Furthermore, Pecham’s own discussion of this point of the soul’s connection to every part of the body differs from Bonaventure’s explanation:

Nevertheless [the soul] has a plurality of virtual parts, which are like parts of it. But from the simplicity of its substance it has the property that it communicates itself as a whole to any random part of the body. . . . [I]ntellectual simplicity does not denote smallness, but communicable unity.  

Here, Pecham distinguishes between intellectual simplicity and imaginary simplicity. One kind of simplicity is that of a small point, e.g., the result of imagining a simple thing. But Pecham says there is also “intellectual simplicity” or simplicity in the abstract, which does not connote smallness but a “communicable unity” (*unitatem communicabilm*). It is in this second sense of simplicity that the human mind holds a simple when the intellect “abstracts its intelligible from measurement and position.”

Pecham's view of the particular corporeal substance as compared to particular intellectual substance appears to correspond with Avicebron's view. Corporeal matter is associated with non-being in Avicebron’s cosmology. Body is dense rather than subtle and thus it cannot penetrate anything else, so it is at one extremity of being:

---

256 Osborne, “Unibilitas,” 244.
257 *Tractatus*, 29: “Habet tamen partium virtualium pluralitatem, quae quasi partes eius sunt. Ex simplicitate autem suae substantiae habet ut totem se cuilibet parti corporis communicet. . . . Simplicitas intellectualis non dicit parvitatem, sed unitatem communicabilem.”
258 Ibid.
259 Ibid., 28: “... intellectus suum intelligibile abstahit a dimensione et situ.”
• “[A]lthough we have found that the corporeal substance is prevented from communicating itself on account of the thickness of the quantity and its obscurity, yet the quantity communicates its shadow to the bodies that are before it, so that, when it meets a luminous body, it gives it its form. . . .”

• “[Y]ou will understand the pettiness of the sensible in relation to the grandeur of the intelligible. And the spiritual substances will stand ready within your reach: set before you, you will see them envelop and dominate you, and it will seem to you that your own essence becomes one with these substances. And presently you will think that you are some part of these substances, on account of your connection with the corporeal substance. Then again you will think that you are the entirety of these substances and that there is no difference between them and yourself, on account of the union of your essence with their essences and the conjunction of your form with their forms.”

Pecham says similar things by way of comparing the sensible to the intelligible. The rational soul acquires its perfection partly from above and partly from below, and does not depend on the body for its essence. The seventh chapter of the Tractatus deals with “How the soul is bound by the ineptitude of the body.” In particular, imbalance in the various humors can affect the animal spirits and impair the

---

261 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 38; cf. Fons Vitae: “Et etiam quia, cum nos inuenerimus substantiam corpoream prohibitam ad conferendum se propter crassitudinem quantitatis et tenebrositatem eius, [et] tamen quantitas confert umbram suam corporibus quae opposita sunt, adeo quod, cum inuenerit corpus lucidum, dat ei formam suam. . . .” (110, bracketed item in orig.).

262 Fountain of Life, Wedeck, 128; cf. Fons Vitae: “[I]ntelliges minoritatem sensibilis secundum magnitudinem intelligibilis. et tunc substantiae spirituales ponentur ad manus tuas; et positas ante occulos tuos considerabis eas comprehendentes te et superiores te, et uidebis essentiam tuam tamquam tu sis ipsae substantiae. et aliquando putabis quod sis aliqua pars illarum, propter ligationem tuam cum substantia corporal: et aliquando putabis quod sis omnes illae, et quod non est differentia inter te et illas, propter unionem tuae essentiae cum essentiis earum et propter adiunctionem tuae formae cum formis earum” (204-205).

263 Quaestiones, 379-380.

264 Tractatus, 25: “Qualiter anima ex corporis ineptitudine ligatur.”
intellect. Corporeality is the natural product of the soul’s emanation and yet a hindrance to the intellect. Pecham says that the soul is “hurt because of the conjunction with the corrupted body, as if weakened. . . .” Only a wise person can control the “sensible concupiscibles” that are common to the beasts. Furthermore, Pecham thinks that a person is more likely to receive intellectual impressions from God or spiritual intermediaries if his senses are impeded.

Finally, Avicebron sees human knowledge as a conjoining to God conceived as active intellect—not the 10th and lowest of the separate intellects as in Avicenna. The conjoining is the conclusion of an ascent to the higher world. And, like Avicebron, Pecham sees the potential for a kind of mystical ascent that is associated with understanding:

But let me take of little by little the tunic of the phantasms, let me take off, let me uncover [the veil] of sensible scales; let me see, the Lord leading me, my more secret places, and I will drive the flock of my thoughts to the hidden desert if perhaps the consoler of my soul would appear to me.

For Pecham as for Avicebron, God is active intellect and the human knows by connecting with God (I will discuss below how this occurs) rather than with the

---

265 Ibid., 26-27.
266 Ibid., 23: “... ex coniunctione cum corpore corrupto laesa est anima, tamquam enervata. . . .”
267 Ibid., 24: “... scilicet concupiscentia vel concupiscibilitas sensibilis, ubi etiam sunt quatuor affectiones praedictae modo sensibili, quae etiam bestiis sunt communes. . . .”
268 Ibid., 28.
270 Tractatus, 3: “Sed exuam pauxillum tunicam tunicam phantasmatum, exuam, detegam [velamen] sensualium squamarum; perspiciam, duce Domino, secretiora mea et ad interiora deserti cogitationum mearum gregem minabo si forte appareat mihi consolator animae meae” (bracketed item in orig.).
lowest of the separate intelligences. Thus Pecham only partially accepts Avicenna’s view of the active intellect. And, as in the *Fons Vitae*, the aspects concerning mystical ascent are at the periphery of Pecham’s discussion; the description of contemplative activity is but a necessary corollary of the metaphysical and epistemological arguments that take center stage.

Thus far in the present chapter, I have shown that Avicebron’s influence on Pecham is not secondary. Rather, Pecham is advancing a tradition that has been transmitted from Avicebron through Gundissalinus and others. However, Avicebron is by no means the only major influence in Pecham’s thought. In the next part of the chapter, I will discuss how Pecham uses various sources to advance his own agenda.

---

271 See ibid., 9-11, 20.
272 See Hasse, *Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West*, 206. Obviously, a Christian who accepts Avicenna’s view of the active intellect would have to explain how a trinitarian, creator God could be identified with Avicenna’s active intellect, “which is only the last intelligence that emanates (indirectly) from the primary cause” (ibid., 211, parenthetical item in orig.). It should be noted that “Avicenna is often quoted as stating the proposition ‘intellectum agentem esse separatum’, which does not appear in his translated works. An important factor is Avicenna’s analogy of the sun (Aristotle had compared the activating intellect to light). It not only served as a link to Augustine’s comparison of God with the sun, it also implied Avicenna’s conviction of the separateness of the active intellect” (ibid., 222, parenthetical item in orig.). Clearly, Pecham associates with Avicenna the doctrine of the separate agent intellect illuminating the human mind: “Item, Avicenna, *VI Naturalium*: Intelligentia in effectu dat formas intelligibiles, ‘cuius operatio est ad animas nostras, sicut apparitio [solis] ad visus nostros’” (*Quaestiones*, 393, bracketed item in orig.).
273 Marrone says of Pecham and Matthew of Aquasparta, “[W]hile neither Pecham nor Matthew venture far from the architectonics of [Bonaventure’s] conceptual scheme, each managed to perfect his theory at critical points by explicitly articulating its connection with those aspects of the doctrine of divine illumination affirming mind’s direct access to divinity. As a consequence, both also evidenced less interest in the mystical way and paid less attention to the contemplative dynamic transforming mind so as to see God” (*The Light. Volume One*, 222, bracketed item added).
In so doing, I will show that Pecham’s philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original synthesis of Neoplatonic metaphysics.

**Part 4: How Does Pecham Marshal His Sources to Advance His Own Agenda?**

As I mentioned above, Pecham wants to show, in true scholastic manner, that his project is consistent with all the great philosophers: Aristotle, Augustine, Avicenna, Avicebron, and Averroes. That is, Pecham wants to show his audience that he is being consistent with the best results of theology and of philosophy.274 Pecham quotes from Aristotle (called *Philosophus*) 22 times in the *Tractatus*, and 26 times from Augustine. If Pecham perceives a conflict between what philosophical authorities teach and what theological authorities teach, then he gives precedence to theological authority. For example, Pecham reports that Avicenna has concupiscibility and irascibility residing only in the sensitive soul, but that the author of the *De Spiritu et Anima* (Alcher of Clairvaux) is correct to place those principles in the rational soul as

274 E.g., *Quaestiones*, 382: Pecham says that Avicenna errs because his position entails that the intellect is not the perfection of man. Such a position is contrary to the “definitions of both the philosophers and the saints” (“definitionibus tam philosophorum quam sanctorum”).
well. This suggests that Pecham’s approach to anthropology is not to simply repeat what he finds in the philosophers, but to interpret their works in a general Augustinian theological context; to show as far as possible how their works support theological convictions. Indeed, that is what the previous section illustrated.

Now, having discussed Pecham’s relationship with the tradition coming from Avicebron/Gundissalinus in greater detail, it is possible to say with more precision how he uses this tradition to advance his own project. The Pecham texts I have studied show that he has a broadly Neoplatonic metaphysical background that is particularly conditioned by the tradition from Avicebron/Gundissalinus. Therefore it is plausible that Pecham views his project as an opportunity to answer the following question: “Given that Avicebron, Gundissalinus, and Avicenna are right about metaphysics, what kind of natural philosophy and epistemology account best for how things are?” Broadly speaking, in addition to his own original thinking on the subject,

---

Tractatus, 15, 33-34, 45. This is a critical aspect of Pecham’s doctrine of the rational will: “Sequitur de intelligentia motiva, quae est voluntas rationalis, quam quidam dividit non sinunt per concupiscibilem et irascibilem, pro eo quod haec ponuntur tantum a Philosopho in anima irrationali. Sed huic contrarium est quod dicitur in libro De anima et spiritu. . . . Amplius, ira, quae est passio irascibilis et ceterae huiusmodi passiones, quae sunt in anima, non sunt tantum secundum partem sensibilem, sed secundum partem rationalem, cum sint etiam in daemonibus. . . .” (ibid., 40; cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 432b. 5-433a.8). Another reference to Aristotle comes in the discussion about why the rational will must be self-moving: “Rursus, definitio Anselmi dicentis: voluntatem esse instrumentum se ipsum movens, similiter et illa Platonis, quia anima est numerus se ipsum movens, videntur habere calumniam quia nihil videtur posse se ipsum movere, dicente Philosopho, IV Physicorum: ‘Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur’. . . . Sed sciendum quod una est vita animae et radix essentiae. . . . Si tamen placet voluntatem seipsam movere, dici potest hoc ipsam per hoc habere [sic] quia reflectitur supra se et est terminus actus proprii; et movet in ratione imperantis et movetur ut imperata. Electio etiam movet et affectio movetur” (ibid., 43-44; cf. Quaestiones, 381).
Pecham uses three tools to answer the question. The first is Avicenna’s account of the human person, cognition, and psychology which Pecham uses to explain how the various aspects of the soul’s function in relation to one another. Pecham’s second tool is a set of Aristotelian principles that he takes to be valid limitations on any anthropology or epistemology. Pecham’s third tool is a divine illumination theory, which has a long tradition going back at least to Augustine. I will discuss in turn each of these aspects of Pecham’s strategy.

Avicenna’s Influence

First, consider Pecham’s use of Avicenna’s account of the human person and cognition. Sometimes when Pecham cites Avicenna in the *Tractatus*, he does so in order to support positions that are central to the *Fons Vitae* or at least present in that book (an obvious example is Pecham’s attribution of statements about humors and animal spirits to Avicenna).276 Here, I will briefly discuss some of these instances where Pecham uses principles drawn from his reading of Avicenna in order to extend the project of the *Fons Vitae*.

In a fascinating combination of diverse principles and sources, Pecham discusses how the soul senses by using the corporeal organs:

---

276 *Tractatus*, 26-27. Further examples: “[N]ec enim anima est vita corporis, sed eius impressio et emanatio, ut dicit Avicenna, *VI Naturalium*” (ibid., 4); “Unde Avicenna: ‘Obligatio animae cum corpore est propter hoc ut perficiatur intellectus contemplativus et sanctificetur et mundetur’” (ibid., 8); “Et cum, secundum Avicennam, *VI Naturalium*, intellectus in operibus suis non indigeat organo, nisi sicut nauta indiget navi tantum donec perveniatur ad portum, sic secundum ipsum intellectus non indiget organis nisi in acquirendo scientiam” (ibid., 25); “Item, Avicenna dicit, *IX Metaphysicae*: ‘Non sequitur malum nisi hoc in cuius essentialia aliquid est in potentia et hoc fit per materiam’. Igitur omnis Angelus et omnis anima rationalis componitur ex materia et forma” (ibid., 47-48).
Therefore the force of the soul perfects and moves the organ that is intimately united to it; and therefore in natural perlustration it is necessary to avert the soul [to] all changes made in the organ and for the soul to transform itself by a natural connection into their likeness, and proportionally it changes itself according to the body, for just as Aristotle says, “Sense is in potency to all sensibles”, not because it suffers with the body, but because it suffers along with the body, to which it is united intimately by affection and by its desire to govern it, just as Avicenna says.277

For Pecham, Avicenna and Aristotle can be used in combination to explain what happens when humans come to know, given that Avicebron is right about the soul/body relationship. In a similar statement, Pecham cites Avicenna in support of the view that the soul and body are bound together (colligatio) in both cognition and motion.278 When Pecham adopted Avicenna’s internal and external faculties in order to explain how the soul functions (as I discussed in the first chapter of the present study), he was adopting a significant modification of the Aristotelian tradition.279

Pecham says that it is impossible to understand how the rational soul’s corporeal embodiment impedes its activity without understanding what Avicenna says about the human being’s intellectual powers.280 Like other scholastics, Pecham adapted Avicenna’s theory of the “four intellects,” accepting it completely in the Tractatus and adding to it both the Aristotelian division between speculative and practical intellects

---

277 Ibid., 13: “Vis igitur animae organum, sibi intimae unitum, perficit et movet; et ideo naturali perlustratione necesse est animam advertere omnes mutationes factas in organo et naturali colligatione in illius similitudinem se transformare, et proportionaliter corpori se immutat, quia sicut dicit Aristoteles ‘Sensus est in potentia ad omnia sensibilia’, non a corpore patitur, sed corpori compatitur, cui intime est unita affectu et desiderio regendi ipsum, sicut dicit Avicenna” (bracketed item added).
278 Ibid., 13-14.
279 Ivry, “Arabic and Islamic Psychology.”
280 Tractatus, 25.
and divine illuminationism, adapted from Augustine. And, Pecham adds a discussion about Avicenna’s view of dreams in order to show how bodily conditions can affect the soul's reception of emanations. Pecham cites Avicenna for support of the view that the radiation of forms on the intellect comes from the agent intellect. Here Pecham takes an idea that is central to Avicebron, that of emanating forms, and uses an Avicennian concept to explain how it works. The Avicennian agent intellect is emanative, “functioning much as the sun, illuminating both subject and object of intellection, and is present at every stage. . . .” Further, Pecham seems to agree with Avicenna that some people have

---

281 Hasse, *Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West*, 223; cf. Pecham, *Tractatus*, 38-39; Deborah Black, “Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological Dimensions,” *Dialogue* 32 (1993): 219-58. “Avicenna distinguishes four different states of the human intellect, which are not different faculties of the soul, but different phases of intellection: three potential intellects, called material, in habitu, in effectu, and one actually thinking intellect, the “acquired intellect” (*al-’aql al-mustafād, intellectus adeptus*). The first potential intellect is pure potentiality to know anything; the second potential intellect knows axioms such as “The whole is bigger than the part”; the third has already acquired conclusions through syllogistic reasoning and the intuition of middle terms, but does not consider them at the moment; the “acquired intellect” comes about when the human intellect connects with the active intellect (*De anima* I.5). This theory exerted a profound influence on scholastic intellect theory, especially in the period from Dominicus Gundisalvi to Albertus Magnus. The scholastics inherited from Avicenna the principal idea that the activity of the human intellect can be differentiated into different phases of gradual development and into different acts of syllogistic reasoning (Hasse 1999 and 2000, 191–200)” (Hasse, “Influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy,” parenthetical items in orig.).

282 *Tractatus*, 36.

283 Ibid., 20.

284 Ivry, “Arabic and Islamic Psychology.”
immediate, intuitive knowledge due to a gift from the agent intellect. Yet Pecham identifies God as the agent intellect, and adds the individualized agent intellect that is the seat of abstraction, basing this addition on his reading of Augustine.

*Aristotle’s Influence*

Now consider the second tool Pecham uses to develop his Neoplatonic anthropology: a set of limiting Aristotelian assumptions. Now, Pecham is not adopting Aristotle’s psychology to the same degree that he adopts Avicenna’s psychology, and Pecham’s conclusions about the soul are at odds with Aristotle’s *De Anima* in many ways. Yet Pecham sees himself as being in general agreement with Aristotelian psychology in large measure.

Therefore the body and soul, when they are defined through one another, are not two separate things. Whence the Philosopher: Everyone who posits that the soul and body are two different things, it obligates him to say what is the cause of the connection of the soul with the body. But who says that the soul is the perfection of the body, and the body does not subsist without the soul, they are not with him two different things, nor does this question arise with him also.

---

285 *Tractatus*, 20; cf. Ivry, “Arabic and Islamic Psychology”: “While most people require preliminary training of the senses to prepare their souls for intellectual cognition, which the Agent Intellect automatically grants, some few individuals with prodigious intuitions can ... grasp intelligible concepts and propositions immediately. . . . Prophets have this sense to an extreme degree, receiving emanations of all, or nearly all, of the intelligible forms in the Agent Intellect.” For Pecham’s related comment about knowledge in cases of prophecy, see *Quaestiones*, 377.

286 *Tractatus*, 20.

287 *Quaestiones*, 380: “Ergo corpus et anima, cum definiuntur per alterutrum, non sunt duo diversa. Unde Philosophus: Omnis qui ponit quod anima et corpus sunt duo diversa, convenit ei dicere quae sit causa ligamenti animae cum corpore. Qui autem dicit quod anima est perfectio corporis, et corpus non subsistit sine anima, non sunt apud ipsum duo diversa, nec accidit apud ipsum haec quoque quaestio.”
Repeatedly Pecham takes positions based on what he thinks “The Philosopher”
says.288 I will not mention each of these cases here, but I will mention some of that
are most critical to Pecham’s overall psychology and to debates of the 13th century.

Perhaps the most important principle that Pecham takes from his reading of
Aristotle is that “the powers which pertain to reason are streamed in to no organ ... the
intellect is the act of no part of the body. But all powers, which are under the intellect,
are applied by the organs.”289 This statement serves at least two purposes for Pecham.
(1) It reflects a distinction between intellect and body which governs the discussion of
the Tractatus. Despite all the ways in which the intellect relates to the body, there is
this one way in which the intellect must be kept separate from the body: Thinking is
not the act of any part of the body, because the power of the intellect cannot possibly
come from any of the organs. (2) The statement sets the stage for Pecham’s discussion
of the soul’s potencies. At the beginning of the following chapter of the Tractatus,
Pecham points to Aristotle’s statement that the intellect is the only part of the human
being that “enters from outside: and even those skilled in divine letters hold this.”290
The intellect could come from outside only if it had an operation that did not require
the use of a bodily organ. The intellect’s extrinsic source is not only fundamental to

288 E.g., Tractatus, 11, 13.
289 Tractatus, 30: “Vires autem, quae ad rationem pertinet, nulli organo influuntur, et hoc
est quod dicit Philosophus, quod intellectus nullius partis corporis est actus. Omnes
autem vires, quae sunt sub intellectu, organis appellantur.”
290 Ibid., 31: “[S]olus intellectus intrat ab extrinseco; et hanc etiam tenent in litteris
divinis periti.”
Pecham’s dualism, but also sets the stage for the 13th-century debates about monopsychism.291

Another guiding principle that Pecham takes from his reading of Aristotle is the position that the particular person thinks, i.e., the human person with his individuated intellect and body is the seat of thought:

Further, I suppose according to the Philosopher that the man understands, and that to understand is of the composite. Therefore some part of the essential man elicits an operation in understanding. But no sensitive power reaches into the intellectual operation which is totally immaterial and without an organ. Nor does it attain the proper object of the intellect which is purely abstract. Therefore unless the intellect is a true part of the man, man by no means understands.292

Pecham thinks that his view of the relationship between the sensitive soul and the rational soul is consonant with his reading of Aristotle. Pecham says that the sensible soul is perfected by corporeal forms received incorporeally, because Aristotle says that “sense can receive species without matter.”293 And Pecham says that “in man sensitive cognition is an intellectual principle, just as is obvious from the Philosopher,” and so the good of the body has to be “lifted” to a superior level by the intellectual principle.294 Pecham posits that the separate agent intellect is the same

291 See Pecham, Quaestiones, 320, 328, 432, 440.
293 Tractatus, 8: “Anima autem sensibilis perfectur corporalibus formis incorporaliter receptis. ‘Sensus enim est susceptivus specierum sine materia’ secundum Philosophum.”
294 Ibid.: “In homine enim sensitiva cognitio principium est intellectuale, sicut patet ex Philosopho.”
agent about which Aristotle speaks in his works: “It is impossible that the agent
intellect, of which the Philosopher speaks, is part of the soul when it is, just as he
says: ‘Separated, neither mixed nor possible, and it is action in itself. And knowledge
in act and is also identical to it.’” Pecham finds support for his theory of vision (a
blend of intromission and extramission) in his reading of Aristotle, even though
Pecham concludes that Aristotle denies extramission.

Pecham shows a willingness to adapt what Aristotle says in a different branch of
philosophy and apply it to psychology. For example, the movement of a mover of one
of the crystalline spheres illustrates how the soul relates to bodily pain. And
Pecham says that because Aristotle says that two bodies cannot be in the same place,
and it is just as unreasonable that an infinity of bodies could be in the same place,
then it is impossible for one mind to receive an infinity of species.

Finally, Pecham relies on his reading of Aristotle’s view of universals and
particulars to refute the Averroistic views about how the intellect is informed about
universals. An Averroistic argument to which Pecham responds is that there can be
no singulars in the intellect because everything that is received in the intellect is
abstracted from individuating conditions. Pecham’s response is that the universal

295 Quaestiones, 402: “Impossibile est intellectum agentem, de quo loquitur Philosophus, esse partem animae cum sit, ut ipse dicit: ‘Abstractus, non mixtus neque passibilis, et est in sua substantia actio. Et scientia in actu atque [eadem] est cum re’” (bracketed item in orig.).
296 Tractatus, 18.
297 Ibid., 13.
298 Quaestiones, 375; cf. Aristotle, Physics, 213b.18-22.
299 Quaestiones, 385-386.
300 Ibid., 367-368.
itself is not in the intellect, but rather a similitude of the universal, and he cites Aristotle in support of this position.\(^{301}\)

**Augustine’s Influence**

Third, consider how Pecham modifies the account based on the *Fons Vitae* by appealing to his reading of Augustine. Avicebron says that emanation is involved in human knowledge.\(^{302}\) To explain how this emanation works, Pecham relies on his reading of Augustine, as Marrone describes:

> By the time John Pecham composed his *Commentary on the Sentences*, the notion of divine illumination in normal cognition of truth was so familiar that he could answer the question: Whether God is the cognitive means for all certain understanding? by launching immediately into discussion of how God served this function, confident that his audience readily accepted the fact that he did.\(^{303}\)

Pecham was not unoriginal in his use of Augustinian principles. While is is beyond the scope of the present study to develop in detail Pecham’s theory of knowledge, consider that Marrone has traced the development of illuminationist thought in Pecham’s work and has drawn the following conclusions:

- Pecham believes that all knowledge depends on an illumination from God. Everything that man knows he perceives with assistance from the uncreated light. Sensation is an occasion for knowledge, but the cause of knowledge is the uncreated light.\(^{304}\) Sensation does not directly produce intelligible species. Rather, the mind forms intelligible species.\(^{305}\)

---

\(^{301}\) Ibid., 387; cf. *Posterior Analytics*, 100a.6-8. Pecham responds to two further arguments that are brief developments of the argument mentioned here (see *Quaestiones*, 368, 386); for exposition of these arguments, see the second chapter of the present study.

\(^{302}\) See Passin, “Solomon Ibn Gabirol”; *Fountain of Life*, Jacob, 296-298.

\(^{303}\) *The Light. Volume One*, 130.


• Pecham thinks it is not enough to say that God created man with the natural capacity to know, but rather it must be said that God intervenes further. That is, Pecham thinks that God must be given not only an efficient role in illuminating the human mind, but also a formal role.  

• Pecham thinks that the agent intellect which illuminates the human mind is not a created intelligence, but God himself, or the eternal light of God that reaches the human mind. Technically, impressed, intelligible species are God’s mechanism for granting knowledge to man independent of man’s observation of the world.

• Pecham refined illumination theory by suggesting a plurality of ways in which God logically could serve as the means of cognition: (1) Something could be the means of knowing and himself an object of knowledge. (2) Something could be the means of knowing and not an object. Pecham’s position is that divine light functions in the second way.

• Pecham thinks that human certitude about the truth or falsity of complex propositions requires reference not only to cognitive species, but also additional reference to eternal and divine reasons; the human mind has to “touch” (attingit) the divine light in some way that does not require making God the object of the mind.

• Pecham thinks that man can be said to know God, but only in the following senses: (1) Man has an intellective memory of innate impressions from God, of transcendentals and the proposition that God is. (2) Man has direct access

---

306 The Light. Volume One, 130, 138-140; cf. Pecham, Quodlibeta, 183-184; Tractatus, 136. This point must be tempered by what Pecham says about intermediaries and his illustration of coming to know via rays from the sun (Tractatus, 12; Quaestiones, 384).

307 The Light. Volume One, 172-175, 179, 231; Pecham, Tractatus, 39; Quaestiones, 395-396, 399, 415, 430, 432. Pecham also posits a created agent intellect as an active principle in the human mind (Tractatus, 20; Quaestiones, 343, 402-403).

308 The Light. Volume One, 142-143; cf. Pecham, Quodlibeta, 185. Marrone notes that Matthew of Aquasparta distinguishes his account of how God functions as an object from Pecham’s account, and this on the basis of an analogy between God’s light and solar light (The Light. Volume One, 145). However, the Pecham passage that Marrone cites includes the very analogy with solar light (Quodlibeta, 185). Thus, while Matthew explicitly mentions three ways in which God could function as object and Pecham finds only two ways, it is not obvious that Pecham failed to notice a principle that Matthew did notice.

