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Social Trust and Soft Power: The Role of Social Trust in Democratic Countries' Soft Power Use

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SOCIAL TRUST AND SOFT POWER: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL TRUST IN
DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES' SOFT POWER USE

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DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my husband István Batházi.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to thank everyone who has helped me throughout this process. Most importantly my family and my friends. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Robert H. Cox for guiding me through this long dissertation writing process. I also would like to thank Dr. Tobias Heinrich for his rigorous attention to details regarding the quantitative elements of the dissertation and Timothy Peterson for his help with all aspects of this dissertation. Dr. András Simonyi for not only showing me the concept of soft power at the beginning but also personally demonstrating the art of practicing soft power. I also would like to express gratitude for Dr. Csilla Farkas and Dr. Èva Czabarka for their continuous help, Roseann Fenley for her proof reading and other support and for Bill Sudduth from the library for his help finding U.S. budget information.

ABSTRACT

We have learned about democracies' peaceful behaviour but we know relatively little about why some democracies are more peaceful and use more soft power instruments than others. I argue that contrary to competing theories that link soft power use to budget size or institutions, it is the variation in the public's social trust that drives the variation in peaceful behaviour. Individual's social trust toward peaceful foreign policies are shaped by their core beliefs about trusting other people, which vary across democracies. I argue that leader's with more trusting populations will be more likely to use soft power instruments because they can generate more public support for peaceful actions effectively.

My mixed method approach first statistically evaluated social trust's role in the selection of soft power actions relative to hard power actions using regression analyses of fifty-one democratic countries over the time period of 1995-2010. My analysis revealed that even though social trust is positively correlated with soft power use, it was not a statistically significant indicator. The quantitative analysis pointed to the perception of geopolitical threat. Using a most similar case design of Finland and New Zealand, my qualitative analysis found that Finland uses high soft power due to the Russian geopolitical threat. Further my crucial case design of the U.S found that in addition to geopolitical threat, in the case of the U.S. the desire to be global leader is also a boosting factor in its soft power use. These findings indicate that scholars should pay more

attention to democracies' geopolitical differences to understand their foreign policies and more attention should be paid to understanding how and why country's construct their foreign policies.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAMEO	Conflict and Mediation Events Observation
COW	Correlates of War
G.D.E.L.T.	Global Data on Events Location and Tone
ICEWS	Integrated Crisis Early Warning Systems
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MID.....	Militarized Interstate Dispute
WB	World Bank
WEO	World Economic Outlook
WVS.....	World Value Survey

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

My exploratory analysis revealed that there is a large variation among democracies' reliance of peaceful instruments such as soft power tools. Some countries like Finland greatly favors soft power instruments over hard power tools as they use 92% soft power instruments in their overall foreign interactions, while Australia only uses 62% soft power instruments (Trunkos 2017). Despite the fact that relying on soft power has been widely noted in international relations, policy makers and academics alike are currently unsure about what factors stimulate countries' use of soft power tools. While not all soft power tools are peaceful, the nature and the objective of soft power interactions are generally considered cooperative (Nye 2011). A detailed investigation and analysis of soft power can significantly improve the peaceful use of foreign policy tools. In addition, there is an increasing criticism of relying on force and coercion which often leads to instability and hate as opposed to cooperation among nations (Johnson 2000, Yalcinkaya and Ozer 2016).

In the past, the concept and use of soft power was closely associated with the United States and its Cold War policies. But since the Cold War, many countries have been utilizing their soft power options which have not been quantified before in a large international scale. Using digital diplomacy and social media as a diplomatic tool (Sandre 2015) or relying on international social pressure by posting human trafficking

performance indicators of various countries (Kelley and Simmons 2013) are just a few of the new ways to achieve foreign policy goals. Other compelling examples of a government that uses soft power is the United States and their reliance on military soft power in the form of officer exchanges (Atkinson 2014) or the cleaning efforts of the U.S. Navy battleships after oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico (Elleman and Pain 2015).

Peace and cooperation is favored over war in most societies and yet there is not enough information about why some democracies use more peaceful instruments such as soft power tools than other democracies. Democracies have been identified and studied since the works of Kant (1795) as a possible group of countries with more peaceful foreign policies than non-democracies. Building on Kant's work research has further studied foreign policy differences between democracies and non-democracies (Maoz and Abdoli 1989, Valentino et al. 2010) but their objective was not to study the variation amongst democracies. Similarly to Stein (2015) I limited my research to democracies because I wanted to understand the variation amongst them. Democracies spread out in the world (Stein 2015) and they impact their region as well as the world. Previous literature has shown that there is variation among democratic countries' soft power reliance (McClory 2017). In democracies the norms and values of the society can also influence foreign policy via the democratic process and the democratic accountability (Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida 1989, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995) and this mechanism offers a great opportunity for my research to find out how much influence can the variation of a specific value, namely trust play in democracies' differences in their soft power reliance.

Despite the fact that soft power instruments are becoming more available and easier to use, not every democracy uses them to the same degree. Some democracies such as Sweden, Germany, France along with the United Kingdom and the United States reportedly top the existing soft power world rankings (McClory 2017), while other democracies such as Poland and Brazil barely succeed in ranking at the bottom of the list (McClory 2017). I argue that the reason for such variation amongst democracies lies in the differences in their society's norms and values. Specifically, I theorize that democracies with more trusting populations are more likely to support their leaders' soft power choices over hard power options and as a result trusting countries end up using more soft power tools than their non-trusting counterparts. Trusting populations by definition feel that others are generally benign, cooperative and honest (Brewer and Steenberger 2002) which makes persuasion and not coercion the most cost-effective and logical choice of interaction with other nations. I argue that trusting societies find the use of soft power tools the most effective as their goal is to sway others into working together with them as opposed to coercing them to do so. This thought process manifests itself when the population supports their leader to prefer and select soft power instruments over force when possible.

When explaining the domestic difference among democracies and their variances in foreign policy outcomes, public opinion in recent literature has been identified as an explanatory variable (Tomz and Weeks 2013, Stein 2015). When studying the choice of using peaceful instruments or force, public preferences vary in different countries (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Feldman 1988) and attitudes towards peace have their roots in individual core values (Jacoby 2006). While it has been noted that the public's mood

(Caspary 1970) impacts foreign policy. In the case of major events such as 9/11 in the United States the mood can change but in general the basic core values of societies remain consistent. Scholarship has also argued that democracies in general are more equipped to settle disputes in a peaceful manner (Dixon et al. 1994); however, there is no adequate information about the actual differences among democracies. My research is important because by using public opinion it will provide clarity about societies' impact on their countries' instrument selection patterns and it will provide further explanation of why Norway and Finland rely mostly on soft power instruments while Ireland or Mexico do not.

There are certain countries that consistently seem to advance more peaceful solutions than other nations in the form of soft power use (McClory 2012, 2015, 2016, 2017). In recent PEW survey ten European democracies' populations were asked if they felt that relying too much on military force was counterproductive. The results of this poll clearly show the variation within European nations regarding their attitudes towards coercive versus peaceful solutions (Pew 2016a). The Netherlands (66%) and Germany (64%) revealed the most concern about using force while Italy (39%) and Poland (30%) scored the lowest regarding this matter. These domestic differences in core values and attitudes towards peaceful interactions are the foundation of my research.

Competing theories explaining the variation of peacefulness have usually focused on resources (Palmer and Morgan 2000, Chiba Machain and Reed 2012) or institutions (Morgan and Campbell 1991, Clark and Nordstrom 2005). Resource-based theories argue that governments use and prioritize their foreign policy instruments based on their capabilities. Following this line of argument, rich countries would be more likely to use

soft power than poor countries and the variation amongst democracies could be explained by their variation in the resources such as GDP, military capability and budget. Resources are definitely key factors in countries' foreign policy decisions as they provide insight into what countries have at their disposal, but they do not provide answers about the differences in foreign policy decisions between countries with the same resources. This suggests that normative examinations of the influencing factors are also warranted (Maoz and Russett 1993). I believe the reason for this is that governments allocate their resources based on their foreign policy goals (Palmer and Morgan 2011) which in democracies are influenced by the population's opinion. I argue that as a result, some democracies such as Ireland will utilize coercive solutions while Switzerland will rely on more soft power instruments. The interesting comparison here is that Ireland and Switzerland have roughly the same resources and yet Switzerland relies on soft power instruments more than Ireland (McClory 2017). Therefore, only looking at their resources will not provide an adequate picture concerning their foreign policy preferences. I argue that the variation in those countries' attitudes regarding trust will complete our understanding of their selections.

The other known theory concerning countries' foreign policies points to institutional differences. Based on this theory, institutional differences such as the timing of elections, political competitiveness, the extent of political participation and the level of legislative constraints on the executive all impact the foreign policy outcome. While examining the institutional variation amongst democracies provides some answers regarding the likelihood of peaceful behavior, they do not provide a clear explanation about why peaceful solutions were chosen in some cases but not in others when the

above-listed indicators are identical. Based on my theory, the reason for their failure is the lack of inclusion of societies' differences in their norms and values. I also concur with Stein (2015) and Weeks (2014) that democratic institutional differences have proved to be weak predictors of variation in nonviolent interactions because they have little variance¹. Using the same examples of Ireland and Switzerland again the commonly used democratic institutional indicators such as Freedom House and Polity would rate these two countries equally and would not provide explanation about the differences in the two countries soft power use.

The variation in social trust on the other hand is able to provide a clearer explanation about the variance of democracies and their use of soft power because their political system is built on feedback from public opinion regarding government actions. For instance, numerous polls have demonstrated the differences in trust level regarding the Syrian refugees entering Europe. The polls clearly show the variation in trust among European democracies as in Sweden (24%), Germany (31%) and the Netherlands (36%) only a small percentage of the population feels threatened by the Syrian refugees while in other countries such as Poland (73%), Greece (69%) and Hungary (69%) the percentages are much higher (Pew 2016b). Building on this argument I will test the variation in trust and its impact on the soft power use of democracies.

¹ Institutional differences have been utilized much more successful in predicting the behavior of non-democracies (Kinne and Marinov 2013; Pickering and Kisangani 2010; Way and Weeks 2014; Weeks 2008, 2009, 2012). Large bodies of literature have focused on domestic institutional constraints on non-democratic leaders' decision to initiate conflict (Morgan and Campbell 1991, Maoz and Russett 1993, Dixon 1994, Ray 1995, Schultz 1999, Howell and Pevenhouse 2007).

First, I will study democracies' peaceful foreign policies via their detailed soft power actions. Soft power has been defined as the ability to achieve goals using persuasion and attraction (Nye 2011). While not all soft power tools are peaceful in nature, I argue that they represent policies that are based on the intention of strengthening relationships with other nations. Soft power is a complex concept. Thus, for this study I disaggregate it into measurable units in the form of diplomatic, economic and military instruments and further divide each into resources and actions. The key contribution of my instrument typology is that it separates soft power actions and resources and focuses my theory and analysis on soft power actions. My approach using the individual soft power actions will provide more information about the type of actions leaders are likely to take.

Secondly, I propose to explain the variation in democracies' soft power use by the differences in their social trust. Building on the role of core values from the literature on public opinion formation (Chong 2000) and research on the relationship between trust and peaceful foreign policy (Kydd 2005, McGillivray and Smith 2000) I hypothesize that democratic leaders with more trusting populations will be more likely to rely on soft power because they can generate public support for peaceful actions more effectively. In order to study trust's influence on democracies' soft power reliance, I will use attitudes regarding trust as a proxy for measuring the level of variation of trust amongst societies. Then using mixed methodologies, I will first conduct a large N statistical analysis about the frequency of democracies' soft power use versus hard power use and then I will test social trusts' influence on such outcomes. Based on the results of the statistical analysis, I will select case studies to further investigate the connection between public opinion and soft power use.

Once my analysis is complete, I expect to find that trusting populations will be more likely to employ soft power instruments to achieve their foreign policy goals than non-trusting societies. I will also have a better understanding of the variance of democratic government's frequency of turning to soft power instruments as well as their reliance on hard power tools which will provide previously hidden information about the fundamental values of those populations and as a result it will also provide indicators about their future foreign policy choices.

1.2 GOALS OF PROJECT AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

In the following Chapter (Chapter 2), I will examine the literature on the competing theories related to leaders' foreign policy choices. I will also discuss the under-utilization of public opinion in such models. In Chapter 3 I will clarify the concept of soft power by creating four new concepts in the form of soft power actions, soft power resources hard power actions and hard power resources. In the same chapter I will develop my theory connecting public opinion and soft and hard power instruments arguing that trusting populations' leaders will rely on soft power instruments more than those of less trusting nations.

In order to test my theory, I will use mixed methods including large N statistical analyses and three case studies. Chapter 4 will explain my research design in detail. Using a most similar case design I will closely examine Finland (Chapter 5) and New Zealand because these two democracies have similar resources and institutions they vary greatly in their leader's selection of soft power relative to hard power. My most similar case approach is designed to uncover the relationship between these two otherwise

similar countries' outcome variables (soft power actions) and alternative independent variables (social trust values). Finland has a very high soft power percentage use while New Zealand has one of the lowest reliance on soft power over hard power among democracies. I will study how these two countries' trust impacts the variation in their soft power instrument selection. Finally, I will study the United States (Chapter 6) as it is a hegemon that plays a leading role in the world as well as it provides an exceptional case of a country that relies on high soft power and hard power actions. The in-depth examination of these three cases' will provide information about public opinion previously not recovered in the statistical analysis and its connection with soft power and hard power instrument choices. My research will conclude with my discussion of the results in the conclusion and policy relevance chapter (Chapter 7).

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW OF SOFT POWER AND SOCIAL TRUST

Soft power instruments are not used equally amongst democracies. Publications regarding the differences in governments' soft power reliance have concluded that the top soft power users are the Western countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany along with France and the Nordic nations (McClory 2012, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018). This means that based on the current literature other democracies such as India, New Zealand, Czech Republic and Portugal are not using as much soft power as the previously mentioned countries (McClory 2018). For example, McClory's 2018 soft power rankings gives the United Kingdom's 80 points while Argentina only receives a 48 soft power score. This variation in democracies' soft power achievements need further explanations.

To better understand the reasons why some countries use more soft power than others, I argue that we need to look into a new indicator that varies amongst democracies and which is not the usual resource or institution-based explanatory variable. The democratic peace literature pointed to democracies' peaceful foreign policy patterns. This is a great start to further examining democracies' use of soft power and by testing a new variable (social trust) this dissertation will offer answers about soft power policy differences between democratic countries with similar resources or institutions.

This review of the literature shows that the existing soft power literature has not provided a clear definition of soft power, which also results in measurement problems. In addition, scholars have not provided any predictors of soft power, which again, makes it difficult to study why some countries use more soft power than others. I propose a new conceptualization, a new measurement method as well a new explanatory variable to compare democracies' soft power use.

2.1 CONCEPT OF SOFT POWER

Soft power has been defined as the ability to achieve goals using persuasion and attraction (Nye 2011). The key concept in Nye's (2011) definition is attraction. Countries can only wield more soft power if they are able to generate attraction. Attraction refers to creating a positive magnetic affect (Nye 2011 p. 92). Soft power builds on this positive attraction that sways others to behave in a preferable way. In terms of states' behaviors, Vuving (2009) suggests that there are three types of characteristics that lead to positive attraction, namely benignity, competence and beauty. Benignity is an aspect of how an agent relates to others. Benign act produces sympathy and credibility. Competence refers to how and agent does things and it produces respect and admiration. Beauty is defined as the perception of ideas, values and visions (Vuving, 2009)². All these characteristics can produce positive attraction, which adds to countries' soft power.

² The success of soft power depends on both the agent having one the listed qualities, otherwise the given actions may produce indifference or dislike (Nye 2011). My dissertation does not focus on the effectiveness or success of soft power use, only on the amount of soft power use for comparison.

Despite that the initial soft power definition (Nye 1990) has been around for almost three decades, a fundamental conflict in soft power literature still exists regarding a clear measurable definition of soft power and its instruments (Parmar and Cox 2010, Naim 2013, Jain 2017, Doeser and Nisbett 2017, Gallarotti 2018). This issue leads to further problems with measuring and categorizing foreign policy tools. Soft power literature offers two conflicting conceptualizations; the earlier one is based on a conceptual dichotomy of power instruments in the form of soft power and hard power tools (Nye 1990, Yan 2007, Sun 2008, Li 2009, Jain 2017) and the later one is based on a mixed-approach (Nye 2011, Gallarotti 2011) in which soft and hard power instruments mix and interact. For example, soldiers rebuilding schools in a war zone would add to the soldiers' country's soft power, according to the dichotomous approach via the benevolent action of the soldiers, however, the mixed-approach would evaluate the same scenarios as the rebuilding of the school counting for soft power, but the contradictions and harm caused by the soldiers and the war taking away from such soft power.

The dichotomous approach is more focused on identifying the instruments and actions and categorizing it as either hard or soft power. But the mixed-approach is more interested in a deeper evaluation of the interaction and perception of the used instruments. According to their framework, the foreign policy actions can weaken or strengthen each other. The next section will review the conceptual development of soft power from the early dichotomous approach to the later mixed-approach.

2.1.2 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SOFT POWER.

This literature review will show that the conceptualization of soft power has changed some, but scholars still need to agree on the concept and on a clear measurement of soft power. Without a clear conceptualization measurement is also problematic.

2.1.3 EARLY YEARS. THE DICHOTOMOUS SCHOOL

The early works of Nye (1990) started a conversation about the dichotomous understanding of power instruments. Many soft power publications use this conceptualization of instruments (Yan 2007, Sun 2008; Li 2009, Jain 2017, Cobaugh 2017). The dichotomous school views power instruments as mutually exclusive. This means that all power tools can be categorized as either a soft power or a hard power tool (Nye 1990, Yan 2007, Sun 2008, Li 2009, Cobaugh 2017, Jain 2017). According to this view, what matters is the ability to clearly place each tool into one or the other category. It is important to note here that the dichotomous school does not argue that there is no interaction between the soft and hard power tools, they merely create categories in which foreign policy tools can be placed.

At the time when Nye (1990) introduced the concept of soft power into the power literature, scholars were mostly concerned with the various aspects of power also known as the faces of power debate. As a reaction to this literature, it was Nye's (1990) work that created the first conceptual separation of soft and hard power. Some of the soft power scholars continued to work with the dichotomous understanding of power and power instruments (Yan 2007; Sun 2008, Li 2009, Cobaugh 2017, Jain 2017). For instance, while Nye (1990, 10) explained that as a result of Norway actively participating

in peace talks in the Philippines, the Balkans, Colombia, Sri Lanka and the Middle East, the country's increased its soft power as other nations identified shared values with Norway. On the other hand, an example of hard power from Nye's (1990, 14) publication explained that the U.S.' War in Iraq in 2003 was categorized as a hard power action because it was a coercive action that was perceived negatively outside of the U.S. In this approach, the conceptual focus is on creating guidelines between soft and hard power categories in order to be able to recognize, separate and apply them in foreign policy.

Another example from a more recent dichotomous conceptual approach is Coughlin's (2017) work, who stresses the importance of using soft power to make hard power more effective. His examples are concerned with current asymmetric conflicts as he separates soft power instruments and hard power instruments (kinetic warfare). Coughlin (2017) specifically notes that a more effective and strategic use of soft power tools in the form of communication/narrative about the current U.S. conflicts in the Middle East would allow the U.S. to have more success in the region. This can only be achieved if soft power instruments are recognized and strategically applied. His dichotomous conceptualization of soft power and hard power (kinetic warfare) serves as another example of scholars separating these power instruments, but it falls short on providing a systematic typology of instruments outside of the military. As a result of the mentioned efforts, the categorization of power instruments became somewhat clear but all hard and soft power instruments were still not comprehensively and systematically separated. Instead, what we see in the soft power literature is conceptual focus on only a few soft power instruments such as culture, sports or education but no further development of a complex typology of all soft power tools.

The problem emerging from the dichotomous approach is the difficulty of categorizing instruments that can be placed into both power categories. President Trump's social media posts for example, can sometimes be categorized as soft power tools when he tweets about Easter at the Whitehouse, but it can also be categorized as a hard power tool when it is coercive. For instance, when President Trump insulted the North Korean leader by calling him "Rocket Man," that was clearly a hard power action. As this example shows, categorizing Twitter as a foreign policy tool solely as a soft or hard power instrument makes the general mistake of oversimplifying the usage of the instrument. Another example is the role of economic instruments. Their classification either as a hard or soft power wielding tool has been questioned from the beginning. Nye (1990) initially placed all economic tools into the hard power category, and later started noting that there are some economic tools such as humanitarian aid that wields soft power (2011). As these examples show, soft power conceptualization would greatly benefit from a more nuanced new typology in which soft power use is clearly separated from hard power use.

2.1.4 LATER SCHOLARSHIP. THE MIXED-SCHOOL

With the mixed-conceptual approach scholars argue that there is a significant interplay between soft and hard power instruments as some tools can play both roles therefore, it is a mistake to separate them into either hard or soft power categories, but instead they need to be conceptualized together. Wilson (2008), Nye's later works (2011) and Gallarotti's (2011) article represent the mixed-conceptual approach. This school of thought also produced concepts such as Nye's (2011) smart power and Kounalakis and Simonyi (2011) and Simonyi and Trunkos (2015) spectral power concepts. These newer

conceptualizations of power instruments argue that the academic focus should not be on the separation of power instruments, but instead the focus should be on the successful combination and application of them.

One of the initial mixed approaches was laid out by Wilson (2008, 111) who argued that the national interest was badly served by an imperfect dichotomous power debate. Gallarotti (2011) also suggests that soft power should not be separated from hard power as it may lead to mistakes when categorizing instruments. Instead, soft power and hard power should be evaluated together as they reinforce and weaken each other. After his initial dichotomous approach in 2011, Nye also proposed merging soft power with hard power, which he called smart power. Nye (2011 p. xiv) defines smart power as the ability to combine hard and soft power into an effective strategy. According to Nye's (2011) conceptualization, smart power was an intelligent integration of diplomacy, defense, development, and other tools of hard and soft power. This mixed concept recognizes that states use different forms of power at different times to achieve the most appropriate goals. Another mixed approach was the spectral power concept (Kounalakis and Simonyi 2011, Simonyi and Trunkos 2015) which offered a visual and a conceptual model for the overlapping nature of power instruments similarly to the other mixed approaches mentioned above.

Kounalakis and Simonyi (2011) and later Simonyi and Trunkos (2015) a proposed a conceptualization using light as a metaphor to explain how some instruments have both soft power and hard power qualities and instead of searching for the cut points to decide where soft power ends and hard power begins, we should study them as shades of light as colors can mix and create new colors. If a tool, for instance is

hard power based on its appearance as well as based on its impact, the spectral power conceptualization would categorize it as hard-hard power and assign the red color to it, while soft-soft instruments would be blue color. Any tool that mixes these powers would end up creating new colors such as orange for hard-soft instruments or green for soft-hard tools (Simonyi and Trunkos 2015).

The mixed-conceptualization reveals the importance of the interaction and mutual impact of such instruments in foreign policy, but it does not help with the clear recognition of soft or hard power tools, in fact, it further confuses them. The mixed-conceptualization also did not offer any operationalization methods by which any measurable values could be attached to soft and hard power tools. This means that Nye's (2011) and Gallarotti's (2011) points are important as they want to shed light on the interactions of soft and hard power tools, they do not offer any measurement methods to study such occurrence. While both scholars write about how hard power actions can diminish soft power tools, other than a few case studies as examples they do not provide any measurements that would allow scholars to test their implications on a larger, international scale. Not only the current literature on soft power is not able to compare all countries' soft power use, but also, they do not focus on why some countries seem to rely more on soft power instruments than others.

For example, while the mixed-approach presented by Gallarotti (2011) focuses on powers enhancing or diminishing the other and to illustrate that, using the example of a positive image bolstering national defense by gaining allies, he does not help to categories actions of national defense (such as sending troops). Even more importantly, as Gallarotti (2011) studies how soft power can enhance hard power instruments, he

does not offer any ways to validate his claim. He does not develop his theory further to offer an operational mechanism which could measure how much certain soft power resources or actions can enhance hard power. Also, by recognizing that some instruments can wield both soft and hard power, the mixed-approach does not offer a way to identify these instruments. Instead, they argue that we should just focus on the effective use of such combination of tools.

This conceptual debate points to a void in literature in addressing a clear conceptualizations and typology of power instruments. The mixed-approach correctly points to the overlap of soft and hard power instruments, but it fails to take the next step to offer an operational solution separating them. On the other hand, the dichotomous approach recognizes the need for conceptual separation but does not provide clear guidelines to do so. A good approach must first clarify soft power instruments, then study how and why countries' use them.

2.2 MEASURING SOFT POWER

The second problem in soft power research has been the measurement of soft power and its instruments. In this effort there are two lines of thoughts; one is comparing countries soft power based on their resources (Nye 1990, 2011, McClory 2017, 2018) and the other one is doing the same but based on states' behaviors or actions (Li 2009, Zahran and Ramos 2010). So far only the resource-based approach was able to produce quantifiable results in the form of an international soft power ranking called Soft Power 30 (McClory 2018). This composite index of soft power was initially created in 2010 and only included 26 countries. These countries were strategic partners of the United Kingdom such as France, Germany, USA, Nordic countries, Brazil South Korea, Japan,

Singapore and South Africa. It did not include the less important countries that may still play an important role in soft power analysis such as Argentina, Portugal, New Zealand, Ireland and Hungary. This initial soft power index included capability indicators from business/innovation, culture, government, diplomacy and education (McClory 2010). In other words, this comparison of 26 countries' soft power was based on mostly (70%) on governments' capabilities and 30% of subjective elements collected from experts' panels from 20 countries that assessed countries international perception based on seven factors including cuisine, culture, technology products and foreign policy (McClory 2010).

2.2.1 MEASURING SOFT POWER: THE RESOURCE-BASED APPROACH

McClory has continue to improve his soft power measurement and today, he includes 30 countries in his index. This leading soft power ranking is still heavily relying on countries' soft power capabilities. According to this composite index, the listed 30 countries' have the most soft power based on a mix of resources, policies and polling data about the perception of the country abroad (McClory 2018). These capabilities include countries' institutions, economic and educational indicators, number of universities, business and innovation indicators just to mention a few.

While the collection of countries' soft power resources is achieved well, this approach led to mismeasurement of countries' soft powers the following way. Based on these soft power capabilities such as the number of UNESCO World Heritage sites, the countries are ranked without much attention to their foreign policy actions. For example, Egypt has many cultural soft power resources in the form of monuments and museums and yet it is not one of the leading soft power users in the world. If measurement relies heavily on these soft power resources such as cultural heritage sites and does not consider

government actions to estimate the country's soft power use, it does not provide a valid picture of the country's foreign policy strategies.

Another example is when the United States is ranked high in soft power based on its number of top universities in the world and its number of international students in the country (McClory 2010), it becomes confusing as to what exactly adds to the soft power of the United States. Is it the fact that the U.S. has good schools or is it the perception held by international students that the American schools are superior and, thus, they strive to attend these U.S. schools for their education? In addition, McClory (2012, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018) mixes government and private soft power initiatives and resources which also makes it difficult to know what the governments' soft power achievements are and what are just a result of cultural heritages or private initiatives such as language spoken, success in popular music and in high technology exports. In other words, while McClory's soft power ranking is a great accumulation of countries' total soft power resources (public and private), but it is not set up to tell us what governments do to practice soft power³.

Finally, McClory's (2018) latest research focuses on the top 30 soft power leaders in the world which excludes many democracies that according to current literature are new and emerging soft power users, such as Mexico (Saraiva 2014, 2016, Delano 2015, Dinnie 2015). A larger sample of countries would be more useful to study global soft power use to include all rising soft power countries as well.

3 (See Appendix B for comparison of my ranking and McClory's ranking for the only overlapping year: 2010).

Another resource-based approach to study countries' soft power use was conducted through the federal annual budget where the programs could be identified as soft power initiatives (Trunkos 2013). In order to study soft power spending in the U.S., budget information was collected from the Department of State's and from the Department of Defense's various programs. The U.S.'s soft power budget was measured with the combined budget of the 75 programs of the Department of State's Foreign Affairs initiatives such as the Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, the National Endowment for Democracy and the United States Institute of Peace. From the Department of Defense three temporary programs were counted as soft power programs which were all Overseas Contingency Operations in various countries. While some of the U.S.' soft power commitment was correctly captured by this budget approach, this method revealed two problems: 1) the annual allocation of the money to these soft power programs did not actually mean that all of it was used; and 2) since the collection of soft power programs and institutions has not been done for other countries, budget approach could not be used to study a large number of countries' soft power use.

2.2.3 MEASURING SOFT POWER: THE BEHAVIOUR-BASED APPROACH

A few soft power scholars have noted that what countries' have at their disposal does not necessarily lead to a correct estimation of their soft power or even to an understanding of their foreign policy strategies (Li 2009, Zahran and Ramos 2010, Jain 2017). Instead, the focus should be on governments' specific actions and policies (behaviors), which will tell us much more about their intentions. This approach is labeled as behavior-based because observation is centered on interactions and not resources. Soft power resources, according to this approach are not the main determinants of soft power

policies. Another important argument of the behavior-based approach is that governments cannot easily and quickly create soft power resources, but they are able to use behaviors that reinforce their existing soft power resources (Zahran and Ramos 2010). In other words, the behavior-based approach brings up the issue of intentional soft power use and their school of thought continues to conceptually develop such framework in order to understand countries' deliberate soft power reliance. Their focus is not so much the measurement of soft power but instead the conceptual development of soft power behaviors.

The behavior-based approach (Li 2009, Zahran and Ramos 2010) critiques the resource-based approach by pointing out the problem of not having a clear theoretical connection between resources and strategic actions. In other words, Li (2009) and Zahran and Ramos (2010) argue that the resource-based measurement fails to address what nations do with their capabilities to utilize their soft power. This means that they only compare countries' soft power wielding possessions but do not offer any explanations about the strategic use of soft power instruments. While the behavior-based framework recognizes this shortfall, they stop short of developing any measurements that could be applied and tested as they remain theoretical. In order to resolve this problem, scholars need to develop a method by which countries' intentional soft power use can be studied.

2.3 DRIVING FORCES OF SOFT POWER USE

After discussing what soft power is and how we measure it, the next important analytical question is which factors influence countries' soft power use, specifically why do some democratic countries use more soft power than others. As of now, the existing soft power literature has not provided sufficient answers for this question. On the other

hand, the conflict literature has been studying the peace-proneness behavior of democracies. In this scholarship democracies have been identified and studied since the works of Kant (1795) as a possible group of countries with more peaceful foreign policies than non-democracies. Building on Kant's work research have further studied foreign policy differences between democracies and non-democracies (Maoz and Abdoli 1989, Valentino et al. 2010). According to the democratic peace thesis, when compared with non-democracies, democracies use more peaceful policies than non-democracies, especially with other democracies (Babst 1972, Doyle 1986, Rummel 1983, Maoz and Abdoli 1989, Russett 1993). This school of thought offered a way to understand differences in countries' peaceful foreign policy patterns which helped me identify a group of countries that would be useful in studying soft power patterns. This group is the democratic countries.

