From the Schoolhouse to the Poorhouse: The Credit Card Act's Failure to Adequately Protect Young Consumers

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Articles

FROM THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO THE POORHOUSE:
THE CREDIT CARD ACT’S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY
PROTECT YOUNG CONSUMERS

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I. INTRODUCTION

As commonly recognized in our society, higher education often serves
as a gateway of opportunity for many young adults.¹ Obtaining a col-
lege or professional degree provides not only an essential prerequisite for
securing certain types of employment,² but also facilitates access to the
leadership and democratic institutions that shape our society.³ Unfortu-

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¹. See JOHN IMMERWAHR ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB, POL’Y AND HIGHER EDUC.,
SQUEEZE PLAY: HOW PARENTS AND THE PUBLIC LOOK AT HIGHER EDUCATION TODAY 8
squeeze_play.pdf (reporting prevalent belief that higher education is necessary for
professional and personal success); Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts:
Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 128 & n.63
(2003) (detailing positive economic benefits of obtaining college degree); Jennifer
Elrod, Article, Academics, Public Employee Speech, and the Public University, 22 BUFF.
PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 12 (2004) (referencing public’s view of higher education as means
to obtain ”greater social status and higher paying positions”).

². See Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13,
versity degree opens the doors to the finest jobs and top professional schools, and
a professional degree, in turn, makes it possible to practice law, medicine, and
other professions.”).

³. See Lani Guinier, Reframing the Affirmative Action Debate, 86 KY. L.J. 505, 516
(1998) (noting that “higher education has become a gateway to democratic citi-
zenship: It is difficult to get a secure job without a college degree, and without a
nately, the doors of opportunity can be closed to many young adults due to the substantial amounts of credit card debt they amass during their college careers. Whether it be their inability to qualify for additional student loans or to pass an employer credit check, the educational, financial, and personal prospects of debt-laden students can be severely hindered by the quagmire of credit card debt in which many find themselves.

In recent years, credit card usage by college students has hit an all time high. On college campuses throughout the country, young and financially inexperienced students are applying for and receiving credit cards at astonishing rates. Colleges and universities are partnering with credit card companies to receive financial compensation for allowing companies on campus to solicit and market to this group of consumers. While it may appear that the majority of student cardholders are managing their debt in a responsible manner, a more thorough examination of the realities that characterize the management or, rather, mismanagement of a job, you are not treated as a contributing member of this society”); Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 333 (2006) (“Courts, policymakers, and advocates recognize higher education as the gateway to citizenship, leadership, and democratic participation.”).

4. For a discussion of these and other negative consequences associated with student credit card debt, see infra notes 120-54 and accompanying text.


6. Id. (reporting that from 1998 to 2008, percentage of undergraduate college students with credit cards increased from sixty-seven percent to eighty-four percent).


8. See, e.g., Michael E. Staten & John M. Barron, Usage of Credit Cards Received Through College Student-Marketing Programs, 34 NASFAA J. STUDENT FIN. AID 1, 7, 15-14 (2004) (reporting that student cardholders are more likely to pay their balance in full in any given month and less likely to use their cards for cash advances as compared to non-student cardholders); Michael McNamara, Conventional Wisdom on Student Debt Inaccurate, AM. BANKER, Jan. 27, 2008, at 5 (reporting findings from student credit card study and concluding “that the overwhelming majority of college students are responsible users of credit cards”). In 2008, “only 7 percent [of college students] admit[ted] to paying less than the minimum required some of the time when their credit card bill comes due.” SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 14.
of student credit card debt reveals that numerous students experience difficulty managing their rising levels of credit card indebtedness.\textsuperscript{9}

Students’ increased credit card usage is symptomatic of our society’s escalating dependence on credit cards.\textsuperscript{10} In 2006, 173 million cardholders amassed $886 billion in outstanding credit card debt.\textsuperscript{11} These numbers represent a fourteen million person increase in the number of cardholders since 2000 and a $206 billion increase in the amount of outstanding debt since that time.\textsuperscript{12} From 2005 to 2008, the amount of total outstanding revolving debt, which is primarily comprised of credit card debt,\textsuperscript{13} increased from $829.6 billion to $957.5 billion.\textsuperscript{14}

Since 2008, however, the amount of outstanding credit card debt has steadily declined as consumers have reacted to the current economic recession by paying down their balances, refraining from borrowing on their cards, and using debit cards more frequently than credit cards.\textsuperscript{15} The decline may also be due to a decrease in the availability of credit during the financial crisis. Over the past two years, many lenders have reduced consumers’ credit limits and closed inactive accounts in efforts to reduce their

\textsuperscript{9}. See id. (“[O]nly 17 percent of college students say they regularly pay off all cards each month . . . . Thus, while they are making at least the required payments each month, more than three-quarters of college students are incurring finance charges by carrying over credit card debt month to month.”). For a discussion of how college students mismanage their credit card debt, see infra notes 92-119 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{12}. Id.

\textsuperscript{13}. Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 Yale J. Reg. 143, 191 & n.249 (2009) (“The majority of revolving debt is credit card debt.”).


\textsuperscript{15}. See id. (reporting that as of August 2010, amount of outstanding revolving debt was $822.4 billion, which is lower than that outstanding in 2005); see also Sandra Block, Credit Card Use Plunges as Hard Times Drag On, Debit Use Rises, USA Today, Sept. 10, 2010 [hereinafter Block, Credit Card Use Plunges], http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/credit/2010-09-10-credit10_ST_N.htm (reporting survey findings that “56% of consumers used credit cards in 2009, down from 87% in 2007” and noting that “[i]n 2009, payment volume for debit cards exceeded credit cards for the first time, a trend that’s expected to continue in 2010”); Ronald J. Mann, The Good, the Bad and the Doubtful in Credit Card Reform, Lombard Street (June 22, 2009), http://www.finreg21.com/lombard-street/the-good-bad-and-doubtful-credit-card-reform [hereinafter Mann, Credit Card Reform] (noting that many cardholders paid down their balances in response to economic downturn).
While some are doubtful that consumers’ newfound “frugality” will continue once the economy rebounds, there are some indications that consumers’ tempered use of credit cards will continue post-recovery.\(^{17}\)

As consumers’ credit card borrowing increased, the credit card industry sought to take advantage of this increased usage by implementing policies and procedures that, while profitable to the companies, have proven costly and detrimental to consumers. From the imposition of exorbitant late and over-the-limit fees\(^{18}\) to the practice of universal default,\(^{19}\) the industry has made it very difficult, and in some cases impossible, for cash-strapped consumers to end the cycle of debt in which many find themselves. These and other unfair and deceptive practices prompted Congress to pass the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (the Credit CARD Act or the Act).\(^{20}\)

In passing the Credit CARD Act, Congress prohibited the practice of universal default on outstanding balances\(^{21}\) and established consumer “opt in” procedures that must be followed before a creditor can assess over-the-limit fees for extensions of credit that exceed consumers’ credit

\(^{16}\)See Shelly Banjo, Credit Card Companies Slash Credit Limits, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123117246022354083.html (“[C]redit card companies are slashing consumer credit lines and closing inactive cards.”); see also Block, Credit Card Use Plunges, supra note 15; Nancy Trejos, Less Power to Purchase: Consumers’ Credit Limits Slashed as Companies Try to Reduce Risk, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/15/AR2008111500216.html (noting that credit card companies “are taking a wide range of steps to mitigate their risk”).


\(^{18}\)Industry consultants estimate that in 2009 credit card issuers will have generated over $20 billion from late fees and over-the-limit penalties. See Andrew Martin, Credit Card Industry Aims to Profit from Sterling Payers, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2009, at A1. This amount represents an approximate $5 billion increase in the amount collected by credit card companies in 2004. See Scana Valentine Shiffirin, Are Credit Card Late Fees Unconstitutional?, 15 WM. & MARY B.R.S. J. 457, 460 n.12 (2006); see also MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 94; Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 389 (2007) [hereinafter Mann, Sweat Box]; Kathleen Day & Caroline E. Mayer, Credit Card Penalties, Fees Bury Debtors, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2005, at A01.

\(^{19}\)Universal default permits credit card companies to raise a cardholder’s interest rate if the cardholder defaults on any credit obligation, including those owed to creditors other than the credit card issuer. Usually without warning or prior notification, a credit card company can increase a cardholder’s interest rate if the cardholder is late paying his mortgage, another credit card bill, or even a utility bill. Events other than late payments, such as exceeding one’s credit limit on any card, having too much available credit, or obtaining a new mortgage or car loan, can also trigger universal default interest rate increases. See Ben Woolsey, Universal Default: What It Is, and How to Avoid It, CREDITCARDS.COM (May 1, 2006), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/universal-default-could-raise-your-interest-rates-1270.php.


\(^{21}\)Id. § 101(b).
limits. Congress’s enactment of these and other consumer-friendly provisions of the Act should be and have been applauded. For decades, consumer advocates have been urging Congress to take action against the credit card industry to end unfair practices and to improve consumer disclosures, both of which the Credit CARD Act purports to do. Congress’s good deed, however, is not immune to criticism, especially as it

22. Id. § 102(a). The Credit CARD Act also mandates that over-the-limit charges as well as other penalties, such as late payment fees, “be reasonable and proportional to [the] omission or violation” that precipitated the imposition of the fee. See id. § 102(b).


26. See Block, Fed Rules, supra note 23 (noting one consumer advocate’s view that “‘the Fed missed an opportunity to require a rollback of all the outrageous interest rate hikes consumers have been slammed with in recent years’”); Sandra Block, What You Need to Know About the New Credit Card Reforms, USA TODAY, Feb. 26, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/money/retail/credit/2010-02-22-cardreforms22_ST_N.htm (detailing potentially harmful practices employed by credit card industry that remain permissible under Credit CARD Act); Credit Card Reform Is Mixed Blessing, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2010, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/feb/22/credit-card-reform-mixed-blessing/print/ (asserting that Credit CARD Act is less effective than anticipated due to card industry’s nine-month window within which to increase interest rates, create new fees, and cut credit lines); Furman & Mcauliff, supra note 23 (detailing consumer advocates’ opinions that final legislation was “watered down” and did not provide for beneficial consumer protections such as caps on interest rates); Kimberly Palmer, Credit Card Bill Already Affects Consumers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. ALPHA CONSUMER BLOG (July 28, 2009), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/alpha-consumer/2009/
concerns protection for the subset of young consumers who incur debt without the sufficient financial means to repay it.\(^{27}\)

The Credit CARD Act primarily seeks to protect college-aged consumers\(^{28}\) by prohibiting certain solicitation practices and by attempting to limit their access to credit cards.\(^{29}\) By prohibiting consumers under the age of twenty-one from receiving pre-screened credit offers without their consent\(^{30}\) and by requiring them to satisfy certain prerequisites before obtaining a card,\(^{31}\) Congress hopes to decrease the negative consequences that many young cardholders have experienced due to their accumulation of credit card debt. This Article questions whether the Credit CARD Act’s narrow approach to protecting young consumers will achieve this goal.

In light of the increased levels of young consumer credit card indebtedness and the negative consequences that befall many college-aged consumers as a result of this debt, this Article asserts that the current legislation misses an important opportunity to provide greater and more effective protection for this cohort of consumers. By narrowly focusing on the availability of credit cards to college-aged consumers, the Credit CARD Act fails to include provisions that provide protection for young consumers once they obtain and begin to use credit cards.\(^{32}\) This Article also questions the efficacy of the current provisions, which, in concert with rules promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board (the Board), appear to permit issuers’ practice of lending to young, unemployed consumers who do not possess the financial resources with which to repay their debt. Therefore, this Article argues that more comprehensive and effective mea-

\(7/28/\text{credit-card-bill-already-affects-consumers}\) (discussing Credit CARD Act’s negative short-term effect on consumers as evidenced by credit card industry’s interest rate increases and balance transfer offer changes); Diana Ransom, \textit{Card Sharp: Where the Credit CARD Act is Falling Short}, \textsc{SMARTMONEY} (June 1, 2010), \url{http://www.smartmoney.com/personal-finance/debt/where-the-card-act-is-falling-short/} (reporting consumer advocates’ concerns that Credit CARD Act did not adequately address consumer protection issues such as lowering and closing of credit lines and accounts and payment allocation toward cardholders’ debt).

\(^{27}\) See, e.g., Regina L. Hinson, \textit{Note, Credit Card Reform Goes to College}, \textsc{14 N.C. BANKING INST.} 287 (2010) (discussing strengths and weaknesses of Credit CARD Act as it relates to young consumers).

\(^{28}\) For purposes of this Article, the term “college-aged consumers” refers to those consumers who are under the age of twenty-one.


\(^{30}\) \textit{Id.} § 302.

\(^{31}\) \textit{Id.} § 301.

\(^{32}\) While the Credit CARD Act does include a provision requiring cosigner approval for limit increases on cards for which he/she is jointly liable, which arguably protects young consumers from amassing high balances, this provision is not applicable to consumers under the age of twenty-one who obtain a card without a cosigner. \textit{See id.} § 303. Subject to the Credit CARD Act’s rules regarding consideration of ability to repay, card issuers are free to increase consumers’ credit limits without their express approval, thereby paving the way for them to sink deeper into debt. For a proposal to rectify this oversight, see \textit{infra} notes 245-66.
sures are needed to help protect the financial and personal futures of college-aged consumers.