309 The Light. Volume One, 149-151, 189; cf. Pecham, Quaestiones, 394, 403, 441; Tractatus, 20-21, 40, 135; Tractantes, 221. Pecham’s picture of human knowledge involves both the mind touching the light of God, and the light of God touching the human mind (Tractatus, 7).
to the divine reasons, but realizes that he perceives all things through God only upon reflection. (3) Man knows universal concepts that are true of objects in the world and, by participation and analogy, true of God himself. (4) Pious souls redeemed by faith have a kind of mental vision that is unavailable to others.\(^{310}\)

Beyond what I have already discussed about illumination, as far as I know, Pecham never explains in detail how God functions as guarantor of truth. Illumination is pervasive in the sense that there is never any knowledge that occurs totally apart from God’s activity.\(^{311}\) However, in the Tractatus Pecham seems to say that the soul has inherently some basic truths of logic and does not need special illumination (beyond that involved in the creation of the rational soul) to grasp them immediately; apparently such illumination is necessary in order to know complex truth.\(^{312}\) Pecham argues that the mind knows noncomplex “first impressions” innately and seems to indicate that these impressions, also known as the regulas luci aeternae, give the human mind access to the divine reasons.\(^{313}\) Illumination subsequent to the infusion of the first impressions is necessary because the human mind cannot focus on two objects at once.\(^{314}\) Additionally, in the Quaestiones we find that the material aspect of

\(^{310}\) The Light. Volume One, 224-232; cf. Pecham, Tractantes, 173, 197; Quaestiones, 433; Quodlibeta, 153; Tractatus, 135-136. Pecham describes another way of coming to know God that seems to be connected to greater familiarity with scripture and greater conformity to the Christian lifestyle (Quaestiones, 384, 390).

\(^{311}\) Pecham, Quodlibeta, 151; Quaestiones, 383; Tractatus, 11-12.

\(^{312}\) Tractatus, 20; cf. Quaestiones, 397, 408, 415-416; Marrone, The Light. Volume One, 149-150.


the cognition of a proposition is provided by the operation of the intellect, whereas
the formal aspect is provided by eternal light.\footnote{409; cf. Marrone, \textit{The Light. Volume One}, 150. Marrone suggests that there is a
collision between Pecham’s accounts of knowledge in the \textit{Tractatus} and in the
\textit{Quaestiones} (\textit{The Light. Volume One}, 151; cf. the two previous footnotes). In the
\textit{Tractatus} Pecham says that human knowledge of true propositions is possible only by
representing terms in the mind of God, where all forms can be seen in divine simplicity.
Pecham allegedly argues “precisely to the contrary” in the \textit{Quaestiones}, i.e., that the
human mind can \textit{naturally} cognize propositions and know their truth. Marrone also
suggests that this apparent contradiction can be resolved by what Pecham says in his third
\textit{Quodlibet}: “Inde enim veritas lucet incomplexorum, inde veritas et evidentia
complexorum. Incomplexorum, dico, saltem quantum ad primas intentiones quae sunt
‘unum’, ‘verum’, ‘bonum’” (\textit{Quodlibeta}, 153). If this is the solution, then Pecham’s
position is that God’s light illuminates in a different way depending on the level of
cognition. Another possibility is that Pecham’s view evolved over time, and that the
\textit{Tractatus} reflects his mature position.}

If we take into account Pecham’s insistence that all things are known in the divine
light and that certitude is gained through the intuitions that God has impressed, then
we have some indication of how the process of certification by divine reasons works,
and it is more natural than we might have expected.\footnote{Marrone, \textit{The Light. Volume One}, 229; cf. Pecham, \textit{Quaestiones}, 394; Augustine, \textit{On
the Trinity}, 9.6.} Given that Pecham is working
late in his career with a framework of emanation inspired by the tradition from
Avicebron and Gundissalinus, then Marrone’s summarization of Pecham’s view of
knowledge \textit{of} God and \textit{by} God is not surprising.\footnote{\textit{The Light. Volume One}, 229: “All the strands of Pecham’s theory of first intentions
and of his view on knowledge of God may well have been bound up in a seamless fabric
of divine illumination.”} Furthermore, Marrone points out
that “in the intellectual climate of the 1260s and 1270s, the problem was how to set
Augustine’s insight into concrete and critical form suitable to the demands of

\textit{Quaestiones} (\textit{The Light. Volume One}, 151; cf. the two previous footnotes). In the
\textit{Tractatus} Pecham says that human knowledge of true propositions is possible only by
representing terms in the mind of God, where all forms can be seen in divine simplicity.
Pecham allegedly argues “precisely to the contrary” in the \textit{Quaestiones}, i.e., that the
human mind can \textit{naturally} cognize propositions and know their truth. Marrone also
suggests that this apparent contradiction can be resolved by what Pecham says in his third
\textit{Quodlibet}: “Inde enim veritas lucet incomplexorum, inde veritas et evidentia
complexorum. Incomplexorum, dico, saltem quantum ad primas intentiones quae sunt
‘unum’, ‘verum’, ‘bonum’” (\textit{Quodlibeta}, 153). If this is the solution, then Pecham’s
position is that God’s light illuminates in a different way depending on the level of
cognition. Another possibility is that Pecham’s view evolved over time, and that the
\textit{Tractatus} reflects his mature position.
Pecham is an example of a philosopher who sets about to solve the problem by locating the various aspects of human cognition in the various areas of the brain according to a reading of Avicenna. It is not only in connection with epistemology that we find Pecham adapting principles of Avicebron according to his religious commitments. For example, Pecham cites Avicenna in support of the idea that the rational soul is connected to the body so that the intellect can be perfected, sanctified, and cleansed. These ideas are taken immediately from Avicenna and might have been taken from the *Fons Vitae*. Yet, Pecham’s conception of the purification of the intellect involves a specifically theological understanding of cleansing by way of “return” to the spiritual realm. Pecham does not directly explain why the intellect would need to be sanctified and cleansed, but presumably this has to do with coming to learn divine truth by reasoning based on the observation of external, sensible reality. Pecham argues that this is one process whereby one accesses divine truth, by discussing what Augustine has to say on the subject:

> [T]he soul, running to and fro through portrayed species according to its highest end, touches the reasons of the same parts in eternal light and there

---

318 *The Light: Volume One*, 134.
319 See, e.g., *Tractantes*, 197.
320 *Tractatus*, 8; cf. Avicenna, *De Anima*, 1.5; *Quaestiones*, 380.
321 Rudavsky says that the *Fons Vitae* “has several basic themes: . . . to return to the world of spirit, the soul must purify itself of the pollutions of this base world” (“Solomon Ibn Gabirol,” 251); *Fons Vitae*: “Perueniendi ad hanc scientiam duo sunt modi. unus est per scientiam de uoluntate secundum quod infusa est in totam materiam et formam; et secundus per sicentiam de uoluntate comprehendentem materiam et formam, quae est uirtus altissima, secundum quod cum nihilo materiae et formae est commixta” (338).
discerns the unchanging truth of the utterable and from there draws up the truth, just as Augustine says, *On the Trinity*. . . .

And, when Pecham arrives at the discussion of the immortality of the soul (the last chapter of the *Tractatus*), he relies on Augustine but not at all on Avicenna, even though Avicennian principles would also lead one to the soul’s immortality.

I have now shown that Pecham is advancing a tradition that has been transmitted from Avicebron through Gundissalinus and others, and how he uses various other sources to advance his own agenda. Therefore, I have shown that Pecham’s philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original synthesis of Neoplatonic metaphysics. In the final part of this chapter, I will respond to two objections to what I have said so far.

**Part 5: Objections to My Position Concerning the Avicebron/Gundissalinus Influence**

Two scholars have argued against the traditional view which I have defended in the specific case of Pecham, i.e., that the Avicebron/Gundissalinus tradition is the primary source for the doctrine of universal hylomorphism, and hence for the corresponding doctrine of the plurality of forms. Roberto Zavalloni (1951) and Michael B. Sullivan, in his dissertation (2010), have downplayed the influence of Avicebron in the 13th century Franciscan school, arguing that the doctrine of spiritual matter is traceable to to Plotinus, Augustine, and Avicenna, and merely finds

---

322 *Tractatus*, 20: “Anima igitur, per species effigiatas discurrens secundum apicem sui, rationes earundem partium in luce aeterna attingit et ibi veritatem enuntiabilis immobilem cernit et inde veritatem haurit, sicut dicit Augustinus, *De Trinitate*. . . .”

secondary expression in Avicebron.\(^{324}\) According to Sullivan, “Avicebron’s influence on thirteenth-century Franciscans espousing spiritual matter has been significantly exaggerated. . . .”\(^{325}\) And Zavalloni says that “Where the hylomorphic composition of all created beings is concerned, the influence of Avicebron is incontestable, but it is neither exclusive, nor even preponderant; that of Saint Augustine ... seems more direct and more decisive than that of Avicebron.”\(^{326}\)

Before responding to Sullivan’s arguments directly, I must admit that Zavalloni and Sullivan are correct in saying that Augustine is the central figure in 13th-century theology. Dales has pointed out that Pecham himself attributes the doctrine of universal hylomorphism to Augustine: “Universal hylomorphism can be grafted onto Aristotelian thought, as it was by Roger Bacon and Matthew of Aquasparta, or onto Augustine’s, as it was by Pecham and many others.”\(^{327}\) Indeed, Pecham grafts the doctrine of spiritual matter onto Augustine and Averroes in the Quaestiones.

Hoc igitur primum fundamentum multipliciter eliditur, tum quia, quamvis careat materia corporali privata, non tamen materia spirituali intelligibili. Unde Augustinus, Contra Manichaeum: “Deus dicitur de nihilo omnia fecisse, quia etiam si omnia formata et de ista materia formata sunt facta, haec ipsa tamen materia de nihilo facta est”. Et ipse etiam Commentator fatetur, quia habet aliquid simile materie et aliquid simile formae. Sicut dicit:

\(^{324}\) Zavalloni, Richard De Mediavilla; Sullivan, “The Debate.”
\(^{325}\) “The Debate,” 22.
\(^{326}\) Richard de Mediavilla, 422: “Comment aprécier l’influence d’Avicebron chez les scolastiques du XIIIe siècle, notamment chez les penseurs franciscains? M. Gilson la croit ‘profond et durable’. Elle nous semble, au contraire, plutôt secondaire. En ce qui concerne la composition hylémorphique de tous les êtres créés, l’influence d’Avicebron est incontestable, mais elle n’est ni exclusive, ni même prépondérante; celle de saint Augustin—nous le verrons dans le cas de Thomas d’York—semble plus directe et plus décisive que celle d’Avicebron.”
\(^{327}\) The Problem of the Rational Soul, 3.
As I discussed in the first chapter of the present study, it is not unusual for Pecham and other medieval writers to look for support in Augustine. Ironically, Aquinas cites Augustine in opposition to the doctrine of spiritual matter in the soul: “On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7, 8, 9) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter nor of spiritual matter.” And it must be borne in mind that Pecham takes Augustine as the major theological authority in general. One statement of

328 379, bracketed items in orig.; cf. Augustine, On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees, 1.6.10: “And that is why we are dead right in believing that God made all things from nothing, because even though everything that has form was made from this material, this material itself all the same was made from absolutely nothing.”

329 Summa Theologiae, 1.75.5; cf. Augustine, Literal Meaning of Genesis: “As for that spiritual material, however, if there was any from which the soul would be made, or if there is any from which souls are still being made, what precisely was it? What name, what specific nature, what function does it hold among created things? Is it alive, or not? If it is, how does it act? What does it contribute to the effectiveness of the whole? Does it live a happy, blessed life, or a miserable one, or neither? Does it quicken anything? Or is it unoccupied with any of this, and resting idly in some hidden place of the universe without conscious sensation or vital movement? If, you see, it was not yet any sort of life at all, how could it be the material, neither bodily nor alive, for life yet to be in the future? So this is plainly untrue, or excessively obscure. If on the other hand it was already living a life neither blessed nor miserable, how could it be rational? But if that material became rational at the moment when the nature of the human soul was made from it, then non-rational life was the material of the rational, that is of the human, soul. So what was the difference, then, between that and a merely animal soul? Or was it already potentially rational, not yet entirely so? After all, we see how the infant soul, already of course the soul of a human being, has not yet begun to use reason, and yet we already call it a rational soul; so why should we not suppose that in that material from which it was made even sentient activity was stilled, just as in this infant soul, which is certainly that of a human being already, rational activity is stilled for the time being?” (7.7; cf. ibid., 7.8-9).
Pecham’s, which I already noted in the present study, shows the allegiance to Augustine among the Neo-Augustinians of the 13th century:

Which doctrine is more solid and more sound, the doctrine of the sons of St. Francis, namely of Friar Alexander [of Hales] of happy memory, of Friar Bonaventure and others like him, who rely on the Fathers and the philosophers in treatises secure against any reproach, or that very recent and almost entirely contrary doctrine, which fills the entire world with wordy quarrels, weakening and destroying with all its strength what Augustine teaches concerning the eternal rules and the unchangeable light, the faculties of the soul, the seminal reasons included in matter and innumerable questions of the same kind? Let the Ancients be the judges, since in them is wisdom! Let the God of heaven be judge, and may he remedy it!\textsuperscript{330}

Despite the Franciscans’ stated allegiance to Augustine, the suggestion that Augustine is the primary influence on their doctrines of universal hylomorphism and plurality of forms is misleading. He may have been the motivator, but the detailed theory comes from Avicebron. The present study cannot address Avicebron’s influence on the 13th-century Franciscans as a whole, but the textual evidence from Pecham himself

supports the traditional view (Weisheipl’s view). Weisheipl argues that, while the doctrines Pecham mentions seem to be clearly Augustinian, Pecham’s actual doctrines represent deviations from Augustine, and where these deviations concern the primacy of the divine will, hylomorphism, and the plurality of forms, the doctrines are largely traceable to the tradition coming from the *Fons Vitae*. I have supported Weisheipl’s

---

331 Bieniak has responded directly to Zavalloni: “In his study on the doctrine of the plurality of forms in the individual, Roberto Zavalloni thoroughly examines the question of the main source of inspiration for [Philip the Chancellor’s] theory of intermediaries. According to Zavalloni, the traditional thesis that this doctrine is inspired by Avicebron’s *Fons vitae*, is not correct: rather the main source of our theory seems to be contained in Avicenna’s *De anima* . . . . Undoubtedly Avicenna played an important role for the anthropology of the first half of the thirteenth century, including the theory of intermediaries. . . . [T]he idea that the soul is united with a body which is already prepared for the union is present in Philip’s thought and certainly derives from Avicenna. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Avicebron’s influence should be diminished. Actually, thanks to the complete edition of the *Summa de bono* [we know the doctrine of the *Fons Vitae* came to Philip] also indirectly, that is through a short anonymous treatise entitled *De potentiiis animae et objectis*. According to the text’s editor, the treatise was employed by Philip in the *Summa* . . . . Undoubtedly, the anonymous author knew Avicebron’s work very well: indeed, the latter is mentioned quite often, and always using the title *Liber de materia et forma*. The strong influence exerted by the Jewish philosopher is visible above all in the case of the theory of the intermediary elements. For, according to Avicebron, in man there exists a hierarchy of forms connecting intelligence and body. Just as in the *Summa de bono* lower forms play the role of material dispositions in regard to higher forms, so in the *Fons vitae* lower forms play the role of matter in regard to higher forms, which, in their turn, operate in the lower forms. Among Avicebron’s intermediary forms, there are, on the one hand, the vegetative soul operating in the body and resembling the body thanks to its consistency (‘crassitudo’), and, on the other, the sensitive soul operating in the vegetative soul and resembling the rational soul thanks to its subtlety. The same hierarchy is adopted by the anonymous author of *De potentiiis animae et objectis*. The sensitive soul resembles the rational soul because it performs a cognitive function and is incorporeal, whereas the vegetative soul is incorporeal but performs no functions of a cognitive kind. Besides the sensitive and vegetative powers, between soul and body there are also two corporeal intermediaries, i.e. the ‘spirit’ and the ‘virtus elementaris’” (*The Soul-Body Problem*, 127-128, bracketed items added, parenthetical item in orig.).

332 “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,” 245ff.
conclusion by underscoring the critical role of Avicebronian doctrines in various Franciscans who influenced Pecham (Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle, Bonaventure, Roger Bacon,), and by at least noting the following connections between Pecham and Avicebron’s *Fons Vitae*:

- There is causal hierarchy whereby a plurality of forms operate upon one another via an emanation of force; emanation functions in the human’s being and existence. The soul, *qua* form, gives being to corporeal matter (at least insofar as it is the body of a human being) and existence to the human person.

- Knowledge is also transferred from above via emanation. Knowledge is a conjoining to God as the active intellect.

- There is a form of corporeity, or a basic structuring principle in all matter. Form and matter are both ordered in a correlative hierarchy such that the rational soul can be called the form of the human being, although the human being has additional forms.

- There is a kind of matter that is not subject to decay, and this is the matter that characterizes the rational soul and the angel.

- Various aspects of the human being can be called “substance,” because “substance” (i.e., form and matter) permeates all of being.

- The substances that are higher on the spectrum of being are simpler, nobler subtler; the intellect is hindered by the body.

- A complex substance can nonetheless be simple, depending on the perspective from which it is considered.

- Animal spirits are the vehicles of the emanation of the rational soul’s powers throughout the body.

- Desire is responsible for form-matter conjunction, and thus desire is central to the being of the human individual, or the “third nature” that results from the combination of soul and body.

- Form and matter both participate in the individuation of a substance.
If the commonalities I have found between Pecham and Avicebron are distinct from
and substantially greater than those between Pecham and Augustine (or even as strong
as those between Pecham and Augustine) then we are safe in concluding that a *Fons
Vitae* tradition influenced Pecham and was, while inspired by certain ideas in
Augustine, a phenomenon that by the 13th century was distinct from Augustine’s
teaching. And, as will become clear in the following paragraphs, the similarities
between Pecham and Avicebron on the subject of form and matter are much greater
than such similarities between Pecham and Augustine.

I will now respond directly to the arguments of Sullivan and Zavalloni. First, a
point of clarification: Sullivan is correct that “Plotinus, as the father of Neoplatonism,
looms behind both Augustine and Avicebron.” But Sullivan goes on to say that the
medievals had no opportunity to read from Plotinus, whereas they did read from
Avicebron. This is technically incorrect, given that the medievals had access to the
*Theology of Aristotle*, which was in large part an Arabic translation of Plotinus.

---


334 Ibid.

335 “In the ninth century, Plotinus was translated into Arabic. Long sections of this
translation went under the title *Theology of Aristotle*. The attribution of the work to
Aristotle helped the text to become an influential source of Neoplatonic ideas in the
Arabic-speaking world. But the Arabic Plotinus materials are important not only as a
conduit for Plotinus' ideas; they also differ on numerous points from their ultimate
source. Thus the *Theology*, along with other texts derived from the Arabic version of
Plotinus, in fact constitute an interpretation of Plotinus' thought, and not just a translation.
The *Theology* in turn becomes the chief text conveying Plotinian ideas to the Arabic-
speaking tradition” (Adamson, “The Theology of Aristotle”; cf. Paul Henry and Hans-
Rudolf Schwyzer, eds., *Plotini Opera, Tomus II: Enneades IV-V* [Paris: Desclée de
Brouwer, 1959]).
Now, consider Sullivan’s downplaying of Avicenum’s influence. Sullivan has suggested that Weisheipl overstates his case for Avicenum’s influence concerning hylomorphism for the following reasons: (1) Avicenum rarely or never speaks of the \textit{forma corporeitatis}.\footnote{Sullivan, “The Debate,” 26.} I admit this, but Avicenum does imply that there is such a form. Theodore James writes:

Unlike Avicenna and later Christian universal hylomorphists [Avicenum] does not speak of a form of corporeity but only a “matter of corporeity”; corporeity or quantity is the basic corporeal form. “Forma quantitatis cum coniungitur materiae inferiori constituit speciem corporis et eam ducit ad esse.” (II.8) The composite corporeal substance is either the corporeal matter supporting the forms of qualities by means of quantity (Tract I) or spiritual matter which sustains the corporeal form (Tract II).\footnote{Introduction to \textit{Fountain of Life}, Wedeck, vii, parenthetical items in orig. “Tracts” here refers to what I have been calling the books of the \textit{Fons Vitae} (they total five). Cf. \textit{Fountain of Life}, Jacob: “And just as the structure of reason underlies all structures and all are sustained in it, so does that of quantity support all structures of physical substantiality and its contingencies, while their existence is within it” (41); \textit{Fons Vitae}: “[E]t sicut forma intelligentiae sustinet omnes formas et omnes formae sustinentur in illa, similiter forma quantitatis sustinet omnes formas corporis et eius accidentia et habent esse in illa” (38).}

It is superficial to claim that Avicenum has nothing to say about the \textit{forma corporeitatis} simply because he does not use the precise, technical term.

(2) Sullivan says that Gundissalinus’ \textit{De Unitate et Uno} was also very influential, and so Avicenum’s influence was more remote and “grandfatherly.” This argument is misleading because it fails to take two things into account: First, the \textit{De Unitate} itself is a conduit of Avicenum’s ideas, so it is odd to attempt to minimize Avicenum’s

\footnote{See \textit{De Unitate et Uno}, 1-11.}
influence on the basis that the *De Unitate* was influential.\textsuperscript{338} Weisheipl writes on this point:

Gundisalvi’s treatise *De Unitate et uno* circulated for some centuries in the Latin West under the name of Boethius . . . although Aquinas rejected it as spurious . . . While the treatise appears somewhat Boethian in its explanation of the various senses in which *unitas* can be said of God and creatures being taken singly or in aggregates, it utilizes material drawn from both Avicenna and Avicebron, as the critical edition clearly shows.\textsuperscript{339}

The *De Unitate* is a brief work, but in it we find a clear statement of the doctrine of spiritual matter: “Omne enim esse ex forma est, in creatis scilicet. Sed nullum esse ex forma est, nisi cum forma materiae unita est.”\textsuperscript{340} The second reason why Sullivan’s argument is misleading is that Gundissalinus had not only one but four distinct works that carried Avicebron’s influence: The *De Unitate et Uno*; the treatise *De Anima*; *De Immortalitate Animae*; *De Processione Mundi*.\textsuperscript{341} Gundissalinus’ *De Anima* was particularly influential and is clearly Avicebronian in terms of its hylomorphism.\textsuperscript{342}

The question relevant to Sullivan’s work is whether a comparable number of commonalities can be found between Pecham and Augustine concerning spiritual matter and hylomorphism. I cannot review all of the Augustine texts in detail, but I can briefly mention the texts that Sullivan marshals in support of his conclusion, and show that it is implausible to suppose that Pecham’s hylomorphism is more the result of a reading of Augustine than of Avicebron.

\textsuperscript{339} “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,” 247-248.
\textsuperscript{340} *De Unitate et Uno*, 1.
\textsuperscript{341} The authenticity of the *De Immortalitate Animae* has been questioned (Houser, “Dominicus Gundissalinus,” 247-248).
\textsuperscript{342} See Callus, “Gundissalinus’ *De Anima*,” 338-355.
The first two passages are from the *Confessions*:

Have you not yourself taught this soul which confesses to you, Lord, have you not taught me that before you imparted form and distinction to that formless matter there was nothing—no color, no shape, no body, no spirit? Yet not nothing at all, no, not that either, for there was some kind of formlessness with no differentiation.”³⁴³

And,

But for my own part, Lord, if I am to confess to you with tongue and pen all that you have taught me about this primal matter, in earlier days I heard it mentioned but failed to understand what it was, when people who were equally devoid of understanding told me about it, and I pictured it to myself under innumerable forms of all kinds, which is to say that I was not thinking of it as it truly was at all. My mind passed in review disgusting, hideous forms, distortions of the natural order, certainly, but forms nonetheless. I dubbed “formless” not something that really lacked all form, but which had a kind of form from which, if it were to appear, my gaze would turn away as from something weird and grotesque, and liable to upset weak human sensibility very badly. But what I thus imagined was not formless in the sense that it lacked all form, but formless only by comparison with things of fairer form; and clear thinking was beginning to convince me that I must eliminate the last vestiges of form entirely if I wished to gain a notion of what true formlessness would be. And this I could not do. I would have found it easier to deem anything that entirely lacked form non-existent, than to conceive of something midway between form and nothingness, neither formed existence nor nothingness, formless and all but non-existent.

Hence my intellect gave up asking questions of my imagination, filled as this was with pictures of formed corporeal things which it could shuffle and vary at will; and I turned my attention to the bodily things themselves, and more carefully examined their mutability. They cease to be what they formerly were, and begin to be what they were not, and I came to suspect that this transition from one form to another involves passing through formlessness, rather than through absolute non-being; but I was anxious to know, and not merely suspect.

So, as I was saying, if my voice and my pen are to confess to you everything that you have disentangled for me concerning this problem, how many of my readers will have enough stamina to take it in? Still, that is no reason for my heart to withhold honor from you, or to stop singing your praises for all that it understands but cannot record here. The mutability of

³⁴³ 12.3.
mutable things itself gives them their potential to receive all those forms into which mutable things can be changed. And what is this mutability? A soul? A body? The form of a soul or of a body? No; I would call it a nothing-something” or “an is-that-is-not,” if such expressions were allowed. And yet it must have some kind of being, to be capable of receiving those visible and organized forms.\textsuperscript{344}

Sullivan cites three more passages from the \textit{Confessions}. In the first of these,

Augustine says that the substance from which God created the heaven and Earth were formless, but here Augustine does not directly say that there was spiritual matter.\textsuperscript{345} In the second passage, however, Augustine does label the “darkness louring over the abyss” as “spiritual matter before its impetuous flux was restrained and it was

\textsuperscript{344} 12.6, parenthetical items in orig.

\textsuperscript{345} 12.19: “True it is, Lord, that you made heaven and earth. And it is true that your Wisdom, in whom you made all things, is the Beginning. It is also true that this visible world consists of the great regions we call heaven and earth, and that these names, “heaven” and “earth,” can be used as a brief, compendious phrase to connote all the natural things made and created within them. Again, it is true that every changeable thing suggests to us the notion of a certain formlessness, whereby that creature can receive form, or can be changed and transformed into something else. It is true that any being which holds fast to immutable form with such constancy that, though changeable in itself, it does not change, is not subject to variations of time. It is also true that formlessness, which is close to nothingness, cannot experience any passage of time either. It is true that a substance from which something else is made can by a certain convention of speech be given proleptically the name of the thing which is to issue from it: hence the formless matter from which heaven and earth were made could have been called “heaven and earth.” It is true that, out of all formed creatures, nothing is nearer to formlessness than earth and the deep. It is true that you, from whom all things come, made not only what is created and formed, but also matter with the potential to be created and formed. It is true that anything which is formed from what is unformed is formless first, and then formed”; cf. \textit{Literal Meaning of Genesis}, 5.5, Sullivan, “The Debate,” 18.
illumined by wisdom.” In this passage Augustine comes closest to the Franciscan idea of spiritual matter, because he discusses mutability in connection with the primal matter and says that there are “visible” and “invisible” things that have “formless matter.” However, the discussion of mutability is brief and imprecise, remaining focused on the matter from which God made the heaven and Earth.

