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Domestic Extension Of Public Diplomacy: Media Competition For Credibility, Dependency And Activation Of Publics

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DOMESTIC EXTENSION OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: MEDIA COMPETITION FOR
CREDIBILITY, DEPENDENCY AND ACTIVATION OF PUBLICS

by

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DEDICATION

To my parents and grandparents. *Omnia vincit amor.*

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I would like to take this opportunity to thank my advisor, Prof. August Grant, for the care he invested into my doctoral pursuit. His welcoming attitude to different ideas and views is the very foundation of this dissertation. I am extremely fortunate working under his patient and meticulous guidance for my entire PhD program.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation connects theories of political communication, public relations and international relations to conceptualize a new model of public diplomacy, where boundaries between distinct types of actors are drawn. It proposes an ecological model and a competition model of public diplomacy. Based on these conceptual models, it empirically supports the academic rationalization of governmental interference in foreign media effects among its domestic citizens: Using a quota sample of 560 survey respondent from mainland China, the empirical part of the dissertation illustrated: 1. Governmental control on foreign media accessibility has significant effects on perceived media credibility and thus dependency on it; 2. Availability of domestic media resource negatively impacts dependency on foreign media; and 3. Foreign media and domestic media, as currently conceptualized, have distinct effects on the psychological activeness of Chinese publics to speak out against social issues.

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The advancement of communication technologies has enabled governments to interact with people in other countries. For either international collaboration or international competition, governments became interested in communicating with foreign people because they want to build better national image, facilitate international trade, increase the clarity of their foreign policy; sometimes, governments communicate with foreign activist groups to destabilize an administration, or reduce rival countries' bargaining power in negotiation.

With examples of international broadcasting plans and public diplomacy campaigns preceding this dissertation, it examines and compares different channels of activating foreign publics through international media. It focuses on the importance of people's perception of the credibility of the communication channel and information source. Moreover, it studies how governmental media influence its people preemptively to reduce the effect of foreign public diplomacy. This means that governments are looking forward to the establishment of an academic rationalization of the defensive *domestic* extension of public diplomacy.

The first chapter serves as an introduction to the dissertation and will briefly summarize the content and the design of this research. Key terms will be introduced in

order to help the reader to get a better conceptualization of the research theme and objective. The following sections include: an introduction to the public diplomacy model; an introduction to the dis-accreditation of foreign media model; and an introduction to the general structure of the dissertation.

1.1 Public Diplomacy, Public Relations and Foreign Publics Activation

In public relations theory, people who have a direct or indirect association with the organization is called “publics”, and there are four types of them: non-publics, latent publics, aware publics and active publics. Organizations around the world try to harmonize their surrounding environment by understanding, communicating and influencing the publics, sometimes this includes activating latent publics to generate debate, or deactivating publics for crisis management.

Governments are essentially organizations, and as they want to do the same thing with its people and foreign publics, scholars and practitioners call this particular type of public relations practice “public diplomacy”. Similarly, an important function of the practice of public diplomacy is turning foreign publics from latent publics into active publics. Research shows that the Arab Spring movement is an example of outside management of public awareness about “Democracy”, the Color Revolution among former Soviet states can also be attributed to active engagement of foreign public diplomacy activities.

However, public diplomacy is far more than incitation campaigns or psychological campaigns for political purposes. Of course, public diplomacy includes these propagandist activities, where government power overrides the foreign publics who

were persuaded or incited. But it also includes more ethical and bilateral methods of understanding and communicating with foreign people. One example was the campaign about air pollution in China by the US embassy in Beijing. It not only turned the Chinese publics into active publics against over-industrialization and pollution, but also educated the foreign publics, benefitted US government's credibility, and Chinese's perception of US' reliability.

Some may argue that the air pollution case can hardly be called a deliberate public diplomacy campaign: the whole national debate around air pollution, PM 2.5, PM 10 (criteria of air quality measurement) started from a routine report of air quality done by the US embassy in Beijing. But its consequential success in activating Chinese awareness and communication about the issue has been phenomenal. The reason is that the issue relates to the Chinese people's personal health, and it showed US government's concern in a neutral and credible way, and the communication was largely happening on social media, ensuring a reactive and two-way communication strategy.

This dissertation studies how such successful case could be replicated by starting with the right step: researching and understanding the target publics. The results of this dissertation show what are the psychological components that drive foreign publics into active communication about an issue. More importantly, it compares how these psychological components interrelate through different information channels (*e.g.* direct US media, social media, target government media, and US media quoted by target government media). In general, this dissertation answered these questions:

“What is the most effective information channel to activate foreign publics?”

“How important is the credibility of these channels in activating foreign publics?”

1.2 Restricting Foreign Influence: Introduction and Assumptions

However public diplomacy is conceptualized or defined, it is a certain type of diplomacy. This means that it is building relationship and negotiating over an issue with foreign entities. Public diplomacy fundamentally means the existence of foreign influence in a certain country, and not all countries welcome foreign influence. Examples about governments expressing their concerns about the existence of foreign media, foreign products, and even the use of foreign language are countless. In modern times, governments sometimes accuse each other for building relationship with their domestic activists, who are a potential political threat to national stability and security.

In certain government types where power is more centralized, government may easily restrict the incoming flow of foreign persuasive information, or the activities of foreign public diplomats. Russia, for example, has announced that it would block radio broadcasting of Voice of America, and several countries blocked online access to *Wall Street Journal*, *New York Times*, or *CNN*. However, as the global information network became increasingly difficult to block, these governments started to understand the importance of consolidating internal relationship with their domestic publics (the people). Relationships are resources, thus one way to consolidate internal relationship is to discredit foreign sources of information thus weakening the relationship between domestic publics with foreign organizations.

China is a perfect example of the above-mentioned strategies. In 2002, new policies prohibited any broadcasting of foreign cartoon, TV series, or movies on

primetime Chinese TV. In consecutive years, the access to Western social media started to be restricted. In recent years, the Chinese authorities promoted the idea of Western media bias and the construction of a new Chinese worldview and common Chinese dream.

The current dissertation holds no ethical or moral responsibility, ability and intention to judge the morals of governmental policies. Rather, it tends to illustrate and study the simple fact the governments can adopt defensive strategies against other countries' relationship building process with its people. Now, given the fact that some countries have far more powerful and extensive information networks and global media than others (Fuchs, 2010), let us imagine **a dyadic relationship where one country is the *acting country* and other is the *receiving country* of public diplomacy**, and let us assume **that national/governmental image and the image of that country's media are positively connected, and their action are coordinated**. Then, as a continuation of the first part of this dissertation, it also studies and seeks to answer the following questions:

“How can the *receiving countries* discredit foreign channels of information?”

“How effectively can they discredit different types of foreign channels?”

“How effectively can they deactivate the publics preemptively?”

1.3 Structure of the Dissertation

Although the current chapter is only an introduction, it only serves as a teaser to give general outlines and to inspire interest. It means that the key conceptualization of the underlying mechanism of the above mentioned dyadic relationship will be explained in detail in Chapter II. Chapter II's purpose is to establish an analytical framework and

conceptual mechanism with which the later analysis could make sense. Without understanding to how public diplomacy works theoretically, how public diplomacy campaigns were conducted, and what were their results, it would be difficult to understand why this study is important and meaningful. Its results will benefit not only the field of international political communication and public relations, but also international broadcasting and international relations. This also means that Chapter II will serve as a “Literature Review” chapter that connects relevant research and cases from the above-mentioned fields.

If one finds the mechanism of public diplomacy acceptable, and agrees that governments have intentions to activate foreign publics, Chapter III will layout a theoretical model of state moderation of foreign media credibility. Moreover, Chapter IV incorporates the notion of public segmentation into the study of public diplomacy: that is, it proposes a model that will empirically test the efficiency of foreign publics’ activations in different experimental scenarios. It is expected that such efficiency is dependent on the different information channels and different perceptions about the credibility of information sources. The efficiency will be measured in terms of general model fit indexes and the effect (coefficients) of antecedent variables on communicative behavior.

It is important to note here that although Chapter II, III and IV all appears to be conceptualizations of theoretical frameworks, their scopes are very different. As mentioned before, Chapter II serves as the overarching literature review for the whole dissertation, which means that it does not bother with the proposal of actual measurement models, but will lay out the theoretical assumptions and conceptual models of public diplomacy. Chapter III and IV then follow up with actual measurement models that

examines only a part, or several links, inside the *conceptual models of public diplomacy* proposed in Chapter II.

Chapter V serves as a discussion about analytical methods, which includes the justification of the choices of data collection and analysis methods. After that, the dissertation will get into the results of empirical examination in Chapter VI, where the theoretical models proposed in Chapter III and Chapter IV are operationalized and examined with survey data.

CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter depicts the theoretical framework of the dissertation and it includes four main parts. Firstly, it introduces public diplomacy to the reader in terms of its definition in four different schools of thought. Secondly, it summarizes previous research and illustrates the problems of previous essentialist and functionalist approaches to public diplomacy. Thirdly, in a structuralist approach, which re-conceptualizes the three of the actors in public diplomacy: the *state*, the *mediator* and the *people*. Last but not the least, it explains the relationships between the different types of actors with a one-sided *ecology* model and a two-sided *negotiation* model.

2.1 What is Public Diplomacy?

The introduction of this dissertation has already showcased a few examples of public diplomacy. However, a few cases or examples are not enough to start the theoretical construction, for they cannot provide an accurate answer to the question “what is public diplomacy?”

This is not an easy question, not even for public diplomacy researchers and practitioners. The actual business of public diplomacy is being practiced by media workers, government officials, advertisers of multinational corporations, NGOs’ outreach department, and so on. Not surprisingly, because a wide range of different industrial or

governmental entities practice public diplomacy, they asked this question (what is public diplomacy?) to a wide range of distinct academics. They include scholars from *international relations, public relations, advertising, and mass communication*. Although there are numerous ways to categorize public diplomacy, this section mainly focuses on the above-mentioned four areas of study.

What is public diplomacy? The first answer was provided by a then retired foreign service officer, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Mr. Edmund Guillon, in 1965. His definition of public diplomacy can be traced in the documents of the Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy:

“Public diplomacy... deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications” (Cull 2008, p. 17)

Guillon’s definition focuses on foreign policies, international relations and foreign public opinion. In comparison to definitions by scholars from other disciplines, this definition is based on the essential interest in international relations, with special focus on *who* conducts public diplomacy and *what* public diplomacy can do for them in terms of international relations.

For example, Malone (1985) defined public diplomacy as "direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments". The definitions became more concrete in terms of actors and areas of influence later, as Tuch (1990) defined public diplomacy as "a government's process of

communication with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies.” Nye (2008), on the other hand, defined public diplomacy as a “tool through which a country’s soft power is exerted”.

Public relations scholars have argued for theoretical convergence between international PR and public diplomacy. Signitzer and Coombs (1992) argued that most of the international PR literature studied how to effectively communicate with foreign publics for the benefits of multinational corporations, not for governments. They compared the basic theoretical components of public diplomacy and Grunig & Hunt’s (1984) typology of public relations models, and argued that the two fields were “naturally converging”. Yun (2006) tested the applicability of the Excellence theory (Grunig, 1992) among diplomats from around the world in Washington, DC, and found supportive evidence: diplomats’ strategies of public diplomacy can be theoretically explained and categorized by the Excellence theory of public relations. Signitzer and Wamser (B. Signitzer & Wamser, 2006) argued that public diplomacy is a “specific government public relations function” (p.435), and that both public diplomacy and public relations are “strategic communication functions of either organizations or nation-states, and typically deal with the reciprocal consequences a sponsor and its publics have upon each other” (p.441).

A different perspective can be found in advertising scholarship, which has addressed how nation branding or “brand states” played an important role in public diplomacy (Van Ham, 2001, 2002). In this sense, their approach to public diplomacy focuses on perception of governments among foreign publics and the consequences.

