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Epithets as Antilogophoric Pronouns

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It has been suggested that anaphoric epithets (e.g., *the idiot, the bastard*) cannot be bound and that they are therefore a species of R-expression (Lasnik 1976, 1989; cf. Postal 1972). At the same time, it has been observed that epithets may not be locally bound, even in languages in which Condition C is inoperative (Lasnik 1989). The latter fact suggests that epithets might be pronouns and subject to Condition B, after all. In this squib we will show that the putative prohibition against structural binding of epithets is inaccurate and that epithets may in fact be bound under the right discourse conditions. We will argue that epithets are pronouns subject to Condition B and that their anomalous distribution is due to the fact that they must be antilogophors. That is, an epithet must not be anteceded by an individual from whose perspective the attributive content of the epithet is evaluated.

1 Background

Jackendoff (1969, 1972) first suggested that anaphoric epithets are a variety of pronoun, and pointed to the following examples as evidence that an epithet may be coreferential with a nonlocal NP within the same sentence (1972:110):

(1) I wanted Charlie to help me, but the bastard wouldn’t do it.
(2) Irving was besieged by a horde of bills and the poor guy couldn’t pay them.
(3) Although the bum tried to hit me, I can’t really get too mad at Harry.

Jackendoff claimed that “[t]hese ‘pronominal epithets’ can occur in some subset of the environments in which pronominalization is possible, and they function semantically more or less as specialized pronouns” (1972:110).

Though Jackendoff did not state what this subset of pronominal environments is, Postal (1972:247) claimed (incorrectly, we will argue below) that the crucial factor was the absence of a ‘command rela-
tion’ between an epithet and its antecedent. As evidence for this, Postal contrasted the above examples with (4), in which the antecedent commands the epithet (hence structurally binds it) and ungrammaticality results.

(4) *Melvin claims that the bastard was honest.

Lasnik (1976) presented similar examples of ungrammatical bound epithets, as in (5)–(6) (1976:11, also 1989:152).

(5) *John,/*He,/*The sissy, realizes that the sissy, is going to lose.

(6) *John, thinks that I admire the idiot,.

On the basis of such facts, Lasnik argued that epithets are not pronouns at all but are, in current terms, R-expressions. That is, epithets pattern with R-expressions in that intrasentential coreference between an R-expression and some other NP is ungrammatical only when the latter NP commands (binds) the R-expression. The behavior of standard R-expressions in this regard is seen in the contrast between (7) and (8) (1976:4, 5).

(7) a. That Oscar is unpopular was finally realized by Oscar.

b. That John is well liked proves that we ought to hire John as public relations director.

c. That Harry won the race really surprised Harry.

(8) a. Oscar finally realized that he/*Oscar is unpopular.

b. It surprised John that he/*John is so well liked.

c. Harry was really surprised that he/*Harry lost the race.

The sentences in (7) are grammatical because the R-expressions are not bound, whereas in (8) the same R-expressions are bound and hence ungrammatical, in contrast to the pronouns. This all follows, of course, from Condition C of binding theory. According to Lasnik (1976), then, the ungrammaticality of the epithets in (4)–(6) parallels the ungrammaticality of the R-expressions in (8), suggesting that epithets, like names, are R-expressions (hence subject to Condition C).

While maintaining that data such as (4)–(6) demonstrate the status of epithets as R-expressions, Lasnik (1989) took the position that epithets are pronominal as well. That is, epithets are pronominal R-expressions, subject to both Conditions B and C. Lasnik found support for this position in Thai, a language that lacks pure Condition C effects (9), though it observes Condition B (10) (1989:153, 155).

\[
\begin{align*}
(9) & \text{ Cənn chাংp Cənn.} \\
& \text{John, likes John,} \\
(10) & \text{ Cənn chাংp khāw.} \\
& \text{John, likes him,}
\end{align*}
\]

Interestingly, Thai epithets pattern with pronouns instead of R-expressions.
Lasnik argued that (11) follows if epithets are subject not only to Condition C (suspended in Thai) but also to Condition B. Thus, in Thai, Condition B effects for epithets can be isolated, whereas in languages in which Condition C obtains, Conditions B and C redundantly conspire to make the analogue of (11) ungrammatical. Lasnik (1989) provided further evidence that epithets are pronominals (which we will not review here).

