Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule, 1966-79 by Oyeleye Oyediran

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Narayan had been exposed to that curious combination of Marxist and American Populist ideologies that was then a prevalent intellectual fad, and it was the basic contradictions between these two ideological traditions that strongly influenced Narayan in the 1930s and thereafter—in particular his perceptions of the Indian communist movement. For some time he sought to combine a Marxist class analysis approach with the highly individualistic populist values, but eventually this proved impossible. Gradually, the populist strand prevailed; Narayan first rejected the Soviet model of a Marxist society and then finally Marxism itself. It was at this point that he became a real radical through his espousal of a modified Gandhian philosophy that accepted a Gandhian-type mass mobilization strategy but for the attainment of goals that are difficult to define as Gandhian.

Volumes 1 and 2 are largely devoted to his process of disillusionment with the Soviet Union and, eventually, the Indian communists. There is not much new here, for this was a phenomenon common to socialists elsewhere, although Narayan may have learned faster and better than some of his European and American counterparts. Volume 3 includes several incisive criticisms of the Western-style democratic system established in India by Nehru and his Congress party, but is notably weak in defining the structure, form and operating principles of the indigenous democratic system that Narayan advocated.

This inability to project his own political concepts in practical terms, long recognized as Narayan’s basic weakness as both a political philosopher and leader, is very evident in volume 4 which includes several publications that seek to define what he means by “total revolution.” The results are rather confusing, but it is clear that Narayan’s “total revolution” was much more dependent upon fundamental changes in human nature than in economic, political and social structures. The latter is expected to follow from the former rather than vice versa, another instance perhaps in which his populist values triumphed over competing revolutionary ideologies.

Narayan eventually became a charismatic political figure who transcended the normal political process in India, and it is doubtful that his specific contributions to Indian political philosophy will long endure. But it is also the case that he strongly and eloquently reflected important strands in Indian society, including some intellectual and political forces that are dedicated to the introduction of real processes of change. A total revolution is not likely to be the result even if his followers should somehow emerge triumphant—an unlikely prospect. But this does not diminish Narayan’s status as a critic of other revolutionary ideologies and as a spokesman for political and social values and concepts that are intrinsic to contemporary India.

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Nigeria has been a favorite subject for students of African politics. In recent years much of the research and many of the publications on Nigeria have been undertaken by Nigerian political scientists. Many of the publications are by American and British presses, but Nigerian companies, such as the well-known Ethiope and the newer, but very active Fourth Dimension Publishers, have been playing increasingly important roles. Among the latest publications of Nigerian political scientists are volumes edited by A. Akinyemi (Nigeria and the World, Oxford, 1978) and the collection edited by Oyelele Oyediran reviewed here.

Fourteen essays are presented in an attempt to examine the impact of 13 years of military rule on the Nigerian political system. The reader is to “see the effect of military rule on the processes and institutions of certain aspects of government and politics” (p. ix). As the editor notes, this is an important topic for consideration, and one that has not been well analyzed in other publications. Unfortunately, although there are some excellent articles in this volume (for example, A. B. Akinyemi, “Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy”), most of the essays fail to describe and, more importantly, fail to analyze the effects of military rule. There are two difficulties. First, several of the papers deal with conditions prior to or after the end of military rule and with the causes of the civil war. Second, those articles which are actually concerned with the period of military rule often fail to show any relationship between the events, occurrences, or phenomena they describe and the presence of military rule. Akin Iwayemi, “The Military and the Economy,” claims that “the military contributed significantly to the development of the Nigerian economy during its regime” (p. 63), but all he really shows is a coincidence. The military was in power and the changes occurred in the Nigerian economy. Did the army cause these changes? Probably not, and many Nigerians believe that the changes took place in spite of the army. One might argue that the growth of petroleum exploitation was the more significant factor in economic change.
This is indicative of a major aspect of several of these essays; they are descriptive, not analytic. In some instances, the authors are really expressing their opinions, not reporting research results. The effect of this is that we have several descriptive, even anecdotal, essays, and only a few that actually analyze. In part, this characteristic is not surprising, for several of the authors are not social scientists of any stripe. Seven political scientists, an economist, journalists, civil servants, and businessmen are included. But in part, this weakness is due to a lack of editorial control.

The two essays on foreign affairs, one by Akinyemi mentioned above and one by Ray Ofogebu ("Foreign Policy and Military Rule") should be noted. Both provide important insights into the making of Nigerian foreign policy and, on at least one point, they disagree on an important statement of fact. Ofogebu's essay is descriptive, but he appears to have had access to information not well known to scholars on Nigerian policy, particularly on Nigerian relations with the USSR. Akinyemi presents a good analysis of the role of the military in Nigerian foreign policy, and the effects of that role. He gives us the best available analysis of U.S.-Nigerian relations and stresses the significance to Nigeria, and to Africa, of Nigeria's conflict with the U.S. over the recognition of the MPLA government in Angola. He notes that Nigeria "launched a diplomatic blitzkrieg" (p. 155) in Africa to gain support for its Angola policy. Ofogebu claims that "regrettably, Nigeria did not launch any diplomatic offensive" (p. 136) in Africa to gain support for its policy.

This volume fails to serve the purposes set forth by the editor; we still do not have an analysis of the effects of the military rule on Nigerian politics. Of course, it is not necessary that a collection of essays meet the purposes of its editor to be a contribution to knowledge. Several of these articles are valuable because they express the opinions and views of influential Nigerian citizens. See, for example, the essay by Lateef Jakande, a well-known journalist, on the role of the press. And, some of the essays are valuable because they do analyze the effects of military rule.

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This is the second in a series of Australian election studies produced under American Enterprise Institute auspices. As in the earlier volume, the contributors, mostly academics, are among the best available for the job. There is a balance among essays dealing with parties as such, with special aspects of the campaign such as the role of the news media, and with the wider political setting. It seems useful to reconstruct the book according to its presentation of the 1977 election per se, of linkage to the Australian political process, and of cross-national applications.

The December 1977 election was held a year before Parliament was scheduled to run its full, three-year term. Liberal Prime Minister Fraser's call for an early election, unusual by Australian standards, was inspired by his wish to avoid potentially less favorable political circumstances later in 1978. Economic conditions were likely to worsen. The Labor party leadership would likely pass to someone more electorally viable than former Prime Minister Whitlam, whose previous government's economic and other shortcomings were still clearly recalled. As the contributors show, the return of the Liberal-National Country party government by another handsome margin therefore did not defy the rules of the electoral pendulum, which presuppose that a government with a lavish majority will lose ground, especially since economic frailty at the end of 1977 could successfully be defined as Labor's legacy. Moreover, in the course of an election that lacked sharp polarization or turgid rhetoric, substantial electoral movement was not to be anticipated. In his introductory essay, David Butler reflects that "there must be some wistfulness about living in a lucky country so contented that there are no great issues, no public challenges and no outstanding leaders to stir the imagination of the bulk of voters" (p. 18).

The 1977 election did have a special quality, but its effect on the representational outcome was negligible. A new and untested party, the Australian Democrats, gained nearly 10 percent of the popular, House of Representatives vote. Their appeal, which drew almost equally from the two major party groups, may have signaled something other than diffused public dissatisfaction with conventional alternatives. The Democrats emphasized their freedom from traditional group-party ties such as trade union links with Labor, business links with the Liberals, and rural interest connections with the NCP. They also stressed life-quality and environmental issues. Their performance,