A DIVISIVE COMMUNITY: RACE, NATION, AND LOYALTY IN SANTO DOMINGO, 1822 – 1844

by

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Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in

History

College of Arts and Sciences

University of South Carolina

2018

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To my grandfather, Manuel Polanco who was gone too soon in my life but whose presence I still feel. *Espero que veamos en el cielo.*
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I must have imagined this moment many times and yet surprisingly find myself at a loss for words. But there are so many people to thank I hope I include you all. I would like to start first with God for watching over me for these years. My faith has been something that has carried me through difficult times and has kept me level headed during my graduate student career. I am grateful for my family who raised me and instilled in me the values of hard work, faith, and the importance of relationships. My mother Ana Polanco served as one of my inspirations raising four children and her decision to go back to school while I was still young. It showed me that anything is possible and to never give up on your dreams. My father Wayne Keane-Dawes whose conversations on history, race and, nation as a kid shaped me and so the direction of this project. I may not have always looked like I was listening Dad but looking back I appreciate that you took the time to teach me things and share with me your perspective growing up in Jamaica. Paula Spicer, who became another mother to me and encouraged me to pursue my passion in history. And to my grandparents on both sides of my family who migrated from the Dominican Republic and Jamaica in search of a new life. Particularly, my maternal Grandfather Manuel Polanco who I lost all too soon. *Espero que esté orgulloso de tu nieto.*

Even with the changes that have come with my decision to go to graduate school, I have appreciated that my siblings, close friends, and extended family continued to treat me no differently. That sense of normalcy is something that I try not to take for granted.
To my siblings Gabi, Jerome, Monet, Elijah, and Magi I want to thank you for the good times we have shared and I apologize for the time I have been away since I made that decision to pursue this endeavor. To my aunts, uncles, and cousins I thank you for your taking an interest, supporting me, and for sharing my triumphs and my falls. I think specifically of my cousins Felix and Nicholas who are like brothers to me and my tias Juana and Xiomara who made sure a bright young boy did not get too full of himself.

Paul, Jacques, David, and Claire, you all became family after our wedding and I appreciate the support and the interest in my work. Alix and Ines, thank you for accepting me as a son and for believing in my work and in myself.

St. Johns University was my first collegiate home and foundational for propelling me forward to continue in graduate studies. My special thanks to many of my professors including Joseph Bongiorno, John Rao, and Azzedine Layachi who encouraged my intellectual curiosity in the classroom and helped me to make the decision to continue my education at the graduate level. I am grateful for the administrators and deans who took an interest in my passions and encouraged me to study abroad in spring 2010. The experience of studying and traveling outside of the United States and to see the ways that other people value their past was another indicator that history was the path for me.

Even though I was ready to begin my graduate student career at Florida International University (FIU), there was a steep learning curve to transition to graduate studies. Still, I am eternally grateful for the professors and classmates who encouraged me both in my studies and applying to doctoral programs. Bianca Premo, thank you for being patient with me and for meeting with me weekly during our first semester together. You saw something in me that I did not see in myself and continued to push me right up
to the very end. Sherry Johnson, who helped me during my time at FIU both as the director of Latin American and Caribbean Center and as my professor during our graduate seminar in the Caribbean. Thank you for always keeping an eye for me for research opportunities and for your advice and approaches for scholarship. Jenna Gibbs, who served as my professor and mentor for my early research on British abolitionism and encouraged me to present and publish it. I appreciated your advice on writing and research that helped both with that project and the dissertation. And to my former classmates and now colleagues who showed me the joys of being a part of a scholarly community, I thank you all sincerely.

The University of South Carolina was the right fit for me and I could not have asked for a better committee. Matt Childs, more than your scholarship and skills as historian is your humility, generosity, good humor, and positive outlook that continue to have a lasting impact on me. Thank you for giving me a second chance and for finding the right balance between guiding me and allowing to grow and mature as a scholar and a person. May we share more desserts, coffee and good times so that Don Postre can live up to his name. Martine Jean, thank you for taking an interest in my work and my career as a junior scholar. Your timely feedback and advice has been important especially this past year. Gabi Kuenzli, thank you for being in my corner and for pushing me to think about my project more than just my immediate interests. Your mantra of giving 150% has stuck with me since our first seminar together and I hope that this dissertation reflects it. Anne Eller, thank you for taking an early interest in my work and for reading an early dissertation chapter. Your advice, feedback, and scholarly comradery that has made this
project and my focus that much better. Jorge Camacho, thank you serving on this committee and for sharing your interests in nineteenth-century Cuba.

I have benefited from the advice, classes, and feedback on my project from various professors both within and outside of the History Department. A special thank you to Pat Sullivan, director of the History Center here at the university for allowing me to present a chapter of my dissertation. Don Doyle, who took an interest in my work as I was writing my proposal and offered me insightful feedback during our seminar together. I also appreciate the feedback both direct and indirect that I received from certain faculty on my research questions, presenting my work, and academia within the department such as Christine Ames, Carol Harrison, and Nicole Maskiel. And from those outside like Andrew Rajca, Kim Simmons, and Mercedes Lopez Rodriguez.

Graduate school builds deep bonds linked by the shared experience of coursework, research, and looking for that elusive balance between work and leisure. I am grateful for the feedback and ideas I received on my research and as a historian. To our Atlantic Reading group, both old and new members, I am grateful to all of those who have read most if not all this dissertation and whose comments have made it that much stronger. Thank you to Caleb Wittum, Lewis Eliot, Pat O’Brien, Jill Found, Melissa DeVelvis, Nathalia Cocenza, Cane West, Erica Johnson, Neal Polhemus, Chaz Yingling, Andrew Kettler, Will Mundhenke, Robert Greene, Erin Holmes, Maurice Robinson, Tyler Parry, and Jacob Mach. Our dissertation reading group further strengthened our cohort bond and look forward to seeing your dissertations finished and projects develop. Thank you to Gary Sellick, Stephanie Gray, Sam King, and Carter Bruns, and Caleb for coming together during our monthly meetings and keep ourselves focused.
I have appreciated the internal and external funding that supported this project and the staff at the various archives I visited. I would like to thank the Conference on Latin History for the James R. Scobie Award; the Ceny Walker Fellowship from the Walker Institute and Area Studies at the University of South Carolina; the Vice President for Research at the University of South Carolina for the SPARC fellowship; and the Russell J. and Dorothy S. Bilinski Fellowship Completion fellowship. I am grateful to the staff at the Archivo de la Nación and the Archivo Histórico del Arzobispado de Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic; the Archivo General de Indias and the Archivo Histórico Nacional in Spain; and the Nation Archive in the United Kingdom. And closer to home, I would like to thank the librarians and staff at Thomas Cooper Library here at the University whose work and positive attitudes made research and writing easier. I would be remised if I did not mention the various families who shared their homes with me in Santo Domingo, Seville, Madrid, and London. A special thank you to my tia Eliana in Santo Domingo who looked out for me especially during my bout with la chikunguña. And also to Eva, Curro, and Manuela in Seville who treated me like my family.

My research and conference travels have exposed me to the larger scholarly community and I have benefited to their feedback, advice, and questions. Andrew Walker and Maria Cecilia Ulrickson who I shared an awesome panel on nineteenth-century Hispaniola. I am grateful to Bill Van Norman, Ana Maria Silva, and Cristina Soriano who took the time out of their research projects to give me tips and insight into the inner workings of the AGI and AHN in Seville, and Madrid. Julia Gaffield, thank you for answering my queries on nineteenth-century historiography on Church and State relations in Hispaniola. I also thank Micah Oelze for his insightful comments for Chapter Three of
the dissertation. And lastly, I am grateful to all the feedback I received at different conferences presenting this research.

Little did I know that when I set foot in Green Library at FIU that the woman helping me at the front desk would become my future wife. Rachel Duval, who took time out of her own professional school to go to conferences, long distance phone calls and skype chats during research trips, and drives down to South Carolina to spend time together. You have even chosen to come to Columbia as I have finished my last year of dissertation writing. To my biggest fan, my best friend, y mi amor words cannot truly capture or express my gratitude, my love, and appreciation. Thank you for giving me hope, peace, and for giving me something to look forward to every time I step away from my work. I am glad you have been with me through this part of the journey and look forward to the future and whatever life has in store for us.
ABSTRACT

On 8 February 1822, Haitian President Jean-Pierre Boyer entered Santo Domingo and ended the short-lived experiment of a moderate republic and the triumph of a popular and radical vision of nationhood. For the next two decades, this unified Haitian Republic faced the scrutiny of Spanish, French, and British slave empires, fueled by the accounts and reports of those Dominicans who rejected this change in events. Using government correspondences, reports, pamphlets, and proclamations, this study argues that the Haitian Unification affected Dominican political allegiances and drove white elites to support Spanish monarchy in contrast to those in Santo Domingo who supported Haitian republicanism and emancipation. In doing so, this study brings together the different literatures in discussion with each other: race and nation in the Dominican Republic, Latin American independence and nationalism, and an Atlantic perspective of empires and nation-states.

This study begins by examining the events leading up to the Haitian Unification and how Dominican and Spanish responses focused on its negative impact, calling for Spain to take back its former colony. Next, this analysis focuses on Haitian reforms in Santo Domingo such as land and Church as a part of the republic’s vision for transforming a former colonial society into an integral part of the Haitian nation. Finally, it investigates Haiti’s successful defense of its sovereignty in Santo Domingo in part because of its official recognition by the French. By 1833, white Dominican elites who witnessed the Haitian defense of sovereignty and Spanish retreat articulated a narrative
lauding their Hispanic ties and identity with Spain while associating blackness with Haiti and rejecting those who supported the republic’s rule. The genesis of this struggle over the role of race in Dominican nationalism and how it manifests itself in its relationship to Haiti play out today within Dominican politics and society.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... iii  

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iv  

ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................... x  

INTRODUCTION: ROYALIST REASONING ........................................................................... 1  


CHAPTER 2: “…ANIMATED BY THE SAME SPIRIT OF OPPOSITION”: SPANISH SUBVERSION IN SANTO DOMINGO, 1822 – 1824 .................................................................................................61  

CHAPTER 3: “THERE IS ALMOST NO PORTION OF THE SPIRITUAL EDIFICE THAT DOES NOT REPRESENT RUBBISH AND RUIN”: HAITI AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN SANTO DOMINGO, 1823 – 1833 .................................................................101  

CHAPTER 4: “A NATION IS TO WATCH ITS CONSERVATION AND TO GUARANTEE ITS SECURITY”: HISPANIOLA AFTER RECOGNITION, 1824 – 1830 .............................................................................................................133  

CHAPTER 5: “DOMINICANS…THE FIRST SPANIARDS OF AMERICA”: SANTO DOMINGO AND THE DISCURSIVE STRUGGLE FOR IDENTITY, 1830 – 1833 ............................................................................................................166  

CONCLUSION: A NATION DIVIDED ....................................................................................199  

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................226
INTRODUCTION: ROYALIST REASONING

On 9 July 1824, former intendente or quartermaster Felipe Fernandez de Castro lamented to the Spanish Secretary of State about the loss of Santo Domingo to the Haitian Republic. In particular, Fernandez de Castro drew attention to the Dominican Creole José Nuñez de Cáceres and his supporters who declared independence from Spain in December 1821 with a list of grievances expressing their feelings of betrayal by the Spanish government.¹ A royalist who fled Santo Domingo after the fall of the Spanish regime, Fernandez de Castro disputed the feelings of Dominicans of the loss of the former Spanish colony. He depicted Núñez de Cáceres as insecure and ambitious, accusing the Dominican Creole of holding a grudge because Spanish officials passed him over for a promotion in the colonial hierarchy. In comparison to Núñez de Cáceres and his supporters, Fernandez de Castro presented the rest of the Dominican population as loyal and victims of the Dominican Creole’s “monster” consuming their “innocence.”² According to Fernandez de Castro, once Dominicans realized the “insanity” and “ambition” driving Núñez de Cáceres’ desire for independence, they attempted to overthrow his rule but were unsuccessful. When Santo Domingo became a part of the

² “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Primer Secretario del Despacho de Estado,” Madrid, 9 July 1824, AHN-Estado Exp. 4, 2a.

Fernandez de Castro’s account of Dominican loyalty conveniently obscures the fact that there were two independence movements against Spanish rule in Santo Domingo by 1821. While Núñez de Cáceres and his supporters wanted a moderate republic and federation with the independent states in South America, much of the Dominican population chose to ally with the Haitian Republic under the rule of President Jean-Pierre Boyer. My dissertation “A Divisive Community” analyzes the aftermath of the Haitian Unification in 1822 until its end in 1844. This study charts the responses of these two groups existing in Santo Domingo during this period. Fernandez de Castro was one of several Dominicans who chose exile, repeating the same paths of French and Spanish planters during the Haitian Revolution who fled to places such as Cuba and Puerto Rico.

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3 Christina Violet Jones “Revolution and Reaction: Santo Domingo during the Haitian Revolution and Beyond, 1791-1844” (Ph.D. diss, Howard University, 2008; Anne Eller ““All would be equal in the effort”: Santo Domingo’s “Italian Revolution,” Independence, and Haiti, 1809-1822” *Journal of Early American History* 1 (2011), 105-141; and Charlton Yingling, “Colonialism Unraveling: Race, Religion, and National Belonging in Santo Domingo During the Age of Revolution (Ph.D. diss., University of South Carolina, 2016).

It was in these colonial possessions where a historical narrative idealizing Santo Domingo’s loyalty to the Spanish Crown and denigrating Haitian rule took form. By presenting the populace as loyal to the Spanish Crown, Dominican royalists encouraged Spain to take Santo Domingo from Haiti, ignoring the support for Boyer’s rule on the island.

This dissertation examines the development of this Dominican royalist narrative development in relation to Spanish and Haitian negotiations for Santo Domingo. This study begins by asking how did the Dominicans respond to the Haitian Unification? Next, how did European and Caribbean officials argue that Haiti’s actions in Santo Domingo would bring about the end of slavery? And lastly, how did the Dominican royalist narrative develop in response to the Haitian Unification’s success? Rather than framing this period as one of a “Haitian Occupation,” my dissertation argues that elite Dominicans deployed a Hispanic and racist rhetoric to purposefully disrupt the Haitian government’s attempts to bring together both sides of the island and ignored the cooperation between Dominicans and Haitians during the island’s unification.

During this period race and ethnicity became a marker and divider among social groups because Dominican royalists kept them at the forefront of people’s minds. The Dominican Creole vision of an elite-led moderate republic gave way to a more egalitarian direction living under the rule of the Haitian Republic. Dominicans had options such as


embracing Haiti or not employing racist rhetoric. Instead, these former separatists decided that Spanish colonial rule was better than living under Haitian rule. To convince the Spanish—and the world—of their aversion to President Boyer’s government, these Dominicans developed an account underlining the population’s affinity and fidelity to Spain and the monarch Fernando VII. This argument refashioned Dominicans as Hispanic royalists and looked past the fact that many of them had only recently rejected Spanish rule with Santo Domingo’s first independence. This new account marginalized the fact that Dominicans steered Santo Domingo to join the Haitian Republic and instead presented it as a foreign occupation. This limited vision left out other possible groups and peoples such as the former enslaved, cattle traders, and revolutionaries. This account gave the Spanish and others who were willing to listen look an opportunity to dismiss the Haitian Unification of the island, shaped by their own fears and prejudices as a legacy of the Haitian Revolution. Separatists explicitly used race and ethnicity to differentiate between Dominicans and Haitians that later separatists took for themselves to justify the end of their union with Haiti in 1844.

HISTORIOGRAPHY
Dominican royalists’ fashioning a Hispanic narrative provides one example of the ways in which historical actors defined themselves in opposition to Haiti. Recent scholars of nineteenth-century Dominican Republic have shown how continued relations with Haiti were not always contentious, with some Dominicans even considering a federation between both island nations.6 This pro-Haitian notion of nationhood clashed with the Dominican elite’s vision that focused on integrating white immigrants into the nation.

While not explicitly anti-Haitian, these Dominican elites were like their counterparts in Latin America who looked down upon indigenous and African elements of society.\(^7\) It was within this context that Dominican historian José Gabriel García wrote his epic four-volume history of the Dominican Republic, devoting several chapters to the Haitian Unification.\(^8\) Gabriel García’s preoccupation with Dominican nation-building shaped his interpretations as he looked to the historical past to offer lessons for his present. He negatively depicted the Haitian Unification because for him it stood as a barrier to Dominican independence and nation-building that emphasized progress.\(^9\) Nevertheless, his point of emphasis was not to focus on this period as the origin of Dominican identity.

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\(^8\) José Gabriel García, *Compendio de la historia de Santo Domingo* 4 volumes (Santo Domingo: Imprenta García Hermanos, 1894). For the purposes of this study, I cite an abridged version containing the first two volumes of the collection.

The Dominican experience under the Unification did not figure as a prominent source of contention or identification for the literature compared to how it would function in the twentieth century.

The anti-Haitian narrative in Dominican historical works became more pronounced in the scholarship produced under dictator Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina (1930 – 1961). One of the things that made Trujillo’s regime notable was his populist tactics that incorporated the rural population within Dominican society by making the state responsible for their well-being. In addition, he embodied several cultural motifs such as a father figure, family man, and caudillo that entrenched his own form of populism.\(^\text{10}\) Trujillo’s dictatorship, however, is infamous for its state-sponsored anti-Haitianism. Although initially inconsistent and ambiguous, Trujillo’s decision to order the Dominican army to kill Haitians living in the Dominican Republic’s northwestern frontier killing at least 15,000 ethnic Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent reflected an anti-Haitian discourse.\(^\text{11}\) With the help of selected intellectuals, Trujillo sponsored studies on Dominican history basing the nation on an idealized Hispanic heritage in stark contrast to Haiti. These scholars blamed Haiti for the Dominican nation’s past and present problems. It was under Trujillo’s rule that this dichotomy of associating Haiti with all things black and African and relating all Dominicans’ positive

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traits as Hispanic and white reached its apogee. Since his death in 1961, Dominican scholarship has distanced itself from Trujillo’s anti-Haitian and pro-Hispanic discourse with studies that have reexamined this period from the perspective of labor, emancipation, slavery, and race. Scholarship in the United States has complemented this literature by offering new studies on the nineteenth-century informing historians’ understandings on the relationship between race and nation, slavery and emancipation, and the continued ties between Haitians and Dominicans. These studies have corrected much of the anti-Haitian bias from the Trujillo regime about the Dominican and Haitian past.

“A Divisive Community” contributes a singular focus on this period by elaborating the elite discourses about these events with new archives and a bigger discussion. By contrasting pro-Haitian Dominicans with their pro-Spanish counterparts,

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this study reveals how the Haitian Unification hardened existing regional, ethnic, and class divisions within Santo Domingo’s society.\textsuperscript{15} This emphasis illustrates how the Unification’s success drove pro-Spanish Dominicans’ to increasingly reject Haitian rule and marginalizing the republic’s supporters through racial language. This anti-Haitian rhetoric underpinning expressions of Dominican identity and its impact in shaping present-day notions of blackness in the Dominican Republic has been the subject of many studies ranging from politics to ideas of beauty.\textsuperscript{16} My analysis focuses in part on Dominican identity by parsing it from notions of \textit{dominicanidad}, or Dominicanness as some Dominicans presented themselves as Spanish subjects. When considering this period as a Haitian occupation from Dominican royalists’ perspectives, this study examines some of Santo Domingo’s conditions under Haitian rule to consider what contributed to its separation from Haiti in 1844. The Unification offers the opportunity to explore the existing fissures within Dominican society and its impact on how the historical actors depicted the Haitian regime in Santo Domingo.

Nearly fifty years ago, scholarship on Latin America began looking at the causes of independence in the region and less the Spanish Empire’s dissolution from a top-down perspective. Earlier scholars focusing on texts such as John Lynch and Benedict Anderson examined the impact of print culture in creating a sense of community as the foundation for nineteenth-century nation states. It was from newspapers circulating

\textsuperscript{15} Scholars have eluded to Boyer drawing support from Dominicans closer to the Haitian and Dominican border. See Eugenio Matibag, \textit{Haitian-Dominican Counterpoint: Nation, State, and Race on Hispaniola} (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2003); and Jones, “Revolution and Reaction.” For such examples of regional studies and focuses see Lora Hugi, \textit{Transción de la esclavitud}; and Eller, \textit{We Dream Together}.

among the Creole elites informing them of the events across the Americas combined with their local grievances that illustrated the different causes of independence in the region. Historians have long since modified these early hypotheses with specific case studies offering examples of alternative ways that Latin American historical actors imagined themselves and others within emerging nation-states. Regional and specific case studies offer examples of Creoles using indigenous symbols, imagery, and history as the basis for their new nations as opposed to their European connections. The aftermath of independence resulted in nation-states where Creoles diverged from Spain rhetorically and not just politically.

Historians have also inserted the contributions of subaltern groups to the larger independence and nation-building narratives. This direction in the scholarship complements existing work on Creole elites to illustrate how Africans, Amerindians, and their descendants became politicized but for different reasons. For example, case studies in the Andes show how different indigenous groups rebelled to transform if not fully overthrow the existing colonial order. In other instances, scholars have examined the New Granada viceroyalty looking at pardos or free people of color who fought against

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the Spanish for the idea of a nation-state free from racism and legal discrimination. New Granada’s coastal region’s connection to the Caribbean served as a reminder of the precariously of cross-racial alliances in the aftermath of independence. The Haitian Revolution and its impact in the Atlantic world illustrate how the struggle against slavery could also be the impetus towards a fight against colonialism and freedom. Formerly enslaved persons turned citizens forced the French to grant them citizenship and held out in Saint-Domingue until Haitian independence and Guadeloupe until the return of slavery. Although it did not become independent until the late nineteenth century, Cuba was not immune from the independent fervor of the Age of Revolutions. The island experienced its own struggle against slavery and its first recorded declaration of independence from José Antonio Aponte, a free person of color. Because of this scholarship, blacks and indigenous political and social contributions to the process of independence during the Age of Revolutions have resulted in moving beyond a singular focus on creole elites to narrate the story of independence.

By focusing on nineteenth-century Santo Domingo, this study brings together the literature of creole nationalism and popular participation among subalterns. Santo

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Domingo’s time as a Spanish colony ended with Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres declaring independence in 1821. Many Dominicans, however, rejected this movement and made their sentiments clear when they enticed and supported Boyer’s entrance into Santo Domingo in 1822. Consequently, the Haitian Unification was less an act of aggression and more a path of independence for the former Spanish colony.  

Faced with this failure to strike out on their own, Dominican Creoles developed a royalist discourse articulating their continued loyalty to the Spanish Crown and emphasizing the Hispanic heritage of the entire population. Scholars have demonstrated how Creoles, Africans, and Amerindians found the choice of constitutional monarchy over a liberal republic as a practical solution braiding together colonial political and legal institutions with an independent nation state. Royalists understood that the Crown could grant privileges to assure its subjects, something that the new nations could not guarantee. With the dwindling Spanish interest in reclaiming their former colony and Haitian rule’s persisting in Santo Domingo, Dominican royalists entrenched themselves within their rhetoric of the past as they focused more on racial differences. Dominicans’ actions supported

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24 Jones, “Revolution and Reaction,” 192-197; Eller, “‘All would be equal,’” 140-141; and Yingling, “Colonialism Unraveling,” 637-639.

independence with the Haitian Republic that drove the Hispanic royalist narrative that elites espoused.

The Haitian Republic’s struggle for French recognition made scholars initially view foreign countries working in tandem to isolate Haiti tandem to defend their own slave regimes. From the metropole’s perspective, France had the complete advantage over Haiti and French recognition was a victory with Haiti signing the financial indemnity. In this interpretation, economic considerations are what ultimately drove France to negotiate with Haiti. Some scholars view Haitian President Jean-Pierre Boyer’s accepting French terms as an example of the republican government’s authoritarian nature. These academic explanations contribute to larger surveys discussing the Duvalier dictatorships’ rise to power. Specific political studies present this event as a part of larger Haitian political elites clashes or another example of the Haitian state and nation’s disconnect. What remains for scholars to examine is how the struggle against colonialism and slavery during the Haitian Revolution manifested in nineteenth-century Haitian diplomacy, particularly the republic’s union with Santo Domingo.

This study situates Santo Domingo’s nineteenth-century history within multiple contexts. This work joins an emergent scholarship that has begun looking at Santo Domingo’s interconnectedness with Haiti, which highlights Dominicans’ affinity with

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their island neighbors. This relationship includes extending the Revolutionary period to include nineteenth-century Haitian diplomacy and politics surrounding Haiti’s sovereignty and union with Santo Domingo. Haitian officials and intellectuals struggled against the Haitian Revolution negative view from foreign perspectives with their own counter-history that legitimized their struggle against France. Julia Gaffield has argued that the diverse foreign responses to Haiti’s independence undermined France’s attempts to isolate its former colony. These viewpoints limited France from waging war against its former colony as the Haitian Republic succeeded in consolidating its independence. In fact, European sympathies contributed to attacks on the French government’s own legitimacy. The French indemnity with Haiti was in part France conceding that it would never get their former colony back. This study presents Haitian diplomatic policy with the British and Spanish following France’s recognition as Haiti extending its earlier strategy against the French. By looking at Haiti and Santo Domingo from different perspectives, this analysis illustrates how Haitians and Dominicans defended their political gains to foreign nations watching these events.

National and regional perspectives, however, often do not include states, people, and events outside of their linguistic, geographic, and cultural purview. Atlantic history allows scholars to encompass old fields and decenter traditional national and regional

29 Jones, “Revolution and Reaction; Eller, “‘All would be equal;” Nessler, An Islandwide Struggle; Yingling, “Colonialism Unraveling;” and Eller, We Dream Together.
Ernesto Bassi’s study on the earlier understudied connections in New Granada’s Caribbean region between New Granada and the Caribbean show how the city of Cartagena aimed for inclusion within the British Empire as Spanish forces drew in to defeat them. The city’s connection to the Caribbean offered it distinct possibilities that diverged from Creoles’ goals. The relationship between the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Brazil becomes more clear when Roquinaldo Ferreira considered a conspiracy from Benguela, a city in Angola, which sought to merge with the Brazilians after the latter’s independence from Portugal in 1824. Santo Domingo’s first and second independence represented alternative visions for a nation and belonging even as contemporaries commemorated the Creole-led one as opposed to its Haitian counterpart. The rival Haitian states and later unified republic served as inspiration for Dominican revolutionaries before Santo Domingo unified with its neighbor. Jeremey Adelman used the metaphor of a labyrinth to describe “the passages from empire to nationhood” and how it “forked in ways that required actors to make choices without knowing the certainty of the outcome.” By examining Santo Domingo within an Atlantic perspective, this study situates Dominicans’ different paths through the labyrinth of independence that did not predetermine a colony’s transition to a nation-state.

35 Bassi, An Aqueous Territory.
36 Roquinaldo Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World: Angola and Brazil during the Era of the Slave Trade (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Ch. 6. Thank you to Matt Childs who reminded me of this example.
37 Lora Hugi, “El sonido.”
An Atlantic perspective also helps imperial historians by enabling them to merge metropolitan and colonial perspectives on a common level. Although this scholarship has contributed to the growing field of Atlantic history, historians comment on its use of a European perspective in encompassing a “single imperial geography” such as the British Atlantic. “A Divisive Community” incorporates the Haitian diplomatic negotiations between the British, French, and Spanish to illustrate the republic’s continued importance for slave-holding regimes in the Atlantic world. This study especially focuses on the Spanish and Haitian negotiations over Santo Domingo to illustrate how they served as proxies for opposing views in the former Spanish colony. Dominican royalists’ attempts to return the colony to Spanish rule appears as an anomaly when one considers the independence movements in the rest of Latin America and the first independence Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres declared. Nevertheless, when scholars situate Santo Domingo within its different Latin American, Caribbean, and Atlantic contexts, some Dominicans’ attempts to stay with Spain resemble the same experiences of other Caribbean colonial elites who choose to continue as colonies as opposed to becoming independent. Through an Atlantic perspective, this study decentralizes the Spanish perspective within its own empire to merge other vantage points including Haiti’s.


40 Gaffield, Haitian Connections.

SOURCES AND METHODS

By examining the anti-Haitian bias within Dominican royalist accounts, this dissertation investigates how Dominican elites discredited the republic’s rule to convince Spanish officials of Santo Domingo’s loyalty. Dominicans’ narratives distorted the events surrounding the Unification that illustrated pro-Haitian support in Santo Domingo and silenced alternative notions of belonging. The Dominican royalists used a selective interpretation of the past to invent traditions linking themselves and Santo Domingo to the Spanish Crown and nation. Sibylle Fischer’s concept of disavowal informs this analysis of some Dominicans’ loyalist rhetoric directed towards their Spanish audience. For Fischer, disavowal is “an attitude perspective towards the past and not the supposed characteristics of a particular moment, historical stage, or ethnic or cultural formation.”

Through analyzing official correspondences, petitions, and reports between Dominican royalists and Spanish officials, this study presents how Dominican royalists denied the Haitian government support in Santo Domingo during the Unification. These Dominicans and their supporters used their interpretations of the past to discredit the Haitian rule on the island and its success.

This study uses the term Hispanism to define Dominican royalist arguments against the Haitian Unification and for Spanish support. By using this term, this analysis focuses on identity, ethnicity, and culture more broadly as opposed to just race to understand the divisions and forms of identification in Santo Domingo under Haitian

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rule. Throughout this analysis, the dissertation uses loyalist and royalist to denote Dominicans who expressed their allegiance to the Spanish Crown and Spanish nation. Dominican royalists presented a narrative of fidelity that highlighted the Hispanic elements of their past and identity. They borrowed from Spaniards on both sides of the Atlantic who identified similarly during the Age of Revolutions. Dominicans’ petitions to the Crown and correspondences to Spanish officials illustrate how they used this tradition to illustrate to their Hispanic identity. This study analyzes these Dominican writings as the precursor to what literary scholar Lorgia García Peña refers to as the “Archive of Dominicanidad.” This metaphorical archive notes the role Haiti played in imagining and writing the terms of Dominican identity for those “who privileged [the] Spanish language, Hispanic culture, the traditions of Spain, and whiteness.” This analysis treats

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45 Satorius, Ever Faithful; and Echeverri, Indian and Slave Revolts. Scholars have explored the relationship between the Spanish king and his subject or vassals during the colonial era. These include Bianca Premo, Children of the Father King: Youth, Authority, and Legal Minority in Colonial Lima (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Alejandro Cañeque, The King’s Living Image: The Culture and Politics of Viceregal Power in Colonial Mexico (New York: Routledge, 2004).


47 Lorgia García Peña, The Borders of Dominicanidad: Race, Nation and Archives of Contradiction (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 16, 25. For studies on the relationship of race and nation in the Dominican Republic and its iteration of anti-Haitian arguments see Mayes, Mulatto Republic; Franklin Franco Pichardo, Sobre racismo y antihaitianismo (y otros ensayos) Santo Domingo: Impresora Librería Vidal, 1997); Sagás, Race and Politics; Howard, Coloring the Nation; and Simmons, Reconstructing Racial Identity.
Hispanism as an ethnic marker to trace Dominican royalist anti-Haitian arguments in and outside the island.

Through an analysis of Haitian rhetoric underpinning state’s reforms, this study investigates Santo Domingo’s transformation from a Spanish colony to a part of the Haitian Republic. Phillip Abrams and his understanding of the state influence this reading of the Haitian government’s actions who proposed scholars should “abandon the state as a material object of study whether concrete or abstract while continuing to take the idea of the state extremely seriously.”48 By examining Haitian proclamations and Dominican royalist reports, “A Divisive Community” illustrates the Haitian government’s ideology and the impetus behind emancipation and secularization reforms in Santo Domingo. These laws impeded the Catholic Church’s autonomy in Santo Domingo and brought Boyer in conflict with the archbishop of Santo Domingo Pedro Varela y Jimenez. The Haitian government wanted to carry out what Emilio Betances refers to as a church subordination to the state model.49 The state intended to create a national Church to serve as an arm of the Haitian government. Through correspondences between Church officials, parishioner petitions, and priests’ records, this study highlights the unforeseen consequences of Boyer’s attempts to create a national Church. The Haitian Unification laws give the opportunity to look at the ideological tenets driving this state-building project.

The Haitian government and its supporters contrasted Dominican Hispanic narratives with their own accounts erasing differences between Haitians and Dominicans.

For Haitian President Boyer, the experiences of racism and slavery that shaped the entire island’s shared identity. These connections offer one example of Paul Gilroy’s role of black intellectuals forging a common history across national boundaries in a “Black Atlantic.” Gilroy reformulates W.E.B. DuBois’s concept of “double consciousness” and analyzes the relationship between the “three modes of thinking, being, and seeing.” They are “racially particularistic, the second nationalistic in that it derives from the nation state in which the ex-slaves but not-yet-citizens find themselves,” and “diasporic or hemispheric.”

This study uses this reformulated conceptualization of “double consciousness” to frame the correspondences, pamphlets, and proclamations from Haitian officials and their supporters to illustrate how the republic simultaneously defended its sovereignty in Santo Domingo similar to other nations and empires while linking Haitians and Dominicans through their experiences as people of color living in a post-emancipation society. Despite not having formal recognition, the Haitian government defined itself as a sovereign nation and used it to their advantage when combatting Dominican royalist and Spanish officials’ arguments. While these Dominicans and Spaniards perceived it as an act of aggression, the Haitian nation-state felt as though it was in its legal right to act very much as their own empire of liberty in a world of slavery and racism.

52 Jeremy Adelman questions scholars for their impositions about the differences between republics and empires through illustrating how historical actors did not see them as a binary. “An Age of Imperial Revolutions” American Historical Review 113, n. 2 (April 2008), 319 – 340.
Haitian narrative with a nineteenth-century form of black nationalism linking both sides of the island.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

This dissertation has five chapters examining the events and context driving the Haitian Unification and the responses. Chapter One examines Santo Domingo as it returned to Spanish possession from the French in 1809. Social and political instability plagued the Spanish regime as Dominicans looked for alternatives to end colonialism. Their Haitian neighbors experienced their own struggles as two rival states in the north and south continued to vie for influence and power on the island. Dominicans’ actions coincided with both the larger independence movements in Spain’s remaining possessions and President Boyer unifying the northern and southern Haitian states. Spanish rule ended because of Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres’ independence movement in 1821 that pro-Haitian Dominicans solidified with their support of Boyer’s entrance to the east in 1822.

Chapter Two investigates Santo Domingo during the early years of the Haitian Unification. After Boyer defeated a royalist conspiracy that sought to bring in the French or Spanish to invade, some Dominicans left Santo Domingo for nearby islands such as Puerto Rico and Cuba, even returning to Spain. Dominican loyalists’ reports and correspondence highlighted Santo Domingo’s fidelity as a reason for the Spanish to get involved. Dominican royalist reports, however, also illustrate Boyer’s success in gaining the support of many Dominicans by defending the new republic’s borders from outside invasion. Dominican royalists began to underscore their loyalty to the Spanish Crown and their Hispanic identity in opposition to the Haitian army, government, and their
supporters. Moreover, these Dominicans presented plans for the Spanish to acquire Santo Domingo from Haitian rule. The first years of Boyer’s rule in Santo Domingo met foreign challenges that drove Dominican royalist arguments.

Chapter Three analyzes the Haitian Unification’s impact in Santo Domingo by examining the relationship between land and Church reform. Haitian secularism clashed with Dominican religiosity. Within the correspondence, arguments, and negotiations between Boyer and Catholic Church officials, the clergy and laity of Santo Domingo began adjusting to the Church’s institutional reform. While Boyer succeeded in asserting Haitian sovereignty over the Church, the inability to train and recruit its own priests forced him to seek a diplomatic solution with the Vatican. As the Haitian reforms impoverished the clergy, Dominican parishioners relied on both Church and state to seek redress from the loss of priests or their removal because of secularization. Through examining Church and state relations in Santo Domingo, this chapter illustrates how the weakening of the Church became a point of contention for some Dominicans against Boyer.

Chapter Four expands the focus of analysis as it examines Santo Domingo’s role in Haitian negotiations with European empires. Boyer’s government sought alternative negotiations besides working out a financial settlement with France to receive recognition of its independence. The terms of French recognition resulted in a larger financial settlement, which eventually crippled the Haitian economy and eroded support for Boyer’s regime. Nevertheless, Haitian officials could now negotiate separately with the British and Spanish concerning their sovereignty and possession of Santo Domingo. The continued negotiations between British and Haitian diplomats highlighted the Republic’s
importance to Great Britain’s interests, especially as it moved towards emancipation in the Caribbean. French recognition of Haitian independence drove Spanish officials to cast aside any ideas of armed conflict and followed Dominican exile Felipe Fernandez de Castro’s suggestions to engage in diplomacy. The 1825 treaty and French recognition of Haitian sovereignty had the consequence of making it harder for Spain to plan and occupy the island.

Chapter Five examines the aftermath of Haitian and Spanish negotiations in Santo Domingo in 1830. The Spanish threat of war drove the Haitian government to strengthen its defenses and give its justifications for its claims to Santo Domingo. For their efforts, Dominican royalist Fernandez de Castro and Spanish officials in the Caribbean continued to entice their superiors in Madrid to begin negotiations again and follow-up with armed forces. They argued that the Haitian government’s might and forces threatened Spanish slave interests in the Caribbean, especially in Cuba. Once it became clear the lengths Boyer and the Haitian state would go to defend its sovereignty of Santo Domingo and the exaggerations of an invasion on Cuban soil, Spanish officials preferred to continue watching from afar rather than conspiring from within, and retreated from negotiations. Dominican royalists who fled in the aftermath petitioned Spanish officials and the Crown to involve themselves in Santo Domingo. Consequently, Dominican royalists’ narrative became ever more racist in their arguments by espousing their loyalty to the Spanish while denigrating the Haitian Republic and its supporters.

THE HISTORICAL LEGACY OF THE HAITIAN UNIFICATION
Despite the end of the Unification in 1844, Dominican and Haitian relations were not always contentious during the course the nineteenth century. In fact, cooperation persisted in some areas especially as Haiti aided the Dominican Republic in its struggle
against Spain during the war of restoration (1863-1865). Dominican elites’ attempts to transform the Dominican Republic into a colony helped to insight a fear of reenslavement among the rest of the population, the same kind that helped to draw Dominicans to their neighbors in 1822. Although both nations remained separated, debates and ideas surrounding late nineteenth-century Dominican nation-building were not dismissive of ideas of federation with their western neighbor. Dominican elites’ disdain extended to black immigrants in general coming into the country during the rise of the Dominican Republic’s sugar industry. The specter of anti-Haitian arguments in Dominican politics and the rest of the population to hold during the Trujillo regime and continued to persist over the course of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the end of the political union between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1844 did not automatically mean both places were to be antagonistic.

The consequences of anti-Haitian rhetoric in the Dominican Republic are felt almost 200 years after Boyer united the island. On 23 September 2013, the Dominican Republic’s Constitutional Court effectively removed citizenship from those Dominicans whose parents were not legal residents at the time of their birth. This ruling overturned an earlier constitutional provision granting citizenship to those born in the Dominican Republic despite the foreign birth of their parents. This court ruling impacted Haitians

53 Eller, We Dream Together.
54 Martinez-Vergne, Nation & Citizen; and Mays, Mulatto Republic.
and Dominicans of Haitian ancestry living in the country and left many “stateless.”

Despite the international outcry and protests from those inside and outside of the
Dominican Republic, the Dominican government deported an estimated 14,000 people,
while another 70,000 who “voluntarily” left. The authorities have left other Dominicans
and Haitians in limbo and living in makeshift camps, resulting in a humanitarian crisis.56

This expulsion came at a particularly trying time given that the 2010 earthquake was still
crippling Haiti in 2013. Dominicans and Haitians suffer the legacy of divisive racial
politics played out in another form through immigration.

Whether it is the 2013 ruling stripping Haitians of Dominican citizenship or the
story of cooperation and conflict that this study analyzes in a “Divisive Community,”
history connects the moral-ethical questions societies face concerning who belongs to a
national community and the historical triumphs of the founding of a nation-state. As
historian Pedro L. San Miguel noted, “The historiographies of the Dominican Republic
and Haiti have been crucial to the construction of notions of identity.”57 If contemporaries
continue to tie Dominican nationalism to an inherent struggle and conflict with Haiti,
then both Dominicans and Haitians suffer the consequences. By not examining the
Unification and the tenets driving Dominicans to join the Haitian Republic, and instead
only concentrating on their desires for separation, then people will continue to
marginalize the legacy of cooperation among two groups of people united by a shared

Alarcon, “It’s Really Happening: The Dominican Republic Is Deporting Its Haitian Residents,” in Foreign
Policy In Focus, 4 April 2016, http://fpif.org/really-happening-dominican-republic-deporting-haitian-
residents/; and Mario Ariza, “La Apatrida: Dominicans of Haitian Descent Are Deported and Forgotten,” in
haitian-descent-are-deported-and-forgotten-9153733.

57 Pedro L. San Miguel, The Imagined Island: History, Identity, and Utopia in Hispaniola trans. English by
past and experiences of slavery and racial discrimination. This study brings much needed
attention and analysis to a formative period in both Dominican and Haitian history to
offer a more inclusive vision for the future.

On 29 December 1821, members of the Junta Central of the city of Santiago de los Caballeros sent a letter addressed to Haitian president Jean-Pierre Boyer in response to the independence that separatist declared. ⁵⁸ Some members of the junta protested Dominican Creoles led by José Núñez de Cáceres creating a new republic in the former Spanish colony of Santo Domingo. “Spanish Haiti,” as Núñez de Cáceres creatively called the new republic, did not have the widespread support of other inhabitants on the island. The indignant Dominicans of Santiago noted the new republic’s constitution “imprudently established distinctions between the citizen and the military, the poor and the rich, the different districts of this part, and maintained slavery as the basis for the foundation of this society.” ⁵⁹ Despite the rhetoric of Dominican revolutionaries, in Santo Domingo City those in the heartland of the former Spanish colony observed the disconnect between the discourse and actual practice of Núñez de Cáceres’ leadership. Rejecting Núñez de Cáceres’ proposed new government, Dominicans of Santiago did not just ask for Boyer to come make Santo Domingo a part of Haiti but sought to live “in union and fraternity” that brought with it the general end of slavery. ⁶⁰ This disconnect

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⁵⁹ “Junte Centrale de St. Yague to Jean Pierre Boyer,” Santiago de los Caballeros, 29 December 1821.
⁶⁰ “Junte Centrale de St. Yague to Jean Pierre Boyer,” Santiago de los Caballeros, 29 December 1821.
between those inhabitants of Santiago and Santo Domingo City reveals large factures within the former colony and alternative visions for its future during Latin American wars for independence.

Núñez de Cáceres’ movement in many ways was preemptive to Dominican support for Boyer emerging in Santo Domingo in the early nineteenth century while under Spanish rule. Dominicans historians have labeled this period Labeled by Dominican historians as “España Boba” or foolish Spain, this tragic interpretation of Santo Domingo’s colonial history obscures the separate visions Dominicans considered as they realized their time with Spain might soon end. To the west, Haiti splintered into two factions with the Republic of Haiti led by Alexander Pétion in the south and the kingdom of Haiti ruled by Henry Christophe in the north. This division, however, did not stop the rival Haitian states from involving themselves in their neighbor’s affairs or being a source of inspiration for future conspirators. Both sides of the island celebrated Boyer uniting the north and south of Haiti as it anticipated a shift in the relationship between Haiti and Santo Domingo. Núñez de Cáceres intended to harness this feeling, even

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61 Frank Moya Pons, La Dominación Haitiana, 1822-1844 Cuarta edición (Santo Domingo: Librería La Trinitaria, 2013), Ch. 1; Frank Moya Pons, Manual historia dominicana (Santo Domingo: Ediciones Librería La Trinitaria, 2013), Ch. 17; and José Gabriel García, Obras Completas Volumen 1. Compendio de la historia de Santo Domingo Tomos I y II (Santo Domingo: Archivo General de la Nación Equipo Editorial, 2016), Libro 1 Ch. 4 offer some examples of this tragic writing of colonial history. For more on Dominican interpretations of colonial history see Pedro L. San Miguel, The Imagined Island: History, Identity, and Utopia in Hispaniola translated by Jane Ramírez (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), Ch. 1. For more on trends in Dominican historiography and the challenge to confront elite narratives see Anne Eller “‘Awful Pirates’ and ‘Hordes of Jackals’: Santo Domingo/The Dominican Republic in Nineteenth-Century Historiography,” Small Axe Vol. 18 No. 2 July 2014, 80 – 94.

calling the new republic Spanish Haiti recognizing Dominican support for Boyer and attempting in a limited fashion to emulate their neighbors.