The literature on the democratic peace thesis offers good insight into democratic countries' foreign policy behaviors for two reasons. First, starting with the Kantian idea of Republics (and not democracies) achieving a perpetual peace, it provides a theoretical hint towards Republics behaving differently than other types of governments and that the ultimate outcome is a peaceful behavior in international relations. Secondly, the Kantian idea of a common cosmopolitan citizenship of these Republics also suggests an underlying norm or value of the individuals within societies which is welcoming and peace-seeking. Both theories are useful when trying to explain why some democracies use more soft power than others.

Soft power use and peaceful foreign policies are not traditionally related concepts. Because of its definition, while not all soft power actions are peaceful in nature, based on

Nye's (1990, 2011) concepts they represent interactions that seek to sway and create long-term relationships and do not seek to coerce the other side. Since soft power instruments are generally peaceful in nature and because the soft power literature did not provide any answers about why some countries seem to use more soft power than others, turning to the democratic peace literature can provide the missing explanations.

2.3.1 DRIVING FORCES OF SOFT POWER USE: INSTITUTIONS

The previous section showed that from the democratic peace literature we have learned so far that democracies' foreign policies might be more peaceful than non-democracies'. When trying to explain this pattern, scholars have pointed to democratic institutions. According to this literature, democratic institutions play a key role in governments' higher likelihood of selecting peaceful foreign policy instruments over coercive ones (Morgan and Campbell 1991, Maoz and Russett 1993, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, Clark and Nordstrom 2005).

In order to explain democratic peacefulness, some of the literature pointed to institutional constraint as the mechanism that results in democratic leaders' peaceful foreign policy choices (Morgan and Campbell 1991, Maoz and Russett 1993, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, Clark and Nordstrom 2005). Institutional constraint has a number of manifestations within democracies and each of them is limiting or delaying the leader to start a conflict. In democracies checks and balances allows each government branch to limit the other branches' power and the equally empowered institutions can slow things down or even stop the conflict initiating process.

The second constraint of democratic systems is the need for public debate of issues (Maoz and Russett 1993, Morgan and Campbell 1991, Russett 1993). The open public debate also makes it harder for democratic leaders to initiate conflict, because in democracies the public is aware and is watching, and a supportive public opinion is needed for the leader in the next election term. In addition, the high audience costs of an unsuccessful war make democratic leaders select other options rather than jumping into conflict. Democratic leaders can also send more credible threats and signal their foreign policy actions to the enemy (Fearon 1994a, Schultz 1999) which is often also enough to avoid conflict. Due to transparency and strong domestic audience in democracies, the democratic leaders are less likely to back down from threats, which makes the leaders' signaling more credible. This phenomenon is also the result of the democratically set up institutions and government where the public influences that leaders by voting them in or out. Finally, the impact of the large size of the winning coalition also contribute to democratic leaders' lower likelihood of using force in international relations (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999).

In terms of studying countries' soft power use, the mechanism of institutional constraint provides an important theoretical piece as to how democratic leaders are constrained by their constituencies and their political structures⁴ (See Figure 2.1). This Figure shows the soft power use average for ten democracies with identical (highest)

4 Joshi, Maloy, Peterson (2015) offer a new insight into democratic institutions as they created the Institutional Democracy Index (IDI) to better illustrate the elite and popular democratic qualities of democracies. This great effort still does not provide institutional answers to foreign policy peacefulness variation among countries with the same IDIs such as UK, USA and Canada.

institutional scores (Polity 4) for the selected time-period⁵. The soft power use data is my recoded ICEWS events data that was recoded into soft power and hard power actions. The soft power use percentage was created by the number of soft power actions divided by the total number of actions per state per year. This means that soft power use percentage shown on Figure 2.1 indicates each countries' average soft power use for the time frame of 1995-2010. The selected countries on Figure 2.1 all have an average of 10 democratic institutional scores (Polity 4).




Figure 2.1 Ten Democracies' Variation in their Soft Power Use Average over Total Instrument Use 1995-2010

⁵ Soft power average was calculated by dividing the number of soft power actions with the total number of hard and soft power actions for the years 1995-2010.

As Figure 2.1 shows there is a significant variation in democracies' soft power use (from 94 % to 65 %) which is unexplained by their democracy (polity) scores. This question is particularly important when trying to explain the soft power variation among strong democracies such as Finland and New Zealand. Both countries are rated high in terms of their political institutions and yet Finland uses 94% soft power in her international interactions while New Zealand only uses 68%.

2.3.2 DRIVING FORCES OF COUNTRIES SOFT POWER USE: RESOURCES

Other competing theories explaining foreign policy choices have focused on resources and argue that when it is time to select a foreign policy instrument the main influencing factor for leaders is the amount of resources they have at their disposal (Palmer and Morgan 2011, Clark, Nordstrom and Reed 2008, Chiba, Machain and Reed 2012). Palmer and Morgan (2011) argues that all government actions use some kind of resources (time, money, military personnel, security guarantees, diplomatic agreements, etc.) and in foreign policy, countries decide what actions to take based on their expected benefits when using such resources. In this view, countries are utility maximizers in their foreign policies, and they are limited by their resources (Palmer and Morgan 2006). Clark, Nordstrom and Reed (2008) along the same lines argue that foreign policy substitutions are created due to resource limitations. Countries' with large amount of resources will also have a large selection of foreign policy choices but countries with low resources will be limited to the more cost-effective policy choices. The limitation of this approach is that it does not offer answers about countries' variation in the foreign policy outcomes with the same or similar resources. In other words, this approach does not explain why rich countries such as Finland and New Zealand differ so much in their soft power usage.

Another work that adds to the resource-based foreign policy explanations is Chiba, Machain and Reed's (2012) article, which provides useful data and theory about the importance of resources when studying major and minor power countries' and their foreign policy actions. Their categorization of countries helps to identify the amount of resources that they have but their study does not seek answers to questions about the variation of individual democracies' peaceful behaviors within the major or minor power groups.

In order to find the leading indicators of high soft power reliance among democracies, scholars need to turn to new explanations. We have seen that resources and institutions only provide some answers about countries' frequency of using peaceful instruments, therefore my research examines another factor. As the previous sections demonstrated, when trying to explain countries' peaceful behavior in terms of the most influential factors, scholars turn to either institutional explanations (democratic institutions), or resource-based explanations (more resource more activity in conflict and peace), but none of these explanations are able to provide answers to why are two democracies with the same institutions and amount of resources would use soft power instruments to a different degree.

The search for more answers leads to the normative explanations of leaders' international behaviors because if two countries with the same capabilities and democratic institutions still rely on soft power instruments to a different degree, then there must be another explanation that needs to be explored. Also, if countries' structural variables seem to be identical, then soft power scholars' attention needs to dig deeper into the individual level differences. The most obvious differences among people in various

democratic countries are their core values. These values guide the public when making decisions about issues such as foreign policy (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Meernik and Ault 2001) and public opinion impacts the leader's decision (Tomz and Weeks 2013, Stein 2015).

2.3.4 DRIVING FORCE OF SOFT POWER: SOCIAL TRUST

In terms of the normative explanations offered by some of the scholars (Maoz and Russett 1993, Chiba Machain and Reed 2012), we have learned that norms and values vary among democracies. In addition, Morgan and Campbell (1991, 189) concluded that democracies prefer negotiations over fighting due to their abhorrence of violence. But we have also learned that while norms may play some role in democracies' peaceful behavior, according to sceptics, democracies abandon their normative commitment to resolve their dispute peacefully when they are in conflict (Bueno De Mesquita, et al 2003, 221). One side of the normative argument argues that norms matter at all times under all circumstances, while the skeptics view that norms do not play an important role in foreign policy decisions while a country is in danger or in conflict.

The listed theories tried hard to find and measure democratic norms. Campbell and Morgan (1991) found that democratic institutions do not fully explain democracies peacefulness and pointed (without testing) towards political culture as a possible explanation. Maoz and Russett (1993) looked at the length of political stability and the number of death by domestic political violence to measure democratic norms, Chiba, Machain and Reed (2012) created major and minor power cultures based on their theorized threat sensitivity and argued that major powers are simply more likely to use

force as they are more sensitive to other threatening changes than minor powers in the international world.

While these variables provide some answers about the differences among democracies, none of them include specific variables for individual level cultural norms (collected from surveyed individuals) that would represent variation of people's core values. Instead, for instance in Chiba, Machain and Reed (2012) they use institutional indicators and capabilities to group countries into major or minor power status and theorize that the grouping also indicates a type of major or minor political culture. Scholars have argued that countries major power culture makes them more war-prone while countries from a minor power culture would be less war-prone (Ayoob 1991, Machain and Reed 2012), but they have not looked into individual-level normative variations within major and minor power cultures. We have seen that democratic institutions do not vary enough to provide strong predictions (Stein 2015) therefore, soft power research needs to dig deeper into individuals' values and study how the core values impact the elected official's foreign policy decisions.

While there are numerous norms and values, comparative politics and international relations scholars have been consistently pointing to the importance of individuals' social trust (Coleman 1990, Putnam 1993, 2000, Fukuyama 1995, Landes 1998, La Porta et al 1999, Chong 2000, Brewer and Steenbergen 2002, Brewer et al 2005) and its impact on various political outcomes. Fukuyama (1995, 26) defines social trust as "the expectation of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on

commonly shared norms⁶. Figure 2.2 demonstrates the variation of social trust among democracies. Figure 2.2 shows the percentage of people who said “most people can be trusted” for each selected country (data was collected from the World Value Survey for the time-period of 1995-2010) (See Appendix B). Figure 2.2 also shows that the range of the average social trust of 44 democracies is from 69 % in Norway to 26 % in Spain.




Figure 2.2 Ten Democracies’ Social Trust Percentage Average for 1995-2010 (WVS data)

In international relations social trust as an explanatory variable has generally been studied to explain cooperation, which is why it might also play an important role in peaceful foreign policy actions which also include soft power actions. One side argues that social trust is necessary for cooperation (Kydd 2005, McGillivray and Smith 2000)

⁶ Fukuyama (1995) defines trust among people in the same community. I believe that this definition is also applicable to defining trust with people outside of the community.

and the other side concludes that social trust as an explanatory variable is not strong enough to explain cooperative behavior (Cook, Hardin and Levi 2005). The cooperation scholars pointed to the importance of social trust in international relations, but their game-theoretical models only provide a dichotomy of trust (or lack of trust). While the debate about the importance of social trust in the study of foreign policy has not been settled, a wide variety of empirical studies has shown social trust's positive effect on political outcomes. For example, Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) and Knack and Zak (2001) showed that social trust is positively correlated with economic growth and more open economic policies (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). In addition, Justwan (2014) found empirical evidence that social trust is a significant explanatory variable in the cross-national variation of alien voting rights. Fukuyama (1995) argued that social trust is the key factor in countries' well-being and their ability to compete. Based on these works pointing to social trust's importance, this dissertation will add to the social trust literature linking it with soft power use.

2.4 CONCLUSION

This literature review pointed to two main issues in soft power research. The first one is the unclear and unmeasurable concept of soft power and the second one is the lack of research about the explanatory variables of countries' soft power use. In other words, we do not know exactly what soft power is, and why some democratic countries use it more than others.

Literature in international relations offers institutional and resource-based explanations as to why countries use different foreign policies. The institutional explanations held that in democracies' institutions impact the leaders' choices, but they

do not tell us enough about democracies with the same types of institutions. The resource based- explanation concluded that rich countries will be more active than poor ones, but again, we did not learn enough about countries with similar amount of resources. The normative theories pointed to societies' core values to better understand the differences in their countries' political outcomes. The core value that stood out from this literature was social trust.

It has been clearly noted that some societies are more trusting than others and also that some countries use more soft power instruments, therefore I argue that the next theoretical and analytical step should be to study countries' social trust values and its impact on their soft power use. Since other scholars have not done this, my dissertation will be the first to study the relationship between social trust and soft power reliance. By bringing together the variation of social trust with countries' soft power use patterns, I am able to test if democratic leaders with more trusting populations select more soft power instruments than those with less trusting citizens. This is an important question when we are trying to understand democratic countries' foreign policies. As of now, previous literature has not looked into social trust as a possible explanatory variable when studying soft power use. Therefore, if this cultural variable is found significant, my dissertation will be able to provide a normative explanation to countries' behaviors. This is particularly important when we are trying to understand the different behaviors of otherwise similar democratic countries.

CHAPTER 3

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND THEORY

The literature review revealed two main issues in soft power research. First, due to fundamental conceptual and operational issues, there is still no concrete way to measure countries' soft power use. In addition, scholars have not focused on what factors lead to more soft power use. Therefore, in this chapter I offer my new conceptualization of soft power and describe my foreign policy instrument classification that includes a soft power category. Further, I turn to a previously unexamined factor that may explain democracies' variation of soft power use. This factor is social trust. I will argue that the level of social trust will be a good indicator of democracies' soft power use.

3.1 A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF SOFT POWER

3.1.1 AGENT

A good concept of soft power should recognize several key distinctions regarding resources and actions of policy instruments, and should clearly imply who the agents are. Before I move on to my conceptual separation of power instruments, the agent problem needs to be clarified. While Nye (1990, 2004, 2011) seems to refer to state actors in his works, his definition of soft power does not include a specific agent. In order to improve upon that, I build on Nye's (2011) definition of soft power (See Intro) and I specify the actor as the government. While it has been noted before that governments do not have

full control over their soft power (Zahran and Ramos 2010) as there are private actors as well as non-government agents creating and using soft power, my dissertation will just focus on governments' explicit soft power and hard power actions. This way, I am able to directly evaluate and compare various governments' soft and hard power activities and I will leave the remaining agents for future research.

3.1.2 ATTRIBUTES OF SOFT POWER: SOFT POWER ACTIONS AND RESOURCES

In order to clarify the term soft power, I am building on Nye's (2011) definition and adding two new concepts in the form of soft power actions and hard power actions. My two main reasons for clarifying Nye's (2011) soft power concept are: 1) soft power resources are often difficult to identify and measure, and 2) while many states have soft power resources, only the use of these resources can influence foreign policy, therefore it is the actions that matter.

The foundation of my approach is behavior-based which means this study will focus on governments' actions in order to understand their strategies. To be able to study only governments' soft power actions, I had to adjust the definition of soft power and conceptually define and separate soft power resources from soft power actions in the following way:

Soft power resources are a country's national *possessions* that can be employed to make the country attractive abroad.

These possessions include both private and government properties such as facilities, institutions, language, music, values, money, artistic and athletic talent as well as food, innovation and educational institutions in addition to navy ships and military

personnel. As my definition above states, countries *can* employ their resources to achieve their goals, however, they may elect not to do so. These soft power resources therefore are any possessions that add to the positive perception of the country. This of course as Nye (2011) has discussed it includes both tangible and non-tangible items such as a country's popular dishes as well as its norms and values. Naturally, some of these items are privately owned such as Hollywood movies and Disney World but this does not stop the government from trying to use it for its benefits. (Example: The U.S State Department allowing basketball star Dennis Rodman to meet with the North Korean leader, which encounter was not previously achieved by any of the American diplomats for a long time.)

I argue that only when scholars are able to clearly distinguish a country's foreign policy actions from its resources can they successfully classify and measure such choices. Until this point, this separation has not been achieved. My new conceptualization of soft power therefore, is crucial for future research. My study builds on governments' intentional foreign policy interactions. To be able to isolate them, I created the following definition:

soft power actions are a government's *activities* undertaken to increase its national attractiveness abroad.

While it has been noted that governments do not have full control over all of the country's soft power resources, they have full control over their own actions. Examples of soft power actions are engaging in a symbolic act, expressing an intent to cooperate, engaging in negotiations or making a visit.

Following the behavior-based dichotomous framework of soft power conceptualization, I argue that hard power resources should also be separated from hard power actions when analyzing foreign policy outcomes. A country's hard power resources such as military size, number of military personnel or nuclear arsenal tells us about their capabilities but does not provide enough information about the actual use of such hard power instruments. Hard power actions are steps that governments take in order to force the other side to do something they otherwise would not have done. Examples of hard power actions are declaring war, posing economic sanctions or threatening to withdraw financial aid⁷. I argue that studying hard power actions will allow a deeper understanding of a government's foreign policy instrument selection. Based on this, my two other subcategories and their definitions are:

hard power resources are a country's *possessions* that can be used to force another state to do what it otherwise would not do. And my definition for hard power actions is:

hard power actions are a government's *activities* to force another state to do what it otherwise would not do.

By creating these four new conceptual categories, two for soft power and two for hard power, I am able to better categorize countries' soft power (and hard power) behavior and able to systematically analyze and compare them. I argue that the reason why these new concepts are necessary is because previously used dichotomous conceptualizations of soft power (Nye 1990, 2011, Nau 2005, Sun 2008, Jain 2017, McClory 2017) viewed soft power as both the resources of the executing state and its

⁷ My study treats governments' threatening actions the same as if they completed the action. These are all code as hard power actions because they coerce the receiving state.

influence on the receiving state. Even though recent scholarship has found that certain countries have more soft power resources than others (McClory 2012, 2017), this type of component index mixed up countries' soft power resources and actions in a way that made it impossible to separate them. This is an important conceptual and methodological problem that leads to confusing results and I argue that it does not provide adequate analysis about countries' soft power policies.

For example, while McClory (2017) has found that the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada, and the Nordic states are the leaders of his soft power index. According to McClory (2017) this outcome is measuring countries soft power resources but looking deeper into the factors he is using it becomes apparent that he included policy outcomes as well. Stating differently, when mixing previously established soft power resources such as number of universities with new policies such as changes in visa regulations, we are adding previously already measured soft power contributions to the countries' current policies and we are not measuring any policy changes that may have occurred. If we know, for instance that the United States is restricting visa regulations in 2017 and limiting its diplomatic outreach with its former allies, this change must show up in our soft power measurement more than just one ranking spot decline. Previous studies were unable to capture such policy changes in their measurement.

Governments' International Actions




Figure 3.1 Conceptual Overlap of Soft and Hard Power Resources and Separation of Soft and Hard Power Actions

The creation and separation of soft and hard power resources and actions provide scholars a new analytical approach that makes it possible to assess a country's foreign policy strategies especially since many resources can be used for both soft and hard power actions (Figure 3.1). Based on this logic my conceptualization helps to separate hard and soft power instruments and clearly classify foreign policy tools (See Table 3.2). For instance, this conceptualization not only allows scholars to explain why certain hard power resources such as battleships (resources) can be used to deliver soft power actions such as providing humanitarian aid, but it also provides information about countries' general foreign policy tool reliance such as the percentage of their soft power actions over time.




Figure 3.2. My Classification of Foreign Policy Instruments Based on the Separation of Resources and Actions into Soft Power and Hard Power Categories

As Figure 3.2 shows according to my framework, in order to study what countries' intended actions are, soft power scholars should focus on the separation of soft and hard power actions without the impact of the types of resources that were used. In other words, it does not matter if the used resource was classified into hard or soft power categories, but instead the nature of the action must be categorized and studied.

By classifying foreign policy instruments based on the government's actions we do not need to consider the employed resources. I will classify actions as either hard power or soft power based on a more nuanced matrix. For example, diplomats are good examples of resources that can be categorized as both hard power and soft power resources. But diplomats can conduct both soft power and hard power actions⁸. For

⁸ Diplomatic actions such as making an empathetic comment or appeal for diplomatic cooperation were coded as soft power actions and disapprove or demand for diplomatic cooperation were coded as hard power actions.

example, when instructed by the government, a diplomat can cooperate diplomatically or refuse to cooperate diplomatically. As this example shows by only looking at the resource, we cannot tell if this action should be hard or soft power. Instead, we must study the action of the diplomat to categorize the interaction (Figure 3.2).

In order to better explain the separation and to provide concrete examples of soft and hard power actions, I created the following tables (Table 3.1 and Table 3.2). As Table 3.1 shows, countries' resources include a long list of private and public items. My framework suggests that we do not need to be concerned with the separation of soft power and hard power resources as many of them are able to produce both types of actions. While in McClory's Soft Power 30 index, the number of top 10 albums in foreign countries is an indicator of the country's soft power ranking, my approach does not consider any of these private (or public) resources as it focuses on government actions.

Table 3.1 Examples of Foreign Policy Resources

Resources
diplomats, monuments, cultural and sports facilities, famous people, popular music, famous brands (Coca-Cola, Nike), language, ministry of culture, level of democracy, budget, number of trade agreements, GDP, military attachés, generals, military capability, number of economic embargoes and boycotts, military budget, military size, number of military personnel, number of military bases abroad

As Table 3.1 shows, the classification of resources becomes irrelevant when scholars try to understand governments' soft power use. The popularity of Coca-Cola products abroad does not help to explain the U.S. foreign policy instrument selection when dealing with conflicts in Yemen and in Syria. Actions speak much louder than resources do. The important implication of this framework is the ability to study countries' foreign policy instrument choice patterns. It is important to know how countries tend to react in both every day international interactions and also in the long-term especially considering that based on my data analysis, most interactions (over 80%) among governments are soft power actions (Trunkos 2017).

In addition, as Table 3.2 shows, the academic focus of this dissertation is shifting towards the specific government actions. When scholars are able to identify and count the number of soft power actions for each country, it becomes possible to compare their soft power activities, identify patterns and point to changes in their behaviors. For example, when a country significantly drops the number of its soft power activities compared to previous years that raises the academic and political question of the future behavior of such government. Also, referring to Table 2.1, learning that Finland uses an average of 94.17% of soft power actions when interacting with other government but Australia only relying on 65.64% of soft power actions tells us about the soft power patterns of such countries.

Table 3.2 Examples of Soft Power and Hard Power Actions

Soft Power Actions	Hard Power Actions
engage in symbolic act, grant asylum, return or release person; appeal for diplomatic cooperation, nation building, supporting women’s rights and education, host a visit, make a visit, provide humanitarian aid, inducements, positive sanctions, provide economic aid, cooperate economically, cooperate militarily, deployment of peacekeepers	cooperate militarily, demand diplomatic cooperation; reject plan or agreement to settle dispute; threaten to reduce or break relations; demand settling a dispute, accuse of crime or corruption; reject request for rights; threaten to boycott, embargo or sanction; threaten to stop aid, use conventional military force, occupy territory, assassinate, use human shield, violate cease fire

It is important to note that these behavioral nuances play a significant role in countries’ everyday interactions. It is diplomatically and socially crucial for each government to have at least a working relationship with other countries, and even better if they can establish long-term good relations with them. This nearly 30% difference in the two compared countries’ (Finland and Australia) soft power usage in the previous paragraph can represent over 100,000 interactions and explain the success or failure of diplomatic events such as a head of state visiting a country or a government releasing a person from jail.

Finally, it is true that governments are most interested in shaping the perceived image of their country and, the applied public relations channels also play a key role in their soft power use. The concept that best describes this process is public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is only one aspect of countries’ soft power tools and this dissertation aims to study a wider range of soft power use. Instruments that are not part of Public Diplomacy include economic tools, cultural and athletic tools.

3.2 NEW CLASSIFICATION OF SOFT POWER AND HARD POWER FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS

One of the goals of this dissertation is to create new guidelines between hard and soft power instruments and ultimately create a foreign policy framework which includes soft and hard power categories. After describing my new categories next, I would like to explain how I created my main instrument groups.

My classification builds on Nye's (1990) initial dual-categorization of soft and hard power instruments with clear division between them. Following the conceptual separation of resources and actions. My classification is able to categorize the previously overlapping foreign policy instruments such as embassies or money. One of the main confusions about recognizing soft power and hard power wielding instruments is the fact that resources such as money or diplomats can be used to wield both types of power. My conceptual framework offers clear guidelines between the types of action that were taken by the government to achieve its foreign policy goals.

Overall, understanding why certain democracies are more peaceful and use more soft power actions than others is the goal of this dissertation. By creating a system in which all foreign policy instruments can be categorized and offering comprehensive guidelines between instrument types is the first academic step towards learning more about democracies soft power use. This conceptual step is also necessary when trying to measure any policy changes that may have occurred from one year to the next. My framework connects soft power actions and policies and studies government actions to make inferences about their policies. Other soft power measurements were unable to achieve that. Therefore, the creation of my framework is not only necessary in

recognizing various governments' moves but also it is crucial for any future soft power policy measurement.

It is important to note here that my dissertation does not argue against what many have said before about using the right amount of soft and hard power in conference with each other (Nye 2011, Cohaugh 2017). In fact, with my classification, I only wish to strengthen the strategic and effective use of soft power and hard power instruments by offering an operationalization method. By clearly separating soft and hard power instruments, I am able to for the first time in soft power research, apply my coding to over 1.5 million interactions and measure the percentage of soft power use per country per year on an international scale. I argue that by classifying government actions based on soft or hard power action definitions, we will be better equipped to understand the preferences and strategies of countries and for the first time provide a measurement opportunity for soft power scholars.

3.3 SOCIAL TRUST AND SOFT POWER USE

The next step in this dissertation is to point to a new explanatory variable that might be able to explain the previously discussed soft power use variation of democracies. In order to create a theory of international variation in societies' mass attitudes towards peaceful instruments, I have to first discuss how those attitudes are formed and then explain how they impact the leader's decision. A significant body of research on public opinion formation has identified core values as a fundamental source of political attitudes (Feldman 1988; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Chong 2000, Jacoby 2006). Core values refer to an individual's deeply held beliefs about what is good, right,

and important in life (Rokeach 1973). In international relations, these beliefs serve as shortcuts for the public for forming opinions about issues that can be unclear (Goren 2000; Sniderman et al. 1993). Lack of knowledge about international matters can make it difficult for the average people to have a clear opinion about the best foreign policy in which case they tend to rely on their core values to decide (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Meernik and Ault 2001). Scholars have also argued that social trust is one of these core values (Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 1995, Inglehart 1999) and that these core values and preferences of societies' can be measured and used to compare countries (Hofstede 1980, 2001, Wildavsky 1987, Thompson et al. 1990, House et al 2004, Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Schwartz 2006).

Social trust (Inglehart 1999, Cook Hardin and Levi 2005) is a relatively enduring characteristic of societies as it reflects their historical and cultural heritage (Inglehart 1999) and it varies among populations. I theorize that the strong cross-national variation among democracies in their populations' social trust at the individual level relates to the differences in their support for soft power use. That is because in trusting countries cooperative and peaceful foreign policy instruments are favored over coercion (Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 1995) and in democracies the public opinion restricts foreign policy outcomes by voting leaders out of office if they do not create policies that the general public can support (Tomz and Weeks 2013, Stein 2015). Therefore, in order to explain democratic leaders' variation in soft power reliance, my dissertation will build on democracies' variation in their attitudes regarding trusting others.

In international relations trust as an explanatory variable has generally been studied to explain cooperation, which is why it might also play an important role in peaceful foreign policy actions which also include soft power actions. The two sides of the academic debate are regarding the significance level of social trust in countries' likelihood of cooperation versus defection (Axelrod 1984, Kydd 2005, McGillivray and Smith 2000). One side argues that trust is necessary for cooperation (Kydd 2005, McGillivray and Smith 2000) and the other side concludes that social trust as an explanatory variable is not strong enough to explain cooperative behavior (Cook, Hardin and Levi 2005). While I praise these scholars' work as they have pointed to the importance of social trust in international relations, I argue that while game-theoretical models are great for illustrating the mechanism of influencing factors, they only provide a dichotomy of trust (or lack of trust) in their models. My research will add to their efforts as I plan to further study the variations of social trust as it relates to variations of different types of cooperative and other peaceful actions. I argue that by looking into the variation of social trust level among societies we will learn much more about individual state's foreign policy preferences.

In addition, it is also important to discuss a possible spurious correlation between countries' social trust and their soft power use. Walt (2020) argues that states' competence/strength impact their soft power use. In fact, Walt (2020) specifically argues that the decline of American competence has been greatly affecting its ability to influence in foreign policy. While it is a fair (Realist) argument that a country's attraction is influenced by its strength and competence, so far none of the scholars were able to explain why some of the less strong and competent nation such as Italy, Greece or Brazil

also score high on soft power. For this reason, this dissertation looks for alternative explanations to strength or competence⁹.

Further addressing a possible correlation between social trust and this alternative factor, namely competence or strength, it is important to note that social trust does not refer to trust in government but instead it is society's trust of other people. This individual-level value develops early in life, it reflects the culture and heritage of the society and it is rarely affected by factors such as the good or bad performances of foreign governments. Even more importantly, the core value of social trust applies to all other people regardless of political borders. Stated differently in societies where there has been a high value of social trust the individuals turn to people from all over the world regardless of nationality with trust and in the hope to cooperate. Therefore, government's competence or strength cannot strongly influence the perceiving states' individuals' social trust as those had already been formed.

The mechanism between social trust and soft power use must also be further explained. In foreign policy the target audience of governments' soft power actions are the general foreign public. While it is true that their domestic population is also impacted, in order to achieve foreign policy goals, governments' must focus their soft power actions to the entire foreign public. The public will then impact its leadership through the democratic process in democracies and through the political elite in non-democracies.

⁹ To further study this relationship, Chapter 4 of this dissertation specifically test the correlation between some of the indicators of countries economic and military strength in the form of their GDP, unemployment rate and CINC scores and finds that none of these indicators are statistically significant. With respect to competence of governments, that factors could be tested in a future once a good measurement is available.

The level of attentiveness differs amongst people, so the governments' goal is to reach the maximum range of society with various soft power actions.

The one method by which governments are able to focus their soft power actions on specific groups of foreign people are their government programs. For example, the United States uses the Fulbright program within the State Department to impact the foreign elite through academic exchange programs and in Finland the government uses the Sports Department (Ministry of Culture and Education) to impact the sports fan segment of the foreign public through organizing sport events.

Trusting populations by definition feel that others are generally benign, cooperative and honest (Brewer and Steenberger 2002) which makes persuasion and not coercion the most cost-effective, logical and legitimate choice of interaction with other nations. The normal behavior of trusting individuals is to reach out to strangers and persuade them into a cooperative relationship (Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 1995). This is due to trusting societies beliefs that the other party shares these cooperative beliefs therefore the most cost-effective way to interact is by cooperation. These shared beliefs include deep values such as the nature of God or justice but also include professional standards and codes of behavior (Fukuyama 1995, 26).