Scholars of nation branding do not usually define public diplomacy in their own terms, but mainly illustrated the association between public diplomacy and concepts such as place branding, nation branding or national image management. For example, Wang (2006a) argued that the management of a nation's image abroad is a key component of public diplomacy. Van Ham (2002, 2003) argued that what citizen around the world think and feel about a state is vital to that state's success. Such *success* includes gaining supportive voice, attracting tourism and investment and expanding exports of domestic products. The key takeaway from the advertising school is that they tried to directly link the practice of nation branding, or public diplomacy in general, with the "shift in political paradigms" from modern sense of geopolitics to postmodern competitions of symbols and images (Van Ham, 2002, p.252). In other word, advertising scholars advanced Nye's (1990) concept of soft power into a more social-interaction, symbol- and emotion-based area of study. For example, Zhang (2006) conceptualized public diplomacy as

"the active participation by nations in the construction of meanings, in which each nation is one of the many players in the international community that continually interacts through exchanging symbols, forming and negotiating meanings, and performing acts based on their respective meanings" (p.27)

It is important to add an additional note here about the differences between the public relations approach and the advertising approach to public diplomacy. Although there are a number of concepts from both schools that may have similar meaning at face value. The public relations approach could be robust in conceptualizing public diplomacy: this is because that public relations includes various conceptualizations about power balances in the communication process: contemporary public relations scholars recognize the importance of gaining, maintaining, exerting and yielding power, while

advertising scholars are more goal-oriented and influenced by other schools such as marketing. The advertising approach to public diplomacy could be closer to propaganda campaigns, nations' image building and incitation campaigns, while the public relations approach could be more useful for local relationship building, education programs and reputation management of governments and national leaders.

The mass communication perspective on public diplomacy has the longest history. While PR focuses on relationship-building, nation branders focus on the emotional and affective outcomes of national image perception. Mass communication scholars are often not regarded as a legitimate member of the public diplomacy research community, for sometimes public diplomats hope to differentiate themselves from propagandists who engage in persuasion, dissemination of false information, and psychological warfare (Fitzpatrick, 2007; Nye, 2008). However, mass communication scholars' focus on the relationships among media, public opinion and government is nevertheless valuable (Gilboa, 2008; Soroka, 2006). Most mass communication scholars also do not bother with the definition of public diplomacy, but their focus on the linkages among media frames, agendas, foreign public opinion and foreign government is unique. Mass communication scholars often come up with empirical models that explains how an international broadcasting system or internationalized social media, work as a mediator between governments and citizen (Entman, 2008; Golan & Himelboim, 2015). These models will be explained with more details later.

To sum it up, scholars of international relations, public relations, advertising and mass communications all have their specific focus in public diplomacy. The way they conceptualize public diplomacy as an academic inquiry is different: international

relations scholars focuses more on the defining the actor (the government) and the expected outcome (ideals, policies), some of them even focuses on resources of public diplomacy (culture) (Nye, 1990) and the instrumentalization of public diplomacy in international relations (Nye, 2008). Mass communication scholars cling the most tightly to international relations in terms of conceptualization, but focuses on the relationships among media, government and public opinion, and are engaged more in empirical studies of foreign public opinion management. Public Relations scholars conceptualized public diplomacy as a government's specific function of relationship management. And advertising scholars have their unique ways of conceptualizing public diplomacy and focuses on governments' efforts in the creation and maintenance of national image. However, as shown in Figure 2.1, it is difficult to draw definite lines between their approaches to public diplomacy, their differences are not absolute, but rather lying on different spectra.




Figure 2.1 Spectra of Foci of Different Approaches to Public Diplomacy

2.2 The Existing Problems of Public Diplomacy Conceptualization.

The previous section discussed the conceptualization of public diplomacy as a government practice in different academic fields. It summarizes these conceptualizations, the current conceptualizations of public diplomacy practice and relationships between different actors do not provide a clear answer to how to strategically analyze a single public diplomacy project.

For example, the symbolic interactionist interpretation of public diplomacy provides a convenient perspective to study what scholars called “cultural diplomacy”, it has a focus on the collaborative work by global institutions in the creation, recreation and negotiation of symbols. However, it does not explain the structural *order* within such collaboration and in most cases, is only interested in the process and results of interactions. This means that the symbolic interactionist school does not explain which institution should complete which task and the corresponding responsibilities of different entities in a public diplomacy project.

This is not to say that there is no normative theory in the study of public diplomacy. Public relations researchers have proposed several versions of a normative public diplomacy theory which incorporates public relations norms (Golan, 2013; Signitzer & Coombs, 1992; Grunig, 1993). Other scholars proposed normative theories of public diplomacy using different focuses and definitions of key concepts (Wang, 2006b; Gilboa,)

The Importance of Competition in Public Diplomacy.

Many would argue that public diplomacy goes beyond the deliberate actions of governments in some cases. For example, the popularity of Hollywood movies can hardly be a direct result of US public diplomacy. Of course, symbolic interactionism again provides a convenient analytical perspective to study the influence of media products abroad. The public relations school would also turn its focus on the strategies of Hollywood movie companies' strategy in promoting their products abroad. These are indeed useful and valuable perspectives, but they both ignore an important feature of mass communication: each human being's energy in media consumption is limited to a certain extent, that means there is a fundamental competition between Hollywood movies, Bollywood movies, and other international cinema. To achieve the goal of gaining positive and supportive public opinion abroad, or to promote national culture and values, governments and culture promoters need to compete in the market of ideas.

Diplomacy means negotiation, and negotiation means there are competing ideas. But the advertising school focuses on a single-sided story of image creation and relationship building. Mass communication scholars do notice the competitive nature of international broadcasting. Scholars of media credibility studied "channel credibility competition" (Kioussis, 2001). And international communication studies include many comparative studies of different frames about international phenomena such as Eurozone crisis, KAL incident, global warming, etc. Entman's (2008) cascading activation model also observed *frame contestation* among US news frames and other countries' news frames. His cascading activation model (explained in detail later) clarifies the functions of governments, media, elites and the mass public. However, this model was not

particularly clear in explaining the relationship between the US government and US-owned global media: the US influence was simplified to “US news frames” as a foreign news source.

The cascading activation model illustrated a point larger than the structuralist perspective it adopted: it showed that within each society there are relationships and mutual influences between the government, the opposing elites, the media and the citizen. The observation into the internal structure of a society is important for the practice of foreign public diplomacy. Because it means that a public diplomat has to look at not only channels and effects, but also other actors influencing those channels and effects. For example, if a person wants to travel from one point to another point, he/she has to consider the method of transportation, the landscape of the route and whether the destination is accessible. But practically, he/she also has to consider if there are too many cars in the designed route, the local regulations about travelling through that route and the driving habits of other drivers on the road.

Scholars of mass communication and international relations noticed frame contestation and the differences of societal structures in different countries. For example, studies have shown that the relationships between media, government and public opinion are different from one society to another. Studies also examined and compared media credibility of different global media platforms for a particular population. Thus, there is knowledge about how differently governments manage public opinion, and how differently global media are perceived by people from distinct regions. But when such knowledge is applied in the study of public diplomacy, scholars often have different findings about the best management of public diplomacy. For example, scholars found

that a nation's leader's image is important in increasing friendly sentiments abroad, while others found that multinational corporations are the main players helped building relationships with foreign publics. In this case, it is important to set boundaries between different entities of public diplomacy.

The Lack of Boundaries between Public Diplomacy Actors.

Among the four major schools that study public diplomacy, the social-interactionist approach is perhaps the most vanguard school of thought. With the emergence of Habermas's concept of public sphere, and Castell's elaboration of a new public sphere in the information age, scholars of public diplomacy were quick in applying a constructivist perspective: so that we see many studies about a "brand-state" is constructed by social interactions. With the rise of social media, the academic inquiry of public diplomacy has been slightly diverted to the focus on the diminishing boundaries between target audience, the global publics, the media, and powerful authorities. Some theories claim the spontaneity of the citizens, other theories focused on the functions of media platforms, some others focused on the influence of authoritative and governmental power in public diplomacy. With the many versions of categorization of untraditional diplomacy (Cull, 2008b; Gilboa, 2008; Golan, 2013; Wang, 2006b), scholars studying public diplomacy found different prototypes of *diplomacy to the publics* or *diplomacy with the publics*. These categorizations include public diplomacy, media diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, education diplomacy, international political marketing, international broadcasting, and so on.

These types of untraditional diplomacy are distinguished from traditional diplomacy usually by *a)* assuming the actor is not a government; *b)* assuming the goal is

not policy change or persuasion; and *c*) assuming that the diplomacy is not done to/with another government. And those assumptions are usually rationalized *because* the special functions of social institutions in the process of untraditional diplomacy. For example, media diplomacy means the use of media to address foreign government officials (instead of global publics in general). As Gilboa noticed, her and other scholar's work often make categorizations based on the different *goals* and *means* of nontraditional diplomacy.

Golan, Yang, and Kinsey (2015) draw the boundaries between campaigns, public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy by looking at the *time* it would take for any effect. For example, they categorized them into short-term, mid-term and long-term projects to address foreign public opinion. This perspective is valuable as it provides a strategic focus on the actual practice of public diplomacy projects, but it still does not give a clear answer to the interrelated nature of public diplomacy actors. Gilboa (2008, p. 59) did a great job in introducing three models of public diplomacy based on the actors of public diplomacy and the relationship among them. The three models are respectively the *Basic Cold War* model, the *Nonstate Transnational* Model and the *Domestic PR* model.

These models are extremely important for the current dissertation, because it not only explores the relationships among the state, the nonstate actors and the audience, but also provides a historical perspective in terms of the emergence of new players in public diplomacy. Rather than categorize the roles played by actors in a generic model, these models are separated because actors have different functions in each of the models and the relationships between them are different. For example, Gilboa (2008) summarized:

“The three models can explain significant variation in perceptions of public diplomacy activities. The Chinese government saw the prodemocracy demonstrations as American use of the Basic Cold War

model: the use of international broad casting to inspire public unrest in China. From the U.S. perspective, however, the prodemocracy campaign in China was an example of the Nonstate Transnational model: an opposition group in China using global communication to mobilize public opinion in the West to actively support their cause. Application of the models showed that the U.S. interpretation was the correct one...” p. 60

However, the difference between the two models is, as Golan et al (2015) categorized, the difference between a short-term effect and a long-term effect. The actors involved in the prodemocracy demonstrations in China are just there despite of the observer’s preference: the opening-up policy of Chinese government in 1978, the import of Western goods, the broadcasting of Western media products and the westernization of Chinese education. The Chinese government, the US government, media of all kinds, international trade facilitators, students, universities are all part of the actors in that event. Simply categorizing a public diplomacy phenomenon as either a *Basic Cold War* model or a *Nonstate Transnational* model is too much simplification of the process. And such simplification will cause ignorance to the competitive nature of public diplomacy, as well as create confusion about the structural relationship between actors.

The Analytical Problems Caused.

Taking a famous question in public diplomacy as an example: in the case where a country’s peace keeping corps sendS financial aid using its naval forces’ vessels to another country, should this be considered *public diplomacy* or *traditional diplomacy*? And with regard to the reporting of this event in the global mass media, and its discussion in social media, should it be considered as *media diplomacy*, *cultural diplomacy* or

propaganda? Scholars studying soft power also ask whether this is *hard* power or *soft* power?

Obviously, the use of naval forces' vessels to transport international aid resources associates this action with a country's military resources and economic resource. Its portrayal and discussion in media platforms may cause the action to have an effect in global public opinion. Thus, scholars can categorize the different *aspects* of this action into either international collaboration, traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy, media diplomacy and so on. That is, the major categorization of public diplomacy is drawn by looking at the *intention* of the immediate *effect* of any *single* actor in the whole event. This categorization has many merits, but it provides obstacles to analyze a relationship building/image promotion/diplomacy process taking all major actor into consideration at the same time (Baldwin, 2016).