This chapter examines the Haitian government’s attempts and actions to set the stage for unification in conjunction with Santo Domingo’s competing independence movements from 1809 to 1822. It begins by asking first, how did instability on Hispaniola bring Santo Domingo and Haiti closer together? Next, how did Haitian propositions to Dominicans overlap with pro-Haitian support in Santo Domingo? Lastly, how did Dominicans split politically regarding the Santo Domingo’s future? This chapter argues that the 1822 Haitian unification was the result of Dominicans’ choices as well as the power of the Haitian Republic, not a simple Haitian occupation as often portrayed in nationalists and teleological frameworks focused on nation-building.

SANTO DOMINGO AND HAITI DURING THE AGE OF REVOLUTIONS
Instability in early nineteenth-century Santo Domingo was in part the result of a series of regime changes during the Haitian Revolution. Spain’s oldest colony in the Americas went from Spanish to French rule in 1795, then occupied by revolutionary Toussaint Louverture in 1801, and to return to French officers by 1804. Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1808 and overthrowing of the Spanish monarch created an anti-French sentiment among Dominicans in Santo Domingo and the nearby islands of Spanish Puerto Rico and Cuba. Under the leadership of mulatto Juan Ramirez Sanchez, Dominicans received logistic support from the Spanish in Puerto Rico, British naval power in Jamaica, and Haitian munitions to take Santo Domingo back from the French in 1809. It was Dominicans, not Spaniards who returned the Spanish

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metropole’s oldest possession in the Americas. The turmoil unleashed by French and Haitian clashes resulted in a colony wrought by the devastation, which Dominicans returned to face.

Elite Dominicans sought stability after the chaos of the revolutionary era, however, they faced a series of conspiracies that plagued Santo Domingo. The Dominican economy floundered as one traveler estimated Santo Domingo’s population at about 103,900 people, down from its 152,640 before the Haitian Revolution. While some scholars connect the colony’s discontent to its economic situation, Spanish officials who arrested conspirators found other factors motivating them. Even with the multi-racial and national cohort that overthrew the French, racism still informed the lives of Santo Domingo’s residents. Among the conspiracies taken against the Spanish, was the Italian Revolution of 1811 named for the Italian mercenaries stationed to defend Santo Domingo City, centered on a multi-national and multi-racial group who sought support and protection from Pétion and his state in the south. Free and enslaved people of color made up another conspiracy in 1812 in Santo Domingo city who sought to “kill all of the whites.” These conspiracies laid bare the inequalities of a society with slaves and the racial hierarchy of colonial rule as a source of the conspiracies.

64 Nessler, Islandwide Struggle for Freedom, 188 – 189.
65 Moya Pons, Manual historia dominicana, 208.
67 Moya Pons, Manual Historia Dominicana, 208.
70 Moya Pons, Manual Historia Dominicana, 209; and Gabriel García, Obras Completas, 308 – 309.
71 For more on the terminology and difference between slave societies and societies with slaves see Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998). While it is important to look beyond labor as a
Santo Domingo’s unstable political and economic environment status invited indirect involvement from one of its western neighbors. By 1820, Christophe, king of northern Haiti in the north was confident enough as to ask the Spanish about securing their eastern neighbor’s territory for themselves. On September 1820, a Parliament Member from the House of Commons contacted the Spanish ambassador to London as an intermediary for Christophe in Haiti. The “pretended king” of Haiti in the eyes of the Spanish, asserted through a Mr. Irving that the ruler of northern Haiti could pay whatever was necessary. Neither Christophe or Pétion in the southern part of Haiti had official diplomatic recognition to deal directly with foreign diplomats and heads of state because of their connection with slave insurrection. Still, both Haitian leaders used intermediaries to negotiate through back channels, such as with the Spanish in this instance. Spain’s continued possession of Hispaniola’s eastern part suggests the Spanish government did not seriously consider the offer, however, it indicates early ambitious plans to expand the Haitian state beyond its initial borders, taking advantage of Santo Domingo’s instability.

Despite the rivalry between Christophe and Pétion, both states shared similarities with one another. One of the ways the separate regimes differentiated themselves was the frame for studying slavery in the Americas we must also take care to not use the experiences of free people of color to inform our understanding of slavery. Some examples of societies with slaves in the Spanish context includes Herman Bennett, *Africans in Colonial Mexico: Absolutism, Christianity, and Afro-Creole Consciousness, 1570-1640* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003); Maria Elena Diaz, *The Virgin, the King, and the Royal Slaves of El Cobre: Negotiating Freedom in Colonial Cuba, 1670-1780* (Stanford, CA: Standford University Press, 2000; and Jane Landers, *Black Society in Spanish Florida* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999).

72 “Spanish ambassador to Secretary of State,” London, 10 September 1820, Archivo General de Indias Estado: Santo Domingo, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Luisiana y Florida (hereafter cited as AGI-Estado), 17.27.
73 “Spanish ambassador to Secretary of State,” London, 10 September 1820 AGI-Estado: 17.27.
74 Without official recognition, both Pétion and Christophe accomplished diplomacy through proxies and intermediaries with foreign governments. For more on the struggle for recognition for Haiti after its independence see Julia Gafffield, *Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World: Recognition after Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2015). Christophe was more pro-British than Pétion and had the support of prominent British abolitionists, such as Thomas Clarkson. For more on their relationship, see Earl Leslie Griggs and Clifford H. Prator ed. *Henry Christophe and Thomas Clarkson: A Correspondence* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1952).
system and form of land tenure. As Christophe continued the plantation system in the north under military supervision to grow crops for export while Pétion enabled smallholding farmers who cultivated their land for themselves in the south without supervision. These two forms of farming: large property and smallholding cultivation offered two contrasting visions for the future of Haiti, however, both leaders sought to reinstitute the vital plantation economies. Another similarity was Pétion and Christophe’s firm commitment to defend their borders from slavery and the slave trade without directly interfering in the foreign affairs of other countries that continued to practice slavery. Even with the similarities shared by both rival states, as long as Haiti stayed divided, Santo Domingo would persist as a Spanish colony.

After Pétion’s death in March of 1818, his secretary of state Jean-Pierre Boyer succeeded him as president and changed the fortunes of Haiti. One scholar describes Boyer as “a colored Machiavelli” who “would have been ready, willing and able to lead his country against the greatest obstacles any new nation faced in modern times”. Christophe’s regime in the northern part of Haiti faced a new threat and rival from Boyer’s presidency. His government, however, did not begin its demise from an external enemy, but an internal illness. In August 1820, Christophe fell ill from a stroke while

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attending a Catholic mass, resulting in the remaining members of his regime to withdraw their support.\textsuperscript{79} The prospect of facing several of his officers challenging his rule caused Christophe to tragically committed suicide rather than surrender to those who stood up against him.\textsuperscript{80} With the weakening of Christophe’s rule and subsequent death, Boyer took it upon himself to unify the Kingdom of Haiti in the north with the Republic of Haiti in the south. For the first time since the death of Dessalines, the ambitious Boyer succeeded in uniting Haiti under his rule, changing its fortunes.\textsuperscript{81}

When news of Boyer’s reunification of Haiti reached Santo Domingo, many celebrated and heralded the Haitian leader’s victory.\textsuperscript{82} The editors of \textit{El Duende} noted the importance of Boyer’s reunification of Haiti and its potential results for Spanish possessions of the Caribbean. The writers complimented Boyer by linking him with his predecessor Pétion but noted he was more ambitious and decisive in his actions. Boyer’s past actions potentially alluded to even more such aspiring deeds in the future. The public well-being and freeing his people from tyranny were what motivated Boyer according to the publication. There was no malice or visions of grandeur from Boyer as he incorporated the former kingdom of Haiti after the death of Christophe. Dominicans considered Boyer’s future actions and their implications for the Spanish side of Hispaniola after he had united the northern and southern parts of Haiti. Boyer set about defending his territory as opposed to expanding emancipation to surrounding

\textsuperscript{79} Dubois, \textit{Haiti}, 84 – 85.
\textsuperscript{80} Dubois, \textit{Haiti}, 84-85.
\textsuperscript{82} “Inglaterra—Londres 3 enero,” \textit{El Duende} Santo Domingo No. 1, 15 April 1821.
colonies.\textsuperscript{83} By presenting Boyer’s unification as beneficial to the Haitian people, the newspaper writers offered their support to the Haitian president.

The return of Spanish rule to Santo Domingo in 1809 brought Dominicans dissatisfaction with the colonial regime. The lack of political and economic opportunities coupled with continued racial discrimination and slavery made Haiti an appealing alternative to Spain. Yet, it was not until Boyer’s unification of the rival Haitian states in 1818 when Santo Domingo’s neighbor became a workable choice. Boyer’s victory over his former rival Christophe drew the support among Dominicans in the east. Pro-Haitian support among Dominicans could now be properly courted, which would present another challenge to Spain’s already tenuous control of its recently reacquired colony.

\textbf{HAITIAN INTRIGUE, DOMINICAN INTEREST}

Spanish officials in Santo Domingo under the leadership of Captain-General Sebastián Kindelan positively (if not cautiously) met the news of Christophe’s death and Boyer’s reunification of Haiti. Haitian officers under Boyer reached out to Kindelan noting relations between both sides of the island would be friendly, if not frank. They planned to maintain trade relations between both sides of the island.\textsuperscript{84} Kindelan assured the Haitian officers of the continuing trade between Santo Domingo and the kingdom of Haiti in the north as long as both parties shared “true sentiments of sincere friendship,

\textsuperscript{83} “Inglaterra—Londres 3 enero.”
good harmony, legal intelligence, and reciprocal frankness.” Kindelan’s diplomatic but firm response reflected his cautious approach.

Boyer looked to take advantage of this opening by asking for the Spanish to send priests to northern Haiti. Through allowing the archbishop of Santo Domingo Pedro Varela y Jimenez to send his general vicar and three other priests to Haiti, Boyer conceded the jurisdiction over the Haitian churches to the prelate. Kindélan considered this exchange to be to the Spanish’s advantage, observing how this “can contribute to strengthen the bonds of friendship and good intelligence by the great influence of professing the same religion.” The Captain-General sought to extend Spanish influence and secure Santo Domingo’s borders. Kindelan understood Haitian officers’ support in service to the archbishop as their recognition of the cleric’s spiritual authority over the western part of Hispaniola, and not just Santo Domingo. This opportunity, however, presented itself because of Boyer’s friendly request for clerics.

As Kindelan was seeking to preserve and strengthen Spanish influence on the island, he became aware of a Haitian commander named Dezir Dalmassi threatening...

85 “Sebastián Kindelan to Army spokesman and Haitian people,” Santo Domingo, 4 November 1820 AGI-SD 970 ed. by Maximo Coscou Henríquez, Documentos Para la Historia de Santo Domingo 2 volumes (Madrid: Sucs. de Rivadeneyera, 1973), Vol. 2, 162 – 163. Although Spain continued to withhold diplomatic recognition from Haiti until 1855, Dominican officials needed to acknowledge Haitian leaders in establishing a practical relationship that dealt with day to day issues. As a result, they used a loophole in Spanish colonial law that enabled Spanish officials to set up local relationships that kept official diplomatic distance between Spain and the other state, Gaffield, Haitian Connections, 189 – 190.
88 “Sebastian Kindelan to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Santo Domingo, 9 December 1820, AGI-SD 970.
Santo Domingo’s frontier border. Dalmassi was a lieutenant colonel and former cattle rancher who along with other Haitians settled along the towns closest to the border. Dalmassi proposed to Haitians and Dominicans he found living along the border in the towns of Farfan de las Matas, San Juan de la Maguana, and Azua that they should mobilize to become a part of the Haitian state where they could receive material benefits under Boyer’s government. Dalmassi’s efforts threatened Spanish power and stability along the border between Santo Domingo and Haiti.

Kindelan decided to have Dalmassi watched for several reasons. The Captain-General considered Christophe’s death and Boyer unifying the two Haitian regions of the north and south under his rule to be the cause of Dalmassi’s actions. Kindelan concluded Dalmassi’s inability to realize his ambitions in Haiti after the death of Christophe meant Santo Domingo was the next target to align himself with the Boyer regime. Caution dictated for Kindelan to order a Spanish officer to report anything out of the ordinary. Kindelan balanced Santo Domingo’s security with cordial diplomacy and building ties with the newly unified Haitian Republic after sending priests to Boyer. Kindelan’s earlier conversation with Boyer convinced the Captain-General of the Haitian President’s ignorance of Dalmassi’s actions in Santo Domingo. By relying on the reports from his Spanish officer and earlier discussions with Boyer, Kindelan decided Dalmassi was a rogue agent who they needed to monitor.

89 “José Lasala to Sebastian Kindelan,” Farfan de las Matas [San Juan], 5 December 1820, AGI-SD 970 ed. by Maximo Coscou Henríquez, Documentos Para la Historia de Santo Domingo 2 volumes (Madrid: Sucs. de Rivadeneyera, 1973) Volume 2, 164 – 165.
90 Moya Pons, Historia Manual Dominicana, 217 – 218; and “José Lasala to Sebastian Kindelan,” Farfan de las Matas, 5 December 1820, AGI-SD 970.
Kindelan was unable to determine the information’s validity he received about Dalmassi. He learned that Dalmassi approached a Spanish administrator under the guise of representing Boyer’s commission to convince Dominicans to join Haiti. When questioned further by the officer, Dalmassi replied that he had to deliver “the [Haitian] constitution and five proclamations.” The Spanish officer made no reference to attempting to detain Dalmassi, which makes one question whether Kindelan’s subordinate seriously considered the Haitian proposal. The Captain-General called the official back for further instruction perhaps suspicious of the lack of clarity.

Town officials in Neiba, a town in the western part of Santo Domingo also verified Dalmassi’s presence and mission in the region. Despite having a series of proclamations and the constitution, Dalmassi’s presence and actions disrupted the peace in Neiba. The city officials sent a copy of Dalmassi’s proclamation and other documents to Kindelan as evidence suggesting Haitian attempts to bring Santo Domingo over to Haiti. Still, without more information, Kindelan could only treat what he heard about Dalmassi as rumors.

Kindelan’s praised the Neiba city council’s efforts in keeping him abreast of events to keep them on his side. He expressed confidence that not only did Dominicans reject the attempts of Dalmassi but also, they would “defend their homes and country like...

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all times with the great glory that Dominican Spaniards had verified.” By referring to Dominicans’ actions in taking back Santo Domingo from and the French, Kindelan sought to motivate them to maintain their vigilance. These compliments, however, did not stop Kindelan from chiding the Ayuntamiento for not detaining and sending Dalmassi to Santo Domingo City for questioning. Kindelan’s response highlights two issues he faced with the Dalmassi actions. First, despite the reports he received about events to the west, Kindelan still could not discern the nature of the Haitian officer’s mission and its connection to Boyer’s government in Port-au-Prince. Second, whether true or false the nature of Dalmassi’s actions of attempting to sway Dominicans over to the Haitian side represented a threat and alternative to Spanish sovereignty on the island. As a result, Kindelan toggled between flattery and admonishment to keep the Neiba city council on his side.

To take more control of the situation, Kindelan sent Captain Manuel Caravajal to the southern region of Santo Domingo. Caravajal’s service in the previous war of reconquest against the French and knowledge of the territory assured Kindelan of his competence. Kindelan noted Caravajal’s familiarity with the “temperament and nature of [Santo Domingo’s] inhabitants, willingly embracing that commission.” The Captain-General could not confidently trust Dominicans’ to steer clear of Dalmassi and doubted

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96 Sebastian Kindelan to Oficio del Ayuntamiento constitucional de Neiba, Santo Domingo, 17 December 1820, AGI-SD 970.
97 Sebastian Kindelan to Oficio del Ayuntamiento constitucional de Neiba, Santo Domingo, 18 December 1820, AGI-SD 970.
their loyalty to the Spanish regime in Santo Domingo. Several towns’ proximity to the Haitian border, the movement back and forth of Dominicans and Haitians, and Dominicans’ displeasure with Spanish rule meant that Kindelan needed to dispel the rumors that Dalmassi had spread. Kindelan called for the town council of Neiba to aid Caravajal with men and supplies. By sending an officer from Santo Domingo that he trusted, Kindelan asserted authority in the border region, away from the confines of the capital city.

Kindelan ordered Caravajal to assess the situation and report back to have more reliable information and to assert a measure of control. The Captain-General noted the rumors had ceased in the towns of Farfan de las Matas, San Juan, and Neiba. This slight change in affairs gave Kindelan confidence expressed in the population’s loyalty to the Spanish government, forged such during Spain’s conquest of Santo Domingo from the French in 1809. Kindelan used Dominicans’ past exploits of working together with the Spanish for a common cause to strengthened their relationship. Local officials assisted Caravajal in his mission within the southern part of Santo Domingo as Kindelan ordered him to defend Santo Domingo’s border, stamp out Dalmassi’s rumors or news, and to arrest the Haitian official to send him Santo Domingo City. 

98 Connections between Santo Domingo and Haiti existed from the time that both existed as colonies but persisted during and after the Haitian revolution. For some works see Charlton W. Yingling, “Colonialism Unraveling: Race, Religion, and National Belonging in Santo Domingo during the Age of Revolutions,” (Ph.D. diss: University of South Carolina, 2016) and Eugenio Matibag, Haitian-Dominican Counterpoint: Nation, State, and Race on Hispaniola (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2003).


101 Sebastián Kindelan to Manuel Carabajal, Santo Domingo, 18 December 1820, AGI-SD 970.

102 Sebastián Kindelan to Manual Carabajal, Santo Domingo, 18 December 1820, AGI-SD 970.
Caravajal illustrated a level of trust and confidence in the officer, that the Captain-General did not have with others in the area.

Spanish officials’ inability to capture Dalmassi made Kindelan uneasy and resulted in scrutinizing Dominican administrators such as in Neiba. Although Kindelan did not question the loyalty of city officials, he found their lack of effort to dispel Dalmassi’s rumors surprising. It was from this silence and lack of intelligence, which brought Kindelan into action to send Caravajal to deal with the situation. Kindelan ordered the city council to report their discussion with Dalmassi and why they allowed for the Haitian officer to perpetuate disorder and disunity when someone should have been apprehended him and sent to Santo Domingo City. If the city officials did not accept these measures, Kindelan wanted to know what kind of measures they would take to “maintain the confidence of the inhabitants.” By critiquing the Neiba city council, Kindelan expressed his uncertainty and frustration with the situation by the border.

The Neiba city council initially overlooked Dalmassi’s rumors because he spent time in Santo Domingo tending to his cattle ranching and other trade across the border. Once he began spreading his rumors and attempts, Dalmassi did not specifically direct it at the city officials. Once they became aware of Dalmassi’s news, the city officials

104 Sebastian Kindelan to Ayuntamiento constitucional de San Juan, Santo Domingo, 28 December 1820, AGI-SD 970.
105 Sebastian Kindelan to Ayuntamiento constitucional de San Juan, Santo Domingo, 28 December 1820, AGI-SD 970.
106 Sebastian Kindelan to Ayuntamiento constitucional de San Juan, Santo Domingo, 28 December 1820, AGI-SD 970.
observed how other Dominicans did not fall for the Haitian officer’s “falsehoods,” particularly his association with Boyer. Neiba’s town council felt these reasons justified responding quickly to Kindelan’s response. Dalmassi’s time and familiarity with Santo Domingo made him an ideal double agent to spread discord and offer Dominicans an alternative to Spanish rule with the Haitian Republic. Nevertheless, the Neiba city council’s response highlights that their oversight reflected their disinterest and not incompetence.

According to San Juan de la Maguana’s city officials, Kindelan’s arrival to Santo Domingo to spread rumors conveniently coincided with the death of the city’s mayor. The simultaneous events brought about their own type of confusion. This instability and Dalmassi’s ambiguous intent hindered Dominican officials from acting decisively. “Having dispelled the news from other individuals of the same nation and officials that were arguing that everything was false,” the population of San Juan de la Maguana had nothing to fear. The town’s proximity to Haiti, as opposed to Santo Domingo City, meant news or rumor could travel faster from one side of the island to the other. Dalmassi intended for his proclamations to send a Haitian officer to Santo Domingo City to see if he could bring the Spanish colony under Boyer’s rule. There was no news of a Dalmassi being in or near the colony’s capital or of Caravajal’s arrival from Santo Domingo city.

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108 Oficio del Ayuntamiento constitucional de San Juan a Sebastián Kindelan, San Juan de la Maguana, 31 December 1820, AGI-SD 970.
109 Oficio del Ayuntamiento constitucional de San Juan a Sebastián Kindelan, San Juan de la Maguana, 31 December 1820, AGI-SD 970.
110 Oficio del Ayuntamiento constitucional de San Juan a Sebastián Kindelan, San Juan de la Maguana, 31 December 1820, AGI-SD 970.
111 Oficio del Ayuntamiento constitucional de San Juan a Sebastián Kindelan, San Juan de la Maguana, 31 December 1820, AGI-SD 970.
112 Oficio del Ayuntamiento constitucional de San Juan a Sebastián Kindelan, San Juan de la Maguana, 31 December 1820, AGI-SD 970.
From their perspective, confusion prevented San Juan de la Maguana’s city officials from carrying out their duties at the same moment Dalmassi’s rumors spread to Santo Domingo’s interior.

The situation forced Kindelan to acknowledge he had “various news and little agreement” about the conflicting reports. Kindelan and other officials in Santo Domingo City understood the seriousness of events in the various cities along the Haitian border as a threat to Spanish control. Kindelan warned their Haitian neighbors about going against the friendship they offered in good faith to disturb the peace within Santo Domingo. Still, Kindelan’s inability to even know the whereabouts of Caravajal, an official he sent from Santo Domingo City, made the Spanish Captain-General’s threat hollow. Even if Kindelan directed his point to those Haitians such as Dalmassi who lived within Santo Domingo conducting their business. Kindelan’s impotence in this situation reflected in his inability to assure what was true or rumor in the conflicting reports.

Other Haitian officials followed Dalmassi’s lead and continued to entice those in Santo Domingo near the border to become a part of Haiti. For instance, one Haitian officer boldly tried to convince Azua’s mayor to recruit Dominicans to support Boyer. The Haitian officer claimed how the Haitian army asked him to place the island under one government. He was not clear whether he was under Boyer’s orders or whether it was

114 “Sebastian Kindelan to Domingo Perez Guerra,” Santo Domingo, 6 January 1821, AGI-SD 970.
115 “Sebastian Kindelan to Domingo Perez Guerra,” Santo Domingo, 6 January 1821, AGI-SD 970.
part of a separate conspiracy.\textsuperscript{117} The Haitian officer claimed all who were in power would continue to rule, including those at the municipal level.\textsuperscript{118} There would be much for them to gain, such as trade, and the Haitian officer claimed Dominicans in Farfan de las Matas and San Juan de la Maguana readily supported Haitian rule.\textsuperscript{119} These inhabitants profited from the cattle trade between both sides of the island, existing since both were European colonies. Boyer would reward those Dominicans who submitted themselves to his rule.\textsuperscript{120} The Haitian officer’s proposal illustrates that Dalmassi was not the only agent working at the border on Boyer’s behalf.

The Haitian officer also tried to coax the lieutenant-general of the free battalion of color Pablo Ali. Born in West Africa and enslaved in Saint-Domingue, Ali fought with the Spanish as part of the black auxiliaries during the Haitian Revolution serving under Georges Biassou.\textsuperscript{121} Curiously, the officer told Ali that the Haitian army asked him to place the island under one government without any mention of Boyer.\textsuperscript{122} He argued Ali was already Haitian because of starting his military career in Saint-Domingue. By appealing to Ali’s past and remarking on the Haitian army, the official wanted to sway him to switch sides.\textsuperscript{123}

While Dalmassi and other Haitian officers continued to draw Dominicans closer to them, Kindelan received confirmation from Boyer about the rumors that reached Santo

\textsuperscript{117} “Ysnardi to Pablo Baez,” Azua, 9 November 1820, AGI-SD 970.
\textsuperscript{118} “Ysnardi to Pablo Baez,” Azua, 9 November 1820, AGI-SD 970.
\textsuperscript{119} “Ysnardi to Pablo Baez,” Azua, 9 November 1820, AGI-SD 970.
\textsuperscript{120} “Ysnardi to Pablo Baez,” Azua, 9 November 1820, AGI-SD 970.
\textsuperscript{121} Jane Landers, \textit{Atlantic Creoles in the Age of Revolutions} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 89; Eller, “Santo Domingo’s “Italian Revolution,”” 121; and Yingling, “Colonialism Unraveling,” Ch. 3 & 4.
\textsuperscript{123} Ysnardi to Pablo Ali, San Juan, 9 November 1820, AGI-SD 970.
Domingo city. Kindelan published this correspondence between himself and Boyer as a 
broadside to dispel the rumors of a possible Haitian invasion into Santo Domingo.\textsuperscript{124} The 
uncertainty surrounding Boyer’s attention and Kindelan’s inability to manage the 
situation warranted the Captain-General to publish these correspondences. By issuing 
these letters for the populace to read, Kindelan wanted to dissuade any malcontents of 
Haiti’s neutrality and assert Spanish control in Santo Domingo.

Kindelan claimed how Dominicans’ security was one of his main priorities, and 
this issue hurt the relationship Haitian and Spanish officials since 1809. It was for these 
reasons Kindelan inquired to Boyer to keep the “good harmony and friendly relations that 
happily existed between one government and another.”\textsuperscript{125} Kindelan accused Dalmassi of 
targeting Dominicans to join the Haitian Republic before its forces invaded Haiti before it 
invaded Santo Domingo. Interestingly, Kindelan claimed this mission did not target 
Spanish officials for their loyalty to the Spanish king Fernando VII.\textsuperscript{126} It may be that 
Kindelan witnessed enough to doubt Dominicans’ fidelity to the Spanish regime in the 
face of the rumors. Dalmassi did not target them because he wanted to speak with 
Dominicans living in the south as opposed to the Spanish. By couching his 
correspondence in terms of security, Kindelan could challenge Boyer to see if the Haitian 
leader was personally involved in this subversion of Spanish rule.

Kindelan cautiously avoided accusing Boyer of inciting unrest in Santo Domingo. 
He carefully presented his belief of Dalmassi and other Haitians working for their own

\textsuperscript{124} Sebastián Kindelan, “Manifesto de la Correspondencia entre el Gobierno de esta parte española y el de 
la vecina de la Republica de Hayti sobre la verdadera ó falsa misión del Teniente coronel Dezir Dalmassi,” 
Santo Domingo, 10 January 1821, AGI-Estado 39.6, 3a.
\textsuperscript{125} Kindelan, “Manifesto de la Correspondencia,” Santo Domingo, 10 January 1821, AGI-Estado 39.6, 3ª
\textsuperscript{126} Kindelan, “Manifesto de la Correspondencia,” Santo Domingo, 10 January 1821, AGI-Estado 39.6, 3ª
private gain and not in the name of Boyer. Kindelan, however, intended to address the threats to the “positive and safe union and harmony between neighbors.” By presenting Haitian and Spanish relations as being on good and mutual understanding, Kindelan tested Boyer to see if the Haitian president was willing to maintain the status quo. If so, then in good faith, Boyer would explain Dalmassi’s actions in Santo Domingo. Boyer’s response would help to shore up Spanish colonial rule while discrediting the rumors of a Haitian invasion. Given the power Boyer had, Kindelan could not explicitly hurl accusations at the Haitian President but provided him the opportunity to explain such rumors as false.

Kindelan’s surprised Boyer who responded, “I am a faithful man to honor and to the laws of my country.” Article 5 of the 1816 Haitian constitution was that the Haitian Republic would not turn its sights to conquer another colony or regime and get involved in another country’s affairs. This article was a staple of Haiti’s early constitutions and assured foreign nations of the island nation’s neutrality concerning slavery in their territories. If Boyer admitted to sending Dalmassi to entice Dominicans to leave the Spanish it would be tantamount to a blatant involvement in the affairs of another country’s affairs. By insinuating that Boyer violated his own laws, Kindelan’s inquiries forced the Haitian president to claim fidelity to the republic’s constitution.

127 Kindelan, “Manifesto de la Correspondencia,” Santo Domingo, 10 January 1821, AGI-Estado 39.6, 3ª
128 Kindelan, “Manifesto de la Correspondencia,” Santo Domingo, 10 January 1821, AGI-Estado 39.6, 3ª
129 Kindelan, “Manifesto de la Correspondencia,” Santo Domingo, 10 January 1821, AGI-Estado 39.6, 3ª
130 Kindelan, “Manifesto de la Correspondencia,” Santo Domingo, 10 January 1821, AGI-Estado 39.6, 3ª
131 Maidou, Histoire d’Haiti, 167. Nevertheless, there were notable exceptions as mentioned earlier in this chapter such as Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier; Gaffield, Haitian Connections; and Ada Ferrer, Freedom’s Mirror: Cuba and Haiti in the Age of Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
Boyer astutely commented on Santo Domingo’s affairs by drawing parallels with nineteenth-century independence movements. With liberal revolutions and communication between “anxious nations” people did not need governments to seduce them.\textsuperscript{132} Boyer insinuated Dominicans interested in joining the Haitian Republic would not need Dalmassi or others to entice them. The Haitian president was aware of the rumors plaguing Santo Domingo and subverting Spanish rule. He noted if he gave “ears to deaf insinuations” from those asking from Santo Domingo he would have led an expedition to reclaim the eastern side of the island a long time ago.\textsuperscript{133} In Boyer’s experience, those in Santo Domingo were like those in other parts of the world who wanted liberty in a world still dominated by monarchy and slavery.\textsuperscript{134} Undeterred by the calls of pro-Haitian supporters and conspirators, Boyer wanted no other title than that of “consolidator and peace of people”.\textsuperscript{135} Boyer’s astute comparison of Santo Domingo to other nineteenth-century independence movements suggested an inevitable fate for the Spanish colony to follow the path of Haiti and other new nations in the Americas.

Kindelan’s cautious but conciliatory response to Boyer’s unification did not prepare the Captain-General for the subversion that followed. From Kindelan’s perspective, Dalmassi and other Haitian officers’ proposals disrupted Spanish rule and placed the colonial system in jeopardy. Dominicans’ sustained effort to capture Dalmassi and aid the Spanish suggests sympathy for the Haitian rule if not disloyalty. The Haitian overtures continued in the face of Kindelan’s protests and plans because Dominicans in

\textsuperscript{132} “Manifesto de la Correspondencia,” Santo Domingo, 10 January 1821, AGI-Estado 39.6, 3ª.
\textsuperscript{133} “Manifesto de la Correspondencia,” Santo Domingo, 10 January 1821, AGI-Estado 39.6, 3ª.
\textsuperscript{134} “Manifesto de la Correspondencia,” Santo Domingo, 10 January 1821, AGI-Estado 39.6, 3ª; and Ada Ferrer, “Haiti, Free Soil, and Antislavery in the Revolutionary Atlantic” \textit{American Historical Review} Vol. 117 Issue 1 (February 2012), 40 – 66.
\textsuperscript{135} “Manifesto de la Correspondencia,” Santo Domingo, 10 January 1821, AGI-Estado 39.6, 3a.
the border towns were willing to listen. Haitian propositions to Dominicans overlapped with pro-Haitian support in Santo Domingo by beginning to create the necessary conditions for a separatist movement intent on joining the Haitian Republic. Yet, they would not go unchallenged as both Spanish officials and Dominicans creoles countered Boyer’s black republic extending its influence into Santo Domingo.

ONE GOAL, TWO INDEPENDENCES

Boyer’s response to Kindelan did not alleviate the Captain-General’s suspicions of a Haitian plot against Santo Domingo. Left with few options, Kindelan contacted Spanish officials in Cuba for more troops in case of a Haitian invasion.136 He had previously served as the governor of the province of Santiago in the eastern part of the island, making it natural for Kindelan to reach out to officials in Cuba. Kindelan claimed the Spanish government’s inability to capture Dalmassi and period it took to verify the rumors did not inspire confidence among Dominicans. Even after speaking with Boyer and dispelling the Dalmassi’s stories, the Haitian government knew Santo Domingo’s borders were vulnerable.137 Spanish support from Cuba would help to maintain possession of Santo Domingo in the face of a Haitian threat. By reaching out to officials in Cuba, Kindelan could mitigate a Haitian plot possibly taking over Santo Domingo.

Kindelan perceptively linked the “security and conservation” defense of Santo Domingo as a common cause for all the Spanish possessions that had slavery.138 The fall of Santo Domingo, a colony with slaves to the black republic of Haiti would have ramifications for Spain’s other possessions in the Caribbean such as Cuba and Puerto

Rico. As a former governor of Cuba, Kindelan’s experience during the Haitian Revolution would reinforce this point. Cuba particularly profited from plantation slavery’s destruction in Saint-Domingue because of the Haitian Revolution. Spain sent peninsular and creole troops from Cuba and nearby colonies to fight in Saint-Domingue during the Haitian Revolution and experienced first-hand the potential for destruction for building a plantation society. Kindelan wrote, “here is the focal point, here is the remedy, and here spread where there would be the same combustible material.”

Preventing Haiti from subverting or taking over Santo Domingo would be to contain the threat faced by Spain’s remaining slave societies. Not helping Santo Domingo Kindelan wrote would be “to leave the contagion to spread without hindering the healthy parts.” He argued Santo Domingo’s defense was crucial to slavery and holding on to what remained of the Spanish Empire in the Caribbean.

Because of the increase of slavery in scope and importance in Cuba, Kindelan felt Cuban and Spanish officials would be more than interested in providing Santo Domingo with arms and munitions. The proximity of the island of Hispaniola to Spain’s other possessions in the Caribbean meant with the control over the island, Haiti would be closer to the other islands and possessions of Spain to launch an attack. The fear and specter of Haiti for security was one, which Kindelan used to obtain support for Santo Domingo in the face of danger. Security in Santo Domingo and the Spanish empire from

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143 “Sebastian Kindelan to Cuban Captain General,” Santo Domingo, 23 April 1821, AGI-Cuba 1989.
the Haitian Republic tied slave interests in Cuba to their counterparts in Santo Domingo and called for their help.

By May 1821, Spanish officials replaced Kindelan with Pascual Real who was not fully prepared for the continued instability and loss of control he would face. He sought to stay in power and was aware of the series of conspiracies plotted against him and the Spanish regime. Ever vigilant against such plots, Real decided to observe and make note of them before they came to fruition. 144 Among them were pro-Haitian supporters’ who attempted to entice Boyer as their displeasure continued to grow. For example, Diego Polanco, commander of San Fernando de Montecristi, sent a message to a Haitian officer offering their support to the Haitian Republic. 145 At the same moment, Andres Amarantes, from Dajabon, pledged the town’s support for the Haitian Republic who took the initiative to raise the Haitian flag in support of Boyer. 146 The previous examples illustrated that Captain-General Real had no control over events from Santo Domingo City as instability morphed into full-blown treachery.

When Boyer received news about the events he alerted his commanders the time had arrived for them to act. He sent three envoys to speak with Captain-General Real about the complaints from those specifically on the border and the situation more broadly. 147 Despite evidence of pro-Haitian support, at this point, only two towns in Santo Domingo had declared their allegiance to Haiti. 148 Boyer could not be sure how

147 Maidou, Histoire d’Haiti, 252 – 253.  
148 Maidou, Histoire d’Haiti, 253.
much of the colony would still support the Spanish. Likewise, Boyer repeated his earlier
statements that he would not violate the laws of his republic to invade Santo Domingo.
Moreover, the Haitian President needed Dominicans’ full support in case of a takeover.
Boyer’s actions of sending representatives to speak to Real in Santo Domingo City
illustrates that the conditions warranted more direct action by the Haitian President.

As pro Haitian-supporters gathered steam in the towns of Dajabon and
Montecristi, a separate conspiracy formed under the leadership of José Nuñez de Cáceres.
Trained as a lawyer from Santo Domingo City, Nuñez de Cáceres had been involved in
the colonial Spanish government under different capacities. Despite years of service,
Spanish officials demoted Nuñez de Cáceres within the colonial hierarchy. The
marginalized Dominican bureaucrat joined with other Dominican creoles such as Manuel
Caravajal and Andres López de Medrano who resented their minor positions within the
colonial bureaucracy and felt abandoned by Spain. The opportunistic Nuñez de Cáceres became aware of what occurred in Montecristi and Dajabon and feared that pro-
Haitian supporters would declare independence from the Spanish. One scholar suggests
Nuñez de Cáceres movement was a preemptive coup meant to prevent the freeing of
enslaved peoples and any instability to follow. He and his supporters desired
independence from Spain with a federation with Gran Colombia, the newly independent
former Spanish colonies of in South America.

150 Franklin J. Franco, Blacks, Mulattos, and the Dominican Nation translated by Patricia Mason (New
York: Routledge, 2015), 82.
152 Moya Pons, La dominación haitiana, 26.
Santo Domingo City formed in response to pro-Haitian support in Dajabon and Montecristi.

Nuñez de Cáceres put his plans into action gaining the support of Pablo Ali and the free colored battalion in Santo Domingo City. Despite Ali’s prestige and military service to the Spanish regime, he was unable to obtain Spanish citizenship because of his former enslaved status and birth outside of the Empire.\(^{153}\) Nuñez de Cáceres won Ali over with the promise of citizenship in the new republic and therefore, he supported the independence movement. Nuñez de Cáceres and his cadre took Captain-General Real by surprise and overthrew the Spanish government declaring independence as the new state of Spanish Haiti.\(^{154}\) By obtaining the support of the free colored battalion, Nuñez de Cáceres and his supporters realized their goals and vision for independence.

In their declaration of independence, Nuñez de Cáceres presented Dominicans as having had “a fanatic loyalty to the kings of Spain” with nothing to show for it. Spanish rule in Santo Domingo only served the interest of Spain at the expense of Dominican Creoles living on the island.\(^{155}\) The focus on loyalty to the Spanish stressed the frustration by members of the Dominican Creole conspiracy against the colonial regime. The Spanish could not even defend its oldest possession in the Americas as Nuñez de Cáceres made references to the Dutch and other European attacks on Santo Domingo over its long history. He referenced the 1809 conquest from the French by its own inhabitants as an example of Dominican loyalty to the Spanish monarchy.\(^{156}\)

\(^{155}\) “José Nuñez de Cáceres to Eusebio Bardají,” Santo Domingo, 12 December 1821, AGI Estado 17.79.
\(^{156}\) “José Nuñez de Cáceres to Eusebio Bardají,” Santo Domingo, 12 December 1821, AGI Estado 17.79.
Cáceres and his movement, Dominicans proved their loyalty and their declaration of independence underpinning the proclamation was in response to Spanish betrayal.

By linking themselves with other former Spanish colonies, Nuñez de Cáceres and his supporters sought to legitimize their grievances and independence movement. They argued that they removed Spanish rule while upholding the honor of their ancestors who came to the Americas.\textsuperscript{157} This Creole movement shared a similar discourse and justification with other independence movements across the continent who fought against the Spanish.\textsuperscript{158} They proclaimed, “we are fully convinced to gain it and to augment it, there is no other path but independence.”\textsuperscript{159} The Dominican Creoles argued for political freedom that also addressed a list of grievances against Spain.

With Spanish colonial rule behind them, Nuñez de Cáceres and the Creole faction drafted a constitution illustrating their vision for the future republic. In a self-fashioning of their neighbor, “Spanish Haiti” would not discriminate towards the new nation’s inhabitants regardless of color or religion. Nonetheless, unlike the Haitian Republic, this new nation did not end slavery or extend its rights to enslaved people even though Nuñez de Cáceres emancipated his own enslaved people.\textsuperscript{160} Within the liberal Spanish vision, the citizens’ constitutional rights and condemning of the slave trade could simultaneously exist with slavery’s persistence. This notion of nationhood clashed with the liberty from

\textsuperscript{157} “José Núñez de Cáceres to Eusebio Bardají,” Santo Domingo, 12 December 1821, AGI Estado 17.79.
\textsuperscript{159} “José Núñez de Cáceres to Eusebio Bardají,” Santo Domingo, 12 December 1821, AGI Estado 17.79.
\textsuperscript{160} “L’acte constitutif du gouvernement provisoire de l’Etat indépendant de la partie espagnole d’Haïti,” 1 December 1821 printed in Thomas Maidou, \textit{Histoire d’Haiti} 8 volumes (Port-au-Prince : Edition Deschamps, 1985) Vol. 6, 260 – 264. Maidou noted that Gran Colombia’s constitution did not abolish slavery which was also the same as Spanish Haiti’s Constitution. This was one of the reasons that made Nuñez de Cáceres’ constitution incompatible with the Haitian constitution of 1816, Maidou, \textit{Histoire d’Haïti}, 262. Leaders during the French Revolution also invoked the metaphor of slavery to describe the struggle for their rights even as they ignored its existence in the colonies, David Geggus, “Racial Equality, Slavery, and Colonial Succession during the Constituent Assembly,” \textit{American Historical Review} Vol. 94 No. 5 (Dec 1989), 1290 – 1308.
slavery offered by its neighbor that in the past warranted conflict. Dominican Creole’s vision of national belonging did not include enslaved people even as it played lip service to racial discrimination.

Given how their movements to overthrow the Spanish and draft a Constitution occurred largely on their own, Nuñez de Cáceres called to Dominicans living in the new Spanish Haiti to win their support. Speaking of the “ancient slavery” under Spanish tyranny, Dominicans living in Spanish Haiti founded a republic “based in liberty.” Nuñez de Cáceres’ contradiction to compare Dominicans’ condition living under Spanish rule to slavery while a republic kept the institution may not have been lost on his contemporaries. He called on Dominicans to reject the Spanish who like other despots used violence and force to stay in power. Instead, Nuñez de Cáceres looked to their neighbors to the north in the United States as a model for a republic for them to follow. His rejection of monarchy and embracing a republic with slavery served as the blueprint for Spanish Haiti’s development. The Creole leader linked Spanish Haiti’s independence movement with the other movements that emerged throughout the Americas. His rhetoric feint was even more prevalent given Nuñez de Cáceres’ affiliation with Simon Bolivar’s Gran Colombia. Offering Dominicans a model after rejecting the Spanish regime was also Nuñez de Cáceres’ way of reassuring and galvanizing Dominicans to support the new republic.

163 “Proclamation de Nunez de Caceres,” Santo Domingo 1 December 1821.
164 “Proclamation de Nunez de Caceres,” Santo Domingo 1 December 1821.
Núñez de Cáceres’ especially sought those who were pro-Haitian for their support of his new regime. He expressed hope that Dominicans in Santiago, Puerto Plata, Beler, and even Montecristi who supported Boyer would extend their backing to Spanish Haiti. Núñez de Cáceres looked favorably upon their neighbors to the west and wisely called for a treaty of commerce and defense with Haiti while maintaining their own sovereignty in the east.\(^{165}\) By offering an alliance treaty to the Haitian Republic, Núñez de Cáceres wanted to appease both his western neighbor and those Dominicans he had yet to win over. He recognized their past and present connected both island nations and tacitly acknowledged the support and positive esteem that Dominicans held of Boyer. The Creole leader turned his attention to those living in Spanish Haiti whether American or European, calling them “brothers, friends, and parents. We are compatriots, sons of a common mother.”\(^{166}\) Núñez de Cáceres sought to create a sense of community among different people with a connection to establish support for the new republic.

Núñez de Cáceres did not galvanize the support he sought for the nascent Republic of Spanish Haiti or from Simon Bolivar in Gran Colombia who could not offer money or troops to support this flailing republic.\(^{167}\) Dominicans in places such as Santiago de los Caballeros made their decision to diverge from Núñez de Cáceres. Located in the heart of Santo Domingo’s Cibao region, Santiago’s tobacco cultivation kept it distinct from Santo Domingo City both in interests and politics.\(^{168}\) The Santiago Junta expressed their “universal discontent” at Santo Domingo’s proclamation under

\(^{165}\) “Proclamation de Nunez de Caceres,” Santo Domingo 1 December 1821.
\(^{166}\) “Proclamation de Nunez de Caceres,” Santo Domingo 1 December 1821.
\(^{167}\) Gabriel Garcia, *Obras Completas*, 338.
\(^{168}\) Franco, *Blacks*, 82.
Núñez de Cáceres, choosing to live under Haitian laws and constitution.\textsuperscript{169} By petitioning Boyer, Dominicans in Santiago chose the Haitian vision of a nation free of legal racial discrimination and slavery and illustrated Dominican Creoles’ failure to consolidate their regime.

News of Spanish Haiti’s independence under Núñez de Cáceres and its rejection by Dominicans in Santiago spread to other parts of Santo Domingo and Haiti. Puerto Plata, La Vega, Cotuí, and San Francisco de Macoris were some examples who rejected independence in Santo Domingo City and declared solidarity with the Haitian Republic.\textsuperscript{170} Meanwhile, Boyer’s commission arrived in Santo Domingo City, expecting to speak with the former Spanish Captain-General Real. Arriving to see a change in the government under Núñez de Cáceres, the commissioners convinced the Dominican leader to believe Boyer would support the new regime.\textsuperscript{171} Correspondences from Dominican towns and the reports of the Haitian officers brought the news to Boyer of Spanish Haiti’s independence.