I theorize that trusting societies find the use of soft power tools the most effective as their goal is to sway others into working together with them as opposed to coercing them to do so. This thought process manifests itself when the population supports their leader to prefer and select soft power instruments over force when possible. Based on this, I theorize that trust plays a dual role in the foreign policy selection process. 1)

Creates a shortcut when not enough information is available about the international situation; and 2) suggests a legitimate option for the leader.

There are certain countries that consistently seem to advance more peaceful solutions than other nations in the form of soft power use (McClory 2012, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018). The first step of my theory suggests that when making a decision about issues such as foreign policy, the public will turn to their core values when there is not enough information. This means that based on my theory, trusting societies will prefer that their leaders' also act according to the public's trusting values when selecting foreign policy instruments, and since public opinion impacts the incentive structure of the leaders, they will be pressured to act accordingly (Bueno de Mesquita 2003). In other words, democratic leaders with trusting populations will not only believe that instruments based on peaceful interaction will be the most effective and legitimate, but also the accountability of the democratically elected office will pressure them to do so.

The next step in my theory is the connection between societies' social trusting values and their constraint on their leaders' choices. Values and norms are created early in life and they create a ranking of preferences (Hudson 1997) and provide ways to make decisions and to resolve conflict (Triandis 1994). My theory builds on this interpretation as I argue that due to the influence of society's social trust, leaders prefer certain instruments over others. Scholarship has also concluded that democratic¹⁰ leaders take

10 In autocracies institutional constraint will be a better predictor for two reasons: 1) Autocratic leaders with small electorates can maintain their positions simply by giving out rewards or punishments (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). This method is simply too expansive in democracies as they have large selectorates. 2) The political elite plays an important role in the decision making of the leader, but the elite will rely less on their

public opinion into account when deciding between peaceful and aggressive foreign policy choices (Sobel 2001, Baum 2004, Brule and Mintz 2006). When public opinion is averse to war, accountability will provide a check on the use of military force. The potential political cost of an unpopular war can create an incentive for democratic leaders to choose nonmilitary options and opt for peaceful interaction. This of course does not mean that trusting societies' leaders would never go to war, but it simply means that all else equal, in democracies with trusting populations the preferred actions are peaceful in nature.

2.4 PUBLIC OPINION'S ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY OUTCOMES

This final section will connect social trust and soft power use. Recent works have identified public opinion as an alternative mechanism to influencing foreign policies in democracies (Tomz and Weeks 2013, Stein 2015). When studying the choice of using peaceful instruments or force, public preferences vary in different countries (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Feldman 1988) and attitudes towards peace have their roots in individual core values (Jacoby 2006).¹¹ Scholarship has also found that democracies in general are more equipped to settle disputes in a peaceful manner (Dixon et al. 1994); however, there is no adequate information about the quantifiable differences among democracies in terms of their motivations to select peaceful instruments.

core values than the public when deciding to use soft power instruments as they have more information and policy experience than the general public (Stein 2015).

¹¹ It has also been noted that the public's mood (Caspary 1970) impacts foreign policy. In the case of major events such as 9/11 in the United States, the mood can change but in general the basic core values of societies remain consistent (Inglehart 1999, Cook Hardin and Levi 2005).

Building on the current literature about the importance of public opinion's impact on leaders' foreign policy choices (Baum 2004, Sobel 2001, Stein 2015) and the undeveloped and untested impact of people's social trust in their foreign policy preferences, I will test social trust's impact on democracies' peaceful foreign policy choices in the form of soft power actions. Based on the described literature combined with my theory, I hypothesize the following:

H1: Democratic leaders' with trusting populations are more likely to rely on soft power actions than less trusting ones because they can generate public support for peaceful actions more effectively.

Overall, by bringing together the variation of social trust with countries' soft power use patterns, I am able to test if democratic leaders with more trusting populations select more soft power instruments than those with less trusting citizens. This is an important question when we are trying to understand democratic countries' foreign policies. As of now, previous literature has not looked into social trust as a possible explanatory variable when studying soft power use. Therefore, if this cultural variable is found significant, my dissertation will be able to provide a normative explanation of countries' soft power reliance.

This is particularly important when we are trying to understand the different behaviors of otherwise similar democratic countries. In order to achieve that, I plan to offer a more detailed picture of why and how some countries use more soft power instruments than others despite their similar capabilities. For this reason, I will compare societies' social trust to better understand the motivation of their decisions. In order to

further study the way these leaders' use soft power instruments, I will use reclassified international actions to illuminate the amount of soft power actions leaders rely upon in various democracies.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN

This dissertation focuses on democracies' use of soft power instruments. Based on my theory, I test if countries with higher social trust values also rely more on soft power tools than countries with lower social trust in. The theoretical foundation of this hypothesis is that countries with more social trust feel that the others can be trusted, and an outreaching, cooperative behavior is the most effective behavior in international relations. As a result, the population of these trusting countries will encourage (through the democratic process) their leaders to use more soft power instruments.

My statistical analysis examines the effects of social trust on countries' soft power use for the time-period of 1995-2010. The goal of this analysis is to test the influences of social trust on the use of soft power instruments against the resource-based and the institutional theories. I use statistical analysis of 51 democracies to test if higher values in social trust leads to more soft power use. I argue that the variation in social trust will offer new, previously undiscovered answers about the differences in countries' soft power use patterns. The result of my statistical analysis shows that the variation in social trust is positively correlated with countries' soft power use, however, the multivariable regression analysis is only able to explain 18% of the soft power variation among democracies.

In this chapter first I will explain my unit of analysis and my dependent and independent variables. Later, I move onto the statistical analysis and conclude with the results.

4.1 UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND SAMPLE

The unit of analysis is the state-year. My sample consists of 51 democratic countries. I included all countries with a polity score average higher than 6 in democracies with the exceptions of those that were missing from one of the datasets¹². In order to test my hypotheses and control for all of my selected variables I had to restrict my analysis to the time-frame of 1995-2010 as the latent social trust data (Justwan et al. 2018), the COW's Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) (Palmer et al. 2015) and its World Religion data (Maoz and Henderson 2013) are only available until 2010 and thus I had to end my analysis at that year. This time-period gives me 16 years which is sufficient to examine any patterns in foreign policy decision-making in various countries.

4.2 DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCE

4.2.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE

My dependent variable is the percentage of soft power action per state-year. I selected this variable because I would like to study countries' frequency of relying on soft power.

Percentage of soft power action: the percentage of governments' actions to increase its national attractiveness abroad over the total power instruments used. The total power instruments used includes the sum of all soft and hard power actions.

¹² Democracies not included in the sample of 51 countries are Hong Kong, Taiwan, Netherlands, Iceland, Malta and Luxemburg due to lack of data.

Selecting this format was an important analytical step as I had two other options for a dependent variable after recoding the data into soft and hard power use. One option was to use the total count of soft power actions and hard power actions per year per country. This method significantly disadvantaged the less active international players and without a comparison with hard power tools selected, therefore it did not provide an adequate picture about countries' soft power instrument patterns. Another option was to use the soft and hard power ratio for each country. This approach was also dismissed as it did not provide an adequate picture about countries' patterns of foreign policy instrument selection over all of their tools (soft and hard power). This pointed me to use the percentage of soft power actions over the total (soft and hard power) instruments. This approach provides a comprehensive picture in the form of the percentage of soft power choices over both instrument categories. In other words, my dependent variable reflects the percentage of soft power choices each country made over all its instrument choices for each year.

To produce my dependent variable, I collected global events data from the ICEWS dataset. The international events are based on news reports from a variety of international news sources and coded according to the CAMEO¹³ (Conflict and Mediation Event Observations) ontology. The event data is machine coded and it is provided in a dyad format which I collapsed into a monadic format for all my models. This means that the TABARI machine coding system produces interaction codes for each event between two

13 Developed by Deborah J. Gerner, Philip A. Schrodtt, Ömür Yilmaz, and Rajaa Abu-Jabr.

countries. Since this research is not concerned with the receiving state's characteristics, I only included the giver state' and its interaction code for each interaction.

Since its creation in 2002 (Gerner, Schrodtt, Yilmaz, Abu-Jabr) the CAMEO codebook has been evolving to include more detailed events. The creators of the ICEWS data set (Boschee et al. 2015) added their own adjustments to the original CAMEO codebook to clarify the events. In addition, my coding of the CAMEO coded events has also evolved. For example, one of the most used event categories (10) is “making a public statement.” This refers to any government official who makes a public statement. Originally in 2015, I have coded this event as an interaction that cannot be decisively categories as attraction or coercion, since the correct coding should depend on the subject of the statement. More specifically, President Trump announcing to send troops to the Southern border is a coercive (hard power) action, but President Trump announcing the opening of Easter festivities at the White House is a soft power action. Since the machine coded event does not provide more information about what kind of statement was made, originally, I coded this event as 0 and dropped it from the database. But lately, new scholarship has pointed to the soft power importance of making a public statement (Rutland 2018). I realized that regardless of the message of the statement, the general nature of “making a public statement” must be coded as a soft power action because the appearance of a government official combined with his/her statement already express the intent to communicate about an event.

4.2.2 RECODING THE ICEWS EVENT DATASET

I created the dependent variable by recoding the ICEWS event data into two categories either as a soft power action or as a hard power action and then calculate the soft power action percentage over the total power usage. The reason used the ICEWS dataset is that it is one of the most current applications of machine coded global events data and it will allow me to recode the specific government actions¹⁴. This dataset includes the range of different interactions that took place between states including, but not limited to, providing humanitarian aid, returning/releasing a person or granting diplomatic recognition. ICEWS is a new CAMEO-coded dataset containing more than 15 million events with global coverage from 1995 to 2014.

Sources that were examined to identify events include all international news coverage from *AfricaNews*, *Agence France Presse*, *Associated Press Online*, *Associated Press Worldstream*, *BBC Monitoring*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Facts on File*, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, *United Press International*, and the *Washington Post*. Additional sources examined include all national and international news coverage from the *New York Times*, all international and major US national stories from the *Associated Press*, and all national and international news from Google News with the exception of sports, entertainment, and strictly economic news (Leetaru and Schrod 2013).

The CAMEO coding system is based on extensive dictionaries which identify actors and events and then associate these with specific codes. Using a machine-coding program called TABARI, the events are coded 1 through 20 based on the nature of the

¹⁴ Events datasets were specifically created to capture the interactions between actors and not the transactions between them (Laurence 1990).

action. The codes were originally designed to indicate cooperation or conflict on a scale of 1-20 with 1 making a public statement and 20 being mass violence (Leetaru and Schrod, 2013). The actions range from diplomacy to waging war and have multiple subsections such as hosting a visit and expressing diplomatic cooperation which today extends the scale to near 300 different event categories. After recoding the events I was able to study countries' soft power actions.

I used MySQL, which is an open-source data management system to recode the ICEWS dataset. All events that I re-classified as soft power actions were recoded as 1. All events that I re-classify as hard power action received 2 (See Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Re-coding ICEW's CAMEO coded events into hard and soft power actions

	Soft Power (1)	Hard Power (2)
Type of Action	positive influence/payment	coercion/payment
Type of Impact	Attraction	deterrence/fear
Specific Actions	making a public statement, express intent to cooperate, engage in diplomatic affairs, support publicly, appeal, consult or visit	demanding, disapproving, rejecting, threatening, protesting, exhibiting military postures, coercing or fighting

In cases where it could not be decided for sure if the action was taken to create attractiveness or coerce were dropped from the analysis. Events were dropped in two basic instances:

1) When the description of the event was more specific, but the giver or initiator state's intentions such as coercing of building attractiveness could not be determined. For instance, 1.11 decline comment, 2.241 appeal for changing leadership or 2.244 appeal for military cooperation.

2) If the initiator state asked a third party to do something. This action did not provide information about the initiator's action. The specific coding of each action type is listed in Appendix A.

The ICEWS dataset grew out of a large body of academic research¹⁵ on using discrete events for studying international (and domestic) relations (McClelland 1976, Azar 1980, 1982, Goldstein 1992). The results of such data collection is applicable to my coding of soft and hard power actions. Some of the earlier criticisms of using machine coded events data included problems with source selection, coding rules, data management and the scale (Laurance 1990, Goldstein 1992)¹⁶. My method uses the counting approach as I am only interested in the number of soft power actions per state. One of the main criticisms of aggregating event data without weighting it has been that weighted events are more conceptually grounded in the theory than events that are just counted (Goldstein 1992). My conceptual framework, however, will not focus on the intensity of the event or the responses from the receiving state. This makes my counting approach the applicable method.

15 Initially there were two basic event coding frameworks, namely McClelland's (1967, 1976) WEIS (World Event Interaction Survey) dataset and Azar's (1980) COPDAB (Conflict and Peace Data Bank) dataset. Later other event datasets were created using machine coded events such as KEDS (Kansas Event Data System). In the 2000s two new event coding taxonomies appeared, CAMEO (Conflict and Mediation Observation (Gerner et al. 2009) and IDEA (Integrated Event Data for Events Analysis) (Bond et al., 2003).

16 The issue of how to best use discrete events to study interstate interactions resulted in two approaches which are either counting the events and using an ordinal scale or weighting the events (Goldstein 1992).

Finally, I resolve the issue of representing interstate conflict on a continuum (Sayrs 1990, de Vries 1990) because I am recoding the 20-point scale into two categories: soft or hard power and I am studying the percentages of soft power actions per year. The process of re-coding is based on my categorization of all occurring events into either soft or hard power actions, or in case the category cannot be clearly selected dropping the event from the dataset. Although hard and soft power actions are mutually exclusive according to my codes, each event represents only a small fragment of each nation's total annual hard and soft power actions because hundreds of events are included in the dataset. In other words, state A can have hard power and soft power actions many times in the same year with the same country.

Recoding the dataset by applying my conceptualization of hard and soft power actions is the core of my method. As the results show, there is only some overlap between mediation and soft power actions, and conflict and hard power codes. The results also show that all cooperation and mediation events do not code as soft power actions (See Table 4.2). One of the main operational contributions of this study therefore is the recoding and measuring of such events as hard or soft power actions.

Table 4.2 Analysis of re-coding CAMEO Coded Events into Soft Power and Hard Power Actions

	Number of Various Events	Dropped Events	Coded Differently from CAMEO
Soft Power	87	26 (29.88%)	22 (25.28%)
Hard Power	121	21 (17.25%)	19 (16%)
Total	284	47.13%	41.28%

4.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

Social Trust (Latent_Trust). To measure my main independent variable, I relied on Juswan, Bakker and Berejikian (2018) latent trust variable. Adopting a Bayesian measurement model, they treat social trust as a latent concept. Their latent trust variable was constructed with a broad set of correlates (19 variables) providing a cleaner and more reliable estimates than previous survey data such as the World Value Survey. Justwan et al.'s (2018) dataset also solved the problem of missing data as they have produced a state-year variable for my selected time-frame while the World Value Survey's dataset was missing 80% of the needed data points.

The collected observables were used in multiple disciplines including political science, psychology, sociology and neuro-economic combining survey data as well as institutional social and environmental correlates of social trust (Justwan et al. 2018). The full list of the variables used can be seen in Appendix B. The latent trust variable ranges from -1.92 to 2.18 (In my selected countries the range is (-.46-2.18)). The units of this latent variable are not directly interpretable, but we can say that higher values show higher social trust in each country (Justwan et al. 2018). This means that in this dissertation based on my hypothesis a positive correlation is expected between soft power use and social trust. Data is available from 1946-2010.

4.3.1. INSTITUTIONAL AND RESOURCE VARIABLES

In my models the variable that represent the institutional theory is Polity4 and the variables that reflect the resource-based theories are gdp and CINC. The Polity4 variable reflects countries democracy levels and gdp and CINC represents countries' economic and military capabilities.

National Material Capability (CINC). I used COW's Combined Index of National Capability (CINC) (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972, Singer 1987) for Model 1. Scholars have identified resources and the national capability of countries as significant variables in foreign policy decision making and as being positively correlated with the amount of foreign policy actions taken (Palmer and Morgan 2006). This index is constructed with two measures of each of three dimensions: industrial, demographic, and military which encompasses six indicators (military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population). This combination of dimensions captures the national capability of states. The impact of states' military capabilities in interstate conflict is one of the most addressed issues in international relations. While there is still disagreement about the exact effect of military capability on conflict (Morgan 1984, 1990, 1994; Morrow 1989; Fearon 1994b; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick 1997), it is without a doubt a significant variable in foreign policy analysis (Palmer and Morgan 2000).

For my theory this explanatory variable tested if a country's resources are positively correlated with the percentage of their soft power actions, and if national capability is a significant variable in a state's choices of soft power actions. As my theory suggests, selecting soft power actions over hard power actions is a policy choice that is influenced more by the trusting level of the population than available resources. Thus, including CINC in my regression models allowed me to test CINC's statistical significance when CINC represents the military capability of the country. Data is available for the years 1816-2012.

Gross Domestic Product (gdp). This economic variable reflects the product or value of all final goods and services produced within a nation in a given year and in this study, it tests the resource-based theory. I collected data from the World Bank. I used gdp to indicate countries' economic power in the world as it has been a commonly used variable in international relations scholarship (Pzeworski and Limongi 1995, Gilpin 2011, Inglehart 1997, 2000). I expect to find that countries with higher gdps will have a higher percentage of soft power actions/year compared to countries with lower gdps. I find the World Banks dataset on gdp specifically useful as it will allow me to use current USD so I will not have to adjust it any further for inflation. Data is available for the years 1960-2014.

Democratization Level (polity). The Polity IV project is sponsored by the Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall, Gurr and Jagger 2016). In my regression models I use Polity IV scores to capture the democratization level of states, which represents the institutional theory in my dissertation. Polity IV captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). On the monadic (national) level scholars concluded that due to various internal dimensions or assumptions, liberals tend to be pacifists, and liberal (democratic) governments (especially larger democracies) prefer negotiations over war and pursue peaceful foreign policies (Morgan and Campbell 1991). Polity IV considers countries with scores from 6-10 as democracies and that is what I used when selecting my democracies (Marshall 1). I expected to find that the higher a country's democracy score is the more likely it is to use more soft power actions over hard power actions. Data is available 1800-2016.

4.3.2 CONTROL VARIABLES

In order to include other important factors that can impact countries' foreign policy decisions, I included thirteen other sets of control variables from the Correlates of War Project; MID, MID count, formal alliances, import, export, gdpgrowth, unemployment, five religions and non-religion. I collected data about unemployment from the IMF and about gdp growth from the World Bank. My main interest is in the soft power actions of states relative to their total interactions, but these can only be estimated accurately if other conditions and capabilities are also represented in the analysis and controlled for.

MID (MID): Militarized Interstate Dispute data (Palmer et al. 2015) collected by Correlates of War Project provides information about conflicts in which a country threatens, displays, or uses force against one or more other states between 1816 and 2010. By definition, "militarized interstate disputes are united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one-member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state. Disputes are composed of incidents that range in intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war" (Jones et al. 1996, 163).

The data is coded as a dummy variable in which 0 indicates the lack of any conflict for the year and 1 signals conflict. The inclusion of conflict for each country helps me to explain soft power use as countries with more conflict are less likely to rely on high level of soft power tools as due to their conflict, they are prone to rely on hard power tools. For this reason, I expect to find that MIDs are negatively correlated with soft power use.

MID Count (MIDCount): In addition, to control for the number of conflicts for each state, I also included the Correlates of Wars' MID data (Palmer et al. 2015) coded as MID count data, which indicates the variation of countries' number of interstate disputes per year. Every year when any kind of conflict started according to the dataset, it was counted as 1 conflict. The range of the MID count per year is 8 conflicts (USA) to 0 conflicts (Switzerland). This control variable allows the variation of conflict heavy and little or no conflict countries to be indicated in the regression models. I expect MID count to be negatively correlated with soft power use as in conflict prone countries there is more attention and effort paid to hard power instruments.

Formal Military Alliance (militalliance): This data set is also part of the Correlates of War Project (Gibler 2009) and it records all formal alliances among states between 1816 and 2012, including mutual defense pacts, non-aggression treaties, and ententes on monadic level. The data is used as a dummy variable where 0 indicates the lack of any formal alliance for a country for each year and 1 indicates the existence of at least one formal military alliance. Based on my theory, countries that are in military alliances do not feel safe (for geographic or historical reasons) and therefore rely on soft power instruments less frequently than nations with no formal alliances. Therefore, I expect military alliances to be negatively correlated with soft power use.

Trade (import, export): to capture the effect of economic dependence of countries', I included the Correlates of War Project's monadic trade data (Barbieri and Keshk 2016) which reflects the incoming and outgoing volume of trade of each selected country¹⁷. The variable measures the annual completed trade in current USD and

¹⁷ Missing countries are South Korea, Czech Republic, Hong Kong and El Salvador.

provides an economic dependency indicator in the models. The amount of trading indicates an amount of economic dependency and connection with other countries which makes it more likely to turn to soft power instruments for countries that import and export heavily. For this reason, the expected relationship is positive. Data is available for 1816-2014.

Religion: to collect data about countries' religious affiliations I turned to the Correlates of War's World Religion Project's (WRP) (Maoz and Henderson 2013) most specifically to the National Religion Dataset. The data records the percentages of the state's population that practice a given religion. I used the five main religions indicators in percentages as control variables; Christian-Catholic (catholic), Christian-Protestant (protestant); Islam (islam); Buddhism (budhism); Hindu (hindu). Also added non-religion (nonrelig) as a variable. Based on previous studies, I expect Protestant, Buddhism, Hinduism and Non-religion affiliation to be positively correlated with soft power use (Landes 1998, La Porta et al 1999). On the other hand, I expect Catholic and Islam to be negatively correlated with soft power use (Landes, 1998, La Porta et al 1999). The unit of analysis in this dataset is the individual state, observed at five-year intervals. This dataset provides information the percent of the state's population practicing a given religion. Data is available from 1945-2010.

Unemployment (unempl) to include the effect of unemployment rate I used the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook database's unemployment data. The World Economic Outlook (WEO) database contains selected macroeconomic data series from the statistical appendix of the World Economic Outlook Report, which presents the IMF staff's analysis and projections of economic developments at the global

level, in major country groups and in many individual countries¹⁸. The unemployment rate indicates the economic strength of each country but also serves as an indicator of social openness towards outsiders (La Porta et al 1999). Higher unemployment rate indicates a weaker economy and less openness towards outsiders. I expect unemployment rate to be negatively correlated with soft power use. The information is provided in percentage of the population for each year from 1980-present.

GDP Growth (gdpgrowth): I also included gdp growth as a control variable to indicate the annual changes of economic strength in a percentage. I expect that this variable will be positively correlated with soft power use as with a stronger economy the country can afford to spend more on non-defensive foreign policy instruments such as soft power tool and actions. This data is collected from the World Bank's World Development Indicators and it is available for 1960-2017.

4.3.3 MULTICOLLINEARITY AND REVERSE CAUSATION

There are two additional statistical problems that must be address. Multicollinearity and reverse causation. With respect to multicollinearity some of the listed independent variables are also correlated with each other in addition to soft power use thus inflating the error term in the regressions. For example, many of the high soft power user countries have strong democratic institutions and plenty of resources as well as they have a Protestant religion and cultural background with low unemployment. My solution to address this problem was to run a Pearson correlation estimate amongst all my explanatory variables to see how strong the correlation was between them. Once the Pearson coefficient was higher than $r=0.50$ between two of my independent variables,

¹⁸ IMF's unemployment rate data is missing India from the democracies.

they could only remain in my linear regression model if the model was still significant, and they added to the R^2 of the regression model. COW imports and COW exports, for instance has a 0.93 bivariate correlation, but keeping both variables in my models still resulted in a statistically significant model and raised the R^2 .

Finally, the last statistical issue is reverse causation. As Delhey and Newton (2005) explains, between the association of trust and another variable is that trust can be the cause or the effect of another indicator. For example, richer countries may be more trusting than poor countries, but that may be because their wealth and financial security allows them to risk possible losses and approach others with trust and openness. On the other hand, they might be richer than others because they are more trusting. Same logic is true for using more or less soft power. Some democracies may use more soft power because they are trusting. On the other hand, they might be more trusting because they have always used soft power instruments to a large degree. Also, as it is evident from my analysis and from other scholars' work, social trust is deeply embedded with other social and economic factors (Inglehart 1999, Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Delhey and Newton 2005). I used control variables to resolve this issue.

4.3 VALIDITY CHECK

In order to check the validity of my social trust data I used two different datasets' social trust data to test the correlation between latent trust and the others. First, using the OECD (Organization of Economically Developed Countries) social trust data which was only available for one year (2007), I ran a bivariate linear regression model and I found that the correlation was weak ($r=.0021$) with $n=23$. Next, I used Inglehart and Welzel's (2005) social trust data to check the correlation between my latent-trust variable and their

social trust. I found that the correlation is considerable ($r=43$) with $n=51$. Overall, while the OECD's limited data did not appear to have a strong correlation with my dataset, the widely used WVS's social trust data appears to be strongly correlated with my latent trust variable and by running two regressions with two other social trust data, the validity of my independent variable appears robust enough for the analysis.

4.4 RESULTS

In order to be able to compare the competing theories about the main factors that influence soft power actions, I created three linear cross-sectional regression time-series models.

4.4.1 MODELS 1-4

In Model 1 (Resources) using an OLS regression, I only included the resource variables (gdp and CINC¹⁹) in addition to the control variables (military alliances, MID, imports and exports, Catholic, Protestant, Islam, Hindu, Buddhist, non-religious, unemployment, gdpgrowth and midcount). I wanted to find out how much soft power use variation can only the resource variables explain. The result showed that the Resource Model (Model 1) can explain 21 % of the soft power reliance variation (See Table 4.3). Model 1 also showed that gdp and CINC are statistically significant indicators and that gdp is negatively correlated with soft power use. In addition, the results revealed that CINC is positively correlated with countries' soft power reliance.

19 Because GDP and CINC are both resource variables, I tested a Model with each of the variables without the other, to see if the Model was still significant. I found that the Model is still significant when only GDP or only CINC is present with the other variables.

Table 4.3 Resource and the Institutional OLS Regression Models on Soft Power Use Percent as a Dependent Variable (1995-2010).

	Model 1 (Resources)	Model 2 (Institutional)
Trust		
Polity		-0.25
GDP	-7.36e-12**	
CINC	264.04*	
Military alliance	-9.11**	-8.77**
MID	0.80	1.00
Imports	0.00**	4.60e06
Exports	-0.00*	2.03e-06
Unemployment	.21*	.17
Protestant	-2.23	-4.01
Catholic	-1.44	-1.47
Islam	-3.9	-2.99
Buddhism	32.12**	10.02*
Hindu	-1066.13**	-1048.633**
Non-religious	18.10**	17.68**
GDP Growth	0.25*	.25*
MID Count	-1.31	-1.26*
Cons	89.00	92.68
R²	.2063	.1898
Obs.	598	598

Notes: *p< .10 **p< .05 Significance: p > 0.05

This means that a lower gdp and a larger military capability both reduces soft power use. In other words, according to the analysis, poor countries use more soft power and countries with more military capabilities also rely more on soft power actions. This is an intuitive finding as countries with more military capability probably feel that they do not need to use soft power tools as much because they view their military tools as more effective in international interactions than soft power instruments. With respect to poorer countries using more soft power actions, this finding makes sense soft power instrument costs less hard power tools. It is also interesting to note the low R² of 0.206 for this model.

In Model 2 (Institutional) using a multivariable OLS regression again, I only observed the institutional variable's (polity) impact on soft power use. The results showed that polity is not a statistically significant variable and it is negatively correlated with soft power use. This confirms my expectation that countries with lower democracy scores rely more on soft power use. The results based on Model 2's R^2 value was slightly higher at 0.19. This meant that none of these two competing theories represented by the appropriate variables were able to explain more than 21 % of democracies' variation in soft power use which result suggested that I keep looking for more robust results.

In order to capture the effects of each individual country in the regression and to avoid unobserved heterogeneity, I ran fixed effect estimators on Model 1 and on Model 2. The result can be seen in Table 4.4 in Models 3 and 4 respectively. The fixed effects estimator revealed that when the unique qualities of each country is taken into account, the military alliance, GDP Growth and Hindu variables remain significant.

Table 4.4 Resources and Institutional OLS Regression Models with fixed effects estimators on Soft Power Use Percent as a Dependent Variable (1995-2010).

	Model 3 (Resources)	Model 4 (Institutional)
Trust		
Polity		-.01
GDP	-5.22e-13	
CINC	7.93	
Military Alliance	-5.41*	-5.45*
MID	-.25	.74
MID Count	-.25	-0.25
Imports	-5.56e-07	-3.88e-06
Exports	3.88e-07	5.39e-06
Unemployment	.15	.15
GDP Growth	.15*	0.15*
Protestant	.39	5.55
Catholic	.96	1.19
Islam	-3.96	-3.60
Buddhism	14.55	12.73
Hindu	-739.21*	-744.65*
Non-religious	.96	.74*
Cons	87.06	87.08
Obs.	598	598

Notes: *p< .10 **p< .05

Significance: p > 0.05

4.4.2 MODELS 5 AND 6 TESTING SOCIAL TRUST'S IMPACT

The research question of my dissertation is how does social trust impact soft power use? According to my theory and hypothesis, social trust is positively correlated with soft power use. Including social trust in the multivariable regression therefore was supposed to increase the strength of the model and provide more robust results. With my final regression models (Table 4.5 Models 5 and 6), I tested the correlations between social trust and countries' percentage of soft power actions including all other control variables. The results of Model 5 indicated that social trust is positively correlated with countries' percentage of soft power use (See Table 4.5), but the R² was only 18%. Model

5 also revealed that military alliance, protestant, Hindu and Non-religious were also strong indicators of soft power use. Finally, to capture the unique effects of each country in the regression and to avoid unobserved heterogeneity, I ran a mixed effect estimator in Model 6. Since my linear regression was not using log likelihood, I ran a mixed effect estimator. The command in Stata treats everything as fixed effect unless it is otherwise specified. As Table 4.5. shows in Model 6 social trust is negatively correlated with soft power use and it is not statistically significant. The change from a positive to a negative correlation also indicates the lack of robustness of social trust on soft power use.