Here is Sullivan’s final passage from the *Confessions*:

> Anyone so minded might advance yet another opinion, namely that when we read *In the beginning God made heaven and earth*, the words do not refer to invisible and visible natures already perfect and formed, but to the still unformed seeds of things, the matter capable of being formed and created, because in it were potentially present, though mingled confusedly, and not yet distinguished by qualities and forms, all those things which are now distributed in their various ranks, the spiritual and the corporeal creation which we now call, respectively, heaven and earth.

Then Sullivan cites a number of passages from Augustine’s *Literal Meaning of Genesis* which discuss an interrelationship between matter and mutability, and

---

346 12.17: “Another view again is that both invisible and visible nature are quite appropriately styled *heaven* and *earth*, and that under these two names is comprised the entire universe which God made in his Wisdom, that is, in the Beginning. According to this opinion the terms *heaven* and *earth* are used by anticipation to indicate the still formless matter which is common to all things, both invisible and visible; this usage is justified because all these creatures were made not from God’s own substance but out of nothing; they are not Being-Itself like God and a certain mutability is inherent in all of them, whether they abide, as does the eternal house of God, or suffer change, as do the human soul and body. From this primal matter, still formless but undoubtedly capable of receiving form, heaven and earth were to be made, that is, both invisible and visible creation in their formed state. Under this double name, however, are included both the invisible and unorganized earth and the darkness louring [sic] over the abyss, but with this distinction: the invisible and unorganized earth is understood to be corporeal matter before it received the distinguishing qualities of form, while the darkness lowering over the deep stands for spiritual matter before its impetuous flux was retrained and it was illumined by wisdom. So runs the theory: what are we to make of it?” (emp. in orig.).

347 Ibid.
speculate about the possibility that just as the matter of earth supports its various
corporeal properties, so the soul could have its own spiritual matter to support its
properties.\textsuperscript{348} Yet none of these passages come close to yielding in full the

\textsuperscript{348} E.g., \textit{Literal Meaning of Genesis}, 1.1: “Or was it the unformed basic material of both
kinds that was called heaven and earth; namely, spiritual life as it can be in itself without
having turned to the creator—it is by so turning, you see, that it is formed and perfected,
while if it does not so turn it is formless, deformed; and bodily being, if it can be
understood as lacking every kind of bodily quality, which is manifested in material that
has been formed, when there are already various kinds of bodies, perceptible either by
sight or by any of the body’s senses?”; cf. ibid., 1.9: “If, however, light, which was the
first thing of which it was said that it should be made, and then it was made, is also to be
taken as holding the first place in creation, then it is itself that intellectual, intelligent life,
which would be in a formlessly fluid state unless it turned to the creator to be
enlightened”; ibid., 5.5: “And so it was in the order of causes, not of time, that the first
good, to be made was formless and formable material, both spiritual and corporeal, from
which would be made whatever had to be made. . . .”; ibid., 1.14: “It is, after all, obvious
(that everything changeable is given form or shape out of something lacking form or
shape)” (parenthetical item in orig.) ; ibid., 7.6: “If the soul, you see, were something
unchangeable, we ought not to be inquiring in any way at all about its quasi-material; but
as it is, its changeableness is obvious enough through its sometimes being rendered
mishapen by vices and errors, sometimes being put into proper shape by virtues and the
teaching of truth, but all within the nature it has of being soul. In the same way flesh, in
its own nature which it has of being flesh, is both embellished with health and disfigured
by diseases and wounds. But just as this, apart from being already flesh and in that nature
ranking high as being beautiful or low as being misshapen, also had some material, that is
to say earth, from which to be made in order to be entirely flesh; in the same way too,
possibly, before being made in the actual nature which is called soul, whose beauty and
misshapenness consist respectively in virtue and vice, could have had some appropriate
spiritual material which was not yet soul, just as earth, from which flesh was made, was
already something, though it was not flesh”; ibid., 7.27: “So then it is futile to ask from
what sort of material the soul might have been made, if one can rightly understand it to
have been made in those first works of creation, when the day was made. Just as those
things, after all, were made out of nothing, so too this soul among them. But if there was
also some formable material, both bodily and spiritual, this too, however, set up by none
other but God. which [sic] indeed came before its formation, not in time but in origin, as
the voice does with the song, what can be a more fitting assumption than that the soul
was made from spiritual material?”
implications of the doctrine of spiritual matter as discussed by Pecham and others in
the context described above.

I conclude that Sullivan is correct to say that Augustine had an influence on views
of matter in the 13th century, but Sullivan’s view must be qualified in the following
ways: While Augustine does associate mutability with matter as Pecham and others
will do, it is only with Avicebron and Dominicus Gundissalinus that the implications
of spiritual matter are developed fully, and it is clear that the *Fons Vitae* was heavily
influential in the propagation of the doctrines of universal hylomorphism and the
plurality of forms. In short, Augustine does not have a fully worked-out doctrine of
universal matter and form as the Franciscans do. Add to this the fact that Pecham
clearly inherits both the Avicebron/Gundissalinus and Franciscan traditions, and the
only reasonable conclusion is that, while Pecham wanted to defend the views of
Augustine, he intended to do it *with the help of the philosophers*, especially Avicenna,
Averroes, and Avicebron.

Sullivan was basically arguing for the view taken by Roberto Zavalloni in his
work on the plurality of forms.\textsuperscript{349} Zavalloni admits that the common interpretation of
the 13th century is that of Gilson, who says that Avicebron had a “profound and
durable” influence.\textsuperscript{350} In the course of describing the history of the plurality view,
Zavoloni reviews the texts of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas that show the
influence of the *Fons Vitae*, and discusses briefly the influence of Gundissalinus in

\textsuperscript{349} Richard De Mediavilla.
his *De Anima*. Then, however, Zavalloni turns to Augustine’s position and determines that Augustine is the primary source for the doctrines, whereas the philosophers are secondary.

In Zavalloni’s section on the Jewish and Arabic sources of the theory of the plurality theory he mentions only two, and with little comment: Alcher of Clairvaux’s *De Spiritu et Anima* and Gundissalinus’ *De Anima*. The latter work, as Callus has pointed out, is noted as being the work of Gundissalinus’ that does not espouse the plurality of forms whereas other works of Gundissalinus, ignored by Zavalloni here, do support the plurality of forms.

Then, Zavalloni reviews the works of those in the later medieval period who associate the plurality view with Augustine in some way, and the list includes some of those I have already mentioned in this study: Thomas of York, Alexander of Hales, Eudes Rigaud, Richard of Middleton, Bonaventure, Robert Grosseteste, Thomas Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, and Roger Marston. Zavalloni is surely correct that authors cited Augustine in support of the doctrine of plurality of forms, but this point

———

352 Ibid., 428ff.
353 Ibid., 429.
354 “Gundissalinus’ De Anima”; cf. Gundissalinus, *De Processioni Mundi; De Unitate et Uno*.
355 Callus, “Gundissalinus’ De Anima,” 353–355; cf. Gundissalinus, *De Processione Mundi*: “Forma uero prima est substantia constitutens essentiam omnium formarum” (30); ibid., *De Unitate et Uno*: “Quia igitur materia in supremis formata est forma intelligentiae, deinde forma rationalis animae, postea vero forma sensibilis animae, deinde inferius forma animae vegetabilis, deinde forma naturae, ad ultimum autem in infimis forma corporis: hoc non accidit ex diversitate virtutis agentis, se ex aptitudine materiae suscipiensis” (8).
must be qualified by bearing five points in mind: (1) As I have shown, and as Zavalloni himself notes, Aquinas and Albertus Magnus also expressed concerned opposition to the doctrines found in Avicebron. (2) In describing how Richard of Middleton establishes the doctrine of the plurality of forms, Zavalloni shows that Richard uses the reasons of the theologians and philosophers. Similarly, in describing the development of the doctrine of the plurality of forms, Zavalloni discusses at length the problem of the interpretation of Aristotle, thus showing that the doctrine of plurality of forms as it was received by the 13th-century thinkers represented a complex of received theological and philosophical traditions. (3) Medieval authors such as Pecham sought to find the support of Augustine’s theological authority for any number of doctrines, but the fact that they sought his authority for such doctrines proves neither that Augustine had the most complete or relevant account of those doctrines. (4) Medieval authors would have been concerned that an endorsement of the Fons Vitae would have been interpreted as an endorsement of pantheism akin to that promoted by David of Dinant, insofar as the Fons Vitae’s emanationism is distinct from the creation doctrine of Christianity. Thus, it would have been natural for Latin authors to utilize even vague expressions of the doctrines that can be found in Augustine rather than citing the Fons Vitae directly. (5) There is evidence, as I showed above, that Franciscan authors were greatly indebted to the Avicebron/Gundissalinus tradition for providing a way of developing in detail the

357 Ibid., 22ff.
358 Ibid., 456ff.
359 See Estevez, La Materia, 225.
doctrines of universal hylomorphism and the plurality of forms which are present in Augustine only in an embryonic form.

Finally, Zavalloni is incorrect in his claim that Vital du Four was the first (around 1290-1295) to allude to Avicebron directly in defense of any position, for Pecham already does so in his *Quaestiones* in the 1260s.360

**Conclusion**

My thesis for this dissertation has two parts. The first part is that John Pecham’s philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original synthesis of Neoplatonic metaphysics. The second part is that Pecham’s anthropology is a significant alternative to that of Aquinas.

After explicating the relevant works of Pecham and Aquinas in the first four chapters, the present chapter has demonstrated the truth of the first part of my overall dissertation thesis. For, while the *Fons Vitae* and the works of Avicenna and Averroes were both widely influential in the 13th century, Pecham and Roger Bacon are unique in their adaptation of the Neoplatonic vision of the soul presented in Avicebron’s text to a wider natural philosophy via Avicenna, Averroes, and others. Admittedly, other authors adopted universal hylomorphism and a version of the doctrine of the plurality of forms; Paul Vincent Spade makes a partial list of the authors who subscribed to versions of these two doctrines (often called the *binarium famosissimum* or “most

---

361 Spade, “Binarium Famosissimum.”
famous pair”, including Gundissalinus, Thomas of York, and Richard of Middleton.

To show in detail how Pecham differs from every philosopher who espoused the binarium famosissimum would require a separate study, although it is not difficult to show that there are significant differences between Pecham and various others such that Pecham cannot be simply grouped with the others. For example, while Pecham was probably influenced by Thomas of York, and they share many positions (both draw extensively from the Fons Vitae), there are also significant differences between the two philosophers. For example, Pecham’s doctrine of life in the Tractatus goes beyond what Thomas says; Pecham applied his psychology to the debate with Averroes, thus bringing to light nuances in his thought. And, while Gundissalinus undoubtedly influenced Pecham and many others by transmitting Avicebron’s and Avicenna’s thought, Gundissalinus’ model of the rational soul is different from that of Pecham. Gundissalinus posits two powers of the rational soul according to Avicenna’s “two faces” model, whereas Pecham makes only vague reference to the “two faces” in the Tractatus and develops the psychological hierarchy in much

---

362 “Binarium Famosissimum.” Spade counts Bonaventure as one of those philosophers who holds to the plurality of substantial forms.
364 See Houser, “Dominicus Gundissalinus,” 247-248. These is controversy as to how influential Gundissalinus’ own *De Anima* was (Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West*, 16-17).
greater detail. Pecham seems to have influenced Richard of Middleton’s position on the plurality of forms, and there are other similarities between the two philosophers. Again, however, Richard has a view of matter that differs importantly from Pecham’s view. Richard has a conception of matter as a purely passive principle that nevertheless contains the same form potentially and then actually, whereas Pecham views matter as the principle of potentiality and corporeal matter as already actually informed by the *forma corporeitatis* via the seminal reasons. And, there are striking differences between Richard’s view of divine illumination and that of Pecham. The present chapter has also shown significant differences between Pecham and Bonaventure, who was head of the Franciscan order during Pecham’s time in Paris.

Now, having defended the first part of my thesis, I will compare Pecham and Aquinas in order to demonstrate that the second part of my thesis is true.

---

366 See ibid., 14; cf. Pecham, *Tractatus*, 3. Furthermore, whereas Gundissalinus takes the position that rational souls are created by the ministration of angels based on the authority of God (Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul*, 14), Pecham simply says that souls are created by divine power and infused into the body (Pecham, *Quaestiones*, 323).


369 See ibid., 575.

370 Cf. Noone and Houser, “Bonaventure.”
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION - PECHAM AND AQUINAS

This chapter is designed to prove that the second part of my thesis is true, i.e., to show that Pecham's philosophical anthropology is a significant alternative to that of Aquinas. It will argue that Pecham’s philosophy merits this high rank by comparing his position to that of Aquinas and will advocate three things: (1) Pecham’s position is not subject to some objections that are problematic for Aquinas’s position; (2) that Pecham and Aquinas are both dualists in some sense; and (3) Pecham has philosophical arguments in the controversy with Averroism that are interesting independent of their value to theology.

Here is how I will carry out this task: First, I will compare the results of my study of Pecham and Aquinas. In doing so, I will briefly discuss five opinions which Pecham and Aquinas share: (1) Individual human souls are created ex nihilo; (2) The soul is in some sense the form of the human body; (3) Each individual human has his own agent intellect; (4) Humans have understanding truly by means of the divine light; (5) Monopsychism is wrong, i.e., opposed to the greater philosophers and Christian teaching. Having shown these similarities between Pecham and Aquinas, I will then discuss how the thinkers differ in two major areas: (1) Focus on the concept of life; (2) Plurality of forms. As I discuss these differences I will adjudicate them to some degree, showing both that
Pecham’s view is more internally consistent and explanatory than that of Aquinas, and that Pecham and Aquinas cannot be divided conveniently along dualist/non-dualist lines.

Finally, I will highlight the philosophical significance of Pecham’s work. I will do so by first revisiting the controversy with Latin Averroism in order to cite examples of Pecham’s philosophical arguments that deserve attention independent of any controversy with Aquinas. Then, I will discuss Pecham’s philosophical motivation for adopting the plurality of forms position: Pecham believes that there are certain unacceptable consequences that follow from Aquinas's metaphysical starting point, but which do not follow from his own starting point. These consequences are of theological and philosophical significance, and so I will briefly review them.

**Similarities**

It is to be expected that Pecham and Aquinas agree about many issues, because they share a number of moral and religious commitments. In order to avoid overstating their disagreement, it is helpful to consider instances of agreement and at least the surface-level compatibility of their anthropologies. Here, I can just briefly state some of these instances, postponing or omitting discussion of underlying issues about which Pecham and Aquinas may disagree.

First, Aquinas and Pecham agree that God creates individual rational souls *ex nihilo* and infuses them into particular bodies. This is the topic of Pecham’s first *quaestio*.¹ Here, Pecham argues that the soul, being unchangeable, cannot be passed along from

¹ *Quaestiones*, 315-330; cf. ibid., 378.
parents to children. On Pecham’s view, a soul cannot be split off from another soul; a soul is not like a candle’s flame that can be passed from one candle to another.

Aquinas also argues that individual souls are created *ex nihilo* and infused. Robert Pasnau explains:

> Because [Aquinas] takes this rational soul to be something nonphysical, he argues that it cannot be generated by purely biological means, through sexual reproduction. The basis for this last claim is quite straightforward: “It is impossible for the active power in matter to extend its action to producing an immaterial effect”.3

According to both Aquinas and Pecham, the body generated by the embryo’s parents is prepared for and receives the rational soul, but is also a formed body itself. Furthermore, Pecham and Aquinas both occasionally use words such as “soul,” “rational soul,” and “intellect” interchangeably, and the reader must allow the context to determine what aspect of the human person is meant.4

Second, Aquinas and Pecham agree that the soul is the form of the body in some sense. (They disagree about what this means, as I will discuss below.) In the *Quaestiones* Pecham says that the soul is the form of the body: “[The soul] is the form of the body essentially as imprinted ... of essence.”5 Pecham also says that the rational soul is a simple form which cannot be multiplied.6 Aquinas argues strongly and repeatedly, in the works considered in the fourth chapter of the present study, that the soul is the form of the body.

---

2 Ibid., 322-324.
5 *Quaestiones*, 349: “Ad decimum quartum dicendum quod est forma corporis per essentiam ut imprimentem, essentiae ut impressam.”
6 *Quaestiones*, 363.
Third, Pecham and Aquinas agree that, in some sense, each individual human has his/her own agent intellect.\(^7\) (Pecham is unlike Bacon in affirming an immanent agent intellect,\(^8\) and perhaps this is due to Pecham’s dialogue with Aquinas.) The Franciscans thought they could find evidence for the agent intellect in Aristotle’s *De Anima* 3.5.\(^9\) But, adapting Avicenna’s teaching\(^10\) to an Augustinian and Aristotelian framework, the Franciscans identified the agent intellect with the divine light itself. Pecham’s student Roger Marston, for example, says:

> It is necessary to posit in our mind, beyond the phantasms or abstracted species, something by which we to some degree attain the unchanging truths. I believe this to be no different than the influence of the eternal light. . . . For the eternal light, irradiating the human mind, makes a certain active impression on it, from which a certain passive impression is left in it, which is the formal principle of cognizing the unchanging truths.\(^11\)

It is easy to see how Marston could have learned this doctrine from Pecham, who also identifies the agent intellect with the uncreated, eternal light of which Augustine speaks:

> “[T]hat light of which Augustine speaks, is the eternal uncreated light; which is not the perfection of the superior reason unless as the object. And that uncreated light is the

\(^{7}\) Aquinas, *Treatise*, 84-89; Pecham, *Quaestiones*, 343, 403. However, in Aquinas's *Quaestiones*, he says that the *possible* intellect is the highest principle in the human being (60).

\(^{8}\) See Hackett, “Roger Bacon”; ibid., “Illumination, Agent Intellect and Intelligible Species.”

\(^{9}\) Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul*, 3-10.

\(^{10}\) See McGinnis, “Avicenna,” 67.

separated agent intellect.” Pecham takes both Aristotle and Augustine to be saying that the agent intellect is not individualized in each person, and says that the divine light (God) is the agent intellect. Yet Pecham has a two-fold doctrine of the agent intellect: On the one hand Pecham thinks that the agent intellect is God, and on the other hand he thinks that there is a created agent intellect.

The fifth article of Aquinas’s 84th *quaestio* addresses the question, “Is the agent intellect part of the soul?,” and the *responsio* is in the affirmative. On Aquinas’s view, God is a superior, separate intellect which contains the divine ideas, but not the agent intellect wherein reside the abstracted intelligibles in the mind of a particular human being.

Fourth, Aquinas and Pecham both teach (although in different senses) that humans cognize things truly in the illumination of divine light, i.e., in their eternal natures, exemplars, or reasons. In the *Tractatus*, Pecham illustrates his broadly applied exemplarist thinking by saying that the soul “may assimilate itself to the eternal exemplar, in which all are united or by life, all represented most simply, all united most

---

13 *Quaestiones*, 402.
15 *Treatise*, 84-87.
perfectly, so also it might imitate the highest exemplar by representing it. . . .”\textsuperscript{17} This approach continues in the \textit{Quaestiones}, where Pecham connects the truth of any statement to eternal reasons.\textsuperscript{18} In his 11th \textit{quaestio}, Pecham says that even separated souls cognize every substance in the exemplars, and in a way that is more expedient than the method of cognition which is characteristic of souls while embodied in the present life.\textsuperscript{19} Pecham discusses his view of the connection between exemplars and the divine light in the sixth \textit{quaestio}: “[D]ivine light is the form of every exemplar and in a way imprinting its similitude on all things, just as the seal imprints form on its wax. Nevertheless it is not the form of something inhering just like the seal’s vestige in wax.”\textsuperscript{20} Pecham says that it is by eternal light that the soul “discerns the unchanging truth of the utterable and from there draws up the truth.”\textsuperscript{21}

Pecham clearly thinks that divine light confirms beliefs, but he also seems to think that the divine light actually \textit{confers} information upon the human mind via the exemplars. Consider the following statements from Pecham:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Tractatus}, 20: “... veritatem enuntiabilis immobilem cernit et inde veritatem haurit. . . .”
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{Quaestiones}, 409.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{17} 9: “... assimiletur aeterno exemplari, in quo sunt omnia unita vel vita, omnia simplicissime repraesentata, omnia perfectissime adunata, sic et ipsa summum exemplar imitetur repraesentando ipsum. . . .”
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Quaestiones}, 409.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 444.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 410: “[L]ux divina est omnium forma exemplaris et quasi efficiens imprimens omnibus suam similitudinem, sicut sigillum imprimit formam suam cerae. Non tamen est alicuius forma inhaerens sicut vestigium sigilli in cera.”
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Tractatus}, 20: “... veritatem enuntiabilis immobilem cernit et inde veritatem haurit. . . .”
\end{quote}
• “... cognition of which descends from the Father of lights on the intellect, caused by the superior power in the intellect, whence only God can illuminate the soul.”\(^{22}\)

• “But the rational soul, marked by the image of God, is less efficaciously ordered from the principles of nature to the same illuminations [i.e., the same illumination that the angels enjoy] ... so that divine brightness, diffused over all creatures, by which it is touching in the mind delicately and through which it sees and cognizes whatever it understands, moves in many ways. . . .”\(^{23}\)

• “The soul is the incorporeal, intelligible substance of illuminations which are from the first perceived relation to the law.”\(^{24}\)

On Pecham’s view, angels remove impediments to cognition, order the phantasms, and minister to the intellect so that the divine light can shine in.\(^{25}\)

Aquinas deals with illumination theory in his 84th *quaestio*. Aquinas’s explanation of how the intellect cognizes things in the divine light is based on the same model that explains how the soul has sensible knowledge of things upon which the sun shines.\(^{26}\) We say that things are seen in the sun because the sun shines on them and allows us to see them. This represents a more restricted role for illumination in human knowledge than Pecham presents, yet both include illuminationism in their epistemologies. Unlike Pecham, Aquinas does not allow that humans have direct access to the exemplars.\(^{27}\)

\(^{22}\) Ibid., 12: “quorum cognitio *a Patre luminum descendit* super intellectum, a virtute superiori causatur in intellectum, unde solus Deus potest sic animam illuminare” (emp. added).

\(^{23}\) Ibid., 7-8: “Anima autem rationalis insignita Dei imagine ad easdem illuminationes minus efficaciter ex naturalibus principiis ordinatur ... ut divina claritas, respersa super omnes creaturas, a qua in mente tangitur tenuiter et per quam videt et cognoscit quidquid intelligit, moveat multipliciter. . . .”


\(^{25}\) *Tractatus*, 12.

\(^{26}\) *Treatise*, 148.

\(^{27}\) See ibid.
Fifth, Aquinas and Pecham are agreed that monopsychism stands in opposition to central tenets of Christianity and to the positions of the greater philosophers, especially Augustine and Aristotle. And, when they address such opposition, Pecham and Aquinas are very similar in their criticism. Aquinas quickly dispenses with these issues at the beginning of his *Against the Averroists*:

> There is no need to show that the foregoing position [that there is but one intellect] is erroneous because repugnant to Christian faith; a moment’s reflection makes this clear to anyone. Take away from men diversity of intellect, which alone among the soul’s parts seems incorruptible and immortal, and it follows that nothing of the souls of men would remain after death except a unique intellectual substance, with the result that reward and punishment and their difference disappear.²⁸

Pecham makes similar statements. He says that monopsychism requires that man is not defined by reason, and so cannot perform natural, rational choice (*electionem naturalem rationalem*).²⁹ Therefore, man cannot be rewarded for his right choices and punished for his wrong choices. Under these circumstances, Pecham says, injustice becomes better than justice.

**Difference: Focus on the Concept of Life**

Pecham orients his discussion of the soul around the concept of life in a way that Aquinas does not. This is not to say that Aquinas thinks of the soul as unrelated to life. In *quaestio* 75.1 of Aquinas’s *Quaestiones De Anima*, he provides a definition of the soul that involves the concept of life.³⁰ Aquinas says that the soul is

---

²⁸ 19, bracketed item added.
²⁹ Pecham, *Quaestiones*, 382-383.
³⁰ *Treatise*, 2-4.
the first principle of life in the things that are alive around us. For we say that living things are *animate*, whereas *inanimate* things are those without life. Now life is displayed above all by two functions: cognition and movement. But the ancient philosophers, unable to transcend their imaginations, claimed that the principle behind these functions is a body. They said that the only things that exist are bodies, and that what is not a body is nothing. And, in keeping with this doctrine, they said that the soul is a body. . . . [T]he soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the actuality of a body. And this is so in just the way that heat, which is the principle of heating, is not a body, but a certain actuality of a body.\(^{31}\)

For Aquinas, every soul has at least the nutritive capacity:

\[\text{[J]ust as a quadrilateral possesses whatever a triangle has and something more, and as a pentagon has whatever a quadrilateral has, so the sensitive soul possesses whatever the nutritive soul does and the intellective soul possesses whatever belongs to the sensitive soul and more.}^{32}\]

Thus on Aquinas’s view, the nutritive soul represents the minimal level of ensoulment.

For Pecham, however, the fundamental act of soul is more difficult to explain. At the beginning of the *Tractatus* Pecham follows Avicenna to sharply distinguish between the life of the soul and the life of the body.\(^{33}\) Pecham’s development of the concept of life in the *Tractatus* represents his most extensive discussion of biological teleology as it is associated with the soul.

In the first seven chapters of the *Tractatus*, Pecham discusses the operation of the soul. He covers the various “acts” associated with living things, and decides that the first act of life cannot be vegetation, sensation, or apprehension, because life itself is required for all of these.\(^{34}\) Pecham concludes that the first act of life is for a thing to be in force, or

\[\text{Ibid., 3.}\]
\[\text{Aquinas, *Quaestiones*, 61.}\]
\[\text{Tractatus, 4.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., 4-6.}\]
to strive toward perfection efficaciously, or to persist in being itself.\footnote{Ibid., 8.} He says that this is the act of the vital form. “Exciting the drive itself immediately follows the perfectible desire to pursuing perfection and this general desire is in all living things, prior to understanding. . . .”\footnote{Ibid.: “Ipsum vigorem immediate consequitur desiderium excitans perfectibile ad perfectionem consequendam et hoc generale desiderium est in omni vivente, prius apprehensione. . . .”; as noted previously, this is a reference to Alfred of Sareshel.} Pecham takes his view to be a development of a principle from the *De Motu Cordis*.\footnote{See ibid.} Whereas Aristotle more or less says that the nutritive power is fundamental to life, Pecham wants to find a principle that is ontologically (although not necessarily temporally\footnote{As far as I know, in neither Pecham’s plurality view nor in Marston’s plurality view is there a clear statement about the timeline at which the various forms (or grades of form) are educed from matter. However, it is clear that both Pecham and Marston are intent upon preserving the unity of the individual substance through the process of generation. Marston does say that all the grades are simultaneously subordinated to the specific form. As Etzkorn explains: “Consequently, the process of generation does not take place by way of the succession of mutually exclusive grades or forms. In the composite already constituted as an individual of the species, the grades and the specific form co-exist in a simultaneous hierarchy, in a relationship of essential subordination” (“The Grades of the Form,” 447).} prior. As I will discuss below, the concept of life is also central to Pecham’s account of how the various substantial forms in the human being cooperate.