On 25 December 1821, Boyer addressed the Haitian Senate about the events that occurred to the east in Santo Domingo, focusing on article 40 of the Haitian Constitution, which placed Haitian territory the entire island.\textsuperscript{172} This article provided a means of Haitian legal justification for the government’s claims to Santo Domingo. Now that Boyer and his troops pacified and united the kingdom of the North it was time to reach out to their brothers in the east to “give to them the natural direction that they should

\textsuperscript{169} “Junte Centrale de St. Yague to Jean-Pierre Boyer,” Santiago de los Caballeros, 29 December 1821.
\textsuperscript{170} Maidou, Histoire d’Haiti, 270.
\textsuperscript{171} Moya Pons, La Dominacion Haitiana, 28 – 29.
have in the name of the nation.”

Boyer understood incorporating Santo Domingo as part of his larger project of reunifying the republic that began with the death of Christophe. Their “brothers of the East” sought to live under the Haitian constitution and the advantages it brought to them. This law included the end of slavery that the regime of Spanish Haiti condoned. By referencing article 40 of the Haitian Constitution, Boyer provided the legal justification for Santo Domingo as a part of the republic.

The right moment was at hand for Boyer to realize his goal to unify both sides of the island under the Haitian Republic. Boyer argued that Spanish Haiti’s independence and the Constitution that its supporters ratified was not in the best interest of the people of the entire island. He linked the fates of both sides of the island together even as Dominicans expressed their dissatisfaction with the new regime of Spanish Haiti. Boyer saw Núñez de Cáceres’ regime as dangerous to the island’s security and that it was his responsibility as president to protect the “public peace of the state.” The unpopular regime’s presence challenged Haitian sovereignty and could invite further trouble. Boyer directed his speech directly to the Senate because of their responsibility to uphold the laws of the Constitution. By presenting a series of rhetorical questions, Boyer aimed to appeal to the Haitian Senators to sanction a decision he already made. They asked could a separate state form in their territory in contrast to article 40 of the Constitution? Whether the inhabitants of the East support or not Núñez de Cáceres’ regime? And could the Senate allow for this regime to exist in direct violation of the Constitution? Their

answers to these questions would help to sanction Boyer’s ambition of bringing both sides of the island together.

The Senate responded in the affirmation that a separate republic could not exist in Haitian territory and that Haitians needed to uphold the Constitution. Boyer had both the blessings of the Haitian Senate and the popular support of Dominicans. As one later traveler to the island noted, Santo Domingo’s people of color “preferred rather to submit themselves to his [Boyer] power than to undergo the trouble of erecting a new government of their own, or to throw themselves into the arms of the South American patriots, whose friendships they more than doubted.” As Haitian forces gathered to go into the eastern part of Hispaniola Boyer wrote to Núñez de Cáceres in an attempt to win the Dominican leader over. Boyer sought a peaceful transfer of power, consistent with his previous messages to the Spanish. For Boyer, his actions constituted a “regeneration” of the eastern part of the island, which the Haitian constitution sanctioned. The Senate’s support affirmed Dominicans’ desires and the Haitian Constitution’s backing to justify Boyer’s actions needed to absorb Santo Domingo into the republic.

Boyer shared with Núñez de Cáceres of his reluctance to help pro-Haitian Dominicans in Santo Domingo until the time was right to “operate a total moral revolution there.” The Haitian president was not clear what this revolution in Santo Domingo would involve, but Boyer previously hinted these changes had something to do with bringing in Santo Domingo under the Haitian Republic’s laws. This notion included

180 Brown, History and Present Condition, 248.
182 “Jean-Pierre Boyer to José Núñez de Cáceres,” Port-au-Prince, 11 January 1822.
183 “Jean-Pierre Boyer to José Núñez de Cáceres,” Port-au-Prince, 11 January 1822.
the end of slavery and defending the island’s borders from pro-slave powers. Boyer revealed he wanted to carry out this act peacefully, noting the partisans he had from various towns in Santo Domingo including the capital city.\(^\text{184}\) By alluding to the support in different parts of Santo Domingo, Boyer aimed to convince Núñez de Cáceres of his isolation. Boyer concerned himself with his public image and the Haitian Republic both to Dominicans and to the outside world. He was already on record telling he would not violate Haitian laws, which included the clause in the Constitution preventing the republic involving itself in other country’s affairs.\(^\text{185}\) This clause was what fed Boyer’s reluctance to directly involve the Haitian Republic in Santo Domingo.

To justify his future actions in Santo Domingo, Boyer relied on two distinct but connected arguments. He believed two separate republics on Hispaniola was just not possible. Boyer used article 40 of the Haitian Constitution to prove the republic’s sovereignty over the entire island of Hispaniola.\(^\text{186}\) Nevertheless, the Constitution prevented Boyer from involving himself in the affairs of other nations as specified in article 15. To find a loophole and justify a unification, Boyer noted how Spanish Haiti’s creation did not have Dominicans’ support. They protested to Boyer, who believed the end of Spanish rule would have brought Santo Domingo together with Haiti.\(^\text{187}\) For Boyer, those “interested for the prosperity of this Island must admit this truth; for to be effectually independent, it should possess within itself the means of securing its Independence.”\(^\text{188}\) Observers could not expect a republic without the support of its inhabitants to remain standing especially when those same people clearly made it known

\(^\text{184}\) “Jean-Pierre Boyer to José Núñez de Cáceres,” Port-au-Prince, 11 January 1822.
\(^\text{185}\) Gaffield, *Haitian Connections*, 196.
\(^\text{186}\) “Jean-Pierre Boyer to José Núñez de Cáceres,” Port-au-Prince, 11 January 1822.
\(^\text{187}\) “Jean-Pierre Boyer to José Núñez de Cáceres,” Port-au-Prince, 11 January 1822.
\(^\text{188}\) “Jean-Pierre Boyer to José Núñez de Cáceres,” Port-au-Prince, 11 January 1822.
their affinity for another republic such as Haiti. Boyer ordered Dominicans to await his troops’ entrance into Santo Domingo. Boyer intended to enter “not as a conqueror, (God forbid that I should ever entertain such a thought,) but consistent with the Laws of the State, as the Pacificator and Conciliator of the interests of all.”

By using the Constitution and popular sovereignty, Boyer justified his change in policy to unite the island of under Haitian rule.

By early 1822, it was clear Santo Domingo would neither be a Spanish colony or a Creole led republic. Earlier, Kindelan wanted for Spanish Caribbean officials to aid his quest to defend Santo Domingo from this exact situation. His pro-slavery argument for Haitian containment did not result in Spanish help. By the end of 1821, Dominicans had two alternative visions for Santo Domingo’s future. Led by Núñez de Cáceres, Dominican Creoles located in and around Santo Domingo City sought independence from Spain through a federation with Gran Colombia. Even with the change in name and political leaders, this first independence movement largely maintained the status quo which notably included slavery’s persistence. Núñez de Cáceres could not draw more support for the rest of Santo Domingo as several towns declared their allegiance to Boyer and the Haitian Republic. These Dominicans by the Haitian-Dominican frontier and other towns sought an independence and nation founded on racial equality, closer economic ties, and the end of the former colonial system. Their actions and allegiance to Boyer were clear to the Haitian president and contemporaries of Dominicans’ choice to join the Haitian Republic.

189 “Jean-Pierre Boyer to José Núñez de Cáceres,” Port-au-Prince, 11 January 1822.
CONCLUSION

Núñez de Cáceres published Boyer’s correspondence along with a proclamation, justifying Dominican creoles’ actions in overthrowing the Spanish. He upheld his intention to continue the previous independence declarations from Dajabon, Beler, and Montecristi. Núñez de Cáceres called for Dominicans to stay peaceful before Boyer’s arrival who the Dominican leader referred to as the “harbinger of peace.” He remarked how Dominicans would show “the political world the example of a people, experienced in the vicissitudes and changes of government, who know how to conform to the necessary modifications.” Boyer’s accomplishments amazed observers as he brought Santo Domingo peacefully under the Haitian Republic with one traveler reflecting how it “seems more like the effect of magic than the results of the efforts of a man.”

Dominicans from the border to as far as Higüey in eastern Santo Domingo prepared for Boyer’s entrance in 1822, putting up the Haitian flag in honor of their new independence. Núñez de Cáceres and his cadre finally honored Dominicans’ requests as they stepped aside for Boyer.

This chapter has argued that Boyer and the Haitian state were successful in bringing Santo Domingo under their control because of the divisions among the Dominican population who supported and identified with their western neighbor. Both independence movements formed with grievances against the Spanish. Haiti’s reunification under Boyer’s rule made it easier for conspirators on both sides of the island.

190 José Núñez de Cáceres, “Proclamation of the Political Chief, to the Inhabitants of Santo Domingo, relative to the Union of the Spanish Part of Hayti with the Haytian Republic,” in Lewis Hertslet and Great Britain, British and Foreign State Papers, 1821-1822 (London: J. Harrison & Son, 1829), 959 – 963.
191 Núñez de Cáceres, “Proclamation.”
193 “Libro del Cabildo, 13 January 1822-13 July 1822,” San Dionsis de Higüey, Archivo General de la Naccion, Archivo Real de Higüey Leg. 5A Exp. 78.
to work together to subvert the Spanish regime. Still, its constitution prevented the
Haitian Republic from outwardly involving itself in another nation or empire’s affairs.
Undeterred by Dominican Creoles’ expulsing the Spanish, other inhabitants outside of
Santo Domingo City rejected Núñez de Cáceres’ vision of national belonging in favor of
Boyer’s. Therefore, the Haitian President realized his larger goal of uniting the island of
Hispaniola for the first time since Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian Revolution from
1809 to 1822 with the popular backing of Dominicans. For these Dominicans, Boyer’s
entrance into Santo Domingo was not an act of foreign aggression, but their decision to
chart the island’s future by aligning with the Haitian Republic.
On 7 March 1822, Spanish and French naval vessels arrived in the Bay of Samaná in the northern part of Santo Domingo. The governors of Martinique and Puerto Rico had received distress calls from former French and Spanish subjects asking them to take possession of the former Spanish colony Santo Domingo from under Haitian control. Martinique’s governor Count Donzelot later wrote to his Spanish counterpart Miguel de la Torre in Puerto Rico predicting, “counterrevolution” back to the Spanish Crown would not be difficult “because the independence declaration had only been done by [José] Núñez de Cáceres and his partisans.” An unknown number of white Dominicans sought relief from what they perceived as “general inequality” among the inhabitants. Because of the Haitians’ successful military mobilization, these royalists coalesced around the Samaná Peninsula as a refugee point for the incoming French squadron to transport them away. They flew the Spanish flag in support of reclaiming Santo Domingo and as a show of defiance to the Haitian Unification initiated one month prior. When French forces arrived they found Haitian President Jean-Pierre Boyer’s forces occupied the nearby towns of Samaná and Savana-la-Mar where royalist individuals had congregated. Counting on the support of Dominicans at their arrival, the French squadron

195 “Ministero de la Guerra to Gobernación de Ultramar,” 23 January 1823, Madrid, AGI-SD 970.
left with some royalists for Puerto Rico as they had orders to not engage directly with Boyer. Their arrival marked the first but certainly not the last challenge to Haitian rule in Santo Domingo.196

The Haitian Unification represented a more inclusive vision of the nation-state, symbolized with the tree of liberty, and a direct challenge to slaveholding regimes. Some contemporaries and later Dominican scholars have interpreted this moment as a low point in Santo Domingo and part of a larger tradition of unwarranted Haitian aggression.197 Subsequent studies from historians have moderated this interpretation arguing that Boyer’s regime brought positive gains to the population and Dominicans celebrated his rule. They question the extent of Haiti’s oppressive rule.198 Despite many Dominicans supporting Haitian rule, Boyer faced a larger challenge of integrating his eastern neighbor with a different set of customs, traditions, and expectations centuries of Spanish rule shaped. There were also some Dominicans who choose a return to monarchy and articulated their loyalty to the old regime over Boyer’s brand of republicanism.199 A unified island of Hispaniola under Haitian rule was that supported emancipation clearly threatened the nearby slave empires in the Caribbean.

196 “Ministero de la Guerra to Gobernación de Ultramar,” 23 January 1823, Madrid, AGI-SD 970.
197 Gabriel García, Obras Completas; Joaquin Balaguer, La Isla al Reves 22º edición (Santo Domingo: Fundación Joaquin Balaguer, 2013); and Emilio Rodriguez Demoriz ed. Invasiones Haitianas de 1801, 1805 y 1822 (Ciudad de Trujillo [Santo Domingo]: Editor de Caribe, 1955).
This chapter examines the first years of this Haitian unification from 1822 – 1824 with the reactions and responses by the Spanish and Dominicans to the loss of Santo Domingo. First, it asks, how did the Haitian state seek to merge Santo Domingo into the larger republic in the face of royalist opposition? Next, how did the Dominican royalist and Spanish officials depict Santo Domingo and its population during the first years of Haitian Unification? Finally, how did the different segments of the Dominican population respond to Haitian rule? This chapter argues that Dominican royalists formulated a discourse depicting Santo Domingo’s population as loyal to the Spanish in response to the Haitian Unification.

AN AUTOCRATIC REPUBLIC
Before Haitian President Boyer made his entrance into Santo Domingo on 9 February 1822, he wrote to Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres to “be cheerful and full of confidence.” By stepping aside to let Boyer consolidate independence in Santo Domingo, Núñez de Cáceres would gain “inestimable repute” among the rest of the Dominican population.200 Despite Boyer’s cheerful words and reassurances of a peaceful entrance to the island, the Haitian President entered Santo Domingo from the west with an army of 12,000 men. Even with the support of Dominicans in towns such as Dajabon, Montecristi, and Azua located near the border, Boyer knew there were at least two factions of Dominicans who could oppose him: those who supported the current government of Núñez de Cáceres and those who wanted a return to the previous Spanish regime. What pro-Haitian Dominicans perceived as Boyer’s peaceful entrance was an

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invasion for Dominican royalists. Boyer split his forces into two groups leading one body in the south and delegating the other in the north to a Haitian officer. Previous Haitian entrances had not proceeded as peacefully, even destroying the city of Santiago de los Caballeros under leader Jean-Jacques Dessalines in 1805. Boyer’s letter to Núñez de Cáceres illustrated the Haitian President sought a peaceful and different approach from his predecessors.

Núñez de Cáceres gave a speech to Santo Domingo’s City council preparing them for the regime change. He noted how Boyer “has not entered as a conqueror, but more as a father, brother, and friend.” Núñez de Cáceres optimistically reassured those Dominicans with apprehensions of the change to come. He was among the Dominicans who met Boyer at the gates of Santo Domingo City to give the Haitian president its keys but by different accounts Boyer refused them. The Haitian President entered Santo Domingo’s cathedral for a religious ceremony to solidify his rule and served as a tacit acceptance to his eastern neighbors’ piety and now political citizens. Boyer’s entrance

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202 Moya Pons, *La dominación haitiana*, 31. Scholar Emilio Rodriguez Demorizi who also was president of the Dominican national archive during the Trujillo regime was a part of the Dominican government’s official anti-Hatian discourse offered a poem of unknown authorship found in Santiago de los Caballeros lamenting the destruction of Haitian invasions during the early part of the nineteenth century. It offers a contrast to pro-Hatian support, “Romance de las invasiones haitianas,” in *Invasiones haitianas de 1801, 1805 y 1822* ed. by Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi (Ciudad de Trujillo [Santo Domingo]: Editor de Caribe), 203–224.
met no resistance reflecting his and Núñez and Cáceres’ efforts to facilitate a smooth political transition.

Soon after his entrance into Santo Domingo, Boyer addressed the Dominican population in 1822 addressing his justifications for the island’s unification. He noted, “there are no more slaves, and we do not form anything but one family.”

His use of familial ties was Boyer’s way of connecting Haitians and Dominicans. He combined his paternal discourse with legal justification invoking the articles under the Haitian Constitution justifying Boyer’s actions in Santo Domingo. Under Article 1 slavery could not exist in the territory of the Haitian Republic. Articles 40 and 41 presented Haitian sovereignty as extending into Santo Domingo. Boyer’s proclamation did not only justify the Unification based on the ties between Haitians and Dominicans, but the legal precedent within the Haitian Constitution defended the republic’s sovereignty in Santo Domingo.

As “sons of Haiti,” Boyer expected Dominicans to learn from previous experiences and be good citizens and patriots by obeying the Haitian Republic’s laws. He focused on Haitians being an “agricultural and warrior people” as their role as citizens of the republic. For Dominicans now living under Haitian rule, Boyer expected former enslaved and free people in Santo Domingo to do their part in cultivating crops for the republic and to defend the black republic as warriors or soldiers. One scholar has noted that the Haitian government defined citizenship based on what citizens owed the state.

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207 Boyer, “Proclama al Pueblo.”
208 Boyer, “Proclama al Pueblo.”
209 Boyer, “Proclama al Pueblo.”
versus “the rights-based element of what the state owed to its citizens.” These expectations included duty, obedience, and obligations to the government.\textsuperscript{210} Boyer saw Dominicans as free citizens and expected them to defend the republic sovereignty and borders, and taking advantage of land to cultivate.

Boyer’s role decree as embodied the Haitian state’s political practice and is an example of what one scholar referred to as “an exercise in legitimation.”\textsuperscript{211} By circulating his decree among Haitian troops for Santo Domingo’s inhabitants Boyer projected his vision for Dominicans now serving the Haitian state. What is implicit in Boyer’s paternalistic language is his vision for Dominicans to serve as cultivators and soldiers. As citizens, Dominicans would be beholden to the Haitian state. The Haitian Unification process of legitimation began in part through Boyer’s proclamation telling his outlook for Santo Domingo’s inhabitants.

Following Boyer’s entrance, the Haitian state organized Santo Domingo into a system of military and financial districts, relying on local officials. Still, a Haitian general governed each district and exercised both military and civil authority and served as a link between Boyer’s government and the local authorities within the district.\textsuperscript{212} The Haitian government integrated the areas of Azua, Santo Domingo, San Juan, Montecristi, Puerto Plata, Tiburon and La Vega within this system of government. General Jérôme Maximilien Borgella ruled the former Spanish colony for the Haitian Republic representing Boyer’s interests.\textsuperscript{213} Haitian rule’s extent differed by region and scholars are

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{210} Mimi Sheller, \textit{Democracy After Slavery: Black Publics and Peasant Radicalism in Haiti and Jamaica} (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 98.
\item \textsuperscript{212} Mackenzie, \textit{Notes on Haiti}, 102.
\item \textsuperscript{213} Mackenzie, \textit{Notes on Haiti}, 102.
\end{itemize}
beginning to explore those nuances during the Unification’s early years. For example, in Higüey, Santo Domingo’s most eastern province, one scholar found that outside of a ceremonial planting of “the tree of liberty,” Haitian officers were no longer in the province. 214 This example illustrates Boyer relied on local officials as he sought to organize Santo Domingo into the existing Haitian system suggesting Dominican cooperation with the new regime.

The Haitian Unification brought some opportunities to the populace of the eastern side of the island to take part in the government. Dominicans played a crucial role in the functions and maintenance of Haitian rule over the Spanish side of the island, especially as representatives to the Camara—the legislature of the Haitian state—in Port-of-Prince. 215 Despite the opportunities the Haitian government provided for representation and political participation within the regime, the ceiling Boyer placed on their advancement excluded Dominicans from the upper strata of the government.

Contemporaries who traveled to the island gave their observations on the matter of the Haitian government’s structure, commenting on its brand of republicanism. One referred to the Haitian political system as “a republican monarchy sustained by bayonette [sic],” while another referred to Haitian President Boyer as “sovereign in all but the name.” 216 Both depictions illustrate the larger amount of power that Boyer and his army wielded in the republic. The Haitian Constitution concentrated sovereignty in Boyer who also served as head of the Church, general over the armed forces of the island, and had

214 Lora Hugi, Transcición de la esclavitud, 52-53.
the authority to initiate laws. Boyer also had the power to select those who served in the Senate as an advisory board for nine years.\textsuperscript{217} The Constitution granted Boyer major control of the Haitian state government with considerable power emanating from him. The lower house or Camara was the part of the legislature where elections from the people decided the delegates. Boyer could expel members at will if they did not follow his wishes.\textsuperscript{218} Foreigner accounts convey Boyer’s executive power was expansive with no checks or balances to stop him.

Charles Mackenzie, the British consul in Haiti observed how Boyer could wield influence even within the republic’s judiciary.\textsuperscript{219} According to Mackenzie, Boyer took liberties in involving himself in proceedings of the court, suspending trials based on his whim. The consul noted how in one instance, “the President in consequence of some low intrigue of the American agent, ordered proceedings to be suspended.” Mackenzie involved himself in this situation, writing “and it was only in consequence of a very strong remonstrance that I made, that the affair was allowed to proceed in its regular course.”\textsuperscript{220} Although Mackenzie pointed to no checks and balances against Boyer’s wishes with its strong executive, this example also illustrates the Haitian President’s intervening on behalf of a request. By Mackenzie’s count, there were five other cases involving British subjects in which Boyer stopped the judicial process.\textsuperscript{221} The Haitian President used his influence and power to even impact judiciary cases involving foreign diplomats.

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\item[217] Candler, \textit{Brief Notices of Hayti}, 86; and Franklin \textit{Present State of Hayti}, 260.
\item[218] Candler, \textit{Brief Notices of Hayti}, 86; and Franklin \textit{Present State of Hayti}, 260.
\item[220] “Charles Mackenzie to Secretary of State,” Port-au-Prince, 1826, TNA-CO 318/102.
\item[221] “Charles Mackenzie to Secretary of State,” Port-au-Prince, 1826, TNA-CO 318/102.
\end{footnotes}
The onset of Haitian rule released a panic through the anti-Haitian part of the population in Santo Domingo resulting in French intervention on the eastern part of the island. Dominican and French settlers sent a message of help to Martinique asking for France’s protection who sent ships to explore the issue.\textsuperscript{222} By not committing an armed force for invasion, the French were treading cautiously toward an area that had been Spanish only a few months prior. Boyer and Haitian officials learned of the French squadron’s approach to Santo Domingo but were unsure of its intentions. Amidst the uncertainty, Boyer issued an embargo on foreign ships coming to Haiti. He also sent troops to Savana la Mar and the Samaná Peninsula in the northern part of Santo Domingo to await the French squadron’s arrival.\textsuperscript{223} By strengthening his defenses in Santo Domingo and closing his ports, Boyer prepared the Haitian Republic as a nation at war. Requests from anti-Haitian Dominicans had drew France, threatening the Unification from its onset.

The governor of Martinique ordered French squadron Captain Julies de Martinieu to aid Dominican royalist against the Haitians if Santo Domingo was a Spanish possession.\textsuperscript{224} Because of Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres had declared Santo Domingo independent from Spain, the French commander was under orders to not get involved in the affairs of the new republic, suggesting France saw it as something beyond their authority. Nonetheless, Martinieu’s superiors commanded him to engage if he saw the Spanish flag flying as a sign of help illustrating Santo Domingo was a Spanish

\textsuperscript{222} “Julies de Martinieu to His Excellency the Gov. [of Cuba],” Harbor of Havana, 28 March 1822, printed in \textit{Baltimore Patriot & Mercantile Advertiser} Vol. 19 No. 92, 20 April 1822.
\textsuperscript{223} “Latest from St. Domingo,” \textit{Baltimore Patriot & Mercantile Advertiser} Vol. 19 No. 89, 17 April 1822; and “Julies de Marinieu to His Excellency the Gov.,” Harbor of Havana, 28 March 1822.
\textsuperscript{224} “Count Donzelot to Governor-General of Cuba,” Fort Royal, 14 February 1822, printed in \textit{Baltimore Patriot & Mercantile Advertiser} Vol. 19 No. 92, 20 April 1822.
territory, which Dominican royalist astutely did to entice the French squadron to help them.225 Haitian President Boyer militarizing Santo Domingo’s northern border was in response to this flying of the Spanish flag and Dominican royalist attempting to bring the French in. Captain Martinieu’s refused to engage directly with Boyer’s troops, leaving those Dominicans in a precarious position.226 The President’s defense of the Unification of a potential foreign attack illustrated that Santo Domingo was no longer a Spanish colony but a part of the Haitian Republic. Therefore, Captain Martinieu would not offer aid to Dominican royalist as a part of his mission from the French.

This attempt to reverse Haitian sovereignty had failed and most importantly did not galvanize the populace to rise against Boyer. The royalists who invited Spanish and French forces to the island boarded Martinieu’s squadron and he dropped them off in Aguadilla, Puerto Rico located on the western side of the island. The Puerto Rican Captain-General granted them asylum and appointed an acting Captain General of Santo Domingo, which served to not recognize Haitian claims and sovereignty in Santo Domingo until the Spanish could get involved.227 This Dominican royalist failure illustrated to remove the Haitians from Santo Domingo suggests that Boyer had the support of much of Santo Domingo’s population, who requested to be a part of the republic.

Dominican royalist arrived with their accounts of the early years of the Unification and its policies. Francisco Brenes, a former Dominican official, noted how

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225 “Julies de Marinieu to His Excellency the Gov., Harbor of Havana, 28 March 1822; and “Count Donzelot to Governor-General of Cuba,” Fort Royal, 14 February 1822.
226 “Julies de Marinieu to His Excellency the Gov., Harbor of Havana, 28 March 1822; and “Count Donzelot to Governor-General of Cuba,” Fort Royal, 14 February 1822.
227 “Julies de Marinieu to His Excellency the Gov., Harbor of Havana, 28 March 1822; and “Count Donzelot to Governor-General of Cuba,” Fort Royal, 14 February 1822.
one of the first things Boyer did to garner support was to call for “the equality of all class[es] of people on the island.” By ending slavery in Santo Domingo shortly after his arrival, Boyer was putting his rhetoric into practice. Consequently, Boyer wanted stability, to maintain support among Dominicans, and did not want any ill will between any of the different racial groups in Santo Domingo. He sought to employ all people of color. Through combining reform with moderate calls for inclusion, Boyer intended to ease the transition for Dominicans from a Spanish colony society to a Haitian republican one. Even after leaving this new society behind, Brenes noted how Boyer had continued his efforts at peace through proclamations offering land, commerce, and political liberties to Santo Domingo’s inhabitants. Despite not offering specific examples of what these liberties entailed, Brenes’s report does highlight generally how the Haitian government aimed to win support among all Dominicans. Haitian policies intended to gain cross-racial and ethnic support for the Haitian Unification among the different segments of the Dominican population.

Still, Brenes intended to discredit the Haitian Unification by pointing to inherent differences between Haitians and Dominicans. He contended that Boyer’s legal changes and sensitive approach could not mask perceived the dissimilarities among the Haitian troops and Dominicans, even at one point referring to himself and others as Dominican-Spaniards. Brenes claimed there was a sense of disgust among Santo Domingo’s inhabitants with the Haitian army and criticized “the Haitian troops’ licentiousness that

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229 “Juan Francisco Brenes to Francisco González de Linares,” Puerto Rico, 16 September 1822, AGI-SD 970.
230 “Juan Francisco Brenes to Francisco González de Linares,” Puerto Rico, 16 September 1822, AGI-SD 970.
they used against a religious people.” By presenting the Haitian army as immoral versus the religious Dominicans, Brenes set up an inherent ethnic division between Santo Domingo and Haiti from the Unification’s very beginning. He further emphasized this point with his label of Dominican-Spaniards that created an ethnic difference between Dominicans of all colors and Haitians through their cultural connection to Spain. Brenes placed doubt in Haitian emancipation with a conversation he had with a Haitian aid of camp known simply as Alejandro. The Haitian officer remarked “we have been fooled because it is necessary to see it to believe it that in Santo Domingo there is not a mulatto or a black that was wanted to be [Haitian] and their glory was in being slaves and Spaniards.”

By presenting Spanish slavery as better than Haitian liberty, Brenes insinuated that not even Dominicans of color would choose to support the new Haitian regime over the former Spanish one. The Dominican royalist’s observations suggested that religion and the experiences of the Spanish colonial society’s benefits divided Dominicans from Haitians and discrediting the Unification in Santo Domingo.

On 2 January 1824, A couple of years later the Captain-General of Puerto Rico Miguel de la Torre sent the first of a series of letters to the Spanish Secretary of State to advocate for Spain to retake Santo Domingo. De la Torre noted the “blacks of Santo Domingo” united forces in the east under the command of Haitian general Borgella to invade Puerto Rico and Cuba. By mentioning the threat of an invasion to Spain’s remaining possessions in the Caribbean, the Captain-General sought to convince his

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231 Juan Francisco Brenes to Francisco González de Linares,” Puerto Rico, 16 September 1822, AGI-SD 970.
232 “...nos hemos engañado; por que es necesario verlo para creerlo que en Sto. Domingo no hay un mulato ni un negro que quiera serlo y gengan de su gloria en ser esclavos y Españoles,” (italics emphasized by editor), “Juan Francisco Brenes to Francisco González de Linares,” AGI-SD 970.
233 “Miguel de la Torre to Secretary of State and Military Office,” San Juan, 2 January 1824, Archivo General de Indias-Estado Santo Domingo, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Luisiana y Florida (hereafter cited as AGI-Estado) 19.85.
superiors to involve the empire in Santo Domingo. According to de la Torre, Dominican royalist who fled Santo Domingo presented as representatives of Santo Domingo who sought help to rid themselves of the “foreign yoke and to reestablish the suspended rule of the Catholic Majesty.” By claiming to speak for all of Santo Domingo and its inhabitants, Dominican royalist aimed to sway Spanish officials both in the Caribbean and in Madrid of their loyalty and depict the Unification as an unwanted foreign occupation. For his efforts, de la Torre served as their spokesperson to Spanish officials in Madrid as he saw the dangers for Puerto Rico and Cuba from this larger Haitian Republic.

Several months later, de la Torre took it upon himself to convince the Spanish government to get involved in the Unification by pointing to the likelihood of success. He emphasized the relationship between Dominicans and the Spanish king Fernando VI by referring to them as the king’s vassals. De la Torre also considered potential allies in Spain’s quest to reclaim its former possession in the Caribbean suggesting Spain combine forces with the French forces in Martinique in their mission of conquest. With this suggestion and early focus on Dominicans’ fidelity, de la Torre sought to show the Spanish the potential support both within and outside of the island. The unified Haitian Republic’s proximity to the Spanish colony threatened slavery in Puerto Rico. Boyer could use this pretext to aid enslaved and free people of color on the island. Like Dominican royalists Brenes and Fernandez de Castro, de la Torre used the Spanish

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234 “Miguel de la Torre to Secretary of State and Military Office,” San Juan, 2 January 1824, AGI-Estado 19.85.
235 “Miguel de la Torre to Secretary of State and Military Office,” San Juan 13 May 1824, AGI-Estado 19.85, 1ª.
236 “Miguel de la Torre to Secretary of State and Military Office,” San Juan 13 May 1824, AGI-Estado 19.85, 1ª.
237 “Miguel de la Torre to Secretary of State and Military Office,” San Juan 13 May 1824, AGI-Estado 19.85, 1ª.
empire’s commitment to slavery to spur officials to involve themselves in Santo Domingo. For his last argument, the Captain-General mentioned his ability to send men in secret from Puerto Rico to Santo Domingo to combat the Haitians.\textsuperscript{238} De la Torre used loyalty, safety, and a potential slave power alliance to convince Spanish officials to get involved in Santo Domingo.

Previously, an unknown number of Dominican royalists reached out to de la Torre by emphasizing their connection to Spain. By referring to themselves as the “true Spaniards of this disgraced land,” these Dominicans expressed their affinity for the Spanish claiming it never wavered even after the independence launched by Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáreres.\textsuperscript{239} Instead they distanced themselves from Santo Domingo’s first independence movement, placing the blame on Núñez de Cáreres for the Haitians taking over the colony. The Dominican royalist presented themselves as innocent in these matters who had demonstrated their loyalty to the Spanish Crown in the past and continued to do so.\textsuperscript{240} By claiming fidelity to Spain and the monarchy, Dominican royalist aimed to convince de la Torre and other Spanish officials that they were worth saving, but at the expense of playing down the support Núñez de Cáreres had for Santo Domingo’s first independence. Still, it was through identifying as Spaniards and loyalty that these Dominicans underlined their relationship to Spain.

To convince the Spanish to retake Santo Domingo, the Dominican royalists gave him a report of Boyer’s troops in the eastern part of the island. They claimed Boyer’s

\textsuperscript{238} “Miguel de la Torre to Secretary of State and Military Office,” San Juan 13 May 1824, AGI-Estado 19.85, 1ª.
\textsuperscript{239} “Dominicans to Captain General of Puerto Rico,” Santo Domingo, 24 November 1823, AGI-Estado 19.85, 8.
\textsuperscript{240} “Dominicans to Captain General of Puerto Rico,” Santo Domingo, 24 November 1823, AGI-Estado 19.85, 8.
troops mostly returned to the western side of Hispaniola leaving Santo Domingo vulnerable to an attack.\textsuperscript{241} The Dominican royalists desired men and munitions from Spain to defend Santo Domingo in the case of another Haitian invasion.\textsuperscript{242} This request implied a sense of confidence in their ability to push back the remaining Haitian forces in Santo Domingo. They sought a chance to prove themselves to the Spanish. The Dominican royalists wrote, “our desires animate us and of our interests of which we do, there is no other way to see us free from them, and under the protection of our Spain.”\textsuperscript{243} Providing details of the Haitian military force and its weaknesses was another way these Dominicans sought to appeal to Spain for help against the Haitian Republic.

The Haitian state sought to merge Santo Domingo into the larger republic by transforming it into other provinces of the nation-state. Boyer considered Dominicans as Haitian citizens who he expected to serve the republic either in agricultural cultivation or in its military defense. The Haitian government provided Dominicans with political opportunities to serve in its legislature, but not at the expense of diminishing Boyer’s power. From Dominican royalist accounts, one learns the material and political gains brought by emancipation ensured Boyer had the support of this part of the Dominican population during the early months of 1822. Dominicans of color serving Boyer suggests the Haitian regime successfully ended legal racial discrimination and material benefits that drove segments of the Dominican population to support the Unification. The Haitian government’s reliance on local troops after defending its gains from a potential French

\textsuperscript{241} “Dominicans to Captain General of Puerto Rico,” Santo Domingo, 24 November 1823, AGI-Estado 19.85, 8.
\textsuperscript{242} “Dominicans to Captain General of Puerto Rico,” Santo Domingo, 24 November 1823, AGI-Estado 19.85, 8.
\textsuperscript{243} “Dominicans to Captain General of Puerto Rico,” Santo Domingo, 24 November 1823, AGI-Estado 19.85, 8.
invasion suggests they were successful in their endeavors. The early Dominican royalists’ and Spanish officials’ reports illustrated the tension between a new society of emancipation and racial equality with the former colonial hierarchy with slavery. In the face of this opposition and protest, Boyer displayed his confidence with these troops by retreating his larger army to the western part of the island. The Haitian government changed Santo Domingo from a Spanish colony to an integral part of the republic.

A PLAN OF ACTION

Dominican royalist Brenes negatively depicted the Haitian Unification and the events leading up to it to accentuate his account of Dominican loyalty to Spain. He rhetorically questioned how could Dominicans accept the changes brought by Haitian rule positively and calmly when “they [Dominicans] are watching their lands defenseless, their estates took down, their urban possessions sequestered, their religion offended, and the libertos united with Haitian troops insulting them at every moment.”244 By presenting the Unification as a foreign occupation, Brenes made Dominicans the victims and absolved them of any role in Boyer’s entrance to Santo Domingo. His report also suggests that former enslaved Dominicans supported Haitian rule, disrupting the royalist’s perspective of Santo Domingo being loyal. Brenes also discredited Núñez de Cáceres and his supporters calling them “bums, drunks, and lost men.”245 Instead, the result of Haitian rule disappointed Núñez de Cáceres and his faction because they lost.246

Given the exit of many Dominican royalists after Santo Domingo’s first independence in 1821, one must consider whether Brenes was among Núñez de Cáceres’ supporters and

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244 “Juan Francisco Brenes to Francisco González de Linares,” Puerto Rico, 16 September 1822,” AGI-SD 970.
245 “Juan Francisco Brenes to Francisco González de Linares,” Puerto Rico, 16 September 1822,” AGI-SD 970.
246 “Juan Francisco Brenes to Francisco González de Linares,” Puerto Rico, 16 September 1822,” AGI-SD 970.
that he like others were disillusioned with the final results of independence. Nevertheless, Brenes argued that Dominicans did not support the first independence from Spain in 1821 nor the current Haitian regime. By downplaying and denigrating Dominican support for independence and the Unification, Brenes alleged that Dominicans had an unwavering loyalty for Spain.

Illustrating Dominican loyalty was a part of Brenes’ argument to sway Spanish officials of the ease they could retake Santo Domingo. For Brenes, it was untenable for the Haitians to continue to stay in Santo Domingo because of their unpopularity Dominicans. Yet, comparing his current observation with his earlier points of Dominicans of color serving the armed forces illustrates that Boyer’s unpopularity probably was not among all Dominicans. Still, he wanted to show Spanish officials that Dominicans committed themselves to overthrowing the Haitian regime. Brenes indicated that there were secret agents in Santo Domingo and in Havana, working to help Spain regain its former colonial possession. Exiles who fled to St. Thomas and Curaçao were ready to fight to retake Santo Domingo. Brenes wanted to convince Spanish officials in Puerto Rico and perhaps back in Madrid of the support awaiting them if they sought to come and retake the island. He even estimated between 6,000-8,000 men would take up arms and support Spain retaking the colony. For Brenes, Spanish involvement in Santo Domingo was less a calculated risk and more an imminent victory.

247 “Juan Francisco Brenes to Francisco González de Linares,” Puerto Rico, 16 September 1822, AGI-SD 970.
248 “Juan Francisco Brenes to Francisco González de Linares,” Puerto Rico, 16 September 1822, AGI-SD 970.
249 Juan Francisco Brenes to Francisco González de Linares,” Puerto Rico, 16 September 1822, AGI-SD 970.
Despite their affinity for Haitian rule, Brenes sought to convince the Spanish that former enslaved and free people of color would rally to the Spanish cause. He listed Haitian troops strength of consisted of a total of 1,700 troops, which included *libertos* and Dominicans of color spread out across different locales in Santo Domingo.\(^{250}\) Brenes’ estimate suggested the potential force of anti-Haitian forces would be greater than the pro-Haitian forces. Still, Brenes was confident that if the Spanish were to get involved, the Black Spaniards would turn against the Haitians to fight with the Spanish.\(^{251}\) Once again, Brenes presented an ethnic distinction between Dominicans of color with cultural ties to Spain and Haitians coming from the west into Santo Domingo. By making these divisions, Brenes argued to sway Spanish officials of people of color support.

As Brenes and other Dominicans fled to nearby islands in the Caribbean, Dominican royalist Felipe Fernandez de Castro a former *intendente* or quartermaster from Santo Domingo made his way to Spain to report on the Haitian Unification. Fernandez de Castro had fled along with his immediate family once Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres established control in December 1821. Because of the changes in regimes in Santo Domingo and the Haitian unification, Fernandez de Castro estimated to have lost 400,000 pesos worth of property and inheritance.\(^{252}\) His motives differed from Brenes in Fernandez de Castro’s report to Spanish officials in Madrid, and had material incentives for the Spanish to get involved. To convince the Spanish of the need to disrupt Haitian rule in Santo Domingo, Fernandez de Castro’s report summarized the events

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\(^{250}\) Juan Francisco Brenes to Francisco González de Linares,” Puerto Rico, 16 September 1822, AGI-SD 970.

\(^{251}\) “Juan Francisco Brenes to Francisco González de Linares,” Puerto Rico, 16 September 1822, AGI-SD 970.

leading up to Boyer’s entrance in 1822. Fernandez de Castro’s report sought Spanish officials to understand what motivated Boyer’s actions in Santo Domingo.

According to Fernandez de Castro, Boyer initially did not show any interest in unifying Santo Domingo with the Haitian Republic, making the Unification harder to explain. Boyer recognized Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres’ regime, and the Haitian President previously had respected Spanish sovereignty in Santo Domingo. Through citing Boyer’s past deference to both Spanish and the former Dominican regime, Fernandez de Castro presented the 1822 Haitian Unification appear surprising and unjustified. Instead, Fernandez de Castro concluded that it was Article 40 of the Haitian Constitution justifying Haitian sovereignty over the entire island as the reason Boyer entered Santo Domingo. With no other reason to point to, Fernandez de Castro deduced the Haitian leader’s ambitions and interests to rule over the island explained why Boyer sought to unify the entire island.

Fernandez de Castro knew of pro-Haitian arguments for slavery to justify the Unification and focused on this institution in Santo Domingo to discredit the Haitian regime. For Dominicans, outside of Santo Domingo city, one reason that they choose the Haitian Republic over Núñez de Cáceres was because he did not end slavery. Fernandez de Castro argued that in the past enslaved people from Saint-Domingue had gone over to the Spanish side including former black auxiliaries such as Jean-François. According to the Dominican royalist, Spanish slave laws in Santo Domingo “have always

254 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-SD 970.
255 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-SD 970.
256 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-SD 970.
257 For more on their arguments and petitions to Boyer see Ch. 1.
been so moderate.” Fernandez de Castro claim over slavery’s restrained nature in Santo Domingo discredited Boyer’s desire to spread emancipation in the eyes of the Spanish. Even after the Haitian state’s emancipation in Santo Domingo, Fernandez de Castro affirmed that former slaves did not mistreat their former masters. The Dominican loyalist did not explain why this treatment occurred, but Fernandez de Castro likely offered this anecdote to prove his point of slavery’s moderation in Santo Domingo.

Historians have offered contrasting evidence to Fernandez de Castro’s account, and they illustrate Dominican elites’ attempts to create plantation slave system in Santo Domingo. By presenting a different interpretation of Santo Domingo’s colonial past, Fernandez de Castro’s aimed to discredit the Haitian Unification and the resulting emancipation.

Despite Boyer’s calls for leniency and for appeasing all segments of the population, Fernandez de Castro asserted the Haitian regime lacked support among Dominicans. He noted Boyer’s entrance into Santo Domingo resulted in a “prodigious emigration” off the island. Preferring exile to Haitian rule, Fernandez de Castro and other Dominican royalists were unable and unwilling to endure the changes and consequences of living in an emancipated society. For Fernandez de Castro the act of voluntary exile

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259 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-SD 970.


261 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-SD 970.
demonstrated their loyalty and the Spanish government should provide Dominican
royalists with compensation for loss of property especially because Spain extended this
measure to other Spanish subjects who fled their former colonies in the Americas. Fernandez de Castro blamed Núñez de Cáceres for the current situation and not the rest
of the Dominican population. Nonetheless, Fernandez de Castro was silent on
Dominicans’ proclamations in late 1821 and early 1822 calling for Boyer to enter Santo
Domingo probably because it did not fit within a Dominican royalist narrative of loyalty.
By ignoring pro-Haitian sentiment among Dominicans and villainizing Núñez de
Cáceres, Fernandez de Castro could argue for Dominican opposition to Haitian rule.

Fernandez de Castro’s report shifted focus by illustrating the consequences of the
Haitian Unification for Spain’s empire in the Caribbean. He asked, “what would you say,
and what must you do to see Santo Domingo dominated by another foreign government
and opposite color.” Fernandez de Castro presented this role reversal under Boyer as
unimaginable where now people of color ruled over those of European descent.
Nonetheless, Juan Sanchez Ramirez who led Dominicans to overthrow French rule in
1809 and ruled in the name of the Spanish was a mulatto; however, he maintained his
loyalty to Spain and allowed for slavery to persist in the colony. Fernandez de Castro’s
observation presents the Haitians as foreign and opposite continuing to create a binary
between them and Dominicans in Santo Domingo. In this nation, according to Fernandez
de Castro, laws prevented whites from owning property, however, the literature has

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262 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-SD 970.
263 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-SD 970.
264 “…que diría, y que se deberá hacer al ber á Sto. Domingo dominado por otro Gobierno Extranjero y de
color opuesto…,” “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-SD 970.
265 Anne Eller, “All would be equal in the effort”: Santo Domingo’s “Italian Revolution,” Independence,
suggested otherwise. Haitian law made discrimination illegal, possibly creating a generic racial category for Haitian citizens. Since Boyer recognized white Dominicans as Haitian nationals it is unlikely the republic prevented them from owning land. 266 Fernandez de Castro further argued that what Boyer did to Santo Domingo he would soon attempt to accomplish in Puerto Rico and Cuba. 267 Haiti’s empire of liberty threatened Spain’s imperial commitment to slavery.

Fernandez de Castro alluded to precautions that Spain would now have to take in defense of its remaining possessions observing that “what Spain has to spend to in the conserve of the Spanish part of Santo Domingo” would be nothing in comparison to the costs” to defend the other islands. 268 By mentioning the fate of the other colonies, Fernandez de Castro intended to situate the issue of Santo Domingo into the broader empire’s fate. Fernandez de Castro used the specter of Haiti to mobilize the Spanish government into action. Pro-slavery forces in the British empire used Fernandez de Castro’s tactic during the Haitian Revolution to argue for slavery’s defense against the attacks of abolitionists. 269 Where Fernandez de Castro differed was for how he sought to convince the Spanish to act against the Haitian Republic.

