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he provides little concrete evidence on this score. Nor does he convincingly document the important role of the small landowners and sharecroppers, who, he claims, swung decisively to fascism in order to protect their wartime gains. In addition, Cardoza argues that Bolognese fascism supplied the model that eventually enabled fascism to become a mass national movement (p. 304). Subsequently, however, he refers to Ferrarese or Parmese fascism as actually having provided central fascist strategies and lessons—admissions that seriously weaken his claim for the primacy of fascism in Bologna.

Such criticisms aside, Agrarian Elites and Italian Fascism is a fine book that takes us a step further toward understanding fascism less as a parenthesis in Italian life than as a logical outgrowth of the liberal state and as a movement with an important impact on Italian economic development and social reorganization. In the changing structure of Bologna's agrarian elite we see part of the process by which the Italian bourgeoisie recast itself not only to resist the challenge of the left but also to redistribute power within its own ranks.

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Until fairly recently scholarly work on Greece has tended to concentrate on three critical eras in that country's history: the formative period during the first quarter of the nineteenth century when an independent state was created; the years just before and during the Great War when domestic and international events shook the country to its foundation and its legitimizing national vision, the Great Idea, was shattered on the shores of Asia Minor in 1922; and the brutal and brutalizing experience of war, occupation, and civil war in the decade after 1940. Coming as it does between two fundamental periods in Greek history, the interwar period has in many cases been treated as an undistinguished interlude fraught with political factionalism and military coups. Often even serious attempts at dealing with this historical moment have been marred by misinformation, politically motivated myths, and even the acceptance of crude national stereotypes.

Works of quality, treating various facets of this historical experience including the role of the military and cultural life have now begun to appear. George Th. Mavroghordatos's book certainly belongs in this category. The author, a political scientist, has chosen, as the subtitle of the work suggests, to concentrate on the interrelationship of social groups and politics at the time. He does this, it must be noted, at the risk of minimizing or eliminating other pertinent factors such as foreign affairs and the role of the military.

The theoretical framework of the study is based on three factors that have affected political life in many countries: the function and impact of a great leader; the establishment and operation of political ties between individuals based on personal or kinship relations; and the influence of social groups as they pursue specific interests. The three factors are neatly and clinically summed up in the terms charisma, clientelism, and cleavage. These three words, however, cap off an entire sociopolitical milieu and therein lies a problem. For an analysis of this sort, the existence of an in-depth social history of the period is a must. This task, however, still remains to be done. Aware of the problem, the author has tried to compensate for this lacuna through the use of three major sources of information. In addition to secondary works of varying quality, he has put to good use the mass of papers in the Venizelos archive at the Benaki Museum, which provide revealing insights into the political battles fought at the time. For statistical data the author has drawn on the published results of several interwar elections and the census taken in 1928, which comes about halfway through the period but before the difficult years of the world depression.

After a sketch of the parties and the elections they participated in during the interwar period, Mavroghordatos concentrates on identifying and analyzing social groups of real or potential political significance according to categories based on class, ethnicity, religion, and geographic region. That there are correlations between these groups is to be expected and they are drawn out. That there were scaled priorities and even contradictory imperatives for individuals in these groups that could result in contravening attitudes is also to be expected. And it is these qualitatively variable factors that must be kept in mind when looking at the neatly defined categories the author has derived through quantitative analysis.

To establish a temporal framework for his socio-political analysis the author actually transcends the dates given in the title. The human dilemmas that Greece faced after 1922 began to emerge a decade before at the time of the Balkan wars. The critical forces that were at the heart of the overriding political dyad of Venizelism and Antivenizelism during the interwar period crystallized into the "National Schism" with the Great War. Going back in time was just as important for the author's analysis of the country's class structure, however. Crucial to that analysis is to establish whether or not those elements that backed Venizelos and presumably demanded change after the 1909 military coup
were truly bourgeois. Mavrogordatos believes they were, and he presents a careful argument in support of this thesis. But that thesis has yet to be empirically substantiated. Nevertheless, the appearance of Venizelos did bring to the national political scene a dynamic figure willing to appeal to various social groups in new ways. The governmental crisis that ensued in 1915 between monarch and prime minister reflected not only a clash of personalities and ideology but also the potential dimensions of social group conflict in the country.

The trauma of the “National Schism” and the disaster in Asia Minor insured that mass politics after 1922 not only inherited that legacy but was crippled by it as well. As for the political personalities, Constantine’s death, following quickly on these events, mercifully removed an ineffectual national leader but left the issue of the monarchy to be resolved. Creating the republic did not bury the issue but at least it provided the other major political figure, Venizelos, with an opportunity. Although undoubtedly a charismatic individual, he literally had seen his politically validating mission, the realization of the Great Idea, torn from his grasp. Nevertheless, what had been a territorially expansionist vision of irredentism now involuntarily became the ingathering of a national diaspora. In this manner Venizelos confronted both an opportunity and a dilemma.

From among the newly arrived refugees and the recently incorporated people in the new lands political support was forthcoming. On their part the Venizelist liberals could and did try to offer a program for building a modern and progressive state. But that also meant a nationally integrated one, on which Venizelos insisted. In a society now badly divided along several lines this seemed to many an unacceptable imposition. Against such opposition, Venizelos, through both political miscalculation and an inadequate personal aura, failed to sustain the now truncated national vision.

The picture of interwar political life that emerges from Mavrogordatos’s account is a stark one. One political camp, the Antivenizelist, fought tooth and nail to defend their particular interests but was incapable or unwilling to promote a broad, national program. For their part the Venizelists were intent on negating not only their opponents but those politically dissatisfied elements within their own camp. The result was stalemate and an appalling factional bitterness.

While discussing these major political developments in interwar Greece, the author has concentrated on more precisely defining the various social blocs in existence at the time. Having done this, he has tried to indicate each bloc’s potential support for mass parties. In turn he has examined the obverse of that political coin, namely, the impact of personal

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