For example, studies have discussed the failure of American public diplomacy in the Middle East after 9-11 (The Shared Value Project), blaming the lack of credibility in the message, the misplaced objectives of media organizations even the poor design of messages (Plaisance, 2005; Wang, 2007). The focus on a single actor (the media and the design team) missed other players in the international public opinion arena: American military actions were not fully supported in the US, creating negative images in the US domestic media, political conflicts among world powers in the region also exacerbated local anti-American sentiments. Research tried to provide a cure for the problem but the majority of the analyses focused only on the decision-making process of the Public Information Office of the State Department (Gilboa, 2001; Snow & Taylor, 2008), the poor focus of the message delivered to the local people and the existence of *Al Jazeera*

(Powers & Gilboa, 2007). But few have asked the question: why *Al Jazeera* gained popularity? How were the locals communicating through non-Western local media? Was *Al Jazeera* similar to CNN or BBC in terms of its role in local society and its relationship with local governments?

Because there were no clear boundaries between actors in public diplomacy, scholars could only image the relationships between them by guessing their role in local society (Wang, 2006a). Assuming media organizations to have the same function worldwide because they are “media” is too essentialist. For example, China Central Television is similar to CNN in many ways, but their resource of power and their social place in China and the US differs drastically. The upcoming section will provide new conceptualizations of actors in public diplomacy. In other words, it tries to draw clear boundaries between actors NOT according to their names, labels or functions in a special scenario, but their *power resources, relationship* with other actors and functions when *connected* to another actor.

2.3 Rethinking Actors in Public Diplomacy: State, Mediator and Publics.

As can be seen in Figure 2.1, different schools that study public diplomacy have distinct focus in terms of entities. This also means that they have different conceptualizations about the actors in public diplomacy. In mainstream theories of international relations, the emphasis is given primarily to *states* and *non-state* actors. Mass communication scholars and public opinion researchers would have a more narrowed-down focus on media platforms, election campaigns, elite organizations and opinion leaders. Advertising researchers focus more on symbols and multinational

corporations. And public relations scholars are more interested in activist groups, NGOs, NPOs and local communities.

Some of these actors overlap in terms of what they stand for. These overlaps create difficulties for theoretical integration of public diplomacy, which requires the re-organization or even the re-conceptualization of actors, relationships and goals. This dissertation categorizes different actors in public diplomacy into three groups: the state, the mediator and the publics. In this dissertation, the *state* refers to governments or governmental agencies that has the goal of influencing foreign public opinion and even behaviors of foreign people (e.g. Embassies, British Council). The *mediator* refers to organizations or platforms that the state collaborates with or utilizes to modify the effect of such influence (e.g. CNN, Olympic Games, WTO, Facebook, foreign agents). And the *publics* refers to (groups of) ordinary individuals who are subject to a particular goal of a foreign government.

State actors in Camouflage.

The definition of a *state* in the current dissertation needs to make clarifications to what should be considered as a government and, more importantly, a governmental agency. A government is defined *as the complex of political institutions that performs governing and administration of a country and promotes its interests*. In the context of public diplomacy, the definition of the state assumes that states have interests in influencing foreign public opinion and behaviors. Numerous governments have specialized departments that monitors and influences foreign public opinion, the U.S. government had the United States Information Agency (i.e. USIA) as the primary public diplomacy machinery. After a few failed attempts in altering anti-American sentiments in

the Arabic world (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2003; Golan & Kioussis, 2010; Plaisance, 2005; Powers & El Gody, 2009), the USIA was put down. However, the Obama administration actually established numerous offices under the Public Information department that focused respectively on different regions in terms of foreign public opinion. The Chinese central government also promoted campaigns such the “Chinese Dream” starting 2014, and such campaign coordinated the efforts from the Unified Front Work Department, the Publicity Department of CPC, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹.

There has been a plausible change in terms of governments’ use of official public diplomacy agency: both the US and China, together with Britain and France, are trying to avoid the establishment of a standalone public diplomacy agency, and tried to put public diplomacy activities in the camouflage of national images, cultural exchanges, educational programs. For public diplomacy researchers, these can hardly be a camouflage, because Cull (2008), Gilboa (2008) and many others have already categorized above-mentioned activities under the umbrella of public diplomacy. However, it is hard to deny that governments are labelling some of their sub-branches as “NGO”s, “NPO”s or “nondepartmental” for better public perception (Hartig, 2012). The camouflage can be effective for ordinary publics, and even for scholars who are not familiar with public diplomacy research.

Because of this camouflage, many would argue about where to draw a line between governmental agencies and non-state actors in public diplomacy. For example, a

¹ The current Chinese system of national governance is a combination of the party system and a government system. Sometimes these two systems go parallel but in other cases they don’t. For example, the “State Council Information Office” is at the same time “International Communication Office of the CPC Central Committee”. This means that the same institution has a role to perform both in the party system and the state system, with the exact same head and personnel.

number of governments have established cultural promotion departments/agencies: public diplomacy researchers and practitioners are familiar with organizations like British Council (UK), Alliance Française (France), Goethe-Institut (Germany), Instituto Cervantes (Spain) and Confucius Institute (China), etc. Some researchers conceptualize them as channels of psychological influence or cultural promotion (Cull, 2008b; Gilboa, 2008; Signitzer & Wamser, 2006). However, although these institutions often have diverse sources of funding including business corporations or private foundations, they only receive funding from one government in terms of government funding. Some of them are also subordinate to direct supervisions of central governments while claiming to be a “non-governmental organization”.

Moreover, state-owned corporations should be conceptualized as a *state* actor in this dissertation. For example, charity campaigns of Chinese construction conglomerates in Latin America should be considered as a state action rather than a pure business strategy of promoting the image of the company’s social responsibility. This is because state-owned companies are more directly monitored, influenced and controlled by their governments in terms of outreach. Researchers would still argue that private multinational companies should not be considered as *state* actors but rather *mediators*. Indeed, privately owned multinational companies have more freedom in deciding their own priorities in terms of global marketing and foreign public opinion. While this dissertation categorizes companies such as CNN, BBC, Samsung and Apple as potential mediators of public diplomacy, it is still necessary for the reader to keep in mind that they are nevertheless subjects of government influences, and *vice versa*. For example, although BBC does not receive direct funding from the British government, it has a long

history of governmental affiliation and is still subject to a Royal Charter which the government can amend (Andrews, 2005). Samsung is a family-owned business, but its connections to the Korean government can be traced in the investigations of South Korean ex-president Park Geun-hye.

Another type of state actors in public diplomacy is the *delegated* state actor. This type of actor often times do not try to cover their connection with the foreign government. Embassies and professional diplomats have played an important role in public diplomacy as well, but they are somehow perceived to be closer to the local citizens than their central government. For example, the pan-social debate on air pollution in China was inspired by a routine report of air quality in Beijing provided by the US embassy. The appointment of a Chinese American diplomat (Gary Faye Locke, a.k.a. 骆家辉) as the US ambassador in China also inspired good hope of the Chinese citizens about Sino-American relations (Zhang, 2013). Another study of US embassy in South Korea also showed that embassies are good actors directly causing pro-American sentiments abroad (Lee & Jun, 2013).

Another type of state actor often overlooked by researchers is the *mediating* state actor. This category includes a variety of different types of organizations that are funded and supported directly by a single government, but are functioning as a mediator in terms of the two mediator functions of *performing* and *channeling* (see next subheading for explication). **The differences** between a mediating state actor and a delegated state actor is that mediating state actors have mediating functions such as organizing local events, facilitating government-business-education negotiations and disseminating messages. A delegated state actor, like an embassy, can only negotiate with governments as a direct

representation of the government, and messages from diplomats usually *depend* on a certain type of media for dissemination. On the other hand, organizations such as the “nondepartmental” British Council, can host cultural events in foreign universities, and can collaborate with the British embassies in search for an official voice (Vickers, 2004). The Confucius Institute of China establish branches of *Confucius Institutes of Confucius Classrooms* with a joint-funding from a Chinese university and a foreign university (Hartig, 2012). The US-funded *Al Hurra* TV in the Middle East is an example of a government agency in the camouflage of a TV station (Powers & El Gody, 2009). Its main competitor in the region, *Al Jazeera*, should also be conceptualized as a mediating state actor because it is a state-owned media company of Qatar (Samuel-Azran, 2013).

Of course, using ownership and source of funding as the only criteria to draw a line between state actors and non-state actors could be blunt. There is a series of studies about the factors influencing the editorial agenda and preferences of media agencies besides ownership, and there is also evidence that British Council and Confucius Institute have certain degrees of freedom in terms of policy-making and collaboration. But when researching a multi-faceted practice like public diplomacy, a clear structuralist categorization is useful so that the different objectives and effects of public diplomacy campaigns can be better categorized. If we can better understand the policy-wise patronage of actors, and the different goals of these actors, we could better answer questions about how different factors influence the outcomes of public diplomacy practice. In conclusion, Table 2.1 sums up the three types of *state* actors in terms of their functions, formats and examples.

Table 2.1 Typology of State Actors in Public Diplomacy

	<i>Functions</i>	<i>Formats</i>	<i>Examples</i>
<i>Direct State Actor</i>	Make Policies and Plans, Provide Funding, Apply Strategies with Mediators	Central Government or Governmental Ministries located inside the state	US Government, USIA, Ministry of Education of China
<i>Delegated State Actor</i>	Communicate with Foreign Governments Directly, Apply Strategies with Mediators	Embassies, Consulates Diplomats, Other specialized governmental delegations (e.g. trade)	US Embassy in China, Ambassadors
<i>Mediating State Actor</i>	Create direct government-instructed effect like a performing and/or a channel mediator	Single Government-funded agencies, Incitation Agents	Al-Hurra TV, CIA agents, British Council

Mediator: Performing and Channeling.

Mediator in the current context could be understood as platforms, channels or tools for the modification of public opinion. These mediators do not necessarily have a spontaneous motive and objective in terms of modifying public opinion or activating publics (in the public relation sense) abroad, but are collaborators, tools or facilitators for governmental goals of public diplomacy. Thus, this particular definition does not limit the format, nationality or the size of a mediator entity: for example, the World Trade Organization can be a mediator through which the outcome of inter-governmental negotiations influences global public opinion about globalization and international trade policies. The Olympic Games can be a platform on which a government wins positive foreign public opinion by showing economic might, credibility and responsibility in

international commitment. Moreover, different forms of media (traditional and new) are perhaps the most important mediators in this process, for they serve the role of dissemination of information on a global scale.

Table 2.2 Typology of Public Diplomacy Actors that could have Mediating Functions

	<i>Prototype</i>	<i>Functions</i>	<i>Formats</i>	<i>Examples</i>
<i>Mediating State Actor</i>	State	Create direct government-instructed effect as a performing and/or a channel mediator	Single Government-funded agencies, Incitation Agents	Al-Hurra TV, CIA agents, British Council
<i>Performing Mediator</i>	Mediator	Providing negotiation or performance space for influential information	Int'l Organizations, Multinational Corporations, International PR firms	WTO, UN, Apple, Toyota, APCO Worldwide
<i>Channel Mediator</i>	Mediator	Providing one-way or two-way communication channels for information	Traditional Media (both global and local), New Media, including social media	CNN, Twitter, Weibo

Although *media* and *international organizations* are two oversimplifying words, their differences are important: media are often the *channels* of communication, international organizations are often the venue of public diplomacy *performances*. Previous public diplomacy research studied both these two kinds of mediators, however, few studies addressed their differences in terms of their roles in public diplomacy. For example, studies about Western media in Color Revolutions treated Western media as a channel or a platform for the organization of activities (Sussman & Krader, 2008). But the actual incitation activities were carried out by activist groups with US support (Way,

2008). As discussed above, these activist groups should be categorized as *mediating state actors*, not a *mediator*. Similarly, a decision made within the WTO cannot travel by itself into the households of foreign people, but was transmitted by the global media such as *The Wall Street Journal* to the world audience. Thus, an analyst of public diplomacy should be careful when conceptualizing public diplomacy actors: for there are difference between a *mediating state actor*, a *performing mediator* and a *channel mediator*. Their differences are summarized in Table 2.2.