Part II of this Article provides an overview of the banking industry’s decision to enter the young consumer market, specifically as it relates to undergraduate students. It details card issuers’ aggressive marketing and solicitation efforts that have succeeded in expanding not only the number of college-aged cardholders but also their levels of indebtedness. Part III discusses this indebtedness in terms of student cardholders’ increased rates of credit card usage and the negative consequences that some experience as a result of such use.

Part IV of this Article critiques Congress’s recent efforts to address the problem of credit card indebtedness among young consumers through the Credit CARD Act. Although the Act attempts to limit college-aged consumers’ access to credit cards, this Part argues that such attempts will likely prove futile for two primary reasons. Both the provisions of the Act itself and the lenient regulations promulgated by the Board pave the way for card companies to continue issuing cards to young, unemployed consumers, many of whom may be unable to repay the debt they incur.

In light of this probability, Part V of this Article proposes several measures that could more effectively and comprehensively protect young consumers’ financial and personal futures. The spectrum of proposals range from prohibiting consumers under the age of twenty-one from obtaining a credit card to reducing the length of time negative credit card history is included in young consumers’ credit reports. Depending on the goals policymakers seek to achieve, one or more of these proposals can be implemented in efforts to both restrict lending to college-aged consumers who lack the financial resources to repay their debt and lessen the negative financial consequences brought on by excessive debt. The serious consideration of these and other measures is imperative if lawmakers hope to have a significant impact on young consumers’ credit card indebtedness.

II. NEW HORIZONS: THE RISE OF THE YOUNG CONSUMER MARKET

Although it is now considered commonplace for unemployed eighteen-year-olds to have ready access to credit cards, this was not always the case.33 Young consumers’ current accessibility to credit cards is a direct result of the banking industry’s strategy to target new markets in an effort to sustain and expand profitability.34 One such market is comprised of undergraduate student consumers. While card companies’ on-campus marketing and solicitation efforts have been integral to the expansion of

33. See Manning, Credit Card Nation, supra note 10, at 166-68.
34. See id.; Sullivan et al., Fragile Middle Class, supra note 10, at 135-37;
this market, they have also been widely criticized by lawmakers, consumer advocates, and university administrators. Concerns regarding the industry’s solicitation methods, which, according to some, border on being predatory and deceptive, have prompted university officials and state and federal lawmakers to implement policies restricting solicitation efforts that target student consumers. It is their hope that such policies will help stem the wave of credit card indebtedness that has engulfed this profitable, yet vulnerable, market.

A. High Risk, High Reward

Prior to the late 1980s, credit card issuers did not aggressively seek to lend to student consumers. Due in part to the financial industry’s “concern that young and impressionable consumers would act irresponsibly with ‘gifts’ of unearned money,” it was standard industry practice to refrain from initiating mass marketing campaigns that targeted young consumers and to require a parental cosigner before approving a college-aged consumer’s credit card application. Both of these practices were consistent with the industry’s initial unitary credit card business model that sought to reserve lending for non-risky, creditworthy borrowers with reliable streams of income. Student consumers, many of whom had (and continue to have) income generated from part-time and summer jobs or had no employment income at all, did not fit into this category of opt-


37. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 167 (noting that “[p]enetration of the student credit card market began in the late 1980s”).

38. Id.

39. See id. at 166-68.

40. See Mann, Patterns, supra note 34, at 4-5; Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1321, 1377 (2008) [hereinafter Levitin, Priceless].

41. See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 35. Although the GAO Report refers to a study reporting that in 2000, fifty-five and nine percent of college students had part-time or full-time employment, respectively, students’ discretionary income after paying for education expenses averaged only $195 each month. See id. Considering the fact that most college students carry balances on more than one credit card, this is not a substantial amount of income with which to pay multiple credit card bills. See SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 6 (reporting that by time students are seniors in college, sixty-two percent have four or more cards).
mal cardholders. The traditional model, however, changed as the banking industry experienced deregulation and card issuers began to utilize more sophisticated underwriting measures that facilitated their ability to more reliably predict consumers’ spending and payment behavior.

After effectively developing and employing new technologies to design profitable strategies for market specialization and segmentation, card companies have become more willing to issue cards to segments of the consumer population, such as low-income borrowers, who were previously considered “unacceptably risky.” The formerly untapped market of student consumers has become particularly attractive to the credit card industry as other market segments have become saturated. As noted by Elizabeth Warren, “[credit card companies] ‘target high-school and college-age people because they see them as the only growth opportunities in a saturated market.’”

42. See Manning, Credit Card Nation, supra note 10, at 166-67. 43. See id. at 167; Sullivan et al., Fragile Middle Class, supra note 10, at 19, 135. 44. See Mann, Patterns, supra note 34, at 5-6. 45. See id. at 7-9. 46. Id. at 6; see also Manning, Credit Card Nation, supra note 10, at 167 (discussing banks’ strategy to mass market to “struggling middle- and working-class families”); Sullivan et al., Fragile Middle Class, supra note 10, at 129 (discussing card issuers’ aggressive pursuit of “high-risk-high-profit” consumers such as those with “incomes too low to make more than minimum repayments”); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1373, 1383 (2004) (attributing credit card industry’s targeting of “less credit-worthy consumers” to its ability to charge higher interest rates to this segment of consumers); Andrew P. MacArthur, Pay to Play: The Poor’s Problems in the BAPCPA, 25 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 407, 478 (2009) (asserting that “credit card companies have targeted the poor “as a source of major profits”” (citation omitted)); Mann, Patterns, supra note 34, at 6-9; Jennifer M. Smith, Credit Cards, Attorney’s Fees, and the Putative Debtor: A Pyrrhic Victory? Putative Debtors May Win the Battle but Nevertheless Lose the War, 61 Me. L. Rev. 171, 180-81 (2009) (discussing industry’s practice of lending to risky borrowers). 47. See Manning, Credit Card Nation, supra note 10, at 167 (attributing banks’ decisions to pursue student consumers to “the saturation of the high-yield consumer services market”); Sullivan et al., Fragile Middle Class, supra note 10, at 134-37 (discussing market saturation and credit card industry’s strategic response of marketing to poor and young consumers); Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 Chap. L. Rev. 79, 142 (2000) (noting that “[t]he credit card market has been saturated for many years and every credit worthy person who wants a credit card already has one”). 48. Dirk Smillie, Bankrupt by 25: People Under the Age of 25 Make Up the Fastest-Growing Age Group Filing for Bankruptcy, N.Y. Times Upfront, Apr. 5, 2004, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0BUE/is_12_136/ai_n17206851/; see also Sullivan et al., Fragile Middle Class, supra note 10, at 134, 137 (noting that bank credit card market was considered by industry experts to be 80.5% saturated in 1980); Johnson, supra note 36, at 201-02 (noting that credit card companies aggressively market to college students because “students entering college are the only adult demographic group largely made up of non-credit card holders”).
Every day, new prospective cardholders reach the age of eighteen and become contractually eligible to independently obtain a credit card. Card issuers are eager to lend to these new customers for two primary reasons: customer loyalty and profitability. Research indicates that many consumers develop long-lasting relationships with their card companies. This also appears to be the case for young student cardholders, many of whom remain customers of their first credit card company for fifteen years or more. As admitted by Bank of America spokeswoman Betty Riess, “[Bank of America’s] objective in serving the student market is to create the foundation for a long-term banking relationship.” Issuers seek to capitalize on this relationship by cross-marketing products and services with other companies and by offering to meet cardholders’ future financial services needs, ranging from student loans to mortgages.

Card companies also target young consumers because they provide long-term profitability for issuers. Considering that a significant portion of the card industry’s revenues are generated by interest income, card-

49. In most states, eighteen is the age of majority for entering into contracts, including credit card agreements. See E. ALLAN FARNsworth, CONTRACTS § 4.3, at 221-22 (4th ed. 2004).

50. See Kimberly M. Gartner & Elizabeth R. Schiltz, What’s Your Score? Educating College Students About Credit Card Debt, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 401, 404 (2005) (discussing student market’s attractiveness to banking industry in terms of “the importance of establishing early relationships with customers and issuing a person’s first card” and “the potential profitability” of market) (citation omitted).

51. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 50, 68-69 (1991) (discussing effects of search/switch costs on card companies’ ability to create and profit from “a base of ‘loyal customers’”). But see Zywicki, supra note 47, at 141-42 & n.250 (discussing industry claims that many issuers have difficulties retaining customers due to plethora of direct mail promotions offered by competitors).


54. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 167.

55. Although some issuers assert that student cardholders are not as profitable as non-student consumers, the industry continues to pursue the student market because student cardholder accounts “[become] more profitable than non-students’ accounts” following students’ graduation from college. See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 35.

holders who fail to pay their balances in full each month are more profitable to card companies than those who do not. Not surprisingly, most student consumers fall into the former category. According to one survey, in 2008, only seventeen percent of student cardholders reported paying their balances in full each month. This percentage is considerably lower than the fifty-five percent of cardholders in the general population who, in 2007, reported that they usually pay their balances in full each month. In addition, because student cardholders often do not have established credit histories, card companies can charge them higher interest rates. The payment of these higher interest rates further enlarges issuers' profitability.

The fact that the vast majority of student consumers are “borrowers” instead of “convenience users” impacts issuers’ ability to generate not only interest revenues but also fee income from this profitable segment of consumers. As noted by Ronald Mann, “once the borrower begins to carry a balance, the likelihood of late and overlimit fees can increase substantially.” Unfortunately, numerous student borrowers have found themselves paying such fees, thereby contributing to the $20 billion in late and overlimit fees that the card industry was able to collect in 2009.

57. As noted by Ronald Mann:
Financially secure customers or “convenience users” do not generate any interest income, late fees, or overlimit penalties. The only source of revenue they provide typically comes from annual fees in some instances and interchange revenues. These charges might be substantial in some cases, but they account for only about 20% of industry revenues. Thus, issuers that rely on lending, “convenience users” are useful only because of the possibility that they will mature into borrowers—as caterpillars mature into butterflies.

For the credit card lender, the first hint of sustained profitability comes when the cardholder (now borrower) stops regularly paying her balance in full each month.

Mann, Sweat Box, supra note 18, at 385.

58. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 14.


60. See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 7, 39-40.

61. For the distinction between “convenience users” and “borrowers,” see supra note 57.

62. Mann, Sweat Box, supra note 18, at 386.

63. See EDMUND MIERZWINSKI ET AL., U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP EDUC. FUND, THE CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP: A SURVEY OF COLLEGE STUDENTS AND CREDIT CARD MARKETING 6 (2008), available at http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/assets/ymirZbG5OlkH2NPuxQEnDA/correctedthecampuscreditcardtrapmar08all.pdf (reporting that percentage of student cardholders who reported having paid at least one late fee or over-limit fee was twenty-five and fifteen percent, respectively).

64. For a discussion of late and over-the-limit fees, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
As the young consumer market continues to expand, so do issuers’ abilities to collect more interchange fees from merchants. An interchange fee is a percentage (usually ranging from one to three percent) of every credit card transaction that a merchant pays to the issuer. Professor Adam Levitin cautions that “[b]ecause interchange is based on transaction volume, it creates an incentive for banks to issue as many cards as possible, regardless of the creditworthiness of the borrower. By creating a huge revenue stream unrelated to credit risk, interchange encourages card issuers to engage in reckless lending . . . .” These concerns are particularly salient when one considers the marketing and solicitation efforts that card companies have employed in their attempts to expand the student consumer market.

B. Marketing to the Inexperienced Masses

Having abandoned former policies of not marketing or lending to college-aged consumers, credit card companies now welcome young cardholders and encourage their accumulation of debt through aggressive solicitation and marketing efforts. Their solicitation strategies have ranged from on-campus mass marketing campaigns such as “tabling,” which is often accompanied by free giveaways such as pens, t-shirts, and pizza, to entering into financial partnerships with universities, alumni associations, and student organizations to solicit new customers. In 2009, credit card issuers entered into 1,044 such partnership or “affinity” agreements and “made total payments of $83,462,712 to institutions and organizations pur...
suant to these agreements.”70 Card companies have also solicited college-aged consumers through direct mail71 and internet marketing.72

Based upon the belief that many college-aged consumers lack financial experience and knowledge,73 some consumer advocates question the ethical implications of aggressively marketing to this potentially vulnerable class of consumers.74 Some assert that credit card companies take advantage of young consumers’ naiveté and “lack of financial awareness.”75 Banking industry representatives, however, contest these claims and “maintain[ ] that students are independent adults who rely on credit cards for essential expenses, such as schoolbooks and emergencies, and that assuming they’ll take on more debt because of free T-shirts insults their intelligence.”76 Although this industry contention may accurately describe many student consumers,77 university officials and state and federal lawmakers have become so concerned about issuers’ pervasive marketing and solicitation efforts that they have enacted policies and laws to restrict such efforts targeting college-aged consumers.

further discussion of the relationship between credit card companies and universities, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.