Table 4.5 OLS Regression Models with Mixed Effects Estimators on Soft Power Use Percent as a Dependent Variable and Social Trust as the Independent Variable (1995-2010)

	Model 5 (Social Trust)	Model 6 (Social Trust+ Mixed Effects)
Trust	1.07	-.52
Polity		
GDP		
CINC		
Military Alliance	-7.87**	-5.55*
MID	1.03	0.75
MID Count	-1.06	-.25
Imports	1.15e-06	-3.87e-06
Exports	5.86e-06	5.49e-06
Unemployment	.16	0.14
GDP Growth	.25*	-.25
Protestant	-6.44*	6.16
Catholic	- 2.13	1.19
Islam	-2.51	-3.91
Buddhism	.04	13.05
Hindu	-1029.39**	-754.38*
Non-religious	15.73**	1.11
Cons	89.42	87.56
R2	0.18	
Obs.	598	598

This also means that Model 5 confirmed my hypothesis that countries with higher trust in the population use more soft power in their foreign policies. I also learned that social trust's statistical impact is not significant. Further, the coefficients of Model 5 indicate that one unit increase in social trust leads to 1.07% increase in countries' soft power use. In addition, Model 6 showed that after running mixed effects, the coefficient of social trust changed to negative indicating the weak correlation.

In addition to comparing the R^2 s of each of my models, also wanted to compare their BIC's (Bayesian Information Criterion), therefore the final step in my statistical analysis was to complete my model selection using the BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) number for each model. There are two ways to read the BIC numbers. One is to compare the BIC numbers of each of my models to compare the robustness of each (when log likelihood is used). As Table 4.6 shows, Model 1 has the lowest BIC number there're it is the most robust of the three. The second way to understand the BIC numbers is to compare the BIC number changes between Models 1 and 3 and Models 2 and 3 and look for the largest (larger than 10) change between two models. In this case, as we can see there is not a significant change in the BIC numbers between Model 2 and 5 but there is a significant change between Model 1 and 5. Stated differently, compared with the most robust model, which is Resource Model (1), the Institutional Model (2) produced the least robust result. Also, comparing the Resource Model (1) with the Social Trust Model (5), we can see that based on the BIC numbers, the Resource Model (1) is more robust.

Table 4.6 Model Selection. Comparing BIC Numbers

	BIC	Number of Observation
Model 1 Resources	4556.704	598
Model 2 Institutional	4569.058	598
Model 5 Social Trust	4569.099	598

Overall, the real importance of my statistical analysis is that I was the first soft power scholar to test social trust value's impact on countries' soft power reliance. More specifically, I was able to test the statistical impact of the variation of a normative value (social trust) on countries' soft power reliance over a 16-year timeframe. While my results do not support my hypothesis about trust's robust impact on democracies' soft power patterns, but my statistical analysis also showed that the resources and institutions can only provide about 20% explanation about soft power variation. This raises the question of what other variables must be examined in the future. Based on my results, I would start looking into democracies resources. I am inspired by the results and the lack of explanatory power of the included variables to keep searching for the explanatory variable that will tell soft power scholars much more about countries' soft power use.

It is interesting to note here that one of my control variables, military alliances proved to be statistically significant and negatively correlated with soft power use. In my case studies comparing Finland high soft power user (94%) and New Zealand low soft power user (65%) I found that in these two countries' Finland had no military alliances and the government relies on high soft power, while New Zealand, which had military

alliances uses soft power actions to a much lower level. A larger n study focusing on the impact of military alliances could explain more of the negative correlation.

Overall, I offered a new operational framework to studying soft power instrument use. This is an innovative academic step as previous literature struggled with separating and measuring countries' soft power reliance. What leads to such variation in soft power usage is the main research question of this dissertation. My statistical analysis revealed that social trust is not a statistically significant factor in soft power use, and I have also learned that the institutional and the resource-based models were also not robust enough. This means that new variables need to be found and tested to better explain why countries' use soft power tools. Based on the statistical results, the resource route is the more promising one, as polity remained insignificant. Perhaps future analysis can study the impact of countries' soft power budgets.

4.6 LIMITATIONS

One of the main limitations of using the ICEWS data set is that not every kind of interaction is recorded in it. For instance, drone strikes are not represented. Athletic interactions and cultural events between countries usually constitutes soft power actions, however, these are also excluded from the dataset. Perhaps future changes made to the TABARI dictionary could include official athletic exchanges and events such as hosting a multilateral mega sport event like the Olympics or simply include leaders and diplomats attending a specific sport events abroad as a part of a diplomatic mission.

Finally, a conceptual limitation of this project is that it only focuses on means of power and does not address other important dimensions such as scope, domain and weight. A future project needs to incorporate those dimensions into the analysis of countries' foreign policy choices.

CHAPTER 5

MOST-SIMILAR CASE DESIGN: FINLAND AND NEW ZEALAND. WHY FINLAND USES MORE, AND NEW ZEALAND USES LESS SOFT POWER

In Chapter 4, I outlined factors that may impact countries' soft power use and using statistical models I tested their impact. The results revealed that social trust has a positive impact on soft power use in my 51 democratic countries, but the statistical model was only able to explain about 18% of the soft power use variation. In order to understand what other factors impact the use of soft power instruments, I now turn to a qualitative approach in the form of a most-similar case design to study in-depth the already included factors and to explore previously left out independent variables.

5.1 CASE SELECTION AND THE MOST-SIMILAR CASE DESIGN

There are 51 democracies in my dataset that are spread out geographically in all five continents and have diverse economic and institutional characteristics. In my sample there are 28 European, 12 from the Americas, 7 Asian, 1 Middle-Eastern, 2 Australian and 1 African nation. Finland and New Zealand have been selected for a most-similar case design for the following reasons.

In terms of their general geographically, political and economic indicators, Finland and New Zealand are similar in the following ways: geographically they are both considered small countries. Finland is 338,145 km² with the population of 5.5 million. New Zealand is 268,000 km² with a population of 4.79 million people.

In addition, according to my statistical analysis, both countries have similar values in the independent variables. More specifically, both countries score high on social trust (Finland has 2.04 and New Zealand has 1.88) and both countries are considered wealthy. The average GDP of Finland for the observed time-frame (1995-2010) was 180 Billion USD while for New Zealand it was 90 Billion USD. In terms of their military capabilities, both countries have low CINC values (Finland is 0.002 and New Zealand is 0.0008). Finally, both countries are strong democracies receiving a perfect 10 scores on the Polity scale (Polity IV). Table 5.1 shows the comparison of these independent variables.

Table 5.1 Average values for the main interdependent variables from the statistical analysis for time period of 1995-2010. GDP is in current USD.

	Social Trust	GDP	CINC	Polity
Finland	2.04	1.80E+11	0.0020	10
New Zealand	1.88	9.03E+10	0.0008	10
Scale min	-0.46	1.97E+09	0	-10
Scale max	2.18	1.50E+13	1	10

Despite their similarities in their independent variables, Finland and New Zealand vastly differ in their soft power outcomes. Out of the 51 democracies included in this study, Finland established itself as a high soft power user country by relying on 94% soft power use. New Zealand, on the other hand belongs to the low soft power user group with 68% soft power use. I turn to a most-similar case design to explore what factors led to the differences in these two otherwise similar countries' soft power use

The most-similar case design can evaluate pairs of cases in various ways in order to isolate the differences between them (Lijphart 1971, Collier 1993). In the cases of Finland and New Zealand, both have similar values on their independent variables which allows for the isolation of new independent variables. Finland has a threatening neighbor and this geopolitical situation has been deeply impacting Finnish foreign policy. On the other hand, New Zealand seems to be buffered from threat by its peaceful neighbors. In this section I will further explore these differences.

International relation literature has offered an alternative explanation regarding the geopolitical differences between countries. Specifically, realist literature suggests that a country that perceives threat will seek to form alliances (Walt 1985). The political elite of the country that is being threatened will create a narrative that emphasizes national security and the need to form alliances for protection (Zhu 2012). The alliance formation serves as a defense mechanism against the perceived threat. This is called **balancing** (Walt 1985).

In terms of soft power use this means that countries that feel threatened may use soft power instruments to create a climate of attractions and a web of personal ties. The high level of positive interaction between countries makes alliance formation more likely. Specifically, this means that using a most-similar case design, I will evaluate if Finland has a high soft power use as a reaction to its threatening neighbor (Russia), while the lack of a geopolitical threat led New Zealand to a much lower soft power reliance.

5.2 EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCES IN SOFT POWER USE

In search of stronger soft power use indicators, I turned to the foreign policy literature, which have pointed to alternative factors. One of them was geopolitics. According to the literature, geopolitical threat can make countries take actions that are designed to mitigate the threatening neighbor (Clerk 2015, Sberro 2015, Moisiu 1998, Browning 2002). In international relations threat has been defined as a situation in which one agent or group has either the capability or intention to inflict a negative consequence on another agent or group (Davis 2000, 10). Realist and neorealist literature have also suggested that when a country is framed as a strong military power, it will impact the others by causing them to perceive them as a threat (Sherif 1966, Levine and Campbell 1972, Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 2001).

Realist literature also suggested that states that appear aggressive can make others react with the goal of strengthening alliances against this perceived threat. This is called **balancing** (Walt 1985). When the aggressor is believed to be unalterably aggressive, **balancing** with others is also the best way to avoid becoming a victim²⁰ (Langer 1950, Walt 1985). In this chapter I theorize that threatened countries are more likely to use a high level of soft power to balance out the strong regional threat by trying to build alliances.

It is also one of the underlying assumptions of this theory that a large number of soft power interactions with other countries can enhance alliance building by creating, what Nye (2011) called a climate of attractions and a web of personal ties. The high level

²⁰ Walt (1985) specifically used Finland as a country that bandwagons but I argue that in terms of its soft power use, Finland has been balancing since its independence in 1917.

of positive interaction between countries makes alliance formation more likely. In terms of my most-similar case design, this means that, according to my theory, Finland should be expected to use a large number of soft power actions to **balance** against the perceived Russian threat, while without having an aggressive neighbor, New Zealand relies on a low number of soft power actions.

Further, international relations literature has also suggested that major geopolitical actors, such as Russia, create a situation in which the **political elite** of the neighboring countries perceives them as an existential threat (Zhu 2012). The political elite consists of people with a voice in the political process for example presidents, prime ministers, ministers and directors of key political institutions. In order to communicate this threat to the public and to policy makers, the **political elite creates a narrative** that emphasizes national security and frequent interaction with other countries (Moisio 1998) as well as the importance of alliances building in the form of balancing (Walt 1985).

The **political elite's narrative** also supports the creation and expansion of the institutions and programs which results in a political and institutional commitment of high soft power use in foreign policy. As a result, governments that are facing a threat, create soft power institutions, which strengthen their alliances using programs that build bridges and enhance the connections between governments. For this reason, the **history of the programs** signals the age of each soft power program and possible reveals path dependency.

When programs exist for many years, this can create a self-reinforcing process which results in the continuation of the program for a long time instead of its cancellation because it is easier to rely on the old programs than to create new ones (Pierson 2000).

This process is captured well by the concept of increasing returns (Pierson 2000). Increasing returns means that the probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path because the relative benefits of the same steps compared to a new direction increases over time (Pierson 2000). Stated differently, the longer a program is in place, the more likely it is that they will remain in use and thus they enhance the country's soft power use abroad. This can also lead to an institutional commitment of high soft power use. On the other hand, where the soft power institutions have not been created, like in New Zealand, there cannot be the same degree of institutional commitment to soft power use.

Finally, **allocating national budget** to soft power programs is also closely related to the **political elite's narrative** and it can also reveal path dependency. Because of the political elite's narrative about the constant threat to their national security, and the need to strengthen alliances, this defensive narrative builds into the budget calculation and increases the amount of funds approved for soft power programs. This often results in a lock-in mechanism, which makes it more likely that the government will continue to fund these programs instead of canceling them. As the later section of this chapter illustrates Finland spends over 2% of its national budget on soft power programs, which is a high percentage. On the other hand, New Zealand spends less than 0.04% on its soft power programs annually, which represents a low soft power budget. The consistent and high soft power budget allocation signals the general policy direction of the government²¹ (Jones et al. 2009). In the cases of high soft power user countries, the political leadership

21 Changes in the distribution of budgetary outcomes is crucial to the study of policy changes (Jones et al. 2009) and in this dissertation indicates a change in the support of soft power use.

funds soft power programs well and consistently with the intention of balancing against the threat by strengthening alliances. In other words, high soft power budget leads to high soft power use.

Overall, in countries with a threatening neighbor, the political elite is likely to emphasize the importance of national security and alliance building, constructing a narrative that influences institutions and the federal budget allocation. Based on this theory, when a country perceives a threat, the political elite constructs a narrative that promotes alliance building. In order to build alliances, the threatened country uses soft power instruments by creating soft power programs and funding them well. The longer this narrative persists over time, the resulting soft power programs will become bigger and a normal part of the country's foreign policy. In countries such as in New Zealand where some or all of these factors are missing, the country is expected to use less soft power.

In the next section first, I discuss Finland's and New Zealand's geopolitics with special attention to the perception of threat. Second, I turn to the narrative of the political elite to find out if it indicates a perception of threat and whether it constructs foreign policy goals that emphasize national security, alliance building and balancing. Third, I study soft power institutions and programs to see if they support the alliance building goals and to see if they have been in existence for a long time. Fourth, I collect budget information from each selected soft power programs and study the amount and the consistency of such budget allocations in order to establish if the budget is provided to support alliance building. In the conclusion, I trace the connection between the examined

factors and soft power use and answer the question: why does Finland (94%) use so much more soft power than New Zealand (68%)?

5.3 FINNISH SOFT POWER

The statistical analysis showed that Finland is one of the highest soft power user countries (94%). This means that, out of 100 international interactions, the Finnish government selects soft power instruments 94 times. Finland has been known for its stable government, high living standards, successful private companies such as ²²Nokia and video games like Angry Birds.

5.4 GEOPOLITICS OF FINLAND

Based on my theory, geopolitics impacts countries' foreign policy including its soft power use. For this reason, Finland is said to be one of the best cases to illustrate the influence of geopolitics in foreign policy (Moisio 1998). Finland's location on the map has been shaping its foreign policy even before the Cold War (Moisio 1998). Finland's geopolitical history with Russia began with the formation of the Finnish nation and territory as an autonomous quasi-state under the Russian Empire (1809-1917) (Moisio 1998) and continued with Finland's independence in 1917 (Browning 2002). During this time, Finnish autonomy was threatened by the rising Russian empire (Apunen and Rytövuori 1982). While Finland became an independent sovereign state in 1917, the Russian threat did not disappear.

In 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact, which included a secret protocol transferring Finland to the Soviet sphere of interest. When

²² While private soft power resources are also part of a country's soft power resources, this study focuses on the government soft power actions.

Finland refused to allow the Soviet Union to build military bases on its territory, the Soviets attacked Finland. The “Winter War” ended in a peace treaty drawn up in Moscow on March 13, 1940, giving southeastern Finland to the Soviet Union (This is Finland. History. 2019). The Soviets did not give up their future plans to occupy the Finnish capital until 1944. That is when the border between Finland and Russia were finalized based on the lines where the military front lines were stabilized late in summer of 1944 (Apunen and Rytövuori 1982). While Finland lost some of its territory, it was able to preserve its independence and was forced to handle the continued threat from Russia for the years to come.

After WWII, the Soviet leaders made it clear that they do not tolerate any hostile governments on their borders (Apunen and Rytövuori 1982). This approach was accepted at the Yalta conference (Tuomo 1980, Apunen and Rytövuori 1982). As a result of the great powers’ acceptance of such concept, in order to defend its autonomy from the Soviet Union, Finland carefully formulated a sophisticated foreign policy in 1948 (Apunen and Rytövuori 1982). According to this plan, Finland dealt with the perceived threat from the USSR by staying neutral and did not join the Western defense community (Apunen and Rytövuori 1982).

The Finnish proximity and history with Russia have led to the development of the perception of threat (Apunen and Rytövuori 1982, Moller and Bjereld 2010). Since Finland’s national security has been threatened for over two centuries by the Russian geographic proximity, the main Finnish foreign policy goal was to protect the country from an invasion by not provoking any forceful actions from Russia. And since Finland perceived Russia as a much stronger military power, Finland felt it had to balance against

Russia with its non-aggressive soft power tools. For this reason, the Finnish leadership decided to react to the perceived threat by building alliances with the West. As a result, Finland learned to use soft power to strengthen its alliances in order to protect itself from Russia (and the Soviet Union) (Apunen and Rytövuori 1982, Browning 2002).

5.5 THE FINNISH POLITICAL ELITE'S NARRATIVE-HOW FINLAND BALANCES WITH SOFT POWER

My theory suggests that the political elite's narrative plays a key role in countries' soft power use. As it was explained before, the Finnish political elite is expected to construct a narrative that directs Finnish foreign policy to alliance building against the perceived Russian threat. Specifically, in this section I am looking for indications of the Finnish elite's concern about the threat and the encouragement of international alliances. In other words, I am looking for indicators of the Finnish government's balancing with its soft power actions.

In Finland, presidents play a crucial role in foreign policy. As part of the political elite, their narrative is represented in the foreign policy formulation and their agendas and soft power policies can increase or decrease soft power use. Finland is a parliamentary representative democracy. The head of state is the President who is also in charge of foreign policy. This means that the use of soft power to achieve foreign policy goals is also vested in the hand of the President. This section will highlight some of the presidents' speeches to study if there is a national security threat present and if they were likely to rely on soft power instruments in order to create alliances. This section will also look at the alliance that were formed during this time-period to see if they were created to defend against the perceived Russian threat.

After Finland earned its independence from Russia in 1917, and later after WWII the great powers agreed that Finland cannot be allowed to become hostile to the USSR, it was the job of the Finnish presidents to promote a carefully designed foreign policy in which they do not provoke the aggressive Russian neighbor. As President Kekkonen said in 1956, Finland will not and cannot pursue good relations with the West at the expense of its relations with the Soviet Union (Apunen and Rytövuaki 1982).

As a result of the Russian threat, this carefully crafted foreign policy of balancing with Finnish soft power continued after the Cold War by future presidents with additional goals. The new Finnish foreign policy included an E.U. integration, increased engagement with international organizations and the support of an E.U. common security and defense policy in the form of peacekeeping operations (Palosaari 2013). All of these goals required high interactions with other countries.

President Ahtisaari was elected president (1994-2000) at a historical moment in Finland's life which also altered its foreign policy. This moment was Finland's E.U. membership in 1995 which also changed a policy of neutrality into a policy of E.U. integration (Browning 2008, Palosaari 2013). In terms of President's narrative in foreign policy, in 1994 he stated the following in light of its effort to gain E.U. membership:

“Yesterday's tools are not sufficient to solve the future's problems. [...] In history all upheavals had an impact on Finland's security. This was particularly true during and after the Second World War. Communism collapsed and the bipolar system yielded. [...]. New tools and new shared views are needed to deal with the new security challenges of Europe. [...] An important part of this Northern dimension is the 800 miles of land border that we share with Russia. With Finland in the E.U. and Russia will meet at this point. [...] Ladies and gentlemen, Finland is a firm advocate of cooperative security. [...] We favor closer cooperation and joint efforts by all democratic states not only in Europe but across the Atlantic and on the global level.” (Ahtisaari 1994)

The above-referenced speech illustrates President Ahtisaari's narrative about Finland's national security issues connected to Russia. More specifically the speech shows that the 800 miles of shared border between Russia and Finland together with Russia's historically aggressive behavior in the region still causes a perceived threat for the Finnish political elite. The speech also explains the government's new direction towards E.U. integration. Regarding the threat from Russia, a closer membership and cooperation with the European community strengthens Finnish alliances with all other 26 members and connects Finland with the West. In terms of soft power, this meant that President Ahtisaari's main foreign policy promoted soft power use with E.U. members as well as strengthened Finland's global mediator role on the world stage (Browning 2018).

The fact that during the Ahtisaari presidency Finland became member of the E.U and engaged in numerous crisis management and peacekeeping operations further illustrates this foreign policy shift (Browning 2008). Based on the conceptualization of this dissertation providing peacekeeping operations is a soft power action, Finland found another way to use soft power to build alliances without provoking Russia. For instance, some of these peace keeping operations included the Concordia operation in Macedonia in 2003 and the Althea operation in Bosnia in 2004 (Palosaari 2013). By actively supporting the stabilization of the Balkan, Finland showed that they were reliable partners of European nations. This tightened its alliances within Europe and signaled to the world that Finland is a reliable ally.

In terms of building new alliances, Finland continued to join alliances after the Cold War (Moller and Bjereld 2010). In fact, by 2000 the Correlates of War IGO (International Government Organization) data analysis concluded that Finland joined the

greatest number of alliances of all countries (Pevenhouse et al 2004). Stated differently, looking at the new alliance memberships of Finland, since the Cold War ended, the Finnish presidents' foreign policy encouraged and implemented high soft power use to build alliances regionally and globally.

Tarja Halonen (200-2012) followed Ahtisaari as President. She was a Foreign Minister before becoming the 11th President of Finland. In terms of using a narrative that points to the Russian threat, the below speech illustrates that national security has remained a key issue in her speeches as well. In a meeting of ambassadors in 2002, President Halonen stated the following about Finland's international engagement:

“I am a supporter of multilateralism on both a global and a European level. In the existing crisis-management tradition we have many actors. On the global level, the UN still holds an overwhelmingly dominant position. We are actively participating in the development of a common foreign and security policy.” (Halonen 2002)

As the above speech indicates, Halonen's foreign policy's general goal was to maximize Finnish influence abroad by using peaceful instruments (Haukkala 2010). Specifically, this meant that President Halonen's government used all diplomatic tools necessary to secure a seat at most international organizations, especially within the E.U. (Haukkala 2010). By achieving and strengthening Finland's E.U. membership, Halonen also strengthen Finland's connections and alliances within the European community. As the speech stated, one of Finland's main foreign policy goal is to keep working with international organizations. In the same speech Halonen also noted:

“I see Europe as being better at development work than at using force. It is better at managing crises than at waging wars. [...] Finland has been active, both alone and together with Sweden and other countries which are not members of military alliances, in the development of European security policy.[...] In reality, independently taking care of crisis management in Europe is already a very demanding task for the E.U. and its European partners, by which I mean also Russia.” (Halonen 2002)

President Halonen's preferences of non-coercive foreign policy tools have also been recorded (Doeser 2017). Specifically, Halonen continued the previous administration's peaceful approach and favored political, humanitarian and civilian efforts to resolve conflict, and while the narrative of threat and national security persisted, Finland's foreign policy direction also states the preference for non-hard power-based tools and demonstrates the goal of alliance building.

In terms of Finland's NATO membership, the issue had come up numerous times during Halonen's presidential campaign and during her tenure. Halonen and the Finnish leadership decided that Finland would not join NATO (Doeser 2017). It is interesting to note that due to its close location to Russia, Finland to date has still not joined NATO but instead focused its foreign policy towards promoting a strong international role for Finland²³ (Browning 2008). It must also be stated here that the last two presidents' speeches mention Russia as an important actor in the context of national security, crisis management and conflict. This suggests that the Finnish political elite continues to be worried about the Russian threat and this concern builds into their narratives and speeches.

Overall, by studying the political speeches of Finnish presidents as part of the political elite, it became apparent that they include national security as one of the main issues in foreign policy. The speeches also implied the Russian threat. In addition, they all favored an outgoing foreign policy in which Finland builds alliances in Western

23 Also important to note that slightly before the time-frame of this dissertation, based on COW data, Finland has only signed one military agreement, and that was a non-aggression agreement with Russia in 1992. This agreement allowed Finland to proceed towards its E.U. membership. It can also be seen as a great foreign policy win for Finland as she was able to influence Russia to sign such as non-aggression agreement.

Europe and beyond (Doeser 2017). In terms of soft power actions, this meant that the presidents were creating the narrative that encouraged soft power actions to engage with the world in order to build alliances. These narratives ultimately resulted in high soft power use.

5.6 SOFT POWER PROGRAMS AND INSTITUTIONS OF FINLAND

My theory suggests that in countries where there is a perception of threat, the political elite creates a narrative that leads to the creation of soft power institutions and programs with the goal of strengthening alliances. My theory also suggests that by balancing with soft power, the creation of such programs ultimately can lead to institutional and political commitment to use high level of soft power in foreign policy. For this reason, in this section I identify the Finnish soft power institutions and programs, discuss the reasons they were created and trace how the programs have developed over time. The goal is to reveal any connections between the elite's narrative about national security issues caused by the Russians and the level of soft power use via these institutions.

In order to better understand the Finnish government's strategic priorities in soft power and to find out if there is an institutional and political commitment to high soft power use in this section, I turn to the analysis of soft power programs to reveal which Finnish programs support alliance building using soft power tools. I also study the time-span of the programs to find out if they have been in existence for a long-time. In order to do so, I collect information from various government websites and from federal budget

documents about the Finnish government's long-term programs²⁴. In addition, I refer to articles on foreign policy analysis to evaluate Finnish soft power use facilitated by government programs.

Even though there is no specific soft power program or department within the Finnish government, the evaluation of the below listed programs reveals their soft power elements. In the Finnish government's budget documents, I found that some of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' (MFA) programs and some of the Ministry of Education and Culture's (MEC) programs were compatible with my soft power definition. The following list presents the found soft power institutions and programs starting with the oldest and ending with the newest.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs Programs (MFA)

- The Foreign Service (1918)
- International Development Cooperation (1988)
- Neighboring Area Cooperation (short-term)
- Civilian Crisis Management (1990s)
- Cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and other CIS Countries (short-term)
- Commercial-Industrial Cooperation (short-term)
- Unit for Public Diplomacy (2008)

Ministry of Education and Culture Programs (MEC)

- The Sports Department (1966)
- Art and Culture (1974)
- International Cooperation (1974)
 - Finnish Cultural and Academic Institute (2005)
- Cultural, Museum and Library Activities (1990s)

As this list of soft power programs show, in Finland there are 2 ministries and 12 programs that are practicing soft power in order to support Finnish foreign policy efforts.

24 There are also short-term programs such as Neighboring Area Cooperation, Cooperation with Central and Eastern European, Russia and CIS Countries, Commercial-Industrial Cooperation. These programs were only created for a few years and then were discontinued.

In the next section, I will evaluate the 2 ministries (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Education and Culture) to reveal how they facilitate Finnish soft power use with their long-term programs²⁵.

5.6.1 MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the main Finnish institution that is designed to support the Finnish government's foreign policy including its soft power use. This means that while not all of the Ministry's programs use soft power abroad, the selected programs use soft power to achieve foreign policy goals. In the next section, I will evaluate the main mission of each ministry looking for the goal of alliance building, reveal the year it was created and discuss some of their programs that use soft power.

According to the official website of the MFA of Finland, their central task is to build a secure and predictable future for all Finns (Finland. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mission. 2019). In addition, part of the mission statement on the ministry's website also explains the country's foreign and security policy which focus on preserving Finland's independence.

The establishment of Finnish Foreign Affairs representation started very early, during the imperial Russia's rule over Finland. While Finland was not an independent sovereign country yet, Finns used the diplomatic services of the Russian embassies as early as 1858 (The History of Foreign Affairs Administration in Finland). The independent Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs was first created in 1918, under the name of Foreign Affairs Bureau right after Finland became an independent country (The

²⁵ The short-term programs will not be discussed as they do not represent well the long-term soft power plans of the government as soft power is not a short-term solution.

History of Foreign Affairs Administration 1). The Ministry's goals were to organize Finland's official relations with the foreign media and to spread general information about the country, its people, history, culture and the economy (Clerk 2014, Clerk 2015, Ipatti 2018). These functions promoted Finnish attractiveness abroad and its ability to strengthened alliances since 1918. Creating these soft power programs built a strong foundation for Finnish soft power use in foreign policy.

Between 1918 and 1955, the Finnish MFA continued to strengthen its cultural relations with the West while dealing with the Russian threat from the East. From the late 1930s through the end of the Cold War, two main factors impacted Finnish soft power use abroad. These were the Soviet Union's attack in 1939 and the diplomatic and strategic balancing of Finland's neutrality during the Cold War (Clerk 2015, Sberro 2015). During the Cold War the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' goal was to communicate Finland's political neutrality while maintain its cultural ties with the West by projecting its attractiveness (Browning 2002, Clerc 2015, Ipatti 2018). Maintaining cultural ties and projecting Finnish attractiveness are key aspects government's strategic use of soft power in order to balance against the Russian threat and build alliances with the West.

The duties related to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs increased greatly from 1955 for three reasons. With new independent countries emerging after decolonization of French, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese and British colonies, Finland began to establish political and commercial relations beyond the borders of Europe. Also, Finnish international cooperation started to expand from the traditional areas into science, technology, education and social affairs. In terms of foreign policy this meant that Finland's overall strategy with its hard power was to bandwagon with the USSR, but with

its soft power it was to balance against it. For this reason, Finland needed a robust ministry to handle its international negotiations and its soft power use.

After Finland's accession to the United Nations in 1955, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' involvement with various international and regional organizations, including economic cooperation programs greatly increased. Even more importantly for soft power use, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1987 and 1988, new departments were created to support development, cooperation, press, and culture (The History of Foreign Affairs Administration 1). These functions are the core of soft power use. As a result, in 1988 the Department for Development Cooperation was created and became the first soft power program within the MFA.

5.6.1.2 FOREIGN SERVICE

The other major department within the MFA that supports Finnish soft power use is the Foreign Service. While the main mission of the Foreign Service is to conduct traditional diplomacy, it is also the most visible outposts of Finnish foreign policy conducted abroad. The Finnish Foreign Service was first created in 1918 with the formation of the Foreign Affairs Bureau to support the foreign missions and their diplomats abroad (The History of Foreign Affairs 1). The official government website describes the following as the Finnish Foreign Services strategic priorities: Foreign and security policy aims to strengthen Finland's international position, desires to secure Finland's independence and regional integrity (Strategic Priorities 1). In order to achieve these goals, diplomats and other foreign service personnel are carrying out the Finnish foreign policy objectives abroad by relying on traditional diplomatic tools as well as soft power tools.

In terms of soft power use, in addition to traditional diplomatic missions, the Finish MFA has clearly stated that Finland wants to be a key player in the global community by supporting attractive global issues such as global warming and poverty. By supporting global problems Finland also works in cooperation with other governments organizations thus strengthening its international alliances (Moller and Bjereld 2010).

5.6.1.3 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The Department for Development Cooperation (DDC) was created in 1988 within the MFA and to date serves as the first Finnish soft power program within the MFA. The Program of International Development Cooperation ensures that Finland implements its development policy by cooperating with international partners, including international organizations and NGOs, in order to achieve development goals (Goals and Principles 1). As the official website of the MFA states, via development cooperation, Finland has been strengthening its dialog with international organizations and with its allies (Goals and Principles 1). In terms of Finnish soft power use, this means that Finland has been relying on its development policy's execution to strengthen its alliances internationally and regionally. With close cooperation with the United Nations, Finland also strengthens its role in the global community which is also the largest international alliance in the world.