To further clarify, mediators are entities that don't receive funding and policy-wise instructions from a *single* government. To qualify as a mediator, an organization should at least self-claim to be a non-partisan, objective information provider. For example, CNN and BBC as internationally recognized broadcasters, claim themselves as objective information providers with a balance of opinions in their news reporting. Secondly, a mediator could receive funding from a *collection* of governments, but not from a *single* government: international organizations could be mediators of public diplomacy because they are venues of international negotiation: taking the World Bank as an example, it provides a platform for negotiations about international fiscal policies, these policies often times determine the prospect of certain countries economic development and influences global expectations. The key takeaway here is that the World Bank does not make decisions, the decisions are an outcome of negotiation between different governments, meaning that no government has absolute power in making global fiscal policies.

It is also true that in international negotiations, certain governments have more leverage in negotiations than others: The United Nations has a security council that

deliberately invested more leverage onto the US, UK, France, Russia and China as winners of World War II. Research about decision making in WTO also showed that there is power imbalance among member states. Media mediators have certain values that are akin to certain states as well: for example, content analyses showed that media of different nationalities reported the same events using different frames, and placed the events on different agendas. Recent research and media response in China to “biased Western values” also showed a conflict in values. These findings and many others have an important implication for this dissertation: *mediators can hardly be value free and cannot assume a balance of voices within themselves.*

Publics: Activeness, Opinion Leaders and Elites.

As discussed earlier, state actors have a variety of goals in public diplomacy, varying from incitation of foreign publics to building benign relationships with them. No matter which goal might be for a public diplomacy campaign, publics are a key factor in the process of reaching that objective. This section will discuss the segmentation of publics according to their activeness about a certain issue, the importance of opinion leaders and elites.

Public relations theory has already provided an effective way of segmenting publics according to their activeness towards an issue or crisis involving a corporation. Public relations theorists define a public as “any group whose members have a common interest or common values in a particular situation” (Bowen, Rawlins & Martin, 2010). In the business management sense, the publics may include investor publics, media publics, activist publics, government publics or general publics, etc. The segmentation of publics was first proposed by Grunig (1997). He categorized the publics according to their

activeness into four types: *nonpublics* are not connected to the present issue in any way; *latent publics* are those who have possible connections to the present issue, but are not psychologically active in elaborating the issue; *aware publics* are already psychologically preoccupied with the issue but inactive in terms of behaviors; *active publics* are active both psychologically and behaviorally.

This typology has useful implications to the management of public diplomacy, for they provide a method of categorizing active versus passive communicative behaviors and prioritizing certain strategies of public diplomacy. For example, the scale of the objective of a state actor in a certain public diplomacy project helps to identify nonpublics, if the objective is to promote national image *around* the globe in the Olympic Games, then there is probably no nonpublic for such project (everyone should at least be latent publics). However, if a project is country- or region-specific like the *Al Hurra TV* project, then the nonpublic is identifiable in terms of regional and religious focus, because the project is geo- and issue-specific. Moreover, one of the objectives of public diplomacy is to influence the policy-making process of another state actor. In many circumstances, this is done through the activation of publics in another state. The obvious example for this is the Arab Spring revolutions and the Color Revolutions in the mid-1990s: these public diplomacy campaigns activated local publics' awareness and behaviors in favor of "Western Democracy" (Bruns, Highfield, & Burgess, 2013; Khondker, 2011; Way, 2008), not only did they alter the policy-making process in many states, but also fundamentally reinstalled the regional political system. American embassy's reports about air quality in Beijing inspired millions of unaware Chinese citizens to discuss air pollution on social media, forming pressure to national

environmental policies in the public discourse. Moreover, research about the role of ethics in public relations management (Bowen, 2004) also shows that incorporating values of autonomy, mutual respect and authenticity in activation campaigns could benefit campaign outcome, for the activists in foreign countries long for these values.

Another dimension of the *publics actor* is the actor's political and social ability in a certain social structure. The publics actor is NOT the last piece of a chain of psychological or behavioral influence. This is to say, although the objectives of public diplomacy are usually in people, but publics are constantly entangled in the process as a feedback provider for the state actors. For example, Entman (2008, p. 88) proposed a model of cascading network activation model to describe in a functionalist sense public diplomacy campaigns that involve "shorter term and more targeted efforts using mass communication (including the internet) to increase support of a country's specific foreign policies among audiences beyond that country's borders". The applied model (Entman, 2008, p. 98, shown in Figure 2.2) included feedback paths from public to national media and finally to the leaders of the ruling party. The publics actor in this model could be a goal in itself, but could also be an influencer of national policy, while being influenced by a "contestation of frames" (p. 90) from the US and the targeted country.

The mediated public diplomacy's cascading network model has at least two important implications for the current theorization: first, the final model considered the influence of "*opposition elites in target nation*" (Entman, 2008, p.98) in target nation media, and *the US media/global media's* influence in target nation media. For a feedback-based policy-influencing strategy to work, it is important to establish connections to target country's national media through opposition elites, which often

allows the US news frames to win in the “contestation of frames” against domestic or other types of news frames. This is to say that not only the segmentation and identification of publics is important, but that the management of the environment in which the desired messages are delivered is also vital.




Figure 2
Cascading Activation Applied to U.S. Mediated Public Diplomacy

Figure 2.2 Entman (2008, p.98) Cascading Model of Public Diplomacy


2.4 Relationships between Actors of Public Diplomacy

This section will discuss the relationships between the different actors of public diplomacy mentioned earlier: namely the *state* actor, the *mediator* actor and the *publics* actor. Moreover, this section organizes these relationships and proposes a new structuralist model of public diplomacy. This new model illustrates not only the traditional single-sided model of public diplomacy, but also the two-sided model where


one state actor can influence another state actor's public diplomacy practice. Thus, this section consists of two main parts: the first part constructs a traditional one-sided model with the new conceptualization of public diplomacy actors; the second part adds a mirror image of the one-sided model and discuss interactions between state actor A's public diplomacy and state actor B's.

The One-Sided Ecology Model of Public Diplomacy.

Public diplomacy is conceptualized as fundamentally a state action. Thus, this model begins with a state actor, and this is actually what many public diplomacy studies begin with in terms of analysis. For example, the Chinese central government have been hiring international PR firms around the world to promote Chinese culture in Time Square, New York City. The PR firms used advertisements on large billboards in the square as the media platform. In this typical case, the relationships between the state actor and the mediator can be conceptualized as (arrows are directions of influence, the same applies to other illustrations in this section):



If we substitute the actual players with the actor types that they should be categorized as, the relationship would then become:




In this scenario, the state actor collaborated with the performing actor in terms of the strategic planning of the cultural promotion campaign. Collaboration was in place because the performing actor provides a venue of negotiation. For example, the international PR firms may have expertise in where and when to broadcast the content that the Chinese government hopes to put out; they could also have negotiated in terms of actual design of the advertisement and payment issues. The billboards do not belong to the PR companies as a property, but they are an important channel through which the negotiated strategies are broadcasted.


In this particular case, the Chinese central government has little leverage against international PR companies, for the Chinese government possess little irreplaceable resource of their needs. The same applies to the relationship between the international PR companies and the billboard owners, for imaginably billboards on Times Square are popular for hire. However, other cases provide evidence that the relationship between state actors and mediators are more than just mere hiring relationships. For example, many have studied the Olympic games as a venue of public diplomacy. The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games was expected by the then Korean government as an opportunity to show off Korean economic development, and to attract global attention to the North Korea problem. As Manheim (1990) put it, the Korea government was purchasing an “insurance against Northern invasion”. For the International Olympic Committee, it hopes to find an

economically capable state that could probably attract global attention. This creates an interdependency between the International Olympic Committee and the Korean government because they both seek unique resources from the other side.


The successful 1988 Seoul Olympics reached households around the world not directly through the International Olympic Committee, but through international media and broadcasting. Take the US as an example, the then WNBC-4 got the authorization to broadcast the event, which would hopefully strengthen its domestic market share during the 1988 games. Vice versa, the International Olympic Committee makes a considerable amount of profit by selling broadcasting rights to TV stations around the world. Moreover, The WNBC-4 would have to rely on the South Korean government in terms of local protection and permissions to operate, and the South Korean government would also depend on WNBC -4 to deliver favorable images of South Korea as the host country in the US. In short, in this scenario, there would be an ecological relationship between the state and different mediators because of the many interdependencies:



If we substitute the actual players with the actor types which they should be categorized as, the relationship would then become:



The *ecology of the state-mediator relationships* is an important model for the state actor to participate in international negotiation and execute its strategies, and it is also an important venue for international and trans-border organizations and media to gain vitality through government funding and other sources of revenues. However, because dependency is volatile and resources are flowing worldwide constantly, the interdependencies between these actors will vary from one scenario to another (S.J. Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976; Emerson, 1962; Grant, 1996). For example, the CNN and BBC are dominant in terms of coverage and audience size as an international media, and their connection to the US or UK state could be stronger than their relationship with other states. In cases where the state is using a mediating state actor (*e.g.* the British Council) to promote national culture and national values, the ecology may become the interdependencies between *two state actors (the direct state actor, the mediating state actor) and a performing mediator*:



Although the goals of different public diplomacy projects vary from persuasion to relationship building, their actualization needs the participation of the *publics* actors. As discussed, publics actors have two important functions: the first is to disseminate message and information for advocacy, and the second is to provide feedback for the public diplomacy strategy. For example, active groups of publics (active publics in a public relations sense) engage in communicative actions to help raise awareness about a political or cultural issue, and even engages in more direct political behaviors such as protests or riots, or cultural behaviors such as celebration, practice of language and ritual ceremonies. Publics with more communicative power like celebrities, social activists and academics can disseminate ideas to form debates in different social networks. Likewise, political elites of an opposing party can influence the state actors' policy making process. In other words, the publics actors could be an end of public diplomacy, but they could also be a means of public diplomacy goals by providing constructive or corrective feedbacks. In sum, the relationship between the publics actor and state and mediator actors can be summarized as:




Figure 2.3 Ecology Model of Public Diplomacy

This model resembles of combination of the ecology model between state and mediator actors and the public relations model of external environmental scanning and publics activation. Regarding the feedback links from the publics actors to mediator actors, it also incorporates Entman's (2008) cascading activation model of mediated public diplomacy. Because of the necessity to consider Entman's conceptualization of elite news media in this model, the elite publics was incorporated into this figure: however, this is not to say that elite publics belongs to the traditional typology of publics segmentation in the public relations sense. The elite publics is put above the other three types of publics (active-, aware- and latent-publics) because they indeed structurally becomes a special link between public opinion and media content: for the rise of social media has empowered many celebrities, politicians or experts to have more communicative ability than media organizations.

In other words, although "elite publics" was only represented by a single box in Figure 2.3, what distinguish them from other types of publics is not their activeness, but their higher role in the publics activation process: they usually possess more resources and political power in terms of public opinion. Thus, it is reasonable to conceptualize the segmentation of elite publics as well: there would be *active elites*, *aware elites*, and *latent elites* (see last section for reasons why there would be almost no non-publics for public diplomacy).

The interaction between these different types of publics could be further explored in another dissertation, the important point to make here is that information source and flows is conceptualized to have the ability to change citizens' activeness on acting about an international issue. With existing measurement models, it is then possible for

researchers to observe the distinct activation effects of international news media: for example, aware publics usually perceive an issue as problematic, but is not feeling involved enough, or feeling powerless to do anything about it. Their communication with active publics and channeling mediators (often international media or broadcasters in a conventional sense) could psychologically enroll them into the issue and empower them.