71. See GAO Report, supra note 35, at 19 (reporting studies’ findings that majority of students (thirty-six to thirty-seven percent) “obtained their cards by responding to mail offers”).

72. See Graduating Into Debt, supra note 68, at 8.


74. See Laurie A. Lucas, Integrative Social Contracts Theory: Ethical Implications of Marketing Credit Cards to U.S. College Students, 38 Am. Bus. L.J. 413, 422-26 (2001) (concluding that issuers’ direct marketing to U.S. college students “should be considered unethical under the [Integrative Social Contracts Theory] framework”); see also Johnson, supra note 36, at 197-98, 265-67 (advocating for legislative intervention regarding credit card marketing “to combat the potential exploitation of college students by credit card companies”).


76. Palmer & Brandon, supra note 75, at 58.

77. See, e.g., GAO Report, supra note 35, at 20 (reporting that occasional and emergency expenses and books and school supplies accounted for sixty-seven and fifty-seven percent, respectively, of students’ credit card charges); see also Sallie Mae Study, supra note 5, at 11 (reporting that in 2008, ninety-two percent of student cardholders used their card for school-related expenses).
University policies have ranged from requiring credit card issuers and vendors to “register, pay a fee, and comply with specific policies” to completely banning them from campus. States such as Arkansas and Louisiana have passed legislation banning certain on-campus marketing strategies such as the distribution of gifts to consumers under twenty-one and the solicitation of undergraduate students during periods of class registration. The recently enacted Credit CARD Act also includes provisions restricting card companies’ solicitation practices on or near college campuses and at college-sponsored events.

Despite these efforts to curtail on-campus marketing to student consumers, students continue to acquire cards and amass significant amounts of credit card debt at alarming rates. This trend could be explained in part by the fact that a majority of students obtain their credit cards online (sixteen percent) and through direct mail solicitations (thirty-eight percent).

78. Johnson, supra note 36, at 233; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 25-28 (reporting colleges’ various solicitation policies); MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 162 (noting that during 2000-2001 academic year, over 800 higher education institutions formulated restriction policies); Jack Phillips, Cuomo, SUNY Announce Credit Card Protection for Students, EPOCH TIMES, Sept. 9, 2010, at A8 (discussing SUNY’s adoption of code of conduct that limits time and location of on-campus credit card marketing).

79. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 231-32 n.171 (discussing universities’ on-campus solicitation policies, including examples of schools that have banned marketers from their campuses); Lazarony, supra note 35 (reporting that in 1999, approximately 300 colleges and universities banned on-campus solicitations); see also Ron Matys, Students Are Still Hooked on Plastic, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 3, 2004, http://www.sptimes.com/2004/08/03/Tampabay/Students_are_still_ho.shtml (noting that several colleges in Florida have barred credit card issuers from on-campus solicitations); Merzer, supra note 36 (discussing Florida Atlantic University’s decision to ban credit card marketers from its seven campuses).

80. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-104-202, 4-104-203 (West 2010). The legislation also prohibits solicitation inside an academic building or within 100 feet of an academic building and requires colleges and universities to include a credit seminar during freshman orientation if they permit solicitations at athletic events. See id.


82. See Credit Card Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 304, 123 Stat. 1734, 1749 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1650) (prohibiting card companies engaged in solicitation on or near campus or at college-sponsored event from offering “tangible items” to induce students to apply for credit cards).

83. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 231 n.171 (citing research “finding that students on campus which had banned on-campus solicitation actually carried higher balances (average balance $1079) than students at universities that permitted on-campus solicitation (average balance $792)”) (citing Mary Beth Pinto et. al., Credit Card Solicitation Policies in Higher Education: Does “Protecting” Our Students Make a Difference?, 42 J.C. Student Dev. 169, 170 (2001).
cent) rather than from on-campus vendor booths (five percent). The Credit CARD Act now prohibits card issuers from sending pre-screened credit card offers to young consumers under twenty-one unless they consented to receiving such offers. It remains to be seen whether this restriction will significantly reduce the number of direct mail solicitations received by young consumers and, consequently, their levels of credit card indebtedness. As the next part details, students' credit card debt has significantly increased over the past decade resulting in negative financial and personal consequences for many young consumers.

III. Debt Becomes Them

For the past several years, young consumers, especially college students, have turned to credit cards to finance everything from clothes to college education. Although many college-aged consumers receive their first credit card before entering college, university campuses across the country serve as breeding grounds for student consumer indebtedness. Whether fueled by skyrocketing tuition and fees coupled with diminishing student aid or by students living beyond their

84. See supra note 68; see also SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 7.
86. In 2010, Professor Jim Hawkins conducted a survey of 338 University of Houston undergraduate students to examine the impact of the Credit CARD Act on college campuses. See Jim Hawkins, The CARD Act on Campus (2010) (data results on file with author). His preliminary results found that notwithstanding the Act’s marketing restrictions, seventy-six percent of students surveyed reported having received a credit card offer in the mail since the beginning of 2010. Id. Only twenty-four percent had not. Id.
87. In 2008, ninety-two percent of undergraduate cardholders reported using their cards for college expenses. See SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 11.
88. According to a recent survey conducted by Sallie Mae, thirty-nine percent of students had obtained a credit card before beginning their freshman year. This 2008 figure marked a sixteen percent increase since 2004. See id. at 6; see also Joyce M. Wolburg & James Pokrywcznski, A Psychographic Analysis of Generation Y College Students, J. ADVERTISING RES., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 33, 36 (reporting that many eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds received credit card cosigned by parent during high school).
89. A number of sources are useful in informing the discussion as to the impact that increased educational costs have on student debt. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 163-66; LINDA NAZARETH, THE LEISURE ECONOMY: HOW CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS, ECONOMICS, AND GENERATIONAL ATTITUDES WILL RESHAPE OUR LIVES AND OUR INDUSTRIES 109-10 (2007); see also AS College Costs Rise, Student Loans Are Harder to Find, INSIDE THE VAULT, Fall 2009, 1, 3-4, available at http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/pub_assets/pdf/itv/2009/ITV_fall_09.pdf (discussing trends of escalating college costs and decreasing student loan availability); Jay MacDonald, Lenders Curtail College Student Loans, CREDITCARDS.COM (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/lenders-cut-back-on-private-student-loans-1279.php (discussing lenders’ curtailment of private student loans during time in which "the average cost of tuition at four-year public and private colleges and universities [has risen] more than 20 percent, from $21,235 to $26,833"); SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 11-12 (reporting that in 2008, thirty percent of undergraduate cardholders used their credit cards to pay for college
means in attempts to conform to perceived peer expectations, the prevalence of credit card usage by college students is troubling, especially when one considers the negative academic, personal, and financial consequences that many experience as a result of such usage. Such detrimental effects necessitate young consumer credit card reforms in addition to those currently included in the Credit CARD Act.

A. College Students’ Credit Card Usage

Several scholars and researchers have detailed young consumers’ general lack of financial experience and knowledge, both of which contribute to the suboptimal and detrimental financial decisions or “mistakes” that many young consumers make. Unfortunately, many of these mistakes are made on college campuses as student consumers apply for and use credit cards without fully contemplating or understanding the consequences associated with credit card debt. Obviously, there are many tuition and fees. But see Daniel de Vise, Financial Aid Rising Faster than Tuition, WASH. POST COLLEGE INC. BLOG (June 29, 2010, 12:41 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/college-inc/2010/06/aid_rising_faster_than_tuition.html (reporting that for second consecutive year, tuition increases have been “in the 4-percent range” as compared to six percent “[d]uring the 10 years prior to the recession” and that students are receiving larger student aid packages due to increases in institutional aid budgets).

90. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 3; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 9 (noting that “[t]he convenience of credit cards may tempt students to live beyond their means”).

91. See supra note 73; see also Troy Adams & Monique Moore, High-Risk Health and Credit Behavior Among 18- to 25-Year-Old College Students, 56 J. AMER. COLL. HEALTH 101, 101 (2007) (summarizing research findings that “lack of knowledge” and “psychological characteristics, such as self-control and beliefs about money” may affect students’ credit behavior); Annamaria Lusardi et al., Financial Literacy Among the Young: Evidence and Implications for Consumer Policy 4-5, 11 (Pension Research Council, Working Paper No. 9, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1459141.

92. See supra note 73; see also Troy Adams & Monique Moore, High-Risk Health and Credit Behavior Among 18- to 25-Year-Old College Students, 56 J. AMER. COLL. HEALTH 101, 101 (2007) (summarizing research findings that “lack of knowledge” and “psychological characteristics, such as self-control and beliefs about money” may affect students’ credit behavior); Annamaria Lusardi et al., Financial Literacy Among the Young: Evidence and Implications for Consumer Policy 4-5, 11 (Pension Research Council, Working Paper No. 9, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1459141.

93. See Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions over the Lifecycle with Implications for Regulation 12-20 (Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=973790 (discussing research findings evidencing “U-shaped age-related curve in the prices people pay for ten financial choices” indicating that majority of costly financial mistakes are made by “young borrowers [who] have low levels of experience” and “older borrowers [who] have ... lower levels of analytic function”).

94. See Kathleen Arano & Carl Parker, Modeling Credit Card Borrowing by Students 6 (Sw. Econ. Rev., Working Paper, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1140767 (“Students are more likely to be impulsive and fall prey to instant
dent consumers who are financially sophisticated and make prudent financial decisions, however, recent studies show that credit card indebtedness remains a problem for a number of student cardholders.

In 2004, seventy-six percent of college undergraduate students had credit cards. By 2008, this number had increased to eighty-four percent. Not surprisingly, the amount of credit card debt college students amassed during this time also increased. In 2004, college students had an average of $2,169 in credit card debt. By 2008, students’ average credit card debt had increased to $3,173.

Student cardholders are not only accumulating more credit card debt, but they are also acquiring debt at earlier ages. In 2004, fifty-six percent of students reported obtaining their first card at the age of eighteen. From fall 2004 to spring 2008, the percentage of freshmen with credit cards rose from forty-two percent to sixty-seven percent, a sixty percent increase. Of this sixty-seven percent, only fifteen percent had a zero balance, compared to sixty-nine percent in 2004. The percentage of freshmen carrying four or more cards also increased during this period from fifteen percent to twenty-three percent.

Perhaps more troubling are the figures illustrating students’ credit card indebtedness as they progress through their college careers. By the time students reach their senior year, eighty-eight percent of them have at least one credit card and sixty-two percent have four or more cards.

gratification by using credit cards to finance consumption, and may place less importance on the future implications and consequences of going into debt.

95. See supra note 8.
96. See Arano & Parker, supra note 94, at 1 (referring to studies that "found that although a majority of the students are responsible and can handle their credit well, there is a significant minority who were having problems").
97. NAZARETH, supra note 89, at 110; SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 5.
98. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 5.
100. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 5.
101. Id.
102. NAZARETH, supra note 89, at 110.
103. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 6; see also MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 170 (reporting that percentage of students who receive their first credit card by end of their freshman year is nearly eighty percent).
104. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 9.
105. Id. at 6.
106. Id.
While freshmen carry an average of $2,038 in credit card debt, seniors’ average outstanding debt more than doubles this amount, totaling $4,138.107 Nineteen percent of seniors carry balances greater than $7,000 compared to only five percent of freshmen.108 These figures are particularly disconcerting when one considers the amount of student loan debt that many students are also incurring.109

According to a recent report issued by The Project on Student Debt, “around two-thirds of students graduating from four-year colleges had student loan debt [and] the average amount these students owe has grown about six percent per year since 2003-04, reaching $23,200 for the class of 2008.”110 When coupled with a 10.6% unemployment rate for recent college graduates, young consumers’ ability to successfully manage repayment of both their student loan and credit card debt is severely hindered.112

Although some researchers and industry representatives often argue that most college consumers successfully manage their credit card debt,113 many consumer advocates counter that such assertions are exaggerated and overstated.114 Take, for instance, the reported percentage of college

107. Id. at 8; see also MIERZWINSKI ET AL., supra note 63, at 6 (reporting findings from 2008 study showing that college seniors carry more than double amount of credit card debt as freshmen).

108. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 9.


111. Id.

112. See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 3 (expressing concern about students’ ability to pay both their credit card bills and student loans following graduation from college).

113. See supra note 8; see also MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 169 (refuting industry representative’s assertion that “[c]ollege students can pay, do pay and are using their plastic cards responsibly”) (citation omitted); Matus, supra note 79 (quoting spokeswoman from American Bankers Association as stating that “[college students] are actually more responsible” than greater consumer population in terms of paying their balance in full each month); Merzer, supra note 36 (according to banking industry spokesman, “Anecdotes of student problems in the card area fail to paint the real picture that students, as a broader group, are in fact managing their credit obligations well . . . .”); Staten & Barron, supra note 8, at 25 (concluding that research did not show that student cardholders “are misusing cards so frequently as to warrant singling them out as a group for special protections from marketing solicitations”). But see Robert D. Manning & Ray Kirshak, Credit Cards on Campus: Academic Inquiry, Objective Empiricism, or Advocacy Research?, 35 NASFAA J. STUDENT FIN. AID 39, 39 (2005) (critiquing Staten and Barron’s conclusions and objectivity of their research).

114. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 161 (describing industry’s research as “methodologically flawed”); id. at 169 (characterizing industry
cardholders who pay their balances in full every month.\textsuperscript{115} According to various sources, this number has declined from fifty-nine percent in 1998\textsuperscript{116} to seventeen percent in 2008.\textsuperscript{117} Consumer advocates such as Robert Manning argue that because these figures do not account for the number of students whose parents pay their bills for them or who use student loans to pay their bills, they mask the complexity and gravity of students’ indebtedness.\textsuperscript{118}

In fact, one could argue that this precipitous ten-year decline in the percentage of students paying off their balances each month and, thereby, avoiding costly finance charges is further evidence of students’ mismanagement of credit and debt. As noted in a recent consumer study, “maintaining a good credit history is only part of the story when managing credit. Reducing finance charges is an important part of debt reduction and . . . help[s] consumers to balance [their] budgets.”\textsuperscript{119} The financial costs borne by college students who have revolving debt are often exacerbated by the negative academic and personal consequences that many experience as a result of their credit card usage—consequences that detrimentally impact both their current and future lives.

\textsuperscript{115} For a detailed discussion of studies reporting the percentage of college cardholders who pay their balances in full every month, see Johnson, supra note 36, at 222 n.136.


\textsuperscript{117} SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 14.

\textsuperscript{118} See Manning, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 176-77 (discussing increasingly popular practice of students using loans to pay credit card bills); id. at 186 (recounting one consumer’s practice of using at least half of her Stafford student loan disbursements to pay down her credit cards); Johnson, supra note 36, at 224 (reporting research findings that “73% of freshmen and 67% of upperclassmen had used student loans to pay off credit card balances”); Lazarony, supra note 35 (citing student loan refinancing and private debt consolidation loans as measures that mask college students’ true levels of credit card debt); Matus, supra note 79 (reporting Dr. Manning’s estimate that twenty percent of college students use student loans to hide their more than $10,000 credit card indebtedness); see also Staten & Barron, supra note 8, at 25 (acknowledging “that the relative performance of student accounts improves over time in part because parents of college students may intervene to help pay the monthly credit card bills”).

\textsuperscript{119} SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 14.
B. Paying the High Price for Credit

For several college cardholders, their accumulation of debt has significant ramifications for their academic and personal lives. Some full-time students who feel pressure to work more hours to pay their bills reduce their course load or enter part-time programs.\textsuperscript{120} Unfortunately, some also opt to withdraw from school for a semester or year to facilitate their efforts to work and pay down their debt.\textsuperscript{121} Studies also show that students with greater credit card debt have a more difficult time managing their debt and are more likely to have lower grade point averages.\textsuperscript{122} As some students become preoccupied with addressing their debt problems, their academic performance suffers due to a lack of concentration and priority placed on course work.\textsuperscript{123}

For many young consumers, debt-induced academic pressures are often coupled with negative personal consequences ranging from stress to depression.\textsuperscript{124} Research shows that a significant percentage of college consumers experience high levels of payment anxiety.\textsuperscript{125} Of the students surveyed, only thirteen percent reported feeling no anxiety regarding their ability to pay their credit card bills while forty-five percent felt extremely or highly anxious.\textsuperscript{126} There have also been cases, albeit extremely rare, where payment anxiety and other factors have contributed to debt-laden students’ decisions to take their own lives.\textsuperscript{127}

Contrary to previously discussed industry contentions regarding how well college cardholders manage their debt,\textsuperscript{128} students’ mismanagement of debt is evidenced not only by the aforementioned academic and personal consequences but also by the financial costs that many must bear as a result of their credit card usage. For instance, a recent study conducted by the U.S. Public Interest Research Group found that twenty-five percent of students surveyed had paid at least one late fee while fifteen percent of respondents had paid at least one over-the-limit fee.\textsuperscript{129} Another study reported that in a given month, 18.4% of student accounts were assessed late and over-the-limit fees as compared to only 12.5% of accounts held by older adults.\textsuperscript{130} Further findings show that while only five percent of

\textsuperscript{120.} See Johnson, supra note 36, at 209; Lazarony, supra note 35.
\textsuperscript{121.} See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 33-34; Lazarony, supra note 35.
\textsuperscript{123.} See id. at 5.
\textsuperscript{124.} See Gartner & Schiltz, supra note 50, at 425-26; Johnson, supra note 36, at 209-10.
\textsuperscript{125.} See Sallie Mae Study, supra note 5, at 15.
\textsuperscript{126.} Id.
\textsuperscript{127.} See Manning, Credit Card Nation, supra note 10, at 160-61; Johnson, supra note 36, at 208 n.82.
\textsuperscript{128.} See supra notes 8, 95, 113 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{129.} Mierzynski ET AL., supra note 63, at 6.
\textsuperscript{130.} Staten & Barton, supra note 8, at 15.
older adult cardholders were either at or over their credit limit, twelve percent of students had either reached or gone over their credit limit.\textsuperscript{131}

Student cardholders and young consumers also experience higher delinquency rates than older consumers, and their accounts are more often past due compared to those held by older adults.\textsuperscript{132} “[T]he 90-day delinquency rate of student accounts (3.1\%) is nearly triple that of older adults and 29\% higher than that of non-student young adults.”\textsuperscript{133} In addition, although having their cards for a relatively short period of time, over six percent of students had so mismanaged their card usage that the issuer canceled their card for delinquent behavior.\textsuperscript{134} These literal and figurative “costs” are compounded by the negative impact such delinquencies can have on students’ credit reports—reports that, in many cases, adversely affect their financial futures for years to come.\textsuperscript{135}

Two common, long-term economic consequences of students’ mismanagement of debt are their inability to qualify for subsequent loans and to receive favorable interest rates on the loans for which they do qualify.\textsuperscript{136} When many college cardholders seek to purchase a car or home, they often find that their previous failures to make card payments on time or their over-the-limit delinquencies have negatively affected their credit scores.\textsuperscript{137} In light of the fact that such scores are often a paramount factor in lenders’ decisions,\textsuperscript{138} having an adverse credit history can negatively

\textsuperscript{131} Id. at 12.

\textsuperscript{132} See The Importance of Financial Literacy Among College Students: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 24 (2002) (statement of Michael E. Staten, Prof., McDonough Sch. of Bus., Georgetown Univ.) (“Delinquency rates on both student accounts and young adult, nonstudent accounts are higher than for older adult accountholders. In a given month, 12 percent of active student accounts are past due, versus about 11 percent for other young adults under age 25 and 8 percent for adults 25 and older.”).

\textsuperscript{133} Staten & Barron, supra note 8, at 17.

\textsuperscript{134} See Mierzynski, et al., supra note 63, at 6; see also Staten & Barron, supra note 8, at 18 (reporting data showing that greater percent of charge-offs occurred for student and non-student young consumer accounts than older adult accounts).

\textsuperscript{135} See Merzer, supra note 36.


\textsuperscript{137} As explained by Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, and Chunlin Liu:

A credit score, whether a generic FICO score or an internal behavior score, is an index constructed to evaluate an individual’s relative risk of default conditional on his/her profile. For example, a lower FICO score implies a higher probability of a consumer defaulting on his outstanding debt in the next 24 months.

Sumit Agarwal et al., The Importance of Adverse Selection in the Credit Card Market: Evidence from Randomized Trials of Credit Card Solicitation, 42 J. Money, Credit & Banking 743, 746 (2010).

\textsuperscript{138} Joe Nocera, Credit Score Is the Tyrant in Lending, N.Y. Times, July 24, 2010, at B1 (noting that credit scores have essentially become most important factor in banks and underwriters’ lending decisions); Shedding Light on Credit Scores, CREDIT
impact young consumers’ future borrowing opportunities and the terms on which they borrow. As noted by Ronald Mann:

In truth, the most effective lever the credit card lender has is the threat of damaging the credit report of the borrower. A credit card debtor that does not pay will suffer a substantially lower credit rating. Although the lower credit card rating will have only a limited impact on the debtor’s access to credit card debt, it will substantially increase the cost of subsequent borrowing.139

In dire situations, some young consumers experience perhaps the most costly financial consequence of debt—bankruptcy.140 In 1999, eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds accounted for 6.9% of debtors filing for bankruptcy.141 This figure represented a fifty-one percent growth rate of bankruptcy filings for consumers under the age of twenty-five from 1991 to 1999.142 In 2001, consumers in this age group accounted for 150,000 bankruptcy filings.143 Interestingly, the percentage distribution of bankruptcy petitioners under the age of twenty-five has declined over the years from 8.7% in 1991 to 4.2% in 2007.144 As Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren, and Teresa A. Sullivan acknowledge:

The corresponding decline in filing rates among young Americans might signal better financial security than that enjoyed by their earlier counterparts. . . . However, the fact that previous generations show a sharp rise in filings among those in early middle age may signal instead that people are living with financial stress for years, putting off the day of reckoning in bankruptcy for as long as possible.145

Because bankruptcy filings are included in consumers’ credit reports for ten years,146 they can have long-term financial and personal ramifications for many debtors.147

Card Mgmt., Jan. 3, 2005, at 20, 20 (discussing that while most consumers realize that lenders use credit scores in making lending decisions, they do not realize that poor score will result in higher interest rates on various purchases as compared to effects of good credit score).

139. Mann, Patterns, supra note 34, at 4.
141. Id. at 13.
142. Id. at 14; see also Johnson, supra note 36, at 218 (reporting that from 1995 to 2000, “the number of people under the age of twenty-six who filed for bankruptcy tripled”).
143. See Smillie, supra note 48.
145. Id. at 88 n.1.
147. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 218.
In addition, young consumers’ poor credit histories can negatively affect their prospective employment and professional opportunities. Employers are increasingly checking prospective employees’ credit reports prior to hiring. Therefore, unbeknownst to many college students, “their employment prospects are limited due to their college legacy of credit card debt.”

When considering the impact of credit card debt on the lives of college-aged consumers, it is important to consider an emerging trend that suggests that young consumers, including students, are choosing to use debit cards more often than credit cards. This occurrence could be attributable to the growing practice of colleges and universities partnering

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148. A recent study conducted by the Society for Human Resource Management reported that thirteen percent of organizations surveyed conducted credit background checks on all job applicants. See Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., Background Checking: Conducting Credit Background Checks 3 (2010), available at http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings.Articles/Pages/BackgroundChecking.aspx. Forty-seven percent reported conducting checks on selected job candidates. Id.; see also Manning, Credit Card Nation, supra note 10, at 177; Johnson, supra note 36, at 214. There have been state and federal legislative initiatives to address this issue. To date, three states have banned employers’ use of credit reports to pre-screen prospective employees: Washington, Hawaii, and Oregon. Representative Steve Cohen from Tennessee is pursuing federal legislation to ban the practice nationally. See Dana Dratch, States Weigh Limits on Credit Checks for Employment, CreditCards.com (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/states-weigh-limits-credit-checks-for-employment-1282.php; Jessica Hoch, Law Bans Employment Credit Checks, OregonBusiness (July 6, 2010), http://www.oregonbusiness.com/the-latest/3766-law-bans-employment-credit-checks; see also Andrew Martin, As a Hiring Filter, Credit Checks Draw Questions, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 2010, at B1.

149. Manning, Credit Card Nation, supra note 10, at 177; see also Manning, Living with Debt, supra note 75, at 38 (discussing students’ lack of knowledge regarding how their credit reports can negatively impact their employment and lending opportunities).

with banks to make student ID cards available as a debit card. It could also reflect “a generational shift” in that young consumers may “have an inherent preference for real-time payment methods like debit.” As observed by Ronald Mann:

The rapidly accelerating shift to debit card use in the last 24 months, for example, suggests a shift away from borrowing-based consumption, a shift that would have a much greater effect on the credit card product than anything Congress is contemplating. This is particularly true if that trend is truly age-based—so that it becomes ever harder to identify young and middle-aged households that will use cards as a routine transaction and borrowing vehicle.

Both Professor Mann and banking industry representatives acknowledge that it is too soon to determine if this trend will amount to a permanent shift away from credit cards and towards debit cards, or if the current preference for debit cards is simply a reaction to the economic recession such that consumers will revert back to using credit cards once the economy recovers. These uncertainties coupled with college-aged consumers’ continued use of credit cards necessitate the consideration of measures that can help protect their financial futures. To that end, Congress incorporated specific provisions concerning college-aged consumers in the recently enacted Credit CARD Act. The next part questions whether these provisions will be effective in protecting this important group of consumers.

IV. The Credit CARD Act: An Empty Promise?

Signed into law by President Barack Obama on May 22, 2009, the Credit CARD Act is considered “the most significant credit card reform legislation” in over four decades. Amid concerns regarding the economic recession and recovery efforts, both the President and lawmakers

152. Block, Credit Card Use Plunges, supra note 15.
153. Mann, Credit Card Reform, supra note 15, at 3.
154. See Block, Credit Card Use Plunges, supra note 15; Mann, What is Changing?, supra note 150.
155. See supra Part III.A.
consider the Act to be an integral component of comprehensive financial reform intended to better protect consumers. With goals to end unfair and deceptive practices and to improve consumer disclosures, the Act includes new rules regarding interest rate increases, allocation and timing of payments, and periodic statement disclosures. Pertinent to this Article are the Act’s provisions concerning college-aged consumers.