5.6.1.4 CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Finland takes an active part in international civilian crisis management since the beginning of 1990's implemented by the European union (EU), the United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO and the European Council (EC) (Crisis Management Finland 1).The objective is to promote development

towards respect for the rule of law and human rights, democracy, good governance and a well-functioning civil society in the target regions. The MFA is responsible for the political guidance of civilian crisis management and decides in which operations Finnish experts participate (Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Crisis Management 1). Civilian crisis management operations are conducted in crisis areas and other regions in which the most critical functions of society are in need. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Crisis Management 1). By providing assistance to countries in crisis, Finland strengthens its international role as a reliable ally. By focusing on the civilian aspect of crisis management, the Finnish government is using its careful strategy to balance against the Russian force.

5.6.1.5 UNIT FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The MFA's Public Diplomacy program has been renamed many times, but since 2008 it has been called the Unit for Public Diplomacy. This department plans the Finnish country branding in the foreign service (Finland. Unit for Public Diplomacy 1). Finnish public diplomacy (which is a form of soft power use) is a type of strategic communication in order to strengthen international networks in various sectors such as in cultural exports, education, innovation policy, immigration, or even in the environmental field. This work is accomplished through media and culture in addition to other means of promotion and influence. The emphasis and strategic application of public diplomacy is an important factor that suggest the Finnish government's ability to rely on soft power instruments in its foreign policies. The creation of the Unit for Public Diplomacy in 2008 also indicates that the Finnish government has been strategically using soft power instruments in their foreign policies, and they plan to continue to do so.

The MFA has been overseeing other important short-term soft power programs as well including the Neighboring Cooperation, Cooperation with Central and Eastern European, Russia and other CIS Countries, and the Commercial-Industrial Cooperation. As this brief historical overview of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' programs revealed, the Finnish government had over 31 (since 1988) years to develop its institutions and foreign policy mechanism for representing the Finnish interest abroad using soft power. As the above overview also revealed, Finland's main foreign policy goals of connecting with the West and building alliances (Sberro 2007, Browning 2008). All these foreign policy goals require the existence of many programs, which overall boosts soft power use.

5.6.2 MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE (MEC)

The second ministry that actively supports soft power programs to achieve foreign policy goals is the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC). The formation of Finnish international cultural policy goes back to the 1970s. In 1974 the Bill for the Promotion of Municipal Cultural Activities articulated three objectives, one of which was the promotion of international cultural cooperation (Kangas 2001). Later in 1999, the new directions of cultural policy, especially regarding the role of the cultural industries in a strategy of economic development were also written into the official program by the Finnish government (1999). According to this new direction, art played a crucial role in Finland's international outreach (Kangas 2001) and as such enhanced soft power use.

The MEC is responsible for the development of education, science, cultural, sport, and youth policies and for strengthening international cooperation in these fields. One of their foreign policy objectives is to promote international cooperation (Ministry of

Education and Culture 2019). The Ministry outlines national policy concerning cooperation with international organizations, culture, youth, sports, and certain fields of research. In international affairs, MEC participates in the work of major international organizations and regional councils, implements programs and initiatives nationally, and supports cultural cooperation and expatriate activities (Ministry of Education and Culture 2019).

Under MEC there are numerous programs whose mission is to use Finnish soft power in in foreign policy. Some of these initiatives are Art and Culture, The Sports Department, International Cooperation and the Cultural Museums and Library Activities. The next section will review the history and mission of these programs in order to reveal their alliance building purposes.

5.6.2.1 SPORTS DEPARTMENT

The Department for Cultural, Sport and Youth Policy was created in 1966 as an Arts Office within the MEC (Kangas 2001). In terms of using sports to achieve foreign policy goals, the MEC states that the focus in cooperative efforts has been on strengthening the integrity in sports; the promotion of equal rights; anti-doping activities; the prevention of spectator violence; and issues related to the status of athletes within Europe as well as globally. MEC further emphasizes its role in international organizations in sport-related cooperation. Stated differently, the underlying objective of the Sport Department is to appeal to other countries with its focus on the ethical and performance-based regulation and drug freeness of sports.

In terms of international interactions and objectives related to MEC, Finland's most important cooperation organizations are the European Union, the Council of Europe

and UNESCO (United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organization). While Finland stresses that the main goals of athletic cooperation are to coordinate and harmonize the sport-related policies and practices within the E.U., by investing into such goals they are also using sports as a soft power tool to interact with other European nations. Therefore, with sports Finland does not have any global ambitions, it only uses it to strengthen its European alliances.

5.6.2.2 ART AND CULTURE

Arts and Culture section of the MEC has been in existence since the 1974 with the objective of strengthening international cooperation by using Finnish arts and culture (Kangas 2001). This function also made the Arts and Culture Program the MEC's first Finnish soft power initiative. Before Finland's membership into the E.U. (in 1995), this function of the MEC focused on connecting Finland with Western countries. After 1995, the Arts and Culture concentrated on reaching and connecting with the other members of the E.U. Arts and Culture works to promote and fund cultural exchange, cooperation between operators and actors working in different art forms and the distribution of works among the E.U. members states. Thus, Arts and Culture program within MEC works to strengthen Finland's alliances with the other E.U. members using the cultural aspects of soft power since 1974. This makes this program (together with the International Cooperation) the oldest soft power initiative within the MEC.

5.6.2.3 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The MEC's international cooperation function is responsible for the coordination of Finland's international cooperation in arts and culture since 1974. Specifically, Finland cooperates with UNESCO, the Council of Europe, the Nordic Council of Ministers and

the Nordic Culture Fund, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and their cultural bodies as well as their neighboring areas (Ministry of Education and Culture/The E.U. and International Cooperation in Arts and Culture 1). The International Cooperation function reaches countries inside and outside of the E.U. with the ultimate goal to strengthening cooperation and alliances.

5.6.2.4. FINNISH CULTURAL AND ACADEMIC INSTITUTE

One of the newer programs created under the MEC's International Cooperation initiative is the Finnish Cultural and Academic Institute. This Finnish network of 17 institutes was created in 2005 with the goal to increase the recognition of Finnish culture, art and science in strategically important countries and promote cultural exchange and cooperation as well as field-specific research and teaching abroad (Ministry of Education and Culture/The E.U. and International Cooperation in Arts and Culture 1). This is also the program that is designed to reach countries outside of the E.U. Some of the cities where the Finnish Cultural and Academic Institute is hosted that are not E.U. members are Beirut, St. Petersburg and Tokyo (Ministry of Education and Culture/The E.U. and International Cooperation in Arts and Culture 1).

5.6.2.5 CULTURAL, MUSEUM AND LIBRARY ACTIVITIES

When it comes to international cooperation in the library field, since the early 1990s the role of the Ministry of Education and Culture's Cultural, Museum and Library Activities has been to strengthen the cooperation within E.U. members (Finland. EU and International Cooperation 1). Finland has two mobile libraries as well. These mobile libraries contain materials in Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish and Saami (Finland. EU and International Cooperation 1). As this brief description showed, with the museum and

library activities Finland only works to strengthen its alliances with other E.U. members and the Nordic states (Taraskina 2009).

Overall, as the listed foreign affairs and cultural programs indicated, Finland has created its foreign affairs institutions as early as 1918 with the purpose of connecting diplomatically and culturally with the West as well as strengthen its alliances abroad. In terms soft power programs, the MEC's Arts and Culture initiatives were created in 1974, which ultimately grew into the Finnish Cultural and Academic Institute in 2005. The MFA's initial soft power institution was the Foreign Service (created in 1918), which by 1988 developed into the International Development Program. Both ministries work together to achieve Finnish foreign policy goals by using soft power programs.

The early establishments of these government institutions strongly supported its strategic use of soft power programs starting in 1974 all over the world, which also lead to institutional commitment to rely on them. The descriptions and the timeline of the creation of the foreign affairs and cultural programs further revealed that Finland has a 45-year history relying on cultural tools, and a 31-year history in using economic aid as foreign policy soft power tools. As the listed programs indicated, as a reaction to a perceived threat from Russia, Finland's political elite directed Finnish foreign policy towards a strategic application of soft power with the goal of strengthening alliances with the West. This foreign policy was built on high soft power use abroad.

5.7 FINLAND'S SOFT POWER BUDGET

In the last section of this most-similar case design, I turn to the closer analysis of Finland's soft power budget. Based on my theory, due to the political elite's narrative about a perceived threat, in countries where there is a strong military power nearby, a

high soft power budget is calculated into country's federal budget as a defense mechanism that is aimed at building alliances. This section will look into the Finnish soft power budget to see if there is a high soft power budget allocation due to the perceived threat of Russia.

In 1998 the total budget of Finland was \$69.9 Billion (USD) (Statistics Finland 2019) of which 1.6 Billion USD was spent on soft power programs²⁶. The amount of USD is just important as the size of this budget compared to the entire government budget. The percentage of soft power use indicates the size of the government's investment into soft power use as oppose to all other budget items. 1.6 Billion USD indicates that the soft power budget allocation was 2.2% of the total budget. In 2010, the total annual budget of Finland was \$113.7 Billion (USD) (Statistics Finland 2019) of which they spent an average of \$2.9 Billion on soft power annually. That figure represents 2.5% of the total budget.

The soft power budget of Finland was calculated by adding up the budgets of all of the programs that qualified as a soft power programs within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and selected programs from the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) (see Figure 5.1 for complete list). The original Finnish budget data was provided in Euros which was converted in USD with the fix rate of (1.11)²⁷. These budget items allocated to these two ministries support the Finnish government's ability to use soft power actions²⁸.

26 The reason the detailed budget analysis does not start at 1995, is that program level data was not available until 1998.

27 The original Finnish budget data was also received in Finnish so using google translate, I translated each budget item into English.

28 The Unit for Public Diplomacy receives its funding through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 2008 and it is included under the Other Expenditure item.

In order to better understand the way Finland allocates its budget for soft power, Figure 5.1 shows the money allocation for all soft power programs allocated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Culture. The highest soft power budget receiver is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The selected soft power programs within the (MFA) collect about twice as much funding as the selected programs of the Ministry for Culture and Education (MCE). These soft power programs ensure Finland's attractiveness abroad as well as the government's continuous reliance on soft power actions such as consult, host a visit, and express intent to meet and negotiate.

Studying further Finland's program-level budget information (Figure 5.1), it is revealed that the most well-funded soft power activities are: International Development Cooperation; Art and Culture: The Foreign Service and the Sports Department (Finnish Budget 1995-2010). Looking at the distribution of funding within the MFA, we can see that the International Development Cooperation receives the most funding (average 523 Million USD) followed by Arts and Culture from the MEC (average of 376 Million USD). Scholars have noted that Finland historically spends a lot of its budget on culture (Kangas 2001) and this budget showed that they also use culture as a soft power tool in foreign policy.

In terms of the consistency of funding, 9 out of 12 receive a consistent amount each year as those are planned to be long-term programs. The three programs that receive 0 USD for selected years are: 1: the Commercial and Industrial Cooperation program, which only received funding in 1998; 2) the Cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Other CIS Countries program, which was only funded for the years of 1998-2001 and; 3) the Neighboring Area Cooperation, which only receiving funding

from 2001 to 2008. All of these programs were designed to be short-term and were discontinued, while the nine other programs continued to be well-funded.




Figure 5.1 Finland’s Program-Level Soft Power Budget 1995-2010 Sorted in the Order of Highest to Lowest Budget.

With respect to Finland’s total soft power budget during the 1995-2010 time-period, as Figure 5.2 shows, Finland provides consistent and slightly increasing funding for its soft power programs. While the lowest budget was allocated in 1998 in the amount of 1.6 Billion USD, Finland has increased its soft power budget until 2008, when it has reached its highest value of 3.1 Billion USD. Figure 5.2 also shows the soft power budget

allocation for each ministry. Not surprisingly, MEC gets about twice as much funding as the MFA. As it has been pointed out, Finland has been known to spend high on its culture and education, and it is not any different in its foreign policy either.




Figure 5.2 Finland’s Ministry-Level and Total Soft Power Budget for 1995-2010 in Billions of U.S. Dollars Including the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Education and Culture’s (MEC) Selected Programs.

In terms of the total amount of money allocated for soft power programs within these ministries, this amount represents roughly 2.2 % of Finland’s total budget between 1998 and 2010. The collected soft power budget also revealed that Finland does not shy away from spending money on long-term soft power programs, and the consistent budget allocated to these two ministries suggests that Finland will continue to spend money on its soft power with elevated focus on cultural programs.

Overall, observing four new indicators (geopolitical threat, political elite’s narrative, historical analysis of soft power programs, and the soft power budget allocation), it can be concluded that in terms of geopolitics, the Russian threat has

increased Finnish soft power use as the Finnish **political elite** constructed a narrative that continued to remind of the Russian threat and encouraged the Finnish government to balance against Russia (using soft power tools) with alliance building.

The **soft power programs** are over 45 years old and have been used to strengthen Finland's foreign policy. The continuation of 9 out of 12 programs also suggests path-dependence, which self-enforcing lock-in mechanism ensures the future of the soft power programs. The old institutions provided support for the soft power programs and facilitated soft power actions all over the world resulting in an institutional commitment to use soft power.

Finally, the foreign policy **budget** allocation revealed that the political elite's narrative about the Russian threat has been increasing the use of soft power in foreign policy. The relatively high (2.2% of total budget) soft power budget allocation of Finland, also revealed path-dependence, which self-enforcing mechanism further enhances the country's soft power actions abroad. Stated differently, in Finland the theorized mechanism of the geopolitical threat's enhancing impact on soft power use has been confirmed.

5.8 GEOPOLITICS OF NEW ZEALAND

The second country in this most-similar case design is New Zealand. New Zealand is a small, trade-dependent, geographically isolated country (Buchanan 2010). Geopolitically New Zealand is in a very different situation than Finland. While Finland is sharing borders with its neighbors (including Russia), New Zealand is an island nation at the southwestern edge of the Pacific Ocean, lying around 994 miles from the nearest foreign landmass and 1,500 miles away from Australia. Its only neighbor is

Australia, which country does not pose any threat to New Zealand. This means that in the case of New Zealand, the government has not been threatened by a large military power.

In addition, historically New Zealand's has been part of the United Kingdom's Commonwealth since 1840 but has a unique relationship with Britain. New Zealand had secure economic ties with Britain (until 1973) and at the same time, it is located at a great distance from the center of the Empire (Buchanan 2010). These geopolitical factors allowed New Zealand from the early twentieth century a high degree of independence and flexibility (Buchanan 2010). In terms of geopolitical threat, New Zealand did not have to protect its independence from any invaders, and only had to be concerned with domestic issues such as the support of its native populations (Māoris). Stated differently, due to the lack of any existential geopolitical threat, according to my theory, New Zealand's political elite did not have the need to develop a narrative addressing an imminent threat, therefore, alliance building using soft power was also not needed.

5.9 NEW ZEALAND'S SOFT POWER

The statistical analysis of this dissertation concluded that New Zealand is one of the lowest users of soft power actions (68%). This means that, out of 100 international interactions, New Zealand will only rely on soft power actions 68 times. Since this is one of the lowest levels among the studied 51 democracies, this qualitative analysis will look into the potential indicators of such low soft power reliance.

The New Zealand government's strategic use of soft power has been a young phenomenon. Before the 1990s, New Zealand was mostly known for spectacular scenery, natural beauty, Kiwi birds, and its indigenous Māori culture, but not for its constant international reach and efforts to build alliances in foreign policy.

5.10 THE POLITICAL ELITE'S NARRATIVE

According to my theory, in countries where there is no geopolitical threat, the political elite does not need to create a narrative that emphasizes national security in their programs and institutions, which leads to lower use of soft power. New Zealand is a constitutional monarchy, which means that the Prime Minister has the most political power including the decision to decide how much to rely on soft power. In order to connect New Zealand's soft power use with its political elite, the next section will look at Prime Ministers' narrative about national security issues. If my theory is correct, in New Zealand there is no imminent national security issue that would threaten the existence of the country, which also means that New Zealand does not need to rely on high soft power us to build alliances.

In order to study the main national security issues in New Zealand, I looked at the specific topics that Prime Ministers discuss under national security. Since WWII, the main security issue has been the desire to ban nuclear testing in the pacific region. In 1963 Prime Minister Holyoake said the following in a parliamentary debate:

"[...] the New Zealand government has received the news that a partial nuclear test ban treaty has been initiated in Moscow by British, United States and Soviet negotiators. Beyond a doubt this represents the most important step taken post-war disarmament discussion. Because of the obvious difficulties of in the way of rapid progress toward general disarmament, which is and must remain our aim, the New Zealand Government has joined with many other governments in advocating the urgent need to conclude a test ban treaty." (Holyoake 1963, 856)

As Prime Minister Holyoake later explains in the same speech, New Zealand's main concern with nuclear weapons was not existential, instead they were worried about possible radioactive fallout of the tests and the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries in the region. As this example illustrates, the political elite did not feel threatened by any imminent existential threat. And while the banning of nuclear testing from the territory of New Zealand was a key foreign policy issue for the political elite starting in the 1960s, it did not directly threaten the independence or the existence of New Zealand, thus the narrative only had to focus on the collective good aspect of a potential test ban treaty.

In terms of threat perception, nothing has changed in the next two decades. In the 1980s Prime Minister Robert Muldoon's 1980 observation that "our foreign policy is trade" also pointed to New Zealand's lack of any geopolitical threats (New Zealand Institute of International Affairs 2019). Years later, taking a closer look at the New Zealand's political elite's narrative in 1997, Prime Minister Bolger' said the following about China:

"China is now New Zealand's fifth largest market. Our relationship has also facilitated links in other areas: in science and technology, in education, in sport and cultural activities. We have exchanged not just goods but services, human resources and capital. The strength of the relationship owes much to the complementary way our two countries have each developed over the past quarter century." (Bolger 1997)

As this speech reveals, New Zealand does not feel threatened by China's military power. In fact, according to this speech, the two countries have a close economic relationship and a strong social connection. Addressing the relationship between another potential military threat, namely Japan, Prime Minister Shipley stated the following in 1999:

“In the case of New Zealand and Japan we have moved from two countries who hardly knew each other, to regional partners. Around the region, we are entering a new millennium woven together by a wide and colorful fabric of people to people links, trade, investment and an emerging sense of being an Asia Pacific community.” (Shipley 1999)

Similarly to Prime Minister Bolger's speech earlier, Prime Minister Shipley's narrative also confirms a strong social and economic link between New Zealand and Japan without the perception of any threat from the military power. Moving on to the 2000s, the one threat identified in some of Prime Minister Clark's speeches in 2000 was globalization:

“New Zealand, as a small nation ‘surrounded by the images and perceptions of others, was particularly vulnerable to cultural globalization but insisted that we are not a suburb of Los Angeles, London or Sydney.’ (Clark 2000, 1)

As a result of the Clark policies, by 2004 the Ministry for Culture and Heritage stated that in a “globalized world it is all the more important that people are able to assert their own unique identity.” (11) The ministry wanted to provide necessary protection against the threat of global cultural homogenization (Goff 2000). As this example shows, in 2000 the only threat identified in the political elite's narrative in New Zealand was globalization, which again, is not an existential threat. Globalization merely impacts

culture, identity and lifestyle, which is why the Clark Administration focused its narrative on protecting New Zealand's culture.

Similarly, to the listed predecessors, Prime Minister Key has named non-proliferation as well as trade and regional cooperation as New Zealand's main foreign policy objectives and did not talk about national security threats. Continuing his predecessor's foreign policies, in a speech delivered in 2008 Prime Minister Key stated:

"I said I did not believe there would be major changes in our international relationships under a National Government, and that New Zealand's nuclear-free legislation should remain." (Key 2008)

In terms of alliance building, New Zealand is a member of the UN, which makes the government set objectives that include the goals of the UN as well.

"New Zealand has contributed troops and personnel to UN peacekeeping operations since they began in 1948. We've been involved in more than 40 peace operations in more than 25 countries over the past seven decades, either under UN auspices or as part of coalitions. In peacekeeping duties we're known as collaborative, practical and respectful team players with a good understanding of multiculturalism and an easy rapport with local communities." (New Zealand. Peace Rights and Security. 2019)

Providing peacekeeping forces and humanitarian aid are definitely soft power actions, and as the official foreign policy website has shown, New Zealand has been utilizing these types of soft power. For example, in the 1990s, New Zealand participated in numerous peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Cambodia, Kosovo, East Timor and in the Asia-Pacific region (McGraw 2000). These missions were conducted for two reasons: 1) to demonstrate New Zealand's international commitment to security issues to its allies, and; 2) to strengthen its regional economic connections (McCraw 2000).

In addition, in 1951 New Zealand joined ANZUS, which was a military alliance with the U.S. and Australia to protect the security of the Pacific. In 1984 the ANZUS Treaty began to unravel when New Zealand declared its country a nuclear-free zone and

refused to allow U.S. nuclear-powered submarines to visit its ports, and on September 17, 1986, the United States suspended its treaty obligations toward New Zealand (Office of the Historian 1). Even though New Zealand has been unprotected by ANZUS since 1986, she has not joined any other military alliances, which also indicates that they do not feel threatened by any of the military powers in the region.

In summary, the listed Prime Ministers and their foreign policy narratives made it clear that New Zealand was living in peace with its neighbor and with the regional hegemons. Without the perception of any threat in the region, New Zealand's political elite did not turn its foreign policy towards national security and alliance building but rather focused on tightening the economic relations within the region, especially with China and Japan. Two national security issues that were uncovered by the analysis were nonproliferation and globalization.

While the resolution of these issues requires some soft power use, based on the analysis of the above-listed political leaders, New Zealand's political elite did not create a narrative that would encourage more alliance building in addition to the existing alliances. Instead, the political elite promoted strengthening existing economic relationships in the region, which required a low degree of soft power. Further, since 2000 New Zealand's foreign policy goal also included protecting the country's culture from globalization. This goal also required very low or no soft power use abroad. For the listed reasons, New Zealand did not need to build a high level of soft power use into its institutions and into its foreign policy.

5.11 SOFT POWER INSTITUTIONS OF NEW ZEALAND

In order to learn more about the possible indicators of New Zealand's low soft power use, I turn to the closer study of its institutions. In the following section using historical analysis, I identify and describe the soft power government programs of New Zealand to uncover when they were created and for what reason. In New Zealand, I found 9 programs within two ministries that carry the mission of soft power. These are:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (selected programs) (MFAT)

- Administration of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities (1968)
- Subscriptions to International Organizations (1968)
- Pacific Cooperation Foundation (1989)
- Promotion of Asian Skills and Relationships (1991)
- Policy Advice and Representation - Other Countries (1998)
- Policy Advice and Representation - International Institutions (1998)
- Hosting of Pacific Islands Forum Meeting (MFAT) (short-term)
- International Radio Services (MFAT) (short-term)

Ministry for Culture and Heritage (selected program) (MCH)

- Cultural Diplomacy International Program (2007)

In order to better understand the goals of each ministry that funded the selected soft power programs, I went to the official websites as well as read the New Zealand treasury's budget documents for each year. In addition, I collected foreign policy analysis articles written about such programs and government goals.

5.11.1 THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE (MFAT)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) was created in 1943 with the purpose of making New Zealand more prosperous and safer (2019). As indicated in the MFAT's 2003 budget, the specific goal of this section of the government was the active and constructive engagement on political, security, and economic issues within the Asia-Pacific region, through strengthened bilateral relationships with key partners (particularly

Australia, Japan, and the United States) and through participation in regional groupings (Treasury New Zealand 2003 p.4).

The appropriations of the MFAT programs aimed to secure advice and services for the government's businesses with foreign countries and their governments, and with international organizations. MFAT contributes to the achievement of key government goals through the pursuit of activities which strengthen national identity, promote an inclusive, innovative economy for the benefit of all, protect and enhance the environment, and restore trust in government (p. 4). When listing the eight strategic goals of MFAT, the list includes the goal of strengthening and protecting the use of international rules and institutions to pursue New Zealand values and interests, but it mostly focuses on regional economic development and territorial security (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2019).

In 1995, the government also announced that New Zealand's diplomatic representation would be strengthened in Asia in the following cities: Beijing, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Seoul (McCraw 2000). In 1995, New Zealand opened an embassy in Hanoi to strengthen trade with Vietnam (McCraw 2000). This meant that the foreign policy goals of New Zealand remained strictly regional and with an economic focus. As the previous examples demonstrated, the MFAT's main foreign goal is to create economically beneficial partnerships mostly in Asia (New Zealand. Aid and Development. 2019). The missions and activities of the Ministry are crucial in facilitating soft power use abroad.

5.11.1.2 SUBSCRIPTION TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

In accordance with the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968, this section and payments is responsible for using soft power with international organization by maintaining a good relationship with organizations such as the UN (United Nations), the Commonwealth Secretariat, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Budget 1998 p. 186). By promoting a positive relationship and facilitating communication between New Zealand and large multinational organizations, New Zealand is increasing its attractiveness with other countries as well as with the organizations. In terms of the political elite's narrative, membership to international organizations helps New Zealand to strengthen its economic connections with its regional trading partners thus improving New Zealand's position in the regional market.

5.11.1.3 ADMINISTRATION OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

Since the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act of 1968, another special section that was created focuses on administering special privileges and diplomatic immunities to diplomats of other countries. Specifically, this program enhancement of New Zealand's political and economic relationships with other countries by providing diplomatic privileges (New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Budget 1998, p. 191). This is an important aspect of New Zealand's soft power use, as providing diplomatic benefits to representatives from other countries enhances its attractiveness abroad. This gesture provides additional benefits to traditional diplomacy because not only the

receiving country's perception of New Zealand increases but also all those countries' who are aware of the list of countries' who were provided the diplomatic privileges.

5.11.1.4 PACIFIC COOPERATION FOUNDATION

Established in 1989, this program ensures that New Zealand is pressing for practical economic benefits from the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process, asserting New Zealand's role in the wider Asia Pacific region by: strengthening key bilateral linkages with Asia Pacific states; actively engaging in regional political groupings and working closely with Australia and South Pacific countries to address neighborhood issues (New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Budget 1998 p. 189). According to the official website of the foundation, the ultimate goal of this foundation is to promote connected, informed and enabled communities in the Pacific region by implementing public/private sector economic development and socio-cultural initiatives in the Pacific region (Pacific Cooperation Foundation 1). This program became New Zealand first soft power program within the MFAT.

5.11.1.5 PROMOTION OF ASIA SKILLS AND RELATIONSHIPS

In order to reach out to strategic partners, the government set up and substantially funded the Asia 2000 Foundation starting in 1991, which administered programs that helped the business sector to operate in Asia, promoted Asian studies in New Zealand, supported cultural links and media coverage of Asia and helped greater knowledge and acceptance of Asia among New Zealanders (McKinnon 1993). In terms of soft power use, this was New Zealand's the second set of programs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade that was designed to use soft power to achieve foreign policy goals.

The Asia 2000 Foundation focused its foreign policy instruments to strengthen its economic relationship with its non-threatening regional partners.

5.11.1.6 POLICY ADVICE AND REPRESENTATION-OTHER COUNTRIES

Since 1998, this group of programs has been created to improved conditions for New Zealand's trade and economic growth – focusing especially on Asia and the Pacific - through regional and bilateral mechanisms, including APEC. The other function of these programs is to maintain New Zealand's role in the South Pacific and the close relationships with Australia and South Pacific countries. In addition, these programs work to enhance New Zealand's political and economic relationships and high-level contacts with other key countries in Asia, the Americas, Europe, Africa and the Middle East (New Zealand Budget 1998 p.1990).

5.11.1.7 POLICY ADVICE AND REPRESENTATION-INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Based on the budget documents of New Zealand, this budget item was created in 1998 to improved conditions for New Zealand's trade and economic growth through multilateral mechanisms, including the WTO. This set of programs increased New Zealand contributions to collective security through cooperation with allied and friendly nations, a positive role in the UN, strengthening of the UN system and the rule of law, and participation in peacekeeping, disarmament, humanitarian and regional security networks. Finally, this initiative also supported New Zealand's interests in the development of international action, both multilateral and regional, for the protection of the environment (New Zealand Budget 1998, p.191).

5.11.2 MINISTRY FOR CULTURE AND HERITAGE (MCH)

The other Ministry in New Zealand that funds soft power programs is the Ministry for Culture and Heritage. The history of this Ministry goes back to 1963, when the first ministry to oversee art was created under the name of Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council of New Zealand²⁹. The purpose of this royal council was to support high art (classical music, ballet, literature etc.) and make it widely accessible domestically (Skilling 2005). In other words, the purpose of this council was to get the people in New Zealand cultured (Skilling 2005). Such was the government's growing interest in the cultural sector that, in 1975, a ministerial portfolio for the arts was established (Volkerling 2010). This was coordinated by the Department of Internal Affairs until 1991, when a separate department, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs was created.

In the previous year's arts and cultures were not strategically applied in foreign policy. In 2000, there was a change in New Zealand's political elite's narrative as well as in its foreign policy. With the leadership of Prime Minister Clark, the Ministry for Culture and Heritage (MCH) was established not only to support and protect domestic culture from globalization, but also to rebrand New Zealand as unique, welcoming and innovative in order to improve the country's position in the global market. MCH was created by bringing together the Ministry of Cultural Affairs with the history and heritage functions of the Department of Internal Affairs. The core functions of this ministry were to strengthen New Zealand's modern image abroad and to protect New Zealand's culture

²⁹ The involvement of New Zealand governments in culture, however, has a much longer history. The government's role in protecting and managing the nation's cultural resources can be traced back to at least 1865. But this approach had no foreign policy strategic goal.

from globalization (Skilling 2010, Mark 2010). The creation of the MCH could focus on protecting domestic culture and at the same time promoting New Zealand as a welcoming business partner to other countries (Mark 2010). This new foreign policy goal and new function of MCH also boosts New Zealand's soft power use.

The MCH also provided advice on arts, culture, heritage, sport, recreation, and broadcasting in addition to care for New Zealand memorials, monuments, war graves and symbols of national identity domestically and abroad (New Zealand Ministry of Culture and Heritage 2019). The creation of the MCH in 2000 was an important soft power milestone for New Zealand. It formally marked government's recognition of the benefits to be gained from bringing together the various cultural activities that for many years had been scattered among several departments and now they could be applied in foreign policy as well.

5.11.2.1 CULTURAL DIPLOMACY INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM

The first soft power program within the MCH was the Cultural Diplomacy International Program's (CDIP). At its creation in 2007, the objectives of the CDIP were to project abroad a distinctive profile of New Zealand as a creative and diverse society with a unique, contemporary culture strongly rooted in its diverse heritage. Even more importantly for soft power use, to position New Zealand among targeted overseas audiences as a country they could understand and want to engage with (Mark 2010).