266 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-Sd 970. Article 12 of the 1816 Constitution prevented whites from owning property in Haiti and as a result would in theory extend to Santo Domingo during the unification. Charles R. Venator Santiago, “Race, Nation-Building and Legal Transculturation during the Haitian Unification Period: Towards a Haitian Perspective” in Florida Journal of International Law Vol. 16 (September 2004), 673, 674; and Maidou, Histoire d’Haiti, 297, 298.
268 Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-Sd 970.
269 Scholars have not reached a consensus on the Haitian Revolution’s impact on slavery, its demise in some areas, and growing strength in others. For more on preeminent scholars’ opinions see David P. Geggus ed. The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), especially Introduction.
Fernandez de Castro offered an alternative plan in contrast to Dominican royalist Brenes’ military solution. First, he suggested Spain enlist the help of a foreign nation.\textsuperscript{270} If Spain was unable to obtain such services, Fernandez de Castro recommended the Spanish government to focus on regaining the property for Dominican exiles and those who would want to leave. He stood as much to gain as other Dominican loyalists who abandoned their possessions after the Haitian Unification.\textsuperscript{271} Fernandez de Castro suggested sending a commission of one or two people to negotiate with Boyer who the Spanish would assign to discuss their claims to Santo Domingo, to ensure the good treatment of Spanish subjects living in Haiti, and to force Boyer to guarantee the safety of the property of those exiles and the safety of others who sought to leave.\textsuperscript{272} Fernandez de Castro’s plan would use diplomacy as opposed to Brenes’ military resolution.

Fernandez de Castro foresaw potential obstacles that would hinder future negotiations between Haiti and Spain. Most notably was the issue of slavery and Fernandez de Castro noted how Haitians had fought strongly for their freedom against the French. Boyer could perceive a return to Spanish rule as a turn back to slavery, which would threaten Haitian freedom. The Dominican loyalist noted how Boyer could “do the most absolute resistance to those who revoked what he proclaimed for the slaves from the Spanish part [Santo Domingo].”\textsuperscript{273} By acknowledging the Haitian state’s commitment to freedom over slavery and their successes in defending this emancipation since 1804, Fernandez de Castro sought to avoid armed conflict especially without the backing of another foreign power. If negotiations for Santo Domingo failed, he suggested

\textsuperscript{270} “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-SD 970.  
\textsuperscript{271} “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-SD 970.  
\textsuperscript{272} “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-SD 970.  
\textsuperscript{273} “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-SD 970.
emancipated slaves be assigned to their former masters to work under new labor relations. Fernandez de Castro’s alternative maintained a labor-client relationship between *libertos* and their former masters in exchange for a fourth of their production. Through presenting his plan in the event the Spanish and Haitians could not resolve the issue of slavery, Fernandez de Castro considered the future obstacles that could put these talks in jeopardy.

Fernandez de Castro had broader plans regarding the Spanish empire’s interest and its commitment to slavery in the Caribbean. He did not think Spain’s recognition of the emancipated slaves in Santo Domingo would harm the interests of its possession, particularly Cuba whose commitment to expand slavery on the island had already been underway. Fernandez de Castro reasoned to Spanish officials how they would not want to face the same fate of France during the Haitian Revolution noting, “if France has not found measures or forces to prevent [emancipation] in that island. How will Spain prevent it?” He stressed again the Haitian Republic’s success in defending their emancipation and sovereignty against the French and foreign attacks. He did not think the Spanish would be successful either. By recognizing emancipation in Santo Domingo, Fernandez de Castro believed it would guarantee slavery’s safety in Cuba and Puerto Rico, which was in the Spanish empire’s best interest.

Fernandez de Castro traveled to the eastern side of the island several years later, writing another report to convince Spain to involve itself in Santo Domingo. He lauded *libertos* actions who by his accounts retained their former customs of the old regime and

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274 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-SD 970.
275 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-SD 970.
276 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-SD 970.
277 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 3 October 1822, AGI-SD 970.
treated their former masters well. His observation implied Dominicans of color retained their cultural attributes that made them closer to being Spanish than Haitian. Fernandez de Castro focused on those free Dominicans of color whom the Haitians enlisted to serve in the armed forces who he said the government offered meager pay and labor from the officers. He claimed that two years after the Haitian Unification, the same troops Boyer used to defend Santo Domingo were also disgruntled with his policies.

By suggesting Dominicans of color still retained their Spanish culture and were dissatisfied with Boyer’s rule, Fernandez de Castro tried to convince his superiors in Madrid that Haiti could be overthrown with their help.

Resistance to Haitian rule was a key element in Fernandez de Castro’s report. He highlighted how opposition crossed racial lines in Dominican society. Even a small number of veteran troops have risen, “animated by the same spirit of opposition.” According to Fernandez de Castro, the immigration of whites was “prodigious” while Haitians did not allow people of color to leave. He implied if Boyer allowed all Dominicans to leave it would represent the Haitian Unification as a failure especially if they were people of color. A likely reason for the lack of Afro-Dominican immigration would be they simply experienced Haitian rule as more beneficial than Spanish rule. Nonetheless, for Fernandez de Castro, the migration’s consequence was Dominicans abandoning land in Santo Domingo. He stressed how Dominicans lived impoverished under Haitian rule. Even the police force left in place by the Haitians faced total ruin.

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278 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7
279 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7
280 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7
For Fernandez de Castro, the Haitian Unification resulted in resistance within and outside Santo Domingo.

Fernandez de Castro saw a Dominican population with distinct characteristics from the Haitians who were in Santo Domingo. He wrote, “the old customs and primary national character had been conserved.” For Fernandez de Castro, Dominican still held on to their traditions from living under Spanish rule. Santo Domingo and its people remained unchanged in character, making his argument for Dominican preference for Spanish rule more salient. Fernandez de Castro compared this occupation with the period of French rule 20 years prior to underscore Dominican fidelity and differentiate royalists with Republican supporters. Fernandez de Castro’s nostalgic depiction of Dominicans was static and unchanged over the last two decades since Spain took back Santo Domingo, distinct from the Haitians.

Dominican royalists Brenes and Fernandez de Castro built upon budding discontent and fear of the Haitian Unification by emphasizing Santo Domingo’s loyalty to Spain. Their accounts discredited Boyer’s reforms in Santo Domingo and Dominican support for Haitian rule. Brenes sought a military solution and argued for the ease of Spanish success against Haitian troops. The Dominican loyalist rhetoric served Brenes to sway Spanish officials to invade Santo Domingo. Fernandez de Castro diverged from the former’s account through discrediting the earlier reasons for independence. He marginalized Dominican creole Núñez de Cáceres’ independence movement while being dismissive of Boyer’s motives outside of security. Fernandez de Castro aimed for a diplomatic resolution for Santo Domingo’s return. Both Dominican royalists present the

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281 Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7
282 Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7
283 Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7
Haitian Unification as a foreign occupation threatening slavery and Spain’s remaining possession in the Caribbean. Furthermore, they emphasized cultural differences between Haitians and Dominicans with Spanish affinity crossing racial lines. Dominican loyalist rhetoric used opposition and the threat of emancipation to make a claim to Spanish cultural affinity from Santo Domingo’s populace.

THE LIMITS OF ACCOMODATION
Captain General de la Torre position in Puerto Rico put him in an ideal position to deal with the Haitian Unification. Consequently, Martinique governor Count Donzelot relayed information to de la Torre that he learned from the French squadron returning from Santo Domingo. According to Donzelot, “the blacks of Santo Domingo occupied themselves in realizing the known project of inciting rebellion of the slaves of the Spanish government’s island.” The earlier threat to Puerto Rico de la Torre warned of came to fruition in Santo Domingo under the Haitian Unification. Donzelot received information stating how General Borgella, the leading Haitian officer in Santo Domingo, was gathering forces in Samaná to invade the island of Puerto Rico. The French governor was silent on his squadron’s act of aggression triggering the Haitian response to fortify their defenses. Neither the French nor the Spanish in the Caribbean had orders from their European superiors to attack. All Donzelot could do was to have French ships patrol the waters around Santo Domingo. Because of Puerto Rico’s proximity, Donzelot could relay more detailed information to de la Torre with the belief the Captain-General was in a better position to deal with the events on Santo Domingo.

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284 “Count Donzelot to Miguel de la Torre,” Martinique, 18 November 1823, AGI-Estado 19.85, 1.
286 “Count Donzelot to Miguel de la Torre,” Martinique, 18 November 1823, AGI-Estado 19.85, 1.
On 2 December 1823, Donzelot received his response from Spanish officials calling for cooperation and peace between both slave empires. As a sign of this potential alliance, Donzelot learned of Spanish preparations to send agents into Santo Domingo. By speaking to Dominican loyalist supporters on the island, the Spanish hoped to receive information regarding troops, supplies, and ships. Despite the assumptions of a Haitian threat, neither the French nor Spanish side could claim with confidence they knew Boyer’s true intentions especially after the skirmish in Samaná. Spanish officials sent ships to patrol the Mona Chanel, the body of water between Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico as they built up their defenses in Aguadilla and other areas on the western side of Puerto Rico in preparation for an attack. They suspected the Haitians may have been simply building up their defenses and consolidating their gains in Santo Domingo; however, the fear of retribution and its consequences was too great a risk for the Spanish to not prepare for the worse possible scenario and ally with the French.

Several days later the Spanish sent a former military captain of Santo Domingo Diego Lira to their former colony as a way to entice the French to their side. Lira sought to return to his former home to reach out to contacts over any news about the faithful and loyal Dominicans who still were there in Santo Domingo. He was from Savana-la-Mar, a town in the north that had been involved in making overtures to the French and Spanish to retake Santo Domingo and likely personally knew members of the opposition to the Haitian Unification. Captain General de la Torre kept close contact with his counterpart in Martinique while he awaited news of Lira’s mission in Santo Domingo.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{287}} \text{“Pedro Tomas de Cordova to Count Donzelot,” Puerto Rico, 2 December 1823, AGI-Estado 19.85, 4.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{288}} \text{“Pedro Tomas de Cordova to Count Donzelot,” Puerto Rico, 2 December 1823, AGI-Estado 19.85, 4.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{289}} \text{“Pedro Tomas de Cordova to Count Donzelot,” Puerto Rico, 2 December 1823, AGI-Estado 19.85, 4.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{290}} \text{“José Rivera to Western military commander,” Puerto Rico, 8 December 1823, AGI-Estado 19.85, 6.} \]
Donzelot warned de la Torre he did not see it in France’s best interests to involve themselves in Santo Domingo at that very moment. He saw the potential danger if the Spanish could not supply Dominican royalists with weapons to fight against Haitian forces; it would put them and their properties in danger. Donzelot counseled de la Torre to await orders from Paris and Madrid. He considered it more prudent to observe the state of affairs in Santo Domingo. Despite, personally involving themselves more in Santo Domingo, Donzelot took away a potential ally for the Spanish.

As a former Dominican official and royalist, Lira was an ideal candidate to send to Santo Domingo. He had existing contacts, which in theory, would make Lira’s job easier in assessing the strength of Haitian forces. By using Lira to report on the Unification, the Spanish illustrated their reliance on Dominican royalists’ earlier experiences in Santo Domingo. Arriving to Santo Domingo from Mayaguez in Puerto Rico, Lira was unable to contact any Dominican royalist until he came across a Julian de la Cruz, someone who was possibly a mahogany cutter. According to Lira, his informant told him that the Dominican population had become agitated with Boyer’s troops. Lira reported on each region’s troop strength manning the island’s defenses. The make-up of these armed forces included Haitians, *libertos*, and “Spaniards.” By offering these numbers for defense, Lira sought to convince his superiors of a potential Spanish victory. Still, the composition of the troops in Santo Domingo suggests Boyer trusted Dominicans to uphold Haitian sovereignty on the island. Lira’s efforts, however, were the result of his experiences serving the Spanish and living in Santo Domingo.

292 “Count Donzelot to Miguel de la Torre,” Fort Royal, 23 December 1823, AGI-Estado 19.85, 12.
293 “Count Donzelot to Miguel de la Torre,” Fort Royal, 23 December 1823, AGI-Estado 19.85, 12.
Lira’s report offered more information of the Haitian military in Santo Domingo that aimed to convince the Spanish to invade the island. Haitian troops in the interior towns such as Puerto Plata and La Vega had gone back to the western part of the island towards Port-au-Prince leaving Santo Domingo sparsely defended.\footnote{296 “Diego Lira to Miguel de la Torre,” Mayaguez, 24 December 1824, AGI-Estado 19.85, 14.} This observation disproved the theory of a possible Haitian invasion of Spanish Caribbean islands. Lira revealed a garrison of troops in Santo Domingo city supported by Haitians, \textit{libertos}, Dominican creoles, and “naturalized” Spaniards. This inspection indicates Haitian support was strongest in the areas of the west where pro-Haitian Dominicans had called for Boyer to enter. Santo Domingo City, as the former capital and stronghold of Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres’s independence movement, needed more forces. Lira perceived this reliance on Dominicans to defend Santo Domingo as Boyer’s potential weakness. The Dominican royalist officer saw others like him who would provide the support needed to defeat the Haitian forces who remained.\footnote{297 “Diego Lira to Miguel de la Torre,” Mayaguez, 24 December 1824, AGI-Estado 19.85, 14.} Lira underlined the great desire Dominican royalist had to overthrow Haitian rule. They would need extra Spanish troops for support and safety in case of another Haitian invasion.\footnote{298 “Diego Lira to Miguel de la Torre,” Mayaguez, 24 December 1824, AGI-Estado 19.85, 14.} By presenting Santo Domingo as vulnerable because of the weak Haitian defenses, Lira intended to get the Spanish involved to push the Haitians back west.

Lira’s observations of the Haitian military revealed a multi-racial force Boyer entrusted to defend the newly unified Haitian Republic on its eastern border. While the Haitian state weathered setbacks in the forms of insurrection, foreign spies, and foreign squadrons patrolling their waters, it also had several successes. Haitian forces mobilized quickly towards the foreign threat, contained signs of insurrection, and had a military
force Boyer theoretically trusted multi-racial force to ensure Haitian rule in Santo Domingo. The Haitian Republic had also succeeded in ending slavery and mediating most retribution between former slaves and masters.

De la Torre’s letter foreshadowed resistance from Dominican royalist on the island. What followed was a pro-Spanish Church inspired plot that sought to overthrow Haitian rule. In February 1824 Baltazar de Nova and cleric Pedro Gonzalez held one of a series of meetings in the town of Los Alcarrizos close to Santo Domingo City. It had the aim of overthrowing Boyer and the Haitian state’s rule in Santo Domingo. Pro-Haitian supporters revealed the plot’s the existence to overthrow Haitian rule and General Borgella, the leading Haitian officer in Santo Domingo. Haitian forces arrested Nova, Gonzalez, and others that they implicated as a part of this conspiracy. The Haitian government empaneled a court of Dominicans to put on trial this group of conspirators. Haitian authorities created a tribunal headed by Dominicans from a variety of professions such as lawyers, priests, and national guard members. The tribunal exiled some, jailed others, but saved the worse punishment for de Nova and Gonzalez. The Haitian state sentenced de Nova and Gonzalez to death for their role in the Alcarrizos conspiracy. Dominican royalist resistance provided evidence for de la Torre’s previous claims to Spanish officials.

Boyer followed these executions with several other laws that had the goal of integrating Santo Domingo within the Haitian Republic and strengthening its government. The Alcarrizos conspiracy could have inspired Boyer of the necessity to

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strengthen Haitian rule in Santo Domingo. These decrees included drafting young men sixteen to twenty-five in the gendarmerie or military police force and the prohibition of writing laws in Spanish. Dominican royalists now found themselves in a precarious situation, as pro-Haitian supporters of the unification became a part of the force used to keep Santo Domingo under Boyer’s rule. Despite the internal and external threats, the Haitian government continued integrating Santo Domingo and consolidating its rule under a single republic.

Several months after these events, Captain-General de la Torre found himself in Spain reporting on events in Santo Domingo to personally convince French and Spanish officials to help reclaim the former colony. While overseas, he corresponded with the French ambassador to Spain, seeking to convince France to offer its support in the Caribbean. De la Torre indicated Dominican royalists needed officers and a small number of troops in their struggle against the Haitian Republic. He underscored the Spanish would use the military support to push the Haitians back west, which was advantageous for the Spanish in the Caribbean. By specifying what Dominican royalist needed from the French and implying Spanish government support, de la Torre sought to convince the French ambassador to reach out to his government in Paris. De la Torre mentioned how he received news of Haitians and Dominicans arming themselves in Santo Domingo to take over the other islands in the Caribbean. He used this angle of fear to push the French ambassador to consider the threat to France’s possessions in the Caribbean.

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used his time in Spain to try to sway both Spanish and French officials to combat the Haitian Unification.

The French ambassador response to de la Torre’s request was similar to Count Donzelot’s in declining the Captain General. The ambassador had communicated with Donzelot prior. The governor of Martinique assured the ambassador of the expediency of this endeavor to convince him of the need to act soon.306 By agreeing with de la Torre Bon the danger of the Haitian Unification for colonial regimes in the Caribbean, Donzelot illustrated his perspective as a colonial official. Nonetheless, the French ambassador was only willing to take this news into consideration when relaying it to France. He was non-committal regarding French support to retake Santo Domingo from Boyer perhaps because of France’s separate negotiations with Haiti covered later in the dissertation.307 Captain General de la Torre’s effort did not convince the French of the urgency of weakening Haitian power and influence in the Caribbean as the ambassador declined him.

Dominican loyalist Fernandez de Castro traveled to the island of Hispaniola under the pretense of regaining properties he left in Santo Domingo. On 5 January 1824, he traveled to Cap-Haitien and made his way to Port-au-Prince to speak with Boyer.308 Fernandez de Castro’s presence in Haiti was as much an opportunity for Haitian officials as it was for the Dominican royalist to obtain more information. For instance, a suspicious Haitian officer questioned Fernandez de Castro about a possible French and Spanish alliance to attack the island. The Dominican royalist wisely feigned ignorance of this plan, perhaps not familiar with de la Torre’s communication with the French.

Fernandez de Castro’s visit to Port-au-Prince surprised Boyer who assumed he had fled permanently with other Spanish officials after Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres declared independence. It appears Santo Domingo’s former leader informed Boyer of those who fled previously. Fernandez de Castro’s return to Hispaniola to try and reclaim his property in Santo Domingo was a pretense to report more on events.

Boyer used this meeting as an opportunity to justify the Haitian Unification. The Haitian President explained his actions were in the best interests of all inhabitants and to secure his borders. Núñez de Cáceres’ regime threatened the peace of their “siblings of the same soil.” Boyer gave the impression he was thinking of the larger interests of those on the entire island. The regime he extinguished invited anarchy and had the potential to bring an unwanted foreign power. Boyer would have respected Spanish sovereignty in Santo Domingo and not entered east. The President presented his actions as a defense of Haitian sovereignty while wisely respecting Spain’s previous rule. There was no mention of pro-Haitian support among Dominicans or Núñez de Cáceres’s regime. By highlighting the Haitian government’s right to defend its sovereignty, Boyer offered a validation for the Unification.

Boyer gave Fernandez de Castro permission to seek out his former properties and keep them, likely suspected the Dominican royalist would report his findings back to his superiors. He prepared the Dominican royalist for some of the things he would see on his arrival to Santo Domingo by revealing the dissatisfaction among many “Spaniards” to which he had no control over. Boyer had to engage in certain measures in response to anti-Haitian sentiment. An example of these measures was the beheading of four

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Dominican royalists implicated in the Alcarrizos conspiracy. Boyer’s comment implied his concern with the foreign perception of his government and their treatment of Dominicans. Fernandez de Castro concluded these examples as the reasons for Dominican discontent under Haitian rule. This restlessness extended to the upper echelons of the Catholic Church as Haitian officials implicated archbishop Varela’s involvement in the earlier conspiracy. The spirit of unrest wrote Fernandez de Castro, “has penetrated the republic” and “animates the Spanish” as they sought to return under Fernando VII’s rule. Fernandez de Castro profited from Boyer’s benevolence by reporting his perspective of the Unification in Santo Domingo.

Fernandez de Castro spent time observing discussed Boyer’s troops’ while not necessarily on the Dominicans who supported them. He did not think it was sensible to disarm the Dominican population over such a vast amount of territory especially when considering the Haitian troops who were left to defend Santo Domingo. The Haitian military’s presence implied Santo Domingo was an occupied territory as opposed to one integrated with the Haitian state. The only troops the Haitians could deploy would be those coordinated towards Santo Domingo’s center in case of a foreign attack, forcing them to retreat. Despite the larger number of troops Boyer brought with him during his initial entrance into Santo Domingo, he left a smaller number of troops left to defend it. The public plan for the defense of a foreign invasion involved a retreat into the mountains where troops would fortify themselves. A first look at this discrepancy in the number of forces suggests Boyer’s rhetoric for wanting to defend Santo Domingo from anarchy and

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a foreign invasion did not reflect in practice, however, the presence of local troops in
Santo Domingo also hints at the Haitian President’s confidence of Dominican support.\footnote{316 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7.}

Fernandez de Castro’s observation offered information on Haitian troops but
underestimated Dominican support.

Fernandez de Castro’s detailed examination included his speculations of the cost
of having Haitian troops in Santo Domingo and its impact on Dominicans. With estimates
at 10,000 – 12,000 pesos monthly, he found that it would be harder to justify such a cost
if Santo Domingo was not contributing money to the Haitian treasury and land remained
uncultivated.\footnote{317 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7.} Without foreign recognition of Haitian independence and the threat of
invasion, all the republic’s resources needed to be devoted to its defenses. On top of these
costs, Fernandez de Castro noted Haitian officers charging up to a third more in taxes to
the population and remained unpopular among Dominicans.\footnote{318 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7.} For Fernandez de Castro,
the Haitian army alienated Dominicans and creating more enemies of Boyer’s regime
who continued to respect the officers even with some of their excesses. Although
Fernandez de Castro devoted considerable attention in his reports to Haitian military
strength, he was unable to provide the number of troops available to Boyer. The Haitian
President wisely did not make those figures available to Fernandez de Castro especially
given the ease the Dominican royalist could infiltrate Santo Domingo and take notes on
the political state of the island.\footnote{319 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7.} Fernandez de Castro found vulnerabilities within the
Haitian military by noting the army size declined since 1822 from death and desertion.\footnote{320 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7.}
His estimates provided Spanish officials with an idea of the costs and how it negatively impacted Santo Domingo.

Fernandez de Castro tried to balance what he observed versus what Boyer told him to uncover the Haitian President’s motives. The Dominican royalist concluded Boyer only fought to sustain Haitian independence and freedom something Fernandez de Castro claimed the Spanish never tried to go against with Haitians. Boyer’s reasoning for the Haitian Unification did not convince Fernandez de Castro and suggests he saw Haitian claims to Santo Domingo as invalid. The Spanish, wrote Fernandez de Castro, were “a nation of frank and religious character” with their dealings with Boyer. These were not in the same vein as the French where they had direct conflict with the Haitian Republic. Fernandez de Castro’s attempt to toggle between two conflicting versions had him conclude the Spanish were right while the Haitians were wrong.

Fernandez de Castro’s report on emancipation offered his assessment of its impact in Santo Domingo. In his earlier report, he believed Boyer would fight hard to defend emancipation in Santo Domingo. After traveling to Santo Domingo, Fernandez de Castro wrote, “truthfully it is not the personal liberty between them that is the subject of the question but general liberty or independence.” He found the Haitian government more concerned with preserving its right to sovereignty and autonomy over the personal liberties of its citizens. According to Fernandez de Castro, Boyer was losing money and resources in keeping Santo Domingo under his rule. For example, the Haitian state could not collect rent from land uninhabited or uncultivated. Fernandez de Castro believed Boyer could issue a claim towards Santo Domingo because of the resources that would be

provided for the state.\textsuperscript{324} The Dominican royalist considered Boyer could possibly negotiate a return of Santo Domingo as long as Spain would not give their colony to a foreign power.\textsuperscript{325} Fernandez de Castro’s report concluded the Haitian government’s commitment to emancipation was not as strong as he initially thought.

Fernandez de Castro believed Boyer could possibly regard holding on to Santo Domingo as a political liability. For the Dominican royalist, the Haitian Unification drained resources from the state and alienated the Dominican population. Even the properties Boyer sequestered required him to pay his military officers and others in Santo Domingo to keep control.\textsuperscript{326} Fernandez de Castro remarked, “even up until my exit on 15 April he [Boyer] has not reinforced [Santo Domingo] to defend it from outsiders.” The Dominican royalist report suggested to Spanish officials Santo Domingo was vulnerable and an ideal time to launch an attack.\textsuperscript{327} These events convinced Fernandez de Castro the Haitian state was willing to consider returning Santo Domingo to the Spanish without the need for hostilities. He suggests that Boyer realized he could defend Haitian sovereignty from its former borders in the west if the Spanish held possession of Santo Domingo.\textsuperscript{328} Fernandez de Castro was convinced that if Boyer saw Santo Domingo as a liability then it was likely for Spain to reobtain its former possession.

Spanish and French officials in the Caribbean enmeshed themselves within the Haitian Unification through reports they received from royalist agents. Dominican royalists sought a return to Spanish rule by presenting Santo Domingo as loyal to the Spanish Crown. While Donzelot could argue for prudence and observation, Puerto Rico’s

\begin{footnotes}
\item[324] Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7.
\item[325] Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7.
\item[326] Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7.
\item[327] Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7.
\item[328] Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7.
\end{footnotes}
proximity to Santo Domingo combined with royalist reports of Santo Domingo informed de la Torre’s decision to aid Dominican royalists to overthrow Haitian rule in Santo Domingo. Fernandez de Castro traveled to Santo Domingo and used his report in making a larger argument for Spanish intervention in Santo Domingo. What differed from his earlier report was the data he gathered from his own first-hand account which bolstered some of his claims while dismissing others. His report gave insight into conditions in Santo Domingo following the Alcarrizos conspiracy which highlighted Dominicans’ loyalty to the Spanish. By complementing this account with numbers and descriptions of Haitian forces in Santo Domingo, he sought to entice the Spanish towards the likelihood of success if officials in Madrid were to get involved and retake Santo Domingo. The Dominican royalist agenda to overthrow Haitian rule in Santo Domingo influenced Spanish and French Caribbean officials to focus their attention more on the Haitian Unification.

CONCLUSION
Writing about Dominican responses to Haitian justification for unification in 1826, the British Consul Charles Mackenzie noted “this view, however, is not adopted by the Spanish Haitians—all that could migrate, have done so—those that remained considered themselves whether white, brown, or black as effectively Spaniards, and the occupation of their territory as an act accomplished by fraud and violence.”329 His words offered a powerful rebuff to the Haitian Unification. This account along with other Anglo-American and Spanish reports and publications offer a clear narrative of difference between Haitians and Dominicans. Yet, these accounts do not discuss the

Haitian Unification’s success despite differences between Haitian and Dominican society brought about in part by divergences in development and colonial rule.

This chapter has argued that Dominican royalists presented Santo Domingo and its inhabitants as loyal to the Spanish because of the Haitian Unification’s first success. The royalist rhetoric of fidelity and Hispanic ties influenced Spanish and French officials in the Caribbean who sought to retake Santo Domingo from Haiti. Men such as Francisco Brenes and Felipe Fernandez de Castro combined their arguments of adhesion and Spanish ties with fear and warning for Spain’s commitment to slavery on its near-by islands. This view of Santo Domingo incorporated different racial groups of the Dominican population who had cultural affinities with the Spanish as opposed to the Haitians. This Dominica royalist rhetoric obscured the support Haitian rule had fostered and marginalized the earlier Spanish discontent contributing to Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres’ independence in 1821. Dominicans’ success in choosing the Haitian Republic as their form of independence resulted in this backlash.
CHAPTER 3: “THERE IS ALMOST NO PORTION OF THE SPIRITUAL EDIFICE THAT DOES NOT REPRESENT RUBBISH AND RUIN”; HAITI AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN SANTO DOMINGO, 1823 – 1833

On 28 June 1823, Bernardo Correa y Cidrón wrote to Santo Domingo Archbishop Pedro Varela y Jimenez about his mission to Port-au-Prince. Varela y Jimenez appointed Correa y Cidrón as his general vicar to the Artibonite department in the northwestern Haiti. He arrived the previous month in Port-au-Prince, the capital, noting how his voyage, “went well with my health, and it has in no way altered at this present time, thanks to God.” Varela y Jimenez previously sent clerics at the request of Haitian President Jean-Pierre Boyer before the Haitian Unification brought Haiti and Santo Domingo together in 1822. By sending priests to another part of the island, Varela y Jimenez asserted his spiritual authority over the island. He vested this authority in his representative, the vicar general. Correa y Cidrón’s arrival in Port-au-Prince may have been a formality for Boyer to acknowledge an earlier custom. After the cleric presented himself to Boyer, the Haitian President refused to acknowledge Correa y Cidrón’s appointment because the archbishop did not consider himself a Haitian citizen.

332 “Bernardo Correa y Cidrón to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Saint-Marc, 28 June 1823, AGN-José Gabriel García 4, 5, C29, Exp. 7, Doc. 7.
taking charge of his position, as the vicar general, Correa y Cidrón failed his mission as Boyer asserted his authority over Varela y Jimenez.

Beginning in 1822, Boyer and the Haitian state embarked on a series of reforms targeting institutions of Spanish colonial society including the Catholic Church. This secularization was part of a larger trend within the revolutionary Atlantic world where the state increasingly took control of the Church’s former responsibilities. The shift reflected the changes in sovereignty from empires to nation-states and obscures how Spanish and French governments previously started curtailing the Church’s influence in their colonies.  

For Dominican loyalists, a commitment to Catholicism became a cultural identity marker, contrasting sharply with Haitian secularism. This inheritance reflected Catholicism’s centrality to Hispanic culture taking shape during the Age of Revolutions. Later scholars have pointed to the relationship between the Church and Dominican national identity as a foundational element eventually resulting in Dominican independence from Haiti in 1844.  

The Haitian Republic’s Church reform also targeted ecclesiastical properties Boyer sought to redistribute to libertos or newly emancipated

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slaves. The Haitian government targeted the Church to transform it from a colonial to a national institution to suit its political needs.

This chapter examines the Haitian Church and land reform in Santo Domingo from 1822 – 1830. The study begins by asking how did Haitian reform impact the state’s relations with the Church in Santo Domingo? Next, how did Haitian state practices transform the relationship between the Dominican clergy and the government? Lastly, how did Haitian secularization impact Dominican parishioners in Santo Domingo? This chapter argues that Boyer’s land and secularization policies created an uneven power dynamic between the Haitian state, the Church, and local communities creating discord among all three groups, which served to undermine the Haitian Unification.

**CHURCH AGAINST STATE**

Varela y Jimenez had previously sent priests to serve in the western side of Hispaniola while Santo Domingo was still a Spanish colony. Haitian officials requested Varela y Jimenez send over priests after Boyer united the northern and southern parts of Haiti in 1820. After consulting with the Captain-General of Santo Domingo Sebastian Kindelan, Varela y Jimenez sent four priests to serve in Haiti. Kindelan later noted it, “was very convenient to reestablish the friendship and good harmony between the two governments.” Among the four priests was Juan Pichardo, an archdeacon, to serve as the vicar general. Varela y Jimenez’s initiative followed Boyer’s separate request to the Vatican for a bishop to serve in Haiti. Boyer would continue to allow the four priests to

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serve in Haiti, but Pichardo could not serve as the vicar general. By honoring Boyer’s request to send priests, Varela y Jimenez took the initiative as archbishop to serve the Haitian president.

In this instance, Boyer’s logic followed the chain of command instituted by the Vatican. He claimed to have reached out to the papacy to send a bishop to take charge of Haiti’s religious affairs. While undoubtedly surprised, even annoyed, Varela y Jimenez would not overstep his authority. The four clerics were to serve under the current vicar general of Haiti who Correa y Cidrón later noted, “was an intrusive priest.” The vicar general had previously worked with Boyer and could guarantee he would control the Spanish priests. This situation did not stop Pichardo from trying to claim his position as the vicar general. Pichardo ignored the reports and Varela y Jimenez’s orders to recall him to Santo Domingo. Varela y Jimenez saw Pichardo’s claim of Boyer sending a military party to arrest the archdeacon for his actions as a ruse to buy more time in Haiti. The archbishop bided his time until he gave Pichardo a final ultimatum: return to Santo Domingo or face suspension. By partially working within the system and dealing with the Vatican directly, Boyer asserted control of religious affairs to obtain more priests in Haiti.

The fallout from this incident resulted in a publicized attack on Varela y Jimenez’s character and intentions. Correa y Cidrón defended the archbishop, claiming he looked out for the Haitian people’s spiritual well-being. He noted how, “[Varela y Jimenez] had no other purpose than Christian Charity, and the desire to develop

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increasingly the friendship of the two governments.” Even though his actions were in
direct contrast to the Vatican’s, Varela y Jimenez still intended to reign in the obstinate
Pichardo. Correa y Cidrón’s writings reveal more about the vicar general’s responsibility
and offer an explanation behind Pichardo’s refusal to return. According to Correa y
Cidrón, the vicar general was not just in charge of ministering to their church area but the
entire district it encompassed. As the archbishop’s representative, Pichardo would assert
Varela y Jimenez’s influence in Haiti. This position was one Pichardo would not be so
keen to give up or Boyer to be so willing to allow. The Dominican public’s attack on
Varela y Jimenez’s actions stemmed from their belief that the archbishop’s schemed to
strengthen his own influence over the good of the larger religious community.

Two years later, Correa y Cidrón found himself in a similar situation as to
Pichardo. What was different was that the deposed vicar general found himself caught
between Boyer and Varela y Jimenez’s larger struggle. Correa y Cidrón believed the
disagreement stemmed from contrasting interpretations of the archbishop’s role in the
Haitian Republic. When he asked Boyer, what was impeding him from taking the vicar
general title, the Haitian President responded, “the archbishop is archbishop of [the island
of] Santo Domingo[;] Santo Domingo has been united and integrated with the republic of
Haiti[;] then the archbishop is archbishop and [a] citizen of Haiti.” Boyer insisted
Varela y Jimenez was a Haitian citizen and, as a result, under his authority as the Haitian
President. Boyer continued, “if he [Varela y Jimenez] is not archbishop and citizen of
Haiti, then under no circumstances can the archbishop pretend that the president of Haiti

342 “Bernardo Correa y Cidrón to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Saint-Marc, 28 June 1823, AGN-José Gabriel
García 4, 5, C29, Exp. 7, Doc. 7.
recognizes his delegates and vicars when he does not recognize himself as a member of this state.” If Varela y Jimenez would not recognize Boyer’s authority over Santo Domingo and its inhabitants, then the Haitian leader would not recognize the archbishop’s authority within the republic. The clashing interests trapped Correa y Cidrón between the premier secular and religious powers on the island.

From the defiant Varela y Jimenez’s point of view, he was still the Spanish king’s subject and the Pope’s. Varela y Jimenez previously offered his loyalty to Fernando VII, the Spanish king, since Santo Domingo’s first independence under José Núñez de Cáceres in December 1821. The archbishop would not submit himself to Boyer’s authority despite his rule over the entire island. Varela y Jimenez claimed ill-health to justify his inability to serve as Boyer’s archbishop and awaited a message from Rome to confirm both his resignation from his title and the news of his replacement. The archbishop used his resignation as a pretext to refuse a Haitian government salary noting it would be “indecent for a bishop who had renounced his bishopric to receive a salary.” Varela y Jimenez persisted in his stance to serve the papacy and not Boyer. But using illness to explain his resignation, the archbishop implicitly acknowledged Boyer’s sovereignty as President. Correa y Cidrón made no mention of Varela y Jimenez challenging Boyer’s right to offer clerics salaries. It implies Varela y Jimenez took Boyer’s claims seriously even if the archbishop still identified as a Spanish subject and under the Pope’s authority.

343 “Bernardo Correa y Cidrón to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Saint-Marc, 28 June 1823, AGN-José Gabriel García 4, 5, C29, Exp. 7, Doc. 7.
345 “Bernardo Correa y Cidrón to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Saint-Marc, 28 June 1823, AGN-José Gabriel García 4, 5, C29, Exp. 7, Doc. 7.
Boyer questioned Varela y Jimenez’s stance and attacked his inconsistency, using the archbishop’s appointment of Correa y Cidrón as vicar general as an example of Varela y Jimenez acting in his role. Boyer noted how Varela y Jimenez addressed his letter accompanying Correa y Cidrón as the “pastoral leader of the Haitian country, naming himself his pastor and prelude.”

From previous experience requesting priests from Varela y Jimenez, Boyer understood the archbishop’s actions to be an attack on the Haitian President’s sovereignty and authority. Even Correa y Cidrón was skeptical of the archbishop’s intentions and argument, openly questioning what would prevent Varela y Jimenez from accepting his role as the Haitian Republic’s archbishop. If he was Santo Domingo’s archbishop, which was a part of the Haitian Republic, then Varela y Jimenez was by default Haiti’s archbishop. Correa y Cidrón agreement with Boyer’s stance suggests the cleric engaged with republican politics and indirectly accepted the Haitian President’s sovereignty over the Church in Santo Domingo. Perhaps Correa y Cidrón sought accommodation with Boyer as the best way to hold on to his position just as Pichardo did two years prior. By questioning Varela y Jimenez’s stance, Boyer and Correa y Cidrón illustrate the archbishop’s consistency from the state’s perspective and how Church and state relations in Santo Domingo were more divisive.

Correa y Cidrón astutely couched his stance as for the Haitian Church’s benefit. According to Correa y Cidrón, the friction between the Haitian state’s premier political and spiritual powers disrupted the Church in Santo Domingo. He noted, “there is almost
no portion of the spiritual edifice that does not represent rubbish and ruin.”348 Varela y Jimenez and Boyer’s struggles of sovereignty weakened the Church. Correa y Cidrón chastised Varela y Jimenez for his refusal to accept a salary under the Haitian government. Varela y Jimenez’s stance and the Church’s ineffectiveness left it susceptible to the threats of “false and heretical” ministries.349 This quarrel impeded the two-premier secular and religious powers from uniting, and hindered the Haitian Church’s potential.

Correa y Cidrón’s loyalty to Boyer and the Haitian state over Varela y Jimenez had other causes besides the Haitian Church’s benefit. The cleric had previously experienced attacks on his integrity when Santo Domingo was a Spanish colony. Dominicans of this era questioned Correa y Cidrón’s loyalty and character to Santo Domingo’s Church when the colony was under French rule. Known by Dominicans for their secularism in comparison to the Spanish’s religiosity, Correa y Cidrón cooperated with the French. Consequently, he published a pamphlet in his defense, to tell his version of the truth to Dominicans.350 Haitian rule mirrored the previous French regime in that it forced Dominicans to choose sides that were not as dichotomous as religious and secular. Correa y Cidron’s backing of Boyer reflected this reality as he considered other factors including his own.

Correa y Cidrón perceived this conflict as a power struggle between Varela y Jimenez and Boyer. The archbishop attempted to preserve his autonomy against the

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348 “Bernardo Correa y Cidrón to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Saint-Marc, 28 June 1823, AGN-José Gabriel García 4, 5, C29, Exp. 7, Doc. 7.
349 “Bernardo Correa y Cidrón to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Saint-Marc, 28 June 1823, AGN-José Gabriel García 4, 5, C29, Exp. 7, Doc. 7.
350 Bernardo Correa y Cidrón, “Vindicacion de la Ciudadania y apología de la conducta politica del Dr. D. Bernardo Corréra y Cidron, natural de Santo Domingo de la Isla Española, escrita por él mismo, año de 1820,” Santo Domingo, 26 August 1820, AGN-José Gabriel Garcia, 4, 9, C37, Exp. 3, Doc. 2.
Haitian President’s right to regulate the Church within the republic’s borders. A papal bull appointed the archbishop to his station intending for Varela y Jimenez to serve the inhabitants of his particular authority. The pope’s right to appoint the bishop to his post was something Correa y Cidrón admitted not even Boyer could dispute. While Santo Domingo City was the seat of the archbishop, Haitian sovereignty determined Varela y Jimenez’s responsibility to serve the citizens of the entire island.\(^{351}\) The inhabitants of both sides of the island—whether Dominican or Haitians—were citizens of the Republic. In other words, Varela y Jimenez as a native and inhabitant of Santo Domingo was, in fact a Haitian citizen. The conflicting religious and secular authority shaped and limited the contours of Varela y Jimenez’s defense of autonomy and Boyer’s assertion of his rights.

The Haitian Unification changed Varela y Jimenez’s political reality and shaped his responses to Boyer. Varela y Jimenez understood himself to be under the Church’s and Spanish king’s sovereignty. The archbishop used his position to resist what he considered Boyer’s encroachment on his rights. For the defiant Varela y Jimenez, there was no accommodation or reconciliation between the two secular and religious powers on the island. This context also points to larger concerns over legitimacy, citizenship, and authority. Correa y Cidrón’s observations illustrate how Varela y Jimenez used his notions of loyalty, identity, and sovereignty to resist allegiance to Haitian rule and to protest Boyer’s regime. Haitian rule in Santo Domingo drew Varela y Jimenez closer to Church doctrine while defending the institution’s religious autonomy in the face of Boyer.

\(^{351}\) “Bernardo Correa y Cidrón to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Saint-Marc, 28 June 1823, AGN-José Gabriel García 4, 5, C29, Exp. 7, Doc. 7.
Varela y Jimenez continued in his position to serve as Haiti’s archbishop but without a permanent solution. The archbishop appointed José Salgado as the vicar general, which Boyer approved. Salgado’s control covered Port-au-Prince and the southern part of Haiti, suggesting Boyer did not perceive the new vicar general as a threat or Varela y Jimenez’s ally.\(^{352}\) Boyer’s gesture likely attempted to mend his relationship with Varela y Jimenez. Nonetheless, the archbishop left the other position of general vicar to serve in the northern part of Haiti vacant after Correa y Cidrón’s rejection. In response, Haitian Secretary-General Joseph Balthazar Inginac sent a priest first to London and then Rome to communicate with the papacy to reach a solution suitable to both parties. Both sides recognized the need for a solution.\(^{353}\) Varela y Jimenez could not continue as the archbishop with the situation as it was.

On 17 October 1824, Julio Maria de Somaglio, a Vatican representative, reached out to Boyer in attempts at a reconciliation. Speaking on the Vatican’s behalf, Maria de Somaglio noted how the Pope expressed “sweet satisfaction” to know Boyer’s “passionate and burning desire” for their “holy religion in the middle of the numerous faithful that compose the island of Haiti.”\(^{354}\) Maria de Somaglio presented the Pope and Boyer’s desires as the same: restoration of religion for Hispaniola’s inhabitants. The Church official used this mutual point of interest to stress the importance to Boyer of

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\(^{354}\) “Julio Maria de Somaglio to Jean-Pierre Boyer,” printed in *Le Telegraphe*, Port-au-Prince, 17 October 1824, AGN-José Gabriel García, 4, 1, C15, Exp. 2, Doc. 5; and Greene, *Catholic Church in Haiti*, 87.
restoring communication between the Vatican and Varela y Jimenez.\textsuperscript{355} This was the first step in Maria de Somaglio’s bid for peace between Boyer and the Church.

One part of this solution required the Church reign in Varela y Jimenez if he would not follow Boyer. Maria de Somaglio sought to limit the archbishop’s authority over the entire island by using the pretext of Varela y Jimenez’s inability to serve its inhabitants when in reality it was because of a disagreement over the archbishop’s responsibilities. This ploy also enabled Maria de Somaglio to ask Boyer to allow for more priests to minister to the island. He noted, how “the [western] part of Haiti that had been kept in private from legitimate ministers” to attend to what was necessary for the religion.\textsuperscript{356} The new priests would aid with evangelizing the island and instruct Haitians and Dominicans on their religion. With the Church’s presence in the Haitian Republic, the “numerous faithful” of the island would be adequately served and instructed in their faith.\textsuperscript{357} This move also served as a way for the Vatican to lessen Varela y Jimenez’s influence as it attempted to reconcile with the Haitian government.