**Difference: Plurality of Forms**

In this section, I will first discuss briefly the history of the plurality debate which led to the controversy between Aquinas and Pecham. Second, I will argue that, as some modern-day Aquinas scholars have noted, Aquinas’s allegedly non-dualist account of human nature is not without its difficulties. Third, I will point out difficulties with various modern-day Thomist responses to the problems with Aquinas’s account of substantial
form in the human being, arguing that Pecham’s dualist account, which includes the plurality view, may be more explanatory than Aquinas’s own unity position. Finally, I will argue that the plurality debate represents not a merely semantic difference between Pecham and Aquinas, as has been suggested; significant metaphysical and theological points are at issue.

Knowles says that the debate concerning plurality of forms seems to have been the “precise point at issue between Aquinas and Pecham”.39 In 1286, Pecham condemns the unicity of form as stated in this article: “That in man there is only one substantial form, namely, the rational soul, and no other substantial form. From this opinion seem to follow

---

39 “Some Aspects. I,” 12; cf. Callus, The Condemnation of St Thomas at Oxford, 16: “Archbishop John Pecham at the metropolitan visitation of the University on October 29th, 1284, in order to short-circuit all evasion, renewed the prohibition issued seven years previously by his predecessor [Kilwardby]; but, for the sake of peace, he added that as a concession he would consider whether any of the thirty theses might be tolerated in the schools. Until then, the prohibitions should be maintained under the same penalties as before. Nevertheless, one particular thesis should be most strictly proscribed, namely, the execrable error of those who posited one single form in man, ‘unum vero illorum expresse notavimus articulum, quorundam dicentium, in homine esse tantummodo formam unam.’ Without significant emphasis he roundly asserted that, in addition to countless other absurdities, it follows from this theory that Christ’s body was not one and the same before and after death; that the relics of the saints venerated in Rome and all over Christendom did not in reality appertain to their own bodies born of their mothers, but would be new entities born of the imagination, for it is in fact impossible to preserve the identity of the body without the permanence of a general or special form” (bracketed item added); cf. Pecham, Registrum, 3:841.
all the aforementioned heresies.” A number of related events preceded the 1286 condemnation. (Some have misapplied the words of Roger Marston and have suggested that: “[I]n the presence of brother Thomas Aquinas, of brother John of Pecham, and of about twenty-four other doctors” the Thomist doctrine of the unicity of form “was solemnly excommunicated as contrary to the teaching of the Saints, particularly of Augustine and Anselm.” In reality, however, Marston does not say that the dispute was about Thomas or the unicity of form, but rather a Peronis Cantor was the one who recanted. In 1284, Pecham famously renewed Kilwardby’s 1277 decree proscribing a number of Thomist doctrines, and explicitly condemned the doctrine of the unicity of form.

---

40 Registrum, 3:923. I am using Wippel’s translation (“Thomas Aquinas and the Unity,” 140) of this text: “quod in homine est tantum una forma, scilicet anima rationalis, et nulla alia forma substantialis; ex qua opinione sequi videntur omnes haereses supradictae.” The “aforementioned heresies” have to do with the identity of the dead body of Christ in the tomb, a subject to which I will return later in the present chapter. Pecham’s attitude toward these heresies can be seen in the beginning of the same letter: “… infrascriptos errores, quos de novo audierat in sua provincia suscitatos, tanquam haereses declaravit, et pronunciavit esse damnatos, in scriptis proferens sub hac forma” (ibid., 921).

41 Wilson, “Henry of Ghent and John Peckham’s Condemnation.”


43 Marston, Quaestiones: “Dicunt ergo quod, si Verbum ‘importet relationem realem’, dicitur tantum notionaliter; si vero relationem rationis, ut quando essentia intelligit se et quaelibet persona intelligit se et aliam per essentiam, sic est Verbum essentiale et commune. Ego tamen praesens fui Parisius et corporeis auribus audivi, quando incepit Cantor de Perona, assistente magistro Girardo de Abbatisvilla praesentibus fratre Thoma de Aquino et fratre Ioanne de Pecham et aliis Doctoribus sacrae theologiae usque ad XXIII vel circiter, ubi haec opinio fuit excommunicata solemniter tanquam contraria Sanctorum assertionibus et doctrinae, et praecipue Augustini et Anselmi, ut patuit in opponendo” (116-117).

It was also in 1284 that Pecham wrote a letter that mentions Aquinas as a representative of the unity view. And finally,

in 1286, at a meeting in London of Bishops and Abbots, Pecham himself condemned the unity of substantial form repeatedly and in much stronger terms, directing it in particular against a young Dominican at Oxford, Richard Knapwell. Knapwell had continued to defend Aquinas’ position on this point (at least as he understood it), and had twice written in defense of Thomas and of the orthodoxy of his position. . . . Pecham also excommunicated Richard and thereby ended his academic career.

Pecham was also opposed by the Thomist William Hothum, who appealed Pecham’s condemnation of Knapwell.

At the time of the controversy between Aquinas and Pecham, the debate over pluralism had been going on for perhaps almost 75 years, although it was more heated at

---

44 “Causam vero opinionum bonae memoriae fratris Thomae de Aquino, quas fratres ipsi opiniones sui ordinis esse dicunt, qua tamen in nostra praesentia subjecit idem reverendus frater theologorum arbitrio Parisiensium magistrorum” (Pecham, Registrum, 3:866); cf. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Unity,” 138.

45 Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Unity,” 139, parenthetical item in orig.; cf. Kelley, introduction to Knapwell, Quaestio, 9-44.

46 Hinnebusch, Early English Friars, 387-388.
Paris than at Oxford. Unicity of form was not found in Étienne Tempier’s Condemnation of 1277, even though a number of Thomist positions were condemned;

48 Callus says on this point: “In the thirteenth century perhaps no other problem aroused such heated controversy as the question of plurality of forms. The origin of the debate is, however, still somewhat obscure. Dom O. Lottin, O.S.B., in an extremely suggestive study, published in this same periodical, threw much needed light on the beginning of the controversy in the Paris schools. He found the earliest accounts of it in Roland of Cremona, the first Dominican master in Paris (1229-1230), and in Philip the Chancellor’s Summa de Bono (1228-1236). Two facts are established beyond doubt by Dom Lottin: (a) the Chancellor’s approach to the question exercised a wide influence upon the theologians of the first half of the century; (b) the pluralist view was not so current and familiar, at least in Paris, as often has been asserted. On the contrary, the leading masters, Philip the Chancellor and William of Auvergne, among the Seculars, Roland of Cremona and Hugh of St. Cher among the Dominicans, John de la Rochelle and the Summa of Alexander of Hales among the Franciscans, all accepted the thesis of unity of soul and substance in man. One would like to know who were those pluralists, the quidam with whom Roland of Cremona, Philip the Chancellor, William of Auvergne and the other masters contended, and how the Schoolmen came into contact with this problem for the first time. . . . In Philip the Chancellor’s Summa de Bono the problem is formulated in such a way as to show that it was not a fresh one, but rather that by this time it was fully discussed in the schools. We have here the statement of the question clearly delineated, and both opinions put forward with their arguments for and against fitly marshalled [sic]. Accordingly, although no name has been definitely established in connection with this doctrine before 1228 at the earliest, there is still such a mass of hitherto unexplored manuscripts that it would surely be rash to state that nothing, previous to that date, could possibly come to light” (“Two Early Oxford Masters on the Problem of Plurality of Forms,” Revue néo-scholastique de philosophie 42, no. 63 (1939): 411-412, parenthetical items in orig.); cf. Lottin, “La pluralité des formes substantielles avant Saint Thomas d'Aquin. Quelques documents nouveaux,” Revue néo-scholastique de philosophie 34, no. 36 (1932): 449-467; Douie, Archbishop Pecham, 20.
this was probably because the unity position was already known at Paris.\textsuperscript{49} Opposition to
the unicity position developed gradually, and Pecham was an important figure in that his
positions may be seen as the culmination of this development.\textsuperscript{50} And, as I noted in

\textsuperscript{49} Douie, \textit{Archbishop Pecham}, 37; cf. “Condemnation of 219 Propositions,” trans. Ernest
L. Fortin and Peter D. O’Neill, \textit{Medieval Political Philosophy}, ed. Ralph Lerner and
describes a meeting of all theology masters at Paris, of whom all except two opposed the
unity position: “Loquendo autem de damnatione per sententiam magistrorum, scio, quia
interfui, quod iam 10 annis elapsis, magistri omnes theologiae tam non regentes actu
quam regentes, qui habui potuerunt Parisius simul congregati ad examinandos quosdam
articulos de mandato domini Stephani episcopi parisiensis et domini Simonis legati, qui
postmodum fuit papa Martinus, inter quos articulos erat ille, quod in homine non erat
forma substantialis nisi anima rationalis, omnes unanimiter uno ore, duobus exceptis,
dixerunt quod dicere in homine non esse formam nisi animam rationalem falsum
erat. . . .” (\textit{Quodlibet X}, ed. R. Macken, Henrici De Gandavo Opera Omnia 14 [Leiden:
Brill, 1981], 127).

\textsuperscript{50} See Sharp, \textit{Franciscan Philosophy}, 83-85, 149-150; ibid., 186-187: “Before the
introduction of Aristotle’s works other than the logical treatises, Scholastics, as a whole,
supporting Plato and Augustine, regarded body and soul as two independent entities
extrinsically united to constitute man. After that introduction, this theory was either
superseded by the Aristotelian conception of the relation between the body and the soul
as one of matter and form, the body as matter having no reality apart from the soul as
form, or was modified to express the opinion that, although they may be related as matter
to form, both body and soul have a reality independent of each other, the soul because it
alone is created and immortal, the body because matter as well as form has its own entity.
The first position, which adopted Aristotle unconditionally, is usually held to have been
originally proclaimed by St. Thomas, but Pecham, writing to the Chancellor and
University of Oxford in December 1284 and to certain cardinals in January 1285,
mentions it as one of the erroneous opinions maintained at Oxford in spite of the fact that
it had been condemned by Kilwardby. This, of course, does not necessarily contradict the
assumption that St. Thomas originated the theory and that later it spread to the Oxford
Dominicans; indeed, Pecham, in the same letters, particularly connects the theory with
‘frater Thomas sanctae memorie de Aquino’. However, . . . even before 1248 the Oxford
pluralists were opposed by the supporters of one single form for each composite. The
pluralists most probably included Grosseteste, Adam Marsh, and Thomas of York, but
their theory does not appear in its elaborated version until Bacon’s day and certainly not
in its developed version until Pecham, under opposition from St. Thomas, was led to
consider its implications. If we return now to Pecham’s interpretation of the relation
between body and soul we shall see the theory of the pluralists in its fundamental form.
chapter five, Aquinas saw in Avicebron, not in the Franciscans themselves, the roots of the Franciscan position on substantial form.\textsuperscript{51}

Daniel A. Callus explains concisely how one might reach either side of the disagreement between Aquinas and Pecham:

If with Aristotle one holds (i) that prime matter is a completely passive potency without any actuality of its own whatsoever; (ii) that privation is the disappearance of the previous form, and, consequently, has not part at all in the composition of the substance; and (iii) that substantial form is absolutely the \textit{first} determining principle, which makes the thing to be what it is, the only root of actuality, unity, and perfection of the thing; then, consistent with his stated principles, the conclusion forced on us is that in one and the same individual there can be but one single substantial form: other forms, that come after the first, are simply accidental and not substantial forms. Since the thing is already constituted in its own being, they cannot give substantial being, but exclusively accidental or qualified being; they do not confer upon the concrete thing its own definite and specific kind of being, e.g., man, but only a qualified or relative state of being, for example, of being fair or dark, big or small, and the like.

On the other hand, if one contends (i) that primary matter is not absolutely passive and potential, but possesses in itself some actuality, no matter how incomplete or imperfect it may be: an \textit{incohatio formae}, or any active power; (ii) that privation does not mean the complete disappearance of the previous form, so that matter is not stripped of all precedent forms in the process of becoming; or (iii) that substantial form either meets with some actuality in prime matter or does not determine the composite wholly or entirely, but only partially; from all this it will necessarily follow that there are in one and the same individual plurality of forms.\textsuperscript{52}

---

\textsuperscript{51} E.g., Aquinas, \textit{A Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima}, 124; ibid., \textit{Summa Theologiae}, 1.115.1.

As became clear in the fifth chapter of the present study, the pluralist position is derived from Avicebron and Gundissalinus and to some degree from the hylomorphism of the Jewish commentators,\(^{53}\) and was developed by Philip the Chancellor.\(^{54}\)

**Aquinas’s Dualism**

Aquinas’s mature position is that there is one, unified, structuring principle for each substance. John F. Wippel has provided a helpful review of the Aquinas texts on this topic.\(^{55}\) In a recent article, Carlos B. Bazán discusses the tension involved in a position that tries to accommodate Aristotelian hylomorphism concerning the human subject and the intellect’s subsistence apart from the body.\(^{56}\) Bazán comments on Aquinas’s choice to follow Aristotle’s hylomorphism\(^{57}\): “When in his *Summa Contra Gentiles* Aquinas rejected the conception of the soul as a complete intellectual substance and adopted Aristotelian hylomorphism as the best philosophical account of human nature he also


\(^{56}\) “A Body for the Human Soul,” *Philosophical Psychology in Arabic Thought*, 243-278.

\(^{57}\) I illustrated this choice of Aquinas’s in chapter four of the present study.
decided to follow the principles that we have just reviewed.”

Aquinas says that the rational soul is the single, substantial form that actualizes matter. Therefore, on Aquinas’s view,

[T]he corporeality of human beings, as long as we consider it to be a substantial determination, is not granted to the composite by a substantial form of corporeality distinct from the soul and prior to the soul (à la Pinocchio), but by the rational soul.

58 “A Body,” 248. The principles “just reviewed” that Bazán outlines as characteristic of Aristotle’s view include the following: (1) Matter and form are correlative principles which do not exist by themselves, but only by their relation to each other within the structure of the composite substance which is the real subject of being. (Matter and form are introduced only to explain generation and corruption, not to posit matter and form as independently existing substances.) (2) Form is the principle of actuality that grants all the essential determinations of the composite. (3) Matter is the potential subject that supports the forms that succeed each other throughout the natural process of generations and corruptions, giving individuation to the form and continuity to the process (although Aquinas argues that the difference in prime matter and determinate differences, together, make up the principle that individuates two numerically different members of a kind [See Jeffrey E. Brower, “Matter, Form, and Individuation,” *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, ed. Davies and Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 96-99]). (4) There is “movement” when matter acquires one form instead of another. Movement is the act of what is in potency as long as it is in potency. As long as the new form has not been acquired, there is movement, but as soon as the change of dispositions in matter is achieved, the composite of matter and old form corrupts, the composite of matter and the new form is generated and the movement ends. (When the form actualizes matter, movement ends.) (5) Generation is conceived as the modification of dispositions in matter by an external agent. Such modification is guided by the final cause of the process. None of this is meant to suggest that Pecham does not also express his anthropology in Aristotelian terms (albeit totally transformed). Pecham operates with these terms in his own way, as has become obvious.

59 “The soul shares with corporeal matter the existence in which it subsists: from that matter and from the intellective soul, one thing comes about. This occurs in such a way that the existence that belongs to the whole composite also belongs to the soul itself, something that does not occur in the case of other forms, which are not subsistent. And for this reason the human soul continues in its existence after the body is destroyed, whereas other forms do not” (Treatise, 24); cf. ibid., *Against the Averroists*, 37; Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind*, 152.
itself, the only substantial form of the human composite and the only cause of all its substantial determinations.\textsuperscript{60}

This is in marked contrast to Pecham, who does posit the form of corporeity (\textit{forma corporeitatis}) that characterizes all corporeal matter.\textsuperscript{61} As has already become obvious in the discussion of Pecham’s debt to Avicebron in the previous chapter, Pecham has a stronger concept of matter than Aquinas does. For Pecham, corporeal matter has an active potency due to the seminal reasons that are constitutive of the \textit{forma corporeitatis}.

Bazán goes on to show how Aquinas develops the argument that the makeup of the corruptible human body is actually for the \textit{benefit} of the soul. Bazán outlines Aquinas’s seven steps in the development of this argument:\textsuperscript{62}

- Matter is for the benefit of form.\textsuperscript{63}
- The union between soul and body is necessitated by the fact that the soul is last in the hierarchy of realities of intellectual nature.\textsuperscript{64} Unlike the angels who have innate ideas, the soul is in potency to intelligible species and must acquire them by the mediation of sense powers.

\textsuperscript{60} Bazán, “A Body,” 252, bracketed items added, parenthetical item in orig. Note that Aquinas also treats corporeality as a form. Kenny has pointed out that, for Aquinas, “Being material or corporeal is, in fact, like any other property, a form” (\textit{Aquinas on Mind}, 138). It is just that for the Franciscan pluralist, the form of corporeity is a substantial form (see ibid., 152). I will discuss further implications of believing in a substantial \textit{forma corporeitatis} below.

\textsuperscript{61} See Knowles, “Some Aspects. I,” 13. Pecham says in the \textit{Tractatus} that there is a corporeal form that perfects the material body, and a “stronger” spiritual form that perfects the spiritual body (50). Bonaventure says the same thing (see Cullen, \textit{Bonaventure}, 54). Wippel describes the \textit{forma corporeitatis} as follows: “[A] second kind of substantial form in corporeal entities. . . . Thus in the case of a living thing, this form of corporeity would make the matter-form composite a body or corporeal substance, and a second substantial form—a soul—would be added to make it a living substance” (“Thomas Aquinas and the Unity,” 120).

\textsuperscript{62} “A Body,” 264-276.


• If the reason why the soul joins the body is because it needs to acquire the intelligible species from sensible things by means of sensation, it is necessary that the body to which the soul is united be very well equipped for the acquisition of sensible data from which intelligible species can be abstracted.\(^{65}\)

• The sense of touch is the foundation of sense activity.\(^{66}\)

• There are particular conditions that a body must meet in order to be the most suitable organ for the sense of touch.\(^{67}\)

• The reciprocity between matter and form facilitates a picture of Nature as proceeding gradually from simple elements, combining them until it achieves the most perfect mode of blending, which is found in the human body. The body’s perfectly balanced constitution makes it the suitable correlate of the human soul. The soul can sense most effectively because of the organization of the body’s parts.\(^{68}\)

• The body suitable for the human soul is one that is composed of contrary elements, and that makes it naturally corruptible.\(^{69}\)

The position that the corruptible body is for the benefit of the soul as the body’s form presents an obvious problem for Aquinas’s position that the human soul is naturally incorruptible.\(^{70}\) So, Aquinas has to discuss the immortality of the soul in theological terms. Aquinas says:

>D[еath and dissolution are natural to human beings by reason of a necessity of matter, but immortality would befit them by reason of the form’s nature. And yet natural sources do not suffice to provide immortality. Rather, a natural disposition for it indeed befits human beings by reason of their soul, and supernatural power


\(^{67}\) Bazán, “A Body,” 268-270; cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 421a.19; Aquinas, Quaestiones, 116; Treatise, 12.


\(^{70}\) It has been suggested that the biological works of Aristotle may be more welcoming to a commentator wishing to develop the idea of a separable soul (see David Ross, introduction to Aristotle, Metaphysics, ed. and trans. John Warrington [West Yorkshire: Pomona, 2008]), xxvi).
fulfills it. . . . And death and dissolution are contrary to our nature insofar as immortality is natural for us.\textsuperscript{71}

Aquinas elsewhere argues that the earthly body as constituted now cannot function as a celestial body.\textsuperscript{72} (Yet elsewhere, Aquinas makes it clear that the immortality of the soul is not supposed to be a truth of revelation, but a truth that is derived from the proper philosophical understanding of the human substance.\textsuperscript{73})

There are several ways to respond to a discussion like Bazán’s. First, someone might respond by saying that Aquinas’s strategy works as Bazán has interpreted it. In other words, Aquinas’s doctrine of the soul’s immortality is simply separate from his natural anthropology, and Aquinas can rightly add God’s supernatural imposition of immortality onto a natural Aristotelian view of the human person. But this strategy does not seem promising, for two reasons. (1) Anton C. Pegis has argued that Aquinas views the soul and body as both initially naturally immortal; death occurs only accidentally as a result of sin.\textsuperscript{74} Thus, the separation of the soul from the body is a state for the soul that is actually against the soul’s nature. Thus there would be a conflict between Aquinas’s natural


\textsuperscript{72} “The body of a human being could not be a simple body nor a celestial body because if it were, the organs of the senses and especially the organ of the sense of touch would be incapable of being affected by their sensible objects; nor can the human body be a simple elementary body because contraries exist in act in an element” (Quaestiones, 120).

\textsuperscript{73} See Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas: “Not being a body capable of perishing (as the biological human organism is), and yet being subsistent, the human soul cannot perish. For Aquinas, that by virtue of which I understand and think is not the sort of thing which can die as bodies can do” (215, parenthetical item in orig.); cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1.75.6; ibid., Treatise, 5-6.

anthropology and his theological principles. (2) On some occasions when Aquinas is not
discussing death in particular, he affirms clearly that the soul and body are two different
kinds of things. For example, Aquinas says that “the soul is the first principle of life,”
unlike secondary principles of vital action, such as the eye. And Aquinas admits that
this principle of life cannot be the body or a part of the body; the soul is an incorporeal
reality whereas the body is a corporeal reality. Thus it would be difficult to develop an
account that would be consistent with Aquinas’s theological principles and yet maintain
the soul’s connection to a naturally mortal body as its one substantial form.

A second response is that of Eleonore Stump, who admits that Aquinas is some kind
of dualist: “Aquinas seems clearly in the dualist camp somewhere since he thinks that
there is an immaterial and subsistent constituent to the subject of cognitive function.” Stump argues that Aquinas’s dualist account is both coherent and non-Cartesian, on the
basis that Aquinas thinks of the soul as a configured form itself while it also is
configuring the body.

For Aquinas, the metaphysical world is ordered in such a way that at the top of the
metaphysical hierarchy there are forms — God and the angels — which are
configured but which aren’t configurational constituents of anything else. These
forms are configured but non-configuring. Near the bottom of the hierarchy are
forms that configure matter but don’t exist as configured things in their own right.
The form of an amethyst is like this. Such forms are configuring but non-
configured. And in the middle are human souls, the amphibians of this
metaphysical world, occupying a niche in both the material and the spiritual
realm. Like the angels, the human soul is itself configured; but like the forms of
other material things, the human soul has the ability to configure matter.

---

75 Treatise, 3.
76 Ibid., 2-4.
77 “Non-Cartesian Substance and Materialism without Reductionism,” Faith and
Philosophy 12:505-531.
Consequently, in the transition from configuring mater to not configuring matter, the human soul doesn’t undergo any radical metaphysical transformation or category switching. . . .

The metaphor of configuration is questionable, since it carries a geometrical connotation that may be misleading in discussions of non-geometrical principles and beings.

Stump acknowledges that her interpretation of Aquinas’s position view brings with it the worry that Aquinas has slipped into the Platonic dualism that he is so concerned to reject, or that Aquinas has raised in his own position all the problems that pertain to Cartesian dualism. Stump says that there is really no problem, for two reasons: (1) Aquinas maintains that the soul is not a substance in its own right; and, (2) the soul is not an integral part of a human being in the same way that a roof is an integral part of a house. Concerning (1), Stump’s assessment of Aquinas’s position should be more cautious. While Stump cites passages where Aquinas argues that the soul is not a substance, in the fourth chapter of the present study I noted two passages in the Quaestiones De Anima (ca. 1269) where Aquinas indicates that the soul is, in fact, a substance. I do not wish to adjudicate this matter here, but merely to note that the issue may be less clear than it seems in Stump’s presentation. Yet even if we grant that Stump’s interpretation of Aquinas’s view is correct, her response does not help, because what should count as a substance is precisely what is at question. Concerning (2), we can ask why a soul is not like a roof. Stump’s example of a protein that is “configured” yet

78 Ibid., 514-515.
79 See ibid., 517.
80 Ibid., 517-518.
81 Summa Theologiae, 1.75.4; Summa Contra Gentiles, 2.51, 2.69.2; cf. Quaestiones, 62.
82 46-47, where Aquinas argues that the soul is an entity in the genus of substance; 37-38, where Aquinas includes the intellectual soul among the intellectual substances.
regulates gene expression is designed to help her readers see how the soul functions as a “configuring configured” without functioning like a roof. But Stump’s protein example, by her own tacit admission, is a case where a structured material substance determines a particular combination of other structured material substances, much as if I—as a structured substance—were to rearrange the positions of some flowers in the garden. I cannot see a correlation between protein and intellect that serves Stump's purpose any more than I can see such a correlation between gardener and intellect.

Similar to Stump’s response is that of Paul Hoffman, who, says that “Aquinas, like Descartes, is a subject dualist. He believes that the human soul is a spiritual, incorporeal subject that is capable of subsisting apart from the body.” Hoffman’s explanation for the unique relationship between the human soul and body is different from Stump’s

83 “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism,” 517-518; cf. ibid., 508.

84 Ibid. 508: “[C]onsider the protein called ‘CAT/Enhancer-Binding Protein’ (C/EBP), one of the proteins known to play an important role in regulating gene expression. In its active form, the molecule is a dimer with an alpha helix coil. On Aquinas’ way of thinking about material objects, the form of C/EBP is the configuration of the dimer, including the alpha helix coil; and the dimer subunits constitute the matter. Of course, each dimer subunit is itself a composite. The form of the subunit is the configuration of its amino acids, in which, for example in one region every seventh spot must be occupied by leucine; and the amino acids composing the subunit are its matter. Amino acids themselves are also clearly composites, however. The matter of an amino acid such as leucine is the carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen of which it is composed, and the form is the way that material is combined. . . . In this example, we have been considering only what Aquinas would call ‘substantial forms’. These are the forms in virtue of which a material composite is a member of the species to which it belongs. Natural material objects belong to a particular natural kind in virtue of the substantial form they have; and all material objects have the essence they have, or are what they are essentially, in virtue of their substantial form. The soul is the substantial form of a human being, the form in virtue of which the matter informed by it (that is, the matter-form composite) constitutes a living human body” (parenthetical items in orig.).

explanation, because Hoffman posits that corporeality and materiality are matters of
degree for Aquinas. But Hoffman’s discussion does not alleviate the problems with
Stump’s account. (Anyway, Hoffman uses his psychological model to support his own
account of the immaterial reception of sensible forms, and not to defend Aquinas’s
psychology in particular.) If Stump and Hoffman are correct in suggesting that Aquinas is
a dualist, then he can no longer be considered, as he is by many moderns, to be a pioneer
of non-dualism in the medieval period.