However, it is important to note that this model only depicts a one-sided story: that is, this model only tends to explain a mechanism by which one state actor communicates with the publics in *another* state. As discussed earlier, in this model there is an ignorance to the actions of state actors from *another* country. Because relationship building or communication between two collective entities are not exclusive, publics in country B can still have relationship with their own government, their domestic media and even actors from country C. Thus, in the following section, a two-sided story will be told about mechanism of a negotiation model of public diplomacy.

The Two-Sided Negotiation Model of Public Diplomacy.

Keeping the one-sided ecology model mentioned above in mind, this section sets free one of the assumptions of classical definitions of public diplomacy: that it is a relationship building/communication process involving two actors: a state and a target population. This section allows the three types of actors (*state*, *mediator* and *publics*) to simultaneously have relationships with two actors of another, but same type. For example, a *state* actor is permitted to have connection with not only foreign publics, but its domestic publics as well. At the same time, its domestic publics are the targeted population of public diplomacy projects from another country.

Let us label the hypothetical states as Country *A* and Country *B* for the convenience of further theoretical elaboration. The key point of the two-sided story is that either country can now attempt to influence the public diplomacy projects of its counterpart targeting its own publics actors. Assuming a scenario where state *B* wants to influence or modify the effect of state *A*'s public diplomacy on publics in *B*, real world cases showed that state *B* can achieve this by *a*) negotiation with state *A* and *b*) negotiation with mediators.

Negotiation between state actors about public diplomacy usually happens to reinforce or facilitate such efforts. For example, the Japanese *Cool Japan* initiative involves negotiations between Japanese governmental agencies with foreign state agencies in Asian countries to facilitate the broadcast of Japanese programs on foreign TV screens (Daliot-Bul, 2009). The broadcast of some of the most famous Japanese TV dramas was also a result of negotiation between the Japanese and Chinese government. It was meant to soften hostile Chinese public opinion toward Japan for the normalization of diplomatic relationship. Local governments also negotiate directly with foreign cultural institutions such as *Alliance Française* to settle terms for local operation and activities (Paschalidis, 2009; Roberts, 2007).

States negotiate with performing mediators such as the WTO, the International Monetary Fund, the UN for access to foreign media and more benign image on the world stage in general. International organizations are oftentimes the venue where countries negotiate to resolve conflict, decide financial aid or sanctions, and even make international fiscal policy. This gives countries an opportunity to send signals to citizens around the world about their attitude towards a particular issue and can be a part of global

public opinion management process. Countries within powerful networks of international organizations are often perceived to be more credible and responsible as well. Other performing mediators such as NGOs are even more convenient for states to gain access to a specific public opinion arena. At the local level, performing mediators such as universities function as hubs of educational and cultural exchange, but they do have to negotiate with foreign government agencies regarding financial support, visa policies and an appropriate purpose of such exchange programs.

With country A's channeling mediators, state actors in B usually negotiate in terms of their operations domestically. For example, failure of successfully negotiate a deal about operation standards and regulations with the Chinese government caused the blocking of Facebook and Twitter in mainland China. HBO and CNN also need to tailor their content when broadcasting in other parts of the world both in terms of language and content to stay in line with the local regulations.

In sum, when state B can negotiate with state A's state actors and mediators, a negotiation model of public diplomacy is in place by adding a mirror image of the ecology model beside itself:




Figure 2.4 Competition Model of Public Diplomacy

The figure above shows a prototype of the negotiation model of public diplomacy. However, it is important to mention that *mediators* of A and B is combined as single boxes in this figure. This may create difficulty in illustrating the transnational relationship between state actors and mediators, but it does explain the truth that the key of state actors' influence on channeling mediator is *access* and *competition*: as more traditional forms of domestic media and governmental media becomes more internationalized, and with the emergence of international social media, the international mediator arena is a list of information platforms that both A and B's publics can choose from. For example, government control over social media access and competition of international vs. domestic news frames happens in the box of "channeling media of A and B", while international negotiations and traditional diplomacy results derive from performing mediators and become information used in public diplomacy. Last but not the least, since there is the existence of international social media, the activation of key publics in B can often times be done by elite publics or active publics in A through an international social media channeling mediator.

That said, because of the many specific relationship between the actors, the figure above lacks simplicity. For simplicity, the negotiation model can be illustrated as:




Figure 2.5 Simplified Competition Model of Public Diplomacy

Based on this negotiation model, the dissertation hopes to provide empirical evidence to support the state-mediator linkage and the mediator-publics linkage. The following two chapters includes two empirical analysis of a) A's state actor's interference with B's mediator's media credibility and b) a publics activation model to examine different types of mediators' effect in the activation of publics in another country.

CHAPTER 3. STATE MODERATION OF FOREIGN MEDIA

CREDIBILITY

International media compete for audiences around the world. At the same time, for a sovereign state, its domestic audiences are seeking relevantly credible information from a collection of news media. This is especially true in China, as the state has been cautious about the dissemination of foreign information among Chinese audiences. Chapter II theorized that governments have the interest and ability to influence the process of global media competition, and an important subject of governments' interest to modify is foreign media credibility among its citizens.




Figure 3.1 Conceptual Links Tested in Chapter 3

This chapter studies the conceptual model shown in figure 3.1: control on media accessibility leads to the possibility of modifying audiences' perception of domestic/foreign media credibility (which is a part of the grand models discussed in chapter II). Such perception of global media credibility further leads to audiences' dependence on domestic vs. foreign media. In other words, the power to control media accessibility as information resources could create power imbalance between the state and the mass public. And such power could be valuable in the process of public diplomacy: because, as Chapter II illustrated, public diplomacy could be understood as a power ecology between the state, the mediators and the mass public (the one-sided ecology model).

This chapter provides theoretical analysis of past research on media credibility, media accessibility and media system dependency. It works as an empirical extension of Chapter II to test its theoretical arguments: especially focusing on governmental influence in the domestic arena of public diplomacy. At the end of this chapter, when the hypotheses are proposed, a psychometric structural equation model was operationalized and proposed to illustrate the conceptual relationship in figure 3.1.

The current chapter does not intend to carry any judgmental discourse to national policy, but to view governmental intervention as an unavoidable part of global media competition. For the current chapter, the phrase *governmental control* only assumes that governments have relative power to global media organizations (either of foreign or domestic origin) because their legitimate ownership of, as well as responsibility to, resources in legislation and public infrastructure. This is particularly important, because although this chapter chooses the Chinese context for empirical examination, the theory

is NOT about “Chinese governmental control of information”, but rather a general depiction of all governments’ important role in global media competition, especially at the domestic stage. Of course, choosing the Chinese context could potentially benefit the upcoming empirical analysis, because media ownership in China can be more centralized and controlled in comparison to that in other places.

3.1 State Actors in Camouflage: The Question of Why

Information transparency has been brought to the publics’ attention after the 2016 US election, when the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s concern about Russian interference in US presidential election was reported by US and international media. This is an important real-world case illustrating the fact that a government (a state actor) can be upset and sensitive to foreign manipulation of domestic public opinion. The alleged Russian interference happened in the format of “Fake news” which was propagated through social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube. In January 2018, CBS accused RT (Russian Today), a Russia-based international broadcaster, for its interference in the 2016 US election, basing the arguments on a report from Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2017) pointing out that RT functions as “the Kremlin’s principal international propaganda outlet” to assist in the leak of DNC data during the 2016 election. (Simonyan, 2018)

But, how is this, and other similar cases, important in explaining why state actors want to take camouflage? One of the reasons may be simple: the ownership and funding of an international broadcaster are critical for its credibility as perceived by global audience. The ODNI report has explained how RT adopted various strategies to achieve

“formal disassociation from Kremlin” which “facilitates RT US messaging” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017, p. 12). In the interview with CBS, Margarita Simonyan (Editor-in-chief of RT) countered such accusations as she thinks CBS and US intelligence agencies are “destroying our reputation.” (Margarita Simonyan, 2018, 1:15)

In their analysis of RT’s engagement with global audience during the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, one study (Hutchings, Gillespie, Yablokov, Lvov, & Voss, 2015) pointed out that RT is militarizing the global information environment and assumed that there is no objectivity to begin with in international broadcasting, for RT, international broadcasting efforts are a “counter-hegemonic struggle”. The paper argues that RT conceptualizes the information arena to be a highly competitive environment for credibility. For the US-funded Al Hurra in the Middle East, researchers found that identification of Al Hurra’s ownership negatively influences its perceived credibility among local viewers, and that knowledge about Al Hurra’s ownership also negatively moderates the relationship between viewing and opinion about the United States (Dabbous & Nasser, 2009; Douai, 2009; Samei, 2010).

Gass and Seiter (2009) also pointed out that credibility plays an important role in public diplomacy effectiveness and outcome. Their analysis on culture and good will as covariates of credibility implied that, in culturally different or conflicting environments, identification of ownership or cultural source could be detrimental to the perception of a medium’s credibility. After all, as El-Nawaway (2006) pointed out: perceived intentions of the medium to persuade would have a negative effect on perceived credibility, and in a culturally and ideologically different information environment, the intention of the source can easily be doubted by a conservative population such as the Chinese one. Moreover,

mainstream media predominant in the current environment have the advantage of framing such intention to win the credibility competition.

Thus, in the context of international broadcasting, unless being forced to declare ownership and source of funding by law, it is reasonable to argue that global mediators, either state-funded or non-state-funded, would not be willing to actively *advertise* about its source of funding or ownership. And for state-funded mediating actors in public diplomacy, as they often operate in a foreign environment, and perhaps with a national strategic goal, a pan-social acknowledgement about its ownership and funding source could be detrimental to its credibility and influence. It is also one of the reasons why Youtube launched an experimental project to label videos on its site in terms of ownership and funding source, with the hope to “equip users with additional information to help them better understand the sources of news content that they choose to watch on YouTube.” (Youtube, 2018)

3.2 Differentiation of Foreign and Domestic Media

In previous studies about foreign media framing, foreign media effects, and foreign media credibility, it seems that the actual definition of foreign media was overlooked. For example, Willnat, He and Xiaoming (1997) skipped this definition, but associated “foreign” with concepts such as Western and US media. In other studies that have used the concept of foreign media, it was also unclear how the author defined what is foreign and what is domestic. Given the discussion offered in the previous subheading, it is known that state mediating actors often have the intention to not actively disclose

their ownership to preserve credibility. And this fact contributes fiercely to the importance of distinguishing what actually make media *foreign* and *domestic*.

For example, apart from RT's efforts of disassociating itself from Kremlin through the establishment of an international media NGO, as well as Al Hurra's efforts to emphasis its association with the new democratic Iraqi government rather than directly with the US government, the Chinese government is adopting an even more subtle way to dissociate itself from its affiliated or collaborating global media. Sun's (2014) study showed that China Radio International is collaborating with private companies in Australia to deliver image-enhancing messages. Without his study, this link could be much more difficult for international scholars to identify. For the Australian government, as well for other governments mentioned in previous cases, there is indeed a difficulty in distinguishing foreign media from domestic media, because of the further integration of government agencies in the global media in general.

Although this is an important point to be addressed in this study, it does not examine the conceptual differences between foreign media and domestic media among policy makers, or among general publics. This may be the focus of another study, but for the Chinese context, this study adopts the following criteria (if such information is unknown, then it will not be introduced to respondents in the survey) to define what is a foreign media and what is domestic, a media organization will be identified as *foreign media in China* if:

- *The location of the owner of a media organization is not in claimed territories of the People's Republic of China.*

- *The editorial language of the mother company of the media organization is not Mandarin, dialects of the Chinese language or non-sinic languages officially used in P.R. China as secondary languages².*
- *The media organization has Chinese versions of its contents targeting Chinese publics.*

Thus, this study includes media organizations such as CNN, BBC, New York Times, The Economics, The Financial Times, Asahi Shinbum, etc. as foreign media. And these media were used as examples in the questionnaire to help the respondents to better conceptualize what is foreign vs. what is domestic.