María de Somaglio and the Church continued appealing for Boyer’s favor by emphasizing that none of the missions would be successful without his “pious efforts.” Through the avenue of religion, order and peace among families and the government would be at hand under the spiritual leadership of the church in the Haitian Republic.\textsuperscript{358}

For Boyer, this correspondence signaled a victory over Varela y Jimenez. By publishing this account in the Haitian newspaper \textit{Le Telegraphe}, the Haitian government conveyed

\textsuperscript{355} “Julio María de Somaglio to Jean-Pierre Boyer,” printed in \textit{Le Telegraphe}, Port-au-Prince, 17 October 1824, AGN-José Gabriel García, 4, 1, C15, Exp. 2, Doc. 5.
\textsuperscript{356} “Julio María de Somaglio to Jean-Pierre Boyer,” printed in \textit{Le Telegraphe}, Port-au-Prince, 17 October 1824, AGN-José Gabriel García, 4, 1, C15, Exp. 2, Doc. 5.
\textsuperscript{357} “Julio María de Somaglio to Jean-Pierre Boyer,” printed in \textit{Le Telegraphe}, Port-au-Prince, 17 October 1824, AGN-José Gabriel García, 4, 1, C15, Exp. 2, Doc. 5.
\textsuperscript{358} “Julio María de Somaglio to Jean-Pierre Boyer,” printed in \textit{Le Telegraphe}, Port-au-Prince, 17 October 1824, AGN-José Gabriel García, 4, 1, C15, Exp. 2, Doc. 5.
papal support of its rule in Santo Domingo. It also suggested a dual effort to curb Varela y Jimenez’s influence on the island. The Vatican’s overtures represented a formal gesture on the pope’s behalf; it did not, however, result in a new diplomatic relationship between the papacy and Haitian government. By 1830, Varela y Jimenez fled Santo Domingo for Cuba, claiming the Haitian government plot to end his life. Maria de Somaglio’s attempts to entice Boyer highlights how the Haitian President’s cooperation would determine the Church’s success on the island.

The earlier dealings between Varela y Jimenez and Boyer informed their understandings of their roles as Archbishop and President. Varela y Jimenez would not directly overstep a decision or action decided by the Vatican, but would assert his sovereignty and interpretations of his position as archbishop. Boyer sought to curb clerics’ influences in Haiti who he could not control, especially if the Church stationed them so close to Port-au-Prince. Haitian reform created what one scholar refers to as a “church subordination to the state model.” Boyer asserted his sovereignty in the Haitian Republic at the expense of marginalizing Varela y Jimenez and the church like other nation-states did in Latin America. By acknowledging Boyer’s stance and importance to the future of the Church in the Haitian Republic, Correa y Cidrón and Maria de Somaglio engaged in republican politics to curry the Haitian leader’s favor. Haitian rule impacted the state’s relationship with the Church by forcing religious officials to accept Boyer’s rule as the final authority on the island, attacking their religious autonomy.

359 “Julio María de Somaglio to Jean-Pierre Boyer,” printed in Le Telegraphe, Port-au-Prince, 17 October 1824, AGN-José Gabriel García, 4, 1, C15, Exp. 2, Doc. 5.
360 Moya Pons, La manual historia dominicana, 246.
As Boyer dealt with Varela y Jimenez and the Vatican, he commissioned a study into which land the Haitian state could redistribute to *libertos* or the newly emancipated enslaved people. This committee included General Jérôme Maximilien Borgella, the leading Haitian officer in Santo Domingo, six Dominicans, and an invited group of administrators from various towns on the western side of the island. Several months later the committee recommended for the Haitian government to sequester property within these criteria: Property belonging to the former Spanish and French governments; ecclesiastical lands such as convents, Dominican loyalists’ properties who immigrated; the capellanías or chantries that had fallen into the power of the archbishop that he and the clergy now abused; and mortgages that were in the Santo Domingo Cathedral’s favor. It was telling that a committee made up of Dominicans concluded these were the best properties for Boyer to redistribute to Santo Domingo’s newly emancipated.

Dominicans of European descent worried about the consequences of Haitian land reform in Santo Domingo. Article 12 of the 1816 Haitian Constitution prevented whites from owning property in the Haitian Republic leaving Santo Domingo’s property-owning elite vulnerable to possible land expropriation. Boyer quelled their concerns, assuring them the Haitian state recognized them as citizens. They would not have to worry about the state appropriating their property. Boyer noted, “I have declared from my proclamation on the 9 February 1822, that the Haitian citizens formed the same family

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and the same government.” Boyer’s paternally looked at Dominicans as Haitians and members of the same family. Contrary to the reports of Dominican royalists, Haitian citizenship extended protection to Dominicans. Boyer wrote to a Haitian official in the Dominican city Puerto Plata to reassure him Dominicans in the vicinity would have their property protected as well. For Boyer, Dominicans need not worry about retaining or purchasing land as Haitian land reforms would not target them because they were citizens of the republic.

Before the unification, the Church was one of the largest landowners in the former Spanish colony. One of the most effective ways the Church obtained its property was through the process of capellanías. A capellanía or chantry was a contract stipulating the terms of an ecclesiastical endowment between Spanish families and the Church. These contracts called for people to commit their properties to specific parishes and priests. In return for this donation, the Church agreed to perform religious services and funerals for the souls of the families and descendants. Dominicans assigned these properties to a family member who managed the assets while the priest who performed mass as a personal chaplain to the family of the land in question.

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away then the archbishop of Santo Domingo would obtain the land. Over time this method enabled the Church in Santo Domingo, now under Varela y Jimenez, to obtain significant holdings, however, the total amount held is uncertain. The committee noted the *capellanías* “from their great age or prescription had fallen into the power and gain of the archbishop and had been donated for the use of the rent of priests who had died or were absent.”

*The capellanía system and land under the Church’s control made the institution a target for Boyer’s reforms.*

The situation in Santo Domingo was untenable for the Haitian Unification’s success. Besides the Church, Dominican and Spanish elites had also obtained land through the informal practice of *communeros de terenos*. This custom entailed Dominicans who claimed ownership of the land through their presence and cultivation as opposed to land titles that did not necessarily correlate with the person inhabiting the land. One scholar estimates 5% of the Dominican population owned most of the land in Santo Domingo. So while Boyer could reassure the Dominican landowning elite of their right to hold land, nothing could prevent him from limiting the land size and obtaining more. The Haitian state also had to consider the consequences for obtaining Church property. Varela y Jimenez proved to be a staunch critic of the regime and Dominican official Felipe Fernandez de Castro noted in his travels to the island Haitian officials implicated the archbishop in the Alcarrizos conspiracy discussed earlier.

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369 José Gabriel García, *Obras Completas Volumen 1: Compendido de la Historia de Santo Domingo Tomos I y II* (Santo Domingo: Archivo General de la Nación Equipo Editorial, 2016), 362 – 364; and Moya Pons, “Land Question in Haiti,” 209. There is also a possibility that the Church did not have full control of the *capellanías* that were in the hands of the local clergy, Lockhart & Schwartz, *Early Latin America*, 154.

370 Moya Pons, “Land Question in Haiti.


372 There is not a consensus as to whether Varela y Jimenez was directly involved with pro-Spanish sentiment against Haitian rule. In his trip to Santo Domingo in 1824, Felipe Fernandez de Castro referenced
current land tenure system benefited Dominican elites but prevented the Haitian state from carrying out reform it had already put into place on the Haitian side of the island.

On 8 July 1824, the Haitian state passed a law to move forward with larger land reform in Santo Domingo in the spirit of the committee’s recommendation. The law was consistent with Boyer’s understanding of nationhood where “for the Haitian social pact, the property law was inseparable from the quality of citizen.” The new law entitled all Dominicans to ownership of land with a set minimum of 15.5 acres.373 The Haitian government rewarded libertos and other pro-Haitian supporters. This new law also came with a series of stipulations meant to coerce Dominicans to work and to assure proper landownership in Santo Domingo. First, the law required those with ownership of land to assure its cultivation to keep Dominicans within a similar land-tenure system as on the western side of the island. Next, the Haitian state called for land owners to provide proof of ownership to their property to obtain a title given by the government.374 The informal land tenure system in Santo Domingo enabled Dominicans to obtain ownership of land through cultivation and without the need for former land titles. The 1824 law prevented Dominicans without proof of ownership from keeping the land, which in theory they cultivated prior. Dominican historians differ in their assessment of land reform and labor codes during the Unification. Scholars differ on the law’s impact with one highlights how

the archbishop and other clerics implicated but does not mention where he learned of this information, “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Minsty,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, Archivo General de Indias-Estado Santo Domingo, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Luisiana y Florida 4.7 (hereafter cited as AGI-Estado). In his nineteenth-century work on Dominican history, José Gabriel García also stresses that the archbishop was involved in this conspiracy, Obras Completas, 362 – 364. While Thomas Maidou does not make the same connection that Fernandez de Castro and Gabriel García to the archbishop to this conspiracy, it is rather telling that the Haitian historian referred to this incident as the Ximenes conspiracy, Histoire d’Haiti, 395-396.
the law alienated different segments of the population, alienating them. Still, a reginal study of emancipation in the eastern province in Higüey points to the state’s absence in which *libertos* continued to work the land.\footnote{Quisqeya Lora Hugi, *Transcición de la esclavitud al trabajo libre en Santo Domingo: El caso de Higüey (1822 – 1827)* (Santo Domingo: Academia Dominicana de Historia, 2012); and Moya Pons, *La dominación haitiana*, and “The Land Question.”} The 1824 law was an important step for Boyer to realize his vision for the newly emancipated in Santo Domingo.

The Haitian state now could begin in earnest to appropriate land from the Church in Santo Domingo. The Haitian government targeted religious convents, monastery hospitals, and properties from other ecclesiastical organizations. The Haitian state felt justified in seizing land it associated with belonging to the former Spanish and French regimes. These properties legally became a part of the Haitian government.\footnote{Maidou, *Histoire d’Haiti*, 403.} Even if Church officials could find a way around this interpretation, they still had to face the possibility of not having the proper land titles to demonstrate ownership for the Haitian state. Boyer recognized clerics could perceive the 1824 law as an attack on the Church and its spiritual functions. The Haitian President assured Dominicans he would respect the clergy’s spiritual place in society and their ministry they conducted in Santo Domingo. The Church under Boyer’s rule received preference over other denominations. This denomination was one of many religions within the island nation competing with Protestantism, vodu, and fraternal organizations such as freemasonry for influence. The Church had preferential treatment within the 1816 Haitian Constitution and Boyer sought to maintain its position within the Haitian Republic.\footnote{Greene, *Catholic Church in Haiti*, p. 85; Leslie Griffiths, *History of Methodism in Haiti* (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie Méthodiste, 1991); *Recueil Général IV*, 135; and “1816 Constitución.”} Under the 1824 law, the Haitian state was to provide monthly salaries for priests making them the government’s
dependents. This act asserted Boyer’s supremacy as the head of the Church in the Haitian Republic justifying his ownership of its land resources in Santo Domingo.\footnote{Linstat, \textit{Recueil Général} IV, 138.} Because of the 1824 law, Santo Domingo’s Church and clergy would no longer rely on the property they appropriated or count on support from the Vatican in Rome. The Haitian nationalization of the Church placed clerics’ salaries under state authority.\footnote{“Actos del Gobierno Haitiano,” in \textit{Invasiones haitianas 1801, 1805 y 1822} ed. by Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi (Ciudad de Trujillo [Santo Domingo]: Editoria del Caribe, 1955), 310 – 311.} One scholar notes how early Haitian rulers inherited an anti-clerical position from the French Revolution while the Republic was a French colony. By the time of Boyer’s presidency in 1816, the Church had official state protection but with limited authority and control over its operations.\footnote{Green, \textit{Catholic Church in Haiti}, 80 – 86.} Without more direct evidence it is likely other influences shaped Boyer’s perspective. The Church in the eastern part of the island now mirrored its counterpart in the west but, some Catholic Dominicans regarded the reforms and changes as a foreign imposition.

The Church drew their numbers for secular priests from the Spanish families living in the colonies with one scholar concluding by 1827 the number of the clergy found in Santo Domingo was 67, more than half born in Santo Domingo. These figures suggest many priests affected by the Haitian state’s secularization reform had local ties.\footnote{Emelio Betances, \textit{The Catholic Church and Power Politics in Latin America: The Dominican Case in Comparative Perspective} (Lanham: MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 25. In Spanish America, the colonial clergy drew their ranks from those locally born. If more than half of the clergy in Santo Domingo were locally born then it is a strong possibility that many were not a part of a specific order, Lockhart and Schwartz, \textit{Early Latin America}, 154.} Among the secular priests found in Latin America were the secular clergy known as the \textit{vicarios}. They were assistant pastors to the parish priests who the Spanish Crown appointed to meet the growing need of understaffed parishes in the Americas. Because
conditions kept vicarios within a specific parish, their observations and collections of documents serve as a lens to analyze the Haitian reforms’ impact on the Dominican clergy.\textsuperscript{382} By examining the impact of the 1824 law through priest correspondences, one can measure the effect of Haitian Church reform within the context and history shaping Santo Domingo’s priests.

José Eugenio Espinosa, a vicario, provides one example of how clerics had to adapt to the new Haitian reforms. On 16 March 1826, Espinosa wrote to the archbishopric office regarding a property donation no longer assuming the Church would automatically inherit this land.\textsuperscript{383} José Joaquin Delmonte y Maldonado, a member of the former land commission appointed by Boyer, granted the Church a part of his estate as a donation.\textsuperscript{384} Espinosa did not reveal the size or the value of Delmonte y Maldonado’s land grant to the Church. The vicario worked with the parish’s fiscal or lay assistant who together figured out the donation would not be enough to support the Church in the city of Santiago de los Caballeros. Espinosa observed the church and parish would need “no more than 5,000 pesos.”\textsuperscript{385} The vicario’s assessment of the donation concerning the Church’s function and survival offered a new reality he confronted.

Further reports from Espinosa to Varela y Jimenez convey examples of this law in practice. In this instance, the Haitian state was successful in limiting the size of land

\textsuperscript{383} “José Eugenio Espinosa to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Santiago de los Caballeros, 16 March 1826, Archivo Histórico del Arzobispado de Santo Domingo-Vicaría del Clero (hereafter cited as AHASD-Vicaría del Clero), Estante 1 Anaquel 79 Caja 1 No 19.
\textsuperscript{384} “José Eugenio Espinosa to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Santiago de los Caballeros, 16 March 1826,” AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1 Anaquel 79 Caja 1 No 19; and “Actos del Gobierno Haitiano,” 309.
\textsuperscript{385} The fiscal served the parish priest as his constable who made sure that the laity fulfilled their religious obligations and paid their clerical fees, Taylor, \textit{Magistrates of the Sacred}, 325. “José Eugenio Espinosa to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Santiago de los Caballeros, 16 March 1826,” AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1 Anaquel 79 Caja 1 No 19.
donations the Church abused previously. Espinosa revealed the need for all mortgages and land transactions to have the proper land titles for the Haitian government to confirm the new transactions. Other historians have questioned the extent of the Haitian state reforms in a direct challenge to older scholarly interpretations, overstating the Haitian laws’ impact. Espinosa’s letter suggests some semblance of the Haitian government’s presence in Santiago to regulate land transactions. Espinosa also highlights that the proper land titles entitled priest to lifelong salaries living on the land. In theory, Boyer lived up to his declaration within the law where he did not seek to disrupt the spiritual works of priests by continuing to provide them an income. It implies a nuanced view of the Haitian President’s anti-cleric bent, that was more politically consistent and institutional than religious.

This system of land tenure came with stipulations meant to regulate the clergy living on the land. Espinosa explained how Delmonte y Maldonado would be both the administrator of the land grant to the Church and the one to manage priests’ salaries living on the property. By delegating this responsibility to Delmonte y Maldonado, the Haitian government shifted the responsibility to implement this law to local officials. If Delmonte y Maldonado died, the priests living on the land would continue to receive

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386 “José Eugenio Espinosa to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Santiago de los Caballeros, 16 March 1826,” AHASD-Vicarió del Clero Estante 1 Anaquel 79 Caja 1 No 19.
387 For works that reveal the lesser impact of Haitian laws in respect to their economic impact see Lora Hugi, Transición de la esclavitud; and Anne Eller, We Dream Together: Dominican Independence and the Fight for Caribbean Freedom (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), Ch. 1. For an assessment on the legal ramifications for Haitian reforms in Santo Domingo see Charles Venator Santiago, “Race, Nation-Building and Legal Transculturation during the Haitian Unification Period (1822-1844): Towards a Haitian Perspective in Florida Journal of International Law Vol. 16 (September 2004), 667 – 676.
388 “José Eugenio Espinosa to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Santiago de los Caballeros, 16 March 1826,” AHASD-Vicarió del Clero Estante 1 Anaquel 79 Caja 1 No 19. While it is not certain how much priests in Santiago were entitled to under the 1824 law article 10, the government allowed priests associated with the Cathedral of Santo Domingo 600 gourdes, Maidou, Histoire d’Haiti, 403.
389 “José Eugenio Espinosa to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Santiago de los Caballeros, 16 March 1826,” AHASD-Vicarió del Clero Estante 1 Anaquel 79 Caja 1 No 19.
their salaries and remain on the property. The Haitian state effectively made the clerics its
dependents and legally assured their protection. Espinosa noted how the Haitian state’s
salaries came to “those of the capacity to engage with the land” and to maximize the
output. The Haitian government expected its citizens to serve as soldiers and cultivators;
they did not exempt the clergy from such expectations. Espinosa pleaded with Varela y
Jimenez to help him obtain titles to the estates under their control to help the other clerics
in Santiago. Without the titles, the priests would not meet the requirements to remain
on the property under the new land tenure system.

José Salgado communicated with Varela y Jimenez regarding the Haitian
Church’s need for priests. Boyer wrote to Varela y Jimenez and others religious officials
regarding “three youths who aspired to the priesthood.” The Haitian President was
interested in the clergy keeping him informed of any aspirants to the priesthood.
Salgado noted how Boyer wanted Varela y Jimenez to use his influence and the appeal of
the state stipends to attract more candidates. “[Boyer] had found that the assignment of
the stipend that he wants to give was not against any of the laws of the republic.” The
Haitian President’s response alluded to the law change and suggested the disagreement
between Boyer and Varela y Jimenez persisted. As Haitian sovereign and head of the
Church in Haiti, Boyer provided the clergy with salaries; however, he needed Varela y
Jimenez’s help to recruit more priests. To convince Varela y Jimenez, Boyer suggested it

390 “José Eugenio Espinosa to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Santiago de los Caballeros, 16 March 1826,”
AHASD-Vicario del Clero Estante 1 Anaquel 79 Caja 1 No 19.
391 “José Eugenio Espinosa to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Santiago de los Caballeros, 16 March 1826,”
AHASD-Vicario del Clero Estante 1 Anaquel 79 Caja 1 No 19.
392 “José Salgado to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Port-au-Prince, 16 March 1826,” AHASD-Vicario del Clero,
Estante 1, Anaquel 79, Caja 1, No 19.
was not a problem for Protestants to accept the state-sponsored salary. Given the
earlier disagreement between the two parties, it is likely Varela y Jimenez was not
helping Boyer to seek new priests. The earlier impasse between Boyer and Varela y
Jimenez persisted in such a way that it affected the recruitment of priests to serve in the
Haitian Republic.

Boyer’s sought to enlist the support of the Dominican clergy because they
oversaw “the direction of spiritual exercises” for the new clergy. Negotiations between
the Vatican and Haitian state stalled, preventing Boyer from obtaining new clerics. The
new priests were to not only to learn the ceremonies of the mass but also “secret prayers”
that went along with them. The experienced priests accompanied new clerics to celebrate
mass for the first eight days before they could serve on their own. The Haitian state could
not train its own priests and therefore needed the support of the existing clergy. There
were limits to Boyer’s power and he needed the existing clergy to recruit and train new
priests.

For practical reasons, Boyer needed the priests to serve in the “empty churches of
the republic.” The President intended for the Haitian Church to train native and foreign
applicants to the clergy. He hinted at wanting these priests to serve in Port-au-Prince.
Boyer wanted new clergy to replace the existing ones on the western side of the island
who led “scandalous” lives and found it necessary for the Church as “the religion of the
faithful.” Without a fresh clergy to replace the old, the Church in the Haitian Republic

393 “José Salgado to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Port-au-Prince, 16 March 1826,” AHASD-Vicario del Clero,
Estante 1, Anaquel 79, Caja 1, No 19.
394 “Gabriel Sánchez Cabrera to Pedro Varela,” Santo Domingo, 23 January 1823, AHASD-Vicaría del
Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 81, Caja 4, No. 10.
395 “José Salgado to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Port-au-Prince, 16 March 1826,” AHASD-Vicario del Clero
Estante 1 Anaquel 79 Caja 1 No 19.
would go into further disarray. A traveler to the island commenting on the state of the Church and priesthood noting how the training of an effective native priesthood would “give moral and intellectual elevation to the national character, and secure a permanence and solidity to the institutions of the government.” Perhaps this observation was not lost on Boyer whose larger state project included a stable Church within his borders. This national church could not be accomplished without the help of the existing clergy. For different reasons Boyer needed well-trained and moral priests serving for the Haitian Church.

Two years later, Silvestre Nuñez Fernández sought financial support from Varela y Jimenez and the archbishopric office. Nuñez Fernández noted how it was “impossible for the ordained [priest] to obtain their benefits simply from capellanías.” His observation suggests Boyer’s land reforms were successful in La Vega’s parish and eliminated priests’ previous arrangements. Nuñez Fernández needed support for the other religious orders referring to “four minor orders and three larger ones.” Unfortunately, he offers no further information about the specific orders or the amount of property the Dominican clergy had in La Vega. Nuñez Fernández’s comments suggest La Vega’s parish’s material conditions could not support the priests. Instead he reports on the new capellanías’ inadequacy. Priests living on capellanías celebrated mass and especially anniversary services for the deceased. The restrictions on land titles the 1824

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396 “José Salgado to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Port-au-Prince, 16 March 1826,” AHASD-Vicarió del Clero Estante 1 Anaquel 79 Caja 1 No 19.
398 “Silvestre Nuñez Fernández to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” La Vega, 29 April 1828, AHASD-Vícaria del Clero, Estante 1, Anaquel 80, Caja 4, No. 17.
399 “Silvestre Nuñez Fernández to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” La Vega, 29 April 1828, AHASD-Vícaria del Clero, Estante 1, Anaquel 80, Caja 4, No. 17.
law imposed would make it more difficult for several priests to continue living on *capellanías*, which is why Nuñez Fernández requested help from Varela y Jimenez.  

The Church and clergy of Santo Domingo became more tied financially to the Haitian government. Espinosa and Nuñez Fernández’s correspondences outline how clerics adjusted to Haitian land reform. Espinosa and other priests were accustomed to a certain life style, supported by the *capellanías*. After the 1824 law went into effect the secular clergy could no longer be self-sufficient. Boyer’s requirement for proper land titles targeted the Church’s practice of collecting expired *capellanías*. In its place was a salary the Haitian state provided to compensate for the loss of ecclesiastical properties. Priests’ involvement in land cultivation illustrated to one of Boyer’s requirements for citizenship. Nuñez Fernández’s pleas for help highlights the negative impact of the 1824 law on the Church in Santo Domingo. No longer could the Church expect to be self-sufficient from land donations. The clerics inability to support themselves indicates the Haitian state’s success in appropriating and nationalizing Church lands and making them dependent on new forms of material support to perform their services. In these instances, priests struggled to adapt their material conditions to their new reality as state employees.

The 1824 law altered the dynamics between the Haitian State and the Church by making both institutions interconnected. By targeting the Church’s practices of collecting expired *capellanías* and providing the secular clergy a salary, religious officials became more financially tied to the Haitian government. The requirements for land cultivation legally placed priests under direct state control. The Church retained control over spiritual matters because of the absence of formal diplomatic relations with the Vatican. This situation forced Boyer to rely on Varela y Jimenez and the other clerics for the

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400 Taylor, *Magistrates of the Sacred*, 78.
recruitment and training of native priests for the Haitian Church. With the previous disagreements over sovereignty and autonomy between Boyer and Varela y Jimenez there were limits to the level of cooperation between the Church and Haitian state. Haitian state practices transformed the relationship between the Dominican clergy and government by making them state employees at the expense of Boyer ceding religious control.

PARISHONERS AND PRIESTS

On 14 August 1827, Dominicans from the town of Moca in the northern part of Santo Domingo submitted a petition to Varela y Jimenez. They requested the archbishop send a priest because their former cleric abandoned them. The petitioners argued for the need of a priest to perform sacraments such as Communion or Penance citing the long distance between Moca and the cities of Santiago de los Caballeros and La Vega. They noted that they still maintained Christian services to the best of their ability. The petitioners requested Gabriel Sánchez Cabrera, a cleric they were familiar with. Their request and familiarity with Sánchez Cabrera suggests he was a vicario who may have spent time in Moca. The petitioners noted if Sánchez Cabrera would be their priest they would not “work harder than his own efforts for the holy church.” They continued that they were “so grateful that we cannot desire his absence only when God is served to take

401 “Town of Our Lady of Rosario of Moca’s Residents to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Moca, 14 August 1827, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 81, Caja 4, No. 10.
402 Vicarios spent up to a year or less in a area before they moved on. Until they were to receive promotions from authorities in the cathedral city they would continue in their position, Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred, 118. “Town of Our Lady of Rosario of Moca’s Residents to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Moca, 14 August 1827, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 81, Caja 4, No. 10.
403 “Town of Our Lady of Rosario of Moca’s Residents to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Moca, 14 August 1827, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 81, Caja 4, No. 10.
The Mocano inhabitants used the absence of a regular priest to justify their petition for Sánchez Cabrera to serve the town.

The Mocanos used both official support and their earlier relationship with Sánchez Cabrera to make their argument. They emphasized the priest’s impact on their “figurative hearts,” that another cleric could not replace. Among the Mocanos who signed their petition included the town’s official military officer Captain Agustin Sicard, his administrative assistant Manuel Angeles, as well as “the majority of the inhabitants.” Sicard supported the Mocanos’ requests for Sánchez Cabrera and vouched for the cleric’s conduct making him suitable to serve in Moca. Sicard even referred to Sánchez Cabrera as “our priest” stressing his commitment to having Varela y Jimenez to appoint this cleric. The officer’s petition offered support and legitimized the Mocanos’ request. Sicard ended his request by petitioning for Varela y Jimenez not to send any other priest other than Sánchez Cabrera. The Church may have licensed Sánchez Cabrera to offer sacraments to parishioners making him even more desirable. By using Sicard’s appeal with their own, the Mocanos had a stronger argument to justify their petition for Sánchez Cabrera.

Clerics also interceded on behalf of their parishioners in their request to the archbishop. On 8 May 1829, José Eugenio Espinosa requested for permission and funds

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404 “Town of Our Lady of Rosario of Moca’s Residents to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Moca, 14 August 1827, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 81, Caja 4, No. 10.
405 “Town of Our Lady of Rosario of Moca’s Residents to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Moca, 14 August 1827, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 81, Caja 4, No. 10.
406 “Agustín Sicard to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Moca, 14 August 1827, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 81, Caja 4, No. 10.
407 Despite being ordained many priest did not administer sacraments or sit for confession. Those priests who the Church licensed to administer sacraments were those tied to capellanías, Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred, 78. “Agustín Sicard to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Moca, 14 August 1827, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 81, Caja 4, No. 10.
to rebuild a chapel for the town of San José de las Matas. The town’s proximity to the city of Santiago explains why Espinosa petitioned on San José de las Matas’ behalf. In his report, Espinosa blamed the “indigenous” for burning down the old chapel where the Matenses previously worshiped. By offering money to rebuild the chapel, San José de las Matas’ inhabitants would have a place to receive sacraments. Like in Moca, Dominicans in San José de las Matas cited the difficulty in traveling to other towns to receive sacraments. These instances of celebration and worship provided parishioners with opportunities to create new kinship bonds and reinforced old ones. Parishioners in San José de las Matas would be rebuilding an important part of their community. Espinosa served as an interlocutor for Dominicans in San José de las Matas to Varela y Jimenez in Santo Domingo City.

Other Dominican parishioners from San José de las Matas followed Espinoza’s illustrating they did not rely solely on the cleric to express their needs. Francisco Estevez emphasized the difficulty of worshiping at another place. Estevez framed the issue as long-standing by highlighting the thirty years since they last heard mass in the vicinity. San José de la Matas’ location required Dominicans either to travel to other places such as La Vega to receive sacraments or to have priests ministering to them. Like Espinosa message, Estevez’s account insinuates the Matenses shaped the message of their clerics

408 “José Eugenio Espinosa to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” San José de las Matas, 9 May 1829, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 79, Caja 1, No. 19.
409 “José Eugenio Espinosa to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” San José de las Matas, 9 May 1829, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 79, Caja 1, No. 19.
410 “José Eugenio Espinosa to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” San José de las Matas, 8 May 1829, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 79, Caja 1, No. 19.
411 “Francisco Estevez to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” San José de las Matas, 8 May 1829, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 79, Caja 1, No. 19; Lockhart & Schwartz, Early Latin America, 15.
even as they supplemented it with their own petitions. José Gonzalez, a justice of the peace, underlined the distance preventing them from traveling to other towns to receive sacraments. Gonzalez used examples such as rivers that made travel difficult. Despite the similarity in messages, the nuances in content convey how Estevez and Gonzalez’s petitions were far from formulaic. Their petitions supported Espinosa’s account and made a stronger appeal for the funds to rebuild San José de la Matas’ chapel that were no longer available because of Haitian Church reforms in Santo Domingo.

The Matenses’ petitions offer a view of life in the town both before and after the chapel’s destruction. Juan Padilla noted how the chapel was the site where they celebrated the town’s patron saint San Ignacio. Padilla’s account illustrated the chapel’s importance for social gatherings and festivities. Gonzalez, the justice of the peace, recalled the difficulty facing priest who traveled to San José de las Matas to minister to the inhabitants after losing their chapel. The Matenses used the chapel’s former site as a cemetery. With fewer funds for the Church to sustain itself after the 1824 law and the difficulty in recruiting and training priest, external factors likely contributed to the situation faced in San José de las Matas. By enlisting the help of Espinosa to petition for more funds, the Matenses illustrated their ingenuity taking advantage of San José de las Matas’ proximity to Santiago. Officials could still make and receive reports as

412 “Francisco Estevez to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” San José de las Matas, 8 May 1829, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 79, Caja 1, No. 19.
413 “José Gonzalez to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” San José de las Matas, 8 May 1829, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 79, Caja 1, No. 19.
414 “Juan Padilla to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” San José de las Matas, 8 May 1829, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 79, Caja 1, No. 19.
415 “José González to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” San José de las Matas, 8 May 1829, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 79, Caja 1, No. 19.
Espinosa did a day later. The petitioners revealed a town where religion was at its core and now limited by the chapel’s destruction.

Varela y Jimenez’s response was non-committal about whether the Church would support the new chapel’s building in San José de las Matas. He requested the communications from the priest who had served the town to provide Varela y Jimenez more information. He stressed the importance for the Matenses ability to worship and receive their sacraments. If one were to consider the political and financial handicaps Varela y Jimenez and clerics faced earlier, they would conceivably look for a prudent approach to resolving the different issues plaguing Santo Domingo’s various areas. Unfortunately, the documents do not mention whether Church officials resolved the issue, but in this instance, they reveal how Espinosa served as the link between Varela y Jimenez and parishioners. While the cleric interceded, and framed their response, it was the Matenses descriptions serving as evidence. The uncertainty within Varela y Jimenez’s response illustrates that it was at least important to acknowledge and suggest the Haitian reforms limited the ways the Church could respond to the Matenses.

Several Dominicans petitioned Haitian authorities in 1832 protesting a priest serving their community. A disagreement between the community and priest stemmed from understandings and practices of worship. By marshaling support from others in the community, these Dominicans sought to offer credibility to their complaint to Haitian

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416 "José Eugenio Espinosa to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” San José de las Matas, 8 May 1829, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 79, Caja 1, No. 19.
417 "Andres Rosonsel Prosenel to José Eugenio Espinosa,” Santo Domingo, 22 May 1829, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 79, Caja 1, No. 19.
418 "Andres Rosonsel Prosenel to José Eugenio Espinosa,” Santo Domingo, 22 May 1829, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 79, Caja 1, No. 19.
419 "Andres Rosonsel Prosenel to José Eugenio Espinosa,” Santo Domingo, 22 May 1829, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 79, Caja 1, No. 19.
420 "Notable Dominicans to District Commander General, Santo Domingo, 26 July 1832, AGN-José Gabriel García 4, 11, C40, Exp. 1, Doc. 16.
authorities and suggesting the expected state to mediate this situation. The community noted how various public officials such as the justice of the peace and another army commander supported their request and “more than 100 of the most notable of the people without counting the women and children,” suggesting a consensus among the community’s males.421 As officers and leaders within the community, they aligned themselves with having the best interests of the Haitian state and of society. The petitioners stressed religion’s importance in their argument as a way of allying the interests of Haitian officials with the community’s. They looked to the authorities and not the Church to rectify the doctrinal dispute between the community leaders and the cleric.422 Communal support among the solicitors legitimized their assertion to the authorities to rule in their favor.

Haitian secularization weakened the Church’s institutional strength, which in turn affected Dominican parishioners. One overarching theme connecting these religious communities within Moca, San José de la Matas, and Santo Domingo City was the importance and centrality of priests and religiosity. Whether the impact was positive or negative, the petitions illustrate clerics were a part of these societies.423 In the first two examples, petitioners stressed priests’ positive influence of the clerical relationship because they performed religious functions. Town officials concurred with the inhabitants, legitimizing their requests. The last community resisted their cleric,

421 “Notable Dominicans to District Commander General, Santo Domingo, 26 July 1832, AGN-José Gabriel García 4, 11, C40, Exp. 1, Doc. 16.
422 “Notable Dominicans to District Commander General, Santo Domingo, 26 July 1832, AGN-José Gabriel García 4, 11, C40, Exp. 1, Doc. 16.
423 In late eighteenth-century New Spain, priests served as important interlocutors between the laity and religious and secular officials in the larger cities. The Bourbon reforms and their secularizing bent eroded this relationship to the determent of the Spanish Crown, Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred. For a Caribbean perspective of the cooperative but conflictive relationship between priests and their parishioners in a community see Maria Elena Diaz, The Virgin, the King, and the Royal Slaves of El Cobre: Negotiating Freedom in Colonial Cuba, 1670 – 1780 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 132 – 134.
highlighting how his religious teachings threatened the community’s stability. The cases all stressed their religiosity whether it was by traveling great distances to worship, highlighting past acts of piety, or demonstrating knowledge of Church custom and tradition. One key difference was in those authorities who they reached out to. The Mocanos and Matenses submitted their petitions to Varela y Jimenez through intermediaries to discuss their issues. Santo Domingo City petitioners directed their grievances at Haitian authorities. The Church reforms in Santo Domingo hindered this institution from adequately providing priests but gave parishioners an additional authority to overstep its boundaries in seeking redress.

CONCLUSION
On 23 July 1830, Varela y Jimenez fled Santo Domingo with forty-nine other passengers to Cuba. The accounts conflicted as to the cause of his exit and will be addressed later in the study. Among the passengers who left with the deposed Varela y Jimenez was Correa y Cidrón, the cleric who chastised the former archbishop. Previously, Correa y Cidrón noted, that the day Varela y Jimenez “says [‘]yes president I am the archbishop of Santo Domingo and as the Archbishop of Santo Domingo from the papal bull, I am the archbishop of Haiti and [the] pastor of the Haitians” because of the Haitian Unification, “this will be a day of celebration for Boyer and for the entire state.” Instead, Varela y Jimenez’s exit highlights the limits of Haitian Church reform and an unforeseen consequence.

424 Guerrero Cano, Disciplina y Laxitud, 40; and José Luciano Franco, Documentos para la historia de Haití en el Archivo Nacional (Havana: Publicaciones el Archivo Nacional de Cuba XXXVII, 1955), 222
426 “Bernardo Correa y Cidrón to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Saint-Marc, 28 June 1823, AGN-José Gabriel García 4, 5, C29, Exp. 7, Doc. 7.
This chapter has argued that Haitian secular reforms in Santo Domingo created a triangulation between local communities, the Catholic Church, and Haitian state because of the shift in power dynamics. While the Haitian government and Boyer were successful in nationalizing ecclesiastical lands they did not provide adequate resources to have priests live sufficiently and consistently under their salaries and on the property provided. The Haitian state could not recruit or train new priests without the help of the existing clergy who Haitian laws and practices hindered from serving Dominicans in Santo Domingo. When obstacles restricted Dominican parishioners from worshiping it was the Church and not Boyer who they petitioned to for redress. If a clergy member proved to be the obstacle then the change in the structure meant parishioners could appeal to the Haitian state directly. Haitian secular reforms intended for the church to be subordinated to the state, but in disrupting the autonomy of the church the changes served to facilitate a more active role of citizens in voicing their requests and grievances on shaping their own religious communities.
CHAPTER 4: “A NATION IS TO WATCH ITS CONSERVATION AND TO GUARANTEE ITS SECURITY”: HISPANIOLA AFTER RECOGNITION, 1824 – 1830

On 28 June 1825, a Spanish diplomat in Paris wrote to his superiors regarding negotiations between France and Haiti over recognizing of Haitian independence. After both parties had ended talks, he doubted that the French would continue to bargain with “those revolutionaries” over recognizing their independence. According to the Spanish diplomat, the other European powers celebrated French king Charles X’s actions towards Haiti. The European rulers supported a peer trying to assert their authority over a former colonial possession. Nevertheless, the Spaniard soon discovered from a French official that his government never intended to stop negotiations with their Haitian counterparts. He noted that former colonists pressured the French government to obtain “some commercial advantages” and for the Haitian government to pay an indemnity. The deal brokered between the French and Haitian governments caught the Spanish diplomat off guard. He wrote, “I could not manifest less the surprise that occasioned me with this resolution, and the bad effects it could produce with respect to the Spanish colonies.” The consequences of French recognition of Haitian independence not only affected Spain’s last Caribbean possessions where slavery remained entrenched. But, it

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also, created new questions regarding Haitian sovereignty over Spain’s former colony in Santo Domingo.

By pondering the fate of Spain’s remaining colonies in the Caribbean, the Spanish official’s writings reveal that the impact of France’s recognition of Haitian independence extended beyond the French empire. The official recognition is misleading because it obscures the earlier ties the Haitian government had with the outside world through unofficial channels. Scholars such as Julia Gaffield have previously explored how alternative interactions through commerce were the ways foreign nations implicitly recognized Haitian sovereignty, challenging the idea of an isolated Haitian republic during the nineteenth century.\footnote{430} French negotiations with the Haitian state set the parameters for future British and Spanish dialogues revolving around sovereignty, slavery, and nationhood. Even as European empires reconfigured their modes of government, commitments to slavery, and focus in the Caribbean, the Haitian Republic and its fate was a part of this process.\footnote{431}

This chapter examines the French, British, and Spanish negotiations with the Haitian government from 1824 – 1830 and its culmination of the republic’s defense of its


sovereignty in Santo Domingo. This study begins by asking how did the Haitian Republic
benefit from France’s recognition of its independence? Next, how did diplomats shape
foreign perceptions of the Haitian Republic and its politics? And lastly, how did the
Haitian and Spanish perspectives clash over justifying their sovereignty in Santo
Domingo? This chapter argues that the Haitian Republic’s aggressive diplomatic strategy
assured its possession of Santo Domingo despite the impact of the French recognition in
1825.

RECOGNITION AND AUTHORITY
Since its 1804 independence, France refused to recognize the Haitian Republic as
a nation because of its symbol of black freedom, resistance to slavery, and anti-colonial
rule. The French already saw an example of the spread of anti-slavery and insurrection
during their attempts to reinstitute slavery in Guadeloupe in 1802 and were not keen for it
to occur in their other colonies. Exiled colonial planters pressured the French government
to invade Haiti, which kept Haitian President Jean-Pierre Boyer on high alert.432 By 1820,
it became less likely France would be able to reconquer its former colony. In 1821, the
French government proposed to its Haitian counterparts a deal to make the Haitian
Republic a French protectorate. Plantation owners from Saint-Domingue wanted
restitution for the loss of property and slaves because of the Haitian Revolution.433 Like
his predecessor, Alexandre Pétion, Boyer had previously expressed interest in paying an
indemnity to French planters for the loss of their property in exchange for France’s

432 Laurent Dubois, Haiti: Aftershocks of History (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2012), 97; and David
Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour, and National Independence in Haiti (New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1996), 62. For more on the reversal of emancipation and the
ideals of the French Revolution in the Caribbean see Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and
Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1784 – 1804 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
433 Dubois, Haiti, 97; and Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 62.
recognition of independence. By negotiating a financial settlement with the French, Boyer could ensure Haitian authority on the island and did not have to worry about an invasion. If France saw Haiti as the antithesis of slavery and colonial rule, Haitian assertions of their authority mattered greatly.

Despite the Haitian government rejecting the status of a French protectorate, there was still the possibility to discuss the parameters of a financial settlement with France. On 17 April 1825, Charles X issued a royal ordinance presenting the terms of an agreement between France and Haiti. Since the French had not recognized Haitian independence they could not present a treaty to the Haitian state because only independent states could carry out this act. On the other hand, if the French recognized Haiti as an independent nation then it did not have to right to impose any financial demands on its former colony. A royal ordinance addressed internal matters within a kingdom and became the solution to this conundrum. This decree was effectively Charles X’s order to Boyer’s government treating the Haitian Republic as if it were Saint-Domingue. Here we see an example of the legal pluralism that enabled this kind of flexibility for the French king to impose these demands. The ordinance discussed both the issues of French commerce and “the misery of former colonists of Saint-Domingue,” calling for the opening of Haitian ports to trade with other nations. In return, the Haitian

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435 Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 64.

436 Dubois, Haiti, 98; and Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 67.

437 Dubois, Haiti, 98; and Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures, 2 – 3.
government would give the French preferential treatment ahead of other nations.\textsuperscript{438} By issuing this decree, Charles X acknowledged the unlikelihood of a French conquest to increase the likelihood of the Haitians meeting his demands.

The terms of this indemnity presented the legal justification for how the French understood their relationship with Haiti. First, Charles X ordered “the inhabitants of Saint-Domingue” to pay 150 million francs as the compensation for the planters of Saint-Domingue. The Haitian government was to meet this payment in five installments beginning in 31 December 1825.\textsuperscript{439} What was significant of the ordinance was that it only applied to France’s former colony of Saint-Domingue illustrating that they did not recognize Haitian sovereignty in including the republic’s Santo Domingo. Since French officials still considered Santo Domingo a Spanish territory, they could not legally intervene in its status.\textsuperscript{440} The French legal justification suggests even though they still saw Haiti as a colony, the Haitians successful defense of their authority on the island took away the choice of a war of conquest. Still, the French were not willing to acknowledge the Haitian Unification, focusing instead on their past colonial relationship with the western side of the island.

Charles X ordered Ange René Armand, the Baron de Mackau to go to Haiti to get the Haitian government to agree to the ordinance. Arriving with a squadron of warships from Martinique, Mackau demanded a meeting with President Boyer who responded by

\textsuperscript{439} “Ordonnance de Charles X.”
\textsuperscript{440} “Ordonnance de Charles X,” and Dubois, \textit{Haiti}, 98.
appointing a committee to deal with the situation. The presence of the French navy right outside Haitian ports illustrates the precariousness of the situation and coercion for the French. Upon learning of the Charles X’s ordinance content, they refused its terms with one member remarking that Mackau “was surprised at the energy of the commission.” Even the threat of renewed hostilities between France and Haiti was not enough to convince them to agree to Charles X’s demands. Therefore, Mackau set up a personal meeting with Boyer and directly negotiated with the Haitian president. Boyer accepted the terms of the ordinance perhaps confident of the republic’s ability to meet the terms the French set. It could also be that Boyer perceived French recognition of Haitian independence as the only way to truly safeguard Haitian sovereignty. Mackau completed Charles X order as Boyer signed the agreement signifying a different direction for France and Haiti.

Boyer’s negotiation with the French made it more likely that other foreign powers would recognize Haitian sovereignty. The commercial stipulation the French gained with its recognition of Haitian independence drew the attention of the British who also wanted a trade agreement for themselves. The British observed that the Ordinance of 1825 called for all nations who traded with the Haitian Republic would have to pay full tariff duties but the French would only have to pay half. This stipulation effectively gave the French

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443 Thomas Maidou, Historie d’Haiti 8 vols. (Port-au-Prince: Edition Henri Deschamps, 1985), Vol. 6, 453-454; and Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 65; and Dubois, Haiti, 100.
special trade arrangements at the expense of the Haitian state. Great Britain also paid close attention to the Haitian state’s foray into emancipation especially as abolitionist debates clamored for slavery’s end in the British West Indies. The British had already been involved in trade with Haitian leaders who had sought to set up official diplomatic relations through back channels. By negotiating and conceding to the French over negotiation, the Haitian government created the opportunity to engage with Britain to negotiate their own treaty.

Haitian officials were aware of the growing British interests and sought to collaborate with their merchants to establish a diplomatic presence in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien. A British merchant even argued that the government would strengthen both nation’s commerce if the British checked France’s influence. Still, one cannot discount that a growing British interest would not benefit the Haitian Republic to have a potential rival to check the balance of French power. For their efforts, Haitian officials, spearheaded by Secretary-General Joseph Balthazar Inginac wanted to highlight their improvements in education, agriculture, and commerce to demonstrate how important it was to begin diplomatic relations. Later they would use the French government recognizing their independence as a reason to sign a treaty of commerce with Great

445 Gaffield, Haitian Connections, Ch. 3; Blackburn, Overtrow of Colonial Slavery, Ch. 11; and Mimi Sheller, Democracy After Slavery: Black Publics and Peasant Radicalism in Haiti and Jamaica (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2000).
446 “Joseph Webb to George Canning,” London, 19 January 1825, TNA-FO 35/1
Britain.\textsuperscript{447} By taking advantage of its change and status and merchant interest, the Haitian government took steps to negotiate with the British.