A third response to arguments like Bazán’s is Kenny’s response. Kenny upholds
Aquinas’s Aristotelian hylomorphism while arguing that Aquinas fails to prove from
natural philosophy that the intellect can subsist separate from the body. Kenny points
out that Aquinas uses “form” to mean both (1) the principle (roughly Aristotle’s formal
cause) that makes a thing what it is, such as a rational animal and (2) the principle
(roughly Aristotle’s efficient cause) that causally moves a thing or makes a living thing
alive, and in the case of the soul it is difficult to combine these two ideas. Indeed, an
objection in the Summa Theologiae argues the point:

That which has existence on its own is not united to the body as its form. For a
form is that by which a thing exists, and so the existence that belongs to a form
does not belong to it in its own right. But the intellective principle has existence in

---

86 Ibid., 83. Pecham may not allow for the immaterial reception of sensible forms; instead
he apparently adopts Roger Bacon’s theory of corporeal species (see Pecham, Tractatus, 9-10).
87 Aquinas on Mind, 143.
88 Ibid., 149. Aquinas ascribes to Plato the view that the soul is an efficient cause (see
Davies, The Thought, 211-212; cf. Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 2.57). Pecham
agrees that the rational soul moves the body in the context of nature, even though the
rational soul also has a function outside the natural order (Quaestiones, 328; Tractatus, 25).
its own right, and it is subsistent. . . . Therefore it is not united to the body as its form.89

As Kenny observes, Aquinas’s response does not meet this objection. Here is Aquinas’s response:

The soul shares with corporeal matter the existence in which it subsists: from that matter and from the intellective soul, one thing comes about. This occurs in such a way that the existence that belongs to the whole composite also belongs to the soul itself, something that does not occur in the case of other forms, which are not subsistent.90

In other words, Aquinas is saying:

(1) The soul has being apart from the body (even if this is not taken to imply the pre-existence of the soul, as in a reading of Platonism91).

(2) The soul gives being to the human body.

(3) The compound of soul and body is the being of the soul.

(1) and (2), at least on a surface reading, are incompatible with (3). Now, Aquinas argues that the soul can survive the death of the body on the basis that the soul has a function that is separate from any bodily explanation.92 Yet when Aquinas is faced with the objection that it is essential for a form to be united to its matter, he does not respond directly to the argument.93

Pecham’s Dualism

Pecham is a dualist right from the beginning of the Quaestiones, where he says the genus and difference of the human being are partly natural and partly supernatural.94
Pecham explicitly calls the human being an aggregate.\textsuperscript{95} He says, “Therefore as far as the incorruptible exceeds the corruptible, by so much the rational soul exceeds the sensible.”\textsuperscript{96} Yet as I argued in the previous chapter, Pecham is not necessarily a strong dualist, or substance dualist, such that he thinks the soul and body accidentally come together to make a mere aggregate along the lines of a pile of stones.

Therefore the body and soul, when they are defined through one another, are not two separate things. Whence the Philosopher: Everyone who posits that the soul and body are two different things, it obligates him to say what is the cause of the connection of the soul with the body. But who says that the soul is the perfection of the body, and the body does not subsist without the soul, they are not with him two different things, nor does this question arise with him also.\textsuperscript{97}

Pecham maintains that the soul and the body come together due to their natures in order to make one human being.

We know that Pecham believed in some version of the plurality of forms.\textsuperscript{98} If Pecham believed in the grades theory that I briefly described in the last chapter, then it is easy to show how that he was not a strong dualist. Unfortunately Pecham’s treatise on the

\textsuperscript{95} Pecham, \textit{Quaestiones}, 326. Aquinas explicitly denies that the human being is an aggregate (\textit{Summa Contra Gentiles}, 2.56).
\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Tractatus}, 49: “Ergo quantum excedit incorruptibile corruptibile, tantum excedit anima rationalis animam sensitivam.”
\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Quaestiones}, 380: “Ergo corpus et anima, cum definiuntur per alterutrum, non sunt duo diversa. Unde Philosophus: Omnis qui ponit quod anima et corpus sunt duo diversa,convenit ei dicere quae sit causa ligamenti animae cum corpore. Qui autem dicit quod anima est perfectio corporis, et corpus non subsistit sine anima, non sunt apud ipsum duo diversa, nec accidit apud ipsum haec quoque quaestio.”
\textsuperscript{98} E.g., ibid., 7: “Rursus, quia formarum vitalium qua vigore vitae ad complementum sunt ordinatae, quaedam ordinatur ad complementum pure spirituale, quaedam ad complementum pure corporale, quaedam utroque modo”; \textit{Quodlibeta}, 256: “Quia licet anima rationalis sit forma immaterialis, tamen complet omnes formas materiales et perficit eas, ut esse et operari possint operationes consonas speciei.”
“grades” theory, *De Gradibus Formarum*, has been lost.\(^9^9\) Still, if we assume that Pecham believed in a grades theory that resembles the theory of his student Roger Marston, as is indicated by Pecham’s *Quodlibeta*, it is clear that he thought that the plurality position did not imply a strong dualism.\(^1^0^0\) In fact, the grades view implies that there is never actually a plurality of forms, and thus never more than one form to complement the matter. Rather there are only grades of a single substantial form, which has in matter a potency proper to itself. The *forma corporeitatis* in matter becomes the grade of corporeity when disengaged from another form and subsumed by the form of water. The form of water becomes a grade when subsumed by the form of the mixture. The form of the mixture becomes a grade when subsumed by the form of life. The form of life becomes a grade when subsumed by the form of animal. Finally the form of animal becomes a grade


\(^{1^0^0}\) Pecham, *Quodlibeta*, 198-199, 230-231: “Dicendum igitur quod sicut coniunctio principiorum—materiae et formae scilicet—dat esse, eorumdem indivisio dat unum esse: ‘unum enim est ens quod non dividitur’. Ex prima autem coniunctione formae cum materia causatur unitas, scilicet ex coniunctione formae primae substantialis cum materia prima, quia ‘simul est substantia et haec substantia’. Et ideo superveniens mutatio formarum naturalium in esse physico circa substantiam non mutat identitatem numeralem substantiae vel corporis per se, quia vivum et mortuum nihil faciunt ad essentiam corporeitatis, quamvis mutent esse specificum generis naturalis infimi et quorumdam subalternorum. Sub transmutatione enim simul manent materia, potentia et forma prima substantialis, quia sola materia non est subiectum. . . . Dicendum igitur quod anima rationalis non est forma corporis, secundum quod corpus est, immo praesupponit corporeitatem, cuius forma non corrumpitur per adventum animae, quia nullam habet cum ipsa corporeitatem. Praeterea, corporeitas supponitur in definitione animae, quae est ‘actus corporis organici physici potentia vitam habentis’ . . . [D]icendum quod in corpore hominis, secundum quod corpus est, omnes formae quattuor elementorum reductae sunt in unam formam mixti; non cuiuscumque mixtionis, sed illius quae est propria complexionis humanae. Unde nulla est ibi forma elementaris quantum ad formarum simplicitatem. Unde sunt in homine formae plures gradatim ordinatae ad unam ultimam perfectionem, et ideo formatum est unum”; see Etzkorn, “The Grades of the Form.”
when subsumed by the complete specific form of horse. . . . Matter receives its diversification and variety only through the medium of form.101

On the grades view all of the grades of form are in the *forma corporeitatis* potentially, i.e., in the seminal reasons, and are drawn out by an extrinsic agent.102 Now, Pecham’s view as presented in the *Tractatus* does not include the same exact forms as are found in Marston’s account; Pecham’s view is instead adapted to the faculty psychology of Avicenna, but the pattern is the same. Furthermore, Pecham does not have the details of the relationship between matter and the grades of form worked out in the detail of Marston’s conception of the various kinds of potencies in matter.103

It is plausible that Pecham intended his view of the seminal reasons104 to be complemented by the grades view along the lines of Marston’s theory, especially given other similarities between Pecham’s philosophy and that of Marston (e.g., the active

102 Ibid., 439-440.
103 See Etzkorn, “The Grades of the Form,” 442-443. Etzkorn describes how one could situate a Pechamian grades view into the history of the debate over the number of substantial forms: “Pecham’s last *Quodlibet*, called *Romanum* because it was debated during his tenure at the Papal Curia in 1277, is also his longest, containing 54 questions in all. In this *Quodlibet* Pecham rehearses many of the themes that came to be typical, and shared by many of his Franciscan colleagues. Prime matter (q. 1) is not just pure potency as Aquinas would have it, but an essence distinct from any form and hence, in principle, ‘creatable by God without any form. . . . In what was at times an acrimonious debate regarding a single form versus a plurality of grades of the form in composite beings, Pecham poses the question (q. 11) as to whether Christ’s ‘eye’ when alive was the same ‘eye’ univocally after his death. This was considered as a test case against the proponents of a single form (Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Giles of Lessines, Thomas Sutton, Richard Knapwell), because according to their opinion, death would involve a “degeneration” into prime matter and the ‘creation’ of a *forma corporeitatis* which the pluralists regarded as gratuitous; thus Christ’s eye wouldn't have been the ‘same.’ Pecham calls such a view ‘frivolous,’ ‘inane,’ ‘foolish’” (“Franciscan *Quodlibeta*,” 139, parenthetical items in orig.; cf. Pereira, “Materia Naturalis”).
potency in matter; the possibility of God’s creation of prime matter due to matter having a separate essence from that of form; the intellect as a perfection). And yet, even if it we were to conclude that it is impossible to know precisely the content of Pecham's grades view, it can still be shown that Pecham is no more a substance dualist than Aquinas is. Neither Pecham nor Aquinas thinks that the human person is a purely simple thing; corporeality and complex physical and psychological powers must also be taken into account. Pecham says that since the body and soul are defined through one another, they are not two separate things; the soul may be considered the essential perfection of the human body.  

Therefore Pecham is not a Cartesian substance dualist. For Pecham, the soul’s and body’s coming together as a result of mutual inclination produces a “third nature” (tertia natura). And, while maintaining that the human being is one nature, Pecham thinks it is an aggregated nature, and the aggregate is what is dissolved upon death. 

Soul, Form, and Matter

Bonaventure and Pecham are both convinced that all substances (even spiritual substances) have a formal component and a material component. In the 12th of the Quaestiones, Pecham says that the soul has an intrinsically material part and that the soul has this part for as long as it is perfecting something extrinsic to itself. But Pecham here also shows his independence of thought: The separated soul has a different kind of

---

105 Quaestiones, 380.  
106 Ibid., 446.  
107 Ibid., 352.  
108 Ibid., 447.
matter from the matter that belongs to the soul when it is united to the corporeal body; this is what makes the separated soul more suitable for understanding. Pecham adds to this the position of Avicenna, who says that the soul cannot be perfect unless separated from the corporeal body.

Kenny has summarized well how this universal hylomorphism may apply to the human soul:

> Is the notion of spiritual matter absurd, involving a contradiction in terms, like the notion of a square circle? No doubt it is, if one thinks of extension and tangibility as the essential elements of matter. But those who believed in spiritual matter insisted that matter is essentially potentiality: matter is the ability to have properties and to undergo change. The soul can have properties, such as knowledge and virtue, and it can undergo change, passing, for example, from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to virtue. Therefore it must contain matter, the potentiality for change.

Now, Aquinas rejects spiritual matter because it conflicts with his own view that the soul is a pure, simple form. Consider, however, how the concept of spiritual matter may solve a potential difficulty for Aquinas’ account. Stump notices this, in fact, as she discusses her view that Aquinas thinks of the soul as a configurational state of the body:

> [A]t this point, we may think that Aquinas’ account can’t accommodate the claim that souls persist and engage in mental acts after the death of the body. . . . [I]f the separated soul is an essentially configurational state, what is it a state of? Aquinas isn’t a universal hylomorphist; he doesn’t think that there is a sort of ghostly ectoplasm that can be configured by the forms of immaterial things, such as souls or angels.

---

109 Ibid.
111 *Aquinas on Mind*, 139. Aquinas believes that even if the soul were a compound of matter and form, it would still be incapable of decay or decomposition (see ibid., 139, 142).
112 “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism,” 513.
Stump misses the point that Pecham’s spiritual matter is not any kind of extended, tangible “thing,” even in principle, but is rather the principle of potentiality. Every created thing has a material aspect, but not necessarily a body. In fact, Pecham explicitly argues that angels are not corporeal beings. Sullivan, whose recent doctoral thesis deals with the spiritual matter doctrine among the Franciscans, has summarized Pecham’s position as set forth in the Quaestiones De Beatitude (included in Spettmann’s edition called Quaestiones Tractantes De Anima):

In his Quaestiones tractantes de anima John Pecham’s position on spiritual matter is similar to that of St. Bonaventure. He takes several arguments positing matter in the human soul from authorities Bonaventure also used, especially De unitate et uno (by Gundissalinus) and pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux, author of De Spiritu et Anima), and gives abbreviated versions of several traditional arguments. The soul separated from the body can be moved, but everything that is per se moved (Pecham takes it for granted that the soul moves itself) is divided into something which is moved and something which moves, which, he claims, can only arise in a composite of matter and form. The soul must have matter because it contains possibility, and possibility is from matter. . . .

Sullivan points out that Pecham’s argument in quaestio 27 is based on the principle that everything that belongs to the genus of substance must be composed of the first principles of matter and form, and Pecham says that substantiality is more universal than the

---

115 “The Debate,” 142, parenthetical item in orig.
distinction between corporeal and spiritual. Thus spiritual things must have matter and
form.

Since matter’s own form is ontologically prior to the soul’s conjunction with the
body, there is a plurality of forms involved in the one unified human being. Thus,
precisely speaking, soul is not equated with the human being’s substantial form on
Pecham’s account. Yet there is a sense in which the soul is the form of the body for
Pecham. One statement of Pecham’s pluralist position comes in the Tractatus, in the
discussion of the immortality of the soul (a theme which Pecham also discusses at length
in his Quaestiones): “Further, if any corporeal form, perfecting corporeal matter, is
incorruptible, therefore much more some spiritual form perfecting the body. But the
rational soul is the most noble of all forms.” In the fifth quaestio, Pecham says that the
intellect could be taken to be an immaterial form in one of three ways:

(1) The intellect could be an immaterial form in the sense that it does not share in
matter at all, but Pecham disagrees with this on the grounds of his universal
hylomorphism.

(2) The intellect could be an immaterial form because it is not the perfection of
corporeal matter, but Pecham takes this to be false and heretical on the basis
that the intellect gives being to corporeal matter first and is the substantial
form for a being.

(3) The intellect could be an immaterial form in that it does not operate by bodily
mediation.

Pecham says that the third way is correct, but in bringing up the second possibility
Pecham makes a clarification, saying that the intellect is the substantial form and

---

116 Tractantes, 143-144; cf. ibid., Quaestiones, 186-187; Quodlibeta, 175-176.
117 Tractatus, 50: “Item, si aliqua forma corporalis, perficiens materiam corcorporalem
[sic], est incorruptibilis, ergo multo fortius aliqua forma spiritualis corpus perficiens.”
118 Quaestiones, 387.
perfection of matter. Referring back to the grades view, it can be said that if the intellect is the specific form which constitutes the individual in a species, the the incomplete forms or grades of the form still provide perfections for the previous, lesser forms.\textsuperscript{119} I will discuss the issue of perfection in more detail in the next section.

Pecham does not take the plurality of forms to be a problem for the soul’s simplicity or for the singularity of the human person. Earlier in the \textit{Tractatus}, Pecham comments on the plurality of forms:

\begin{quote}
But the sensible soul is perfected by corporeal forms received incorporeally. . . . In order to understand the meaning of this consider, since as the author of \textit{The Fount of Life} says: Life is the first act of form. This is certainly not about any old form, but that which is structurable from itself and can complete its own fulfillment. For the act of the elementary form is not life, nor is anything above the elementary form, that would be required for the species of the element, nor anything below that would suffice for the species, but in living things there is a continuous drive and from this drive there is a desire arising, exciting and moving the living thing to the perfecting of its fulfillment. . . . Again, since some of the vital forms are ordered by the drive of life toward fulfillment, some are ordered to purely spiritual fulfillment, some to purely corporeal fulfillment, some to both ways. Accordingly the force of the vegetative soul strives to purely corporeal perfections by nourishing, growing, and multiplying. . . . Truly the first substances, separate from matter, have purely spiritual fulfillment, namely
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{119} See Etzkorn, “The Grades of the Form,” 430
illuminations descending from the Principal by which they are fulfilled and perfected, born to extend to those in the serenity of celestial clarity.\textsuperscript{120}

Thus, in addition to the vital force or form of life itself, there are no fewer than four forms (or grades of form) that are involved in the human being: (1) the \textit{forma corporeitatis}; (2) the nutritive form; (3) the sensitive form; and (4) the intellectual form.\textsuperscript{121} Each form is correlated to its own matter, although in the cases of the nutritive and sensitive forms the correlated matter is numerically the same, and only in abstraction do we find a numerically different matter for the \textit{forma corporeitatis}. Notice that “soul” (\textit{anima}) and “form” (\textit{forma}) are used sometimes interchangeably here. Pecham’s idea is that the addition of the rational form to the vegetative and sensitive forms completes the soul’s simplicity. The completion of the soul’s simplicity, which I discussed in the previous chapter, is not the kind of completion that results from a combination of contraries. Pecham regularly discusses the vegetative and sensitive

\textsuperscript{120} 8: “\textit{Anima autem sensibilis perficitur corporalibus formis incorporaliter receptis.” Cf. ibid.: “\textit{Ad huius intelligentiam considera, quia sicut dicit Auctor Fons vitae: vita est primus actus formae. Certum est quod non cuiuscumque formae, sed illius quae ex se ordinabilis est et potest perficere ad sui complementum. Actus enim formae elementaris vita non est, quoniam nec supra formam elementarem aliquid est, quod requiratur ad speciem elementi, nec infra aliquid quod speciei sufficiat, sed in rebus viventibus vigor est continuus et ex vigore oriens appetitus excitans et promovens rem viventem ad consequendum sui complementum. . . . [Q]uia formarum vitalium quae vigore vitae ad complementum sunt ordinatae, quaedam ordinantur ad complementum pure spirituale, quaedam ad complementum pure corporale, quaedam utroque modo. Vigor siquidem animae vegetivae tendit ad perfectiones pure corporales nutriendo, augendo et multiplicando. . . . Substantiae vero primae, a materia separatae, complementum habent pure spirituale, illuminationes scilicet a Principio descendentes quibus implentur et perficiuntur, natae ad istas pertingere in serenitate claritatis supernae” (6-7, bracketed item added). Recall that Pecham’s reference is not to the \textit{Fons Vitae} itself, but rather to Alfred of Sareshel’s \textit{De Motu Cordis}.

\textsuperscript{121} One might also include the original “vital form” as discussed above, although Pecham calls all the forms “vital” (\textit{Tractatus}, 7ff.).
“souls” or “powers,” so that the same numerical soul has a number of potencies and properties. Of course, the soul is complex in the sense that, before one has an accurate picture of a pluralist soul, one must have a number of concepts in mind. Yet Pecham thinks there is a sense in which the soul remains a simple thing.

Admittedly, a difficulty in interpreting Pecham is that he sometimes speaks of various substances in the human being, and at other times of various forms. Does this fact indicate that Pecham holds contradictory positions, or is he merely using loose, colloquial language to say the same thing? Douie says that Pecham takes one position about substance in the *Quaestiones De Anima* and another in the *Tractatus*. In reality, however, Pecham uses *substantia* in various ways throughout the *Quaestiones De Anima*, and so the context must determine if he is using the term in the same way he uses it in the *Tractatus*.

- *Substantia* may refer to the matter of the body of a newly ensouled embryo’s parent.

- *Substantia* may refer to simple, non-composite, divine substance.

- *Substantia* may refer to “this thing,” a composite of matter and form, e.g., a man.

- *Substantia* may refer to the rational soul (or the substance of the rational soul) that is united to the human body and can be separated. Similarly, *substantia* may refer to the substance of the possible intellect in particular.

---

122 Archbishop Pecham, 22-23: “In his *Quaestiones* he adopts the extreme pluralist position, treating them not merely as separate forms but as separate substances, whereas his language in the *Tractatus de Anima* suggests that, like Aquinas, he regarded them not as forms but as faculties of the soul.”

123 *Quaestiones*, 322; cf. ibid., 326.

124 Ibid., 322-323.

125 Ibid., 326, 386, 397.

126 Ibid., 327, 328, 337, 338, 341, 376, etc.

127 Ibid., 378-379, 389, 430.
• *Substantia* may refer to the sensitive or vegetative soul, e.g., of a brute.\(^{128}\)

• *Substantia* may refer to a separated substance.\(^{129}\)

• *Substantia* may refer to the set of characteristics essential for a species or a kind.\(^{130}\)

Generally speaking, the context of Pecham’s usage of *substantia* must determine how the word is to be understood.

To deal with Douie’s point, however, it must be asked if Pecham refers (in the *Quaestiones De Anima*) to the vegetative and sensitive aspects of the soul as substances in their own right? In reviewing the 96 usages of *substantia* in the *Quaestiones*, it seems to me that although Pecham’s dualist position requires there to be multiple forms in the one human being (itself a third nature, or “substance”),\(^ {131}\) Pecham does not insist (when stating his own views) that the vegetative and sensitive forms are themselves *substantiae*. In fact, he emphasizes that diverse potencies can be in a single substance,\(^ {132}\) and notes that others (e.g., Gennadius, the *philosophantes*), have said that the sensitive and intellective souls are two substances.\(^ {133}\) In this context, however, Pecham cites the very same biblical passage that he evidently cites in the *Tractatus* (Exodus 21:22-25) and allows that the sensitive soul (not the nutritive) be called a substance in addition to the intellect. But Pecham is clearly more concerned in this passage that we avoid the position that there are two souls in one man than he is about whether we call the different forms

\(^{128}\) Ibid., 327.

\(^{129}\) Ibid., 350, 378, 379, 381, 401.

\(^{130}\) Ibid., 384, 386.

\(^{131}\) See, e.g., ibid., 364: “Rationalis enim anima et a substantia et operatione a corpore separari apta est. Ipsae autem secundum ambo existentias inseparabiles sola cogitatione ut species separatur.”

\(^{132}\) Ibid., 361.

\(^{133}\) Ibid., 362; *Tractatus*, 30-31.
In the corresponding *Tractatus* passage Pecham clearly says that vegetative, sensitive, and intellective are three *substantiae*. Therefore I am inclined to say that there are not two conflicting Pechamian constructions in the two works at hand. And, while Wippel is certainly correct to say that the issue of plurality of forms is closely related to the issue of plurality of souls, these two issues are not one and the same problem for Pecham.

*Forms as Perfections*

As I have said, Pecham’s concept of perfection exhibits the pluralist account of how the forms relate to one another. In the *Tractatus* Pecham provides a breakdown of the various forms, all of which contribute to the soul’s first act of life. Some are ordered to nutrition, some to sensible perception, some to rationality, and some to all three acts. Clearly, all of these are united by their involvement in life. We can assume then, that every form strives for its own particular perfection in service of the person’s life. And, given the discussions of life in the present study, it can be assumed that life does not

---

134 *Quaestiones*, 357-358, 362-363.
136 Of Pecham and others, Wippel writes: “[N]one of those whom I have just mentioned agreed with Thomas that there is a real composition and distinction of essence and act of existing in all finite beings, and that the substantial form of a given being ‘gives’ substantial esse to its corresponding matter. Hence they would not quickly agree with him that multiple substantial forms within a given entity would imply multiple substantial acts of existing and, therefore, multiple substances within that entity” (“Thomas Aquinas and the Unity,” 133).
137 Ibid., 125-126.
139 *Tractatus*, 7ff.
140 Ibid., 9.
141 See ibid., 30.
simply refer to biological existence, but the actualization of human potential overall. So
one account of the relation between the forms has to do with their united purpose. In
Roger Marston’s grades view, which was probably influenced by Pecham’s position,
“These incomplete forms or grades do not therefore constitute a being in act, but merely
perfect and ennoble matter in greater or lesser degrees.” Each higher form in the
hierarchy perfects the form which is beneath it, and in this way the entire substance is
actualized by the specific form (intellect, in the case of the human being).

Yet to have an account suggesting that the various substantial forms “work together”
is not to know anything about how they work together, or why one would wish to posit
that each form (or grade of form) is perfected by the next, as Pecham does. In fact, he
does not provide a very detailed account of this interaction, but there is a clue about what
he thinks: Pecham gives an example when he discusses the perfection of the eye in
chapter 4 of the Tractatus. The eye is necessary for apprehension, but the question of
apprehension is properly about the soul and not about the eye. The intellect transforms
itself in receiving forms that are derived from perceptions that the eye has helped to
produce. The rational soul is the form that allows the sensitive soul, the previous form, to
complete its function. Thus, the sensitive soul’s function cannot be understood without

---

142 Bieniak has shown that there is a tradition of thinking of the soul as a perfection,
including Avicenna, Costa Ben Luca (as I have mentioned in the previous chapter), Hugh
of St. Cher, Philip the Chancellor, Roland of Cremona, John of La Rochelle, and
Bonaventure (The Soul-Body Problem, 10-13, 17-18, 30, 34-36). Pasnau has also found
the same position in Albertus Magnus (Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 74).
143 Cf. Tractatus, 30.
reference to the intellect. Once the sense data has been abstracted by the intellect, the sensitive soul (like the bodily eye) is no longer involved in the production of knowledge.  

Contemporary Discussion

There have been at least two modern-day Thomist responses to the debate between Aquinas and Pecham on the plurality issue. Some clearly support Aquinas’s position, and see it as the only plausible one, even if it does not solve the problem of immortality. For example, Kenny says, “If there were some other substantial form pre-existing in matter when the intellectual soul was joined to the body, then the soul would merely be introducing an accidental change into the body, and not giving it existence as the kind of thing it is.” In response, consider that while Pecham thinks that it is possible for the intellect and the body informed by the forma corporeitatis to exist separately, it does not follow that the introduction of the intellect is accidental from the perspective of the whole human being. In fact, if the intellect is not infused, the substance we know as the human being never exists at all. The conjunction of soul and body may be considered accidental from some larger perspective, but it is essential to the human being for soul and body to be united.