As discussed below, the Credit CARD Act seeks to protect young consumers by restricting access to those potential cardholders who do not have the financial means with which to repay their debt. In theory, this is a sound approach because it allows young, creditworthy consumers, many of whom prove to be responsible cardholders, to obtain credit while preventing those who do not have adequate means to repay their debt from obtaining a credit card. However, due to the broad latitude afforded issuers by the new rules and regulations, it is doubtful that this approach will significantly reduce the number of non-creditworthy, college-aged cardholders or curtail their credit card usage. Therefore, as proposed in Part V, additional legislation and regulations are needed both to reduce the number of young consumers who are permitted to obtain a card without the financial means to repay the debt and to diminish the negative long-term consequences that many young cardholders suffer as a result of amassing significant credit card debt.

In its efforts to stem young consumers’ credit card indebtedness, Congress passed legislation that seeks to curtail the number of young consumers who obtain credit cards and the amount of debt that they incur. The Credit CARD Act includes three primary provisions aimed at reducing credit card indebtedness for college-aged consumers. First, effective

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159. Id. §§ 102(a), 106(a)-(b).
160. Id. § 201(a).
161. The college-aged consumer protection provisions are found in Title III of the Credit CARD Act entitled “Protection of Young Consumers.” See id. §§ 301-05.
162. See Senator Dodd Statement, supra note 157, at S5316 (stating that Act seeks to end deceptive card practices aimed at young people and protect them from “onslaught of credit card offers, often years before they turn 18, usually as soon as they set foot onto a college campus”); see also 155 CONG. REC. H5015, H5020 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Rep. Louise Slaughter) [hereinafter Representative Slaughter Statement] (discussing her support of measures “to protect college students from the hardship of excessive credit card debt and bankruptcy”).
163. Although the Senate bill contained a provision permitting consumers under the age of twenty-one to obtain a card if they complete an approved financial literacy course, the final version of the Act omitted this provision. See S. REP. No. 111-16, at 12 (2009); see also Hinson, supra note 27, at 303 (discussing earlier
February 22, 2010, consumers under the age of twenty-one are not permitted to obtain a credit card unless their application includes the following: (1) the signature of a cosigner who is at least twenty-one years old; or (2) financial information indicating that they have independent means of paying the bill.\footnote{Credit CARD Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 301.} In addition, card issuers are no longer permitted to send prescreened credit offers to consumers under the age of twenty-one unless the consumer has previously consented to receiving such offers.\footnote{Id. § 302.} Finally, card issuers and creditors that engage in solicitation on or near a university campus or at a university-sponsored or related event are now banned from offering college students “free” gifts as inducements to complete a credit card application.\footnote{Id. § 304.} At first glance, one would think that these measures could indeed keep credit cards out of the hands of many young consumers and, thereby, inhibit their ability to rack up thousands of dollars in credit card debt. However, upon further inquiry, it becomes apparent that several existing factors will hinder the Credit CARD Act’s promise of young consumer protection from being fulfilled—the most disconcerting of which being the Act’s rules and regulations themselves.

Because the Credit CARD Act permits college-aged consumers with independent means of paying their bill to obtain a card without a cosigner, it leaves the door open for young consumers to continue amassing large amounts of credit card debt. The likelihood that this will occur is particularly great when one considers the Federal Reserve Board’s newly promulgated regulations that accompany the Act.\footnote{See generally Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 75 Fed. Reg. 7658 (Feb. 22, 2010) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). With regard to the provisions discussed in this Article, the Board’s final rules were, in most respects, the same as those proposed. Compare id. (final rule), with Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 74 Fed. Reg. 54124 (proposed Oct. 21, 2009).}

Consider, for instance, the regulations concerning a card applicant’s ability to pay. While the Act and regulations both require card issuers to verify that all consumers, including college-aged consumers, have the ability to pay before issuing them a card,\footnote{Credit CARD Act § 109; Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 226.51 (2011).} this requirement only applies to prospective cardholders’ ability to pay “required minimum periodic payments under the terms of the account.”\footnote{12 C.F.R. § 226.51(a)(1)(i).} Thus, the issuer is not required to ensure that a consumer has the ability to pay the entire credit amount that will be made available to him or her under the credit card agreement. Rather, the issuer is only required to ensure that the consumer has the ability to pay the minimum monthly amount due.\footnote{See Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 75 Fed. Reg. at 7660.} The regulations do...
require card issuers to assume “utilization . . . of the full credit line that the issuer is considering offering to the consumer”\textsuperscript{171} when “estimating the minimum periodic payments the consumer would be required to pay.”\textsuperscript{172} However, depending on the amount of the credit line and the minimum payment formula employed by the issuer,\textsuperscript{173} this required payment amount could be as low as $25 to $50 per month.\textsuperscript{174} With such a low payment threshold, it appears that card issuers can easily comply with the Act’s ability to pay rules and regulations by endeavoring to qualify college-aged consumers who have independent financial means to pay these low amounts. As demonstrated below, credit card issuers will likely accomplish this undertaking with ease due to the wide latitude granted to them by the Board’s regulations concerning issuers’ verification (or lack thereof) of young consumers’ independent ability to pay.

As previously mentioned, consumers under the age of twenty-one can obtain a credit card without a cosigner if they can show that they have independent financial resources with which to make their minimum periodic payments.\textsuperscript{175} According to the Board’s official staff interpretations, both current resources as well as “reasonably expected”\textsuperscript{176} resources can be considered in establishing a college-aged consumer’s independent ability to pay. “For example, a card issuer may use information about current or expected salary, wages, bonus pay, tips, and commissions. Employment may be full-time, part-time, seasonal, [or] irregular. . . .”\textsuperscript{177} In addition, card issuers are permitted to consider consumers’ “assets or income,” which includes savings accounts, to establish their ability to pay.\textsuperscript{178}

Take, for instance, an eighteen-year-old incoming college freshman who is interested in obtaining a credit card. According to the regulations, this individual can submit the tips and wages he or she expects to earn while working as a server in a restaurant during holiday break to substantiate an independent ability to pay the low minimum monthly payments. According to the regulations, it does not matter that he or she will not actually receive this income for approximately four months because expected wages and tips from seasonal work qualifies as evidence of indepen-

\textsuperscript{171} 12 C.F.R. § 226.51(a)(2)(ii)(A).
\textsuperscript{172} 12 C.F.R. § 226.51(a)(2)(i).
\textsuperscript{173} See 12 C.F.R. § 226.51(a)(2)(ii)(B); see also Kristin Arnold, Calculating Your Minimum Payment, Bankrate.com (May 3, 2005), http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/debt/20050503b1.asp (reporting that although it varies by issuer, consumer’s minimum payment is commonly two to four percent of card balance).
\textsuperscript{176} Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 75 Fed. Reg. 7658, 7900 (Feb. 22, 2010) (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{177} Id.
\textsuperscript{178} Id. (emphasis added).
dent means to pay. Moreover, if this incoming student takes out student loans to fund his or her educational expenses, these loans can be treated as “income” to independently qualify for a card—a disconcerting practice that some student consumers have already begun to implement.179 This student can also place loan disbursement money into a savings account and use it to independently qualify for a card because the account could be considered an “asset” under current regulations.

Student loan refund accounts themselves may be deemed a permissible asset in light of the emerging practice of colleges and universities partnering with companies to distribute student loan refund cards.180 Such cards, which take the place of traditional refund checks, essentially operate as debit cards except that purchases and withdrawals are deducted from students’ loan refund accounts rather than their checking or savings accounts.181 Although touted by university officials as both an administrative cost- and time-saving measure as well as a way to generate income in difficult economic times, many students and consumer advocates complain about the fees associated with the cards, which are not currently regulated under the Credit CARD Act.182

Perhaps even more disturbing than these potential assets on which issuers can rely to qualify college-aged consumers is the fact that young consumers can merely state on their credit card application that they have (or expect to have) these financial resources, and the regulations do not require card issuers to independently verify the truthfulness or accuracy of such statements.183 Effectively, the regulations create a “stated” income and assets regime similar to that employed in the subprime housing market—a regime that not only invites and facilitates fraudulent financial representations but also results in consumers obtaining credit and debt that they cannot afford to repay.184 In the housing context, this practice of

179. In his survey of undergraduate students, Professor Hawkins found that thirty percent of college-aged students who obtained a credit card since the beginning of the fall 2010 semester reported using student loan proceeds as income for card qualification purposes. See Hawkins, supra note 86; see also, e.g., Susan Tompor, Credit Card Offers Still Contain Trouble Spots for Consumers, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 30, 2010, http://www.freep.com/article/20100930/COL07/9300471/Credit-card-offers-still-contain-trouble-spots-for-consumers.


181. See id.

182. See id. (“[S]tudents say several of the fees associated with Higher One’s card are particularly irksome, including the $19 inactivity fee, a 50-cent charge for using a PIN to make a purchase rather than a signature, and a $2.50 fee for using other banks’ ATMs.”).

183. See Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 75 Fed. Reg. at 7722 (discussing reactions to Board’s rules regarding issuers’ ability to simply rely on income and asset information stated on applicant’s application without independently verifying information).

184. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Over-Indebtedness, the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, and the Effect on U.S. Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 395, 400-03 (2009) (stating that...
deceptive and irresponsible lending not only caused grave consequences for thousands of consumers but also contributed to the “mortgage meltdown” and global financial crisis.185 Young consumers may experience similar negative consequences, such as delinquencies and bankruptcies, if credit card issuers are permitted to engage in this same sort of imprudent and exploitative lending behavior.

One would think that Congress surely intended stricter requirements than these when attempting to protect young consumers and to restrict creditors’ abilities to issue credit cards to those who cannot afford to repay the debt.186 As recognized by Senator Christopher Dodd:

Just as we saw in the mortgage crisis with lenders and borrowers, too often issuers offer cards to young people without verifying any ability to repay whatsoever. This is particularly true for students. . . . It is time to insist that credit card companies take into account a young person’s ability to repay before allowing them to take on what is all too often a lifetime worth of debt. Very little we do in our legislation will be more important than these provisions.187

Unfortunately, the Board does not appear to share this intention. As acknowledged in the regulations, the Board clearly rejected consumer advocates’ recommendations that it “require a more stringent evaluation of a “some borrowers intentionally inflated their incomes on liar loan [applications]” resulting in outright fraud); Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 41 (2009) (stating that “stated” income loans, also known as liar loans, are “the most common form of mortgage fraud” because of opportunity to lie about one’s income on application); see also Alan M. White, The Case for Banning Subprime Mortgages, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 617, 634 (2008). As noted by Professor White:

The prevalence of “no-doc” loans, i.e., subprime mortgages made without requiring any written verification of borrower income or assets, fostered a climate in which borrower’s income, assets, and property value were routinely falsified. No-doc or “liar loans” reached a level of $276 billion in 2006, accounting for 46% of all subprime mortgages.

Id. at 634 (footnote omitted).

185. See Dickerson, supra note 184, at 412 (detailing evidence of housing crisis that was precipitated, in part, by unscrupulous and predatory lending); David Anderson & Sarah Hodges, Credit Crisis Litigation: An Overview of Issues and Outcomes, 28 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. (June 2009) (“The subprime mortgage crisis that began in the summer of 2007 has exploded into a global financial crisis more severe than anything seen in the past 70 years.”); Tami Luhby, Senate Votes to Ban Liar Loans, CNNMONEY.COM (May 13, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/13/news/economy/senate_mortgage_rules/index.htm?section=money_realestate (stating that Senate banned controversial liar loans that brought down housing market).

186. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. See generally Representative Slaughter Statement, supra note 162, at H5020 (discussing lawmakers’ efforts to “ensure that credit card companies cannot provide students with extravagant limits and require the creditors to obtain a proof of income, income history and credit history from the students before approving the application”).

187. Senator Dodd Statement, supra note 157, at S5316.
consumer’s ability to make the required payments for consumers under the age of 21 than the one required” generally for all consumers. 188 According to the Board:

[C]onsumer group commenters suggested, for example, that card issuers be required to only consider income earned from wages or require a higher residual income or lower debt-to-income ratio for consumers less than 21 years old. A state regulatory agency commenter suggested that the Board require card issuers to verify income or asset information stated on an application submitted by a consumer under the age of 21. The Board declines to make the suggested changes. The Board believes that the heightened procedures already set forth in [the Truth in Lending Act], . . . , as adopted by the Board . . . , will provide sufficient protection for consumers less than 21 years old without unnecessarily impinging on their ability to obtain credit and build a credit history. 189

Considering the low threshold that card companies must meet to continue issuing cards to young consumers, it is doubtful that the Board’s beliefs will be realized, especially when one considers the credit card industry’s strategic ability to adjust their practices to accomplish their economic goals.