The Foreign Office in London appointed Charles Mackenzie as Consul to Haiti in December 1825, instructing him to gather information on the Haitian Republic. Mackenzie was also to study the different labor regulations imposed by Haitian leaders from Toussaint Louverture to President Boyer to assess their impact on the nation.\textsuperscript{448} Mackenzie’s superiors had also warned him of the Haitian government’s eagerness to negotiate a commercial treaty and provided him with examples of commercial treaties signed with the emergent nations of Latin America as a guide.\textsuperscript{449} Mackenzie’s instructions reveal that the British government felt it did not have reliable information on Boyer’s government and Haiti more generally. Moreover, the British caution was in response to the aggressive Haitian diplomacy that had gained them official recognition and now sought a beneficial treaty with Great Britain. Consequently, Mackenzie’s orders to learn more about Haiti reflected British cautiousness.

Both Haitian and British officials wanted leverage what would enable them to negotiate a favorable treaty for their respective nations. The Foreign Office appropriately directed Mackenzie to glean information about the agreement between France and Haiti, notably where it pertained to trade with French colonies. The British government had banned trade between its Caribbean colonies and Haiti where slavery still existed and did

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\textsuperscript{447} “Joseph Balthazar Inginac to George Canning,” Port-au-Prince, 26 December 1826, TNA-FO 35/1.
\textsuperscript{448} “George Canning to Charles Mackenzie,” London, 16 January 1826, TNA-FO 35/2.
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not pose a threat to those colonies. Nevertheless, if the Haitians obtained any concessions to trade with the French colonies, the British would need that information in the event Boyer brought it to their attention. The British also suspected the French had intercepted some of their letters and had an unfair advantage in further negotiations with Haiti.

The Haitian government sent a list of its demands for the commercial treaty and even considered sending its own agent to Great Britain to negotiate directly to force the situation. The Haitian proposal called for British recognition of its independence, neutrality from Great Britain if a naval war occurred, and the ports in the south of the country opened to trade. The British would receive assurances of security for its Caribbean colonies, protection for its citizens involved with trade in Haiti, and to admit more diplomats to the island.

While the British searched for more information, the Haitians took the initiative to offer their proposal, illustrating a struggle for leverage. The Haitian government wanted to avoid signing an agreement with the British like the French and one that favored the island nation. Mackenzie suspected this view and noted that in November 1825, the Haitian government took out a loan from a French bank to meet the first payment of 30 million francs at 80 percent interest and made it nearly impossible to pay off. British officials did not see such an agreement, but must have been confident when Mackenzie provided Haitian officials with the terms of a

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450 “George Canning to Charles Mackenzie,” London, 16 January 1826, TNA-FO 35/2; and Nicholls, *From Dessalines to Duvalier*, 56.

451 “Foreign Office to George Canning,” London, 26 January 1826, TNA-FO 35/1. In a previous letter, Mackenzie had described to his superiors the method of sending letters to them that he felt were unreliable, “Charles Mackenzie to George Canning,” Port-au-Prince, 19 January 1826, TNA-FO 35/3.

452 “Foreign Office to George Canning,” London, 26 June 1826, TNA-FO 35/1.

commercial treaty that Great Britain signed with the new republic of Gran Colombia. \(^{454}\)

One advantage that Boyer had was that the Foreign Office did not initially know the full terms of the commercial agreement between his government and the French counterparts. Because they did not have all the information, the British could not situate the Haitian government’s terms in proper context. The Foreign Office found the terms vague and decided to grant Mackenzie full power to negotiate a commercial treaty, trusting the consul’s judgment to get the best deal for Great Britain. \(^{455}\) The Haitian government not only evaded signing an agreement like the French but also forced the British to involve themselves more with the negotiations on the republic’s terms.

The British delayed the negotiations during the summer of 1826 to gain more leverage. While Mackenzie diligently drew up the parameters of the first draft of a commercial agreement between the two nations, the Foreign Office learned that French and Haitian officials had drawn up a commercial agreement. The British used this as a pretext to slow down their negotiations with one official not wanting Britain to be an obstacle “to the conclusion of an act, which was considered by us and by the world as the foundation of Haitian independence.” \(^{456}\) The British were not willing to negotiate a final treaty before the French especially if it was to their detriment. Consequently, the Foreign Office took away Mackenzie’s full powers and ordered him to stall even as he warned them that not moving forward with the transaction would lose the goodwill between the two countries. Mackenzie believed this move would benefit the French more than the

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\(^{455}\) “George Canning to Charles Mackenzie,” London, 27 March 1826, TNA-FO 35/2.

\(^{456}\) “George Canning to Charles Mackenzie,” London, 13 September 1826, FO 35/2. The Treaty of Paris that ended the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 gave the restored Bourbon king Louis XVIII the right to regain all of France’s American the colonies. The British agreed to recognize Haiti as a French colony, Lacerte, “Xenophobia and Economic Decline,” 500.
By commanding Mackenzie to feign ignorance of the decision-making process in London, the Foreign Office brought a measure of duplicity into these arbitrations. This tactic also made sure the negotiations would continue and shift control back to the British.

Eventually, the Haitian government desired an alliance with the British as equal sovereign states to counteract France’s influence. On 8 October 1826, General Inginac presented Mackenzie with a revised treaty between the two nations. First, the Haitian government wanted the British to send any Africans captured as contraband from the slave trade to Haiti. Inginac argued that the Haitian constitution would guarantee the former enslaved Africans freedom and the Haitian government would be in charge with “civilizing” them. The British would not be the ones to decide the fate of enslaved Africans. Second, the Haitian government wanted to institute a commercial relationship between themselves and the British North American colonies in present-day Canada. Haitian officials likely understood that the British were not likely to allow trade between their Caribbean colonies despite its call from some commercial interests. This part of the agreement would replace the commerce lost by Haiti with the United States. Lastly, the Haitian government wanted the British government to support them in other negotiations with foreign governments. Inginac emphasized that the Haitian government wanted to continue to have a good relationship with Britain and this article hints at a formal extension of this reality. The British, however, suspected the Haitian government

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457 “George Canning to Charles Mackenzie,” London 13 September 1826, TNA-FO 35/2; and “Charles Mackenzie to George Canning,” Port-au-Prince, 22 June 1826, TNA-FO 35/3.

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was scheming to have the British establish a protectorate.\footnote{Joseph Balthazar Inginac to Charles Mackenzie,” Port-au-Prince, 8 October 1826, TNA-FO 35/4; “George Canning to Charles Mackenzie,” London, 18 January 1827 TNA-FO 35/2; and Lacrete, “Xenophobia and Decline,” 503.} By allying with the British as equals, the Haitian government could counteract the French influence on the island.

The Haitian Republic benefited from the French recognition of independence by using it as leverage in its immediate future during talks with Great Britain. While the indemnity the French imposed would prove to be detrimental, it also provided a basis for future negotiations with other foreign powers. The Haitian government’s attempts to use Britain as a buffer against the French illustrates how these talks were not just a one-sided affair. If British Consul Mackenzie as his superiors were ignorant on the details of the agreement between Haiti and France, Boyer and his government could hold Britain off and entice it with the possibility of commerce. With the foreign recognition of its sovereignty, the Haitian Republic could use it as the basis to support its claims to Santo Domingo as well. The Haitian government’s aggressive negotiations gambled the republic’s present and immediate future to assert its influence for long term stability and peace.

**FOREIGN NARRATIVES OF HAITI**

Within his first year in 1826, Mackenzie reported on the causes he perceived as contributing to the Haitian Republic’s political instability. Mackenzie reserved praise for Boyer’s Secretary General Inginac who he described as a “self-taught man” who was important to running Boyer’s government.\footnote{Charles Mackenzie to George Canning,” Port-au-Prince, TNA-CO 318/102.} The Consul presented Inginac as pro-British compared to the rest of Boyer’s cabinet who he saw as pro-French. Mackenzie
disparaged them as unfit for their jobs.\textsuperscript{462} It is likely the difficulty in negotiating with Boyer’s regime informed this observation. Mackenzie described Boyer’s government as “despotic,” without the Haitian citizens’ popular support, and openly questioned whether the current government could continue to rule from Port-au-Prince. For Mackenzie, the indemnity and ordinance signed in 1825 by Boyer was part of the reason for Haiti’s political unrest.\textsuperscript{463}

Mackenzie concluded Boyer’s leadership would affect the Haitian Republic’s ability to honor a commercial treaty with Great Britain. The British Consul used the financial settlement between Haiti and France as a parameter to assess the republic’s government. Although he found its terms oppressive, Mackenzie blamed the Haitian government for “accepting the Ordonnance [sic] to pay as the price of the recognition of her independence to the mother country one hundred and fifty millions [sic] of francs in five equal annual payments.”\textsuperscript{464} By focusing on the Haitians’ role in agreeing to this financial settlement, Mackenzie discredited Boyer’s regime and decision making. Mackenzie scrutinized the Haitian government for not only getting itself involved in a deal it could not afford but for not renegotiating the settlement with France. He particularly directed his ire towards Boyer observing that, “his utter inability to pursue a straight forward course and his propensity to intermeddle on every occasion convince me that so long as he is at the head of the government, no obligations contracted with it can be binding.”\textsuperscript{465} From the Consul’s perspective, the Haitian government irresponsibility

\textsuperscript{462} “Charles Mackenzie to George Canning,” Port-au-Prince, TNA-CO 318/102.

\textsuperscript{463} “Charles Mackenzie to George Canning,” Port-au-Prince, TNA-CO 318/102.

\textsuperscript{464} “Charles Mackenzie to George Canning,” Port-au-Prince, 5 March 1827, TNA-FO 35/5.

\textsuperscript{465} “Charles Mackenzie to George Canning,” Port-au-Prince, 5 March 1827, TNA-FO 35/5.
and Boyer’s duplicity would put the British at risk if they signed a commercial agreement.

Mackenzie’s arrival in 1826 coincided with the Haitian implementation of the Rural Code, which the British were aware of. The French recognition of Haitian independence and the financial burden it imposed forced the Haitian government to explore ways to extract labor from its citizens. In 1826 the Haitian government passed the Rural Code, building on the premise of agriculture’s importance to the Haitian economy with the intention to increase state control over labor and discipline like the military. In a proclamation directed to Haitian military and civil officials, Boyer noted “that overseers, drivers, and field negroes [sic], who in like manner have their superiors, should conduct themselves as officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers in whatever may concern them.” By comparing cultivators to soldiers, Boyer expressed his expectations for citizens’ contribution to the state. Mackenzie’s visit to Haiti was intentional as it provided an observer to the Rural Code’s effectiveness.

Boyer and the Haitian ruling elite sought to counter the development of what one scholar referred to as the “counter-plantation” system. Boyer expressed this concern to Haitian officials and officers, observing that “labourers [sic] of both sexes, then too young to be employed in the field, refuse to go now, under the pretext of freedom, spend

467 Quisqueya Lora H., Transición de la esclavitud al trabajo libre en Santo Domingo: El caso de Higüey (1822-1827) (Santo Domingo: Academia Dominicana de Historia, 2012), 120.
468 “Haitien Proclamation,” in “George Hibbert to Mr. Peel,” Jamaica, January 1827, The National Archive Home Office (hereafter cited as TNA-HO) 44/17/07. Also see chapters 1 and 2 for more on Boyer’s discourse.
their time wandering about, and give a bad example to the other cultivator.”

For Boyer, emancipation had given Haitians a misguided perception of their responsibilities. Emancipation did not signal the end of plantation labor as the Haitian government aimed for the cooperation between military and civil officials. In what appeared to be a draft of the Rural Code, Boyer provided articles holding military officers responsible for knowing the cultivators’ location, for ensuring agricultural production, and to monitor the free time that cultivators spent outside of their work. He wanted the different levels of municipalities, generals, and officers to collaborate and report abuses within the system.

The final version of the Code Rural was expansive consisting of 202 articles that covered aspects from labor to punishment, and policing. This labor code was the Haitian government’s solution to combat the threat to the complete abandonment large scale agricultural production in favor of subsistence farming.

Mackenzie blamed the general unrest in Haiti on the indemnity and Rural Code. Nonetheless, he had not ventured out to other parts of the island, admitting having spent time in Port-au-Prince. Scholars, however, have assessed the Rural Code’s impact, concluding it was unsuccessful. Haitian cultivators had become accustomed to working on their plots of land for the last 20 years and the government could not compel them to work. Many of those in charge of enforcing the laws associated with the cultivators

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469 “Haitien Proclamation,” TNA-HO 44/17/07, in “George Hibbert to Mr. Peel,” Jamaica, January 1827, italics in the original.

470 This English translation of Boyer’s proclamation makes the distinction between different articles pertaining to labor, its policing, and punishment that the government would impose. On my further review, the articles within Boyer’s proclamation did not line up with the actual Code Rural, “Haitien Proclamation,” TNA-HO 44/17/07; and “Code Rural d’Haïti” in Código Rural de Haití de 1826 edición bilingüe español-francés, traducción y notas Francisco Bernardo Regino Espinal (Santo Domingo: Archivo General de la Nación, 2015), 103 – 144.

471 “Haitien Proclamation,” TNA-HO 44/17/07.

472 “Charles Mackenzie to George Canning,” Port-au-Prince, 6 November 1826, TNA-FO 35/4.
themselves and took care of their own interests at the Haitian state’s expense. While
the Haitian government could at least nominally enforce the provisions of the Rural Code
in the first years of the western part of the island, it was not as successful in the eastern
part in Santo Domingo. The Haitian government’s limited presence in the eastern part of
the island meant that local officials could not consistently prevent the labor force’s
movement or punish those who left. Haitian scholars attributed the state’s inability to
successful enforce the Rural Code to the proliferation of subsistent farming as Boyer did
not reconcile the old and new regimes of labor. Dominican scholars have pointed to the
Rural Code’s ineffectiveness because of the rise of tobacco cultivation. The Haitian state
had difficulty implementing certain laws and punishments. From his view in Port-au-
Prince, Mackenzie concluded that the Haitian government could not consistently enforce
the code in the republic.

Despite the limited information at Mackenzie’s disposal, he believed it was not in
Great Britain’s interest to conduct a deal Boyer’s government. Mackenzie’s observed that
the key to Boyer’s power was his influence on Haitian officers that in effect turned the
Haitian Republic into a “military aristocracy.” While Haitians felt this influence in and
around Port-au-Prince, Boyer’s tenuous hold concerned Mackenzie. He noted that British
financial commitments in Haiti were small, meaning their investment was not as great in
the island nation. Nonetheless, Mackenzie understood that Haitian officials would not

474 Lora H., Transición de la esclavitud, Ch. 5.
agree with the consul’s assessment and sought to leave negotiations in a reasonable state for his future replacement if they could negotiate an advantageous deal.\footnote{Charles Mackenzie to George Canning, Port-au-Prince, 5 March 1827, TNA-FO 35/5.} Given that Mackenzie did not travel to the other parts of the island, it was plausible to understand their concern. By focusing on the political and economic ramifications of a possible treaty, Mackenzie concluded the British had little to gain from an agreement with the Haitians.

During the summer of 1827, Mackenzie finally traveled to Santo Domingo, observing tension between some Dominicans and the Haitian government.\footnote{Charles Mackenzie to George Canning, Port-au-Prince, 2 July 1827, TNA-FO 35/5.} The consul devoted his attention to analyzing the consequences of the 1824 law that appropriated land from the Catholic Church. Mackenzie concluded that the Haitian government benefited from these reforms and suggested “white Spanish Haitians” did not support the measure. He wrote that when the white Spanish Haitian “looks forward for some redeeming pledge in his favour [sic], he cannot find one.”\footnote{Charles Mackenzie to George Canning, Port-au-Prince, 2 July 1827, TNA-FO 35/5.} Through looking at an important Haitian reform in Santo Domingo, Mackenzie suggests white Dominicans did not profit from the Haitian Unification. He continued, writing that “he [white Spanish Haitian] finds the clergy of the Church reduced to beggary, and claiming support from has already reduced Pittance—his religion degraded in the persons of her Ministers.”\footnote{Charles Mackenzie to George Canning, Port-au-Prince, 2 July 1827, TNA-FO 35/5.} Mackenzie’s observations illustrate white Dominicans’ concerns with the Church’s state, illuminating divisions between themselves and the Haitian government. Mackenzie’s report on the grievances between some Dominicans and the Haitian government alluded to the Haitian Unification’s impact in Santo Domingo. According to
Mackenzie, the Haitian state had not reimbursed former masters for the loss of their slaves after emancipation. Once the former slaves became soldiers and left, the former owners had lost help to cultivate their properties.\textsuperscript{480} Mackenzie revealed one aspect to how the Haitian Unification altered Santo Domingo’s hierarchy. According to his sources in Santo Domingo, Mackenzie claimed that changing the language of official documents from Spanish to French alienated Dominicans. Although the extent to which the Haitian government replaced Spanish at the local levels was probably not as strong as Mackenzie or other later scholars implied.\textsuperscript{481} Another grievance that Mackenzie mentioned was that the Haitian government forced the inhabitants in Santo Domingo to contribute revenue for paying the indemnity even though the French government directed this amount towards its former territory of Saint-Domingue and not the former Spanish side of Santo Domingo. Lastly, Mackenzie illustrated that because the Haitian Republic lacked commerce with other parts of the Caribbean it hurt the cattle ranching business in the eastern part of the island.\textsuperscript{482} Mackenzie’s report suggests the Haitian Unification’s was uneven with how it benefited some sectors of Dominican society but not others.

Mackenzie used his observations in Santo Domingo to argue that Haitian prospects in the east were not favorable. He inferred Dominicans would seek out any European power that would involve themselves in their affairs such as France and

\textsuperscript{480}“Charles Mackenzie to George Canning,” Port-au-Prince, 2 July 1827, TNA-FO 35/5.
\textsuperscript{482}“Charles Mackenzie to George Canning,” Port-au-Prince, 2 July 1827, TNA-FO 35/5.
Spain. The threat of foreign occupation from two European powers with claims to the island was something Mackenzie used to convince his superiors to second guess Britain’s commitment. Mackenzie noted the Spanish would defer to the French before acting in a hostile manner towards the Haitian Republic. By only extending recognition to its former claims in the western side of the island, the French government gave Spanish officials an opening to consider pressing their claims to the eastern part of the island. French officials benefited from this scenario because the Spanish would continue to pressure the Haitian government as the French sought to impose the indemnity. The idea of a French conspiracy with the Spanish supported Mackenzie’s argument that Haitian rule in Santo Domingo was tenuous.

Mackenzie was not the only one to consider this scenario as Dominican royalist Felipe Fernandez de Castro used the possibility of a French invasion against Haiti for his discussion. He recommended that the Spanish should have a presence in Haiti to preempt an attack by the French, convinced that France officials would respect Spain and allow them to negotiate with Haiti. Fernandez de Castro used the possibility of a French invasion to spur the Spanish into acting against the Haitian Unification. He believed that if the Spanish government engaged with their Haitian counterparts it would “also [serve] to ferment the opinion of those Spaniards and to encourage their hope in the sovereign’s protection that their king demonstrates and devout drive in such a manifested way.” By negotiating on behalf of Dominican loyalists in Santo Domingo, Fernandez de Castro

483 “Charles Mackenzie to George Canning,” Port-au-Prince, 2 July 1827, TNA-FO 35/5.
484 “Charles Mackenzie to George Canning,” Port-au-Prince, 2 July 1827, TNA-FO 35/5.
485 Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 11 July 1824, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 4, 3ª.
486 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 11 July 1824, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 4, 3ª.
calculated for Santo Domingo’s population to instigate resistance against Boyer and in support of the Spanish. He believed that the Spanish government should negotiate under the premise that the Haitian government took possession of Santo Domingo in the interests of security. Fernandez de Castro used the idea of a possible French invasion to convince the Spanish to involve themselves on the island, whereas Mackenzie regarded an increasing French presence as reason for Britain to hold back.

Fernandez de Castro’s strategy to reclaim Santo Domingo was contingent on Spain’s preparation beforehand. Therefore, he noted that Spanish officials should give the commissioner the power to take possession of Santo Domingo in the name of the Spanish Crown. Moreover, he was to count on assistance from the Captain-General of Puerto Rico to reinstitute Spanish laws in Santo Domingo. The astute Fernandez de Castro thought ahead if negotiations between the Spanish and Haitian governments failed. He wrote, “the same decorum and dignity of the nation demands the support of the armed forces.” The armed forces from Puerto Rico were to go only into Santo Domingo to take possession of Spain’s claims. Fernandez de Castro associated Spanish success with loyal Dominicans’ support. They were “willing to reunite their forces at the first cry, supporting and leading and which to be firm to redraw the party and spread the operations.” Fernandez de Castro strategically offered these examples to draw parallels to 1809 when loyal Dominicans and Spanish support in Puerto Rico took Santo Domingo

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487 For more on anti-Haitian narrative that also present pro-Spanish fidelity see Ch.2. “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 11 July 1824, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 4, 3ª.
488 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 11 July 1824, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 4, 3ª.
489 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 11 July 1824, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 4, 3ª.
back from the French. With the right preparations, Fernandez de Castro argued the Spanish would succeed in reclaiming its possession of Santo Domingo.

By writing their reports on Haitian politics on the island, Mackenzie and Fernandez de Castro’s contributed to a growing number of foreign accounts and reports presenting the Haitian Republic in a negative light. Mackenzie’s reports illustrated poor leadership under Boyer, which coupled with political instability made a reciprocal commercial treaty risky. The British Consul presented Haitian rule in Santo Domingo as another source of instability, pointing to Boyer’s command of the island as tenuous, further encouraging France and Spain to take advantage of the situation. Even with the attention that the British gave to Haiti’s experiments in free labor, Mackenzie’s imperial commentary presented Haiti in negative terms. Fernandez de Castro’s report conveyed the potential of loyal “Spaniards” in Santo Domingo who looked to the Spanish Crown to inspire rebellion against the Haitian state. While he sought to convince the Spanish of Dominican fidelity, Fernandez de Castro simultaneously displayed Haitian claims to Santo Domingo about security not focusing on other reasons such as Dominicans rejecting Spanish rule for their actions. These reports had notable limitations as Mackenzie spent much of his time in Port-au-Prince and Fernandez de Castro made few trips to Santo Domingo. Still, metropole officials relied on these accounts as they that shaped their perspectives and policies, granting legitimacy to perceptions of Haitian decline and instability.

490 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 11 July 1824, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 4, 3ª.
STRUGGLES OF SOVEREIGNTY

More than a year passed before Captain-General of Cuba Francisco Dioniso Vives learned about France’s recognition from a French squadron that embarked on the island. Vives had been in constant communication with Spanish officials in Madrid over the different internal and external threats that challenged his rule in Cuba, including the 1825 slave uprising in Guamarco in the western part of the island, which he was in the midst. This change in fortunes, however, was not the topic of discussion. The discouraged Vives noted that the Spanish saw “disappear the abundance and the security and with them their property and fortune.”

Cuba’s plantation economy and commitment to slavery framed Vives’ thinking. France’s recognition legitimized the success of enslaved insurrection and its consequences, making this threat more a possibility for Cuba. Vives felt France’s recognition of Haiti would encourage “the natural inclination that we see transform of the blacks towards their liberty, for the desire to abolish the slavery in which their brothers lie.” Vives suggested that this would spread the Haitian Republic to Cuba in the same way that it did in Santo Domingo.

Based on the information he received, Vives concluded the French granted official legitimacy to the Haitian struggle against slavery, endangering Cuba and Puerto Rico’s place with slavery in the Spanish Caribbean.


492 “Francisco Dioniso Vives to Secretary of State,” Havana, 28 July 1825, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 4.

493 “Francisco Dioniso Vives to Secretary of State,” Havana, 28 July 1825, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 4. Scholars have debated the impact of the Haitian Revolution on slave insurrection and emancipation from those linking a mode of casualty to those who dismiss the impact looking to other factors. For an example of such debates see David Geggus ed. The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), Part One. See also Michael Craton, Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982), Epilogue.
Vives sought to sway his superiors in Madrid that the Haitian Unification was a danger to Spanish slave interests in Cuba. He spoke from experience after dealing with 1825 slave rebellion in Guamarco in the western part of Cuba, noting that “enemies twice as terrible that exist in our rooms and in the heart of our families’ trust.”494 Cuba’s past and present with slave insurrections influence Vives’ perspective. He saw the Haitian Unification as part of this long-standing threat going back to the 1790s and relied on Dominican royalists’ reports for his information. For Vives, it was important to defend Spanish rule in Cuba against the “contagion of the principles of emancipation.”495 The potential for Cuba to end up as Santo Domingo was very much a reality for the Cuban Captain-General. Vives believed the Spanish would weaken the Haitian Republic and defend slavery in Cuba if they took back Santo Domingo.496 By convince the Spanish of the Haitian Unification’s threat, Vives desired to involve his superiors’ more.

More than four years passed after French negotiation of Haitian independence until events in the Caribbean convinced Spanish officials to order Fernandez de Castro to negotiate Santo Domingo’s return to Spain. First, Fernandez de Castro was to leave in only one naval ship and to arrive in Port-au-Prince—not Santo Domingo—on a mission of peace and with no intentions of warfare. Second, he was to focus on the legality of the Haitian Unification and engage with the notion that Boyer wanted to contain the

495 “Francisco Dioniso Vives to Secretary of State,” Havana, 10 May 1826, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 4.
496 “Francisco Dioniso Vives to Secretary of State,” Havana, 10 May 1826, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 4.
“anarchy” and instability in the eastern side of the island. By referencing this part of the Haitian argument, Fernandez de Castro could negotiate to receive compensation for the loss of property and land of exiled Dominicans during the unification. Fernandez de Castro had consistently articulated this point in other reports to the Spanish. Lastly, if Fernandez de Castro’s mission was successful, he would have a Spanish Consul establish formal diplomatic relations. The French example and Dominican royalists’ reports swayed the Spanish to begin making efforts to retake Santo Domingo.

Fernandez de Castro arrived in Port-au-Prince in January 1830 not certain as to who he would be negotiating with. The Dominican royalist learned he would be deal with Haitian envoys and not Boyer directly. The Haitian commission included the president’s Secretary-General Inginac, Senator J. F. Lespinasse, and Colonel Marie-Elizabeth-Eustache Frémont. Fernandez de Castro as the Spanish Crown’s representative was negotiating among equals, Boyer’s representatives rather than the Haitian President himself.

Fernandez de Castro disputed the Haitian Republic’s legal claims to Santo Domingo. One of the rationales that Boyer made for Haitian claims in Santo Domingo was Article 40 of the 1816 Haitian Constitution that established the republic borders over the entire island of Hispaniola. Fernandez de Castro argued that the Haitian government did not make that claim at all during the second period of Spanish rule until 1821, noting, “from 1809 until 1814, neither from this year until 1821 elapsing more than twelve years

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497 “Secretary of State to Felipe Fernandez de Castro,” Madrid, 10 April 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 4.
498 “Secretary of State to Felipe Fernandez de Castro,” Madrid, 10 April 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 4.
499 “Secretary of State to Felipe Fernandez de Castro,” Madrid, 10 April 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 4.
of good peace and harmony.”501 By referring to the Haitian Republic’s not asserting this claim, Fernandez de Castro questioned the entire validity of Article 40. Not only did Boyer not assert this claim to any Spanish official in Santo Domingo, he had in fact, publicly rejected the notion that he would involve himself in Santo Domingo’s affairs in 1821. Ultimately, it was Núñez de Cáceres’ coup d’état that accelerated the turn of events that ended with Boyer’s entrance in Santo Domingo City. Fernandez de Castro and the Spanish were not interested in those details particularly Núñez de Cáceres’ grievances.502 From their point of view, Núñez de Cáceres’ betrayal was not representative of the feelings of Dominicans at large. Since Fernandez de Castro claimed Dominicans were still loyal at the moment of independence and there had been no problems between Haiti and Spain, the Dominican royalist concluded that Boyer’s actions violated Spanish sovereignty and the peace engendered by both nations for almost twenty years.503 Fernandez de Castro asserted that the Haitian Republic’s legal claims that did not supersede the Spanish Crown’s.

Fernandez de Castro, however, did not to completely condemn Boyer’s actions in Santo Domingo. The threat of a French invasion made it plausible to apprehend why

Boyer would invade a neutral territory.\footnote{“Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Haitian Commissioners,” Port-au-Prince, 19 January 1830, in \textit{Reclamation de la Partie de L’est d’Haïti par l’Espagne} (Port-au-Prince: De L’imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1830) in AGI-Cuba 2014.} By playing off this plausible possibility, Fernandez de Castro set up the next part of his argument to delegitimize another Haitian claim. With the threat of a French invasion gone, the Spanish government did not see any reason for the Haitian Republic to hold on to Santo Domingo. Fernandez de Castro assured the Haitian commission that the intentions of security that had animated Boyer’s actions in Santo Domingo would allow for its return to Spain because they did not threaten Haitian interest in the west.\footnote{“Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Haitian Commissioners,” Port-au-Prince, 19 January 1830, in \textit{Reclamation de la Partie de L’est d’Haïti par l’Espagne} (Port-au-Prince: De L’imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1830) in AGI-Cuba 2014.} By not disregarding Boyer’s other claims to Santo Domingo, Fernandez de Castor aimed to convince the Haitians of how Spanish possession of Santo Domingo would serve their security interests.

The commissioners’ response to Fernandez de Castro based the republic’s claims on the Haitians Constitution, their government’s past actions and their relationship to Santo Domingo. It was Toussaint Louverture who had first united the entire island to set up French rule before Leclerc’s invasion in 1802.\footnote{Laurent Dubois, \textit{Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution} (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), Ch. 11; Charlton Yingling, “Colonialism Unraveling: Race, Religion, and National Belonging in Santo Domingo During the Age of Revolution” (Ph.D. diss: University of South Carolina, 2016), Ch. 7; Graham Nessler, \textit{An Islandwide Struggle for Freedom: Revolution, Emancipation, and Reenslavement in Hispaniola} (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), Ch 4.; and “Haitian Commissioners to Felipe Fernandez de Castro,” Port-au-Prince, 21 January 1830, in \textit{Reclamation de la Partie de L’est d’Haïti par l’Espagne} (Port-au-Prince: De L’imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1830) in AGI-Cuba 2014.} Haitian officials argued that the eastern side of the island became “indispensable” to their territory and independence after 1804. Hence, this viewpoint of Santo Domingo informed Haitian government’s actions on the island. The Haitian commissioners reminded Fernandez de Castro that it was the arms and munitions from Alexandre Pétion that also contributed to Spanish reconquest in
1809.\textsuperscript{507} The Haitian commissioners addressed Fernandez de Castro’s claims regarding the Haitian Constitution’s article writing that “from 1809 to 1821, the Government of Spain never made a protest against the Haitian Constitution article.”\textsuperscript{508} The Haitian point of view staked its claims to the constitution’s validity and their role in securing Santo Domingo from the Spanish.

The Haitian commissioners disputed other parts of Fernandez de Castro’s version of events surrounding Spain’s loss of its colony. They asserted that it was much of the inhabitants who sought to become a part of the Haitian republic and not a “few vassals” as the Spanish claimed who were discontent.\textsuperscript{509} By emphasizing the degree of Dominican support for Haitian rule, the commissioners argued that the Unification was a manifestation of popular sovereignty. The Haitian commissioners did not deny Núñez de Cáceres and his supporters’ independence who sought to become a part of a federation with Gran Colombia or the anarchy that his regime brought. Nonetheless, they added that the Dominicans reached out to Boyer for him to intercede to become a part of Haiti.\textsuperscript{510}

Intriguingly, the Haitians flags flown in support of Boyer occurred everywhere but Santo Domingo City. The Haitian version of events presented the Unification as an act supported by Dominicans that clashed with Fernandez de Castro’s depiction of Santo Domingo’s loyalty.

\textsuperscript{507}“Haitian Commissioners to Felipe Fernandez de Castro,” Port-au-Prince, 21 January 1830, in Reclamacion de la Partie, AGI-Cuba 2014.

\textsuperscript{508}“Haitian Commissioners to Felipe Fernandez de Castro,” Port-au-Prince, 21 January 1830, in Reclamacion de la Partie, AGI-Cuba 2014.

\textsuperscript{509}“Haitian Commissioners to Felipe Fernandez de Castro,” Port-au-Prince, 21 January 1830, in Reclamacion de la Partie, AGI-Cuba 2014.

\textsuperscript{510}“Haitian Commissioners to Felipe Fernandez de Castro,” Port-au-Prince, 21 January 1830, in Reclamacion de la Partie, AGI-Cuba 2014.
Fernandez de Castro response emphasized Dominicans’ loyalty to the Spanish crown. He asserted the Spanish would “not abandon the men that have reunited in the firm hope to be protected, that only to have tried to reinstitute the fatherly dominion of his Catholic majesty.”\footnote{“Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Haitian Commissioners,” Port-au-Prince, 24 January 1830, in \textit{Reclamacion de la Partie de L’est d’Haiti par l’Espagne} (Port-au-Prince: De L’imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1830) in AGI-Cuba 2014.} By concentrating on Dominicans’ desires, Fernandez de Castro emphasized their loyalty and part of the Spanish empire. It was with this fidelity that the consistent Fernandez de Castro used in his arguments to convince Spanish officials to retake Santo Domingo from Haiti.\footnote{“Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Haitian Commissioners,” Port-au-Prince, 24 January 1830, in \textit{Reclamacion de la Partie de L’est d’Haiti par l’Espagne} (Port-au-Prince: De L’imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1830) in AGI-Cuba 2014.} He disputed Haitian claims that the Dominican population supported Haitian rule.

Fernandez de Castro based Spanish sovereignty on Dominicans’ actions and the validity of treaties. He noted that the Treaty of Paris of 1815 signed between Spain and France assured Spanish sovereignty in Santo Domingo. A treaty of this magnitude “could not be disvalued by a simple Constitution, conceived in the exaltation of animosity of a cruel war against France.”\footnote{“Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Haitian Commissioners,” Port-au-Prince, 24 January 1830, in \textit{Reclamacion de la Partie de L’est d’Haiti par l’Espagne} (Port-au-Prince: De L’imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1830) in AGI-Cuba 2014.} For Fernandez de Castro, a treaty between two imperial powers trumped the constitution of a republic. He disagreed on the degree of Haitian support contributing to Dominicans victory over the French in 1809, focusing on Spanish support from Cuba and Puerto Rico contributed to Dominicans taking Santo Domingo from the French.\footnote{“Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Haitian Commissioners,” Port-au-Prince, 24 January 1830, in \textit{Reclamacion de la Partie de L’est d’Haiti par l’Espagne} (Port-au-Prince: De L’imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1830) in AGI-Cuba 2014.} By minimizing Haitian contribution for this victory, Fernandez de

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\footnote{“Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Haitian Commissioners,” Port-au-Prince, 24 January 1830, in \textit{Reclamacion de la Partie de L’est d’Haiti par l’Espagne} (Port-au-Prince: De L’imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1830) in AGI-Cuba 2014.} 
\footnote{“Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Haitian Commissioners,” Port-au-Prince, 24 January 1830, in \textit{Reclamacion de la Partie de L’est d’Haiti par l’Espagne} (Port-au-Prince: De L’imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1830) in AGI-Cuba 2014.} 
\footnote{“Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Haitian Commissioners,” Port-au-Prince, 24 January 1830, in \textit{Reclamacion de la Partie de L’est d’Haiti par l’Espagne} (Port-au-Prince: De L’imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1830) in AGI-Cuba 2014.} 

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\footnote{“Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Haitian Commissioners,” Port-au-Prince, 24 January 1830, in \textit{Reclamacion de la Partie de L’est d’Haiti par l’Espagne} (Port-au-Prince: De L’imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1830) in AGI-Cuba 2014.}
Castro whittled away at the Haitian government’s justification for its sovereignty in Santo Domingo. Fernandez de Castro used the 1825 French recognition of independence to further underline his argument, stating that it only extended to the western side of the island. According to Fernandez de Castro, the French government did not include the eastern part of the island because they still recognized Santo Domingo as a Spanish possession. By focusing on treaties and Dominicans’ actions, Fernandez de Castro asserted another argument for Spain’s benefit.

Fernandez de Castro disputed the Haitian arguments of security and popular sovereignty. Focusing on the Haitian Republic defense against enslavement, Fernandez de Castro contended that “slavery in its duration that exists in the day on the civilized nations, it is the country’s right,” of which no foreign state or power could interfere without threatening a country’s independence. For Haiti to use the issue of anti-slavery to invade another part of a country was akin to threatening that nation’s sovereignty. Fernandez de Castro, however, could not deny the Haitian commissioners’ claims of Dominicans calling to Boyer to come into Santo Domingo in support of the Haitian Republic. Nonetheless, this point did not convince the firm Fernandez de Castro that the general population shared this sentiment. Núñez de Cáceres’ independence movement from Santo Domingo City provided Fernandez de Castro a telling example to once again dispute his Haitian counterpoints’ claims. Even if the larger population wanted to become a part of Haiti, Fernandez de Castro considered it “indisputable” that a colony

could change governments. The Dominican royalist contended that Haitian arguments for security and popular sovereignty did not trump Spain’s right to impose and maintain slavery.

Fernandez de Castro offered the Haitian commissioners an ultimatum to return Santo Domingo to the Spanish Crown’s possession as his final argument. If not he wrote that the, “evil things that [a state] produce towards one or the other state [out of] necessity can place the consequences that trace the case.” Fernandez de Castro implied the Spanish government would use force if the Haitian government did not consent to the Spanish state’s wishes. Spanish officials in Madrid had not given Fernandez de Castro any orders relating to the use of force in negotiation. Yet, his bluff hinted at a calculated risk meant to convince Boyer that there was no other option. Despite these Spanish terms for negotiation, Fernandez de Castro wanted to also commend the Haitian government to meet his demands. He expressed that if the transaction could occur peacefully then both nations could continue in friendship. Any other kind of negotiation outside of transferring to the former Spanish colony was unnecessary. Fernandez de Castro’s ultimatum ended Spanish negotiations as he waited for an answer.

The Haitian commissioners countered Fernandez de Castro’s arguments with their own assertion of their constitution’s legality and defending Dominicans’ popular choice.

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The Haitians did not deny the law of reconquest of the Spanish who drove the French out. Despite the contrary, the commissioners defended the right of the Haitian republic to live in safety writing that “a nation [has the right] is to watch its conservation and to guarantee its security.” Therefore, the laws of the constitution were against the claims of Fernandez de Castro and Spain. The Haitian commissioners did not challenge anti-Haitian opposition expressed by some elements of the Dominican population. Yet, they flipped the argument by asking Fernandez de Castro to consider whether other factions existed among the different groups of people who the Spanish had dominated in the past. They questioned where the Spanish could apply this concept to “the Batavians, the Portuguese, and other nations who are taken away from Spain’s domination.” The Haitian commissions plainly referenced Spanish control over the Netherlands and Portugal who overthrew their rule to be independent. How could Fernandez de Castro and the Spanish consider a small fraction of counter-revolutionaries if they were ultimately against the will of the larger public? The Haitian Constitution’s legality and Dominicans’ support of the republic repelled Fernandez de Castro’s point of view.

Haitian and Spanish perspectives clashed over sovereignty in Santo Domingo by focusing on the causes and legality of the Haitian Unification. Fernandez de Castro argued that the Spanish Crown established its rule in Santo Domingo with the final defeat of the French on the island and the later treaty, which confirmed these acts. While

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acknowledging the Haitian Republic’s emphasis on security, Fernandez de Castro assured his counterparts that Spanish possession of Santo Domingo would not threaten the Haitian Republic. Importantly, he presented Santo Domingo and Dominicans as pro-Spanish royalist and questioned the popular sovereignty for Haitian rule. The Haitian commissioners asserted that the Haitian Constitution enshrined the republic’s borders in Santo Domingo and its importance for security. They countered Fernandez de Castro’s claim of loyalty by focusing on the Dominicans who asserted their desire to join the Haitian Republic that resulted in Boyer’s arrival in the east. The Haitians could not support Fernandez de Castro’s claim for a nation to defend its right to slavery out of principle. The Spanish perspective of Haitian rule as a foreign imposition and act of aggression against loyal Hispanic Dominicans was a stark dichotomy to the Haitian viewpoint of two sides of the island making one whole and supported by its inhabitants.

CONCLUSION

Between February and June 1830, the Haitian government published a series of correspondences documenting the events leading up to the unification and the subsequent negotiations between the Haitian commissioners and Fernandez de Castro. The recent discussions caused Boyer’s regime to offer evidence of its claims of sovereignty. By printing the debates between the two sides Boyer wanted to express in “plain confidence in the justice of its cause, the Haitian Government seeks to impress the occasion to introduce to the world the negotiations between the Republic and foreigners.” What on the surface appeared as a tract of propaganda to combat the negative views from the Spanish was also a defense of the choices made by Dominicans to join with the Haitian

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Republic and institute its rule on the entire island. “How can one imagine that a population with an enthusiasm and unanimous for liberty, and in which to taste the sweetness after nine years can be disposed of and resumed a new shameful chains of servitude?”526 By publishing the negotiations and accounts of pro-Dominican support, the Haitian state aimed to highlight their argument’s validity.

This chapter has argued that Haitian diplomatic strategy and the decision to agree to indemnity with the French enabled it to defend its sovereignty in Santo Domingo because the Spanish government had to deal with the Haitian Republic as a legitimate nation. By having France recognize Haitian independence, the republic could now negotiate with other foreign powers such as Great Britain, which had taken an interest in the commercial affairs of the island. The French and Haitian negotiations took away an important threat to Boyer’s sovereignty and erased the possibility of joint action between Spain and France. Consequently, the Spanish finally turned to Dominican royalist Fernandez de Castro and his reports to formulate a plan to regain possession of Santo Domingo. The Spanish and Haitian negotiations represented a culmination of hardened perspectives of Santo Domingo and its inhabitants on a rhetorical level. Despite Spanish threats and the looming uncertainty of large forced payments, the Haitian Republic defended the legitimacy of Dominicans’ rights to choose which government to live under in this struggle of sovereignty.

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526 Réunion de La Partie de l’est a La Republique (Port-au-Prince: De L’imprimerie du Gouvernmenet, 1830), 8, in AGI-Cuba 2014.
On 16 February 1830, Haitian President Jean-Pierre Boyer issued a proclamation addressed to Santo Domingo’s inhabitants. In response to the Spanish Crown’s claim to Santo Domingo, Boyer proudly proclaimed, “the response of this petition could not be doubted, she [Santo Domingo] derives naturally from our December 1806 Constitution.” By referring to one of its early constitutions, he sought to illustrate since its independence in 1804, the Haitian government always intended to unify both sides of the island. Boyer grounded his argument not just in the Treaty of Basel transferring Santo Domingo to France in 1795, but the later fight against the French to reestablish slavery on the island. Boyer rhetorically asked whether it was “undeniable” that a nation looking to its future security would not look to uniting the entire island. He considered the island’s history under colonialism to underline his point of view for the Haitian Unification. The French and Spanish, two colonial slaveholding powers could not coexist in peace, and went to war during the Haitian Revolution. How would such a case bode for two governments as different as Haiti and Spain? Boyer’s proclamation, however assured Dominicans of their place in the Haitian Republic.

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By justifying Haitian claims in Santo Domingo, Boyer and pro-Haitian supporters contended directly with Dominican royalist rhetoric depicting the Haitian Unification as an unlawful foreign occupation. Haitian claims captured Dominican dissatisfaction with Spanish rule in and their choice for independence and Haitian rule over Spain. Dominican royalists responded by emphasizing their support to Fernando VII and later Isabel II, claiming to represent Santo Domingo’s population at large. Their active rewriting of the past and interpretation of its events served to convince Spanish officials to wrestle control of Santo Domingo from the Haitian Republic. With conflict between Spain and Haiti possible, it was imperative for despondent Dominicans fleeing Santo Domingo to prove their fidelity to the Spanish. Both sides contended whether the Haitian rule was indeed an occupation or the popular act of Dominicans who appealed to Boyer.

This chapter examines the fallout of the negotiations between the Haitian and Spanish government from 1830 – 1839 and their different arguments to support their positions for unification and separation. This study begins by asking how did the Haitian government and supporters respond on the island to the end of negotiations over Santo Domingo? Second, how did Spanish officials deal with the Haitian Republic after the failure to diplomatically obtain possession of Santo Domingo? And last, how did Dominicans fleeing Santo Domingo depict themselves and their loyalty to the Spanish? This chapter argues that Haitian success in asserting its sovereignty in Santo Domingo

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drove Dominican loyalists to use racism and racial superiority, and prominent Hispanic cultural ties to bolster their arguments for assistance from the Spanish Crown.