2 Antilogophoric Pronouns

In this section we will show that Jackendoff’s (1969, 1972) proposal that epithets are pronominal is essentially correct. However, we will challenge the corollary claim developed in Lasnik 1976 and 1989 that epithets are also R-expressions. As noted above, Lasnik based this claim on the supposition that epithets, like R-expressions in general, may not be structurally bound (i.e., by a c-commanding antecedent). However, the putative prohibition against binding of epithets does not hold up under closer scrutiny.

Consider the examples in (12) and (13). In each case the antecedent binds the epithet, yet the sentence is grammatical.

(12) John, ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idiot directions.
(13) Through an accumulation of slipups, John (inadvertently) led his students to conclude that the idiot couldn’t teach.

On the basis of these facts, we claim that (4)–(6) are ungrammatical not because of Condition C effects but because the nonlocal antecedent in each case is the perspective-bearer (i.e., the one from whose perspective the attributive content of the epithet is evaluated). Examples (12) and (13) are grammatical precisely because the antecedent of the epithet is not the perspective-bearer. Put differently, epithets are antilogophoric.1

That antilogophoricity, rather than Condition C, determines the distribution of epithets can be seen more clearly in (14)–(17). In (14)–(15) the antecedent does not bind the epithet, whereas in (16)–(17) it does. In each case the epithet is ruled out only in the (a) example, where the antecedent is the perspective-bearer.2

1 Logophoric construal of a pronoun or anaphor is often characterized in terms of antecedence by an individual from whose perspective the proposition containing the pronoun/anaphor is evaluated (see, e.g., Reinhart and Reuland 1991, Sells 1987a).
2 Note that each starred sentence, for which the most natural interpretation has the antecedent as perspective-bearer, can be considered grammatical only to the extent that one can abstract the locus of perspective away from this antecedent and onto the discourse speaker (i.e., so that the epithetic evaluation is the discourse speaker’s, not John’s).
(14) a. *It was said by John, that the idiot, lost a thousand dollars on the slots.
   b. It was said of John, that the idiot, lost a thousand dollars on the slots.

(15) a. *According to John, the idiot, is married to a genius.
   b. Speaking of John, the idiot, is married to a genius.

(16) a. *John, told us of a man (who was) trying to give the idiot, directions.
   b. John, ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idiot, directions.

(17) a. *Despite an accumulation of slipups, John, asked his students to conclude that the idiot, could teach.
   b. Through an accumulation of slipups, John, (inadvertently) led his students to conclude that the idiot, couldn’t teach.

Without data such as (12)–(17) it would be easy to conclude (mistakenly) that epithets must not be bound. This is because standard examples of bound epithets in the literature usually involve psych-verbs and verbs of saying whose subjects typically have perspective over the sentential complement. However, as the above data show, epithets are not subject to Condition C, and they may be bound by nonlocal antecedents so long as antilogophoricity is respected. This stands in marked contrast to R-expressions.

(18) *John, ran over a man who was trying to give the president, directions.

(19) *Through an accumulation of slipups, the teacher, inadvertently led his students to conclude that John, couldn’t teach.

We note, however, that epithets can never be locally bound. Observe (20) and (21).

(20) *John, shaved the idiot,.
(21) *John, embarrassed the idiot,.

From these facts (along with Lasnik’s Thai data), we can conclude that epithets are pronouns subject to Condition B.3

3 One might object that examples such as the following show that epithets may violate Condition B as well as the antilogophoricity restriction outlined in the text:

(i) John realized that he was the real idiot.

However, we take (i) to be an example of what is often termed “accidental coreference,” in which case “two NP tokens have distinct indices that are anchored to the same referent (or, equivalently, pick out the same individual)” (Pollard and Sag 1994:74). This is one instance in which it is critical to distinguish between coindexation and coreference (see discussion in Pollard and Sag...
To conclude this section: We have shown that epithets are true pronouns, subject to Condition B but not to Condition C. They may indeed be bound, and they have the same distribution as pronouns when antilogophoricity is observed. The antilogophoricity restriction on epithets may be characterized as follows:

(22) Antilogophoricity constraint for epithets

An epithet must not be anteceded by an individual from whose perspective the attributive content of the epithet is evaluated.

