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trality of the United States to the fate of postwar and then post-treaty Japan. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations in Washington spoke repeatedly of ensuring that Japan remained on the American side in the Cold War in northeast Asia. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur reported regularly from the embassy in Tokyo that the need for the still weak Japan of the 1950s to trade with the United States would tie the two nations together. Given that Japan had lost its prewar China market and that other nations, led by Britain, were decidedly wary of attempts to encourage any major revival of the Japanese economy and worked to exclude Tokyo from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), it was readily apparent that such economic realities ought to have carried the day.

Yet the highly disruptive security crisis of 1960 damages this comforting thesis. Despite the thorough discussion by Forsberg of the U.S.-Japan trade friction experienced in the 1950s, the economic connection proved to be of little comfort to American policy makers when angry Japanese demonstrators took to the streets to protest the very existence both of the alliance and of the conservative government of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi that had loyally supported it. Japanese domestic opinion was far from convinced that, to employ Forsberg's subtitle, “the Cold War context of Japan's postwar economic revival” was the way forward. Since the mass student demonstrations in Tokyo were aimed at countering precisely what Forsberg charts in the 1950s, it is difficult not to feel that more attention might have been placed on the 1960 crisis. We get a vivid sense of how U.S. trade negotiators and security analysts saw post-treaty Japan but tend to hear less of how divided Japanese society itself was during these years. The assumed economic imperatives do not appear to have been quite so obvious, precisely because the opposition in Japan sensed that trade, finance, and technology from the United States served to bind Tokyo ever closer to the American imperium. The fact that there would be substantial shifts in American dealings with Japan after 1960 suggests that “lessons” were quickly accepted by Washington and that the best way to preserve the alliance was to downplay the Cold War factor.

This book is an ambitious attempt to place postwar economic history within the wider realm of international relations. It is a pioneering study of patient administrations, angry Congressmen, and pleading Japanese bureaucrats. It also includes wry commentary on the dismissive U.S. view of Japan's economic prospects and reports on the bizarre moment when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles followed up his complaints on the shoddy quality of a “brightly patterned flannel shirt of cheap material made in Japan” by demonstrating to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida that it had been copied from its superior American counterpart. Despite slight reservations over his handling of the big picture, Forsberg's account of the difficulties and successes of U.S. dealings with Japan on the economic front in the 1950s remains a substantial achievement.

ROGER BUCKLEY
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The involvement of the United States in the affairs of Greece in the late 1940s has attracted scholarly attention for decades. A small, underdeveloped European country, Greece found itself on the geographical and ideological frontline of the Cold War. Its staggering political and economic problems, stemming from World War II and the civil war that ensued, became bound up with American global foreign policy. From the early 1950s, when Leften S. Stavrionas wrote of Greece as America's “dilemma and opportunity,” the historiography of this unequal yet close relationship has grown significantly. After the United States's Vietnam experience and Greece's difficult years under military rule in the late 1960s, accounts critical of American intervention in Greece appeared. In her introduction to the literature, Judith S. Jeffery briefly discusses a couple of the revisionist works, those by Lawrence S. Wittner and Yannis R. Roubatis.

In her own book, Jeffery accepts as given that the diplomatic culture of the Cold War significantly affected U.S.-Greek relations and that there were negative consequences of U.S. intervention for Greek national sovereignty. Her attention, she notes, is more narrowly focused on the aid program created by the Truman administration and then continued under the Marshall Plan managed by U.S. officials. In this context, the work takes up the civil war and Greek domestic politics that were critical to the course and outcome of the aid program.

The first two chapters of the book set the stage for the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine. Then the author offers a sampling of opinion in the American press regarding aid to Greece before and after President Harry S. Truman's speech to Congress. There follow three chapters on the aid program, including both its economic and military components. The account continues with a short chapter on the defeat of the leftist forces that adds little to existing knowledge on the issue. Two chapters take the reader from 1949 to 1952, covering several related topics, including the outlook and actions of American administrators of the aid program, Greek domestic politics, the Greek military in politics, the scaling back of economic aid, and Greece's admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The narrative is topped off with both a conclusion and an epilogue. The latter is an unilluminating sketch of the coming of military rule in Greece in 1967 that would have been better left out.
number of appendixes reproduce documents, including Truman’s message to the U.S. Congress.