As recognized by Adam Levitin, “[t]he card industry has shown that it is quite skilled at adaptation, and economic theory tells us that regulation has a hydraulic effect—if practice A is banned, the market will simply move to practice B.” 190 As evidenced by a recent report issued by the Pew Health Group, this effect is exactly what has happened since the enactment of the Credit CARD Act. 191 While banks have eliminated troubling practices such as the imposition of over-the-limit fees without consumers’ consent and unfair payment allocation, some have also increased

188. Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 75 Fed. Reg. at 7722.
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Levitin, Legislation, supra note 156; see also Levitin, Credit Union Report, supra note 156, at 12 (noting that when new legislation limits “tricks and traps” relied upon by large bank issuers, it also “incentivize[s] large issuers to come up with new ones”); Todd Wallack, Credit Card Firms Raise Fees Before Law Changes, Boston Globe, July 27, 2009, available at http://www.boston.com/business/personal finance/articles/2009/07/27/credit_card_firms_raise_fees_before_law_changes/(discussing card companies’ practices of increasing rates and fees in response to passing of Credit CARD Act).
surcharges for cash advances and stopped disclosing the size of penalty interest rates.\textsuperscript{192}

Interestingly, with respect to the Credit CARD Act’s provisions related to young consumers, the report found that out of its entire survey of over 450 card-issuing banks and credit unions,\textsuperscript{193} only one “mentioned special provisions for young people, indicating that a co-signer would be required if the applicant was under age 21. These new protections have not been widely reflected in card issuers’ terms and conditions.”\textsuperscript{194} This finding begs the question: Why are issuers seemingly paying such little attention to these “protections”? Perhaps, they have been preoccupied with complying with other provisions of the Act. It may also be possible that the current legislation and regulations are not likely to have a significant impact on the way issuers currently do business with college-aged consumers.

Prior to the Board’s promulgation of final regulations, some industry representatives speculated that issuing cards to college-aged consumers would be so burdensome and costly that some banks may decide to stop extending credit to this class of consumers.\textsuperscript{195} It does not appear that this will be the case.\textsuperscript{196} Card issuers are aware of the lenient regulations related to establishing young consumers’ independent ability to make periodic payments; they know that they are permitted to simply rely on the financial information submitted by young consumers on their card applications.\textsuperscript{197} In fact, the regulations state that “[i]ndustry commenters were supportive of the Board’s approach”\textsuperscript{198} regarding this matter.

While some issuers such as Discover state “that full-time students under age 21 will need to show verifiable income that’s above $2,000 a year and must have ‘an acceptable debt-to-income ratio’ to qualify for the Discover Student card,”\textsuperscript{199} credit card companies have routinely customized or waived underwriting standards for students in attempts to increase their number of student cardholders.\textsuperscript{200} Considering the current and fu-
ture profitability of this segment of the market,\textsuperscript{201} it is doubtful that credit card companies will end these customization practices, which appear allowable under the Act. Therefore, creditors will most likely continue issuing cards to consumers under the age of twenty-one who do not possess the financial means to repay their debt and, in so doing, continue to facilitate the escalating problem of young consumer indebtedness.

One final factor that may hinder the effectiveness of the Credit CARD Act in protecting young consumers is the Act’s allowance of college-aged consumers to obtain a card if they are able to secure a cosigner who is at least twenty-one years old.\textsuperscript{202} Ideally, the cosigner would be someone such as a parent or guardian who has the knowledge and experience to fully understand and appreciate the financial liabilities associated with being a cosigner. Indeed, issuers have already begun marketing to parents in their attempts to attract student consumers.\textsuperscript{203} However, since any qualifying adult who is age twenty-one or older can cosign on the application for college-aged consumers, older students, who may already have student loan and/or credit card debt, are permitted to cosign if they meet the issuers’ requirements. There have already been reports of some college students paying older students and friends to serve as cosigners.\textsuperscript{204} Therefore, the Act paves the way for increasing the indebtedness of not only college-aged consumers but also of their cosigning parents, guardians, friends, and relatives.

Despite its efforts to restrict the issuance of cards to young consumers who do not have adequate financial resources with which to repay the debt, it is doubtful that the Credit CARD Act will significantly impact the number of young cardholders or the amount of debt that they amass. In view of these factors, more comprehensive legislation is needed to diminish the negative long-term effects that credit card debt can have on the lives and futures of many young consumers.\textsuperscript{205}

\textsuperscript{201} See supra Part II.A.


\textsuperscript{203} See Andriotis, Strategies, supra note 199 (discussing issuers’ use of direct mail to parents’ homes to market student credit cards).

\textsuperscript{204} See College Students Skirt Rules to Get Credit Cards, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.pri.org/business/economic-security/college-students-skirt-rules-to-get-credit-cards\textsuperscript{2166}.html; see also David Migoya, More College Students Duck Credit Card Law, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 20, 2010, at 20; Tompor, supra note 179.

\textsuperscript{205} See Hinson, supra note 27, at 302 (stating that Credit CARD Act does not fully protect young consumers because once credit card is issued, they can still amass large amounts of debt for which they do not have income or financial means to pay).
V. Protecting Our Youth—Preserving Their Futures

As previously discussed in Part III of this Article, credit card usage by college-aged consumers has increased significantly over the past several years resulting in detrimental academic, financial, and personal consequences for several young cardholders.206 Congress has recognized the significance of this problem; however, its recent attempts to address it may very well prove futile.207 Not only does the Credit CARD Act provide methods by which card companies can continue to issue cards to college-aged consumers who may not be able to repay their debt, but it also fails to include provisions that can provide protection for young consumers once they receive and begin to use their cards.208 Consequently, additional measures are needed to more effectively protect young consumers’ personal and financial futures.

This Part discusses several additional provisions that could be implemented to provide greater protection for college-aged consumers. Inherent in the suggestion and consideration of any proposal are inevitable normative questions related generally to credit availability and debt accumulation and, specifically, to young consumer indebtedness. Policymakers, lawmakers, and scholars can and often do disagree on how best to approach and resolve these complex issues.209 Even among those policymakers who may agree that college-aged consumers need greater protections than those currently provided in the Act, they would surely have differing opinions regarding various aspects of such protections, such as the appropriate time period for providing such protections. Three options, which are not mutually exclusive, include the following time periods: (1) before young consumers obtain a card; (2) during the time in which they are using their card; or (3) at the time when they default on their card agreement. In addition, policymakers may have divergent thoughts regarding what the goals of additional measures should be. Again, non-mutually exclusive options include: (1) decreasing the number of college-aged cardholders; (2) decreasing the amount of credit card debt young consumers incur; or (3) decreasing the literal and figurative

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206. See supra Part III; see also SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 3 (reporting that “[n]early every indicator measured in spring 2008 showed an increase in credit card usage [by college students] since the last study was conducted in fall 2004”).

207. See supra Part IV.

208. See Hinson, supra note 27, at 303-04 (critiquing Credit CARD Act’s lack of protective provisions for college-aged consumers once they obtain cards, such as limits on amount of credit and number of cards young consumers can obtain).

“costs” that young cardholders must pay as a consequence of incurring debt.

Because of these various possibilities, this Article suggests a spectrum of proposals ranging from those that would further restrict young consumers’ access to credit cards and, thereby, reduce the number of college-aged cardholders, to those that would provide protections after young consumers begin to use their cards. Obviously, there are costs and benefits associated with each proposal that would have to be carefully considered before adoption. However, given the possibility that the Credit CARD Act’s current provisions may fail to significantly impact young consumers’ credit card indebtedness, policymakers should earnestly consider these and other measures if they hope to provide meaningful and effective protections for college-aged consumers.

A. Raising the Bar to Borrow

As evidenced by the enactment of the young consumer provisions included in the Credit Card Act, lawmakers have been deeply concerned with the growth in the number of young cardholders and the amount of debt they have amassed. Assuming that the Act’s current provisions are not likely to effectively curtail these occurrences and that the growth in young consumer indebtedness warrants curtailment, policymakers should implement new ways by which to restrict non-creditworthy, college-aged consumers’ access to credit cards. Such measures could impose stricter underwriting requirements such as an age restriction or employment requirement, or they could require issuers to independently verify the financial resources information included on young consumers’ applications. Depending on the goals policymakers sought to accomplish, one or more of these proposals could be effective.

1. Increased Age Restriction

If policymakers wish to significantly decrease the number of college-aged cardholders, the most effective way to achieve this goal would be to prohibit them from independently obtaining a card until they reach the age of twenty-one. Despite the potential effectiveness of this proposal, it is likely not a feasible proposition for several reasons. First, in most states, the age of majority for entering into contracts is eighteen. Therefore, requiring consumers to be twenty-one to enter into a credit


211. See supra note 162.

212. See supra Part IV.

213. See, e.g., Wayne Jekot, Note, Over the Limit: The Case for Increased Regulation of Credit Cards for College Students, 5 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 109, 125 (2005) (proposing that “credit card issuers should be prohibited from granting credit to those under twenty-one who are full-time college students”).

card agreement would contradict this established rule. If Congress felt that young consumers’ escalated credit card debt warrants the age restriction, then it could utilize its authority under the Spending Clause to effectuate an age increase. Just as it did to implement an increase in the drinking age, Congress could condition the receipt of federal funds to states’ agreement to increase the age for obtaining a credit card to twenty-one. It is doubtful, however, that there would be sufficient political will to invoke this authority.

Many lawmakers would likely oppose requiring young consumers to be twenty-one before obtaining a card because of their concerns that doing so would infringe upon adults’ freedom to obtain needed and beneficial credit. As argued by Representative Jeb Hensarling, “[w]e’re talking about folks over 18 who can vote, who can go to war, in most States can marry, own real property. We shouldn’t be paternalistic towards them. We shouldn’t deny them what could be an incredibly valuable tool to get them through college in the first place.”

Indeed, college officials and industry representatives have acknowledged the benefits of credit cards for many students. Such advantages include accessibility to financial resources in the event of an emergency, ability to pay for education-related expenses, and the opportunity to establish and build credit history. Those who would oppose an age restriction...
tion could argue that prohibiting consumers under the age of twenty-one from obtaining a credit card would prevent them from obtaining these benefits.

It could also be argued that denying or restricting young consumers’ access to credit cards would deprive them of the benefit of learning how to responsibly manage credit.221 Recent studies show that young consumers make costly financial mistakes (i.e., exceeding their credit limit and paying bills late) due, in part, to their inexperience and lack of financial knowledge.222 The adverse impact that lack of financial experience has on consumers’ credit card behaviors is confirmed by recent research finding that new cardholders pay a greater number of late payment, over-the-limit, and cash advance fees than do consumers who have had their cards for longer periods of time.223 These findings suggest that over time and after encountering negative borrowing experiences, consumers learn to avoid making costly mistakes such as going over their limit or making late payments.224 If learning is “driven by feedback,” as concluded in the study,225 then restricting young consumers’ ability to obtain cards would arguably deny them opportunities to experience card use and learn from the financial mistakes that can accompany such use. Perhaps the optimal time for consumers to make and learn from these mistakes is during their college-aged years so that they are better equipped to manage credit and debt when they get older.

Imposing an age restriction, however, would not necessarily prevent young consumers from learning how to manage credit and debt or from enjoying any of the other benefits mentioned above. They could do so by

221. See GAO Report, supra note 35, at 9 (noting that some student cardholders’ parents view credit cards as “tool for learning financial responsibility”); Barbara Bedway, Credit Card Issuers’ Last Stab at Hooking Your Kid, CBS MoneyWatch. com (Sept. 10, 2009), http://moneywatch.bnet.com/saving-money/article/college-kids-and-credit-cards-what-every-parent-needs-to-know/340021/ (stating that some financial experts believe that having credit cards can help “a young adult learn how to manage credit responsibly, build a credit history, and provide peace of mind to his parents in an emergency”); Burnsed, supra note 150 (“Credit cards are the simplest way for students to build strong credit before they’re thrust into the real world.”); Connie Prater, Law May Force Parents, Children to Talk About Credit Cards, Creditcard.com (July 8, 2009), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-law-college-students-parents-1282.php (stating that limiting college students’ access to credit will result in hindering or delaying young adults building credit history in their names).

222. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.

223. See Sumit Agarwal et al., Learning in the Credit Card Market 3, 6-9 (2008) [hereinafter Agarwal et al., Learning], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1091623&download=yes (finding that “fee payments are fairly common when accounts are initially opened, but that the frequency of fee payments declines rapidly as account tenure increases”). For further discussion of research indicating that the majority of financial penalty fees are paid by inexperienced young consumers or less intelligent older persons, see supra note 93 and accompanying text.

224. See Agarwal et al., Learning, supra note 223, at 3, 6-9.

225. See id. at 3.
obtaining a card with a cosigner or by becoming an authorized user on someone’s account, such as a parent.\textsuperscript{226} In addition, it is important to recognize that these financial lessons are extremely costly to young consumers not only in the short-term with the payment of fees but also in the long-term with the reporting of negative credit history on their credit reports for seven years.\textsuperscript{227} Considering the gravity of these costs, policymakers could attempt to prevent college-aged consumers from experiencing them by imposing the age restriction.

As previously discussed, young consumers often experience detrimental consequences as a result of their credit card use, especially when they incur debt without having the financial means by which to repay it.\textsuperscript{228} Arguably, a complete proscription to issuing cards to consumers under the age of twenty-one would not be the optimal way to help young consumers avoid these consequences because such a restriction could be viewed as overinclusive. Although policymakers would be attempting to protect those consumers who do not have the financial resources with which to repay their debt, the increased age restriction would give no consideration to a consumer’s ability to pay. Therefore, perhaps a more balanced approach would be to permit issuance of credit cards only to those college-aged consumers who are currently employed and can verify that they have sufficient income to repay their debt.