The CDIP was created as a collaboration between six core New Zealand government agencies: The Ministry for Culture and Heritage (MCH) and supported by a Steering Group made up of representatives from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE), Tourism New Zealand

(TNZ), Te Puni Kōkiri (Ministry of Māori Development) (TPK), Education New Zealand (ENZ) and New Zealand Story. The Steering Group consults other government and cultural agencies and, on occasion, private sector interests, in order to recommend programs or activities to the Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage. The roles of the CDIP program are the management and delivery of a series of projects and activities primarily focused on Asia and in locations where New Zealand is pursuing free trade agreements such as in the U.S. and in the E.U. (Ministry for Culture and Heritage 2010).

CDIP programs included presentations of New Zealand cultural activities in the selected region, including cultural activities, publicity, media, catalogues, translation and project management. In addition, some of the other activities include management of historic places, museum services, performing arts services and public broadcasting services (NZ Cultural Diplomacy Report 2010). The economic benefits of each programs were crucial for the New Zealand government and they were highlighted in each program's outcomes. This meant that in the case of New Zealand, even with this new soft power program, the government was mostly using soft power actions to strengthen its economic partnerships but not to gain alliances all over the world.

While the CDIP was established to spread New Zealand's attractiveness abroad, there was an issue that weakened its effectiveness. CDIP did not coordinate the appropriate programs with the desired foreign policy objectives well (Mark 2010). The reason for such miscoordination was the lack of a clear plan to create programs that can connect with the country's foreign policy objectives. For instance, the many of the programs portrayed New Zealand as unique, deeply rooted in a diverse heritage but they were not promoting a welcoming message for investors or to visitors (Mark 2010). The

foreign policy object of New Zealand was to promote an image of society and culture that is open to foreign investors, but what the CDIP program actually promoted was a traditional cultural heritage that has been protected and sheltered. Stated differently, the practice of New Zealand's soft power has been poorly managed and badly executed as a soft power tool.

As this analysis revealed, New Zealand's soft power institutions were created in 1943 (MFAT) and in 2000 (MCH) and its first programs were formed in 1989 (Asia Pacific Foundation) and in 2007 (Cultural Diplomacy International Program). As these examples showed, New Zealand's soft power use is mostly limited to their Asian partners and allies and to peacekeeping missions to support developing nations. While New Zealand does use some soft power to reach countries outside of the Pacific region, New Zealand does not have to deal with a threatening power thus she does not seek to spread its influence intensely outside of the existing alliances.

5.12 NEW ZEALAND'S SOFT POWER BUDGET

Similarly to the Finnish case, in the last part, I will evaluate New Zealand's spending habits on soft power programs while looking for indicators that may explain its low soft power use. The shown budget is the combination of the above explained two ministries and their 9 programs from 1995-2010, including specifically selected programs' budget from the MFA and from the MCH³⁰. It is important to note here why the education and sport budgets were not included in New Zealand's soft power budget while they were part of the Finnish soft power budget calculation. As the treasury

³⁰ Online budget information was only available from 1998. The Treasury of New Zealand scanned in their budget books and emailed them to me. While ministry level data was retrieved, but program level data could not be before 1998.

document from 2010 explains, the government's goals for education are solely focused on education of citizens, closing educational gaps between communities, and supporting the Māori and Pacific communities (Treasury 2000, p7). The Department of Education of New Zealand does not identify education as a tool to increase the country's attractiveness abroad so for this reason, it was not included in the soft power budget. On a similar note, after studying New Zealand's the strategic goals of the sports programs, (despite of the international success of the ALL Black Rugby team), I concluded that they did not support any foreign outreach efforts at all, so these were not included in the soft power budget programs.

In 1998, the New Zealand government's total budget was 24.28 Billion USD of which 0.01 Billion USD was allocated to soft power programs (NZ Treasury 1999). This budget allocation represents 0.001% of the total federal budget. In 2010, New Zealand's annual budget increased to 68.8 Billion USD (New Zealand Treasury 2010). As Figure 5.4 shows, the soft power budget was 0.28 Billion USD which represents 0.04% of New Zealand's governments budget. Figure 5.4 clearly shows an increase in the total soft power budget as well as in the percentage of soft power spending over the total government budget from 0.001% to 0.04%.

The original budget data was provided in New Zealand Dollar and was converted into US Dollars at the fixed rate of 0.69. It is also important to note that in addition to the Government of New Zealand, there is also private funding received for such initiatives. My research focuses on the government spending and does not include any other financial support. In order to provide a more telling picture of New Zealand's soft power budget, I also collected budget information on a program-level. The complete list of soft

power programs can be seen on Figure 5.3. Figure 5.3 shows all 9 soft power programs that were included in the budget analysis and also reveals any changes in their funding.




Figure 5.3 Soft Power Budget Allocation of New Zealand by Programs³¹ within Ministries sorted by highest to lowest budget.

31 Budget items Policy Advice and Representation-Other Countries PLA and Promotional Activities both have the same function as the Policy Advice and Representation-Other Countries. They are supplementary budget items (not programs).

The program-level data on soft power budget tells us that the government does not fund soft power initiatives consistently. Figure 5.3 shows that out of the 12 budget items, 10 are programs (two are supplementary budget items and not programs), two receive funding for a few years but then do not get any money for a while. One of these is Hosting the Pacific Island Forum, which received funding for the years 1998, 1999, and 2003 but not for all the other years. The other is the International Radio Services, which was transferred into the private sphere after 2002. Cancellations happen because either these programs were planned for a short-term, or the money was allocated elsewhere. In the case of the Pacific Island Forum, it is not hosted by New Zealand every year. The program-level data also reveals that one program within the MFA, the Policy Advice and Representation for Other Countries receives the most funding (average of 112 Million USD) and all other soft power programs get a significantly lower budget for each year between 0.5 Million USD to 22 Million USD.

It is also important to note that the 2010 funding is the highest amount (0.28 Billion USD) allocated for the examined 1995-2010 time-period for soft power use. The creation of a new soft power program (Cultural International Diplomacy Program³²) in 2007 and the later merged ministries creating the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment in 2012 are indications that the New Zealand government is going to focus more on the use of its soft power in the future, however, some of the issues surfacing are the lack of government programs and institutions that would exercise such soft power actions consistently.

32 CDIP's first budget allocation was created in 2006 so it can be fully operational by 2007. Budget data for this program has been collected from 2006-2010.

Moving to the ministry-level analysis, Figure 5.4 shows the country's soft power budget by the two listed ministries to indicate any changes in the money allocation. As Figure 5.4 shows, since 1998 the soft power spending has been slowly increasing from 0.1 Billion USD to 0.23 Billion USD by 2008. Figure 5.4 also shows that almost all of the soft power budget allocation was to the MFAT with the only exception of the CDIP programs starting in 2006. Overall, it was the last year of this analysis (2010), that allocated the most funds to the MFAT and to the MCH soft power programs during the examined time-period as the budget increased the soft power spending to 0.28 Billion USD by 2010. Stated differently, based on the observed changes in New Zealand's soft power budget and its new (CDIP) program, it is reasonable to say that the government will rely more on soft power actions in the future³³.

33 In addition, the creation of programs under the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment fit the descriptions of Nye's soft power, but this specific ministry was not created until 2012 by merging the Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of Science and Innovation, Department of Labor and the Department of Building and Housing (New Zealand Treasury). While the time-frame of this dissertation ends in 2010, New Zealand shows promising budget trends and programs that indicate an increase in its soft power use in the future.




Figure 5.4. New Zealand's Soft Power Budget by Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage

In conclusion, as the above qualitative analysis revealed, New Zealand's soft power budget is low and uneven. In addition, the government limits most of the soft power programs to a regional reach, which also limits New Zealand's global recognition. However, due to a shift in the political elite's narrative, the government's new programs such as the CDIP and its budget allocation suggests that New Zealand will focus more on the use of soft power internationally in the future.

5.13 CONCLUSION

Overall, what governments do is a very important factor in understanding their soft power use. As this chapter revealed, Finland has a high soft power reliance and New Zealand uses soft power instruments to a low degree. I theorized that this is due to a threatening neighbor that makes Finland to use a strategic balancing mechanism to build alliances. As this chapter also showed, New Zealand does not have a perceived threat that would encourage alliance building, thus New Zealand does not need to use a high level of

soft power. And while New Zealand also uses soft power instruments, her strategic choices focus on positioning itself in the regional market and forming economically beneficial partnerships targeting China, Japan, and the Pacific Islands. While both countries use soft power, as the previous study revealed, they both hope to achieve different goals from such action, which impacts the amount of soft power they rely on.

What this chapter has discovered were indicators that the statistical analysis missed. These were: 1) geopolitical threat; 2) political elite's narrative; 3) age and mission of soft power programs; 4) the differences in the consistency and the amount of the respective governments' soft power budgets. More deeply, what this chapter revealed was the importance of a perceived geopolitical threat, measured by the narrative a country developed and reflected in the programs it develops and funds over time. In Finland, where Russia has threatened the country's independence, the political elite promoted a foreign policy, which carefully balanced with soft power in order to not provoke their aggressive military giant. This resulted in high Finnish soft power reliance. In New Zealand, on the other hand, due to the lack of any perceived geopolitical threats, the political elite focus the country's foreign policy on existing economic ties and protection from globalization. None of these goals required high soft power use. Table 5.2 shows the results of the comparison between Finland and New Zealand.

Table 5.2 Finland and New Zealand Comparison

	Finland	New Zealand
Soft Power Use	High (94%)	Low (68%)
Geopolitical Threat	Threatened	Not Threatened
Political Elite's National Security Narrative	Present	Not Present
First Soft Power User Institution	1918 Foreign Affairs Bureau	1943 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
First Soft Programs	1974 International Cooperation Programs within MCE	1989 Pacific Cooperation Foundation within MFAT
Soft Power Budget as a % of Total Government Budget	High 2.2% Consistent	Low 0.001%-0.04% Inconsistent

Revealing the impact of the **geopolitical** differences between Finland and New Zealand, this analysis discovered that due to geopolitical threat, the Finnish soft power use has been a much older phenomenon than in New Zealand. In the case of Finland, its proximity to Russia has pushed the elite to create a narrative that constantly reminds of the Russian threat. Due to the proximity of the Soviet Union, Finland was also forced to

use its soft power programs to strengthen its sovereignty and take a politically neutral position during the Cold War. Finland bandwagoned with its hard power but balanced with its soft power programs. After the Cold War, Finland shifted its soft power towards even more engagement with the West to build alliances. This resulted in the creation of early soft power programs and institutions. Today these elements all serve as strong pillars of high Finnish soft power use. Thus, geopolitical differences showed that having a threat at the border increased Finnish soft power use in the form of a defense mechanism. In the case of New Zealand, having a friendly neighbor resulted in a much lower perceived need to use soft power.

The **political elite's narrative** has been different in each country as well. While in Finland, the political elite continuously points to the Russian threat, in New Zealand, the political elite's narrative focuses on nuclear disarmament and globalization. This meant that while in Finland the idea of a necessary alliance building mechanism based on existential threat was constructed into the soft power programs, in New Zealand that was not the case. In New Zealand, the political elite's narrative focuses on less threatening issues and positioning the country as an attractive regional economic partner.

Further, it is important to note the difference between the **number** and the **age of soft power institutions and programs** as well. The first Finnish soft power facilitating institution was created in 1918 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), for the purpose of strengthening Finland's hard-earned independence from Russia and the first Finnish soft power program was established in 1974 under the name of International Cooperation under the Ministry of Education and Culture. In New Zealand, on the other hand, the first institution that could facilitated soft power programs was not created until 1945 (Ministry

of Foreign Affairs and Trade) while its first specifically soft power program was established in 1989 (Pacific Cooperation Foundation). As these results show, Finland has been relying on soft power programs since 1974, while New Zealand only started utilizing it in 1989.

Comparing the **number of** ministries and programs that are associated with soft power use in foreign policy, this chapter revealed that both countries have two ministries that supervise their soft power use. One is a foreign affairs ministry and the other is a ministry overseeing cultural affairs. In terms of the number of ministries involved, these two countries are identical. In addition, this dissertation also identified 10 soft power programs for New Zealand and 12 programs for Finland. Based on the number of soft power programs, Finland has a larger number of government programs specialized on soft power use abroad, which also contributes to its higher soft power reliance and to the Finish institutional commitment to soft power use.

In terms of the **budgetary** differences, Finland spends much more money on its soft power than New Zealand. This analysis revealed that the Finnish funding has been consistent and appears to be locked into the annual budget calculation. The breaking down of the soft power budget also revealed strategic differences. For Finland, its main soft power budget allocation goes to cultural initiatives while in New Zealand it is allocated for its MFAT's policy advice programs, which is focusing on building economic relationships.

In addition, New Zealand's **budget allocation** pattern further indicates steady increase in soft power budget since the 1990s. More specifically, New Zealand's soft power budget has been increasing from 0.001% to 0.04% of the total federal budget

during the observed time-period. Finland, on the other hand, spends consistently on its soft power around 2.2% of its total annual federal budget. Even with New Zealand's increase of its soft power budget, Finland still spends 55 times more money every year on its soft power programs than New Zealand, which results in a higher Finnish soft power reliance.

The strategic distribution of their respective money vastly differs as well. On the ministry-level and on the program-level, Finland allocated its soft power **budget** more evenly while New Zealand heavily funds one program (Policy Advice and Representation-Other Countries) and barely allocated money to the other programs. In order to successfully promote New Zealand's foreign policy interest through soft power use, the government needs to spend its budget more evenly, so most of the soft power programs can strengthen and develop.

My two cases revealed new variables that can improve future quantitative analyses of countries' soft power use. The most-similar case design was able to disclose the boosting impact of geopolitical threat on Finland's soft power use, which factor should also be tested on a larger number of countries. In the case of New Zealand, a new foreign policy goal emerged. New Zealand wishes to strengthen its position in the Southeast region and focuses most of its soft power efforts to achieve this goal. The regional outreach of this policy also leads to a lower use of soft power actions, while Finland's alliance building foreign policy requires a more global outreach. This ultimately also leads to higher soft power reliance for Finland.

CHAPTER 6.

THE U.S.'S HISTORICAL STRONG RELIANCE ON SOFT POWER

In the previous chapters I outlined elements that may impact democracies' soft power use, and then I analyzed the patterns of soft power use amongst 51 democracies. The statistical results showed that my hypothesized link between democracies' social trust and their soft power use is weak. In fact, social trust only explained about 18% of countries' soft power use variation. The statistical analysis also revealed that the previously included resource and institutional variables could not explain more than 20% of the variation either so more qualitative analysis was needed to uncover new explanatory variables. I now turn to a crucial case design to study in-depth the already included factors and to reveal any new independent variables.

6.1 CASE SELECTION. CRUCIAL CASE-U.S. AS A HEGEMON

There are 51 democracies in my dataset that are spread out geographically in all five continents and have diverse economic and institutional characteristics. In my sample there are 28 European, 12 from the Americas, 7 Asian, 1 Middle Eastern, 2 Australian and 1 African nation. The United States has been selected for a crucial case design for the following reasons. The United States is a wealthy hegemon that is very active in international relations. In terms of its soft power action count, it stands out as the highest user of soft power compared to all other democracies in the dataset. See Table 6.1. My statistical measurement of American soft power use revealed that the U.S. government

relies on an average of 32,788 soft power actions each year. This is an especially high value compared to all other democracies in the dataset as the average soft power action count is 2,306 per year.

Table 6.1 Average Soft Power Action Count and Average Soft Power Percentage (1995-2010).

	Soft Power Action Count Average Per Year
United States	32,788
51 Democracies	2,065

The case of the United States also plays an important role in soft power literature and in international relations in general. Not only the concept of soft power was created by an American scholar (Joseph Nye), but also the United States' use of soft power has been the focus of most soft power scholarship¹. In addition, the U.S. as a hegemon impacts the international behavior of all other countries. In this chapter, the U.S. provides a crucial case through which I will be able to examine one country for the purpose of understanding how the most prominent actor in international relations behaves in terms of its soft power use. I am specifically interested in uncovering any new factors that may have resulted in such high soft power reliance.

Turning to a crucial case design, I will explore the possible drivers of the American high soft power use. Crucial case studies are based on most-likely or least-likely designs and can be useful for the purposes of testing certain types of theoretical arguments, as long as the theory provides relatively precise predictions and the measurement error is low (Eckstein 1975). Most/least likely designs are based on the

assumption that some cases are more important than others for the purposes of testing a theory. They are based on a Bayesian perspective in which the weight of the evidence is evaluated relative to prior theoretical expectations (McKeown 1999, George and Bennett 2005). This means that the U.S.’ soft power reliance should be examined as a crucial case because of its major power status in world politics and because of its high soft power action outcome.

My statistical analysis revealed that, the U.S. has an exceptionally high GDP (1.15 trillion USD) and high CINC scores (0.14). Both of these values support its major power status in the world but none of these factors provided adequate answers about the high American soft power use in the regression models of Chapter 4. The polity score (10) was just slightly higher than the average of 51 democracies (8.87), therefore it was not providing additional explanation regarding the exceptionally high soft power use either (See Table 6.1).

Table 6.2 Average values for the main independent variables from the statistical analysis (1995-2020). GDP is in current USD

	Social Trust	GDP	CINC	Polity
United States	1.62	1.15E+13	0.14	10
51 Democracies Average	1.06	7.00E+11	0.01	8.87
scale min	-0.46	3.57E+09	0	-10
scale max	2.18	1.5E+13	1	10

My expectation based on my theory was that the high social trust value would drive the American high soft power use. However, the findings indicated that the U.S.'s social trust value was only slightly high at 1.62, which did not explain its exceptionally high soft power reliance (See Table 6.2). Therefore, while the American social trust value is somewhat higher than the average social trust value of the 51 countries included in the dataset (1.06), it is not high enough to confirm my theory.

Since social trust could not provide adequate explanation for American high soft power use, I turn to the realist literature that offered alternative explanations. Chapter 5 explained in detail my theory of soft power use based on the perception of geopolitical threat. I will apply this theory to reveal if geopolitical threat offers answers about the high American soft power use. The following sections will further study the impact of geopolitical threat on American soft power use.

6.2 EXPLAINING THE EXCEPTIONALY HIGH SOFT AMERICAN POWER USE

Since social trust did not provide sufficient answers about countries' soft power use, I now turn to alternative explanations. As I explained in Chapter 5, the foreign policy literature pointed to **geopolitics'** impact on countries' foreign policy behaviors. This literature suggested that countries react to geopolitical threat by taking actions that are designed to mitigate the threatening actor (Clerk 2015, Sberro 2015, Moisis 1998, Browning 2002). Specifically, realist literature pointed to **alliance formation** as countries' reaction to a perceived threat (Walt 1985). Realist and neorealist literature have also suggested that when a country is framed as a strong military power, it will impact the others by causing them to perceive them as a threat (Sherif 1966, Levine and Campbell 1972, Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 2001). In terms of soft power use, this means

that countries that feel threatened may use soft power instruments to a higher degree in order to build alliances against the perceived threat.

As the realist literature also suggested, states that appear aggressive can make others react with the goal of strengthening alliances against this perceived threat. This is called **balancing** (Walt 1985). When the aggressor is believed to be unalterably aggressive, balancing with others is also the best way to avoid becoming a victim (Langer 1950, Walt 1985). In this chapter I theorize that threatened countries are more likely to use a high level of soft power to balance out the strong regional threat by trying to **build alliances**.

It is also one of the underlying assumptions of this theory that high positive interaction with other countries in the form of soft power can enhance alliance building by creating, what Nye (2011) called a climate of attractions and a web of personal ties. The high level of positive interaction between countries makes alliance formation more likely. In terms of my crucial case design, this means that according to this alternative theory, the U.S. is expected to rely on a very high degree of soft power to **balance** against the perceived threat. Specifically, this means that the crucial case should exhibit the strong alliance building and seek to balance against the threat.

My theory further suggests that as a result of the perceived geopolitical threat the political **elite creates a narrative** that emphasizes national security and alliance building. As it was explained in Chapter 5, major geopolitical actors such as Russia create a situation in which the political elite in other countries perceives them as threat. In order to communicate this threat to the public and to the leadership, the political elite creates a narrative that emphasizes the need for protection in the form of alliance building.

Also, governments that are perceiving a threat, as a result of the political elite's narrative on national security, they create soft power programs and institutions to strengthen their alliances. These institutions support educational, cultural and other types of programs that enhance the mutual understanding between countries and thus strengthen alliances. Over time these programs become well established. For this reason, the **history of the American programs** signals institutional commitment. Stated differently, when programs exist for a long time, they are likely to remain in use and thus enhance the country's soft power use abroad.

Finally, **allocating federal budget** to soft power programs should also be closely related to the political elite's narrative. Because of the political elite's narrative about the perceived **threat to their national security** and the need for **alliance building**, we should expect the government to fund programs that support this narrative in the form of cultural and educational programs. This narrative builds into the budget calculation and increases the amount of funds approved for soft power programs. These programs support the government's efforts to balance against the perceived threat by strengthening the cultural, personal and often political connections between countries and ultimately the alliances between them. The repeated issues of national security and alliance building in the political narrative often result in a lock-in mechanism which makes it more likely that the government will continue to use these programs instead of canceling them. This is also called path-dependence, and it results in the consistent and high soft power budget allocation and signals the general policy direction of the government² (Jones et al. 2009).

Overall, in countries where there is a perception of geopolitical threat, the political elite is likely to create and maintain an emphasis on the importance of national

security and alliance building. In order to be successful in the promotion of their foreign policy, the country needs soft power institutions and a consistent soft power budget allocation. Closely studying the U.S. therefore, I seek to determine whether the biggest soft power user supports this new formulation of the theory as well as uncover factors that may have been overlooked in my statistical models.

This chapter will proceed as follows: I turn to four indicators. These are: 1) perceived geopolitical threat; 2) narrative of the political elite; 3) the history and mission of the soft power programs and institutions; 4) the budget of soft power programs. In the conclusion, I will trace the connection between the newly found indicators and soft power use in the United States.

6.3 GEOPOLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES

Based on my theory, the existence of a perceived geopolitical threat can lead to a defense mechanism in the form of balancing with high soft power use. In this section, I discuss American geopolitics with special attention to any perceived geopolitical threat that would lead to a possible high American soft power use.

While the U.S. has been fortunate with its geographic location being surrounded by oceans to protect it and with peaceful neighbors such as Canada and Mexico, it found itself as one of the two key players in the Cold War. The U.S. and Russia were allies during WWII, but since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the U.S. was worried about the geographic and ideological spread of Communism (Scott 1996). Directly after WWII, the Soviet Union started to threaten the U.S. with its geopolitical ambitions (Leffer 1984). Since 1946, until the late 1980s the official interpretation of the strategic goals of the USSR was that they seek regional and global dominance (Wolfe 1984, Scott 1996). In

terms of geopolitics, this also meant that the U.S. was facing an enemy that was perceived to want to expand its borders and its influence as far as possible.

The American response after World War I was the creation and support of a new network of democratic countries (Arndt 2006, Lebovic 2013). By the 1960s the Soviet threat became more imminent. The domino theory argued that the Soviet Union will try to take over the developing world country by country and destroy the American liberal world order (Scott 1996). In terms of an American response, the political elite chose to promote strong alliance building to protect against the perceived threat of the USSR. This meant that the political elite selected actions that would stop and even roll back the USSR from these countries to ensure the free expansion of Western democracies (Scott 1996, Persico 1990). As a result of the American political elite's narrative on the perceived threat, starting in the 1960s many programs and aid packages were created and sent to the geographically threatened areas such as Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia and Mozambique as part of the alliance building efforts (Scott 1996).

While my case study begins after the Cold War, this chapter argues that the perceived geopolitical threat of the Cold War jump-started the American soft power use as a defense mechanism against a threat. I further theorize that this historical occurrence also created the political and institutional foundations for American high soft power use after the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical threat also declined until September 11, 2001 (Debrix 2007). The attacks on the World Trade Centers ignited a new geopolitical threat in the form of the Global War on Terror. The new policy also emphasizes the need for Americans to be protected from terrorism (Coleman 2013). The

anxieties and fear born from the 9/11 attacks with respect to transboundary interactions continued during the 2000s in the U.S. (Coleman 2013).

Geopolitics' influence on the American history lead to the development and continued perception of threat (first from the Soviets and later from terrorists) in the U.S. political elite (Debrix 2007, Coleman 2013). Since U.S. national security has been threatened since World War II, the main foreign policy goal was to protect American borders and gain influence abroad. Since both Communism and terrorism were perceived existential and ideological threats to the American way of life, as a defense mechanism the U.S government relied on a high level of soft power in order to combat such perceived threats in the form of alliance building.

6.4 THE POLITICAL ELITE'S NARATIVE: NATIONAL SECURITY

With this section I will pay special attention to the theorized connection between the political elite's narrative in national security and the American soft power use. Specifically, I will focus on the American political elite's narrative about the perceived Soviet threat during the Cold War, and the perceived threat of terrorism after 2001. Looking at speeches and publications from the political elite, I will also evaluate if the policy direction was pointing to alliance building as a result of such perceived threats and if the U.S. government was balancing with its soft power actions.

The U.S. is a Federal Presidential Constitutional Republic in which the President plays a key role in foreign policy formulation. As part of the political elite, the President's narrative guides the formulation of foreign policy which can increase or decrease soft power use. This section will highlight some presidential (and other members of the political elite) speeches to evaluate if there is a perceived national

security threat and if they were likely to use soft power instruments in order to create alliances. This section will also look at the alliances that were formed during this time-period to see if they were created to defend against the perceived threat.

6.4.1 THE POLITICAL ELITE'S NARRATIVE ABOUT THE SOVIET THREAT

Even though Russia and the U.S. were allies during WWI, after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 there was a growing fear that the Soviets planned world domination, which perception influenced the American political elite's foreign policy narrative (Leffler 1984, Leffler 1985, Scott 1996). By 1946, it was a common place for intelligence and military reports to state that the Soviet foreign policy goal was to dominate the Communist world (Leffler 1984). In 1947, Undersecretary of State Dean G. Acheson warned that three continents could fall prey to Soviet domination (Acheson 1969). As a result, what showed up in the political elite's narrative was the need for the U.S. to remain in control of its geographic destiny (Debrix 2007) in addition to create and expand a network of like-minded democratic countries (Ruggie 1994). This was a carefully crafted foreign policy in which the U.S. protected its sphere of influence and strengthened its alliances.

In the 1940s and 1950s, as a result of the perception of threat, the American elite supported the expansion of the American alliances in Southeast Asia and in Europe as a direct result of the expanding Soviet threat in China and in Eastern Europe (Leffler 1984). As the National Security Council stated in a report in 1948, "Soviet political warfare might seriously weaken the relative position of the United States, enhance Soviet strength and either lead to our ultimate defeat short of war, or force us into war under

dangerously unfavorable conditions" (Leffler 1984). As this segment shows, the American elite in charge of national security felt that the U.S. had to implement foreign policy tools to balance against the Soviet threat. This policy direction led to alliance building in Europe and in Southeast Asia.

In the 1960s American foreign policy turned towards Latin America to spread its influence. As President Kennedy announced on March 13, 1961, the U.S. government wanted to strengthen its alliances with Latin America. In the name of Alliances for Progress, President Kennedy declared that the U.S. government will provide economic assistance to Latin American countries:

"I have called all people of the hemisphere to join in a new alliance for progress. Let us transform the American continent. For our unfiled task is to demonstrate to the entire world that men's unsatisfied aspirations for economic progress and social justice can be best achieved by free men working within a framework of democratic institutions (Kennedy 1961).

As President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress speech demonstrated, the American president created new alliances with selected Latin American countries in order to balance against the soviet threat using democratic institutions and economic aid. This program also built democratic institutions in Latin America thus strengthening the political and social connection between the U.S. and selected South American countries including Puerto Rico, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia (JFK Library 1).

As the Cold War and the arms race continued into the 1970s, the political elite increasingly perceive the Soviet Union as a threat. In 1974 Kissinger wrote that the U.S.:

"will oppose the attempt of any country to achieve a position of predominance either globally or regionally. We will resist any attempt to exploit the policy of détente to weaken our alliances. We will react if relaxation of tension is used as a cover to exacerbate conflict in international trouble spots. The Soviet Union cannot disregard these principles in any area of the world without imperiling its entire relationship with the United States." (p.261-262)

Secretary of State Kissinger explained that the Soviet Union's threat had to be stopped (Kissinger 1974). In fact, the above section also reveals the imminent perceived Soviet threat not only to the U.S. but also to the world. This global threat scale required exceptionally intensive soft power use from the U.S. Secretary Kissinger's (1974) statement also reveals the special attention paid to protecting alliances in this global struggle.

Even more pronounced was the Soviet threat during the 1980s when the U.S. was worried about a so-called domino effect of the Soviet Union's expansion. In fact, President Reagan and most of his key advisors believed that the Soviets wanted world domination (Wolf 1984, Scott 1996). As President Reagan explained in an interview in June 1980:

"Let's not delude ourselves, the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hot spots in the world." (House 1980)

Reagan's speech shows the continuous perceived threat from the Soviet Union. Using the metaphor of the unstoppable dominos falling, President Reagan's narrative points to the U.S. important job to prevent any dominos from falling and also emphasizes the impact of the Soviet threat.

In a speech in 1984, Reagan stressed the importance of strong alliances:

"Strength is essential to negotiate successfully and protect our interests. If we're weak, we can do neither. Strength is more than military power. [...] Equally important is our strength of spirit and unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad [...] Our defenses are being rebuilt, our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear." (Reagan 1984)

The above speech points to the Reagan Administration's focus on the strengthening alliances in order to balance against Communism. The alliance building process was an important aspect of the American foreign policy during the Cold War and continued after the Cold War (Ruggie 1994).

Overall, the American political elite during the Cold War created a narrative of national security and the need to build alliances. This narrative manifested in continued alliance building against the perceived Soviet threat on a large scale. As a result, the U.S. government has joined the Allies (1941), helped create the United Nations in 1945 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, joined the United Nations Command in 1950 and joined the Australia, New Zealand and the United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) in 1951. In addition, in 1954 the U.S. joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 1955 the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, in 1958 the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the Strategic Cooperation Agreement with Israel in 1981.

In terms of alliance building, by 1965, based on the Correlates of War's International Government Organization data shows that the U.S. was one of the most integrated countries with the most alliances (Pevehouse et al 2004). In addition, literature has also pointed to the American foreign policy goal of skillfully forming alliances during this time-period in order to balance against the Soviet threat (Debrix 2007, Leffler 2005, Payne 1994) and to build and strengthen a network of democratic countries with U.S. leadership (Ruggie 1994). Stated differently, during the Cold War as a result of a perceived threat from the Soviet Union, the American foreign policy was oriented to relay on high soft power use in order to build alliances all over the world.