The work is based largely on official publications of the U.S. government, including the “Foreign Relations of the United States” series. In addition, Jeffery conducted interviews in Greece in the late 1980s and utilized manuscript collections found in the Truman Library. But there are no sources in Greek, certainly a drawback when it comes to discussing and analyzing the crucial events that transpired in Greece.

A main argument of the book is that the Truman Doctrine committed the United States unambiguously to help Greece with economic and military aid in order to bring the civil war that was tearing the country apart to a “speedy end” and to rehabilitate the country economically. But, in the author’s view, the United States contradicted its own policy of unwavering commitment to aid Greece by placing conditions, such as the demand for political reform, on the Greek government in return for the proffered aid. This critique is repeated in several of the chapters. This argument is not tenable, however, because the United States implemented its bold new policy of containment in as specific a manner as might be reasonably expected. In Greece, the purpose of the aid was to help the Greek government defeat the insurgents. The amount of aid to be given was up to the United States government, which reserved the right to terminate that commitment whenever it saw fit. There was no contradiction in the American policy. The United States sought to include political reform in order to encourage the Greek state to become more efficient and therefore better able to deal with the communist threat.

When it comes to the leftist insurgency, Jeffery argues that the outcome of the civil war was not so much a victory for U.S. policy but rather a defeat for the guerrillas in the Democratic Army. Thus the Truman Doctrine was not a resounding success, as touted by the administration in Washington, but a failure. It is true that the communists were not defeated merely because of American involvement. Other factors, including the leadership and tactics of the Greek Communist Party (KKE), the withdrawal of Yugoslav support for the left, the efforts of the Greek government, and public attitudes, played a role. Nevertheless, the termination of the civil war was a victory for the United States, vindicating its policy in Greece while marking a defeat for the communists who in the end failed to achieve their goals.

Finally, the author asserts that U.S. policy failed in its intent to help rehabilitate Greece economically because aid was cut back beginning in 1950, just as the war-ravaged country was starting to get back on its feet after a decade of conflict. Direct economic aid was reduced because the primary goal of the Truman Doctrine was achieved. Greece’s inclusion in the Marshall Plan, however, brought continued economic assistance. That more might have been done was noted at the time. But this does not mean that the promises expressed in U.S. policy were inappropriate to the actual efforts. In sum, our knowledge and understanding of the subject is not greatly advanced by this work.

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This important, little book by John Subritzsky examines an international crisis in the mid-1960s known as Konfrontasi (Confrontation). Put simply, Confrontation was a campaign undertaken in Indonesia, inspired by President Sukarno, to prevent the incorporation of the former British-held territories of Sarawak and Borneo into the new Federation of Malaysia. The Indonesian dictator set out to crush this newly emerging state because he regarded it as part of a British imperialist plot to encircle his Southeast Asian archipelago nation, which occupied a strategic position between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. These territories, Sukarno claimed, were rightfully territories of Indonesia, and he refused to acknowledge the validity of the succession of legal procedures by the federating states (i.e. consultation and the United Nations-observed referendum of the inhabitants), at the end of which Sarawak and North Borneo (renamed Sabah) became states in the Federation.

Confrontation, which began in earnest in 1963, involved Indonesian measures such as terminating trade with Singapore, guerilla incursions into Sabah and Sarawak, parachute drops and commando raids across the Malacca Straits, and various breaks in diplomatic relations, plus the confiscation of British property. In response, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand combined efforts to resist Jakarta, with London in fact assembling a naval armada, as well as considerable sections of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air forces. Paradoxically, at no stage did the charismatic Sukarno seem eager to engage in a full-scale war.

During the period of Confrontation, Sukarno developed close relations with Beijing and Moscow, taking delivery of much military equipment, including planes and warships from the latter. He also received advisors from the Soviet bloc. Given the reigning psychological dynamic of the Cold War, these events caused much alarm in Washington, leading the United States, through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to intrigue with Indonesian generals to procure the overthrow of Sukarno and his policies. Sukarno’s power finally came to an end when the Communist Party he had nurtured was linked to a failed coup attempt in 1965. His successor, General Suharto, and the army quietly ended Confrontation while going about the business of ejecting Soviet and Chinese influence as well as physically annihilating the powerful Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

Within this context, then, Subritzky’s book attempts,