146 Ibid., 14. The soul is the perfection of diverse organs (ibid., 30), Aquinas on Mind, 154; cf. Aquinas, Treatise, 34-35.
147 As I will discuss later in the present chapter, there is a sense in which every form other than universal form is accidental, according to Pecham’s Avicebronian view.
148 Quaestiones, 380: “Ergo corpus et anima, cum definiuntur per alterutrum, non sunt duo diversa. Unde Philosophus: Omnis qui ponit quod anima et corpus sunt duo diversa, convenit ei dicere quae sit causa ligamenti animae cum corpore. Qui autem dicit quod anima est perfectio corporis, et corpus non subsistit sine anima, non sunt apud ipsum duo diversa, nec accidit apud ipsum haec quoque quaestio.”
Another contemporary Thomist response is that of Robert Pasnau, who says that the problem between Pecham and Aquinas is philosophically uninteresting:

> [W]e should look beyond the Aristotelian terminology and consider exactly what it is that the two sides disagree on. It is not at all easy to say. After all, Aquinas and his critics agree on analyzing human nature in terms of potentiality and actuality; they agree that the soul provides the actuality; they agree that the rational component of the soul is nonphysical; they agree that the sensory component (somehow) involves physical organs. Aquinas does believe that the rational soul corrupts all prior forms, whereas Pecham and others believe that the rational soul perfects these prior forms. Yet once we see that corruption does not actually mean destruction, but more like reconstitution within a different substance, it remains unclear what this difference really amounts to. . . .

> What seems to be in question is how forms, or actualities, are to be individuated. This, I am inclined to say, is not a deep metaphysical question. . . .

> Different accounts are compatible with the same metaphysical situation: that a human being is composed of various sorts of actuality, interrelated in complex ways.\(^{150}\)

Pasnau rightly acknowledges the difficulty of the debate and carefully outlines Aquinas’s arguments, but does not present arguments from Pecham (or any other pluralist) in detail.\(^{151}\) Thus Pasnau has not shown that Aquinas’s view is as reasonable as Pecham’s view.

Pasnau is incorrect in implying that the only point at issue between Aquinas and Pecham is “how forms or actualities are to be individuated,” or that the two theologians differ on an insignificant, merely “grammatical” issue.\(^{152}\) Aquinas and Pecham have different schemes whereby the human actualities are individuated, and differences between the two schemes (1) were of deep significance to Aquinas and Pecham in their

---

\(^{150}\) *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*, 127-128, 129-130, parenthetical item in orig. Pasnau does gloss arguments by William de la Mare, from the *Correctivum Fratris Thomae*.

\(^{151}\) *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*, 126-130.

\(^{152}\) Ibid., 128.
day; (2) entail significant philosophical and theological consequences. I will treat these
two points in turn.

The first point, that the differences between Pecham and Aquinas on the issue of
substantial form were of deep significance to both thinkers, becomes especially clear
when one considers that a modern Thomist, Denys Turner, says that Aquinas organized
his attack on the Averroists with a view toward preserving the philosophical basis for his
opposition to thinkers such as Pecham:

The Latin Averroists were, Thomas thought, teaching a version of Aristotle’s *De
anima* which, if a correct interpretation, played straight into the hands of the
Augustinian-Platonist opponents of Thomas’ Aristotelianism. Their conviction
that Aristotle’s account of the soul was theologically threatening was confirmed
by the version of *De anima* promoted by the Averroist philosophers. Thus was
Thomas’s Aristotelian philosophy of mind doubly threatened: if the Averroists
were in fact correct in their interpretation of Aristotle, then Thomas had no one on
whom to rely for his alternative account of soul, no stick with which to beat the
Augustinian-Platonists. What is worse, if the philosophers were to be believed in
their interpretation of Aristotle, then Aristotle became a stick with which his
theological colleagues could beat Thomas as a heretic.¹⁵³

Furthermore, Pecham obviously considered the problem to be very significant and
thought that its solution had serious consequences. One imagines that the controversy
would have been quickly resolved or entirely ignored if a simple grammatical adjustment
could have solved it. Pecham was far from being the only one involved in the
controversy:

[M]any opponents of the unicity of substantial form in human beings were also
defenders of universal hylomorphism. . . . Such thinkers as Roger Bacon, John
Pecham, William de la Mare and, after Aquinas’ time, Richard of Middleton, and
still later, Gonsalvus of Spain, come to mind, not to mention Thomas’ earlier
contemporary, Bonaventure. Closely associated with this position was the view

¹⁵³ *Thomas Aquinas: A Portrait*, 93.
that some minimum degree of actuality must be assigned to prime matter in and of itself. This position was defended even by some who rejected matter-form composition in spirits, such as Henry of Ghent.\textsuperscript{154}

Having shown that Pecham’s and Aquinas’s positions were not taken to be merely grammatical differences, I am now in a position to show why this was the case: The unity and pluralist views entail significant philosophical and theological consequences.

First, since Pecham’s plurality of forms view is an integral part of a Neoplatonic metaphysics that includes particular views of matter and form (as I discussed in the previous chapter of the present study), what is at stake is nothing short of an entire system accounting for practically all of physical and spiritual reality. As Bieniak says,

\textbf{[T]he debate concerning the presence of principles between the rational soul and the body is particular to the thirteenth century. The roots of this debate, however, are very deep and cannot be confined to the Middle Ages. The doctrine of the intermediary principles must be viewed in the broader context of the Neoplatonist cosmology. It is a system in which all ontological distance is filled with principles partly sharing in the nature of the higher being and partly the nature of the lower being.}\textsuperscript{155}

Little wonder that Pecham and others in the “Neo-Augustinian” movement considered the plurality issue significant.

Second, Pecham thinks the full perfection of man is neither nutritive nor sensitive, but intellectual. So, he thinks that the nutritive and sensitive aspects must have their own

\textsuperscript{154} Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Unity,” 133. Henry of Ghent, like Pecham, “opposed the ‘unicity theory’ of the number of human substantial forms. . . . by 1286 Peckham maintained a pluralism of substantial forms, and Henry maintained a dymorphism of human substantial forms. For Henry there are two human substantial forms, the rational soul which is infused by God, and the form of corporeity, educed from the potency of matter by the human parents. Both thinkers, though, had by 1286 vigorously opposed the unicity theory found in Thomas Aquinas and his defenders” (Wilson, “Henry of Ghent and John Peckham’s Condemnation,” 261-263).

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{The Soul-Body Problem}, 124.
distinct, subservient perfections. In the Contra section of the fifth quaestio, Pecham discusses the perfection of the human being through the intellectual act.

Further, about the rational soul: It is united either as perfection and form, or only as mover. If as perfection, it must be multiplied according to the multiplication of matter, because form seeks matter for itself, nor is it possible for just any soul to enter just any body. If it is united according to the fact that it is a mover, the same must be, because the Philosopher investigates number of movers, according to the number of motions, as is clear from the Philosopher in Book 11.156

Here, Pecham says that the rational soul can be united to a man either as his perfection or as a mover (Pecham thinks the rational soul is both, and that it has to be multiplied according to the number of persons).157 If we take it that Pecham thinks of “substantial form” as specifying a “perfection” or “completion,” then Pecham is simply saying that the intellect is the highest of the substantial forms and has the highest degree of perfection. Pecham takes the following positions concerning perfections:

---


157 Ibid.: “… necessario quod multiplicetur secundum multiplicationem materiae. . . .” (377; cf. 342, 359).
• The rational soul is the perfection of the body, and Pecham draws evidence for this position from his reading of Aristotle and Augustine.\textsuperscript{158} The rational soul is designed to perfect the whole. (This suggests that the body is a kind of support system to allow the intellect to perform its function.)\textsuperscript{159}

• Two souls are two perfections. There cannot be two perfections for one person. Therefore, each person has only one soul.\textsuperscript{160}

• The intellect itself can be perfected.\textsuperscript{161} That is, the perfection of man is the consideration of truth and the development of beatitude by the created agent.

---


\textsuperscript{159} \textit{Tractatus}, 9: “Habet enim anima desiderium naturale cognoscendi omnia, ut perfectio universi, quae exterius est materialiter, sit in ipsa suo modo spiritualiter, ut sic assimiletur aeterno exemplari, in quo sunt omnia unita vel vita, omnia simplicissime praesentata, omnia perfectissime adunata, sic et ipsa summum exemplum iniquetur praesentando ipsum, non solum in gradu suae essentiae sed in plenitudine scientiae omnia complectendo, et quae estra ipsam sunt materialiter in ipsa sint spiritualiter et acquiratur ei plenitudo essendi. . . .”

\textsuperscript{160} \textit{Quaestiones}, 354: “Item, duo motores aeque primi non possunt esse respectu eiusdem mobilis. Item, nec duo spiritus simul in eodem corpore; ergo multo magis duae animae, quae sunt formae propriae et perfectiones, non possunt esse in eodem corpore.”

\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Tractatus}, 8: “Et quia vigor, qui est vita animae, ad perfectionem non sufficit consequendam nisi corporis adiutorio subnixa, dico, nisi alter vel naturaliter una virtute ipsam essentiae simplicitatem comitante, radicata in intimis essentiae, ad perfectionem corporis inclinatur, ut mediante corpore sibi perfectio requiratur, non a corpore, sed ministrante corpore.” Pecham describes the perfection of the soul in a nuanced way in chapter 11 of the \textit{Tractatus}, drawing on Aristotle, Avicenna, and Augustine as he develops his own view.
intellect; only intellect (assisted by grace) has such potentiality.\textsuperscript{162} Pecham qualifies this potentiality by saying that until the judgment, the soul is always short of true perfection.\textsuperscript{163}

In the last of these positions, we see perhaps more clearly than at any point why it was such a serious issue for Pecham to combine the plurality of forms with the singularity of the soul. Every human potency has its own perfection. If the perfection of one man is exclusively a function of his “highest” aspect, the intellect, then the vegetative and sensitive aspects simply cannot be man’s highest perfection. They are thus relegated to the category of subservient forms. They are not independent souls, but they do have less exalted perfections.\textsuperscript{164} Pecham goes into far greater detail in his taxonomy of the intellect,

\textsuperscript{162} \textit{Quaestiones}, 343: “Tertio, ex ratione desiderii naturalis, quia appetit beatitudinem. Beatitudo autem consistit in perfectione animae ex pulchritudine veritatis et bonitatis vel iocunditatis, ut dicunt etiam philosophi; et ‘status omnium bonorum in aggregatione perfectus’, ut dicunt theologi. Ad haec autem nihil est magis necessarium quam immortalitas, sicut nihil magis contrarium quam mortalitas. Ergo, necesse est animam ad hoc ordinatam esse ut felicitatem intellectualem obtineat et possideat sine fine. Et est ratio Anselmi, ut dictum est, \textit{Monologion} [cap.] 79, et in principio II libri \textit{Cur Deus homo} inquit: ‘Ideo homo rationalis est, ut discernat inter iustum et iniustum. In vanum autem discerneret vel discernendi potestatem haberet, si secundum discretionem non vitaret et amaret. Ad hoc igitur facto est, ut summum bonum diligeret super omnia, quod sit [ita] dilectum ut [nec] Deum deceret ei auferre, nec ipsa possit sponte diserere’; ergo etc.” (bracketed items in orig.); cf. ibid.,403, 415. On this view, the truth that man considers is ultimately referred to the divine light of God (see \textit{Tractatus}, chapter 13).

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Quaestiones}, 445: “Item, Augustinus, XIV \textit{De Trinitate}: ‘Imago, quae renovatur in spiritu mentis, perficietur in visione quae erit post iudicium’. Ergo usque ad judicium semper sibi deest aliquid perfectionis; et hoc non videtur nisi ex defectu sui corporis; ergo etc.”

\textsuperscript{164} \textit{Quaestiones}, 386. It is interesting that Aquinas also says that there are various levels of perfection in matter, such as existing, living, sensing, and thinking, but maintains that the presence of the various perfections does not constitute the presence of various forms (\textit{Treatise}, 35).
providing the five intellectual perfections as he draws on Aristotle, Avicenna, and Augustine. Each of Pecham’s five intellectual powers has its own perfection.

Third, the plurality of form view allows the body to retain its corporeal form after death. Even the dust of the fully decayed individual’s body would retain the forma corporeitatis and thus remain a part of the individual human being. On the other hand, Aquinas’s position is that the intellect is the only substantial form for the body; thus when the intellect departs at death, it leaves the body with no principle of unity or identity.

Pecham elaborates on the implications of the plurality view for the identification of the dead body:

So therefore in a certain way it remains the undivided of the kind, undivided in diverse species, even if they are changed to ashes: When a man dies and the body is corrupted, the species of the body and of the individual of the species changes to ashes, but remains the individual of the kind; although the ashes are changed to air or in the body of whatever animals, it is true to say, “This matter, this substance was in the body of some man. . . .”

Kilwardby’s pluralism was also motivated by this point:

Later in 1277, responding to the criticisms of the Dominican archbishop of Corinth, Peter Conflans, Kilwardby maintained that a form cannot be corrupted into pure nothingness, since such annihilation would make it impossible for a body at the Last Judgment to rise with the same form it had in life. . . .

---

165 Tractatus, 38-39.
A clear implication of the plurality view is that the dead body of Christ in the tomb retained its identity as the body of Christ for the three days until the resurrection, not taking on any lower substantial form.\(^{169}\) (The plurality view provides similar answers to questions about dead bodies of saints, the Incarnation, and the Eucharist; the theological issues surrounding the debate over plural forms made the controversy intense.\(^{170}\)) Douie writes on this issue:

> Serious theological implications arose. . . . The question over which Pecham and Aquinas came into conflict—the nature of the body of Christ during the three days between His death and resurrection—was one which had been long debated in the schools. It is not surprising that the pluralists found the explanation, that in this case the union of the divine and human natures enabled it to preserve its identity, unconvincing. In a later *quodlibet* Pecham maintained that in this case it could only be described equivocally or metaphorically as the body of Christ, since after the departure of the soul the introduction of a new substantial form, that of the inanimate body, into a matter which had no tendency towards any particular form, but was pure potency without any actuality, involved a complete change of nature. According to the pluralist theory, on the other hand, it would retain its identity owing to the survival of the bodily form. . . .\(^{171}\)


\(^{171}\) Ibid., 21-22; cf. Pecham, *Quodlibeta*, 175-176.
Aquinas admitted that the body of Christ in the tomb was only equivocally identical to the living body, and Pecham confronted him on the issue. In Pecham’s 1286 condemnation, the following three articles were condemned:

- **Article 1**: “The dead body of Christ has no substantial form that is the same as that which the living body had.”

- **Article 2**: “That in the death [of Christ] a new substantial form and a new species or nature was introduced, although not joined to the Word by a new species or assumption or union. From this it follows that the Son of God was not only man but of another unnamed species.”

- **Article 5**: “There was numerical identity of the dead body of Christ with the living body only because of the identity of matter and of undetermined dimensions and the relation of these to the intellective soul, which is immortal. In addition there is identity of the living and the dead body by reason of the existence of both in the same hypostasis of the Word.”

---

172 See Douie, *Archbishop Pecham*, 15; cf. Aquinas, *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, 2.1.1: “In morte autem separata fuit anima a corpore: alioquin non fuisset vera mors Christi, de cuius ratione est quod separetur anima a corpore, quod per animam vivificatur; sed divinitas non fuit separata nec ab anima nec a corpore: quod patet ex symbolo fidei, in quo de Filio Dei dicitur, quod sepultus est, et descendit ad inferos. Corpore autem iacente in sepulcro, et anima ad inferos descendente, non attribuerentur ista Filio Dei, nisi haec duo essent ei copulata in unitate hypostasis vel personae. Et ideo de Christo in triduo mortis dupliciter loqui possumus: uno modo quantum ad hypostasim vel personam, et sic est idem numero simpliciter qui fuit; aut quantum ad naturam humanam; et hoc dupliciter.”

173 *Registrum*, 3:922. I am using Wippel’s translation (“Thomas Aquinas and the Unity,” 140) of the following articles: “quod corpus Christi mortuum nullam habuit formam substantialem eandem, quam habuit vivum. . . . quod in morte fuit introducta nova forma substantialis, et nova species, vel natura, quamvis non nova assumptione vel unione Verbo copulata; ex quo sequitur, quod Filius Dei non fuerit tantum homo, sed alterius speciei innominatae. . . . identitatem fuisse numeralem corporis Christi mortui cum ejus corpore vivo, tantummodo propter identitatem materiae et dimensionum interminatarum, et habitudinis ipsarum ad animam intellectivam, quae immortales est. Esse insuper identitatem numeralem corporis vivi et mortui, ratione existentiae utriusque in eadem hypostasi Verbi” (emp. added).
There is uncertainty about how Aquinas assessed the substantiality of Christ’s body. If Aquinas took the position that Christ’s divine nature preserved his body’s identity, then this account would not explain the continuity of the average dead person’s bodily identity from death until the general resurrection.\(^{174}\) Or, Aquinas might have said that the identity of the body in the tomb is accounted for by the identity of the supposit,\(^{175}\) a position that Pecham calls \textit{frivola et inanis}.\(^{176}\) Pecham’s account, relying on the \textit{forma corporeitatis} to preserve identity, is certainly more naturalistic than the view that Christ’s divine nature accounted for the preservation of his body’s identity. Pecham’s view of the dead body is counterintuitive insofar as it implies that the corpse continues to be a person’s body even at late stages when it would be difficult (or impossible) to recognize it as such by sight (just imagine instances of cremation or burial at sea). However, this difficulty is not a logical problem for Pecham, as his view does not imply that the body be visually identifiable after death.

Fourth, the plurality position avoids positing that previous forms are corrupted during the development of the embryo, as Aquinas taught.\(^{177}\) Since Aquinas holds that the intellect contains whatever belongs to the sensitive soul, he compares the intellect to the quadrilateral which “possesses whatever a triangle has and something more. It does not

\(^{174}\) See Aquinas, \textit{Treatise}, 411-412.
\(^{175}\) See Wilson, “The Critique of Thomas Aquinas's Unicity Theory,” 428-429; For an overview of contemporary discussions concerning what position Aquinas took, see Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Unity,” 150-154.
\(^{176}\) \textit{Quodlibeta}, 198.
\(^{177}\) See Pecham, \textit{Quaestiones}, 326.
follow from this that the nutritive and sensitive differ essentially from the intellective, but rather that one of them includes the other.”

Pecham agrees with “the wise” that there are three aspects of the soul (vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual), but the issue at hand is when these three aspects come together in one unified person, and what becomes of the pre-existing form(s) when new forms are introduced. There is a Tractatus passage that deals with embryology, but it is more concerned with whether to call the three aspects of the soul substances than it is to address when or how the three unite. In Pecham’s first quaestio, he says that God creates and infuses the rational soul, or the intellectual form, but the corporeal form is from the parents:

[The composite] is generated from the body and the sensitive soul, which is not corrupted when the rational soul comes in, but completed. And that generated, with the rational soul which is poured in, are not two souls, but one; just as man is one substance and the soul composite.

Pecham thus attempts to avoid dealing with the problem of what happens to forms that are “destroyed” on Aquinas’s view.

---

178 Aquinas, Quaestiones, 61.
179 See Pecham, Tractatus, 30-31.
180 Ibid., 31.
181 Quaestiones, 326. “[Compositum] generatur ex corpore et anima sensitiva, quae non corrumpitur adveniente anima rationali, sed completur. Et quod generatum, et anima rationalis quae infunditur, non sunt duae animae sed una; sicut homo est una substantia ex anima composita” (bracketed item in orig.). This quotation is especially helpful as an example of Pecham’s tendency to call the intellect “the soul,” e.g., throughout the first quaestio. This becomes especially important for understanding the following contra argument that Pecham gives: “Item, si anima est ab anima sicut ab anima patris, et tunc Christus non habuit animam; aut ab anima matris, et sic Eva non habuit animam; aut ab utroque, et tunc Adam non habuit anima; quorum quodlibet est impossibile etc.” (ibid., 320, bracketed item in orig.).
While the present study is not about theories of individuation, it is plausible that Pecham’s view of the subject is more explanatory than Aquinas’s view.\textsuperscript{182} Aquinas thinks that individuation begins with the union of soul and body,\textsuperscript{183} whereas Pecham believes that the soul and body are both already individuated. Pecham can therefore still say that the individuation of the substance as such (the third thing that results from the combination of the soul and the body) begins with the union of soul and body. The Aristotelian view of prime matter is the target of Pecham’s first \textit{quaestio}, in which he asks whether the rational soul is \textit{ex traduce}, i.e., provided by the biological parents, and answers in the negative.\textsuperscript{184}

\textbf{Revisiting the Controversy with Latin Averroism}

Recall Dales’ suggestion that, in the controversy over Latin Averroism, Pecham was not a worthy opponent on the philosophical level for the young artists. He holds two positions that seem to be mutually incompatible: first, that the soul is the substantial form of the body; and second, that the soul is composed of matter and form. He adopted the first position in order to preserve the unity of the individual human being and his dignity as a rational substance. He adopted the second in order to explain how the soul could be \textit{a hoc aliudicid} and be multiplied according to the number of human beings.\textsuperscript{185}

Dales’ summary cannot be the end of the story concerning Pecham’s view of form and matter, for we have already seen that Pecham wants to think of form and matter in different senses depending on whether he is considering an existing substance with its form and matter (such as a human being) or prime matter, a separated form, etc. Yet to

\textsuperscript{183} See Quinn, \textit{The Historical Constitution}, 192.
\textsuperscript{184} \textit{Quaestiones}, 315-330.
\textsuperscript{185} \textit{The Problem of the Rational Soul}, 131.
judge whether Dales’ assessment of Pecham’s work against the young artists is right, we
would also have to do an evaluation of many major Averroists in addition to our
evaluation of Pecham. Such is beyond the scope of the present study, which is not
designed primarily to assess arguments in favor of monopsychism. However, with the
main differences between Pecham’s and Aquinas’s approaches to anthropology in view, it
is possible to show how the two thinkers diverge in their response to Latin Averroism.

It is clear that, while Pecham agrees with Aquinas that monopsychism should be
opposed, Pecham sees Aquinas’s response as itself endangering certain centrally
important revealed theological convictions. First I will say something about this contrast,
and then I will suggest that Pecham’s purely philosophical arguments against Averroism
deserve attention independent of their possible value to theology.

Pecham thinks that Averroes is wrong about issues that Pecham associates with
Augustine’s authority, especially spiritual matter. It is striking that in the fifth quaestio,
Pecham is not primarily addressing what Aristotle taught, as Aquinas seems to be doing
in the first and second quaestiones in his own Questions on the Soul. Pecham sees the
defense of Augustine as a major goal, whereas Aquinas sees his major task as the defense
and integration of Aristotle. Aquinas has as his goal to show that Averroism is subject to
the same criticisms that make Platonism problematic, but this objective is simply not on
Pecham’s agenda.\textsuperscript{186} Rather, Pecham begins by answering objections that he believes

\textsuperscript{186} See Aquinas, e.g., Treatise, 135-136, 141-145, 150.
\textsuperscript{187} Quaestiones, 383ff.
involve misinterpretations of Augustine. Only in the eighth objection does Pecham respond to an argument that deals directly with Aristotle.

Pecham’s purely philosophical arguments deserve consideration independent of any disagreement with Aquinas. Pecham’s texts contain interesting, non-theological arguments against Averroism which Aquinas does not make in the texts I have considered, and which are interesting independent of debates with Averroism. I suggest that a careful consideration of such philosophical arguments on Pecham’s part would further support my claim that his anthropology is worth consideration alongside Aquinas’s anthropology. The central point in Pecham’s quaestio five is that Averroes is mistaken in claiming that the possible intellect is substantially free from matter. Yet additional arguments, some of which Pecham only briefly mentions, further distinguish his approach from that of Aquinas. I will mention some of them here.

Pecham’s view of corporeal species serves as a backdrop for a counterargument to the Averroists’ claim that, if the intellect can receive intelligible species of one object, then the intellect can receive infinite species from an infinity of objects at once. Pecham responds by citing Aristotle’s principle that two bodies cannot be in the same place. Furthermore, since Pecham believes that the soul relates to the body as mover (in addition to being the body's perfection), he can make an argument against monopsychism

---

188 Ibid., 367-368, 386.
189 Ibid., 378-379.
190 See ibid., 375. Aquinas comes close to making this argument (Against the Averroists, 111). See the second chapter of the present study for a brief discussion of corporeal species.
that Aquinas cannot make.\textsuperscript{192} According to Pecham, Averroes erred when he said that the soul could perfect many, diverse things.\textsuperscript{193} Pecham takes Aristotle to have contradicted Averroes’ argument by saying that a plurality of movables are moved by a plurality of movers and not by a single one.\textsuperscript{194}

Furthermore, since Pecham thinks of reason as the perfection of individual human beings (in the sense discussed above), he can make an argument that monopsychism conflicts with this role for the intellect.\textsuperscript{195} It would seem that this argument is available to Aquinas as well, yet I have not found him doing so in the anti-Averroist texts that I consulted. Aquinas does make an argument about perfection in terms of the activity of a capacity,\textsuperscript{196} but this is a more limited sense of perfection than the one that Pecham emphasizes; Aquinas’s sense of perfection refers strictly to the fulfillment of the possible intellect’s activity (or to the activity that correlates with any potentiality whatsoever), whereas Pecham’s notion of perfection refers to the life of the whole person. Pecham’s

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{192} See, e.g., \textit{Tractatus}, 25.
\textsuperscript{194} See, e.g., Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, 1072a.19ff.
\textsuperscript{195} See Pecham, \textit{Quaestiones}, 376, 377.
\textsuperscript{196} See Aquinas, \textit{Quaestiones}, 69.
view of perfection is also related to his view of individuation, because it is impossible for “whatever soul” to perfect “whatever body.”\textsuperscript{197}

Aquinas’s argument concerning the Averroists’ difficulty with the attribution of thought to individual humans has to do with the ways in which an action can be attributed to something.\textsuperscript{198} Pecham, on the other hand, deals with the issue by asking how a separate intellect can account for abstract thought on Averroist terms, given that no phantasms are involved in purely abstract thought.\textsuperscript{199} This is one consequence of Pecham’s belief that not all thought requires recourse to the phantasms.\textsuperscript{200} Bonaventure had already taken the

\textsuperscript{197} \textit{Quaestiones}, 377. Pecham does clearly explain his view of individuation in the texts I have studied here. However, it is possible to make some progress toward understanding what he thinks. Based on unibility, Bonaventure has a robust notion of individuation that results from the divine implanting of the human soul in the body. And, Pecham discusses unibility in various ways in the first and 13th of the \textit{Quaestiones} (327, 449). In the first \textit{quaestio}, Pecham brings up unibility to mark two distinctions: (1) the difference between the souls of plants, brutes, and men; and (2) the difference between unifiable spiritual substances (human souls) and non-unifiable spiritual substances (angels): “[C]redo quod anima sensitiva brutalis et vegetabilis non sunt in genere [substantiae] spiritualis, quamvis habeant esse spirituale et incorporeum, quia substantia spiritualis dividitur per unibilem et non-unibilem, et non operatur nisi corpore mediante” (327, bracketed item in orig.). There are two interesting points to make about Pecham’s usage of the unibility concept in the 13th \textit{quaestio}. First, Pecham brings up unibility for the purpose of showing that embodiment does not hinder the separated soul’s activity. Second, Pecham says: “Anima appetit uniri corpori ex nobiliori quod est in ipsa, quia eius differentia specifica est unibilitas. Nobilius autem quod sit in anima est intellectus” (449). Thus Pecham applies the notion of unibility to the soul’s individuation. Evidently, Pecham thinks the soul gets the body it does because of its own particular unibility.