6.4.2 THE POLITICAL ELITE'S NARRATIVE ABOUT THE THREAT FROM TERRORISM

After the end of the Cold War, there was a calmer period where the perceived threats were declining. During this time, the political elite's national security speeches focused on the American role in the post-Cold War era. In 1990 immediately after the Cold War has ended, President Bush stated the following:

“This is the beginning of a new world order [...] in which self-determination, cooperative deterrence, and joint action against aggression would come to hold greater sway.” (Bush 1990). Based on the Bush foreign policy statement therefore, the future of American foreign policy was based on multilateral cooperation and working together with other nations. This enhanced alliance building continued into the Clinton Administration. Working together with NATO, the United States wanted to extend, in the words of President Bill Clinton, "the fabric of transatlantic prosperity and security" into Central and Eastern Europe (Ruggie 1994).

President Clinton later further explained in his 1995 State of the Union address: “Our security still depends upon our continued world leadership for peace and freedom and democracy. As the statement shows, President Clinton expressed a strong desire to build international alliances. In addition, President Clinton's also stresses the need for American global leadership.

The attacks of 9/11 brought a high level of fear back into American society, especially into the political elite (Debrix 2007). As Debrix (2007) stated, after 9/11 the political elite empathized the cultural differences between the U.S. and the attackers from

the Middle East and suggested to focus on national security. President Bush had to respond to a direct attack on American soil from a peacekeeper to a terrorism eradicator around the world. President Bush stated the following about American's role in responding to 9/11. "Our responsibility to history is clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil." (Bush 2001, p.1). As President Bush's statement reveals, according to the President, terrorism was a threat to U.S. national security and the U.S. had to play a global leadership role in stopping terrorism in other countries as well. As President Bush noted during his 2002 State of the Union address of America's new war against terror:

"Our cause is just, and it continues. Our discoveries in Afghanistan confirmed our worst fears and showed us the true scope of the task ahead. We have seen the depth of our enemies' hatred in videos, where they laugh about the loss of innocent life. And the depth of their hatred is equaled by the madness of the destruction they design They embrace tyranny and death as a cause and a creed. We stand for a different choice, made long ago, on the day of our founding. We affirm it again today. We choose freedom and the dignity of every life."

President Bush's address illustrates well the magnified perceived threat caused by terrorism. The speech advocated for the protection of the U.S. and all other countries from such perceived threat. Specifically defending our European allies. As Blankley (2006), the former speechwriter of President Reagan wrote:

"To preserve the West, Americans must revive Europe's Western values. We cannot afford to lose Europe. We cannot afford to see Europe transformed into a launching pad for Islamist jihad." (p. 21)

As the above-narrative shows, the post 9/11 period's narrative was dominated by language that emphasized the perception of fear and the need to stay close with our allies as well as the need to defend them. In other words, the elite's narrative about national security advocates alliance formation in order to protect against the perceived threat.

This continued perceived threat from terrorism also played a strong part in President Obama's narrative:

“This century's threats are at least as dangerous as and, in some ways, more complex than those we have confronted in the past. They come from weapons that can kill on a mass scale and from global terrorists who respond to alienation or perceived injustice with murderous nihilism. They come from rogue states allied to terrorists and from rising powers that could challenge both America and the international foundation of liberal democracy. They come from weak states that cannot control their territory or provide for their people.” (2007 p.3)

As President Obama stated, the perceived threat of terrorism from multiple directions was imminent and dangerous. His narrative enforced the need to focus on national security to protect the country. In addition, President Obama also emphasized that need to build alliances and defend America as well as all other countries by working together:

“America cannot meet the threats of this century alone, and the world cannot meet them without America. We can neither retreat from the world nor try to bully it into submission. We must lead the world, by deed and by example.” (Obama 2007 p. 4)

President Obama's turn to the global community to engage them and work together with them in order to defend itself and each other shows the American foreign policy of building alliances as a reaction to a perceived threat of terrorism. In terms of the Obama Administration's alliance building efforts, the U.S. was still member of NATO and in addition later joined the U.S.–Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2012 and renewed the U.S Israel Strategic Partnership in 2013. This is relevant as these partnership in addition to joining the Paris Climate Agreement in 2016 demonstrate that after 9/11 the U.S. continued to be highly engaged in the world and committed to alliance building.

In the same speech president Obama also stated:

“Today we are called again to provide visionary leadership. [...] To renew American leadership in the world, I intend to rebuild the alliances, partnerships, and institutions necessary to confront common threats and enhance common security.” (Obama 2007 p.2)

In the U.S. the political elite has been very clear about the perceived threat of Communism during the Cold War and about the perceived threat of terrorism after 2001. As a result of the Soviet threat, one aspect of the elite’s narrative was the focus on national security and alliance building which boosted soft power use.

The political elite’s narrative also revealed a new factor in its foreign policy. The narrative clearly demonstrated the American desire for **global leadership**. Regarding global leadership, literature suggests that hegemons (Wight 1978) such as the U.S. aspire to create a global empire and to do so they will be more active in international relations. According to this explanation, hegemonic states have a different agenda than other countries as they wish to become **global leaders** (Lemke 2003, Wight 1978). Soft power is especially useful to countries that are trying to expand their global roles and project more power. Therefore, in the American case, a global leadership desire has also been revealed as a factor boosting its soft power use.

6.5. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN SOFT POWER PROGRAMS

According to my theory, in countries where there is a perceived threat, the political elite creates a narrative that leads to the creation of soft power institutions and programs so the country can balance against the threat. In order to study the U.S. institutions’ soft power programs and the consistency of the American government’s soft power mission, I will now focus on the historical development of soft power institutions.

I will pay special attention to the age and lifespan of each institution and whether the mission statements include alliance building in foreign policy in the mission statements. The goal is to reveal any connections between the elite's narrative about national security and the level of soft power use executed by these programs.

In order to better understand the American government's strategic choices regarding its soft power reliance, in the following section I turn to the analysis of soft power programs to reveal, which U.S. programs support alliance building with soft power tools. I also study the timespan of each program to see how long they have been in existence. I also collect information from various government websites and from federal budget documents. In addition, I also refer to foreign policy articles.

Even though there is no soft power program within the U.S government, the evaluation of the listed programs revealed soft power elements.³ In the American government's budget documents I found that it is the Department of State's selected programs along with the Department of State's affiliated agencies that are compatible with my definition of soft power. The following list is a chronological order of the American soft power programs.

Department of State (DOS) (1789)

- Diplomatic and Consular Programs (1789)
- Division of Cultural Relations (1938)
- Foreign Affairs Programs (1946)
 - Education and Cultural Exchange Programs (1946)
 - Fulbright Program (1946)
 - Peace Corps (1961)

Department of State Affiliated or Independent Agencies

- Broadcasting Board of Governors (1941)
- United States Information Agency (1953)
- United States International Aid Development (1961)
- United States Institute of Peace (1984)
- Overseas Contingency Operations (2001)

As the compiled list shows, in the U.S. there is one department, which is the Department of State (DOS) with 7 programs and 5 affiliated/independent agencies that are using soft power to achieve foreign policy goals identified by this study. In the next section, I will evaluate the DOS' and the affiliated/independent agencies' soft power programs to see if they seek to build alliances with their efforts in order to balance against a perceived threat.

6.5.1 DEPARTMENT OF STATE (1789)

The State Department, originally known as the Department of Foreign Affairs at the time of its creation in 1789 is the oldest of the cabinet-level agencies in the Executive Branch. It consists largely of diplomats and Foreign Service officers who carry out American foreign policy throughout the world (AllGov. DOS. 2019). Since its creation, the Department of State has grown and has been reorganized to focus on emerging global responsibilities (Office of the Historian 2019).

The foreign affairs functions of the U.S. Government are carried out through a complex network of agencies. Foreign policy and diplomatic relations are led by the Department of State, development assistance is led by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), international broadcasting by the Broadcasting Board of Governors; and other functions carried out by several other agencies, including the Peace Corps (US Budget 2003, p. 229). Each will be evaluated in the following section.

6.5.2 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (1789)

The U.S. government has been using diplomatic relations programs since September 15, 1789 as part of the Department of State (f/k/a Department of Foreign Affairs). Initially there were two services devoted to diplomatic and consular activity. The Diplomatic Service provided ambassadors and ministers to staff embassies overseas, while the Consular Service provided consuls to assist United States sailors and promote international trade and commerce. Since 1789, these functions have greatly expanded.

Today, the conduct of diplomatic relations involves the learning and exchanging in-depth knowledge and understanding of political and economic events in many nations. Some of the main goals include promoting human rights internationally, supporting emerging democracies and economic development, improving the global environment, and meeting humanitarian emergencies that destroy political and economic well-being and stability are vital to America's long-term interest. These goals require quality reporting, analysis, and personal contact. American diplomats and Department of State staff work at more than 260 missions abroad (U.S. Budget 2007, p.13). While these functions were not specifically soft power programs, they facilitated the use of soft power as they were created to use traditional diplomacy with other governments.

6.5.3 DIVISION OF CULTURAL RELATIONS (1938)

The United States government has created soft power programs as early as the 1930s to expand its influence abroad (Arndt 2006). The first U.S. soft power program identified by this study is the Division of Cultural Relations created in 1938. The formation of this department was partly the result of Wilson's universalist pledge after World War I to make the world a better place again with the help and guidance of the

U.S. (Arndt 2006, Lebovic 2013), and partly as a result of the growing influence of the Communist ideology of the Soviet Union (Leffler 1984, Leffler 1985, Scott 1996, Keys 2004).

The War and the U.S.'s sizable bureaucracy and large federal budget also raised questions about the intellectual side and goals of U.S. foreign policy, specifically about the best way to handle the outreach with other governments in the future (Healt and Kaplan 1977, Arndt 2006). As a solution to these questions, the foundations of soft power programs were created first in the form of the Division of Cultural Relations. The designers of this division had built a mechanism to support the ideas of American cultural internationalism and the idea that the attractive American lifestyle can transform ideologies and societies for the rest of the Century (Keys 2004, Arndt 2006).

The Division of Cultural Relations was created to use influence abroad (Arndt 2006) and while it was not technically called a soft power program, it fits my definition of soft power. This cultural program was created to communicate the attractiveness of American norms and values while promoting a dialogue with other countries in order to facilitate political and economic cooperation while the rest of the world was dealing with the rise of fascism (Arndt 2006, Lebovic 2013). Spreading American attractiveness and ideas soon became the main function of the Cultural Division of the State Department, which handled the information exchange together with international educational and scientific cooperation (Cull 2003).

With the creation of the Division of Cultural Relations, the idea of creating a centralized department where American information flow and cultural outreach has been synchronized in order to spread the image of prosperous American democracy in the

form of the *America dream* (Ninkovich 1981). The deeply held belief that the attractiveness of the American lifestyle could transform other ideologies and social systems was the underlying motivation (Keys 2004).

6.5.4 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS PROGRAMS (1946)

The Foreign (International) Affairs programs initially were broken up into issue areas such as diplomats, embassies, travel, culture and information. The general mission of these programs was to support diplomats and development experts, and project American values all over the world (Clinton 2011). Based on my conceptualization of soft power actions, I found that many of the International Affairs Programs qualified as soft power programs. To see the full list of State Department Programs, See Appendix C.

According to the federal budget documents for the fiscal year 1996, the specific purpose of the Department of State's Foreign Affairs programs was to support other nations in their needs:

"The programs continue our commitment to strengthen democracy and the emergence of free market economies in the newly independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union [...] support of a strong and growing global economy and [...] providing humanitarian response to crises and conflicts that have divided many nations." (DOS Budget FY 1996, p.115)

This statement was later changed to a message focusing on building international coalition, shifting the focus from domestic development to the War on Terror:

"Since September 11, 2001, the Department's top priority has been the war on terrorism. The State Department has led the effort to build and manage the broad-based international coalition that helped defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and is now destroying the al Qaeda terrorist network around the world. [...] While the war on terrorism is our top foreign policy priority, the President has stressed that it cannot be our only one. We live in an age of tremendous opportunities to advance America's interests (DOS Budget FY 2003, p. 231).

Finally, arriving to the 2011's agenda of fostering global consensus as it was articulated in their budget statement.

“The Department of State [...] and other international programs advance the interests of the United States through engagement, partnership, and the promotion of universal values. Through the power of example and the empowerment of people, using diplomatic and development tools, the Administration is working to forge the global consensus required to defeat the threats, manage the challenges, and seize the opportunities of the 21st century.” (DOS Budget FY 2011, 106).

As the mission statement of the 2011 budget document above shows, the objective of the U.S. government's International Affairs programs was to strengthen international engagement and foster global consensus and cooperation by using the examples of American values in addition to diplomatic, economic and other soft power instruments. This statement makes it clear that spreading American values and interest vis soft power instruments in order to create alliances is one of the core American foreign policy goals. This statement also confirms that in 2011 the main objective remains to spread American influence through attraction abroad. With respect to soft power actions, the mission statement also indicates that the U.S. wishes to use soft power instruments to foster global cooperation in order to protect against threats.

6.5.5 EDUCATION AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS (ECE) (1946)

The Education and Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE) was first created in 1946 under the name of Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC). In 1961 it became the Education and Cultural Exchange Programs with the mission to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange that assist in the development of peaceful relations (ecastategov/about 1). As part of the Department of

State (Under Bureau of Educational Cultural Affairs), the Education and Cultural Exchange Programs connect scholars, artists, educators, athletes, students and the youth in the United States and in almost every other country in world (ecastategov/about 1).

ECE cultivates mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries to promote friendly, and peaceful relations, as mandated by the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. ECE exchange program alumni consist of over 1 million people around the world, including more than 75 Nobel Laureates and nearly 450 current and former heads of state and government (ecastategov/about 1). In terms of soft power, the ECE programs use a high degree of soft power to connect people in the U.S. and abroad through talent and scholarship.

6.5.6 FULBRIGHT PROGRAM (1946)

The 1940s produced another significant soft power program. The Fulbright Program, created in 1946 was one of the new initiatives which later became one of the most significant exchange programs (Dizard 2004, Arndt 2006, Lebovic 2013). Today the Fulbright Program runs under ECE. The basic idea was to support the free exchange of the elite from various countries who would spread the American norms and values and make the U.S. more attractive abroad. It was initial funded by the surplus of the wartime economy and that its ideological and foreign policy justifications were based on rational efforts to promote American hegemony and power politics (Lebovic 2013). More specifically, as Lebovic (2013) explains, the idea of the Fulbright exchange programs grew out of American “nationalist globalism” in support of U.S. global hegemony by using the unifying power of American culture. In addition, by strengthening the mutual understanding between the U.S. and other countries in the Fulbright Program the U.S.

government is also increasing its ability to build alliances with those countries through exchange visitors.

6.5.7 UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY (1953)

United States Information Agency (USIA) is an independent agency which was initially only responsible for providing information about the U.S., its policies and about the good understanding of American society and its values. The agency was created in 1953 in order to spread American influence via culture and people to people diplomacy until 1999 when it was merged into the State Department under the newly created Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

The United States Information Agency (USIA) served two purposes: 1) to promote better understanding of the U.S. in other countries and; 2) to increase mutual understanding between Americans and the public abroad (Wang 2007). Even more importantly, the creation of USIA with the United States Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948 provided a legal foundation for American soft power use for many years to come (Wang 2007).

At the birth of USIA in 1953 the Cold War and the bipolar system guided the foreign policy of the U.S. This meant that the long-term goal of the government was to defeat Communism. In 1953 the main function of the newly created USIA was to handle cultural information such as books, libraries, cultural centers and exhibits in other words focus on the information side of American soft power (Arndt 2006, Cull 2003, Wang 2007). From its creation in 1953, USIA served as the key information agency which was created to produce and spread information about the U.S.

Nevertheless, the use of American culture and the way of life remained part of the method to conduct foreign policy. The American soft power machine was fueled by the Cold War's ideological conflict with the Soviet Union and it was going strong until the end of the Cold War in 1990. As a result, USIA had numerous directors throughout the years promoting various messages and foreign policy agendas, but overall, continued to be the most extensive public relations machine in the world (Cull 2003, Wang 2007).

By 1994, the agency defined, explained, and advocated U.S. policies abroad and sought to increase knowledge and understanding among foreign audiences of U.S. society and its values which is a remarkable vehicle for soft power use (United States Budget 1994, p. A-1155). Other programs included overseas missions, Radio Free Asia and the Bureau of Information among others. For the full list of programs see Appendix H. USIA as independent agency was later melted into the Internal Communication Agency in 1998 (Act 1998), but its mission and prior activities abroad created the foundations of soft power programs that are still active today. The formation of USIA contributed to the American government's consistent and strategic soft power use around the world (U.S. Budget 2020).

The above-mentioned soft power programs were not discontinued only transferred into the State Department in 1999 (Cull 2003, Wang 2007). Studying these programs and their goals and mission statements while considering the historical changes in the world, it becomes apparent that the U.S. mission to influence other nations with its culture, norms and values did not end with the Cold War. In fact, the mission statements continued to express the will to build alliances using the attractiveness of American wealth and culture.

The United States Information Agency was the largest full-service public relations organization in the world during the Cold War, spending over \$2 billion per year to highlight America's view, while diminishing the Soviet's side interacting with about 150 different countries (Snyder 1995). It was also one of the first centralized government bureaucracies in the world that was created to use influence abroad (Gienow-Hecht 2010). In 1953 the information flow was centralized under USIA with the ultimate goal of overseeing all outgoing information about the U.S. (Cull 2010). Initially, the agency created programs that shaped the information flow to their countries about the U.S., but later it also included programs that supported the exchanges of persons, both short and longer-term visits and created publications, television and radio broadcasting, libraries and exhibits (U. S. Budget 1992 p. Part 2-198). Overall, USIA played a key role in the formation and execution of soft power use and thus increased American soft power use abroad.

6.5.8 PEACE CORPS (1961)

The Peace Corps was created in 1961. Its mission was to share American ideals and values abroad. The volunteers of the Peace Corps dispel myths about the United States, help people of interested countries and create bonds of friendship with host country citizens. The volunteers are teachers, business advisors, information technology consultants, agriculture and environmental specialists, and health and HIV/AIDS educators (Peace Corps Budget 2009).

Since 1961, the Peace Corps has represented the United States in 141 countries, working to advance the agency's three goals: 1) building local capacity by strengthening the capacity of local communities and individuals through the service of trained

volunteers; 2) sharing America with the world by promoting a better understanding of Americans through volunteers who live and work within local communities; and 3) bringing the world back home by increase Americans' awareness and knowledge of other cultures and global issues through volunteers (Peace Corps Congressional Budget Justification/Summary, ii). The Peace Corps strengthens mutual understanding between countries therefore strengthen American soft power use and alliance building.

6.5.9 UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID) (1961)

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is an independent agency of the United States federal government that is primarily responsible for administering civilian foreign aid and development assistance. The programs within USAID are designed to expand diplomatic and development operations (QDDR 2). These commitments are compatible with my soft power definition of soft power as they include increased U.S. foreign assistance in order to reduce poverty, combat global health threats, develop markets and govern peacefully, which makes the U.S. attractive abroad [...] (New Era of Responsibility 2010, 87). With large sum of development assistance provided mostly to developing countries by the U.S. government, the U.S. appears supportive, and attractive which increases its soft power. The USAID's sizable budget also reflects the U.S.'s commitment to strengthen diplomatic and assistance tools to address current and future challenges that impact the security of the United States. While USAID is an independent agency, its budget is often treated with DOS's foreign affairs budget due to their close relationship and their common foreign policy goals.

The origin of the United States Agency of International Development (USAID) can be traced back to the post-World War II U.S. foreign policy. Moving away from isolationism, policy makers had been advocating for a more internationally involved foreign policy. The cornerstone of this policy shift was the result of Secretary of State George C. Marshall's commencement address at Harvard University in 1947 (Natsios 2005). The core message of the speech was that the U.S. should use its wealth and power to help the world devastated by the war back to economic health (Marshall 1947). As a result of this speech, the Marshall Plan was created and soon after USAID was established. Secretary Marshall's speech indicated; the U.S. should help other countries for the simple reason that it can. This notation was built into the foundation of both the Marshall Plan and later into USAID. In terms of soft power, helping war-torn countries has always been one of the actions that results in a favorable view and increased political and economic cooperation.

Building on the success of the Marshall Plan, President Harry S. Truman proposed an international development assistance program in 1949. The 1950 Point Four Program focused on creating markets for the United States by reducing poverty and increasing production in developing countries and diminishing the threat of Communism by helping countries prosper under capitalism. Similarly to the Marshall Plan, these programs provided economic aid to countries in need which action in return brought the U.S. into a favorable light and increased its attraction abroad. From 1952 to 1961, programs supporting technical assistance and capital projects continued as the primary form of U.S. aid, and were a key component of U.S. foreign policy (USAID History). With increasing economic assistance built into American foreign policy, this soft power

instrument also became one of the core pillars of U.S. global engagement. But it needed a strong institution to oversee these foreign policy actions, therefore in 1961 President Kennedy created USAID (United States Agency for International Development).

USAID has many programs focusing on separate issues such as Agriculture and Food Security, Democracy, Human Rights and Governance, Education, Gender Equality, Global Health and Science, Technology and Innovation, just to mention a few. For the full list of programs, see Appendix I. The Bush Administration has made development a national security priority and one of the three strategic areas of emphasis for foreign policy and the Global War on Terror (Natsios 2005). As a result, international economic development became one of the three foreign policy goals of the U.S. after 2001.

In terms of soft power actions, sending aid to other countries is one of the key soft power instruments that connect countries together. And in terms of the U.S.'s foreign policy objectives, USAID programs continue to strengthen the U.S.'s global leadership role and they play a key role in U.S. foreign policy. The fact the U.S. government continuously uses these soft power programs (U.S. Budget 2020) reveals that it sees them as effective and useful foreign policy tools. In addition, the use of development aid increases American soft power use abroad.

Overall, USAID has been functioning as a soft power institution, running programs that provide financial aid to other countries and thus increase American soft power use since 1961 and promotes American alliance building through economic assistance.

6.5.10 BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS (1941)

The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) was originally formed in 1941 as part of the United States Information Agency, but it is now an independent entity since 1999. The BBG is still funded by Congress under Foreign Affairs programs budget items. BBG is responsible for all U.S. non-military international broadcasting programs. The BBG promotes freedom and democracy and enhances understanding through multimedia communication of accurate, objective, and balanced news, information, and other programming about America and the world. BBG radio, television, and internet programs reach over 215 million people each week in 61 languages. The agency was created when the USIA was folded into the State Department and remained independent ever since.

Through this program, the BBG funds operations of the Voice of America (VOA), Office of Cuba Broadcasting (Radio and TV Marti), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), and Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN, including Alhurra and Radio Sawa). Their budget includes funding for local and regional coverage on VOA Radio Deewa to Afghanistan and Pakistan, MBN television and radio maintenance and repair, and digital equipment at RFE/RL and RFA (U.S. Budget 2012). These radio programs have played a key role in ending the Cold War using soft power tools (Simonyi and Trunkos 2015). And today they continue to spread American culture and influence using only the voice of radio programs in numerous languages. By contributing to the understanding of American culture and values, the BBG also fosters the possibility of alliance building.

6.5.11 THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE (USIP) (1984)

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) formed in 1984 is an independent institute that is established and funded by Congress. USIP was created to help prevent and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The resources of USIP support peace-building efforts around the world and empower people with knowledge, skills, and resources through conflict management education, training, and research. USIP promotes peace and democracy in 15 developing or war-torn countries. Assisting post-conflict countries by which increasing America's attractiveness abroad not only create bridges with other countries but also adds to the list of soft power action of the U.S and promotes alliance building.

6.5.12 DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S-OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (OCO) (2001)

In addition to the highlighted DOS Foreign Affairs and Related Agencies, the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) programs must also be discussed as their sole purpose is to rebuild specific war-torn countries (Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan), which, similarly to the Marshall Plan, fits my definition of soft power. The main goals of the operations were to assist with post-war reconstruction of facilities as a result of the Global War on terror and train people to be able to run their own government, but such actions also bring the U.S. government welcomed attraction as the Department of State helps the fragile countries to grow into self-reliant and secure nations (Department of State 2011, p. 763).

Since 2001, the Contingency Operation budget is a new temporary part of the Department of State's budget, which was created to replace some of the previous efforts of the Department of Defense to provide reconstruction, security, and stabilization assistance funding executed by non-military personnel. The account provides a source of flexible contingency funding to meet unforeseen reconstruction and stabilization needs of strategic countries (DOS FY 2011, McGarry and Epstein 2019).

The Department of State's Budget for the fiscal year 2011 stresses these Overseas Contingency Operations funds. The increasing amount of aid provided to Afghanistan and Pakistan is allocated in order to revitalize economic development and to confront the resurgence of the Taliban. Also, these OCO funds support the continued progress towards a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq and prepares the Department of State to assume responsibility for security, logistics, and police training programs as part of the military-to-civilian transition in Iraq (DOS FY 2011, 105).

This type of soft power has not been outlined enough in previous soft power literature; however, it fits my definition of the concept. While the contingency operations used to be coordinated and executed by military personnel thus, they may appear as hard power actions at first, but looking closer into the nature of these actions reveals that helping war-torn countries to rebuild can increase the U.S.'s attractiveness in Iraq and in Afghanistan and thus qualifies as a soft power program. Not only people receiving assistance from the U.S. government in the selected countries build trust and admiration for the U.S. servicemen on the ground, but also the international community notices the help of the U.S. government. All these activities increase American attractiveness abroad. Therefore, since 2001 this creates a new soft power program for the U.S.

One thing that became apparent by studying closer the listed programs while putting them in a historical context was that since 1938, the U.S. government has been consistently working on strengthening its alliances using all the previously established soft power programs. Initially, the U.S. government created programs as a reaction to the Soviet threat, and after 2001, the OCO program was established as a result of the perceived terrorist threat. The historical analysis also revealed that for the past decades, old programs such as the Fulbright Program and institutions such as the USIA⁴ has been executing American soft power in order to build alliances in order to balance against the Soviet Union and later against terrorism.

The mission statements and the timeline of the creation of the foreign affairs, cultural, educational and economic programs further revealed that the U.S. has an 82-year history relying on cultural instruments, 79-year history in using broadcasting tools and 59-year experience in using economic aid in foreign policy. As the listed programs and institutions also revealed, as a reaction to the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and later from terrorism, the American political elite directed foreign policy towards a strategic use of soft power tools in order to strengthen alliances all over the world, which resulted in overall high soft power use.

In addition, similarly to the previous section on the analysis of the political elite's narrative, the evaluation of the government programs also revealed the U.S.'s desire to have a global reach with its cultural and educational programs. This means that while the perceived threat from the Soviet Unions and later from terrorism boosted the reliance on these soft power programs, in addition to alliance building the American desire to be a global leader has also greatly enhanced its soft power use.

6.6 SOFT POWER BUDGET

In order to reveal more about the American soft power budget, I will look at the allocated budget covering a 16-year timeframe. Based on my theory, in countries where there is a perceived threat, the political elite creates a narrative that focuses on national security which builds into the budget. As a defense mechanism, this narrative encourages alliance building in order to balance against the perceived threat. My theory also indicates that due to a path-dependent mechanism, balancing against a perceived threat result in a consistently high soft power budget. This section will look into the American federal budget to see if there is a high soft power allocation due to a perceived threat.

I compiled the U.S.'s soft power budget by first selecting those agencies and their specific programs (listed above) which fit my soft power definition, then their annual budgets were collected for the time-period of 1995-2010. This included the combined budgets of the Department of State's International Affairs Programs (including selected foreign operations and related programs), plus the Department of State's Overseas Contingency Operations budget⁵ since 2002. Since the U.S. government's International Affairs budget includes over 60 programs and the programs are regularly renamed, placed under new budget items, under new programs, or moved out of the DOS's budget as an independent program, so I only compiled program-level budget data on the most known, consistently named and placed and funded budget issues and programs. These are: Diplomatic Relations, USIA, BBG, Peace Corps, USAID, and USIP in addition to the Department of State's Overseas Contingency Operations budget⁶.

The goal of the collection of the soft power budget and the breakdown of the largest soft power programs are to study the soft power policy commitment of the U.S.

and connecting it with possible enhancers such as the political elite's narrative on national security. The budget quantifies collective political decisions made in response to incoming information, the preferences of the decision makers and the institutions that structure how decisions are made (Jones et al. 2009). Changes in the distribution of budgetary outcomes is crucial to the study of policy changes (Jones et al. 2009) and in this dissertation indicates a change in the support of soft power use with the underlying objective to build alliances in order to balance. It is the underlying assumption of this dissertation that if a government allocates money to a program, it intends to use its instrument to achieve its foreign policy goals. In addition, the amount of money allocated represents the level of significance of such programs to the government.

The U. S.'s soft power budget within the State Department increased from \$25 billion (in 1995) to \$65 billion by 2010 (See Figure 6.1). This increase was consistent with the rise of the total U.S. federal budget. After 9/11 when the Overseas Contingency Operation funding was added to assist with the non-military side of nation building, American soft power budget began to increase. As a result, the combined budget of the State Department's International Affairs Program and its temporary emergency funding, by 2007 the soft power funding increased to 74 Billion, or 2.6 % of the total federal budget.




Figure 6.1. U.S.’ Soft Power Budget 1995-2010

Studying closer the three budget items on Figure 6.1, a steady increase can be discovered with peaks in 1999, 2004 and 2007. Seeing the consistency of a minimum of 2% budget allocation for soft power programs throughout the examined time-period signals an important strategic statement. It is also important to note, that the two main soft power programs are both related to the Department of State, which indicates the government’s intention to use these soft power programs to achieve foreign policy goals.

Looking deeper into the budget spike in 1999, the federal budget document reveals that the Clinton Administration requested more money for the Foreign Affairs programs specifically to support the newly independent states and for supporting the NATO integration of three new countries (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) (US Budget 1999, p 126-127). Supporting the three new former Soviet Satellite’s countries’ membership into the alliance made the U.S. look attractive not only to the supported countries but also to all Western democracies. In the budget document president Clinton

explains his increased budget request with his desire to “advance U.S. leadership around the world” (US Budget 1999, p. 126).

The budget spikes of 2004 and 2007 were the results of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The U.S. government decided to fund the non-military foreign affairs related efforts through numerous departments. In 2004, the State Department received a large amount of funding for its Overseas Contingency Operations⁷ program for Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The 2007 budget spike represents the Bush Administration’s efforts to enhance democracy building and cultural and education exchange programs focusing on the Muslim world (US Budget 2007, p. 197). Both of these budget spikes were created as a reaction to the political elite’s narrative about the perceived threat from terrorism, and as a defense mechanism, these budget items were built into the American effort to strengthen American alliances abroad.