2. \textit{Strengthened Ability-to-Pay Requirements}

Similar to suggestions consumer advocates offered to the Board during the proposed rulemaking comment period for the Credit CARD Act,\textsuperscript{229} legislation intended to protect college-aged consumers could require those consumers and issuers to comply with stricter underwriting requirements.\textsuperscript{230} The spectrum of stricter standards could include a prerequisite that college-aged applicants verify that they have \textit{current income}, not “expected assets” as presently permitted by the regulations,\textsuperscript{231} if they wish to obtain a credit card without a cosigner. Requiring young consumers to be employed before being eligible to obtain a credit card would ensure that they are generating income and wages with which to pay their debt. Although cardholders could quit their jobs after having their card application approved, one would think they would be disinclined to do so, especially after incurring charges on their card for which they are responsible.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{226} See Hinson, \textit{supra} note 27, at 298 (discussing advantages of young consumers becoming authorized users on their parents’ credit card accounts).
\item \textsuperscript{227} See \textit{supra} Part III. For a proposal to reduce the costs associated with the reporting of young consumers’ negative credit card history, see \textit{infra} Part V.B.3.
\item \textsuperscript{228} See \textit{supra} Part III; \textit{see also} GAO REPORT, \textit{supra} note 35, at 9-14.
\item \textsuperscript{229} See \textit{supra} Part III; \textit{see also} GAO REPORT, \textit{supra} note 35, at 9-14.
\item \textsuperscript{230} See \textit{supra} notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{231} See \textit{supra} notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
\end{itemize}
Mandating an employment requirement could be viewed as good public policy because it could teach young consumers (and remind the card industry)\(^ {232}\) that receiving a credit card should not be viewed as a right to which all consumers become entitled merely by turning eighteen years old. Rather, it should be looked upon as a serious financial undertaking reserved for those individuals with sufficient income to pay their debt. Considering that research shows that students’ credit card use is affected by their attitudes regarding the normalcy of debt in general and credit card debt in particular,\(^ {233}\) policymakers should attempt to implement proposals such as an employment requirement that can help to foster fiscally responsible attitudes.\(^ {234}\)

While this proposal would succeed in reducing the number of young unemployed cardholders, it may also contribute to increases in young consumers’ debt levels once they become cardholders. A recent study examining credit card borrowing by college students found that “a student who is currently employed is 29\% more likely to borrow,” resulting in, “on average, $390 more in credit card debt [ ] than a student not currently working.”\(^ {235}\) Therefore, policymakers would have to consider this potential consequence when contemplating the viability of an employment requirement to accomplish their consumer protection goals.

The concerns discussed above regarding the imposition of overinclusive rules that prevent young consumers from enjoying the benefits of credit also apply to this proposal. Implementing an employment requirement would prevent all unemployed consumers from independently obtaining a card, even if they possess adequate financial assets with which to pay their debts. Arguably, this proposal is not as overinclusive as the age restriction because employed consumers under the age of twenty-one would be permitted to obtain cards. However, young consumers’ access to credit cards is significantly reduced under this proposal, particularly for those college-aged consumers who may have significant financial assets due to their socioeconomic status. Such consumers would have to secure a cosigner or become an authorized user on someone else’s card in order to obtain a card and begin establishing their credit history. Policymakers would have to weigh the potential benefits of prohibiting young unemployed consumers from obtaining credit cards against this and other possible costs.

Another proposal along the spectrum of heightened eligibility rules would be requiring issuers to base ability-to-pay determinations on young consumers’ ability to repay the entire amount of offered credit rather than

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\(^ {232}\) For further discussion of the credit card industry’s original reluctance to lend to unemployed, young consumers, see supra Part I.A.

\(^ {233}\) See Arano & Parker, supra note 94, at 1-2, 7.

\(^ {234}\) Such attitudes could also be developed through financial literacy courses and public service campaigns. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 268-76 (recommending mandatory financial education for college-aged consumers).

\(^ {235}\) Arano & Parker, supra note 94, at 6.
their ability to make minimum monthly payments, as currently permitted by the Act and accompanying regulations.236 As previously discussed, the current rules set forth a very low standard for issuers to independently qualify young consumers.237 They appear to be premised on the assumption that young consumers will be “borrowers” making minimum monthly payments238 rather than “convenience users” who pay their balances in full each month.239 This assumption is correct for the majority of student cardholders; however, young consumers’ borrowing causes them to pay significant amounts of interest and contributes to their incurrence of costly penalty fees.240 To prevent college-aged consumers from incurring debt for which they can only afford to make minimum payments, policymakers could require issuers to ensure that young cardholders’ income and assets (if one is unwilling to impose an employment requirement) are sufficient to repay an amount equal to the amount of credit that will be extended under the card agreement.

Perhaps the least objectionable approach to strengthening the current ability to pay requirements is to require card issuers to independently verify applicants’ income and assets before issuing them a card.241 Issuers could accomplish this by requiring applicants to provide copies of their current paycheck, pay stub, and financial account statements when submitting their application. While there may be some administrative costs associated with performing such verification, the benefits of ensuring that applicants actually possess the financial resources on which they are relying to obtain a credit card could outweigh those costs. As previously discussed, permitting a “stated” income approach when issuing cards to young consumers is an untenable proposition and invites the very deceptive behaviors that the Act is intended to eliminate.242 Therefore, policymakers should consider requiring issuers to independently verify college-aged applicants’ current income and assets before issuing credit cards to them.

237. See supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text; see also Representative Slaughter Statement, supra note 162, at H5019 (proposing income verification amendment to Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights Act of 2009 stating that “a creditor shall require adequate proof of income, income history, and credit history, subject to the rules of the Board, before any college student credit card account may be opened by or on behalf of a student”).
239. See supra note 57.
240. For a discussion of the correlation between payment histories, interest rates, and penalty fees, see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text; see also Representative Slaughter Statement, supra note 162, at H5019 (proposing income verification amendment to Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights Act of 2009 stating that “a creditor shall require adequate proof of income, income history, and credit history, subject to the rules of the Board, before any college student credit card account may be opened by or on behalf of a student”).
242. See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
B. Lowering the “Costs” of Borrowing

The proposals discussed thus far arguably would provide greater protections for young consumers by restricting their ability to incur debt they cannot afford to repay. If implemented, the proposals would protect young consumers prior to the issuance of a card. One of the other weaknesses of the Act is that it fails to provide adequate protections for young cardholders post-issuance (i.e., once they receive and begin to use their cards). Although the Act includes beneficial provisions that are generally applicable to all cardholders, it misses an important opportunity to provide greater protections for college-aged consumers by reducing the literal and figurative costs that many of them must pay as a consequence of their credit card indebtedness. Three of these costs include: (1) higher debt levels facilitated by unsolicited credit limit increase; (2) high interest rates; and (3) inclusion of negative credit history in credit reports. Policymakers should consider implementing measures to help reduce these costs which would, in turn, provide greater protection for college-aged consumers’ personal and financial futures.

1. Restricting Credit Limit Increases

One way to better protect young consumers from the pitfalls of credit card debt is to prohibit issuers from increasing young cardholders’ credit limits without their request or consent. Currently under the Act, consumers under the age of twenty-one who obtain a card with the assistance of a cosigner are not permitted to have their credit limits increased unless the cosigner provides written approval of the increase. This beneficial provision protects consumers against issuer-initiated credit limit increases and, thereby, helps to reduce the amount of debt young consumers will incur. Unfortunately, this provision does not apply to college-aged cardholders who independently qualify for a card. The approval provision’s inapplicability to non-cosigner accounts may reflect Congress’s attempt to protect young cardholders’ parents, many of whom provide financial assistance to repay their child’s credit card debt. However, considering the ease with which card companies will likely be able to independently qualify consumers and young consumers’ escalating indebtedness, policymakers should consider implementing measures to help reduce these costs which would, in turn, provide greater protection for college-aged consumers’ personal and financial futures.

243. See supra note 208.
244. See supra notes 21-22, 158-60 and accompanying text.
246. See Senator Dodd Statement, supra note 157, at S5316 (noting that many parents “ultimately” repay credit card debt their children incur); see also 155 CONG. REC. S5488 (daily ed. May 14, 2009) (statement of Sen. Claire McCaskill) (asserting that issuers “send these cards to kids because they know their parents, if they are in college, don’t want them to get into trouble and they will bail them out if they get in too deep”).
247. See supra Part IV.
248. See supra Part III.A.
lawmakers should pass additional legislation to remedy this discrepancy and extend the protections provided by this provision to all college-aged consumers.

While it is true that cardholders who receive an unsolicited credit limit increase could easily contact the issuer and request that the limit be decreased to the original amount, for several reasons it is unlikely that many young consumers will do this. First, they enjoy the perceived freedom and independence that credit gives them;\(^{249}\) therefore, they are unlikely to voluntarily seek to curb or restrict this freedom. Also, some enjoy the perceived sense of status that having cards with high credit limits provides.\(^{250}\) They feel that with a higher limit they can afford to socialize with and be accepted by individuals with higher financial and social stature,\(^{251}\) even if their reliance on credit and debt masks their true ability to do so.

Also, like many consumers, young cardholders can be affected by “a combination of behavioral biases that results in the underestimation of future borrowing.”\(^{252}\) As Oren Bar-Gill has recognized, consumers’ use of credit cards can be affected by biases such as underestimation of self-control problems whereby “consumers overestimate their ability to resist the temptation to finance consumption by borrowing”\(^{253}\) and optimism bias whereby consumers “underestimate the likelihood that they will be forced to resort to credit card borrowing.”\(^{254}\) These biases could contribute to young consumers’ decision not to request a reduction in their credit limit because they do not anticipate using the additional credit.

And if they do decide to borrow with the additional credit, many young consumers expect that their future financial resources will enable them to repay the debts they incurred during their young adulthood.\(^{255}\) In fact,

\(^{249}\) See Manning, Living with Debt, supra note 73, at 31 (discussing young consumers’ association of “debt-based behaviors” with “assertions of adulthood/ independence, freedom, and market-based self worth/social status”); id. at 36 (attributing students’ use of cards to their “psychological need to satisfy cravings for independence, self-esteem, and financial freedom”).

\(^{250}\) See Manning, Credit Card Nation, supra note 10, at 171 (recounting student’s feelings after obtaining credit card: “‘It made me feel like I had made it . . . people treated me differently when they saw [the Gold card].’”) (alteration in original).

\(^{251}\) See id. at 171-72 (discussing student’s rationalization that having credit card “befitted his status as a student at an elite, private university” and “alleviated social-status anxiety” because of way his peers treated him when he used his card); id. at 175 (discussing student’s use of cards to meet in with “‘the right people’”); see also Manning, Living with Debt, supra note 73, at 35 (discussing students’ perceived need to spend in order to “keep up with everyone”).

\(^{252}\) Bar-Gill, supra note 46, at 1375. For a detailed discussion of the underestimation of future borrowing behavioral theory and its impact on consumers’ credit card use, see id. at 1395-411.

\(^{253}\) Id. at 1395, 1395-400.

\(^{254}\) Id. at 1400.

\(^{255}\) See Manning, Credit Card Nation, supra note 10, at 171; Manning, Living with Debt, supra note 73, at 34; Yarrow & O’Donnell, supra note 73, at 67,
Research suggests that consumers base their borrowing on current estimations of future likely ability to pay, and that consumer estimates of future ability to pay are influenced by the credit limits banks bestow on them. Thus, consumers reason: "If a bank is willing to loan me this much money, there must be good reason to think that my salary will increase in the future sufficiently to permit repayment."256

Therefore, unsolicited credit limit increases assist young cardholders in amassing large amounts of debt—some without awareness of the amount of debt they are accumulating257 and others without contemplating the future difficulties they may have repaying it.258

The credit card industry, which would likely oppose this proposal, could argue that it unduly restricts their ability to build customer loyalty by rewarding those customers who have responsibly maintained their accounts over an established period of time.259 They could also argue that they are actually improving a consumer’s credit score by increasing their credit limit. While this is true if the consumer can resist the temptation to use the additional extension of credit,260 the reality for many consumers, including young cardholders, is that the more credit they have the more credit they will use.261 Arguably, issuers are aware of this behavior and seek to facilitate it by increasing the credit limit for those cardholders who are close to exceeding or have already exceeded their original credit limit.262


256. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 99, at 48-49.

257. See SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 12 (finding that sixty percent of college students surveyed reported being frequently or sometimes surprised at how high their credit card balances had reached).

258. See id.; MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 137-40.


260. See Jessica Dickler, Credit: Know Your Limits, CNNMoney.com (Sept. 25, 2008), http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/25/pf/credit_limits/index.htm (discussing impact of consumers’ “debt-to-limit ratio” on calculation of their credit scores). For further discussion of consumers’ attempts to control their credit usage as well as their underestimation of their own self-control, see supra note 253 and accompanying text.