\textsuperscript{198} \textit{Treatise on Human Nature}, 20-21.
\textsuperscript{199} \textit{Quaestiones}, 375-376.
\textsuperscript{200} Aquinas says that all knowledge, even self-knowledge, is impossible without encountering objects other than the mind, as Davies explains: “According to Aquinas ... there is no such thing as direct human self-knowledge, where the object known is something incorporeal. His view is that we come to knowledge of things as we encounter material objects and receive forms intentionally” (\textit{The Thought}, 214; cf. Pasnau, \textit{Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature}, 343; Aquinas, \textit{Treatise}, 153).
position that the agent intellect can cognize without recourse to the phantasms, and Pecham agrees. Pecham does not deny that phantasms may be involved in cognition, but he does deny that the phantasms are always required. For example, in the Tractatus Pecham says that “no medium falls between ... the intellect and itself.” Pecham wishes to give space to divine illumination and innate knowledge (e.g., of first principles and the existence of God). Pecham also thinks that abstraction has to take place knowingly, thus knowledge of universals presupposes knowledge of singulars. Knowledge of singulars, however, does not always presuppose reference to phantasms. Pecham admits that the mind is always moved by intelligible species, but he also says that intelligible species do not come exclusively through abstraction from phantasms.

Whereas Averroes had said that the diversity in the intellect comes from the natures of the diverse things that the intellect receives, Pecham says that the diversity goes deeper than that: “the intellect in diverse ways must receive diverse and disparate things; therefore there is diversity.” Diversity that pertains to the various intellects themselves

---

201 See Quinn, The Historical Constitution, 360.
202 See Quodlibeta, 91-96; cf. Etzkorn, “John Pecham, O.F.M.,” 77. For Pecham’s discussion of the nature of the imagination itself, which Pecham calls “the box of forms,” see Tractatus, 35-36.
203 See, e.g., Quaestiones, 377.
204 42: “nihil autem cadit medium inter intellectum et se ipsum.”
205 Quaestiones, 430; Tractatus, 17.
206 Etzkorn, “John Pecham, O.F.M.,” 77. In the 10th of his Quaestiones Pecham presents a principle that is fundamental to his argument: cognition is always cognition of an intelligible (429).
207 Quaestiones, 429.
208 Ibid., 432.
209 Ibid., 377: “[I]ntellectus in diversis recipit diversa et disparata penitus; ergo est diversitas.”
is a partial cause of the diversity in thoughts.\textsuperscript{210} While Aquinas certainly discusses diversity of intellect in the anti-Averroist texts I consulted,\textsuperscript{211} he focuses on the multiplication of the content of knowledge rather than on the human intellect as the essential cause for diversity.\textsuperscript{212}

Aquinas and Pecham both insist that the soul is in every part of the body equally.\textsuperscript{213} Yet Pecham adds that the soul senses every bodily lesion no matter in what part of the body the lesion occurs, and that in such a situation the sensitive soul is not impeded by phantasms that relate to another sense, such as sight.\textsuperscript{214} Pecham thinks that this phenomenological fact presents a problem for monopsychism: The universal mind would not have a way cognize an instance of pain as relating to a particular part of the body. Presumably, this is because it is not by a phantasm that such pain is cognized, yet our experience suggests that we do focus on the particular locale of a given pain.

\textbf{Philosophical Motivation for the Plurality of Forms in Pecham}

Pecham’s and Aquinas’s anthropological projects have similar overarching aims. Pecham and Aquinas are both synthesizing views of prominent philosophers and theologians to develop conceptions of the human person as some combination of intellect and corporeal-temporal matter (the body). For both Pecham and Aquinas, the intellect and some matter must come together in such a way that a single human being, one human substance, is produced.

\textsuperscript{210} Cf. \textit{Tractatus}, 10-11.
\textsuperscript{211} E.g., \textit{Against the Averroists}, 19.
\textsuperscript{212} E.g., Aquinas, \textit{Quaestiones}, 69-71.
\textsuperscript{213} E.g., Aquinas, \textit{Treatise}, 45-46; Pecham, \textit{Quaestiones}, 378.
\textsuperscript{214} \textit{Quaestiones}, 377-378.
Why, then, do Pecham and Aquinas differ so sharply concerning the plurality of forms and the concept of life? One reason is that Pecham is part of a different philosophical tradition; he does believe that his Neoplatonic background and commitment to Augustinian illumination theory dictate that plurality is the correct position. However, lest one suppose that Pecham adopts the plurality view simply because he subscribes to different strands of authority from those to which Aquinas subscribes, it must be understood that Pecham has philosophical as well as theological reasons for adopting these two doctrines. That is, he takes the positions he does not only because of his allegiance to a particular tradition but also and primarily because he believes these positions are more reasonable than the opposing views taken by Aquinas. Thus, in this section, I will draw on the evidence presented above to summarize Pecham’s philosophical reasons for thinking that his view of life and of the plurality of forms offers greater explanatory power than the unitarian view of Aquinas.

Pecham’s anthropology diverges sharply from that of Aquinas at the fundamental level of the definitions of matter, form, and substance. Pecham believes there are certain unacceptable consequences that follow from Aquinas’s metaphysical starting point, but which do not follow from his own starting point. The consequences are of significant theological and philosophical importance concerning the relationship between the soul and the body, including:

- The identity of the dead body of Christ in the tomb.
- The Eucharist.
- The creation of the first man, Adam.
Pecham and Aquinas are primarily theologians who are using philosophy to help them better understand their theological convictions, to better answer theological problems. Therefore, given Pecham’s references to convictions on the topics listed, it is safe to assume that they served as the major motivation for his central doctrines of the plurality of forms and of life. These two doctrines, as I have shown in the present chapter, constitute the substantive doctrinal differences between Pecham and Aquinas. Here, I will discuss Pecham’s and Aquinas’s metaphysical definitions, and then show how they give rise to these significant controversies.

*Matter, Form, and Substance*

To get a clear picture of how Pecham and Aquinas differ in their definitions of matter, the idea of matter must be isolated from other ideas. That is, we must first consider “prime matter” (what Avicebron calls “universal matter”) before considering “natural matter,” or that matter that is specified by form(s) and contributes directly to the constitution of objects which we observe sensibly or of which we are aware due to philosophical reasoning or revelation. In fact, opposing conceptions of “prime matter” are central to the differences between Pecham (and other pluralists, such as Roger Bacon) and Aquinas (and those who subscribe to the unity view). Crowley provides a helpful explanation of Bacon’s hylomorphism, which applies equally to Pecham:

The first point of difference between the two theories is that, for Bacon, prime matter is co-extensive with finitude or contingency and is its source or principle. It is, therefore, a *potentia ad esse*. For St. Thomas, prime matter is limited to the
world of material things and is, together with the form to which it is intrinsically and necessarily relative, in potency relatively to the act of existence from which the essence constituted of matter and form is really distinct. But in spiritual things, in the opinion of St. Thomas, the principle of finitude or limitation is not matter but essence conceived as simple form which is in potency relatively to existence conceived as act.215

For Bacon and Pecham, matter considered in itself (as “prime”) is the principle of possibility. It is thus the “root of contingency” of finite beings, and has a different essence from that of form.216 Matter is not purely non-being or the mere absence of something, or just a pure possibility. Nor is it an accident. It is rather a real potency. Aquinas understands that Avicebron’s position required this active reality on matter’s part.217 Matter itself is not mere nothingness, because it is due to matter’s essence of possibility that various substances are formed.218 (It is impossible that matter’s ability to be formed be due to forms that are as yet not present, and so there must be a real, active potency in matter per se.) Although matter in itself has an essence, it is an incomplete essence

215 Crowley, Roger Bacon, 96-97; for Pecham’s treatment of prime matter, see his Summa De Ente et Essentia (Delorme, “La Summa,” 60-65).
216 Crowley, Roger Bacon, 99.
217 Treatise on Separate Substance, 62: “Avicebron in a way returned to the opinion of the ancient Naturalists who held that all things were one being, by positing that the substance of all things was nothing other than matter. This matter they did not consider as something only in potency, as Plato and Aristotle did, but as some actual being. . . . Avicebron, thinking that the nature of things was not contained in bodies alone, said that that one principle which he held to be the first matter and common substance of all things, was a non-corporeal substance. And that he posited this universal matter, which he says is the substance of all things. . . .”
218 Pecham, Quodlibeta, 176: “Quia igitur a propria natura habet posse capere formam, istam potentiam non habet a forma, quae radicatur in essentia ipsius materiae.”
insofar as it is in potency to *all* forms. It should be noted that, for Pecham, prime matter is not merely an abstract concept. Pecham thinks that God *does* create matter without form, but actually uses form to “conserve” created substances in complete being. (So neither Pecham nor Aquinas expects to ever come across any isolated prime matter in the world.)

The Bacon/Pecham definition of prime matter is distinct from that of Aquinas. For Aquinas, prime matter is the principle that is intrinsically relative to a form as the potency for the act of existence of the corporeal form/matter compound (substance). “For if it is of the nature of matter that it be in potency, then prime matter must be completely in potency. As a consequence, it is not predicated of any actually existing thing.” Matter, for Aquinas, is not an essence but is the pure possibility for the actualization of a form’s essence, and so the mutability or finitude of the substance comes from the limited existence of the form. This is the perspective from which Aquinas criticizes the doctrine of spiritual matter:

> It is important to notice, however, that if someone were to claim that the soul is composed of matter and form, then he could in no way say that the soul is the body’s form. *For since form is actuality, whereas whereas matter is solely*

---

219 Ibid., 176: “Ad secundum dicendum quod materia est in potentia ad formam, et ista potentia materiae non fundatur in nihilo, sed in ipsa essentia materiae. Unde, quamvis sit in potentia ad formam, est tamen essentia quaedam diminuta in actu, sicut est etiam principium. Et illum actum essendi non habet a forma, sed a creante, sicut etiam habet essentiam, scilicet a Creatore: essentiae autem est esse sicut lucis lucere. . . . Habet igitur actum essentiae incompletae ordinarum potentialiter ad receptionem formarum.”

220 *Quodlibeta*, 175-176. “Et ideo sicut producit materiam de nihilo, non per formam—quam tamen conservat in esse completo mediante forma. . . .” (ibid., 175).


222 Aquinas, *Treatise on Separate Substances*, 64; cf. ibid., 61.

223 Ibid., 68.
potential being, there is no way in which what is composed of matter and form can be the form of something else in respect of its whole. But if it is the form in respect of some part of itself, then we will say that the soul is that which is the form, and we will say that what it is the form of is what is first ensouled. . . .”

Aquinas’s hylomorphism therefore exhibits a primacy of form, minimizing the contribution on the part of matter.

Matter also can be considered in what Crowley calls its various “natural” states, or in states that are, for Bacon and Pecham, specified to some degree by form:

Matter which is the substratum of coming to be and passing away is not prime matter, is not that simple essence distinct from form which is the root of contingency, but is prime matter plus certain forms. It is prime mater plus the forms of substance, of corporeity, and of the elements. . . . This does not mean to say that matter has, of itself, any kind of active spontaneity or vital energy. In order to become active, the incomplete form (or active potency) has to receive from an external agent a complement or power (virtus) which confers on it a new mode of being. . . . The incomplete form or active potency is not to be thought of as an accident of matter, nor is it identical with matter. It is a substantial form, essentially the same as the complete form. Between this incomplete form or active potency and the complete form, there is only a difference of degree of actualisation within the same essence.

While Bacon has a basic distinction between prime matter and natural matter, it should be noted more precisely that the later Bacon has five stages of matter, the last of which is natural matter or the subject of generation and corruption. Michela Pereira’s forthcoming article on “Materia naturalis” in Bacon shows that he largely reproduces Avicebron’s layered structure of stages from prime matter to natural matter, including:

---

224 Treatise, 23.
225 See Crowley, Roger Bacon, 100ff. Pecham refers to natural matter specifically as that which can undergo corporeal changes, e.g., from rarity to density, hot to cold, humid to dry, etc. (Delorme, “La Summa,” 62). Bacon includes in natural matter the unchanging celestial matter (which is still contingent substance).
226 Crowley, Roger Bacon, 103-106, emp. and parenthetical items in orig.; cf. Pecham, Tractantes, 143-144; Quaestiones, 186-187; Quodlibeta, 175-176.
1. The genus generalissimum (prime matter and form).

2. Spiritual incorporeal substance (separate substances and rational souls),

3. Universal corporeal matter (not a body, but a common root for both heavenly and non-heavenly corporeal matter).

4. Corporeal substance (heavenly matter and non-heavenly matter [non-heaven corporeality being the root for natural generation], to include the sphere of the elements, which are not subject to generation and corruption).

5. Natural matter, or the world of generation and corruption (from the simplest mixed bodies to man).

While Pecham emphasizes the gradation of matter less than Bacon does, most of these stages are present in Pecham. But Bacon includes two (rather mysterious) distinctions that Pecham, to my knowledge, does not: For Pecham there is no “universal corporeal matter” that is a common root for heavenly and non-heavenly matter, and there is no non-heavenly corporeal substance other than the corporeal matter that is subject to generation and corruption. (Pecham also has no spere elementorum, although he does have both elements and mixed bodies.)

Recall that Bacon and Pecham subscribe to universal hylomorphism, or the view that every finite being, whether associated with a corporeal body or not, has matter (not

---

227 Bacon, Communia naturalium, 1.pars. 2.d.1.ch.4, p. 66; cf. Avicebron, Fons Vitae, 12, 21, 270-278; Pereira, “Materia naturalis”.

228 Pereira posits that Bacon thought of alchemical theory as a path toward stripping natural matter of all of its forms and thus reverting mixed bodies to the incorruptibility characteristic of corporeal substance (“Material naturalis”; cf. Bacon, Liber sex Scientiarum, Opera hactenus inedita, 9:183-184).

229 Tractatus, 6-7.
necessarily corporeal matter).\textsuperscript{230} Thus, in fact, every finite, formed thing consists of matter that has been specified by form to various degrees.\textsuperscript{231} For Pecham and Bacon, those form/matter compositions include not only the corporeal things of our sense-experience, but non-corporeal things such as angels and intellects. In his discussion of natural matter, Bacon says:

\begin{quote}
Et planum est quod non incipit in genere generalissimo nec in materia et forma ejus, quia illa in omnibus habentur per creationem, quoniam conveniunt spiritualibus et corporabilibus et celestibus et aliis. Similiter nec in prima specie que sequitur hoc genus, que est substancia spiritualis et incorporea, quia illa quantum ad angelos et quantum ad animas racionales creatur totaliter. Nec incipit in specie alia ei coequeva, scilicet, in substancia corporea, quoniam illud est commune celo et non celo, et ideo antecedit generationem.\textsuperscript{232}
\end{quote}

For Aquinas, on the other hand, natural matter can refer only to corporeal matter. This is necessitated by his view that prime matter is the potency to the actualization of a corporeal being’s form.

For the pluralists, matter and form are \textit{essentially} different from one another.\textsuperscript{233} Matter is gradually specified by a series of forms—or grades of the single form—which are not expelled as new forms are educed from the active potency of matter by external

\textsuperscript{230} See Pecham, \textit{Quodlibeta}, 207-212; Pereira, “Materia naturalis”.
\textsuperscript{231} Ibid., 175: “Et ideo sicut producit materiam de nihilo, non per formam—quam tamen conservat in esse completo mediante forma—ita potest eam, si velit, facere esse sine forma, cum in infinitum plus dependeat a Creatore quam a forma”; cf. \textit{Quaestiones}, 447.
\textsuperscript{232} \textit{Communa naturalium}, 66.
\textsuperscript{233} Delorme, “La \textit{Summa},” 64-65.
forces. Pecham, like Bonaventure, refers to these forms which are in matter as the seminal reasons, taken from the philosophy of Stoicism and Augustine. Substance itself is the result of the union of universal matter and universal form, and is analogous to the “most general genus,” which contains in potency its various species, each of which is determined gradually by more and more specific formation. In the case of Bacon it is more correct to refer to the individual being’s single substantial form which has various grades, admitting of degrees, whereas for Pecham the situation is not entirely clear, but as I have noted above, it is entirely possible that he advocates the grades theory, as would be perfectly consistent with his philosophy.

For Aristotle and Aquinas substantial form does not admit of degrees; each being can have only one substantial form, else it would not be one thing. For Pecham, who does not share Aquinas’s definitions of form and matter, it is not logically necessary that a

---

234 See Crowley, 106-107. Concerning the external agency: “Under the influence of some universal or particular external agent, this incomplete form or active potency becomes the complete form. This does not mean to say that matter has, of itself, any kind of active spontaneity or vital energy. In order to become active, the incomplete form (or active potency) has to receive from an external agent a complement or power (virtus) which confers on it a new mode of being. It must be clearly understood that, for Bacon, the external agent contributes no more than this impulse or virtue which has for effect to arouse the active potency in matter” (ibid., 106, parenthetical items in orig.).


236 Delorme, “La Summa,” 61; cf. ibid., 65: “Primum ergo compositum resultans ex unione materiae primae et formae primae est genus substantiae, quod est unum et generale. . .”

237 Crowley, Roger Bacon, 106.

238 See ibid., 109; cf. Amerini, Aquinas on the Beginning and End, 76; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1.93.3; Aristotle, Categories, 3b.33-4a.9.
substance have but one form in order to be a unified substance. In fact, Pecham uses
*substantia* in a wide variety of contexts, and so the reader cannot assume that the word
refers to what is traditionally called “substance” in Aquinas’s language.

Whether Pecham subscribes to the grades view or not, he certainly sees a progressive
unfolding of the actualization of substantial form. In the case of the human being,
Pecham views substantial forms (or grades of form) as being non-static, accounting
jointly for all human function and thereby fulfilling one another. For example, the
nutritive and sensitive forms are taken up and transformed in the activity of the
intellective form, because human thinking presupposes the support of the nutritive and
sensitive souls. Nonetheless the nutritive and sensitive forms have their own subservient
perfections. Pecham insists that the *forma corporeitatis* is included in the very definition
of the soul of the human being, because the definition of the soul makes reference to the
organic body that potentially has life. Pecham cites both Avicenna and Boethius to
make the point that form can refer whole of the thing with its parts, as well as the *esse* of
the thing.

I have already said that for Aquinas, matter (prime or natural) does not contain in
itself any forms in any sense, but is rather is pure possibility for the actualization of form

---

239 *Substantia* may refer to: (1) The matter of the body of a newly ensouled embryo’s
parent; (2) Simple, non-composite, divine substance; (3) “This thing,” a substantial
composite of matter and form, e.g., a man; (4) The rational soul (or the substance of the
rational soul) that is united to the human body and can be separated; (5) The sensitive or
vegetative soul, e.g., of a brute; (6) A separated substance; (7) The set of characteristics
essential for a species or a kind. Generally speaking, the context in which Pecham uses
*substantia* must determine how the word is to be understood.

240 *Quodlibeta*, 230.

which is ontologically external to it.\footnote{See Aquinas, \textit{Treatise on Separate Substances}, 61.} Matter is therefore a purely receptive potency and forms cannot be educed from natural matter at all:

> Now it is proper for matter to be in potency. This distinction of matter must therefore not be understood as matter contains its diverse forms or dispositions, for this is outside the essence of matter, but according to the distinctions of potency with respect to the diversity of forms. For, since potency is called that which is said relatively to act, it is necessary that potency be distinguished with respect to that of which potency is primarily predicated.\footnote{Ibid., 68.}

For Aquinas, the single substantial form for a being is static, so while it is possible for the form to be corrupted and for the matter to receive a different substantial form, it is impossible for a single being to have more than one substantial form (or more than one grade of a form) at a time.\footnote{Pecham, \textit{Tractatus}, 8.}

\textit{Life as Emanative Force}

Pecham thinks that life is an emanative, immanent, “top-down” force (sometimes called a form\footnote{See ibid., 3-9. Aquinas, on the other hand, does not allow an emanative, Neo-Platonic life force into his account of nature, and this is part of his overall rejection of Avicebron’s account of matter: “For as often as one arrived at one completely uniform matter, according to the principles of [Avicebron’s] position it would be necessary that this matter should receive only one form and this equally throughout the whole. And again the matter underlying the form would, as a consequence, receive only one form and this uniformly throughout the whole; and thus by descending even to the lowest of beings, no diversity could be found in things” (\textit{Treatise on Separate Substances}, 66-67, bracketed item added).} which, in its farthest reaching emanation from God, animates all living corporeal matter.\footnote{Pecham, \textit{Tractatus}, 8.} In living things, the actualization of forms (e.g., the nutritive and sensitive) is driven by this force as it reaches the soul and then “overflows” to the
body. Life is more fundamental than the activity of the nutritive soul; nutrition involves
the passing on of material from part to part, but some principle must explain why this
happens. Life, as this emanative principle, does not emerge out of matter. But it is
omnipresent in living, corporeal beings.

Aquinas does not have a principle to explain why nutrition happens, because he
thinks that there is nothing more fundamental in the living thing than the nutritive soul
itself. While Aquinas also associates form with life, his concept of life is not the same as
that of Pecham. For Aquinas, the soul is actuality of a physical body that potentially has
life. Life results from the ensoulment of matter, but there is not the same Neoplatonic
emanation of life.

As one reads Pecham, it is easier to understand the effects of life than to understand
life itself. He characterizes the effects of this vital form in terms of various emanated
forms. The plants, having only the “farthest resonance of life” have only enough of the
vital force to attain the nutritive form/soul. Animals have more of the vital form, and so
they are able to attain not only the nutritive form, but also the sensitive form. Humans,

249 It is interesting that Aquinas and Pecham both use the language of combination to
describe the single human being. Just as Pecham says that the human individual is a
“third thing” that results from the combination of soul and body (*Tractatus*, 187), so
Aquinas says: “Wherefore we call man a rational animal, not from the composite of
animal and rational, as we say that he is composed of body and soul; for man is said to be
composed of soul and body, just as from two things a third thing is truly constituted,
which is neither of the two, for man is neither soul nor body” (*Concerning Being and
Essence (De Ente et Essentia)*, trans. George G. Leckie [New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1937], 12).
while still far removed from the source of life, are close enough to be subject to a greater measure of the vital force and thus also suited to receive the intellective form.

**Substantial Unity**

Aquinas thinks that the unity produced by Pecham’s combination of the substance of universal matter and the substantiality provided by the various forms is purely accidental: “For if to some being existing in act, another act is added, the whole will not be one essentially but only accidentally because two acts or forms are essentially diverse.”\(^{250}\) Surely Pecham’s combination of the various forms in a being would result in an accidental unity if he were operating with the same definitions of form and matter that function in Aquinas’s thought. But Pecham’s definition of natural matter includes the seminal reasons, which guide the formation of the substance. It is anything but accidental, therefore, that a being takes on the forms that it does. Pecham’s extended treatment of the seminal reasons is found in his *Summa De Ente et Essentia*.\(^{251}\) There, Pecham says that a seminal reason is the “power of the genus of the individual, through which it is to find the species ramificalem.”\(^{252}\) Pecham illustrates this point by contrasting a man and a donkey. While the man and the donkey are both in the genus of animal, the seminal reason that contributes to the production of the donkey is not in the matter that produces the man, and vice versa. The result is that man does not naturally produce a donkey (although God could miraculously use the matter of a man to make an donkey, if he willed to do so).

\(^{250}\) *Treatise on Separate Substances*, 64.


\(^{252}\) Ibid., 66: “Si ergo quaeras sit ratio seminalis, dico quod haec virtus generis individui, per quam est invenire speciem ramificalem. . . .”
In this discussion, Pecham also explains the gradual development of the various kinds of creatures throughout the world due to the seminal reasons in matter. All animals may be said to be closely related in that they are all part of a genus that has evolved according to the seminal reasons, as universal matter has been progressively specified by form. This gradual evolution of substantial form must occur, for “generation embraces a multiplicity of partial generations.” The devolution must come to an end, however, and Pecham is evidently thinking of this when he mentions the mule: In the far reaches of this specification the mule, for example, is made from the mating of the horse and donkey because the horse and donkey are closely related in the genus.

Pecham explains further in his *Summa De Ente et Essentia* how a substance that includes various active, formative principles, which are educed from the active potency of matter, may constitute a single “being.” The being (*esse*) of a thing can be explained in four ways, and in each of these explanations there is a perspective from which form can be considered as an accident of matter (every attribute of universal matter is accidental in a sense).

1. Being can refer to a thing not as it is composed of principles, but to the nature of the thing as it is in relation to others. For example, “to read” makes reference to a book, and “to write” makes reference to a script. What one reads is the book, not the principles that compose it. In this sense, *esse* is in a

---

253 Ibid., 66-67.
254 Crowley, *Roger Bacon*, 110.
sense an accident of being (\textit{ens}), although it remains an \textit{ens} in itself (i.e., the book is really a being in virtue of the principles that compose it).\(^{255}\)

2. Being can refer to the whole nature of the thing, that is, whatever is in the being other than its accidents. This includes the Boethian distinction between \textit{quod est} and \textit{quo est}. We refer to the being of a thing when we say that someone is capable of taking on the accident of becoming wise.

3. Being can signify the form or quiddity of the thing. For example, humanity is the form a whole human being (not just a part). This form may also be called accidental in the sense that the thing’s coming together as one thing is contingent.