THE RIGHTS OF A REPUBLIC

The fallout from the Spanish and Haitian negotiations left the republic hold in Santo Domingo in a precarious position. According to British Consul Harrison James Thompson, Boyer believed Spain would ask for an indemnity in exchange for Haitian sovereignty in Santo Domingo. While Thompson never verified this claim’s validity, it is plausible the Haitian negotiators were flexible to other arrangements that could appease Spain in order to hold on to Santo Domingo. Thompson believed Fernandez de Castro’s warning of armed conflict would not bode well for the Haitian Republic’s rule in Santo Domingo. He observed that “in the East there are many persons who have refused, ever since the union, to accept any employment from the Republican government, or to take the oath of allegiance.” Thompson alluded in part to the struggle between Archbishop Pedro Varela y Jimenez and President Boyer where the prelate refused to accept Haitian sovereignty over the Church and spurned a state salary. From his perspective, the Haitian government could lose a potential source of trade if Santo Domingo’s inhabitants broke away. Furthermore, the agreement between the two nations, would continue and the Haitian state would still have to continue paying for an army for its defense against foreign invasion. The consequences of the negotiation over Santo Domingo jeopardize the Haitian government’s control over the entire island.

532 “Harrison James Thompson to J. Backhouse,” Port-au-Prince, 7 February 1830, TNA-FO 35/12.
533 “Harrison James Thompson to J. Backhouse,” Port-au-Prince, 7 February 1830, TNA-FO 35/12. For more on Church and State relations in Santo Domingo during this period see Ch. 3.
Haitian officials, however, did not express concern about the ramifications and instead illustrated a firm but flexible stance with the Spanish. Upon his return to Cuba, Fernandez de Castro reported that Boyer and his agents were willing to negotiate any other demands with the Spanish besides Santo Domingo’s return.\textsuperscript{534} It is likely that Haitian officials possibly could have offered the financial settlement Thompson had alluded to his British superiors. Fernandez de Castro mentioned that he tried to speak to the Haitian commissioners individually and even found an opportunity to speak directly to Boyer.\textsuperscript{535} Through attempting to speak to his counterparts individually, Fernandez de Castro wanted to sow dissension among the group, hoping one or two would follow his line of reasoning. For all his efforts, Fernandez de Castro was unable to convince Boyer or his officials to transfer Santo Domingo back to a Spanish possession.\textsuperscript{536} With rejecting Spanish sovereignty claims to Santo Domingo but showing a willingness to negotiate, the Haitian government illustrated that it was not preoccupied with the consequences of rejecting Spain.

It was within this climate of uncertainty when Boyer issued his proclamation that asserted Haitians and Dominicans similarities as opposed to their differences. For Boyer, their Haitian experiences with slavery connected them noting, “like all of the Haitian sons, your origin you will always remember [begins with] the African blood that circulates in your veins.”\textsuperscript{537} By focusing on the experiences they shared as African descended people, Boyer asserted that Haitians and Dominicans shared a black identity

\textsuperscript{534}“Felipe Vives to Secretary of State,” Havana, 16 March 1830, Archivo Historico Nacional Secretaria de Estado y del Despacho de Estado (hereafter cited as AHN-Estado) 3395 Exp. 4.
\textsuperscript{535}“Felipe Vives to Secretary of State,” Havana, 16 March 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 4.
\textsuperscript{536}“Felipe Vives to Secretary of State,” Havana, 16 March 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 4.
\textsuperscript{537}“…y, como todos los hijos de Hayti, vuestro origen os recordara siempre que la sangre africana circula en vuestras venas…,” Boyer, “Proclama, AGI-Cuba 2014.
which erased any notion of essential differences. Boyer’s discourse drew parallels with the ways that African-Americans and Britons sought to unite different people within the Diaspora together. Scholars have argued that that people of color in the Black Atlantic used a collective African identity that helped to challenge discrimination and slavery. Boyer previously attempted to appeal to other people of color during the colonization attempts with African-Americans in 1824. Consequently, Boyer’s appeal to a common black identity born out of slavery and racial discrimination uniting Haitians and Dominicans was part of a larger political platform aimed at people of African descent throughout the hemisphere.538 Boyer’s message was silent on those Dominicans who claimed European ancestry and who may have been former slave owners themselves. When considering the Haitian government recognized all white Dominican nationals as Haitian citizens and outlawed discrimination based on skin color it is likely he saw no need to address it.539 Boyer saw considered it more important to bring Haitians and Dominicans together in the face of a familiar enemy in this uncertain time.

Boyer actions, however, suggests he feared internal enemies as much as a foreign invasion. He ordered Haitian officers to fortify key entry points from a Spanish invasion such as throughout Santo Domingo and had them lead the defenses in important cities

and towns. Yet, one scholar notes how Boyer also issued secret orders to his subordinates to counteract the spirit of opposition among Dominicans and halt any kind of insurrection from taking place, worrying that the news of Fernandez de Castro’s travels would spark a sense of hope among them. Haitian officers also removed any remaining Spanish coats of arms and replace them with the Haitian equivalents. By giving these decrees to the Haitian army, Boyer’s actions suggest that he feared a threat from Dominican royalist sympathizers. Another scholar confirmed Boyer ordering Haitian officers to monitor any identified Spanish sympathizers among Dominicans in Santo Domingo. The Haitian government prepared for the defense of its sovereignty in Santo Domingo. Boyer took these measures to prepare against internal enemies among Dominicans.

Spanish officials in Puerto Rico learned of Haitian responses pin Santo Domingo from two men who arrived claiming to have escaped the island on 13 March 1830 in Mayaguez. The previous month they left Puerto Rico intending to fish in the Mona Channel, which is the body of water separating Hispaniola and Puerto Rico to the East. After facing bad weather, an “indigenous” warship with 30 men approached the fishing vessel of the two men. Given the circumstances, Haitian officer Jérôme Maximilien Borgella could not be certain whether the fishermen were spies or members of an...
invading force from Santo Domingo.\textsuperscript{544} Accompanied by other officials, he interrogated them asking “if in Puerto Rico there were many troops, boats, and what creoles could embark to attack them?” The concerned Haitian and Dominican officials focused on a possible Spanish attack as a means of retribution against the Haitian Republic.\textsuperscript{545} The fishermen’s experiences in Santo Domingo provided Spanish officials with eyewitness accounts of the Haitian government’s preparations in Santo Domingo in the aftermath of the negotiations.

During the summer of 1830, Dominican official and interlocutor Tomas Bobadilla published a pamphlet defending Dominicans and condemning the Spanish perspective.\textsuperscript{546} He noted, “in the nineteenth century, in the century of illustration, in the century where the progressives of reason have spread in all parts, there are apologists of the injustice, not recognizing the imprescriptible rights of nature.” Bobadilla referenced Fernandez de Castro’s disregard of Dominican desires to join Boyer and the Haitian Republic.\textsuperscript{547} Bobadilla noted those who persisted in this belief were unable to understand the “love for social institutions” created to inspire men to love their country. His comments referred to the Haitian Republic and the type of government institutions it supported. Bobadilla expressed a disconnect between governments devoted to their citizens and those that looked for their own self-interest.\textsuperscript{548} His tract served as a defense of Dominicans’ choice

\textsuperscript{544} “Captain-General of Puerto Rico to the Secretary of State,” San Juan, 5 April 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
\textsuperscript{545} “Captain-General of Puerto Rico to the Secretary of State,” San Juan, 5 April 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
\textsuperscript{546} Tomas Bobadilla, \textit{Observaciones Sobre las notas oficiales del Plentipotenciario del Rey de España y los de la Republica de Hayti, sobre el reclamo y posesión de la parte del Este} (Santo Domingo, 1830) in AGI-Cuba 2014.
\textsuperscript{547} Bobadilla, \textit{Observaciones Sobre las notas} AGI-Cuba 2014.
\textsuperscript{548} Bobadilla, \textit{Observaciones Sobre las notas} AGI-Cuba 2014.
Bobadilla’s writing noted Boyer’s earlier call to Dominicans to defend the Haitian Republic noting how the “tree of liberty” he planted in Santo Domingo was to always have indestructible “fertilized roots.” The Haitian president had indeed metaphorically and literally planted a tree representing the republic’s commitment to freedom after emancipation, which he used to galvanize Santo Domingo’s inhabitants’ support against the perceived Spanish threat.\textsuperscript{549} Boyer recounted the period of Spanish rule from 1809 to 1821 as an aberration and implicitly disregarded Spain’s claims to its former colony. Dominicans’ place within the Haitian nation was a voluntary incorporation and yearning. Boyer’s points echoed the larger themes the Haitian commissioners presented to Fernandez de Castro during their earlier negotiations.\textsuperscript{550} Boyer asked whether then Dominicans should take the same measures that others such as the Portuguese and North Americans had in defending their sovereignty alluding to both wars against foreign invaders and colonial empires. By drawing those parallels to other struggles of independence, Boyer presented the Haitian Unification as a legitimate act of self-determination. His message downplayed any connection or sentiment that had existed in Santo Domingo from the Spanish and calling on Dominicans to defend their liberty.\textsuperscript{551}

Bobadilla defended this liberty with his writing, disputing Fernandez de Castro’s frame of reference disregarding any independence movements, particularly José Núñez de Cáceres’ conspiracy. The Dominican official dismissed them noting, it was “not for


\textsuperscript{550} For more on the negotiations over Santo Domingo between Haiti and Spain see Ch. 4.

\textsuperscript{551} Boyer, “Proclama,” AGI-Cuba 2014.
rebellion but by mistake, they did not want to adhere to the universal principles of the citizens and the vote of the people.” Núñez de Cáceres did not misinterpret the Dominicans general discontent with Spanish rule, but the real desires of Dominicans to join the Haitian Republic.  

Bobadilla argued that it was the majority’s “irresistible forces” that brought Boyer into Santo Domingo who entered as an “angel of peace” to unite the entire island. He admitted there were similar “elements” the Gran Colombian and Haitian governments shared but doubted anyone would raise their flag to join the federation. With acknowledging the separate independent movements and Haitian unification, Bobadilla asserted against Spanish claims that most Dominicans did not support. He struck down another one of Spain’s claims underlining their conquest of Santo Domingo from the French in 1808. The Dominican official asserted that it was from Haitian support and supplies that Dominican commander Juan Sánchez Ramirez could defeat the French. Bobadilla contended it was through a small pro-Spanish faction that Spain implemented its control implying many Dominicans did not support the colonial regime. His arguments disputed any Spanish claims of support and asserted Dominicans’ call for independence. 

As president, Boyer wanted the entire island to defend this independence from Spanish claims and invasion. He wanted no foreign government to doubt the Haitian Republic’s intentions to defend itself. He argued that the Haitian government’s actions in Santo Domingo consisted of implementing state laws and constitutional articles. Boyer’s point was consistent with earlier Haitian arguments asserting Santo Domingo as

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a part of the republic and its anti-slavery stance. Historians have argued that the Haitian Revolution precipitated a culture of fear among the Spanish possessions of Puerto Rico and Cuba over the course of the nineteenth century. Boyer dissuaded Spanish officials’ arguments in the Caribbean, warning that “if in another time our territory comes to be violated, we would stay free of our promise for our aggressors.” Boyer’s message suggested the Haitian Republic would be justified in defending itself and taking any action it sought appropriate because of foreign threats.

Borgella followed Boyer’s suit in his interaction with the Spanish fishermen and made sure to dispel any notion of fear in the fishermen’s presence. He assured them it was only through “bayonets” the Haitians would cede the plaza of Santo Domingo City. His response supported Boyer’s stance in his proclamation to Santo Domingo’s population. According to Borgella, Boyer warned Spanish emissaries, “if they attacked the plaza [of Santo Domingo] then Puerto Rico and Cuba would feel it.” Boyer’s admonishment boldly asserted that the Spanish would not intimidate the Haitian Republic. It was likely Boyer’s way to astutely play on Spanish officials’ fears of a Haitian threat to their slave possessions in the Caribbean. Borgella’s detention of these fishermen illustrate the Haitian officer embodying Boyer’s proclamation to defend Santo Domingo.

558 “Captain-General of Puerto Rico to the Secretary of State,” San Juan, 5 April 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
559 “Captain-General of Puerto Rico to the Secretary of State,” San Juan, 5 April 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
Bobadilla defense was in his criticism of the Spanish, observing that they did know or understand the society the Haitian government established on the island. This suggestion of Spain’s ignorance was quite accurate as Spanish officials relied on Dominican loyalist who no longer lived in Santo Domingo. The Dominican official lauded Haitian institutions and the open reception extended to foreigners such as Fernandez de Castro when he returned in 1824. Bobadilla stressed how Fernandez de Castro sought to live in Haiti, insinuating the republic had something to offer that Spain could not. He could not understand “how a man wanted to live and be an individual in a state where there are not rights guaranteed and where they do not know or observe nature and people.”

Bobadilla’s observation questioned Fernandez de Castro’s true intentions and earlier claims during his 1824 travel to the island. By discrediting Fernandez de Castro’s reports and observations, Bobadilla was striking at the heart of Dominican royalist discourse. The Dominican official did not consider it necessary to justify why Dominicans should separate from the Haitian Republic. Simply put, they would not choose a return to a system that supported slavery as before.

Bobadilla disagreed with Spain’s committal to slavery and seeing it as a nation’s right. From the Spanish perspective, the right for a nation to have slavery conformed to natural rights of property. Bobadilla countered them noting, a “sweet religion, tolerate and paternal of Jesus Christ, has destroyed slavery in Europe. A poorly understood Christianity has been introduced in America. They made blacks into slaves to convert them.”

Bobadilla argued that the Spanish incorrectly used religion and natural rights to

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560 Bobadilla, Observaciones Sobre las notas, AGI-Cuba 2014.
561 Bobadilla, Observaciones Sobre las notas, AGI-Cuba 2014.
562 Bobadilla, Observaciones Sobre las notas, AGI-Cuba 2014.
justify slavery’s existence in the Americas even after it met its end in Europe. For
Bobadilla, it was because of the American movements for independence that brought
forth the language of “the natural rights of man.” Bobadilla warned that a slave can “lose
up to the desire for liberty but an entire people and the generations that succeed cannot
love without ceasing their brutalization.”

For those knowing the negative impact of slavery on a single person and society, they would call for its end. Bobadilla’s comment was akin to the entire island’s experiences with enslavement, emancipation, and for those in the east even possible re-enslavement under the Spanish. For Bobadilla, slavery was not a natural right that the Spanish could justify protecting or extending into Santo Domingo.

In sum, the Haitian government and its supporters responded to the end of negotiations by galvanizing Dominicans to defend the island from a possible Spanish invasion. By issuing a proclamation and publishing the earlier diplomatic correspondences, Boyer wanted to inform Dominicans of the steps the Haitian government took and was willing to take to defend their sovereignty. The Haitians followed these messages with the strengthen of defenses, which included key cities and settlements. The Spanish fishermen’s accounts illustrate the vigilance that Borgella and his officers took to defend Santo Domingo City and to find out more information about Spain’s force in Puerto Rico. Bobadilla’s tract offered a rhetorical defense of the Haitian Unification, which Dominicans supported. By simultaneously questioning Spain’s commitment to slavery and defending Dominicans’ choice to be a part of Haiti,

563 Bobadilla, Observaciones Sobre las notas AGI-Cuba 2014.
564 Bobadilla, Observaciones Sobre las notas AGI-Cuba 2014.
Bobadilla’s writing disputed earlier Dominican royalist contentions of a loyal former colony that never wanted to sever its ties with Spain. The Haitian Republic responded to Spain’s threat with its own counterargument and military build-up to prepare.

SPANISH RETREAT

Spanish officials learned more about Haitian preparations in Santo Domingo from Dominicans who fled to Puerto Rico. According to the exiled Dominicans, the Haitian government under Boyer had not only declared war against the Spanish government and monarchy but also gave fifteen days for all Spaniards who had remained on the island to leave. Therefore, they took it upon themselves to leave Santo Domingo for Puerto Rico because of relatives they had on the island. They noted that other “Spaniards” fled to other Caribbean islands such as St. Thomas. Through this testimony, the Captain General of Puerto Rico and his officials learned that Dominican royalists had fled Santo Domingo because of this militarization, likely creating communities on other islands. These Dominican informed officials that the Haitian government reinforced Santo Domingo City’s plaza with 2,000 men, but there was only one boat to patrol the borders. They observed “that similar to a mob the troops frequently threatened those for being Spaniards with the loss of life making everyone ready to leave.” By listening to Dominican royalists, the Spanish learn that the Haitian government had begun expelling sympathizers among the population and strengthening their defenses.

565 “Captain-General of Puerto Rico to the Secretary of State,” San Juan, 30 April 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
566 “Captain-General of Puerto Rico to the Secretary of State,” San Juan, 30 April 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
567 “Captain-General of Puerto Rico to the Secretary of State,” San Juan, 30 April 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
The Spanish in Cuba received reports from the British and Dominican exiles, confirming a possible Haitian invasion.⁵⁶⁸ Captain General of Cuba Francisco Dionisio Vives met with other Spanish ministers and reported that the Haitian government intended to send 8,000 men from Santo Domingo in preparation for an invasion. From this number, Boyer would portion 3,000 men to invade Cuba as the Haitian government was gathering the boats necessary for the invasion. Five Dominicans who immigrated to Cuba confirmed this information, bringing more news of battalions forming.⁵⁶⁹ The reports from the British and Dominicans illustrated that Haiti threatened Spain’s rule and slavery in Cuba. For Vives, the Spanish failure to negotiate Santo Domingo’s return resulted in the unchecked Haitian Republic building its military. He had previously warned Spanish officials of this possibility when Vives learned of France’s recognition of Haitian independence in 1825.⁵⁷⁰ With the information that the Spanish received, a possible Haitian invasion threatened Cuba and Spain’s sovereignty.

Vives and the other administrators appropriately used this news to propose a serious of measures meant to balance security of Spain’s remaining possessions and peace. First, Vives called for the Spanish to send a squadron to patrol the eastern part of Cuba or to the south of the island of Hispaniola. This act would serve as a precaution if negotiations continue and were not successful. Second, was to send a Spanish subject on a foreign boat to the island of Hispaniola to cover the political and social state of the island. Lastly, Vives called for the Spanish to send a separate ship with an official to Port-au-Prince to speak and negotiate again with Boyer, the same way as Fernandez de

⁵⁶⁸ “Francisco Dionisio Vives to the Secretary of State,” Havana, 7 May 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04. ⁵⁶⁹ “Francisco Dionisio Vives to the Secretary of State,” Havana, 7 May 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04. ⁵⁷⁰ “Francisco Dionisio Vives to the Secretary of State,” Havana, 7 May 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
Castro did before. Vives hoped to use these two officials would give those in Cuba and Puerto Rico more time to prepare if the Spanish reestablished communication channels. If the Spanish were not successful, officials in Cuba’s eastern part were to have the island’s defenses ready with the right amount of forces and weapons. Vives’s proposal to officials in Madrid sought to find a middle ground of relying on diplomatic channels while strengthening military forces in Cuba in case of an attack.

Fernandez de Castro, however, disagreed with Vives’ assessment and believed that the Haitian Republic’s current situation was advantageous to the Spanish reclaiming Santo Domingo. The failures of negotiations between the Spanish and Haitians resulted in the militarization of the eastern part of the island putting a financial burden on Boyer and his government. Haitian Secretary-General Joseph Balthazar Inginac had in fact written to Fernandez de Castro surprised at the claims of pro-Spanish support on the island. The Haitian government still had not resolved its negotiations with its French counterparts for the indemnity payments. Until both sides agreed, Boyer would be on guard if the French involved themselves militarily. Haiti was in fact in a situation where it had to deal with multiple problems that could threaten its security. Fernandez de Castro believed both the French and Spanish should ally to put pressure on the Haitian government. By facing a simultaneous attack from France and Spain, Fernandez de Castro thought Haitian forces would retreat from Santo Domingo out of necessity. With

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571 “Francisco Dionisio Vives to the Secretary of State,” Havana, 7 May 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
572 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Secretary of State,” Santiago de Cuba, 18 July 1830, AHN 3395 Exp. 04, No. 8.; and “Joseph Balthazar Inginac to Felipe Fernandez de Castro,” Port-au-Prince, 08 May 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
the Haitian military situated on the western side of the island, the Spanish could repossess Santo Domingo taking advantage of their former enemy’s retreat.  

For Fernandez de Castro, Haiti’s militarization would work in Spain’s favor as it attempted to colonize Santo Domingo.

Other Spanish officials shared the same sentiment as Fernandez de Castro but they sought had a different view on alternatives to regaining Santo Domingo. One administrator considered attracting the free people of color living in Santo Domingo to the Spanish side. He believed those “of good inclination would go under the protection of the European nation with who they were raised.”  

This relationship included the language and customs the Spanish gave Dominicans of color. The official insinuated Dominicans of color would seek a return to Spanish rule because Spain had protected their interests when Santo Domingo was a colony. If colonial authorities had mistreated them, it was because they were leaders who feared to lose their authority.  

The Spanish official dismissed any grievances that Dominicans of color had with mistreatment noting those instances were an exception and not indicative of conditions under Spain’s rule. He justified the Spanish Crown’s claims to Santo Domingo for historical reasons, which he believed no person could reject.  

For the Spanish official, gaining Santo Domingo’s free people of color’s support was key for gaining control of the former colony.

The Spanish official did recognize the Haitian Unification made a return to slavery unfeasible. He presented a strategy to entice the free people of color in Santo

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574 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Secretary of State,” Santiago de Cuba, 18 July 1830, AHN 3395 Exp. 04, No. 8.
575 sin nombre y sin fecha AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
576 sin nombre y sin fecha AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
577 sin nombre y sin fecha AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
Domingo to rejoin the Spanish side. Therefore, he recommended the Spanish Crown recognize blacks and mulattos as free subjects and to stress there was no chance of re-enslavement. For the same reason, the Spanish government would provide land to free people of color in Santo Domingo land they could choose to live on. By accepting these parts of Haitian reforms already in place in Santo Domingo, the Spanish official hoped that some people of color would not “be late to ‘come’ to search for the advantages of civilization.” His comment insinuated a dichotomy between the positive attributes of Spanish rule from Europe versus the negative view of Haitian rule from blacks and mulattos. The Spanish official’s proposal acknowledged free people of color’s freedoms that they earned in Santo Domingo under Haitian rule by keeping them in place. He hoped the Spanish would have the support of Dominicans of color to regain Santo Domingo from Haitian rule. The Spanish official intended for his plan to serve some use to the Spanish Crown in their attempts to regain Santo Domingo serving as an alternative if diplomacy proved futile. His plan was in response to the changes in the geopolitical situation threatening Spain’s Caribbean slave enterprise.

Spanish officials in the Caribbean considered a mix of force and finesse because of the negotiation failures. One official reflected on how the Haitian commission only sought to defend its justification with the Haitian Constitution’s laws and Dominicans’ desires in supporting Haitian rule. Haitian and Spanish officials were far off in terms of their interest in Santo Domingo. As a result, the Spanish official recommended the best course of action for Spain was to keep the relationship between the two nations friendly.

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578 sin nombre y sin fecha AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
579 sin nombre y sin fecha AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
580 sin nombre y sin fecha AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
581 sin nombre y sin fecha AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
In the meantime, Vives requested no barrier be issued to people or commerce traveling from the island of Hispaniola to Cuba.\textsuperscript{582} The Haitian government sought a peaceful way to solve the “difficult situation” between the two nations. Boyer hoped the Spanish government would both recognize Haitian independence and sovereignty over the entire island. As Spanish officials in Cuba considered a blockade, they awaited orders from Madrid enabling them to put more pressure on the Haitian Republic through force or diplomacy.\textsuperscript{583}

By September 1830, Spanish officials made little headway with Haitian forces in Santo Domingo and it was clear that the republic would not invade. Fernandez de Castro reported the number of troops that the Haitian government stationed in Port-au-Prince numbered between 5,000-6,000, “but they lacked discipline.”\textsuperscript{584} Despite the armed confrontation’s absence, Fernandez de Castro earlier warned of the potential threat for Spanish slaveholding interests. He observed that “since the reclamation that has been done for the Spanish part, those islanders are irritated against us and appear are well prepared to defend themselves vigorously.”\textsuperscript{585} Far from pushing Santo Domingo closer to the Spanish orbit, Fernandez de Castro’s diplomatic mission had strengthened Haitian resolve on the entire island. He received reports the Haitian government had sent 6,000 men to Santo Domingo to defend the eastern part of the island. Yet, the Haitian government had not allied with Mexico or Gran Colombia to attack the Spanish in

\textsuperscript{582} sin nombre y sin fecha AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
\textsuperscript{583} sin nombre y sin fecha AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
\textsuperscript{584} “Felipe Fernández de Castro to Secretary of State,” Santiago de Cuba, 16 September 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
\textsuperscript{585} “Felipe Fernández de Castro to Secretary of State,” Santiago de Cuba, 16 September 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
Cuba. Despite Fernandez de Castro’s exaggerated claims and Spanish forces headway, Cuban Captain-General Vives concluded the threat of a joint attack by Spain’s enemies was as unlikely as the Haitian government ceding its claims over the Spanish in Santo Domingo.

After failing to acquire Santo Domingo diplomatically, Spanish officials dealt with the Haitian Republic by simultaneously building up defenses in the Caribbean and observing events on Hispaniola. The different and conflicting reports suggested a potential threat to Spanish economic and political interests in its remaining colonies, most notably in the expanding slave colony of Cuba. This change of events fed into existing fears perceiving Haitian strength as a threat to slavery and colonial rule in the Caribbean. While the Spanish continued to observe Haitian actions from their nearby colonies and consider a blockade, other officials such as Fernandez de Castro pitched alternatives highlighting their preoccupation with the Haitian Unification. These substitutes included enticing Dominicans of color to the Spanish cause and continued negotiation backed by force. The unlikelihood of a Haitian invasion gave the Spanish some consolation as they shifted their focus away from the events in Santo Domingo that tacitly acknowledged the success of Boyer’s government in defending its legitimacy in Santo Domingo.

LOYAL VASSALS
Dominican royalists who lived in Santo Domingo after the negotiation’s failure characterized Haitian rule as an occupation. They spoke of Haitian insults towards the “loyal Spanish spectators in Santo Domingo.” These actions included taking the coat of arms from the Cathedral of Santo Domingo and the damage done to other churches and

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586 “Felipe Fernández de Castro to Secretary of State,” Santiago de Cuba, 16 September 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04.
other religious structures. These attacks also included other public places in Santo Domingo City. Interestingly, the Dominican petitioners’ accounts offer a perspective of the results of Boyer’s decree seeking to destroy the remaining Spanish coat of arms on the eastern side of the island. Their accounts hint at some form of soldiers’ excess in Santo Domingo with damaging other Dominican loyalist properties. But without more evidence, one can only speculate on their claims’ validity. From the Dominican petitioners’ perspective and like other loyalists, Haitian soldiers’ actions in Santo Domingo resulted in their “uncontrolled liberty” on the eastern side of the island. To emphasize the severity and disapproval towards Haitian rule, the Dominican petitioners noted it was worse than French rule during the early part of the century. By comparing Haitian and French rule in Santo Domingo, the Dominican petitioners underlined that Boyer’s government was a foreign occupation and unwanted.

The Haitian Republic’s successful defense of its legitimacy in Santo Domingo contributed to the exodus of the pro-Spanish Dominicans such as archbishop Pedro Varela y Jimenez. Haitian officer Borgella believed Varela y Jimenez was in communication with Spanish authorities and aided their efforts to undermine Haitian rule. While it is not certain whether the archbishop secretly wrote to Spanish officials in Madrid or the Caribbean, Varela y Jimenez already expressed his continued loyalty to the Spanish Crown. One scholar alleged that the Haitian government’s bitterness towards Varela y Jimenez caused them to plot the archbishop’s death. When finding himself face

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587 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, Archivo Historico Nacional Ministerio de Ultramar (hereafter cited as AHN-Ultramar) 4601 Exp. 15
588 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15.
589 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15.
590 Gabriel García, Obras Completas, 385.
to face with the prelate, the would-be murderer fell to his knees confessing his mission.\footnote{Gabriel García, \textit{Obras Completas}, 385. For more on Varela y Jimenez’s confessions of loyalty to the Spanish Crown and schism with Boyer see Ch. 3.} This apocryphal story suggests a continuing schism between the highest-ranking secular and religious powers on the island. It is likely Varela y Jimenez did fear for his safety given the increased militarization of the island while the fact that the prelate requested his passport gave Haitian officials the right pretext to rid themselves of a nuisance.\footnote{Historians differ in their account for Varela y Jimenez’s reasons for leaving Santo Domingo with Gabriel García siding with the prelate. Haitian historian Thomas Maidou focused on Varela y Jimenez’s request for his passport conveyed to the Haitian authorities the archbishop’s desire to resign his post. Gabriel García, \textit{Obras Completas}, 385; and Maidou, \textit{Historie d’Haiti}, 77.} Varela y Jimenez soon left for Havana accompanied by former vicar general Bernardo Correa y Cidrón, a Boyer supporter.\footnote{Gabriel García, \textit{Obras Completas}, 385; and Maidou, \textit{Historie d’Haiti}, 77.} Haiti’s unchecked sovereignty in Santo Domingo resulted in Varela y Jimenez exile to Cuba.

Varela y Jimenez was not the only Dominican loyalist the Haitian government granted a passport to leave. On the same day, various individuals and their families took advantage of this moment to flee from the Haitian Republic to Cuba. Gabriel García wrote some “embarked secretly” while others Haitian officials sent to Port-au-Prince.\footnote{Gabriel García, \textit{Obras Completas}, 385.} Haitian officials granted passports certified by a \textit{greffier}, or notary, for Santo Domingo’s inhabitants to leave. While uncertain as to the criteria for inhabitants, the remaining passports suggest some truth to the Dominican exiles’ accounts of Spaniards and pro-Spanish Dominicans leaving Santo Domingo. Instead of an expulsion, the passports suggest a voluntary action of migration.\footnote{“Captain-General of Puerto Rico to the Secretary of State,” San Juan, 30 April 1830, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04. Dominicans fled Santo Domingo previously after the transfer from Spanish to French rule and again when Toussaint Louverture entered on the eastern side of the island. For more on this exodus José}
government issued passports from individuals to those with families.\footnote{596} With Santo Domingo City as the departure point, Haitians granted safe passage for those Dominicans choosing to flee.

Upon his arrival to Santiago de Cuba on the eastern side of the island, Varela y Jimenez wanted to establish a post in Cuba and receive compensation from the Spanish government. He wrote to the Count of Villanueva eager to seek employment and situate himself in Cuba. By writing about his experiences as the archbishop in Santo Domingo, Varela y Jimenez made his case for assistance and to defend his actions.\footnote{597} He notes, “the torrent of afflictions, bitterness, penalties, and indescribable pain that I have seen in the narrow case and tough necessity to abandon the flock that without my merit I am confided.” Through referring to external factors beyond his control, Varela y Jimenez presented himself as the victim who held out until the end. Varela y Jimenez subtly noted how he shared the same loyalty and support for the Spanish Crown with Dominicans.\footnote{598} With mentioning this faithfulness, Varela y Jimenez discreetly upheld his support for the Spanish Crown as a pretext for help. Moreover, he also hinted that his stay in Santo Domingo up until that point was for those parishioners who were left. Through presenting his role as tending to the loyalty of Dominicans, Varela y Jimenez deliberately set

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\footnote{596}{“Pasaportes,” AGI-Cuba 2014.}

\footnote{597}{“Pedro Varela y Jiménez to El Conde de Villanueva,” Santiago de Cuba, 9 September 1830, Archivo General de Indias Audiencia de Santo Domingo (hereafter cited as AGI-SD) 1108.}

\footnote{598}{“…el torrente de aribulaciones, amarguras, penalidades, y el indecible dolor de haberme visto en el estrecho caso y dura necesidad de abandonar el rebano que sin merito mio me esta confiado,” Pedro Varela y Jiménez to El Conde de Villanueva,” Santiago de Cuba, 9 September 1830, AGI-SD 1108.}
himself up for more benefits from the Spanish Government as officials would soon realize.599

Varela y Jimenez was the first of petitions from an exiled Dominican community increasingly depicting Haitian rule in stark and negative terms. The petitioners hailed from Santo Domingo City and claimed to speak in “the name of the natural inhabitants of the Spanish part.” They wanted military support for Dominicans to overthrow the “yoke of the mulattoes and blacks” from Haiti.600 The Dominican petitioners blamed the maligned Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres for their situation, accusing him of being in secret agreement with Boyer. They believed Núñez de Cáceres’ actions allowed for Boyer to enter Santo Domingo, which struck “a mortal blow to the nation” to Dominicans’ detriment. For the Dominican migrants, Haitian rule had introduced “stupid men” among a “docile, obedient, and peaceful people.”601 By depicting themselves as innocent and defenseless in the face of Haitian aggression, these Dominicans negatively presented the Unification as an occupation that they did not warrant.

Archbishop Varela y Jimenez based his argument for compensation on his loyalty he exhibited in Santo Domingo. The Haitian state appropriated ecclesiastical land as a part of its 1824 land reform and allowed Varela y Jimenez’s a salary to make up for it. Nevertheless, the archbishop rejected this offer to prove that he served as the archbishop of Santo Domingo and not Haiti.602 By emphasizing his antagonism towards Boyer, Varela y Jimenez intended to underline his loyalty and support to the Spanish Crown as

599 “Pedro Varela y Jiménez to El Conde de Villanueva,” Santiago de Cuba, 9 September 1830, AGI-SD 1108.
600 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15.
601 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15.
602 “Pedro Varela y Jiménez to El Conde de Villanueva,” Santiago de Cuba, 9 September 1830, AGI-SD 1108; and Frank Moya Pons, La dominación haitiana (Santo Domingo: Librería La Trinitaria, 2013).
opposed to Boyer and the Haitian Republic. The archbishop referred to the “good
[financial] accounts during the other government in the other Spanish part and none after
the intrusive and usurper [Haiti] that in actuality the rule and tyranny for which I
justifiably resisted.” With juxtaposing the Spanish and Haitian regimes in Santo
Domingo, Varela y Jimenez idealized Spain’s rule and his resistance to Boyer’s authority
in Santo Domingo. He wisely sought to convince Spanish officials that he served as their
archbishop who refused to collaborate with Boyer and the Haitian government. This
notion included refusing the Haitian government’s salary signifying Varela y Jimenez’s
role as the archbishop of Haiti. Any hint of Varela y Jimenez’s cooperating with the
Haitian government as the archbishop of Haiti would hurt his chances of gaining
compensation from the Spanish. Varela y Jimenez’s best way to acquire Spanish
compensation would be to present his steadfast loyalty as the Spanish archbishop of
Santo Domingo.

The Dominican royalists would later use their loyalty to their arguments for the
Spanish by emphasizing their innocence at the Haitian entrance into Santo Domingo. The
Dominicans noted it surprised a nation of “love and loyalty to their sovereign” of the
Haitian government’s domination. Boyer’s entrance into Santo Domingo resulted in him
emancipating the remaining enslaved peoples. This act ended ranches and reduced the
property of others. From Dominican loyalists’ perspectives, Haitian rule resulted in
seized property, imposed contributions to the state, and the Haitian state persecuting
Dominican youth to serve as soldiers in the Haitian army. They wrote, “in a word, the

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603 “General superintendent to Revenue Office,” Havana, 11 October 1830, AGI-SD 1108; “Pedro Varela y
Jiménez to Francisco Vives,” Santiago de Cuba, 11 September 1830, AGI-SD 1108.
604 For more on the impact of the 1824 law and its impact on the archbishop office see Chapter 3.
605 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15.
Spaniards were betrayed for what they were calling human liberty affiliated with their persons who were little more than prisoners.” Land reform, emancipation, and other Haitian reforms proved to be a form of enslavement by their twisted logic as opposed to liberty. The petitioners emphasized how Dominicans’ suffer under Haitian rule continued after Boyer’s reforms in Santo Domingo. The Dominican loyalists not only continued to express their loyalty and faith for the Spanish Crown but how the rest of Santo Domingo’s population but also offered evidence of these actions. They used the period of 1822 – 1824 as one in which conspiracies characterized the Dominican population in favor of Spanish king Fernando VII’s reign. By presenting their innocence and entrapment, the Dominican petitioners not only wanted to convince Spanish officials of their support but how they and others actively desired to overthrow Haitian rule.

To persuade the Spanish of his loyalty, Varela y Jimenez needed to prove why he stayed in Santo Domingo for nearly a decade under Haitian rule. The archbishop argued that he stayed and resisted Haitian rule “for the obligation in that was to not dissuade the flock whose merits they were confiding in me.” Varela y Jimenez explain his reasons for staying in Santo Domingo via his obligations to administer sacraments to Dominicans as a part of his spiritual role. It was with this public spirit Varela y Jimenez justified weathering “sad luck and [being] miserable” under Haitian rule. For instance, Haitian land reform and secularization in the 1820s was one example Varela y Jimenez observed and lived through during his tenure as the archbishop of Santo Domingo. The archbishop

606 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15.
607 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15.
608 “Pedro Varela y Jiménez to Francisco Vives,” Santiago de Cuba, 11 September 1830, AGI-SD 1108.
asserted that it was because of this “hate and the persecution” eventually forcing him to flee Santo Domingo for Cuba. Varela y Jimenez hoped his justification and actions in Santo Domingo warranted a pension for which the archbishop could pass his days “with rest in an advanced age and in a state full of affliction and bitterness affecting afflicting my spirit for the consideration of having separated from such a docile flock.” By stating his reason for staying as spiritually taking care of Dominicans in Santo Domingo, Varela y Jimenez explained why he stayed on the island and to support his case for loyalty to the Spanish Crown.

The Dominican petitioners used their account of Santo Domingo’s conditions to plead for their sincere loyalty. They believed Haitian rule reduced Dominicans to “the most severe slavery” and desire to “liberate themselves from the brutal domination.” To express the cruelty they suffered under Haitian rule, the Dominican loyalists turned to what for them was the worst thing imaginable, chattel slavery. What they desired from Spain was to restore Spanish rule under Isabel II in Santo Domingo. The Dominican petitioners invoked past Dominicans’ victory in 1809 taking back Santo Domingo back from the French. They noted, “it is not possible, great Madam that some vassals that in each past century from their discovery have given glorious evidence of their fine love and important memorable victories against the tenacious enemies.” By situating their past descendants’ actions with the exploits of other great Spaniards in their history, Dominican loyalists fashioned an interpretation of the past celebrating their Hispanism. This account was silent on the help Haitian leaders Alexandre Pétion and Henri

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609 “Pedro Varela y Jiménez to Francisco Vives,” Santiago de Cuba, 11 September 1830, AGI-SD 1108.
610 “Pedro Varela y Jiménez to Francisco Vives,” Santiago de Cuba, 11 September 1830, AGI-SD 1108.
611 Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15.
612 Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15.
Christophe provided to help them get rid of the French, and historians have offered evidence conflicting with such pro-Spanish loyal accounts. Dominican petitioners’ pro-Hispanic rhetoric offered past exploits as evidence of their fidelity contradicting and distorting the truth of the past and present of Haitian rule.

Varela y Jimenez’s petition and descriptions became a subject of discussion among Spanish officials as they pursued to make sense of his version of events in Santo Domingo. According to the archbishop’s explanation to the Spanish, the Haitian government had come to violently occupy Santo Domingo; however, Dominicans continued to demonstrate their loyalty to the Spanish Crown. From this perspective, Varela y Jimenez differed little from Dominican loyalist reports fleeing Santo Domingo in the 1820s but it won over Spanish officials. His account took pro-Spanish Dominican experiences to speak for most of the population. Where Varela y Jimenez differed from early accounts was that he did not leave during the early years of Haitian rule in Santo Domingo and even applied for a passport from the Haitian government. Varela y Jimenez claimed he sought a passport to use it under the right conditions and circumstances. Boyer interpreted this request as a sign of Varela y Jimenez’s resignation as archbishop of Haiti. The change in circumstances with the Haitian government combined with the existing hostile conditions resulted in Varela y Jimenez leaving for


614 “Spanish official to the Grace and Justice of the Indies Minister,” Havana, 26 November 1830, AGI-Ultramar 147 N. 2. For more on anti-Haitian narratives by Dominican loyalists see Ch. 2.
Santiago de Cuba with his passport. The archbishop expressed how he and another Dominicans lived in misery under Haitian rule, which Dominican loyalist Fernandez de Castro’s arrival exacerbated. According to Varela y Jimenez, Fernandez de Castro’s failure to negotiate a transfer of power resulted in the worsening of the situation Dominicans found themselves under. Through their discussions of Varela y Jimenez’s accounts of Haitian rule in Santo Domingo, Spanish officials found he qualified for financial compensation and granted the archbishop 3,000 pesos to live under on 14 March 1831. By proving the Spanish with his observations of the Unification in Santo Domingo, Varela y Jimenez’s loyalty rhetoric convinced the superiors to support him.

The Dominican royalists combined their loyalist pleas with racist arguments with the notion of a menacing Haitian threat to call for Spanish support. The Dominican petitioners called for the Spanish protection from the “ferocious Ethiopians of the French colony.” Nineteenth-century black and white contemporaries used Ethiopia or Ethiopian as a synonymy for black when speaking of people of color in the present. White speakers or writers used this term to underscore the concept of an embodied threat. By referring to Haitians as French Ethiopians, the Dominican petitioners presented them as both being different and dangerous. The Dominican royalists criticized the Haitians as “men without character” attributing it to slavery in Saint-Domingue. They warned how Haitian President Boyer was “a bad example for those of color in the other

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615 “Spanish official to the Grace and Justice of the Indies Minister,” Havana, 26 November 1830, AGI-Ultramar 147 N. 2.
616 “El Conde de Villanueva to Intendente de Havana,” Havana, 14 March 1831, AGI-SD 1108.
617 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15.
Spanish Antilles and the French” alluding to the symbol of Haitian sovereignty for enslaved and free people of color. The Haitian Unification was “a dangerous movement” that could spread to Caribbean colonies with plantation slavery. With their time in Cuba, the Dominican were probably aware of the fears of slave insurrection and sought to capitalize on it. They claimed Boyer sought to spread revolution and his “depraved system.” By pointing to the danger to Puerto Rico and Cuba with racist arguments towards Haitians, the Dominican royalists wanted to sway the Spanish to go to Santo Domingo.

Despite Dominican loyalists’ failure in overthrowing Haitian rule, the petitioners wanted to sway Spanish officials to involve themselves more directly. They did not want outward resistance absence against Haitian rule after 1824 to turn the Spanish from offering a “strong arm” for those “love and support at their dear king and at his great nation.” By associating their loyalty to the Spanish Crown with the nation, the petitioners linked themselves as Spaniards who were a part of the Spanish empire. The petitioners strategically reminded the Spanish Crown how it was because of the actions of Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres, “an ungrateful vassal” who separated Santo Domingo from Spain. Curiously, they blamed former Captain-General of Santo Domingo Sebastian Kindelan who could not make headway from his new station in Cuba to regain Spain’s former colony. What this reference did for the petitioners was to shift the blame for their failure to something beyond their control. The Dominican petitioners reminisced about Dominican loyalist Fernandez de Castro’s failure to negotiate Santo

619 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15.
620 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15.
621 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15.
622 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15.
Domingo’s return to Spanish control with the Haitian commissioners. Through mentioning the previous negotiations in 1830, the Dominican petitioners could also reject Boyer’s claims of sovereignty to Santo Domingo viewing them as “frivolous reasons,” and it presented them an opportunity to further align themselves with the Spanish. 623 Through linking their perspectives with Spain, the Dominican loyalists hoped to bring in more direct Spanish support.

The Dominican petitioners offered an interpretation of the past underscoring their Hispanic cultural ties as a stark dichotomy between themselves and the Haitians they left just a few years prior. The presented themselves as “the Dominicans, who[are] the first Spaniards of America, that those distinguished men for their fidelity, that in the middle of the most barbaric slavery, and the hard chain, that at much lift [themselves] up to the royal throne their weak voice.”624 The Dominican loyalists put for their interpretation of the past offering contradictory logic to the emancipation Boyer’s rule brought to Santo Domingo. By offering examples of their fidelity and focus on enslavement, the Dominican petitioners strategically interpreted the past in this way while denying the current present of the Haitian Unification.625 These Dominican loyalists underscored their relationship to the Spanish Crown as vassals by referring to themselves as “faithful subjects and children of both worlds.”626 Their paternalistic framing of the relationship between themselves and the Spanish monarchy draws parallels to the work of scholars of Latin America exploring the ties between the Crown and its subjects during the colonial

623 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15.
624 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15.
626 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15.
era. This past interpretation of Hispanic vassalage allowed the Dominican petitioners to draw themselves closer to Spain as opposed to Haiti.