3.3 Aspects of Global Media Credibility

The study of media credibility as a psychometric construct developed by Hovland, Janis, & Kelley (1953). Their primary concern was not credibility itself, but rather how different characteristics of information sources can have different influences on attitudinal change. What they found are two significant factors that are related to credibility: *source expertise* and *source trustworthiness*. The trustworthiness aspect of their findings went on to inspire a series of media effect studies that focuses on media credibility, and mistrust or distrust in media, plus their relationship with audiences' attitudinal or behavioral change. As a factor underlying a reader's or viewer's evaluation of news, the concept of credibility has been defined primarily in three ways: (1) message

² In this criterion, the Korean language and the Mongolian language are excluded, for they are used as official languages in parts of China and in other countries.

(or story), (2) source (or organization), and (3) media (or channel) credibility (Sundar, 1999).

Kiousis' (2001) previous research on media credibility mentions two types of credibility usually studied in mass communication: source credibility focuses on the communicator, who is usually an individual, group or an organization; and medium credibility (or channel credibility) that focuses on the media through which information is transmitted. Such categorization explains theoretically the different facets of credibility study in mass communication, and it implied that credibility itself can be analyzed in terms of the communicator, the channel and the message itself (Bucy, 2003; Fico, Richardson, & Edwards, 2004; Kiousis, 2001).

This dissertation does not examine the differences in journalism professionalism or the used of different technologies between foreign media in China and domestic media in China. Because of this, although the aspects of source expertise (message) and channel (whether it is TV, radio, newspaper, etc.) credibility would greatly add to the depth of this dissertation, it would be too overwhelming for the respondents to consider all aspects of media credibility at a single time. Given the public diplomacy focus of this dissertation, this study is more interested in the *source credibility*, or source trustworthiness of the foreign vs. media organizations discussed earlier.

Wanta and Hu (1994) conceptualized media source credibility to have two facets: the first one being *believability* and the second one being *affiliation*. *Believability* stands for how unbiased, trustworthy, fair and professional a media is, while *affiliation* stands for audiences' perception of whether the media works in favor of their well-being and speaks for their interests. This conceptualization was also widely used in other studies

which has the strong interest in media's relationship with the publics, just as this dissertation does. This dissertation argues that, conceptually, the perception of the credibility of a foreign media relies on publics' affective and cognitive identification of the nature of the relationship between them and the media organization: after all, when it comes to foreign media credibility, a foreign media could be perceived as highly professional but yet not trustworthy.

3.4 Selective Control on Media Accessibility in the Chinese Context

Media accessibility is often ignored or mixed with media use/exposure in previous studies. However, this dissertation conceptualizes media accessibility to be an antecedent of credibility perception. In their study about media credibility and media reliance, Wanta and Hu claimed that their study does not assume "there is a passive phase before the active phase" (1994, p. 92) for credibility's influence on reliance (*i.e.* dependency). In other words, Wanta and Hu (1994) did not test whether a "*passive*" reliance can lead to increase in perceived media credibility (*e.g.* a person was exposed passively to partisan media at early age, and trusted that particular media), they only tested that perceived media credibility can lead to *active* reliance. For them, the differentiation of passive and active reliance seems to be a chicken-or-the-egg question again.

Even so, this chicken-or-the-egg question can be well-explained by media dependency theory, as well as by the ecology public diplomacy model on which the current chapter is based. Passive dependency, or "exposure" in previous researchers' words, is usually caused by audiences' lack of power in controlling their information

environment. For example, for a child, the power to control social and political information environment usually lies in the hands of the parents. Emerson's (1962) view on relative power and dependency contributed largely to the formation of media system dependency theory. He conceptualized relative power as the inverse of dependency, and that relative power between entities A and B is determined by B's need for resources from A and B's *access* to alternative sources of such resource. For global media's competition for media credibility in the context of public diplomacy, the resource is obviously information/news.

The second set of political communication related to the concept of media accessibility in China is selective exposure. This is because selective exposure to information and its impact on citizens' political behavior also related to competition of media and the competition of ideas. Selective exposure is defined in the literature as "the selection of information matching their beliefs": for example, people who have more conservative political inclinations in the U.S. may select to attend to conservative media such as Fox News or Breitbart, and conservative ideas would be reinforced in their minds as they stay tuned. This may be also true in China as diversity of political inclinations are allowed among Chinese media: for example, *Phoenix TV* from HongKong and the *Southern Weekly* are two comparatively more liberalist and critical media than other media organizations more directly associated with the government (e.g. China Central TV, People's Daily, etc.).

However, when it comes to international affairs and foreign policy, the diversity of news agendas and frames within Chinese media is still not comparable on the global scale. Directly adopting the traditional conceptualization and operationalization of

selective exposure in Western literature may not suffice to capture the situation of media accessibility or media availability in China. For accessibility pre-defines the information resources available for Chinese citizens, and selective exposure was created as a psychometric concept in the Western context: where systematic control on information content has been more implicit and perhaps less stringent. In short, given the Chinese context, although selective exposure is a concept that overlaps with Chinese citizens' exposure to different types of media, in many cases, some selections are not presented to Chinese citizens.

At this point, *access to news media* becomes particularly important, because *a priori* access to a particular news source can be necessary for an audience to believe in such news source (*i.e.* the passive reliance link to media credibility not discussed by Wanta and Hu). In other words, *access* could precede affective and cognitive *knowledge* about media credibility, and perceived credibility lead to *dependency* on media. If a person has no convenient access to New York Times, he/she may not even have a chance and experiential basis to form knowledge about the New York Times' credibility (other than hearing other information source talking about New York Times³). The rationale behind this logic is that resources for information could be deliberately restricted, creating a power imbalance which ultimately leads to media dependency.

The importance of media accessibility in the Chinese media context has been discussed by numerous scholars. First of all, the conceptualizations of media accessibility in China are unbalanced because the majority of them tends to focus on Web accessibility

³ On the other hand, if someone he/she personally knows does have knowledge about the New York Times, then it is possible that accessing the New York Times is not difficult given that particular person's social environment.

or Internet accessibility. Nevertheless, (Chan, 1994) examined four types of accessibility of STAR TV in the pan-Asian area, exploring why different levels of restrictions were put onto the broadcasting of STAR TV in distinct regions/countries. The study of STAR TV's accessibility established a model for accessibility of satellite TV and listed eight factors influencing the accessibility of STAR TV in East Asia. These factors include national regulation, *competition* from terrestrial television, technological innovation, linguistic barriers, cultural gaps, national affluence, programming policy and financing.

Studies focusing on other types of accessibility in China have explored two different facets of accessibility: the first one is the *technological accessibility*: elevation of penetration rates of Internet technology, amelioration of user friendliness of Chinese websites (Yao, Qiu, Huang, Du, & Ma, 2011) and the facilitation of e-government in China with the help of increased Web accessibility (Rau, Zhou, Sun, & Zhong, 2016) The second one is *policy accessibility*: the government control of accessibility of Internet sites and its psychological consequences (Zhu & He, 2002). While both angles can be related to global media competition for credibility, the second one is the main concern of this research, because *restrictions* of Internet accessibility help to provide a *resource-based* conceptualization of media credibility. Zhu and He (2002) rationalized their argument as:

“Information accessibility refers to the extent to which the audience has access to a diversified range of information. In particular, our concern is with the number of alternative sources of information available to the audience in addition to the official media. Previous research on mere exposure has demonstrated that exposure to information alone can make a big difference in knowledge, attitudes, and behavior (Zajonc, 1974). Conversely, as inoculation research has suggested, individuals living in a “germ-free” environment are more likely to be affected by a non-orthodox message when facing such a situation (McGuire, 1964).” (p. 9)

The STAR TV study and the studies on Web accessibility further illustrate how global media competition happened in the context of China or even East Asia (Greater China region including China mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau at least). These findings, however, were usually written in a critical fashion.

For this dissertation, the conceptualization of media accessibility adopts the route of *policy accessibility* mentioned above. That is, the conceptualization of accessibility in this study does NOT focus on the Internet penetration rate, how many TV stations are available for an average person, etc. Rather, it focuses on Chinese citizens' perception on how *easily*, given Chinese media policies and current social environment, they can access a diversified set of foreign or domestic media for a particular type of information.

3.5 Selective Accessibility Control and Media Credibility

This section adds more discussion to the rationale of this relationship in a competitive environment for media credibility, and especially in the context of Chinese media landscape as a subject of public diplomacy.

After all, how does accessibility relate to credibility? In Zhu and He's (2002) study, their focus was not on this question, but rather on the effects of accessibility and credibility on citizens' value system. More specifically, they found that *access* to Chinese mainland and Hong Kong TV can have different, if not opposite, effects on citizens' value system: mainland TV associates with communist values and Hong Kong TV relates to materialist values. At the same time, *credibility* in domestic and foreign media have similar effects on citizens' value system: they (domestic media credibility *vs.* foreign

media credibility) were competing and creating different values in citizens' minds. Other studies compared the relations between media exposure and postmaterialist values in China and the U.S. and found significant relationships between the two in both countries (Cho et al., 2003; Ran Wei & Pan, 1999). However, few research have looked into the relationship between accessibility/exposure and credibility, and most of the studies have treated them both as independent variables and have not attempted to study the relationship between themselves.

That said, the empirical evidence provided by these studies found that accessibility to a source often works in the same direction with credibility of the source as independent variables. This finding provides indirect support to the hypothesis that accessibility to domestic media could positively influence perceived credibility of domestic media (and the same for foreign media). Given such data, this chapter is also interested in exploring whether accessibility to foreign media could influence credibility of foreign media. Therefore, this chapter has the following set of hypotheses:

H1a: For foreign media, perceived media accessibility positively leads to perceived media credibility

H1b: For domestic media, perceived media accessibility positively leads to perceived media credibility

When it comes to the relationship between foreign media credibility and domestic media credibility, Golan and Kiouisis' (2010) results suggested that there is a strong correlation ($r > .65$) between foreign and domestic media credibility, however, they focused on their different effects and did not make an argument on why this is the case. It is possible that, given their result, foreign media credibility and domestic media

credibility are different, yet overlapping, facets of a more general “media credibility” or “trust in media” concept. This dissertation is interested in showing the effect of those non-overlapping parts of foreign and domestic media credibility on each other.

Previously studies seem to be not interested in how their unique variances affect each other, if their covariances are controlled for (variances caused by a spurious social cognition variable like *trust in all media*, *trust in all government*). Because domestic media is more ubiquitous than foreign media in China, it is possible that if a person has access to foreign media, he/she is already unsatisfied with the credibility of domestic media, or is seeking alternative points of view; otherwise he/she would not be motivated to find access to foreign media content. On the other hand, if we assume that Chinese domestic media do not deliberately defame or attack foreign media, then it will be hard to argue that if a Chinese person has high trust in domestic media, he/she will have low trust in foreign media. Thus, the following hypotheses proposed:

H2: Perception of foreign media credibility will negatively influence perception of domestic media credibility

3.6 Media Credibility and Media Dependency

Researchers have studied the relationship between media use and media credibility. Kiouisis (2001) found that there are significant positive associations between media use and perceived media credibility for both newspaper and online news, however, the study did not find relationship between TV use and perceived TV credibility. Tsfaty and Cappella (2003) explored the relationship between two similar concepts: news exposure and media skepticism. Although media skepticism may have

less emphasis on source credibility, it does have an emphasis on audiences' perception of media credibility (p. 507). Tsfaty and Cappella also found that media skepticism is positively associated with nonmainstream news exposure and negatively associated with mainstream news exposure. Moreover, they found that media skeptics consumed a significantly larger share of nonmainstream news, and that higher media skepticism was associated with lower mainstream news consumption and higher nonmainstream media consumption (as a combination of total media diet).


Golan and Kiouisis (2010) explored the different effects of domestic and foreign media credibility on citizens' assessment of democracy in the Arabic world. They argued that there is a strong relationship between media credibility and people's cognitive (Salwen & Matera, 1992; Semetko, Brzinski, Weaver, & Willnat, 1992) and affective (Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004) evaluation of foreign nations. In their study, their conceptualization and measurement of the media credibility variable was very similar, or even identical, to a conceptualization of media reliance or media dependency (see Golan & Kiouisis, p. 90). This shows that conceptually media credibility and media dependency are highly related.