261. See, e.g., MANNING, LIVING WITH DEBT, supra note 73, at 36 (reporting that “some students accumulate high levels of credit card debt within weeks and even within days of receiving their line of credit”); Littwin, supra note 220, at 487 (discussing findings of two studies indicating that “consumers tend to maintain balances at a consistent percentage of their credit limit”).

To avoid this from happening to young consumers, lawmakers should require issuers to receive consent from all college-aged cardholders before raising their credit limits. Similar to proposals recommended by Angela Littwin in the context of low-income cardholders, “consumer-controlled credit limits” could be very beneficial for reducing young consumers’ debt. With regards to credit limit increases, Littwin proposes various ways in which proposals could be implemented, ranging from consumers affirmatively requesting a credit limit increase by completing and returning a form that could be included with the monthly bill to issuers sending “notifications of potential credit-limit raises” to which consumers must affirmatively assent by returning an acceptance form. Obviously, there are implementation costs associated with these and other proposals that must be considered; however, Congress has already shown a willingness to impose such costs by requiring written cosigner approval for limit increases on young consumer accounts. Therefore, such costs should not deter lawmakers from extending those same protections to all college-aged cardholders.

Arguably, requiring all young cardholders to request or consent to a credit limit increase would be consistent with the current credit card issuance rules included in the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) that prohibit card companies from issuing cards “except in response to a request or application therefor.” Admittedly, the cardholder agreement may grant the issuer the authority to review the cardholder’s credit status and make changes to the account accordingly; however, if the purpose of TILA’s issuance rules is to prevent issuers from unilaterally imposing credit and debt upon uninformed, unsuspecting consumers, then this same purpose should be reflected in the Credit CARD Act’s provisions concerning credit limit increases for all college-aged cardholders, including those who have cosigners and those who do not.

263. See Littwin, supra note 220, at 485-87. In the article, Professor Littwin proposes an innovative model for a new credit card system that includes the use of self-directed cards, which are those that “permit consumers to exercise more control over their credit-card usage by precommitting to certain levels and types of credit-card spending and borrowing.” Id. at 479. For a more detailed discussion of the proposed system, see id. at 478-501.

264. Id. at 485-86.

265. See id. at 486.


268. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006). The relevant portion reads: It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.

269. During the rulemaking comment period, consumer advocates recommended that credit card issuers not be permitted to increase any card limit without
2. *Capping Interest Rates*

Another way policymakers could provide greater protection for young consumers after they begin to use their cards is to impose interest rate caps on college-aged consumers’ accounts.270 As previously discussed, the vast majority of student cardholders incur interest on their credit card debt, and their interest rates can be higher due to their lack of credit history.271 Because interest represents a significant cost to young borrowers and increases the amount they have to repay using no or relatively little income,272 imposing a relatively low interest rate limit on young consumers’ accounts would significantly reduce their cost of borrowing. Since the vast majority of undergraduate cardholders (ninety-two percent) report using credit cards for education-related expenses,273 lawmakers could mandate that issuers of cards to college-aged consumers cap their interest rates at the amount charged for Federal Direct Loans. The interest rates for Direct Loans currently range from 4.5% to 7.9%,274 which is significantly less than the current average student card rate of 13.31%.275

Although lawmakers have been unwilling to establish a federal limit for credit card interest rates, Congress has shown a willingness to provide interest rate protections to certain groups of consumers who lawmakers feel warrant heightened protection. Based, in part, on arguments made by Steven Graves and Christopher Peterson regarding predatory lending and military families,276 Congress imposed a thirty-six percent annual interest rate cap on certain types of consumer loans offered to military personnel and their families.277 Policymakers could attempt to make a similar case with regards to college-aged consumers and credit card issuers receiving a direct request to do so. See Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 75 Fed. Reg. 7658, 7720 (Feb. 22, 2010). However, the Board rejected this suggestion arguing that the Credit CARD Act’s ability-to-pay provision, which applies to issuance and credit limit increases, is sufficient to protect against improper unilateral increases. See id.

270. For a discussion of the historical and current debate concerning interest rate caps, see Bender, supra note 209 and Vincent D. Rougeau, Rediscovering Usury: An Argument for Legal Controls on Credit Card Interest Rates, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (1996).

271. See supra note 60 and accompanying text; see also Hinson, supra note 27, at 291.

272. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.

273. See Sallie Mae Study, supra note 5, at 3, 11-12.


in efforts to limit the amount of interest charged on young consumer accounts.

Like military service members, college-aged consumers are “young people [who] often lack financial experience and tend to borrow with less regard for the long-term consequences.”278 Issuers engage in aggressive solicitation tactics to target college-aged consumers,279 and they set and raise credit limits seemingly without regard to young consumers’ capacity to repay the debt.280 As recognized by Representative Louise Slaughter, “If credit card companies applied the same scrutiny to college students as they do to adults when approving them for credit cards, college students would not be able to maintain the balances which they are incapable of paying.”281 And just as payday and installment lenders target military personnel by “situat[ing] themselves in close proximity to the front gates of military installations,”282 card companies have historically solicited young consumers on or near college campuses and events.283 Therefore, the parallels that exist between lending to military personnel and young consumers may warrant capping the amount of interest charged on young cardholders’ accounts.

In considering whether to impose a usury limitation on college-aged consumer credit cards, lawmakers would need to consider the impact such a restriction could have on young consumers’ access to credit cards. As asserted in the context of low-income families, interest rate restrictions could “make it more difficult . . . to obtain credit cards.”284 This may not be the case for student consumers because card issuers view “‘college students as long-term investments.’”285 Therefore, issuers may be willing to continue lending to college-aged consumers under an interest rate limit, especially if the limit is only applicable on cardholders’ accounts who are under the age of twenty-one. Arguably, implementing such a proposal would succeed in providing needed protections for young consumers post-issuance.

278. Graves & Peterson, supra note 276, at 677
279. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
280. The Credit CARD Act’s ability-to-pay rules and regulations are intended to rectify this problem. See Credit CARD Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 109, 123 Stat. 1734, 1743 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1665e); Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 226.51). However, as discussed in supra Part IV, it is doubtful that this will be the case.
281. Representative Slaughter Statement, supra note 162, at H5020.
282. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 10 (2006); see also Graves & Peterson, supra note 276, at 709-821 (detailing concentration of payday lenders in military communities).
283. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 167-68; Johnson, supra note 36, at 191-93.
284. Littwin, supra note 220, at 453.
3. Decreasing Duration of Negative Credit History Reporting

A final proposal concerns the reporting of adverse credit card history on young consumers’ credit reports. As previously discussed, young cardholders’ financial inexperience often leads to financially detrimental behaviors such as making late payments and exceeding credit limits. Unbeknownst to many of them, these and other financial missteps are chronicled in their credit reports—reports that can detrimentally affect many of their future personal and financial opportunities.

Currently under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), adverse items of information concerning a consumer’s credit history can generally remain a part of his or her credit report for seven years. In light of the fact that young consumers’ financial mistakes are often attributable to their lack of financial knowledge and experience, Congress should consider amending the FCRA to decrease the amount of time adverse credit card information can be included in college-aged consumers’ reports. The specific proposal is that any adverse credit card information reported to or obtained by a credit reporting agency while the consumer is under the age of twenty-one must be removed from the consumer’s credit report after three years. By reducing the duration of time that negative credit history can be included in young consumers’ credit reports, this FCRA amendment could significantly lessen the detrimental impact that finan-

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286. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text; Staten & Barron, supra note 8, at 12.
287. See supra notes 135, 139 and accompanying text.
288. Although the FCRA does not define an “adverse item of information,” the Federal Trade Commission has issued a staff opinion letter stating: “We believe that the common understanding of these words must be used. The dictionary definition of ‘adverse’ includes ‘unfavorable’ or ‘opposed to one’s interests.’ Accordingly, we believe that to be covered by Section 605(a)(6) information must cast the consumer in a negative or unfavorable light.” See FTC Staff Opinion Ltr. (Apr. 17, 1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcra/seham.shtm.
289. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681c(a)-(l) (2006). Bankruptcies are allowed to be included in the report for ten years. See id. § 1681c(a)(1).
290. See supra notes 73, 92, 222-23 and accompanying text.
291. To conform to the language currently included in the FCRA, the proposal could read: No consumer reporting agency may make any consumer report containing any adverse item of information that pertains to a consumer while he/she is under the age of twenty-one which antedates the report by more than three years. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (2006).
292. Other scholars have advocated for a reduction in reporting periods as a means to protect consumers from various harms caused by the inclusion of adverse information in their credit reports. See, e.g., Helping Families Save Their Homes: The Role of Bankruptcy Law: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 147-48 (2008) (statement of Adam Levitin, Prof., Geo. Univ. L. Ctr.) [hereinafter Levitin Testimony] (recommending that reporting period for bankruptcies be reduced to same time period as those established for other items of adverse information such as foreclosures); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1667, 1680 (2008) (suggesting brief reporting period for information related to “someone’s involvement in landlord-tenant litigation”).
cial mistakes can have on young cardholders’ future economic and employment opportunities. Such action would provide young cardholders with greater and more long-term protection than that currently provided by the Act.

Presently, if an eighteen-year-old freshman obtains a credit card then fails to make required payments by the due date, the resulting adverse credit history can detrimentally impact that student’s financial and personal opportunities until he or she is twenty-five years old. One could argue that no reduction in reporting time is needed because twenty-five is still a fairly young age at which time the negative history will be deleted from the report. This argument, however, fails to consider the fact that young adults experience several significant moments during this time period that can be adversely impacted by a negative credit report. Such moments include: applying for student loans for undergraduate and/or graduate school; applying for a car loan; applying for a mortgage; applying to rent an apartment; and applying for a job. These situations are welfare-enhancing not only for the consumer but also for society as a whole. Therefore, it is important to protect young cardholders’ future opportunities while also providing relevant and useful credit history information to those individuals requesting reports.293 Policymakers could argue that a three-year reporting duration accomplishes both of these goals.

Opponents of this proposal could raise the objection that someone under the age of twenty-one who engages in behaviors that result in negative credit history could engage in similar credit-risky behaviors in the future; however, the creditor, employer, or landlord reviewing the credit report would have no notice of this because the pre-twenty-one history has been purged from the report. This could create a reliability issue such that credit report evaluators would no longer trust that the report accurately reflects the credit history of the consumer. Such mistrust could lead to adverse credit decisions for young adults.

While this is a valid concern, it can be somewhat overcome by previously discussed research that shows that many cardholders, including young consumers, learn over time how to reduce their credit card mistakes.294 This learning results in a decrease in the frequency of behaviors that create certain adverse credit history such as making late payments and

293. The stated purpose of the FCRA is:
The purpose of the fair credit reporting bill is to prevent consumers from being unjustly damaged because of inaccurate or arbitrary information in a credit report. . . . Creditors obviously have a right to know if a person has had trouble in paying his bills. At the same time it can be unfair to burden a consumer for life with a bad credit record if he has improved his performance. The Associated Credit Bureaus has recognized this problem and had proposed voluntary guidelines to its members to the effect that adverse information not be reported if it is older than 7 years. S. REP. No. 91-517, at 4 (1969).
294. See supra notes 93, 223-25 and accompanying text.
exceeding one’s credit limit. Although the data did indicate some knowledge depreciation, the researchers concluded that “on net, knowledge accumulation dominates knowledge depreciation. Over time, fee payments drastically fell.” Therefore, despite the duration reduction, users of the reports could have some reassurance that they reflect a reliable credit history for consumers who may or may not have incurred negative credit card history during their college-aged years.

Opponents could also argue that because this proposal would absolve young cardholders of their credit card transgressions after only three years, it incentivizes bad financial behavior. This may be true in some cases; however, it is doubtful that it would be a widespread problem due to the negative consequences that one could still encounter during the three-year reporting period. Such consequences include denials of credit or employment and the imposition of unfavorable borrowing terms such as higher default interest rates. Also, engaging in excessive bad behavior could result in the cancellation of the card, which most consumers would presumably want to prevent from happening.

Considering that the FCRA already includes reporting differentiations for various adverse items, lawmakers should not oppose including another that affords greater protection for young consumers, especially in light of claims that the credit card industry seeks to exploit college-aged consumers’ lack of financial knowledge and experience. By imposing a three-year reporting duration for young consumers’ adverse card information, lawmakers could strike the necessary balance between college-aged consumers experiencing consequences for their poor financial choices and receiving a fresh start with which to have access to beneficial economic and employment opportunities. Considering the likelihood that the current Credit CARD Act may prove ineffective in significantly remediating the dilemma of young consumer indebtedness, lawmakers should earnestly consider this and other measures that seek to lessen the long-term consequences caused by young consumers’ credit card usage.

VI. Conclusion

As this Article has demonstrated, the accumulation of credit card debt continues to have significant consequences for many college-aged consumers. To provide some protection for this group of consumers, Congress passed the Credit CARD Act. While lawmakers should be applauded for

295. See Agarwal et al., Learning, supra note 223, at 6.
296. Id. at 17.
299. See supra Part IV.
taking a step in the right direction toward young consumer protection, more should be done to provide greater protection for college-aged consumers both before they receive a credit card and after they begin using it. Such comprehensive measures will help to more effectively preserve their personal and financial futures.