Looking into the program-level analysis of the American soft power programs, as Figure 6.2 shows, the budget items receive a stable allocation between 11 Million USD to 1.8 Billion USD each year. Since the Department of State has over 60 programs (only seven are shown), these allocations nicely add up into a consistent and stable soft power budget. Overall, soft power had enjoyed the consistent support of the federal government at a 2% of the federal budget with the lowest budget allocated in 1997 and 1998 (less than 2%) and the largest spike in 2007 to 2.6% of the federal budget (See Figure 6.2).

Most of the mentioned programs belong to the Department of State and three are (USAID, USIP, Broadcasting Board of Governors) are now independent agencies. Some programs such as the Voice of America Radio broadcast are placed into new programs within the State Department and some agencies such as USIA are later combined into

larger programs such as the Internal Communication Agency (Act 1998). Moving issue areas into different departments, creating and recreating mission statements is just the way governments try to adjust to changing demands (Arndt 2006, Cull 2003). In term of budget allocations, moving budget items into different department or program happens frequently. The historical overview of this dissertation revealed that cultural programs, for instance, have been moved multiple times within the State Department’s various bureaus (Arndt 2006). This analysis also revealed that in 2001 as a result of 9/11 a new policy orientation of the U.S. government increased the reliance and funding of nation building projects in post-conflict areas (Marks and Lamb 2012). This increase also leads to higher soft power use and enhanced alliance building in the targeted region.




Figure 6.2 Program-Level Budget Information for Selected Department of State Related Programs and Agencies

And while the U.S. total budget allocated for soft power programs are not high compared to its hard power allocations (Schneider 2005, Pigman 2010) it is one of the key findings of this dissertation that while the American government's allocation of a minimum of 2% of total federal budget does not match its military spending (over 20%), but compared to other countries' soft power programs it is a consistent and significant funding. In New Zealand for instance, there is less than 0.5% of the total budget allocated for soft power initiatives.

The increasing numbers speak for themselves. Just as Nye suggested in a hearing at the Committee on Foreign Relations (2008b), the U.S. government considers the soft parts of power and allocates money for democratization and developments. The stability and the long history of the soft power institutions also indicate the government's consistent strategic use of soft power tools. Another important observation about the soft power budget allocation is that it remained consistent with the lowest budget allocated in 1997 and 1998 with only \$15 billion, and the highest budget provided in 2007 with \$74 billion including the contingency operations, which constituted a budget spike (Jones et. at 2009).

In addition, the evidence of path dependency can also be discovered in relations to the timespan and budget allocated. As Pierson (2000) explained path dependency, once a budget item or program is introduced it is likely to continue due to a relative benefit of the existing program. In this increasing return process, the probability of taking steps towards the same path increases with each step taken into that same direction (Pierson 2000). In other words, in terms of soft power use, since 1938 the U.S. created institutions and allocated budget to support its soft power actions. These programs remain funded

over time as doing so was relatively easier and cheaper than stopping the existing programs and starting new ones. Also, the idea of alliance building for national security reasons and the need to strengthen global leadership remained locked into the listed government programs' mission statements.

Overall, all these programs were created to spread U.S. influence around the world starting in 1938. This indicates a strong motivation not only to continue to use soft power instruments but also to create new ways to reach out to people in other countries. These programs continued to survive because the U.S. has also continued to rely on them to advance its interest. Also, these programs play a role in solving international problems using cost-effective tools such as economic aid (Clinton 2010, McGarry and Epstein 2019). This analysis confirmed what has been revealed many times (Schneider 2005, Pigman 2010, Nye 2011) soft power instruments are cheaper than hard power tools. The fact that most of these programs still exists today is a strong indicator that the U.S. government is planning to rely on soft power actions in the long-term (US Budget 2020).

The budget documents also revealed that the mission statements include the desire for American global leadership. While in the 1960s, economic assistance was needed, in the 1990s, it was democracy building in Europe and in the 2000s defeating global terrorism were the main budget items of the American government. In all these cases, the American political elite envisioned U.S. global leadership in these listed issues and Congress allocated the funds. Ultimately the high soft power spending led to high soft power reliance in foreign policy.

6.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter discovered indicators that the statistical analysis missed. The underlying question was what factors led to the American high soft power use outcome when the theorized social trust was only at a medium level? The American case study provided the following answers: First, the U.S. leaders perceived a strong **geopolitical threat** since the Cold War and later after 9/11. These perceived threats were geographic as well as ideological. Second, in order to stop the Soviet Union from spreading and terrorism from attacking, a strong national security focused narrative became part of the **political elite's narrative** and policy recommendations. This narrative encouraged a form of a defense mechanism based on alliance building. The strong alliance building efforts (balancing) also ensured the high reliance on soft power instruments. This analysis also revealed that the political elite also supported a strong **American global leadership** role in the new world order for the same reason. Both of these policy directions resulted in high soft power use.

Third, the **history of American government programs** revealed that since 1938, the U.S. government intentionally created programs which were designed to spread U.S.' influence via attraction. In addition, the consistent alliance building, and **global leadership mission** of these programs has also been revealed. This means that in the U.S. the political elite's narrative supported the use of soft power tools in order to balance against the perceived threats. This also led to high soft power use in foreign policy.

Fourth, the **budget distribution** of the U.S. government's soft power programs also confirmed that only some of the budget changes dynamically with policy changes (Jones et al 2009). Thus, the soft power budget and the idea to use attraction abroad are

path-dependent and the American government continues to rely on them since 1938. Also, by studying the patterns of soft power budgets, this analysis showed that the smaller soft power programs continue to run without disturbance or spikes while the major programs that receive the most funding react to policy changes in the form of budget spikes. This means that, as Pierson (2000) explained, steps taken into one direction become self-enforcing because the relative benefits of continuing the same path is higher than starting something new. Increasing returns processes ensure that the American soft power programs communicating attractiveness abroad continue to live on and get funded. Therefore, the U.S. soft power institutions' budget are path-dependent, strong and stable.

As the consistent funding of soft power programs together with the mission statements of the programs also revealed, the U.S. government continues to fund programs that strengthens its **global leadership** role. By relying on a high level of soft power actions the U.S. continues to work on achieving its ambitious global agenda. Stated differently, one of the findings of this chapter is that the U.S. government has had an inspiration to become a **global leader** and has been consistently creating soft power programs and allocating budget to support such a cause. While this a unique aspect in studying countries' soft power actions as most countries do not seem to desire a **global leadership role**, this is an important factor in American soft power use and sheds light on the soft power use of a critical case. This also means that learning about the strategic soft power selectin of the strongest soft power user country in the world (in the number of soft power actions per year) also confirms my new theory about the importance of geopolitics in countries soft power use.

This budget analysis also revealed spikes in soft power allocation in 1999, 2004 and in 2007. These spikes indicate a policy move in favor of supporting soft power actions and programs. Since this analysis ends in 2010, a longer time-series is needed to reveal more about this uncovered budget increase and possible policy changed with soft power use. In general, the U.S. soft power budget has been found consistent with a slight increase.

In conclusion, based on the findings of this chapter, the U.S. government's **geopolitical threat** combined with its **global leadership ambition** are the key factors in its high level of soft power use. In addition, the institutional factors pointed to the willingness to use more soft power to achieve foreign policy goals. It seems that the perception of threat is a much stronger indicator of the U.S.'s soft power actions than social trust. The examined new factors of the American case study point to a quantitative testing of the new variables. If they are found statistically significant, those will strengthen future quantitative analysis of countries' soft power use.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RELEVANCE

This dissertation started out by comparing a constructivist approach of democracies' social trust's impacting their soft power uses, to realist approaches of resources and institutions. While social trust could not produce strong answers to why some democracies use more soft power than others, nor did the realist explanations of resources or institutions. Therefore, the real finding of this dissertation was answering the question, what else could explain democracies' soft power use? The case studies of this analysis revealed that different countries construct their soft power use differently to achieve their goals as a reaction to geopolitical threat.

More specifically, my quantitative approach revealed that social trust was not the main indicator of democracies' soft power use. While social trust was positively correlated with countries' soft power use, the statistical analysis showed that it only explained a small amount of the soft power use variation, therefore new indicators had to be explored. The quantitative multifactor analysis revealed that military alliances was statistically significant factor in countries soft power reliance. In order to learn more about its impact, I turned to three case studies.

The three case studies revealed two independent variables that were driving soft power use. In Finland and in the U.S., geopolitical threat led to high soft power use to an exceptionally high level. In addition, in the critical case of the U.S., the desire to be a global leader also drove American soft power use. Both of these countries turned to soft power use in order to create alliances as a defense mechanism and the U.S. also used it to strengthen its global leadership role. Overall, the case studies concluded that different countries create their foreign policy differently in order to achieve their foreign policies.

In the case of Finland where Russia has been posing a geopolitical threat, soft power was used to mitigate the aggressive neighbor and to strengthen global alliances to preserve the Finnish independence. In this carefully constructed Finnish foreign policy, the political elite continued to emphasize the need to reach out to Western Europe and to the rest of the world in order to strengthen their cultural and political bonds as well as protect Finland with strong alliances against Russia. And while the concept of soft power was coined by an American scholar, and soft power scholarship does not focus on countries' soft power use before 1990, the Finnish case study also revealed that Finland might have been using soft power before the U.S. did. If that is the case, Finland might be one of the first users of soft power in the world.

The budget description of the Finnish soft power programs and the foreign policy analysis articles confirmed geopolitics' enhancing effect on Finnish soft power use, where balancing against Russia led to the Finnish high soft power reliance. Stated differently, in Finland, geopolitics made the political elite create a narrative that emphasized the continued national security threat, which resulted in both political and institutional commitments to high soft power use.

In the case of the U.S. the Cold War's perceived ideological and territorial threats from the Soviet Union also boosted American soft power use all over the world. From jazz diplomacy to the Marshall plan, from the Fulbright program to the creation of the Institute of Peace, the American government has invested lots of money and effort into government programs that make America more attractive. As a result of the Soviet geopolitical threat, the U.S. constructed a foreign policy that included showcasing the attractive aspects of the American way of life as well as created programs that would send financial assistance to countries in need.

The crucial case study of the U.S. also revealed another boosting factor in the form of the desire to be a global power. This independent variable also greatly boosts soft power use, especially since the Cold War, the U.S. has been relying on demonstrating the world the attractiveness of the American life through government programs. This goal has also become a large part of U.S. foreign policy, which supports American use of cultural, educational and economic tools to spread American way of life all over the world.

Finally, in the case of New Zealand, this study confirmed that countries construct their foreign policies according to their needs and circumstances. Since there was no imminent geopolitical threat or the desire to be a global leader, New Zealand's use soft power serves a different reason and as a result it is used to a lower degree than Finland. As the most similar case design revealed, New Zealand uses its soft power to strengthen its position in the regional market.

Further, New Zealand's main reason to use soft power is its desire to strengthen its regional economic relationship. In this case, the political elite's narrative pointed to the

strengthening of economic and social ties in the Pacific region and the budget allocation supports such goals. Having mostly regional economic goals resulted in New Zealand's low soft power use. There was an interesting foreign policy shift in New Zealand in 2006 uncovered by this dissertation. With the leadership of Prime Minister Clark, in New Zealand's started to invest more money into soft power programs in foreign policy as well as started promoting New Zealand more actively not just to the regional but also globally. This policy shift suggest that New Zealand will prioritize its global engagement more and therefore will rely on soft power to a higher degree in the future.

Overall, both the new conceptualization and the new operationalization of soft power actions provided scholars a new way to study soft power and test new hypotheses in foreign policy. The discovered five new indicators (geopolitics, narrative of the political elite, soft power programs, soft power budget and global leadership inspiration) should be further tested in large n quantitative models to reveal their impact on countries' soft power use.

7.1 POLICY RELEVANCE

Scholars traditionally analyze conflict or the lack of conflict (peace) and they fail to include the application of soft power as a policy choice even though my analysis showed that 80% of all international interactions are soft power action between countries. Knowing the patterns of soft power selection, academics and scholars will be able to better understand why leaders make certain decisions with respect to their foreign policies.

One interesting result of this analysis was that even though one of Finland's strongest soft power resource is its education, the government does not use it to promote its foreign policy goals. The mission statements of the education budget-items did not reveal any foreign policy goals for Finnish education programs. This is a subject area where Finland could strengthen its soft power use abroad.

In New Zealand the recent increase soft power budget and the creation of a new soft power programs such as the China Free Trade Agreement in 2008, the Rugby Diplomacy and the TV co-production agreement with China in 2011 all indicates that New Zealand might be increasingly using its soft power to enhance its regional market share. However, in order to be successful in soft power use, the government of New Zealand has to coordinate its foreign policy goals well and clear with its ministries and programs so they can all work towards the same foreign policy outcomes.

Finally, while historically the U.S. stood out as the leading soft power user, this dissertation revealed that many other countries rely on soft power as well. For the U.S. to remain a leading soft power user, the government needs to better coordinate its programs with the country's foreign policy goals. In terms of non-democracies, future research needs to look into their soft power use patterns. There is a strong possibility that today, the non-democracies are the main soft power users on the global stage.

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APPENDIX A

SOFT AND HARD POWER RE-CODING

The re-coding of the CAMEO mediation dataset is based on the following:

Soft power actions=1

Hard power actions=2

I used MySQL to recode the ICEWS dataset. All events that I re-classified as soft power actions were recoded as 1. All events that were re-classify as hard power action received 2. In cases where it could not be decided for sure if the action was taken to create attractiveness or coerce, or the action was taken towards a third party, these were dropped from the dataset.

Dropped cases:

- 1) When the description of the event is more specific, but the giver or initiator state's intentions such as coercing of building attractiveness cannot be determined. For instance, 1.11 decline comment, 2.241 appeal for changing leadership or 2.244 appeal for military cooperation.
- 2) If the initiator state is asking a third party to do something. This action does not provide me information about the initiator's action.

Note: When governments only talk about doing something (express intent, demand, appeal for etc.) those actions are all coded as diplomatic actions.

Dropped events:

	dropped from soft power
11	decline comment
12	make a pessimistic comment
13	make an optimistic comment
16	reject or deny responsibility
24	appeal for political reform
26	appeals to others to meet or negotiate
28	appeal to others to engage in or accept mediation

34	express intent to institute political reform
52	defend verbally
53	rally support on behalf of
75	grant asylum
90	Investigate
241	appeal for leadership change
242	appeal for policy change
244	appeal for change in institutions or regime
251	appeal for easing administrative sanction
254	appeal to easing economic sanctions, boycott or embargo
341	express intent to change leadership
342	express intent to change policy
831	accede to demands for change in political leadership
832	accede to demand for policy change
834	accede to demands for institutional or regime change

	dropped from hard power
101	demand material cooperation
104	demand political reform
105	demand that target yield
113	rally opposition against
114	complain officially
120	Reject
123	reject request or demand for political reform
128	defy norms, law
141	demonstrate or rally

1014	demand intelligence cooperation
1041	demand leadership change
1042	demand policy change
1222	reject request for military aid
1224	reject request for military protection or peacekeeping
1231	reject request to change leadership
1232	reject request to change policy
1411	demonstrate or rally for leadership change
1412	demonstrate or rally for policy change
1622	reduce or stop military assistance

Soft Power Events Coded:

10³⁴	make a public statement
14	consider policy option
15	acknowledge or claim responsibility
17	engage in symbolic act
18	make empathetic comment
19	express accord
20	make and appeal or request
21	appeal for material cooperation
22	appeal for diplomatic cooperation
23	appeal for material aid
27	appeal to others to settle dispute
30	express intent to cooperate
31	express intent to engage in material cooperation
32	express intent to cooperate diplomatically

³⁴ Bold indicates the most commonly used events.

33	express intent to provide material aid
35	express intent to yield
36	express intent to meet and negotiate
37	express intent to settle dispute
38	express intent to accept mediation
39	express intent to mediate
40	Consult
41	discuss by telephone
42	make a visit
43	host a visit
44	meet at a third location
45	engage in mediation
46	engage in negotiation
50	engage in diplomatic cooperation
51	praise or endorse
54	grant diplomatic recognition
55	Apologize
56	Forgive
57	sign formal agreement
60	engage in material cooperation
61	cooperate economically
63	engage in judicial cooperation
64	share intelligence or information
70	provide aid
71	provide economic aid
73	provide humanitarian aid
74	provide military protection or peacekeeping

80	yield
81	ease administrative sanctions
82	ease political dissent
83	accede to request for political reform
84	return or release
85	ease economic sanctions, boycott or embargo
86	allow international involvement
87	de-escalate military engagement
91	investigate crime or corruption
92	investigate human rights abuse
93	investigate military action
94	investigate war crimes
212	appeal for military cooperation
213	appeal for judicial cooperation
214	appeal for intelligence cooperation
233	appeal for humanitarian aid
234	appeal for military protection or peacekeeping
243	appeal for rights
253	appeal for release of person or property
255	appeal to allow international involvement
311	express intent to cooperate economically
313	express intent to cooperate in judicial matters
314	express intent to cooperate on intelligence
331	express intent to provide economic aid
333	express intent to provide humanitarian aid
334	express intent to provide military protection or peacekeeping

343	express intent to provide rights
351	express intent to ease administrative sanctions
352	express intent to ease popular dissent
353	express intent to release person or property
354	express intent to ease economic sanctions, boycott on embargo
355	express intent to allow international involvement
356	express intent to de-escalate military involvement
811	ease restrictions on political freedoms
812	ease ban on political parties or politicians
813	ease curfew
814	ease state of emergency or martial law
833	accede to demands for rights
841	return or release persons
842	return or release property
861	receive deployment of peacekeepers
862	receive inspectors
863	allow for humanitarian access
871	declare truce, cease fire
872	ease military blockade
873	demobilize armed forces
874	retreat or surrender military

Hard Power Events Coded:

72	provide military aid
100	Demand
102	demand for diplomatic cooperation
103	demand material aid

106	demand meeting
107	demand settling of dispute
108	demand mediation
110	Disapprove
111	criticize or denounce
112	Accuse
115	bring lawsuit against
116	find guilty or liable
121	reject material cooperation
122	reject request or demand for material aid
124	refuse to yield
125	reject proposal to meet
126	reject mediation
127	reject plan, agreement to settle dispute
129	Veto
130	Threaten
131	threaten, non-force
132	threaten with administrative sanctions
133	threaten political dissent
134	threaten to halt negotiations
135	threaten to halt mediation
136	threaten to halt international involvement
137	threaten with repression
138	threaten with military force
139	give ultimatum
140	engage in political dissent
142	conduct hunger strike

143	conduct strike or boycott
144	obstruct passage or block
145	protest violently or riot
150	demonstrate military or police power
151	reduce relations
152	increase military alert status
153	mobilize or increase police power
154	mobilize or increase armed forces
160	reduce relations
161	reduce or break diplomatic relations
162	reduce or stop material aid
163	impose embargo, boycott or sanctions
164	halt negotiations
166	expel or withdraw
170	Coerce
171	seize or damage property
172	impose administrative sanctions
173	arrest, detain or charge with legal action
174	expel or deport individuals
175	use tactics of violent repression
180	use unconventional violence
181	abduct, hijack, or take hostage
182	physical assault
183	conduct suicide, car or other non-military bombing
184	Use human shield
185	attempt to assassinate
186	Assassinate

190	use conventional military force
191	impose blockade, restrict movement
192	occupy territory
193	fight with small arms and light weapons
194	fight with artillery and tanks
195	employ aerial weapons
196	violate cease fire
201	engage in mass expulsion
1011	demand economic cooperation
1012	demand military cooperation
1013	demand judicial cooperation
1031	demand economic aid
1032	demand military aid
1033	demand humanitarian aid
1034	demand military protection or peacekeeping
1043	demand rights
1044	demand change in institutions and regime
1051	demand easing of administrative sanctions
1052	demand easing political dissent
1053	demand release of person or property
1054	demand easing economic boycott, embargo or sanctions
1055	demand to allow international involvement
1056	demand de-escalation of military engagement
1121	accuse of crime corruption
1122	accuse of human rights abuses
1123	accuse of aggression
1124	accuse of war crimes

1125	accuse of espionage
1211	reject economic cooperation
1213	reject judicial cooperation
1214	reject intelligence cooperation
1221	reject request for economic aid
1223	reject request for humanitarian aid
1233	reject request for rights
1234	reject request for change in institution or regime
1241	refuse to ease administrative sanctions
1242	refuse to popular dissent
1243	refuse to release person or property
1244	refuse to ease economic sanctions, boycott or embargo
1245	refuse to allow international involvement
1246	refuse to de-escalate military engagement
1311	threaten to reduce or stop aid
1312	threaten to boycott, embargo or sanction
1313	threaten to reduce or break relations
1321	threaten with restrictions on political freedoms
1381	threaten with blockade
1382	threaten occupation
1383	threaten unconventional attack
1384	threaten conventional attack
1385	threaten unconventional mass violence

APPENDIX B

SOFT POWER RANKING (2010)

Comparison between McClory's ranking and my ranking for the year 2010

McClory's Soft Power Ranking 2010

1. France and UK
3. USA
4. Germany
5. Switzerland
6. Sweden
7. Denmark
8. Australia
9. Finland
10. Netherlands

My Ranking 2010 Democracies

1. USA
2. Japan
3. India
4. S. Korea
5. UK
6. Australia
7. Mexico
8. Brazil
9. Germany
10. Argentina

My Ranking 2010 for All Countries

1. USA
2. China
3. Russia
4. Japan
5. India
6. Iran
7. Turkey
8. South Korea
9. UK
10. Nigeria

APPENDIX C

LATENT SOCIAL TRUST

Indicators for Measurement Model (Justwan et al. 2018 Table 2 p.153)

Indicator type and name	Data source	Value range	Exp. (a)	Indicator relationship to social trust suggested by
Survey-based measures				
General Trust Question	World values survey	0.03–0.74	+	
General Trust Question	Barometers	0.02–0.75	+	
Institutional correlates				
Political rights	Polity IV (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002)	–10 to 10	+	Delhey and Newton (2005)
Political rights (non-linear effect)	Polity IV (squared)	0–100	+	You (2012)
Corruption	Transparency International (2017)	0.40–10	+	You (2012)
Bureaucratic quality	ICRG (PRS Group, 2015)	0.04–1.00	+	Rothstein and Stolle (2008)
Judicial independence	Cingranelli et al. (2014)	0–2	+	Rothstein and Stolle (2008)
Non-currency money/total money supply	Clague et al. (1999)	0.03–0.99	+	Baliamoune-Lutz (2011)
Civil liberties	Freedom House (2017)	1-7	–	Delhey and Newton (2005)
Institutional effectiveness	Elgin and Oztunali (2012)	0.08–1.13	–	Rothstein and Stolle (2008)
Former soviet country	hand-coded	0-1	-	Bjørnskov (2006)

Social-psychological correlates				
Protestantism	La Porta et al. (1999)	0–97.80	+	Delhey and Newton (2005)
Income Inequality Gini index	(World Bank, 2015)	15.90–73.90	–	Rothstein and Uslaner (2005)
Ethnic fractionalization	Fearon and Laitin (2003)	0.01–1.00	–	Delhey and Newton (2005)
Biological/environmental correlates				
Fertility rate	World Bank (2015)	1.08–9.22	+	Zak and Fakhar (2006)
Environmentally protected areas	World Bank (2015)	0–98.11	+	Zak and Fakhar (2006)
Size of female population	World Bank (2015)	24.26–55.85	+	Zak and Fakhar (2006)
Prevalence of malnourishment	World Bank (2015)	5.00–70.00	–	Zak and Fakhar (2006)
Water pollution	World Bank (2015)	0.09–0.45	–	Zak and Fakhar (2006)

(a) Expectation for the relationship between a given indicator and the estimated latent trust variable.

APPENDIX D

LIST OF SOFT POWER DEPARTMENTS AND PROGRAMS IN FINLAND

(AS BUDGET ITEMS 1995-2010)

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

1. The Foreign Service
2. Civilian Crisis Management
3. Neighboring area cooperation
4. International development cooperation
5. Commercial-industrial cooperation
6. Cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and other CIS countries
7. Neighboring area cooperation
8. Other expenditure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administration

Selected Items from the Ministry of Education and Culture

1. International cooperation
2. Art and culture
3. The Sports Department
4. Cultural, museum and library activities

APPENDIX E

LIST OF SOFT POWER DEPARTMENTS AND PROGRAMS IN NEW ZEALAND

(AS BUDGET ITEMS 1995-2010)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (selected programs) (MFAT)

1. Administration of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities
2. Consular Services
3. Pacific Security Fund
4. Policy Advice and Representation - International Institutions
5. Policy Advice and Representation - Other Countries
6. Policy Advice and Representation - Other Countries PLA
7. Pacific Cooperation Foundation
8. Promotion of Asian Skills and Relationships
9. Subscriptions to International Organizations
10. Promotional Activities - Other Countries
11. International Radio Services
12. Hosting of Pacific Islands Forum Meeting

Ministry for Culture and Heritage (selected programs) (MCH)

1. Cultural Diplomacy International Program

APPENDIX F

LIST OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS PROGRAMS IN 2001 FOREIGN AFFAIRS BY FUNCTION (150-155)

A. Administration of Foreign Affairs

Diplomatic & Consular Programs (D&CP)
D&CP Worldwide Security Upgrades
Salaries & Expenses (S&E)
Capital Investment Fund (CIF)
Technology Fund
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency
International Information Programs (IIP)
Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance:
Worldwide Security Upgrades

Other State Programs:

Educational & Cultural Exchange Programs
Representation Allowances
Protection of Foreign Missions and Officials
Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service
Payment to the American Institute in Taiwan
State Office of the Inspector General
Repatriation Loans Program Account
F.S. Retirement and Disability Fund

B. International Organizations

Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA)
Contributions to International Organizations (CIO)
UN Arrearage Payments (CIO/CIPA)

C. Related Programs

The Asia Foundation
East-West Center
North-South Center
National Endowment for Democracy (NED)

Commission on International Religious Freedom
Eisenhower/Israeli-Arab Exchange Programs
National Commission on Terrorism

D. Supplemental Appropriations

Balkans and Southeast Europe /5

E. Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)

International Broadcasting Operations
Broadcasting to Cuba
Broadcasting Capital Improvements

F. Other Programs

Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
Holocaust Assets Commission
International Trade Commission

II. Foreign Operations (Including Wye)

Title I - Export and Investment Assistance
Export-Import Bank (EXIM)
Export-Import Bank - Loan Subsidy
Export-Import Bank - Administrative Expenses
Export-Import Bank - Direct Loans, Negative Subsidies
Subtotal, Export-Import Bank
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
Administrative Expenses for Credit & Insurance Programs
Net Offsetting Collections
Credit Funding - Direct & Guaranteed Loan Subsidies
Subtotal, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Trade and Development Agency (TDA)

Title II - Bilateral Economic Assistance

U.S. Agency for International Development
Sustainable Development
Child Survival & Diseases Fund /3
Development Assistance (DA) /3
Development Fund for Africa (DFA)
Development Credit Authority
Central American/Caribbean
Emergency Disaster Recovery Fund
International Disaster Assistance
Micro and Small Enterprise Development - Subsidy
Micro and Small Enterprise Development - Admin. Exp.
Urban and Environmental Credit Program - Subsidy
Urban and Environmental Credit Program - Admin. Exp.
Development Credit Program Subsidy

Development Credit Program Administrative Expenses
USAID Operating Expenses
USAID Inspector General Operating Expenses

Other Bilateral Economic Assistance

Economic Support Fund (ESF) - w/ Fund for Ireland
Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (SEED)
Asst. for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (FSA /NIS)

Independent Agency

Peace Corps
Inter-American Foundation /3
African Development Foundation /3

State Department

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INC)
Assistance to Plan Colombia
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)
U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund (ERMA)
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining & Related Prog. (NADR)
Department of the Treasury
Treasury Technical Assistance
Debt Restructuring

Title III - Military Assistance

International Military Education & Training (IMET)
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF)

Title IV - Multilateral Economic Assistance

International Financial Institutions
Global Environment Facility (GEF)
International Development Association
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) - Ordinary Capital
Inter-American Development Bank - Fund for Special Operations
Asian Development Bank
Asian Development Fund
African Development Fund
African Development Bank
European Bank for Reconstruction & Development (EBRD)
IADB - Multilateral Investment Fund
Inter-American Investment Corporation
MDB Arrears
International Organizations & Programs (IO&P) /3

Supplemental and Advance Appropriations

Assistance to Plan Colombia

Balkans and Southeast Europe /5

Debt Restructuring (HIPC)

Wye and Egypt Supplemental

Total, Wye & Egypt Supplemental

Economic Support Fund (ESF)

Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

APPENDIX G

LIST OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS IN 2010

FOREIGN AFFAIRS BY FUNCTION (150-155)

A. Administration of Foreign Affairs

Diplomatic and Consular Programs
Capital Investment Fund
Border Security Program
Working Capital Fund
Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance
Conflict Stabilization Operations
Office of Inspector General
Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs
Representation Allowances
Protection of Foreign Missions and Officials
Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service
Buying Power Maintenance Account
Repatriation Loans Program Account
Payment to the American Institute in Taiwan
Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund

B. International Organizations

Contributions to International Organizations
Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities

C. Related Programs

The Asia Foundation
Center for Middle Eastern
Western Dialogue
Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship Program
Israeli Arab
Scholarship Program
East-West Center
National Endowment for Democracy

D. Related Agencies

Broadcasting Board of Governors
International Broadcasting Operations
Broadcasting Capital Improvements
United States Institute of Peace

FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND RELATED PROGRAMS

II. United States Agency for International Development

USAID Operating Expenses
USAID Capital Investment Fund
USAID Inspector General Operating Expenses

III. Bilateral Economic Assistance

Global Health Programs
Development Assistance
International Disaster Assistance
Transition Initiatives
Complex Crises Fund
Development Credit Authority
Economic Support Fund
Migration and
Refugee Assistance
U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund
Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund

B. Independent Agencies

Peace Corps
Millennium Challenge Corporation
Inter-American Foundation
African Development Foundation

APPENDIX H

USIA PROGRAMS (1990-1997)

1. Overseas Missions
2. Bureau of Broadcasting
3. Radio Free Asia
4. Educational and Cultural Affairs
5. Policy guidance and program support
6. Bureau of Information
7. Agency direction and management
8. Administrative support from other agencies

APPENDIX I
USAID PROGRAMS
(WWW.USAID.GOV)

1. Agriculture and Food Security
2. Democracy, Human Rights and Governance
3. Economic Growth and Trade
4. Education
5. Environment and Global Climate Change
6. Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
7. Global Health
8. Science, Technology and Innovation
9. Water and Sanitation
10. Working in Crises and Conflict