4. Being can refer to anything that is in the genus of \textit{ens}. Accidents are not beings in this sense, because they have essence not from their own principles, but from principles of the beings that are the subjects of change.\(^{256}\)

For Pecham, natural substances are unified beings, but this in no way rules out their composition “from subsisting principles.”\(^{257}\)

\(^{255}\) Pecham goes into some detail here about the sense in which \textit{esse} may be considered as accidental and the sense in which it may not be: “Vocat autem Avicenna accidens rei quod non est in re sicut esse vel pars eius, ut quia non est genus vel differentia, materia vel forma. Boethius autem [et] alii, utentes nomine accidentis, dicunt ipsum esse non esse accidens. Nec sequitur quod est accidens entis: non enim est accidens mediante potentia, sed ipsius rei accidentalitas immediata, non elicta a potentia, sed concomitans principiorum confluentiam et causata ab ipsa” (Delorme, “La \textit{Summa},” 62, bracketed item in orig.).

\(^{256}\) Delorme, “La \textit{Summa},” 62-64; Aquinas understands that the Avicebronian position holds that every particular substance is in some sense an accident of being (\textit{Treatise on Separate Substances}, 63). Aquinas rejects the Avicebronian view, instead choosing a definition of accidental being that is clearly more limited: “[C]onsider that a substantial form differs from an accidental form as follows: an accidental form does not give being unconditionally, but being such. (So heat does not make its subject be unconditionally, but be hot.) And so when an accidental form is added, we do not say that something is made or is generated unconditionally, but that it is made such or that it stands in some way. Likewise, when an accidental form departs, we do not say that something is corrupted unconditionally, but in a certain respect \textit{(secundum quid)}” (\textit{Treatise on Human Nature}, 34, parenthetical items in orig.).

\(^{257}\) “[E]x principiis subsistentes” (Delorme, “La \textit{Summa},” 63).
Substance and Individuation

Yet, to say how particular beings are unified is not to explain how they are individuated from one another. Pecham’s account of individuation is presented in his *Summa De Ente et Essentia*, and it relies on the discussion of the active potency of natural matter described above. Pecham argues that individuals are totally distinct from one another, even if they share membership in some genus. Individuation is not something that is superadded onto the most specified species of being; rather, individuation is *already present* in the species by virtue of its active potencies. Pecham’s illustration for this has to do with fire and the surrounding air. When a fire is corrupted into air, it is not the case that the fire is totally corrupted into absolute nothingness, nor is the source of the air nothing. Rather, there is something of the fire that remains after the change and there was already something of the ignited air (as yet not fully actualized) in the fire. Pecham uses this example to show that the individuation of the product of change (a third thing after the form and matter are counted) results from both matter and form, according to the following procedure: Matter contributes to the individuation of the third thing, because the subject of the change, the fire, is matter that becomes the ignited air. However, form is also involved, because the form of the air already resided in the fire as an active potency. The form of the fire is corrupted and resolved into a new substance.

---

258 Ibid., 65-66.
259 Ibid., 65.
260 A companion passage in Pecham is *Quaestiones*, 381.
The new substance shares the same “root” as that of the fire.\textsuperscript{261} No individuation is purely accidental, but rather occurs “according to the order of nature.”\textsuperscript{262}

As would be expected, the individuation of the human being adheres generally to the foregoing pattern. The various forms and the corporeal matter both contribute to the individuation of the person. The difference is that in the case of the human being, there is not only the \textit{forma corporeitatis} and the seminal reasons which lead to the actualization of the potency of the already-formed matter, but there is also the intellectual form, which God inserts from outside the human being. The rational soul cannot be united to just any kind of body, but must be united specifically to a corporeal structure capable of yielding a human body.\textsuperscript{263} Therefore, the rational soul requires a bodily disposition which “ministers to its operation”\textsuperscript{264}. The organization of the full body is required to make possible the uniquely human activity, intellection. However, the organization and life of the body alone is insufficient to account for intellection. The intellective soul has an operation that is not carried out by the matter of the corporeal body, and so it cannot be educed from the potency of matter. It is not that the intellection cannot occur apart from the human body, but rather that the human body must operate in a certain way if there is to be intellectual

\begin{itemize}
\item Delorme, “\textit{La Summa},” 65: “[I]dem ergo radicaliter G, verumtamen esse rei est alterum et alterum.” “G” denotes the common subject which was before the individual fire and became the air.
\item Ibid., 68: “Sed ex via Avicennae sequitur error, ut individuatio sit per accidentia, quod falsum est; cum individua sint diversae substantiae, non est individuatio per accidentia, sed per ipsa principia essentialia, quae sunt alia et alia. Si ergo omnia accidentia sint a principiis substantiae, necesse est priorem esse individuationem substantiae quam accidentium ordine naturae.”
\item \textit{Quaestiones}, 377; \textit{Tractatus}, 27.
\item \textit{Tractatus}, 27: “… suae operationi subministret.”
\end{itemize}
functionality on the part of this human being. Thus the intellect plays a decisive formal role for the unity and plurality of the human being.

For Aquinas, the individuation of a substance comes primarily from matter, although there is a contribution from form in the sense that multiple instantiation must be suitable to a form’s nature. This is not the place for a full study of Aquinas’s theory of individuation, but the relevant point here is that his rejection of the Avicebronian position about the unity of matter pre-empts any Pechamian explanation of species individuation. In fact, Aquinas likens those who share Pecham’s view with the Pre-Socratics substance monists. Every case of individuation on the Avicebronian view is taken as a merely accidental difference, and so any further remaining Pechamian explanation concerning substantial individuation (as discussed above) is of no use. As I said earlier in the present chapter, however, it is not clear that Aquinas’s account of individuation is as

---

266 “Now in this way alone is a species one without qualification, namely, insofar as that which is man is truly animal, not because animal is the subject of the form man but because the very form animal is the form man, differing only as indeterminate from the determinate. For, if animal be one thing and biped something else, the biped animal that is man will not be essentially one and consequently will not be essentially a being. As a consequence, it follows that whatever things agree in the genus, will differ only by an accidental difference and all things will be one in substance which is the genus and the subject of all substances; just as the one part of a surface is white and the other part black, yet the whole is one surface. For this reason, the ancients themselves who posited one matter which was the substance of all things and predicated of all them, asserted that all things were one. These difficulties likewise beset those who posit an order of diverse substantial forms in one and the same being” (*Treatise on Separate Substances*, 65).  
267 Aquinas’s argument against any accidental determination of substantial form-matter combination is in *Treatise*, 40-41.
explanatory as Pecham’s account. This becomes clearer in the case of the individuation of
the embryo, which I will discuss below.

Now, consider how Pecham’s views on form, matter, and substance support his
various central convictions.

*The Separation of the Soul and Bodily Identity*

Pecham wants an anthropology that guarantees not only the unity and individuality of
the human being, but also the persistence of the body’s ontological identification after
death. This identification is critical not only for addressing the concerns of those who
expect to be reunited with their bodies in the eschatological resurrection described in
Christianity, but also for explaining how the dead body of Christ maintained its
identification during its three days in the tomb. (Furthermore, a philosophical account of
diachronic bodily identification was necessary to explain how the dead body of Christ
could be involved in the Eucharist.268) Pecham believes that *only* his account of the
human person—and not that of Aquinas—can explain the ontological persistence of the

268 Pecham says on this point: “Unde elegantissime deserviunt vocabula fidei christianae,
ut non dicatur panem transmutari in corpus Christi, sed transubstantiari: ubi enim est
commutatio, et subjectum commune et materia eadem manet; corpori autem Christi non
ei isto modo advenit nova materia, quia individua ipsa materia panis, immo ipsum
individuum substantiae quod est in pane, transit in individuum substantiae quod est
corpus Christi; ideo propriissime dicitur transubstantiatio” (Delorme, “La *Summa,*” 67).
human body, and so I suspect that this is one of the major issues motivating Pecham to take his anthropological claims so seriously. (In fact, his own writing suggests this.)

According to Pecham, at death: (1) The intellect leaves the body; (2) The body is no longer animated by the vital form; (3) The nutritive and sensitive forms, which are no longer needed to maintain the body’s corporeal life and provide phantasms for cognition, are corrupted; (4) However, the *forma corporeitatis* remains with the decaying body.

---

269 Callus, *The Condemnation of St Thomas at Oxford*, 16: “Archbishop John Pecham at the metropolitan visitation of the University on October 29th, 1284, in order to short-circuit all evasion, renewed the prohibition issued seven years previously by his predecessor [Kilwardby]; but, for the sake of peace, he added that as a concession he would consider whether any of the thirty theses might be tolerated in the schools. Until then, the prohibitions should be maintained under the same penalties as before. Nevertheless, one particular thesis should be most strictly proscribed, namely, the execrable error of those who posited one single form in man, ‘unum vero illorum expresse notavimus articulum, quorundam dicentium, in homine esse tantummodo formam unam.’ Without significant emphasis he roundly asserted that, in addition to countless other absurdities, it follows from this theory that Christ’s body was not one and the same before and after death; that the relics of the saints venerated in Rome and all over Christendom did not in reality appertain to their own bodies born of their mothers, but would be new entities born of the imagination, for it is in fact impossible to preserve the identity of the body without the permanence of a general or special form” (bracketed item added); cf. Pecham, *Registrum*, 3:841.

270 Pecham, *Quodlibeta*, 237: “Si enim dicere vellet quis animam sensitivam hominis generari et solum intellectum creari et extrinsecus advenire—ut videtur sentire Philosophus—tunc dicere oportet sensus aut vires sensitivas nullatenus separari. Sed quia ‘quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest superior’ et non e converso, intellectus separatus potest cognoscere sensibilia sicut omne genus sensitivum unica vi intellectiva.” I do not know of a passage where Pecham describes precisely the corruptive process through which the nutritive and sensitive forms go, but he implies that they are corrupted when he says that the intellect is not corrupted precisely because it has a potency that works without an organ: “Potentia autem, quae sine organo operatur, sine organo habet esse, cum operatio habeat esse a forma, quae dat esse. Ergo potentia intellectiva nullo modo dependet a corpore, et ita nec corrumpitur, corpore corrupto” (*Tractatus*, 49). And, Pecham says that whatever is generated is corrupted (*Quodlibeta*, 227); the nutritive and sensitive souls are generated, therefore they are at some stage (death) corrupted.
preserving its identification as this particular body. Corporeity was present before the infusion of the rational soul, and so it will remain there when the rational soul departs.

Pecham says that it is by virtue of the seminal reasons in matter that the identity of the dead body is maintained:

Haec ergo ratio seminalis est vis individui generis propinqui, quae vis non est solius formae generis, sed continens aptitudinem materiae et esse alio modo praedicto. Sic ergo manet idem quodammodo individuum generis in diversis individuis specierum, etsi in cineres transmutantur: quando homo moritur et corpus corrumpitur, in cineres transit species corporis et individuum speciei, sed remanet individuum generis; etsi cineres mutantur in auras vel in corpora quorumcumque animalium, semper verum est dicere: “haec materia, haec substantia fuit in corpore alicuius hominis”.

Pecham thinks that the body’s reduction to ashes, or even to prime matter, is not a problem for the identification of the body, because the matter has been permanently identified as being the matter of a individual by virtue of the matter having been specified by the seminal reasons, which produced the *forma corporeitatis*.

On the other hand, the separation of the intellect from the body is problematic for Aquinas, given his definition of matter. If matter is a totally uninformed potency, it cannot be disposed to any particular form. Having lost its only form, the matter is now free from any disposition and therefore totally unspecified. There is no hope to account philosophically for its future identification, nor is there any principled reason for it to

---

271 In the *Tractatus*, Pecham bases an argument for the immortality of the soul on the incorruptibility of a bodily form: “Item, si aliqua forma corporalis, perficiens materiam corcorporalem (sic), est incorruptibilis, ergo multo fortius aliqua forma spiritualis corpus perficiens. Sed omnium formarum nobilissima est anima rationalis” (50); cf. Delorme, “La *Summa,*** 66-67.


274 *Tractatus*, 48-49; *Quodlibeta*, 227-228, 230.
taking up the form of a corpse after death. This is precisely the point Pecham makes in his *Summa De Ente et Essentia* and in his ecclesiastical condemnation of 1286. Aquinas is forced to rely on God’s miraculous intervention to re-introduce the bodily identification at the resurrection. For Pecham, Aquinas is making two mistakes by introducing the miraculous to solve the philosophical difficulty: He is introducing a strictly theological explanation that arbitrarily infringes on his own Aristotelian account of natural processes, and he is opposing the only philosophical explanation that supports what both thinkers understand to be orthodoxy.

When we turn to Pecham’s fourth Quodlibet (*Romanum*), we find further problems with the unity view relative to the intellect’s isolation from the corporeal body. Pecham says that God infused a rational soul into the already-formed body of Adam, that is, the

---

body had a form prior to the introduction of the rational soul.\textsuperscript{276} If Adam’s body were not already specified by form, then there would be no reason for God to introduce the soul into that body rather than into, say, a stone. Pecham adds that there is no sense in which the forms already present in the body are corrupted when the rational soul comes in, as Aquinas taught. Thus it is clear that the discussion is directed against Aquinas and others who espouse the unity of form position.

In the very next \textit{quaestio} of the fourth Quodlibet, Pecham argues that it is not due to the intellective soul’s creation that it is made impure by sin, but rather because the intellective soul is infused into a corporeal body.\textsuperscript{277} This requires, however, that the body already have certain properties. The corporeal body considered in the state of being

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textit{Quodlibeta}, 233: “Dico quod anima creatur munda et ex carne infecta inficitur et efficitur immunda. Quod patet sic: quia anima creatur ex nihilo, et hoc non potest esse nisi ab illo cuius potentia est infinita, qui solus potest aliquid facere de nihilo. Ipse autem, cum sit optimus, nihil potest facere nisi bonum in genere suo. Impossibile est igitur animam esse malam ex creatione, sed in corpore inquinatur”; cf. \textit{Quaestiones}, 359.}
\end{footnotes}
prepared for the introduction of the rational soul, is not a nothing or a pure potency, but rather is an already informed something.

Notice the implication of these discussions in the fourth Quodlibet: Pecham sees his own understanding of matter as required for a consistent understanding of how the theological doctrines could be true. It is not just that Pecham thinks he has a more explanatory account of the human person than that of Aquinas. Rather, he thinks that the Scriptures and Augustine’s philosophy require the pluralist account.

Embryology

The same pluralist vision that accounts for the separation of the intellect from the body also implicates an account of embryology. For Pecham, every part of the embryo is the product of natural generation with the exception of the rational soul, which is created and infused, and the form of life itself.278 The parents pass on material from which the embryo’s various forms (including the nutritive and sensitive souls) are educed by external forces associated with the parents.279 Life as the universal teleological drive for

278 Quaestiones, 315-330; see the discussion in the present chapter (above) concerning life as the animate form.
279 Pecham, Quaestiones, 324: “Ergo, animatum et inanimatum sunt in eadem potentia formae substantialis”; ibid., 326: “[S]perma habet animam potentia, actu autem non, sed est virtus paterna in semine transfusa, quae quidem operatur ad productionem animae species. . . . Et quia non distinete [agit] ad operationem membrorum, quasi per modum artis incipiens a corde, ideo dicitur intellectus, [quia] quasi similis intellectui in operando. . . . Ideo generat aggregatum essentialiter ordinatum ad animam rationalem. Quod autem ad animam rationalem non potest attingere, non est ex impotentia et indignitate, sed summa hominis dignitate qua [secundum] supernaturalem modum est ad imaginem Dei. . . . [H]omo generat hominem et aggregatum, quia generat quidquid est in homine generabile. Tamen, quia illud quod per se generat est ordinatum essentialiter ad animam rationabilem, unde credo quod si per impossibile Deus non infunderet animam rationalem, necessario deficeret” (bracketed items in orig.).
animate beings participates with the matter to cause the embryo’s organization and vital
development. At some point during the natural, gradual, bodily developmental process,
the created rational soul is infused.\textsuperscript{280} The forms that were in place prior to the
introduction of the rational soul are completed.\textsuperscript{281}

Aquinas’s position concerning the animation of the embryo is as follows: The embryo
initially has its own nutritive soul/form, which is corrupted upon the development of the
sensitive soul. The sensitive soul contains virtually the powers of the nutritive soul. Then,

\textsuperscript{280} See Crowley, \textit{Roger Bacon}, 132-135, especially: “It is interesting to note that the roles
of Aristotle and St. Augustine in the present debate are the reverse of what one would
expect: Aristotle is the great authority in the camp of the ‘pluralists,’ Augustine, in the
opposite camp. In the \textit{De Generatione Animalium}, the Stagirite traces the various stages
in the development of the embryo. Generation involves a succession of forms. . . . For
Aristotle, the nutritive and sensitive souls were developed through the normal processes
of generation: reason alone came from ‘outside,’ \textit{ab extrinseco}. For the scholastics, this
meant that the rational soul was created and infused into the body. In the debate on the
powers of the soul, which was intimately bound up with the question of plurality of
forms, the fact that, for Aristotle, the origin of the nutritive and sensitive powers was
completely different from that of reason, was one of the central arguments of the
protagonists of plurality of forms” (134-135). Amerini says that the pluralist position
about the development of the embryo’s soul is: “[T]he sensitive soul and the rational soul
are added to the vegetative soul, which is present in the semen, in such a way that there
are in humans three substantially different souls.” This phrasing would most readily be
interpreted to mean that the sensitive soul is infused just as the rational soul is. However,
Pecham’s view is that both the sensitive and nutritive souls are \textit{educed from matter},
whereas only the rational soul is infused from outside (\textit{Quaestiones}, 315-330):
“\textit{Dicendum quod [compositum] generatur ex corpore et anima sensitiva, quae non
corrumpitur adveniente anima rationali, sed completur. Et quod generatum, et anima
rationalis quae infunditur, non sunt duae animae sed una; sicut homo est una substantia ex
anima composita}” (ibid., 326, bracketed item in orig.).

\textsuperscript{281} \textit{Quaestiones}, 326: “\textit{Dicendum quod [compositum] generatur ex corpore et anima
sensitiva, quae non corrumpitur adveniente anima rationali, sed completur. Et quod
generatum, et anima rationalis quae infunditur, non sunt duae animae sed una; sicut homo
est una substantia ex anima composita}” (bracketed item in orig.).
when the rational soul is created, the sensitive form is likewise corrupted, because the rational soul contains virtually all of the powers of the sensitive and nutritive forms.

For Thomas the formative power, passed on by the father’s semen, is a corporeal power whose only task is to manage the material formation and organization of the body. It remains throughout the whole process, at least until the coming of the rational soul. But since for Thomas the species of what is formed changes during the process (in fact the embryo performs vital operations—vegetative, sensitive, and intellective functions—that are of different species), it follows that, once it is conceded that one and the same form cannot perdure and be gradually perfected, the only possibility is to assume that in the process of generation there is a succession of species, and this requires an alternation of generation and corruption because … “every process of generation involves a process of corruption, and vice versa.” And so, before the coming of the rational soul, embryos are formed to last a short period of time. As soon as they are conceived, embryos possess a vegetative ensoulment. Once they reach a more perfect form of organization, these embryos corrupt and embryos specifically more complex take their place. in this way, embryos in their first phases are entities that are transitory and almost instrumental, produced to give life to more articulated and functionally sophisticated embryonic forms and, finally, to a human being.282

The issue here is not just that Pecham prefers to say that developmental forms are perfected whereas Aquinas chooses to say they are corrupted. It is that Aquinas’s account of the organization and vital activity of the embryo has a problem that Pecham’s account does not. Given Aquinas’s positions (1) that natural matter is the principle of a form’s potency, but has no active principle in itself; and (2) that the rational soul is not infused until the body is organically prepared to receive its ultimate form, the rational soul,283 he is left with no principle to explain the development of the various transitory forms from the matter provided by the parents.

282 Amerini, Aquinas on the Beginning and End, 74, parenthetical item in orig.
283 See ibid., 56.
Aquinas thinks the contribution from the father, the semen, contains a remote potency for either the production of the soul or for the organization required for vital function.\textsuperscript{284}

Yet this does not account for how the lower forms facilitate functions associated with the higher forms, as Stephen J. Heaney writes:

Could it be that each successive soul, in some way, manages to transcend itself—that is, to produce by its own power a body capable of receiving a higher form? In this scenario, the original vegetative soul produces a body with the organs necessary for the sensitive soul, which in turn produces a body capable of receiving an intellectual soul. No; such a production is impossible. . . . There is a lack of due proportion of producer to what is produced; a cause cannot be the cause of what is greater than itself. Thus a lower soul, which itself is incapable of higher operations, could not be responsible for the production of organs of higher operations. Nor could it be the case that a lower soul upon further perfection becomes the higher soul, for this would mean: a) that substantial form is susceptible of degrees, and b) that a rational soul is corruptible, since it would thus be founded in a vegetative and sentient substance.\textsuperscript{285}

The matter from the parents can produce only organic parts, but not the activities associated with ensoulment.\textsuperscript{286} Aquinas could have accounted for embryonic development by arguing—as others did—that there is a “double soul,” i.e., that in addition to the ensouled body that is developing in the womb, there exists an additional tripartite soul created by God to facilitate the development of the ensouled embryo as it develops its own animate function.\textsuperscript{287} On this view, both of the following are in one embryo:

\textsuperscript{284} Ibid., 63-78.
\textsuperscript{286} See Amerini, \textit{Aquinas on the Beginning and End}, 53.
\textsuperscript{287} For a discussion of the history of the theory of \textit{duplex vegetativa et sensitiva}, see Crowley, \textit{Roger Bacon}, 125-128. Concerning this position, see Alcher of Clairvaux, \textit{De Spiritu et Anima}. 

508
• A nutritive and sensitive soul educed according to the laws of nature.

• A nutritive, sensitive, and intellective soul, concreated by God and infused.\footnote{Bacon argues against this view in his \textit{Communia Naturalium}, 1.pars 4.d.3.ch.1, p. 283-284.}

But this explanation would have conflicted with Aquinas’s convictions regarding biology, as Heaney points out, and so he does not use it.\footnote{“Aquinas and the Presence,” 25, 27-29; cf. Aquinas, \textit{Treatise on Human Nature}, 33; Aristotle, \textit{Generation of Animals}, 736b.1-3.} Heaney’s own solution is to argue for a reading of Aquinas texts that adapts to contemporary scientific embryology and shows how Aquinas can accommodate the immediate presence of the rational soul in the early embryo.\footnote{“Aquinas and the Presence,” 32-48.} This reading makes the rational soul the causation of the embryo’s natural, biological development. Heaney admits that Aquinas did not overtly teach the immediate presence of the intellective soul. After all, if Aquinas had espoused this view, his teaching would have been entirely original in his day (as far as I know).\footnote{Amerini, \textit{Aquinas on the Beginning and End}, 77; Crowley, \textit{Roger Bacon}, 124ff.}

Whether Heaney’s suggested reading of Aquinas is correct or not, the problem of accounting for fetal development is not problematic (at least not in the same way) for Pecham. For the pluralists hold that the substantial form \textit{is} susceptible of degrees, and matter has already within itself the seminal reasons from which subsequent forms may be naturally educed. And, it is clear that Pecham’s position does not necessitate that the previous forms in the embryo be destroyed.
Conclusion

Insofar as Pecham and Aquinas operate with different definitions of matter, form, and substance, they have two distinct projects. Pecham’s metaphysical definitions rule out the possibility that his anthropology results from a failed attempt to do what Aquinas also attempted to do, i.e., to give an an account of the human person that was not only consistent with Christianity but also true to a particular reading of Aristotelian anthropology. Unfortunately, Aquinas judges the consistency of the Avicebronian background of Pecham’s position by its failure to remain consistent in his application of metaphysical definitions from Aristotel that Aquinas has himself specified.  

292 Examples abound in Aquinas’s lengthy critique of the *Fons Vitae*, where he says that one Avicebron argument is “unacceptable because Avicebron proceeds upward from the lower beings to the highest ones by resolving them into material principles, which is an argument absolutely contrary to reason. For matter is compared to form as potency to act” (*Treatise on Separate Substances*, 61). Also, Aquinas says that Avicebron’s position “destroys the true nature of prime matter. For if it is of the nature of matter that it be in potency, then prime matter must be completely in potency. . . . This position likewise destroys the principles of logic by doing away with the true nature of genus, species, and substantial difference, inasmuch as it reduces them all to the mode of accidental predication” (ibid., 63). And Aquinas does not acknowledge that the pluralists may be said to view the form/matter combination as being purely accidental only if “accidental” has the meaning given to it by Aquinas’s own context of predication (ibid., 64-65). In Aquinas’s critique of the plurality of forms, he relies on his reading of Aristotelian predication: “Therefore if something were said to be an animal because of one form, and said to be a human being because of another, then it would follow that either (i) one of the forms could be predicated of the other only per accidens, if the two forms did not have any order to one another; or (ii) there would there be predication in the second mode of speaking per se, if one of the souls were a prerequisite for the other. But each of these is clearly false. For (i) *animal* is predicated of *human being* per se, not per accidens, and (ii) it is not the case that *human being* is contained in the definition of *anima*, but vice versa. Therefore, it must be the same form through which something is an animal, and through which something is a human being. Otherwise the human being would not truly be that which the animal is, in such a way that *animal* would be predicated per se of *human being*” (*Treatise*, 31-32).
Avicebron, Bacon, and Pecham should not be judged in this way, because they radically alter the meaning of the Aristotelian language to function in their own project. It is impossible, therefore, to judge the success of Pecham’s project on the basis of his consistency in applying Aquinas’s definitions of central concepts (especially matter).

In chapters two and three, I gave an exposé of the content of Pecham’s relevant texts for the purposes of supporting my thesis and enhancing future Pecham scholarship. Then, in the fifth chapter, I placed Pecham’s texts in their intellectual context in order to show that Pecham exhibits a nuanced, original interpretation of a particular metaphysical tradition. Therefore the fifth chapter proved correct the first part of my thesis, i.e., that Pecham’s philosophical anthropology is based on a distinctive, original synthesis of Neoplatonic metaphysics.

In analyzing the relevant texts of Thomas Aquinas in the fourth chapter, and in comparing them with Pecham’s views in this concluding chapter, I also showed (1) that Pecham’s position is not subject to some objections that are problematic for Aquinas; that (2) Pecham and Aquinas cannot be conveniently separated along dualist/non-dualist lines; and that (3) Pecham makes interesting philosophical arguments that Aquinas does not make in his own anti-Averroist texts. Since Pecham’s work on the soul has these qualities, I have proved correct the second part of my thesis, i.e., that Pecham’s anthropology is a significant alternative to that of Aquinas. Only with this more complete background in place can the medieval debate about the nature of the soul and the metaphysical status of the human being be fully explained.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources:

Albertus Magnus. *Opera Omnia Alberti Magni*. Aschendorff, 1951-.


---. *In Librum Aristotelis De Generation et Corruptione, Commentaria in Aristotelem et Alios*, S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia 4 (Stuttgart: Bad Cannstatt, 1980), 1.10


513


**Secondary Sources:**


---. *Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler.* Chicago: University of Chicago, 1996.


526