More importantly, as mentioned but not elaborated on earlier, Wanta and Hu (1994) studied the relationship between media credibility and media reliance. The introduction of the concept of reliance further enrich the theoretical context for the current discussion. This is because, in contrast to the previously mentioned studies that focused on media usage or media exposure, the concept of reliance introduces the difference between passive usage (exposure) and active usage (reliance or dependency). Wanta and Hu (1994) based their theoretical argument about media reliance on the

media system dependency theory proposed by Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976). The findings were that participants' perceptions of media credibility are related to their media dependency.

In general, media dependency theory explains the relationships between governments, the market, the media and audiences. At the individual level, Grant (1996) argued that citizens rely on media for six different purposes: self-understanding, social understanding, individual orientation, interaction orientation, individual play and social play. Grant and other media system dependency scholars tested these dimensions of media dependency in a variety of contexts including television shopping (Grant, Guthrie, & Ball-Rokeach, 1991), patterns of television viewing (Rosenstein & Grant, 1997; Waterman & Grant, 1991), political communication (Loges, 1994), etc. In comparison to Wanta and Hu (1994)'s study, the conceptualization and the actual operationalization of media dependency and the "reliance" in their study are also similar given their common theoretical root.

In this chapter, the understanding and orientation dimensions of the individual media system dependency are taken into consideration. This is because, as will be explained in Chapter IV, that this dissertation examines all its empirical models in the context of Chinese citizens' understanding and behavioral intention about air pollution in China. This topic is less related to the play dimension of media dependency, and thus such dimension was not included in the operationalization of the dependency variable.



Note: AF = Accessibility of Foreign Media; AD = Accessibility of Domestic Media
 CF = Credibility of Foreign Media; CD = Credibility of Domestic Media
 DF = Dependency on Foreign Media for Understanding and Orientation
 DD = Dependency on Domestic Media for Understanding and Orientation
 N.S. = Not Significant

Figure 3.2 Model Specification Allowing Direct Credibility Competition

Conceptually, Chinese citizens' reliance on foreign and domestic media could be conceptualized in media system dependency terms: similar to credibility, it is expected that foreign media dependency would be positively related to domestic media dependency, because they are different but overlapping components of an overarching "media system dependency" (Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach, 1985). Because they are still conceptually different, foreign media dependency would be explained more by foreign media credibility, and domestic media would be explained more by domestic media credibility. Here, the following hypotheses are proposed:

H3a: Perception of foreign media credibility will negatively influence dependency on foreign media for understanding and orientation

H3b: Perception of domestic media credibility will negatively influence dependency on domestic media for understanding and orientation.

Thus, all the hypotheses proposed in the current chapter can be allocated accordingly to the links shown in the structural equation model shown above in figure 3.2.

CHAPTER 4. ACTIVATING AND DEACTIVATING PUBLICS

This chapter builds on the theoretical models illustrated in chapter II, and continues the design of empirical examinations illustrated in chapter III. In chapter II, the one-sided ecological model and the two-sided negotiation model were conceptualized with the assumption that state actors have the goal of influencing global public opinion. This assumption is the theoretical basis for this chapter to further connect people's media dependency to their psychological antecedents of communicative behavior. These psychological antecedents are as far as this dissertation will go, for theories in political public relations and political communication have already linked political participation (including communicating behaviors) to governmental policy change (Aldrich, Sullivan, & Borgida, 1989; Groeling & Baum, 2008).

Chapter III discussed what constitutes media dependency in a competitive global media environment by focusing on the roles played by media *accessibility* and media *credibility*. The empirical models subject to examination will be continued in this chapter by adding three more psychological antecedents after media dependency: namely *problem recognition*, *constraint recognition* and *involvement recognition* (Grunig, 1997; Kim & Grunig, 2011).

For the three sets of variables in chapter III (accessibility, credibility, and dependency), there are two dimensions being measured: one is foreign and the other is

domestic. This distinction allows a to comparison of the perception of foreign and domestic media in China, and how such perception played out as a key factor influencing people's dependency on foreign or domestic media. As a continuation, the key research questions this chapter responds to is: would dependency on either foreign media or domestic media lead to higher activeness (conceptualized as communicative behavior motivation) among Chinese citizens to speak out about air pollution? And, is Chinese people's dependency on foreign media a more significant and important factor for their communicative behavior about air pollution in China, or is dependency on domestic media the more important one?

In sum, this chapter's focus is on the activation of publics given consideration about their different levels of dependency on foreign and domestic media. Note that this *activation* is not what was discussed in chapter II as public actions (such as voting, protesting or rebelling) which could influence policy change. The word *activation* in this chapter only refers to a psychological active state of the publics: this is, in public relations research, the segmentation of public activeness. Also, although public relation scholars (Bowen, 2010; Grunig, 1997) were concerned about self-activation (*e.g.* information seekers), this dissertation focuses on the activations caused by an external source (*i.e.* public diplomacy). Therefore, it was stated earlier that "these psychological antecedents are as far as this dissertation will go". That said, the three psychological antecedents (problem recognition, constraint recognition and involvement recognition) were under empirical examination in international public relations scenarios, which showed that they do connect tightly to people's consequent communicative behavior

(Kim & Grunig, 2011). This is the first thing that should be explained in detail in this chapter.

The second thing that this chapter needs to do is clarify how the hypotheses in chapter III fit in with the analytical context of the current chapter. In other words, this chapter needs to explain why dependency is expected to influence people's psychological antecedents of communicative behavior, and whether or not the assumptions of these two different theories are in conflict (*i.e.* media system dependency theory, situational theory of problem solving) and how they can coexist in harmony. Moreover, this chapter explores the interplay between these two theories, using this insight to extend the empirical models.

4.1 The link between public relations and diplomacy

Keeping the theoretical models illustrated in chapter II in mind, this dissertation's theory building focuses on the structural relationship between state actors, mediators, and publics in the context of public diplomacy. One of the goals of public diplomacy is influencing the public opinion, attitudes, or behavior in another country, and it is these goals which bind together the two major variables in this chapter: media dependency and problem-solving antecedents.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, media system dependency theory is suitable in the current structuralist-functionalist model of public diplomacy because of its assumptions about the ecological dependences among the state, the media, and the market. On the other hand, the three problem-solving antecedents chosen as a psychological outcome of public activation derives from the *situational theory of problem solving* (*i.e.* STOPS, Kim, 2006; Kim & Grunig, 2011). The STOPS model is an

extension to the earlier *situational theory of publics* (i.e. STP, Grunig, 1976). While STP was a typology of the “publics” in terms of their activeness towards a certain organizational, social, or political issue, the STOPS model explained the kinds of communication activities that different types of publics engage.

Conceptually, the STP and the STOPS are both in accordance with the grand theoretical models proposed in chapter II. One of the reason is that both have the assumption that publics could be *identified*, that is, both theories invented ways to draw boundaries between groups of publics by differentiating their activeness towards the issue. In essence, either STP (Grunig, 1997) or STOPS (Kim & Grunig, 2011) can be structural-functionalist, for these two theories describe the relationship between the organization and its publics, and they explain how the organization and the publics could approach each other for mutual benefit. Tracing it further, Grunig (1997) based his work on the research of Jerald Hage (Hage & Aiken, 1967), who is also a structural-functionalist researcher in many ways. That is, the organization and the different types of publics (active, aware, latent, non-) are functions of each other when a goal is put in place.

These assumptions concur with the basic assumptions of the public diplomacy model: firstly, states and governments can be, and often are, considered as organizations (Bowen, 2011). Using the typology explained in chapter II, a state actor can be conceptualized as an organization (a governmental or government-supported agency) with a goal (change foreign public opinion or behavior⁴). The mediating actors and the

⁴ This is one of the goals of public diplomacy, and it is also a core objective. See chapter II for definitions of public diplomacy.

publics constitute the state actor's pool of stakeholders. Thus, in public relations terms, the organization need to continuously monitor the outside environment in order to adapt to or modify it (Bowen, Rawlins, & Martin, 2010; Bowen, 2011; Grunig, 1992).

For public diplomacy, state organizations do both at different levels: state agencies *adapt* to the international environment of public diplomacy by adopting similar approaches, changing output contents, reframing appearance and outlook, increasing compatibility, etc. In these cases, state agencies want to adapt because, in many cases, modifying outside environment in terms of social structure and foreign operational policies can be difficult.

However, in the context of public diplomacy, state agencies' diplomatic behaviors are situational in terms of public opinion and publics' behavior, by the fact that the "organizations" in public diplomacy are governments and usually have political power over domestic publics. This makes public diplomacy different from public relations in the organization-publics power imbalance. Domestically, government-publics relationship is different than corporate-publics relationship given that power imbalance. For foreign publics, however, the government then has less power in most cases, thus, many of those successful public diplomacy campaigns adapt to the environment, those who attempt to modify the environment usually failed.

But, where should a government start when it wants to influence domestic publics? In other words, if we assume that there is indeed a domestic extension of public diplomacy where governments modify incoming influence, which theories have discussed things worth of monitoring? These "things of monitoring interests" should better not be an actual protest, an on-going rebellion or epidemic public dissent, because

it would be too late when these are observable. Public relations theories also suggested that public relations management should always prevent a crisis or a problem from happening, and *post hoc* “solutions” to an existing crisis could already be the worst solution (Bowen et al., 2010; Grunig, 1992).

Therefore, the STP and STOPS have gained much popularity both in academia and industry, for they monitor publics’ problem recognition processes and predict their possible future communicative behavior. Communicative behaviors are considered to be important antecedents, or predictors, of more actual behaviors such as voting or protesting. Much of the mass communication or political communication literature already illustrated how citizens’ communication-formed attitudes led to their further political behavior. There is also research showing mass communication processes or political campaigns can suppress political efficacy and even political participation. In sum, it is arguable that communicative behavior, as well as its psychological antecedents, can modify how ordinary citizens approach political issues around them.

4.2 Psychological Antecedent of Communicative Behavior

Some may wonder why the current empirical examination only chose the three antecedents in the STOPS model (namely *problem recognition*, *constraint recognition*, *involvement recognition*), while there are many other possible psychometric variables to look at in political communication literature. For example, political efficacy (Kenski & Stroud, 2006; Pinkleton, Austin, & Fortman, 1998), political trust (Camaj, 2014; Chen & Shi, 2001), and third-person-effect (Davison, 1983; R. Wei & V, 2015) are associated with citizens’ political behavior or behavioral intentions, of voting, protesting, and communicating.

The first reason is the STOPS' focus on people's conceptualization of a *problem*. This focus is important in the context of public diplomacy, and in the theoretical models proposed in chapter II as well. Public diplomacy includes the explanation of government policies and governmental attitudes to foreign publics, usually with the help of media and international organizations. Thus, the portrayals and agendas of an international issue in media are critical for the publics to understand the issue. For example, Entman (1991) studied how the Korean Air Lines incident was depicted differently by media in different nations in terms of definitions and attribution of responsibility. Similar studies have showed that issues of global warming (Billett, 2010; Nisbet & Myers, 2007; Olausson, 2009), international trade (Zhu & Wang, 2017), and regional collaboration (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000) were also depicted differently for different publics.

In other words, the same event may be regarded as troublesome and problematic by some information sources, but may be played at a lower or even opposite key by other sources. Previous studies naturally compared different portrayals between the media from different countries, thus the fundamental assumption is that national boundaries fragment the media landscape because media from different countries have national identities which would influence how they portrayal events.

Scholars expected that the differences in these portrayals to have distinct effects on publics' behavior or intentions (Entman, 1991; Nisbet & Myers, 2007; Y. Zhu & Wang, 2017). However, there is still little evidence of this link. The current chapter conceptualizes such distinct effects as the different extents to which the publics considers the issue at stake a "problem". In other words, the current examination hypothesizes that

credibility and dependency of foreign and domestic media would have different effects on publics' activeness, especially when accessibility to these types of media are different.