Dominican royalists fleeing Santo Domingo depicted themselves as loyal to the Spanish Crown and against the Haitian government by highlighting the differences between them. Varela y Jimenez and later Dominicans emphasized an unwavering if not static loyalty as vassals of the Spanish Crown. This rhetoric entailed focusing on the negative impact of Haitian rule in Santo Domingo to dissuade any question of collusion between Dominican royalists and Haitian officials. This made sense as these Dominicans had stayed living in Santo Domingo after the earlier conspiracies and attempts to overthrow Haitian rule were unsuccessful. These Dominicans further unpinned their argument by accentuating their affinity for Hispanic culture and the ties that brought them together as Spaniards. Their arguments rested on representing the rest of the Dominican population with whom they shared their loyalty and support to the Spanish Crown and Spanish rule as they condemned the Unification as a foreign occupation in racially explicit terms.

CONCLUSION
On 30 January 1838, the Captain-General of Puerto Rico communicated to other officials about his observation of a French squadron. According to the Captain-General, the French intended to deliver an announcement to the Haitian government. Judging by the size of the squadron numbering eight ships, the Spanish official concluded the French

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intended to blockade the island of Hispaniola.\textsuperscript{628} The Spanish were silent over any action to take on the change of events just as they were silent over the decision to not intensify their attempts to regain Santo Domingo. The struggle Dominicans and Haitians had and continued to have as a unified republic was reminiscent of the same fight other former colonial possessions had against Europeans. During the tense moments after the 1830 negotiations, Bobadilla called for Santo Domingo’s inhabitants to stay united with the Haitian government and to prepare to use force if necessary. He wrote, “we leave victorious or we bury ourselves in our ruins before we become slaves.”\textsuperscript{629} Bobadilla’s call to rally Dominicans to defend Haitian sovereignty on the island against the Spanish could be applied for the French or any European power that sought to clash with Boyer.

This chapter has argued that Dominican loyalists strengthen a discourse promoting ties to the Spanish Crown and Empire while using a racist argument to discredit Haiti because of the successful Haitian assertion of the republic’s sovereignty in the face of Spanish diplomatic pressure. The Haitian government committed itself militarily and rhetorically to defend its sovereignty in Santo Domingo and Dominicans’ choice to join the republic. The decline of Spanish interest to regain Santo Domingo left it up to Dominicans who left Santo Domingo to convince Spain to redouble its attempts. These attempts created a discourse of Hispanism to separate themselves from Haitians and their supporters. By presenting themselves and the rest of Dominicans as staunch Spaniards, Dominican loyalists sought to sway Spanish officials to regain Santo Domingo

\textsuperscript{628} “Captain-General of Puerto Rico to Secretary of State,” San Juan, 30 January 1838, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 4.
\textsuperscript{629} Bobadilla, Observaciones Sobre las notas AGI-Cuba 2014.
even if the distance between what they expressed and what was the reality was an entire
fiction based upon a nostalgic past.
CONCLUSION: A NATION DIVIDED

On 22 August 1843, Spanish royalist priest Gaspar Hernandez wrote to the governor of Puerto Rico after fleeing Santo Domingo for exile in Curaçao. Hernandez pleaded with officials, asking them to “shake off the yoke of Ethiopia” and to “indicate their unchanging loyalty to the Spanish nation.”

The cleric referred to the former Spanish colony of Santo Domingo that had been a part of the Haitian Republic for the last twenty-one years. Hernandez’s reference to Ethiopia was a negative depiction of the Haitians who he presented as black foreign occupiers in Santo Domingo. His language and appeal to the Spanish echoed the earlier calls of Dominican royalists during the previous decades as Hernandez took the initiative to present himself as speaking for Santo Domingo’s inhabitants. Hernandez wanted to convince the Spanish to occupy Santo Domingo and break up the union Dominicans and Haitians forged in 1822.

Compared to the early decades where Dominican royalist wrote at the peak of Haitian power, Hernandez wrote after an island-wide insurrection forced Haitian President Jean-Pierre Boyer into exile. Now out of favor with the current Haitian regime, Hernandez wrote to the governor of Puerto Rico to entice him to renew Spanish attempts once again to retake Santo Domingo.

630 “Gaspar Hernández to Gobernador de Puerto Rico,” Curaçao, 22 August 1843, Archivo Histórico Nacional de España (hereafter cited as ANH) Gobierno de Santo Domingo Ultramar 3524 Exp. 5 n. 2
631 For more on the racist language implemented by Dominican royalist and Spanish officials see Ch. 5.
In the year leading up to Boyer’s fall from power, British Consul G. M. Mountery’s reported unrest manifesting itself in the Haitian legislature. Mountery noted how the dispute between the Haitian President and the Camara (lower legislative body) had its origins when Boyer previously expelled Haitian legislators from the chamber who opposed his presidency. Among Boyer’s critics were Hérard Dumesle, a Haitian legislator, who pointed out the president’s abuses in his role as the leader of the government. Dumesle and others came back into power because their constituents had reelected them. They wanted to assert legislative control by having the Senate elected by constituents rather than appointed. The Haitian Constitution stipulated the process whereby special voters would select the Senate on a rotational basis that Boyer could influence. By having other people elect the Senators into office, it assured that the Senate would periodically change as a counter to Boyer’s influence. According to Mountery, Dumesle and his supporters also wanted greater authority in drafting, interpreting, and implementing Haitian laws. The clash between the different Haitian government branches in the late 1830s involved protests over the power Boyer wielded in ruling the country.

The Haitian president’s political enemies also questioned his decision-making as they challenged his hold on power. Earlier, the Haitian navy seized a series of Spanish ships on their way to Cuba. The British Consul was not clear about the reasons for the Haitians detaining the ships, but it was not the first time the Haitians had seized foreign shipping. Earlier in the nineteenth century, Alexandre Pétion had ships stopped that

634 “G.M. Mountery to Secretary of State,” Port-au-Prince, 24 October 1839, TNA-FO 35/29.
635 “Usner to Secretary of State,” Port-au-Prince, 6 January 1839, TNA-FO 35/26.
drifted to close to Haitian coasts that transported slaves. It could be likely that Boyer’s officials suspected that the Spanish were importing slaves to Cuba for its plantations.\textsuperscript{636} Spanish officials protested this act and demanded the Haitian government pay them back for the loss of cargo. Unlike in 1830 when Boyer refused to give up its claims to Santo Domingo, the Haitian president capitulated and agreed to pay the amount. The Consul noted that Haitian officials in the government were not happy about Boyer’s decision as he had a history of making decisions with little to no consultation with his advisors.\textsuperscript{637} The opposition had another opportunity to discredit Boyer who became further isolated. The result was a conspiracy forming in the southern part of the republic in Les Cayes. The British believed that the conspirators would seek to form a federal republic under a European power’s protection and that the conflict would result in further bloodshed. With the opposition questioning his political acumen and the loss of support, Boyer held on to power by relying on the army and their loyalty to him.\textsuperscript{638}

It took collaboration among Haitians and Dominicans to challenge Boyer’s regime. Dominican elites negatively affected by Boyer’s policies grouped around Juan Pablo Duarte, Ramon Matías Mella and Francisco del Rosario Sanchez in Santo Domingo City and created what became known as \textit{La Trinitaria} in 1838. In 1842, Dusmele founded the Society for the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in Haiti in 1842. Both organizations coordinated their efforts, circulating proclamations to incite Haitians and Dominicans to overthrow Boyer’s regime. Later reports surfaced of Haitian and Dominican elites accusing Boyer of tyranny, robbery, and a weak show of force against

\textsuperscript{637} “Usner to Secretary of State,” Port-au-Prince, 6 January 1839, TNA-FO 35/26.
\textsuperscript{638} “Usner to Secretary of State,” Port-au-Prince, 23 January 1843, TNA-FO 35/26.
the Spanish.  In a call for freedom of the press, protection for local industry, and a political rights opened to Haitian residents in towns and cities, Dominicans and Haitians came together in what is known as the Praslin revolt. Boyer’s political enemies on both sides of the island forced the Haitian president into exile on 13 February 1843.

Despite earlier British fears of chaos and revolution, a later report after Boyer’s disposal revealed that the provincial government largely maintained order in Port-au-Prince. Charles Rivière-Hérard, cousin of Dusmele, lead the troops in Port-au-Prince and the British consul noted that there were those who believed the Haitian general would be the next leader in charge. Even as the provisional government began setting up a new regime, Hérard marched to the northern part of the Republic and to Santo Domingo in the east to keep the Haitian government’s hold on the island. Despite the four-person committee he left to rule in his stead, Hérard’s absence created a power vacuum that engendered new plots to overthrow the Haitian provisional government. While they did not come to fruition, it appeared that the stability and order of the provisional government masked discontent.

The end of Boyer’s presidency resulted in an opening for the Haitian Unification’s supporters and detractors to express their voices. Royalist priest Gaspar Hernandez circulated a sermon arguing that the twenty-one years of rule under Boyer was both a source of division and unity for Haitians and Dominicans. Hernandez referred to those on


640 Dubois, Haiti, 122; Charles R. Ventor Santiago, “Race, Nation-Building, and Legal Transcultural during the Haitian Unification Period (1822-1844): Towards a Haitian Perspective” in Florida Journal of International Law, 111; and Moya Pons, Manual de historia dominicana, 254 and 258.

641 “Usner to Secretary of State,” Port-au-Prince, 22 March 1843, TNA-FO 35/26.

642 “Usner to Secretary of State,” Port-au-Prince, 12 May 1843, TNA-FO 35/26.
the western side of the island as their “brothers of the west,” who “cried over their luck and ours, and we lament their sad state, and ours.” This narrative of shared misery was one that united the island’s population, however, the reasons for distress were different for Haitians and Dominicans. Hernandez recounted the origins of this unification, as starting under false pretenses. Boyer “looked to give Dominicans a fraternal arm, and to unite with them as neighbors, without change nor harm in anything of their destinies and properties. But when the men entered, how far they were from keeping their promises!” For Hernandez, Boyer’s reforms suppressed the Catholic Church and brought Dominicans such misery. Hernandez’s message targeted Dominicans who identified with and shared these experiences. The end of Boyer’s rule provided an opportunity for Hernandez’s expression of betrayal that he used to differentiate between Dominicans and Haitians.

Yet, despite the “harm” brought about by Boyer, the Praslin revolt offered Hernandez and others a chance for opportunities to right the wrongs of the past under Boyer. Hernandez proclaimed: “Oh March 24! You will be memorable in the extravagance of this city. The sweet voice and agreeable reform that will be heard in the west of the Republic animate here the bereaved Dominicans…. [whose] determination accompanies the military uprising of Les Cayes.” The experiences of the populace of the eastern side of Hispaniola had influenced them enough that they not only welcomed the uprising against the ex-president, but also were willing to throw their support behind

643 Gaspar Hernandez, Discurso que en acción de gracias al todo poderoso de la Misericordia (Santo Domingo: Imprenta nacional, 1843), Archivo General de la Nación de la Republica Dominicana Colección José Gabriel García (hereafter cited as AGN-José Gabriel García 4, 5, C 29 Exp. 3, Doc. 2.
644 Hernandez, Discurso, AGN-José Gabriel García 4, 5, C 29 Exp. 3, Doc. 2.
645 Hernandez, Discurso, AGN-José Gabriel García 4, 5, C 29 Exp. 3, Doc. 2.
the uprising. By acknowledging his support for March 24, Hernandez reinforced his view that Boyer’s fall was an act of God’s providence, legitimizing his alternative version of events. Hernandez’s sermon recognized that Boyer’s exit from Haiti offered the entire island new possibilities.

Other Dominicans used this regime change as a moment to challenge Haitian legitimacy in Santo Domingo. On the eastern side of Santo Domingo, far from the seat of power in Haiti in a region called El Seibo, Pedro and Ramón Santana, two brothers who were influential ranchers and landowners organized an extensive conspiracy to separate from the Haitian state. As Dominicans organized themselves, Hérard arrived with his army on 18 July 1843 to stop the conspiracy. The Santana brothers were unsuccessful as Hérard’s troops seized and arrested them. The Haitian general charged Hernandez with circulating subversive ideas in Santo Domingo and exiled him while other fled to Curaçao. Some Dominicans’ confrontation to Haitian rule was unsuccessful.

A popular junta or committee of Dominicans formed in Santo Domingo declaring, “we profess ourselves subjects of the legitimate government to sustain the union of the Republic, only and indivisible of all the indigenous and inhabitants of this island.” Like Hernandez’s sermon, these Dominicans noted how the Praslin revolt ended a government that from their perspective oppressed them for 21 years. Where the committee differed from the cleric was in how they saw their relationship to the Haitian Republic. These junta members claimed to speak for the rest of Santo Domingo. These Dominicans pictured themselves as a part of the nation and not from “the force of arms or

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for the title of conquest that they had associated spontaneously to be a part of the Haitian Republic.” 648 Through mentioning their choice to join Haiti, the Dominicans wanted to present themselves as loyal and not seeking to end the Haitian Unification. The committee wanted to assure Haitian officials that the population’s anxiety was natural and did not call for patrols or extraordinary measures. Given that there were Dominicans not in support of Haitian rule and the conspiracy that would later happen, the Haitian provisional government had enough evidence to take a cautious approach to hold the republic together. Still, these Dominicans assured Haitian officials their committee was a measure they took to select delegates for the Constitutional Assembly to draw up the new Haitian Constitution. 649 Their diplomatic approach and willingness to take part in drawing up the new government illustrated their wish to stay within the Haitian Republic.

The committee, however, desired some concessions from the Haitian government as they wanted to protect their interests. By underlining that they were not a “conquered people” and instead represented a “voluntary portion” of the Haitian Republic, the Dominicans couched their demands as if they were diplomatic requests. 650 The Dominicans requested: laws written in their “common” language, which was Spanish; for the Haitian government to observe their “Catholic Religion;” and to conserve their “language, uses, and local and native customs.” If the Haitian government honored these request, Dominicans would not oppose or weaken the union between Santo Domingo and Haiti. They would not cause any discord over “the differences of the color of skin,” the

648 “Representación de la junta popular, 8 junio 1843, Bibliothèque de Petit Deminaire de Port-au-Prince.
649 “Representación de la junta popular, 8 junio 1843, Bibliothèque de Petit Deminaire de Port-au-Prince.
650 “Representación de la junta popular, 8 junio 1843, Bibliothèque de Petit Deminaire de Port-au-Prince.
origin of birth for themselves now being Haitian.\textsuperscript{651} The Dominicans requests suggest even though the constitution guaranteed them certain rights as Haitian citizens, questions of race and ethnicity were still unresolved. Nevertheless, the committee did not consider the use of armed force and looked to the United States as a model. The Dominicans noted how the “general laws constitutive of democracy” govern the U.S. and made up “their union and indivisibility of the Republic.”\textsuperscript{652} They expressed how Santo Domingo’s inhabitants shared this sentiment of reconciliation and negotiation despite the changes they wanted as citizens of the Haitian Republic.

For some Spanish officials’ perspective, Boyer’s fall from power created an opportunity for Spain to involve itself once again in Haiti’s affairs.\textsuperscript{653} The Spanish Vice Consul of Jamaica and the Spanish governor in Cuba communicated with a Dominican royalist exile who wanted them to consider renewing attempts to take Santo Domingo from the Haitians. One official proposed that retaking Santo Domingo from the Haitian Republic “would be a measure of security for the island of Cuba.”\textsuperscript{654} Resurrecting an old theme, Dominican royalists aimed to convince the Spanish that Santo Domingo was willing to rejoin the Spanish empire. Still, not all Spaniards agreed with this assessment and did not want to involve Spain in such an endeavor because of the danger it entailed. Perhaps they considered the previous Haitian regime’s commitment to defend its sovereignty in Santo Domingo during the 1830 negotiations.\textsuperscript{655} A Spanish official saw

\textsuperscript{651} “Representación de la junta popular, 8 junio 1843, Bibliothèque de Petit Deminaire de Port-au-Prince.
\textsuperscript{652} During Santo Domingo’s first independence in 1821, José Núñez de Cáceres also presented the United States as a republic for Dominicans to model themselves after. For more on this rhetoric faint see Ch. 1.
\textsuperscript{653} “Regente de Reino to Captain-General of Cuba,” Madrid, 4 May 1843, ANC Gobierno 848, n. 28572 printed in Documentos para la Historia de Haití en el Archivo Nacional (Havana: Sociedad Cubana de Estudios Históricos e Interacionales, 1954), 227-228 ed. by José Luciano Franco.
\textsuperscript{654} “Regente de Reino to Captain-General of Cuba,” Madrid, 4 May 1843, ANC Gobierno 848, n. 28572.
\textsuperscript{655} For more on the negotiations and fallout after the Spanish failure, see Ch. 5.
this potential mission in the given circumstances as “difficult” and “adventurous.” Consequently, to not lose this opportunity, he proposed a joint venture with the French who would deal with the Haitians in the west, while the Spanish took over Santo Domingo in the east. The end of Boyer’s regime convinced some Spaniards to revisit an alliance for armed confrontation as they consolidated their influence.

The arrival of Dominican royalist Antonio López de Villanueva to Cuba in 1843 in part piqued Spanish officials’ interests in Santo Domingo. López de Villanueva, a former colonial official in Santo Domingo, stated President Boyer’s resignation reanimated Dominicans’ overtures to Spain for reincorporation into their empire. López de Villanueva claimed to express “the positive feelings the inhabitants of that [Spanish] part was having to shake off the yoke of the Haitians and submit themselves under the protection and ample benefits and paternal government of Spain.” By depicting Santo Domingo’s inhabitants as royalist Dominicans who rejected Haitian rule, López de Villanueva aimed to convince the governor of Santiago de Cuba to establish a Spanish presence on the island. López de Villanueva most certainly hoped the governor would report to his superiors in Havana as the Dominican royalist continued towards Jamaica. Shortly thereafter, Santiago de Cuba’s governor communicated this information with Havana officials in response to López de Villanueva’s arrival.

The Cuban Captain-General was aware of the situation as he and others weighed arguments from both sides. He believed the issue was “so arduous that it cannot give
interest to our metropolis a similar proposition” in respect to the Antilles’ security. Dominica

Dominican royalist interests were second to the larger goal of preserving Spain’s empire

and slavery in the Caribbean. He worried that if the Spanish became more involved in

Santo Domingo, then the “revolutionaries of Santo Domingo” (meaning the Haitians)

would turn their attention towards Cuba. The “ever faithful isle’s” security from a Haitian

invasion resurfaced in the Captain-General’s mind as it did in other officials during the

previous decades. Yet, the Spanish could take advantage of the Haitian Republic’s

weakness because of its political uncertainty. Consequently, The Captain-General

advised Santiago de Cuba’s governor to not discount scenarios of Spanish involvement in

Santo Domingo or keeping their distance. He would not dismiss entirely the potential

scenario for active involvement, but balanced it with assessing its threat toward Cuba’s

internal security should they become involved in Santo Domingo once again.

Spanish officials in Madrid met to review the information they received from the

Caribbean concerning the Haitian Republic. There was the sense among the

administrators that Dominicans rose up against the Haitian government in 1843 because

they wanted to rejoin the Spanish Empire. Therefore, they ordered to have assembled and

reviewed all documents about Santo Domingo since 1814 when the end of the

Napoleonic wars assured Spanish possession of the eastern part of Hispaniola. Spanish

officials also formed a commission to review this evidence and make recommendations on

660 Captain General de la isla de Cuba to Gobernador de Santiago de Cuba, Havana, 18 April 1843, ANC Gobierno 848 n. 28572
661 “Ministerio del Ultramar to Regenete del Reino,” Madrid, 2 June 1843, AHN Ultramar 3524 Exp. 2.
the best course of action. Despite the order for assembling and review of the relevant documents, it appears at an administrative level no further action was taken as the extant archival records do not provide any additional details regarding further specific action.

Nevertheless, this did not stop Spanish officials in the Caribbean who continued to interact with Dominican royalists and seeking out their information on Santo Domingo. In Curaçao, royalist priest Hernandez and another cleric assured the Spanish that “the mulatto part like the black [part] are decidedly in favor of the Spanish government.” While Hernandez began his request asking for help in overthrowing the “yoke of Ethiopia,” depicting black and mixed race support for Spanish rule illustrates a distinction between those in Santo Domingo and those outside. In addition, with a large population of people of color in Santo Domingo, it was imperative for Hernandez and others to convince the Spanish of the success awaiting them if they involved themselves in Santo Domingo. To further emphasize his point, Hernandez assured administrators in Puerto Rico that if they sent help to Santo Domingo, it would always be a part of the Spanish empire. He further included news of “Spanish” troops deserting the Haitian army as they made their way to Santo Domingo. Hernandez used these examples to support his argument of Dominicans’ loyalty and the loss of Haitian support. The information provided by the royal priest made a Spanish victory seem all the more likely.

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662 “Ministerio del Ultramar to Regenete del Reino,” Madrid, 2 June 1843, AHN Ultramar 3524 Exp. 2.
663 “Pablo de Castillo to Capitan General de Puerto Rico,” Curaçao, 25 August 1843, AHN Ultramar 3524 Exp. 5.
664 “Pablo de Castillo to Captain General de Puerto Rico,” Curaçao, 25 August 1843, AHN Ultramar 3524 Exp. 5
Hernandez took it upon himself in speaking for the “disgraced Spaniards, so religious, and so moral when loyal to the benign Spanish monarchy.”\textsuperscript{665} Through serving as the mouthpiece for Dominican royalists, Hernandez intended to sway the Spanish to seeing Santo Domingo was a royalist bastion. Furthermore, he confirmed other parts of Santo Domingo felt the same one way, citing Santo Domingo City, Puerto Plata, Santiago de los Caballeros, La Vega, and Moca among the towns that wanted to return to Spanish rule. Besides Santo Domingo City, the other places Hernandez referenced were strongholds of Haitian support and in the northern and western parts of Santo Domingo, closer to the former border. For Hernandez, it was important to illustrate this Hispanic affinity. He blamed Dominican Creole José Núñez de Cáceres discussed earlier in the dissertation for being “under the yoke of the blacks.”\textsuperscript{666} Hernandez claimed free people of color had previously feared that Núñez de Cáceres’ regime would result in enslavement under a Simon Bolivar led South American federation.\textsuperscript{667} Consequently, the result was Dominican support for the Haitian regime and the Unification to the royalists’ detriment.

The Constitutional Assembly of 1843 was an opportunity for Dominicans and Haitians to come together and ratify a constitution for all. The Constitution of 1843 that came out of this meeting, as a result, was in some parts dissatisfactory for both sides. While the assembly met, General Hérard assured Dominican separatists that the new Haitian government would respect their requests such as those the committee articulated. There were some Dominicans, however, who did not trust Hérard and felt he was trying

\textsuperscript{665} “Gaspar Hernández to Gobernador de Puerto Rico,” Curaçao, 22 August 1843, AHN Ultramar 3524 Exp. 5 n. 2.
\textsuperscript{666} “Gaspar Hernández to Gobernador de Puerto Rico,” Curaçao, 22 August 1843, AHN Ultramar 3524 Exp. 5 n. 2.
\textsuperscript{667} “Gaspar Hernández to Gobernador de Puerto Rico,” Curaçao, 22 August 1843, AHN Ultramar 3524 Exp. 5 n. 2
to get supporters to pick him as president. Entering with this assumption, the Dominican
delegates representing different parts of Santo Domingo found the Haitian delegates to
not be as accommodating as Hérard had predicted. The new Haitian Constitution of 1843
did alter the use of French by making its use in public and official settings and documents
optional. Even so, it also allowed freedom of worship to other religions, which had the
effect of limiting once again the Church’s singular prominence it once had exercised in
Santo Domingo. On December 30, 1843, the new constitutional assembly enacted the
new constitution.\footnote{Alfonso Lockward, \textit{La Constitucion hatiano-dominicana de 1843} (Santo Domingo: Edición Taller, 1995), 17, 38; and Frank Moya Pons, \textit{The Dominican Republic: A National History} (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2010), 147 – 148.}

As the new Haitian Constitution passed through ratification, Dominican separatist
who had followed Pedro Santana’s fight against the Haitians published a manifesto
illustrating their grievances.\footnote{“Decreto en nombre de Pedro Santana,” Santo Domingo, 27 December 1843, AGN Colección José Gabriel García, 4, 2, C21 Exp. 4 Doc 5.} Santana’s partisans were probably fellow landowners and
ranchers from the same region of El Seibo and nearby Higüey, in the east of Santo
Domingo. These petitioners expressed their feelings about Boyer’s regime, calling it a
“fallacious system” that “passed legislation for the eastern part that was contrary to all the
principals, forgetting in her the most sacred rights.”\footnote{“Decreto en nombre de Pedro Santana,” Santo Domingo, 27 December 1843, AGN-RD Colección José Gabriel García, 4, 2, C21 Exp. 4 Doc 5.} This protest stemmed in part from
the 1824 law that secularized Church lands that Chapter Three covered. Cautious and
rightly so because of the Haitian army’s presence, Santana’s partisans voiced some
expectation that the new government would “turn to ensure the enjoyment of the citizens
of this portion of the republic.”⁶⁷¹ The state was responsible for the welfare of the citizens of the Haitian Republic. Consequently, Dominicans demanded that they could enjoy their sacred rights that had not occurred under the old regime.

While some Dominican separatists dialogued their grievances with the Haitian government, another faction led by Buenaventura Baez, a rich landowner, appealed to the French for aid in separating Santo Domingo from the Haitian Republic.⁶⁷² Among Baez’s supporters were former administrators in the Haitian government whose familiarity with French legislation convinced them France offered the best possibility to end Santo Domingo’s union with Haiti.⁶⁷³ The pro-French Dominicans identified themselves as representatives for the Spanish part, implying they represented most if not all of Santo Domingo. They and the partisans of Santana were similar in their list of grievances used to validate a language of separation from the Haitian state and shaped their interpretation of the past twenty years under the Haitian state. One such commonality was their displeasure towards the 1824 law and described it as a “tyrannical law” which “stripped the eastern part of the major part of its properties.”⁶⁷⁴ It is important to note former Haitian president Boyer created commissions to deal with the changes in land tenure that some members of the pro-French Dominican faction were a part of. Instead of including this important piece of information, the Dominicans twenty-two years later stressed the measure was “another trick,” and denoted themselves and others as “an impotent

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⁶⁷² “Texto en español de la exposición hecha por representantes de la Parte Española de la Isla al Gobierno francés,” “Port Republicain, 12 January 1844, AGN-RD Colección José Gabriel García 6, 2, 4, C61 Exp.1, Doc. 18.
⁶⁷³ Moya Pons, Manual de historia dominicana, 264.
⁶⁷⁴ “Texto en español de la exposición hecha por representantes de la Parte Española de la Isla al Gobierno francés,” Port Republicain, 12 January 1844, AGN-RD Colección José Gabriel García 6, 2, 4, C61 Exp.1, Doc. 18.
minority of Spaniards in concurrence with the Haitian majority." Baez and his cadre of supporters aimed to appeal to the French by presenting themselves as victims of Haitian aggression and different from their neighbors.

This narrative of alienation espoused by the pro-French Dominicans could not be more exemplified than their response to Boyer’s actions towards the Catholic Church in Santo Domingo. They described their faith as the “Catholic Religion, Roman, Apostolic, [and] generally professed in the former Spanish part, the object of an imponderable enthusiasm and whose worship had been sustained with splendor for three centuries.”

The Church and Dominicans forged their relationship over time that resulted in a part of their identity according to the solicitors. Baez and his followers perceived any attack on their faith and Church by the Haitian state as an assault on their identity. They felt that their faith had been “vilified and persecuted” despite the Haitian Constitution’s protection of religion. Their interpretation of the relationship between the Church and Haitian state portrays them as martyrs—attacked because of their faith that went against not only the laws of the land but further aggravated by Boyer’s promises to keep up the customs and traditions of Santo Domingo. The attack on the Church and their faith was another measure that alienated the Dominican populace and was a grievance against Boyer’s regime.

While a pro-French separatist movement formed among Dominicans, another faction lobbied to become a British protectorate led by a landowner from Las Matas de

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675 “Texto en español de la exposición hecha por representantes de la Parte Española de la Isla al Gobierno francés,” Port Republicain, 12 January 1844, AGN-RD Colección José Gabriel García 6, 2, 4, C61 Exp.1, Doc. 18.
676 “Texto en español de la exposición hecha por representantes de la Parte Española de la Isla al Gobierno francés,” Port Republicain, 12 January 1844, AGN-RD Colección José Gabriel García 6, 2, 4, C61 Exp.1, Doc. 18.
Farfán named Pimentel. The British concerned themselves about the declining stability of the Haitian government as it appeared Dominicans in the east would take up arms against them. The British diplomat in Haiti was neither sure about what spurred the separatist movement nor what flag they would have as it appeared more likely the Haitians would lose Santo Domingo. The British declined Pimentel’s request claiming they would not interfere within the domestic affairs of Haiti. Without more reason given by the British consul, one can surmise that Great Britain’s commercial interests with Haiti superseded any political aspirations by Dominicans or Haitians. The British were wary of former president Boyer’s political instability and did not want a repeat of those circumstances. Pimentel’s movement was not the first-time Dominicans sought to join the British empire, trying to do so during the Haitian Revolution. In that instance, Britain’s moderate rule in comparison to the French, defense of Catholicism, and commercial benefits drew Dominicans in. It is likely these reasons drew Pimentel and his followers away from the flailing Haitian Republic.

A fourth movement led by independence leader Duarte and the Trinitarios illustrated the divisions among Dominican separatists. Duarte and his supporters wanted to achieve independence without foreign aid or intervention. With the help of Dominican rancher Pedro Santana and his supporters, Dominican conspirators under the Trinitarios launched a coup against Haitian forces in Santo Domingo City on 27 February 1844. Negotiations over the course of two days resulted in the peaceful surrender of

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678 “Usner to Secretary of State,” Port-Republican, 22 February 1844, TNA-FO 35/28; and “Usner to Secretary of State,” Port-Republican, 9 March 1844, TNA-FO 35/28.
679 Charlton Yingling, “Colonialism Unraveling: Race, Religion, and National Belonging in Santo Domingo During the Age of Revolutions (Ph.D. diss: University of South Carolina, 2016), Ch. 6.
power to the Dominicans with the deposed Haitians able to leave under favorable conditions. In a proclamation to the leading Haitian officer in Santo Domingo, the new Dominican provisional government stated, “the provocation of our rights, the humiliations and bad administration of the Haitian government, you have put us in the firm and indestructible resolution to be free and independent.”

Similar to the pro-French leader Baez and Santana’s earlier protest, the provisional government accused the Haitian government of injustices during the period of the Unification. The Trinitarios success was not the result of direct foreign aid or involvement, but the support among Dominicans at a crucial moment with the Haitian government divided. Duarte’s vision for “an independence pure and simple” for Santo Domingo came to fruition. Yet, the divisions among the Dominican separatist were left unresolved and would have consequences for the new state of the Dominican Republic.

Despite the anti-Haitian rhetoric motivating Dominican separatists, they found that the rest of the population did not forget the Haitian Republic’s defenses of their freedom. The Dominican provisional government was not in agreement over the immediate steps to take in setting up a nation. Some members considered turning the Dominican Republic into a French protectorate and giving away Samaná bay in the north to France in exchange for protection and supplies against Haiti. When a Dominican officer found out about the scheme, he stated to the rest of the population that the French intended to enslave the rest of the population. By bringing up the threat of reinstituting slavery, Dominican detractors intended to discredit the pro-French movement. Moreover,

682 “Junta Gubernativa provisional to Henri Etienne Desgrotte,” Santo Domingo, 28 February 1844, AGN-RD Colección José Gabriel García 4, 11, C39, Exp. 9, Doc. 3.
683 Moya Pons, Manual de historia dominicana, 263.
it illustrates how after more than twenty years of freedom in Santo Domingo, the fear of re-enslavement was still on the minds of many Dominicans. The pro-French Dominicans saw Boyer’s general emancipation as a “general risk and ruining the country.” They did not present the end of slavery negatively, which was “done to protect the political independence” but “in its form and management that it was verified, in the middle of a simple people, kind, and of good faith.” Their attempts to distinguish between gradual emancipation under slave masters and instant emancipation enacted by Boyer is worthy of comment especially when it threatened Dominican elites’ political power.

As the Dominican provisional government fractured over rancher Santana and Trinitario leader Duarte vying for influence, the specter of slavery persisted. Santana’s asserted himself through his fighting against the Haitians and soon strengthened his hold, however, the new Dominican government only had control of Santo Domingo City and its surrounding area. Duarte fled to the Cibao region to fight Santana who the British claimed wanted to separate into its own nation. These divisions occurred while the frontier area still desired to main ties to the Haitian Republic. These separate movements illustrating independence was not a given and there were those still seeking union with Haiti. Santana capitalized on these divisions by accusing Duarte and the

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685 The fear of reenslavement emerged as a constant theme in the early years of the Dominican Republic that divided Dominican elites from the rest of the population. For more on how Dominicans used this fear of reenslavement to fight annexation from the country’s ruling elite see Anne Eller, We Dream Together: Dominican Independence and the Fight for Caribbean Freedom (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016).

686 “Texto en español de la exposición hecha por representantes de la Parte Española de la Isla al Gobierno francés,” Port Republicain, 12 January 1844, AGN-RD Colección José Gabriel García 6, 2, 4, C61 Exp.1, Doc. 18.

687 “Texto en español de la exposición hecha por representantes de la Parte Española de la Isla al Gobierno francés,” Port Republicain, 12 January 1844, AGN-RD Colección José Gabriel García 6, 2, 4, C61 Exp.1, Doc. 18.

Trinitarios of wanting to replace the Dominican flag for Colombian flag and to reintroduce slavery. Duarte would eventually flee the Dominican Republic, leaving Santana unchallenged. The threat of re-enslavement once again challenged the legitimacy of another Dominican leader and illustrated freedom’s uncertainty in a nation founded in response to perceived political and social inequalities.

SUMMARY
“A Divisive Community” has examined the Haitian Unification in the context of Spanish and Haitian struggles for Santo Domingo beginning with its impact on Dominicans’ political allegiances on the island. From 1809-1821, Spain’s second rule of Santo Domingo pushed Dominicans away from Spanish support as they sought other options. Inspired by the political movements against colonialism across the Americas, Dominican Creole José Núñez de Cáceres led a moderate faction aiming for the political change of the Spanish government while maintaining things as they were. This vision for a nation clashed with much of the Dominican population who looked to their Haitian neighbors to the west. Haitian president Boyer’s entrance into Santo Domingo in 1822 was the result of many Dominicans aspirations and vision for independence from colonialism. With the Dominican Creole elites’ experiment for independence ended, they looked to the Spanish Crown and its empire as the best way to keep things the way they were. The Haitian Unification hardened existing divisions within Dominican society by making colonialism and slavery a practical option against republicanism and emancipation.

689 “Usner to Secretary of State,” Port Republicain, 22 August 1844, TNA-FO 35/28; and “Usner to Secretary of State,” Port Republicain, 21 September 1844, TNA-FO 35/28.
This study has analyzed the writings of Dominican royalists and Spanish officials to illustrate how they presented the Haitian Unification as it related to slavery. The Spanish were aware of the potential danger of Haiti to its possession of Santo Domingo but did not prioritize it with the defense of the rest of its empire in the Americas and Caribbean. Dominican royalist fleeing Santo Domingo brought accounts of a society transformed by emancipation and the end of legal racial discrimination. Spanish officials in Puerto Rico and Cuba used these accounts to make larger arguments of a Haitian threat to the Spanish Antilles’ remaining slave systems. Dominican royalist Felipe Fernandez de Castro was among those who asserted that by regaining Santo Domingo, the Spanish would contain the Haitian Republic and protect slavery. To further convince Spanish officials in Madrid to involve themselves in Santo Domingo, Fernandez de Castro and others presented Dominicans and Santo Domingo as Hispanic, loyal to the Spanish Crown, and Catholic as a counterpoint to the Haitians who they presented as immoral, dangerous, and incapable of effective rule because of their skin color and former enslaved condition. At least initially, Dominican royalists made allowances for Santo Domingo’s free people of color who they depicted as culturally different from Haitians and would not support the Unification.

The Haitian Unification’s success drove Dominican royalists to develop an increasingly exclusive argument for their loyalty that drew on their interpretations of the past. The Dominicans and other foreigners watched as Haitian president Boyer’s aggressive diplomatic strategy mortgaged the republic’s present with a larger financial indemnity. The French recognition of Haitian independence made Spanish armed intervention less likely as officials in Madrid acquiesced to the calls of Dominican
royalist and Spanish officials. Spain appointed Fernandez de Castro to negotiate Santo Domingo’s return to Spanish possession with the potential threat of force against the Haitian government. The Haitian Republic called Spain’s bluff and relied on the support of Haitians and Dominicans to defend its borders, Dominicans’ choice to unite with Haiti, and the rights of a nation-state against an empire. The Spanish retreated with the consolation that the Unification was not a threat to slavery in the empire’s remaining Antillean possessions. Consequently, Dominican royalist continued arguing for Santo Domingo’s loyalty to convince the Spanish to regain Santo Domingo by underlining a more exclusive Hispanic heritage.

“A Divisive Community” has argued that the Hispanism at the center of Dominican royalists’ arguments disrupted the Haitian Unification on Hispaniola because it created an alternative and contrast to the Haitian Republic. Dominican royalist used interpretations of the past to present Dominicans as loyal, Catholic, and Hispanic victims to Haitian aggression in the face of Boyer’s rule over the entire island. Within their arguments, the Dominican royalist denigrated Haitians and their supporters because of their race, formerly enslaved condition, and secularism while accusing them of “enslaving” the Dominican population. Dominican royalists claim for representing all of Santo Domingo marginalized and silenced those Dominicans who choose and supported Boyer and the island-wide Unification. Hispanism and disavowal of the past actively rewrote Santo Domingo’s history and excluded Dominicans of color and their desires, which resulting in fermenting a divisive community.

By examining Dominican royalists and their construction of a Hispanic narrative, this study illustrates how the origins of an anti-Haitian rhetoric tradition has embedded
itself within Dominican politics despite its inconsistency. Scholars must continue to illuminate how relations between the Dominican Republic and Haiti were not always contentious. Mid-nineteenth-century Dominican elites inconsistent and convenient racist rhetoric personified in the Haitian Republic silenced alternative notions of belonging and narratives within the Dominican population that later writers and hijacked for their own purposes. One of the notable embodiments of this power was during the Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina’s dictatorship from 1930-1961. Among the infamous acts of the Dominican Republic under his leadership was the Parsley Massacre killing Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent to uphold a white Hispanic ethos. Less notable was Trujillo’s early reaches of friendship with the Haitian government, even celebrating his Haitian heritage. The legacy of this dictatorship and racism that contemporaries associated with it influenced Joaquin Balaguer, a Trujillo intellectual and member of the regime, rise to power during the 1970s and 1980s. This legacy even affecting a contentious election in the 1990s surrounding Dominican politician José Francisco Antonio Peña Gomez and his Haitian ancestry. This royalist rhetoric or Hispanism has ebbed and flowed throughout Dominican history, often sparking political waves of xenophobia during times of contentious politics.

693 Ernesto Sagás, Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic (Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 2000); and David Howard, Coloring the Nation: Race and Ethnicity in the Dominican Republic (Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).
Through a singular focus of this period, “A Divisive Community” reveals that the Hispanism articulated by Dominican royalists did not stand for Santo Domingo despite their intentions. This study has situated these pro-Spanish Dominicans with their pro-Haitian counterparts to posit that the Haitian Unification hardened exiting regional, ethnic, and class divisions within Santo Domingo. Through investigating these arguments and Santo Domingo’s conditions under the Unification, scholars can understand a society that was more inclusive than Spain’s former colonial society, even as the Spanish and other foreigners focused on the opposite. Rescuing these alternative narratives and situating them with the existing Dominican nationalist narratives brings balance to the literature and offers crucial insight into the relationship between the Dominican Republic and Haiti during the Unification. This study highlights that the existing nationalist account from this period fueling anti-Haitian arguments was far from correcting in depicting Dominicans’ sentiments.

The events leading up to Santo Domingo’s union with Haiti in 1822 provide scholars the opportunity to study opposing independence movements from Spain during the Age of Revolutions. Regional and specific case studies in Latin America offer examples of Iberian Creoles eclectic use of symbols, imagery, and history to affirm their independence and build the basis of new nation-states where nationalism had not existed before. Subaltern groups’ contributions to independence and nation-building highlight politicized Africans, Amerindians, and their descendants from the Andes to Mexico to the

Santo Domingo was the site of two such movements as Dominican Creoles raced to end Spanish sovereignty on the eastern part of the island, even fashioning their new republic “Spanish Haiti” to establish support for a moderate and exclusive notion of nationhood. Boyer’s later entrance to the east and consolidation of both sides of the island was less a foreign occupation and more the culmination of those Dominicans’ choice to align themselves with the Haitian Republic as opposed to the path Creoles had trodden on the mainland. By situating Santo Domingo in the larger independence movements of the Americas, the Haitian Unification becomes one of many alternatives that historical actors had at their disposal.

“A Divisive Community” is one of the few accounts of the Haitian Unification to assess its importance for both Haitian and Dominican history. The different foreign responses to Haitian independence would affect the republic’s union with Santo Domingo. A focus on the indemnity signed between France and Haiti not only draws

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attention away from the former colony successfully consolidating its independence in a
world of slavery and colonialism. But it also obscures how the Haitian state’s continued
to struggle against attacks on its sovereignty in its negotiations with the British and
Spanish.\textsuperscript{697} The variety of Spanish, English, and French language sources this dissertation
analyzed will hopefully encourage other scholars to revisit overlooked repositories to
complement existing nation-state documents to offer new historical interpretations.

Haitian and Dominican actions to create and uphold their union on Hispaniola do
not fit neatly into regional, national, and imperial perspectives. The Haitian Unification is
like other independence movements in Angola and New Granada’s Caribbean coast or
even Cuba except that the Dominican and Haitian one was successful.\textsuperscript{698} The new island-
wide Haitian Republic faced challenges from the British, French, and Spanish that
illustrated the island’s continued importance to European slave empires. Focusing on
Santo Domingo from a “single imperial geography” such as Spain obscures the link
between French recognition of Haitian independence and its impact on later negotiations
for the eastern side of the island.\textsuperscript{699} The nuances of the Haitian and Spanish negotiations

\textsuperscript{697} Marlene Daut, \textit{Baron de Vastey and the Origins of Black Atlantic Humanism} (New York: Palgrave
Macmillian, 2017); Laurent Dubois, “Thinking Haiti’s Nineteenth Century,” \textit{Small Axe} Vol. 18, no 2, July
2014 (No. 44), 72 – 79; Julia Gaffield, \textit{Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World: Recognition after
Revolution} (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); David Nicholls, \textit{From Dessalines to
Duvalier: Race, Colour, and National Independence in Haiti} (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press, 1996); Friedemann Pestel, “The Impossible Ancien Régime colonial: Postcolonial Haiti and the
Michel-Rolph Trouillot, \textit{Haiti, State Against Nation: The Origins & Legacy of Duvalierism} (New York:

\textsuperscript{698} Matt D. Childs, \textit{The 1812 Aponte Rebellion in Cuba and the Struggle against Atlantic Slavery}
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Roquinaldo Ferreira, \textit{Cross-Cultural Exchange in the
Atlantic World: Angola and Brazil during the Era of the Slave Trade} (New York: Cambridge University
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\textsuperscript{699} Alison Games, “Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities,” \textit{American Historical
Review} Vol. 111, no. 3 (June 2006), 741-757; Ernesto Bassi, “Beyond Compartamentalized Atlantics: A
Case for Embracing the Atlantic from Spanish American Shores” \textit{History Compass} 12, no. 9 (2014), 704-
become blurred when scholars consider it strictly from studying Santo Domingo’s path to independence as the Dominican Republic, or its relationship strictly to Spain. By studying the Haitian Unification and its lifespan in Santo Domingo, this event becomes broader and connected beyond just Spain and its relationship with its former colony.

The British Consul’s bleak assessment of the Dominican Republic’s future from Haiti offers a perspective of the island’s state of affairs in 1844 when the Unification came to an end. He considered the Dominican ruling elite “fortunate in uniting the whole of the Spanish part of the Island under one Republic, but unless they can induce immigrants to locate among them of the black and coloured [sic] race, and engage capitalist from Europe to cultivate the soil, it will be impossible that they can long exist as a separate government.”700 His observations illustrate the sense that agriculture and a relationship in Europe were the Dominican Republic’s best chance as the new nation floundered. He further noted how “the blacks in the Spanish part, who form a small portion of the population, will always look towards their brethren in the West[sic] for security against any attack on their liberty.” The Haitian Unification offers one example of Dominicans of color seeking the Haitian Republic as their choice for nationhood. The British official further observed, “and the fear of what may happen from one moment to another, will in all probability, deprived the Dominicans of those aides, which in their enthusiasm, they look upon as certain.”701 Both in 1822 and in 1844, Santo Domingo’s

700 “Usner to Secretary of State,” Port Republicain, 21 September 1844, TNA-FO 35/28.
701 “Usner to Secretary of State,” Port Republicain, 21 September 1844, TNA-FO 35/28.
elite overlooked Dominicans of color’s political aspirations to impose their vision for the island to their detriment and long term future.
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