3 Further Differences between Epithets and R-Expressions

In section 2 we showed that bound epithets have a narrower distribution than bound pronouns and that this can be accounted for by the antilogophoricity restriction on epithet antecedence. In this section we will explore further the differences between epithets and R-expressions. R-expressions are also subject to an antilogophoricity constraint (Sells 1987b); however, it is stronger than the one that applies to epithets, such that the distribution of R-expressions is more constrained than that of epithets. Consider first the following paradigm from Sells 1987b:

(23) a. *He, has heard from us that Walter, will never be allowed to enter the Lodge.
   b. He, has heard from us that under no circumstances will Walter, be allowed to enter the Lodge.

(24) a. *We told him, that Walter, would never be elected.
   b. We did our best to tell him, that Walter, would never be re-elected.

In each case the pronoun he/him binds the R-expression Walter, and yet the expected Condition C violation is suppressed in the (b) cases. Sells argued that these data may be accounted for if Condition C is subsumed under the broader antilogophoricity principle stated in (25).

(25) Sells’s antilogophoricity principle (1987b:14)

Any reference to an individual bearing a discourse role must be syntactically expressed by a pronominal [i.e., R-expressions cannot bear discourse roles].

1994). Accidental coreference is presumably involved in (ii)–(iii) as well (we wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for example (ii)).

(ii) I am the real idiot.
(iii) I am he.

4 We wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing Sells 1987b to our attention. Note that Sells himself draws substantially from Bolinger 1979 for his data.
The discourse roles referenced by (25) are SOURCE, SELF, and PIVOT. SOURCE is defined as “one who is the intentional agent of the communication”; SELF is “one whose mental state or attitude the content of the proposition represents”; and PIVOT is “one with respect to whose (space-time) location the content of the proposition is evaluated” (1987b:7).5

Applying (25) to the data in (23) and (24), we note that the (a) sentences are ungrammatical because in each case Walter potentially bears a discourse role but is an R-expression rather than a pronoun. In (23a) and (24a) Walter can bear the SELF role, since the recipient of a communication may adopt the same mental state or attitude toward the content of that communication as held by the agent of the communication (Hamilton 1997). That is, once a message has been communicated, the agent and recipient of the communication may be said to (potentially) share awareness of the message communicated. In (23a) and (24a) this results in a violation of (25). In (23b) and (24b), however, the phrases under no circumstances and did our best cause the SELF role to be restricted to the agent (not recipient) of the communication. In (23b) under no circumstances causes the complement clause to be treated as a quotation, emphasizing that this complement clause represents the viewpoint of us (and not of Walter). Similarly, the phrase did our best in (24b) emphasizes the role of the agent (we) in the communication process, making it unclear to what extent Walter has received the communication and adopted the same mental state/attitude as the agent. (23b) and (24b) are both grammatical because the SELF role is restricted in each case to the agent of communication (us/we) instead of Walter, and principle (25) is respected.

Sells’s principle (25) accounts for grammatical sentences that would be incorrectly ruled out by Condition C, as well as for certain ungrammatical examples that Condition C fails to rule out. In (26) and (27), because him/he do not bind the R-expression John, coreference cannot be subject to Condition C. (26a) and (27a) are nonetheless ungrammatical.

(26) a. ??I answered him, as soon as John, [PIVOT] spoke.
   b. I recognized him, as soon as John, [¬PIVOT] spoke.
(27) a. A: Why did he, refuse the offer?
   B: ??Because John, [PIVOT] didn’t need the money.
   b. A: Why did you refuse him, the offer?
   B: Because John, [¬PIVOT] didn’t need the money.

In (26a) John is a nonpronominal that can bear the PIVOT role. It thereby violates (25). In contrast, “John cannot be PIVOT in [26b] as one cannot recognize someone whose point of view one is already taking” (Sells 1987b:19). Principle (25) is respected in (26b) because John can bear

5 Our account crucially relies on the contrast between the discourse roles SELF and PIVOT. Insofar as SOURCE is not by itself essential to the points made here, we ignore its possible significance with respect to antilogophoricity.
no discourse roles. The same argument can be made to explain the contrast in (27). We can conclude from this that R-expressions, being nonpronominal, are subject to the antilogophoricity restriction stated in (25).6

However, we will show that Sells’s constraint on nonpronominal R-expressions is more restrictive than the antilogophoricity constraint for epithets in (22). Whereas nonpronominals cannot bear any discourse role, we will find that epithets can bear PIVOT, but not SELF. We therefore expect epithets to have a wider distribution than R-expressions, via-à-vis antilogophoricity. Consider (28) and (29), in which epithets replace the R-expressions in (26) and (27).

(28) a. I answered him, as soon as the idiot PIVOT spoke.
   b. I recognized him, as soon as the idiot [Pivot] spoke.

(29) a. A: Why did he, refuse the offer?
   B: Because the idiot [PIVOT] didn’t need the money?
   b. A: Why did you refuse him, the offer?
   B: Because the idiot [−PIVOT] didn’t need the money?

In (28) and (29) there is no discernible contrast in grammaticality between the (a) and (b) examples, even though the idiot can bear the PIVOT role in (28a) and (29a). If (25) is correct, then the grammaticality of (28a) and (29a) indicates that the epithets involved are indeed pronouns. That is, if (26a) and (27a) are ungrammatical because R-expressions are nonpronominal and cannot bear the PIVOT role (as (25) claims), then the grammaticality of (28a) and (29a) is evidence that epithets are pronounal because they can bear the PIVOT role.

If (as argued above) the antilogophoricity constraint on epithets (22) references the discourse role SELF, but not PIVOT, then we predict that the distribution of epithets and R-expressions will overlap, whenever the SELF role is involved. Compare the epithets in (30) and (31) with the R-expressions in (23) and (24).

(30) a. *He, has heard from us that the idiot SELF will never be allowed to enter the Lodge.
   b. He, has heard from us that under no circumstances will the idiot [−SELF] be allowed to enter the Lodge.

(31) a. *We told him, that the idiot SELF would never be elected.
   b. We did our best to tell him, that the idiot [−SELF] would never be re-elected.

In (30a) and (31a) the epithet the idiot potentially bears the SELF role, and the sentences are as unacceptable as (23a) and (24a), which have R-expressions instead. (30b) and (31b) are grammatical (just as (23b)

6 Sells (1987b) does not take a firm position on whether Condition C is entirely subsumed by the antilogophoricity principle in (25) or merely overridden in certain cases by this principle. We rather doubt that (25) can account for all traditional Condition C violations, but we will not address this question further here.
and (24b) are) because the additional phrases under no circumstances and did our best, respectively, serve to draw the self role off the idiot and onto the agent of communication (i.e., us/we). We conclude from the data in this section that (a) epithets are pronouns, since they may bear internal pivot without violating (25), and (b) although the antilogophoric restriction on epithets is not sensitive to pivot, it is sensitive to self (inasmuch as the “mental state or attitude” characterized by self may include the evaluation of epithetic content).

4 Conclusion

It appears, then, that Jackendoff’s (1969, 1972) original claim that anaphoric epithets are pure pronouns is closer to the mark than various positions entertained since. In particular, the claim that epithets are R-expressions (Lasnik 1976) or pronominal R-expressions (Lasnik 1989) does not hold up under scrutiny. Epithets are subject neither to condition C nor to Sells’s antilogophoricity restriction on R-expressions (25). Epithets may be bound by c-commanding antecedents (in violation of condition C) and exhibit a less restrictive antilogophoricity constraint than do R-expressions (and hence have a wider distribution). These facts, combined with other data indicating epithets’ pronominal status, suggest that epithets are pronouns subject to the constraint stated in (22), where “an individual from whose perspective the attributive content of the epithet is evaluated” might be equivalent to the discourse role self.

References


Jackendoff did not recognize the antilogophoricity of epithets shown here.
Since Pollock 1989 and Abney 1987, many studies have been undertaken to determine what functional categories are projected within a clausal or a nominal structure. With respect to nominal expressions, it has been argued and widely accepted that a nominal expression should be represented as a Determiner Phrase (DP) headed by a Determiner (D). This is especially true when the nominal expression is an argument, in contrast to a nominal predicate, which is generally represented by a Noun Phrase (NP) (see Stowell 1989 for some complications with respect to nominal predicates). A D heading a DP, in English for example, can be the definite article the. Questions arise about whether an argument nominal is always expressed by a DP even in languages without clear counterparts of English-type articles, such as Chinese. Indeed, more general questions are whether the categorial projection DP exists at all in languages such as Chinese, and, if the projection exists, what evidence supports its existence. Another equally important question is whether there are intermediate projections between DP and NP. This question can be made clearer if we compare nominal structure with clausal structure. If we equate DP with CP (both functioning as arguments) and NP with VP (both functioning as predicates), what is the nominal structure that might be equivalent to IP at the clausal level? An IP can occur without a dominating CP (as in exceptional-Case-marking or raising cases); can an

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