Therefore, the three psychological antecedents of communicative actions proposed by Kim and Grunig (2011) are used as dependent variables. According to Kim and Grunig, whether an issue is worth of action for the publics depends on their 1) problem recognition; 2) constraint recognition and 3) involvement recognition. *Problem recognition* refers to whether the publics consider the issue as problematic, or do the publics see a gap between the status quo and an ideal scenario. *Constraint recognition* means to what extent do publics consider they are restricted by objective conditions to act about the issue. *Involvement recognition* means to what extent publics consider themselves as involved or connected to the issue or the consequences of it.

It is worth attention that these psychological antecedents are usually used as exogenous variables in other empirical models explaining communicative behavior, thus they are conceptually covarying (a person with high problem recognition tends to also have high involvement recognition). Thus, one of the challenges that this study faces is the discriminant validity between problem recognition, involvement recognition, and constraint recognition.

4.3 Media Dependency and Activeness

Although it is now hypothesized that access to foreign media and domestic media would have different effects on the psychological antecedents of the publics' activeness, the actual mechanism remains unexplored. For example, would access to foreign media increase *problem* recognition, decrease *constraint* recognition, and increase *involvement* recognition? And would domestic media do the same or the reverse?

To answer the first question, literature on foreign media's influence on domestic publics' cognition, attitude and behavior about certain issue of problem have given this study abundant support. For example, (Snyder, Roser, & Chaffee, 1991) found that access and reliance on foreign media are significant promoters behind people's intention to emigrate, (Golan & Kioussis, 2010) found that credibility of international media promotes suppresses democratic values among the observed Arabic population. The positive relationship between foreign media use and increase of materialist thoughts was also examined (Zhu & He, 2002). Many other studies have showed similar results supporting the point that a person's relationship with foreign media significantly increased his/her awareness about the issue, and in certain cases, lead to behaviors to change the status quo.

To answer the second question of whether foreign media and domestic media would produce similar or conflicting effects, there is need to review some existing research and examples. First of all, whether or not an issue is a *conflict determinant* should be considered. Because public diplomacy ultimately hopes to benefit the perception and/or adoptions of government policies, attitudes, cultural values abroad. For example, Zhu and Wang (2017) analyzed how Latin American newspapers portrayed Chinese OFDI (i.e. outward foreign direct investment) in the region, and found that different national interests were a factor that influences the portrayal. Simply put, if a country could be potentially benefitted by Chinese OFDI (which is a strategic advancement decided by the Chinese policy, and analyzed by governmental sources quoted in media), then newspapers within that country would comparatively portray the OFDI as a positive thing, despite domestic partisanship.


Thus, it is reasonable to argue that the effects of foreign/domestic media dependencies on publics' activeness could be situational, partially depending on to what extent the two states differ, or have conflict, in a certain issue. However, as other research showed (Semetko & Valkenberg, 2000) not only does conflict play a part: even if governments have similar interests in an issue (the unification of the Euro currency), media from different countries would still differ in the focus of the issue. These different foci would possibly influence people's *constraint* or *involvement* recognition in distinct ways and to distinct extents. For example, if currency unification is an international trade problem, then fewer people would have high levels of involvement, in comparison to when currency unification is framed as a problem of local employment.

This is to say that the framing and agenda-setting functions of media cause differences in people's general activeness. And in this chapter the differences in framing and agenda-setting (of the same issue) between media from different countries have already been explained. Thus, a hypothetical comparison of the effects of foreign *vs.* domestic media dependency on activeness should consider the conflict of interest in the following areas: problem prevalence (corresponding to problem recognition), level of expected arousal (corresponding to constraint recognition), and amplitude (corresponding to involvement recognition).

Simply put, when monitoring publics' activeness, researchers and practitioners should understand the content of a possible, although not necessarily, rival media. The content of the media gains its power through people's dependency on the media. This chapter then, proposes the following model (Figure 4.1) to test whether foreign media and domestic media (in the case of China) have different effects on publics' activeness

about an issue. To focus this inquiry, this chapter continues the thematic focus of the previous chapter, which is air quality in China.

As discussed in previous chapters, air quality was chosen as the problem for Chinese citizens given its omnipresence in China: nearly all provinces in China have air pollution to varying extents. However, air quality is perhaps not a *conflict determinant* topic between foreign and domestic media, meaning that the general tone of news from foreign and domestic is not expected to be very different. Also, as explained in earlier chapter, using an actual conflict determinant topic is difficult for a survey conducted in China: for example, asking about the “abuse of human rights” in China as a problem (which is a conflict determinant) would be unacceptable for local survey companies, given the fact that they have to follow Chinese laws when doing business. Given these considerations, Hypotheses 4 – 6 are proposed, and illustrated in Figure 4.2.



Note: AF = Accessibility of Foreign Media; AD = Accessibility of Domestic Media
 CF = Credibility of Foreign Media; CD = Credibility of Domestic Media
 DF = Dependency on Foreign Media for Understanding and Orientation
 DD = Dependency on Domestic Media for Understanding and Orientation
 PR = Problem Recognition; IR = Involvement Recognition; CR = Constraint Recognition

Figure 4.1 Media Dependency Leading to Psychological Activation

H4: Media dependency positively influences problem recognition about air pollution.

H4a: Foreign media dependency positively influences problem recognition

H4b: Domestic media dependency positively influences problem recognition

H5: Media dependency positively influences involvement recognition about air pollution.

H5a: Foreign media dependency positively influences involvement recognition

H5b: Domestic media dependency positively influences involvement recognition

H6: Media dependency negatively influences constraint recognition about air pollution.

H6a: Foreign media dependency negatively influences constraint recognition.

H6b: Domestic media dependency negatively influences constraint recognition.

CHAPTER 5. METHOD

Chapter III and Chapter IV of this dissertation proposed several hypotheses based on the grand-level theorizations in Chapter II. The current chapter introduces and explains how psychometric models in Chapter III and IV are tested, detailing the data collection method, operationalization of variables, and data analysis strategies. More specifically, this chapter explains why the survey method is the most suitable for the current empirical examinations, and how the survey is constructed to operationalize the psychometric variables. Lastly, it explains how the data are analyzed to yield theoretical implications.

5.1 Choice of Data Collection Method

Although chapter II has incorporated a series of country-level and individual-level variables in the process of theory building, this dissertation, in its current form, only has the time and space for the analysis of individual-level variables. In other words, the empirical part of the current dissertation is focused on the psychological antecedents and results of public diplomacy activities. It is true that chapter III discussed how government interference could have its impact on how foreign media credibility is perceived. However, chapter III's conceptualization of governmental interference as a variable is based on *perception* as well. This means that, while there are many possible

conceptualizations and thus ways to operationalize “government interference” (e.g. an actual quantitative measurement on government policies, the trend in official discourse about information control, etc.), the choice is to focus on the *perception of information access* (discussed in chapter III) as a public perception of the effects of governmental control of information.

The logic here is that chapter III already discussed different types of information access problems in China. It is arguable that government control of information cannot be easily equated to the perception of information access, because government control could be only one of the reasons of public’s perception of a low information accessibility. For example, as discussed in Chapter III, a person in China may feel that access to foreign media is scarce because of *a)* the scarce knowledge in new information technology, *b)* the lack of public infrastructure necessary for the reception of foreign media content, and/or *c)* policies that restrict foreign media access. Thus, we need to control for the former two reasons and focus on the last reason: policy-based controls of information access. The variable conceptualization section further discusses how exactly these are controlled. As for now, the point is that all of the variables in the models are individual-level psychometric variables.

Chapter III and Chapter IV have clear inclinations towards a quantitative strategy in terms of model building. However, it is still necessary to explain why this is the case. The public diplomacy literature has an abundant volume of studies focusing on pure theory building by qualitative terms. For international relations scholars, public diplomacy is often discussed with country-level factors such as soft power, hard power, ideology, government type, culture, economic abilities, and so on. However, very few

studies have been able to generalize theories with quantitative measurements of these variables. One reason is that many of these concepts are internally flawed and are still questionable at the stage of conceptualization; the other reason might be that governments' public diplomacy practices differ. These two reasons can be speculated from critics to the existence of soft power (Baldwin, 2016) and the public diplomacy case studies which provide often conflicting theoretical implications.

The innovations of chapter II include, firstly, a focus on publics as the ultimate goal of public diplomacy. The publics, or the publics actors in public diplomacy, are not a means (public opinion) to an end (national interests), they are but national interest *per se*. This means that publics' thoughts are national interest just like natural resources, borders, economic reserves, military equipment, and so on. Secondly, the power ecology between a state actor and mediating actors at the domestic and international levels is a collection of relationships built by the governments' hope to *protect* or *expand* their national interest (public's thoughts). Thus, psychological inclinations of the publics should not be treated as *results* of governments' public diplomacy campaigns around the world, but the fundamental *raison d'être* of public diplomacy. For foreign publics' thoughts and psychological inclinations facilitate the ability of the acting government to procure resources and economic means of acting in its interests: furthering national goals and its values around the world.

At this point, it should be clear that psychological traits are the focus of this dissertation. The next question is how they can be empirically observed and analyzed. Social scientists have developed a number of methodologies to do so: anthropological fieldwork, interviews, focus groups, survey and big data analysis. That said,

ethnographical and naturalistic approaches may require a much longer time for fieldwork, and their focus is usually on grounding new theories. Focus groups could be a good way to get psychological insights, however, they do not provide data for quantitative modelling, which is essential to test the links in the ecological and competition models in Chapter II. This dissertation adopts survey as the data collection method, this is because survey data can provide a more coverage and more generalizability given the same amount of resource and time.

5.2 Operationalization of Variables

Foreign and Domestic Media Credibility

As Gunther (1992) pointed out, the perception of media credibility can be situational for a person given different themes, times and platforms. Thus, the current dissertation decides to anchor such perception at a given theme and moment and adopt a multi-item measurement for different types of media platforms. The questions will ask respondents in China to evaluate the media credibility in terms of news about air quality in China.

Before asking the questions, the respondents will first read a definition of foreign media: which is defined as internationally well-known media organizations (newspapers, magazines, TV or radio companies, online news websites, and international news agencies such as AP, AFP, Reuters) that are not headquartered in mainland China, but in countries and regions such as US, UK, Japan, etc. Then they will answer eight questions related to two different facets of media credibility: *believability* and *affiliation* (Wanta & Hu, 1994). The questions can be seen in Appendix A. It is worth mentioning that the first item used by previous researchers to measure believability (*i.e.* [name of media] does not

try to manipulate local opinion) was forbidden by censorship officers from the Chinese survey platform. Thus, believability was measured only using the remaining four items. All five items measuring affiliation were used.

Then the respondents will answer nine similar questions again, but in relation to domestic media, whose definition will be shown to the respondents: domestic media means media organizations that are headquartered inside mainland China (newspapers, magazines, TV or radio companies/stations) at both the national, provincial or municipal level.

Foreign and Domestic Media Accessibility

This variable is conceptualized as policy accessibility of a given media, and the rationale for this has been explained in chapter III. Although much literature is available on how to measure exposure, media use or reliance to foreign media in the Chinese context, little research has been done in China directly asking respondents for their perceptions about foreign media accessibility. Because of this, the current study focused on the Chinese public's perception of how easily they and other citizens can access foreign media, how available these foreign media contents are, and whether the person's social environment facilitates foreign media access. All of these items are conceptualized to ensure that governmental policy can have strong impact on the respondents' answers. The actual scale can be seen in Appendix A.

Media System Dependency for Understanding

Survey measurements of media system dependencies at the individual level were developed and consolidated by Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976) and Grant (1991, 1996). The original 18 items measure three established components of media

dependency: understanding, orientation and play. Each of these represents a media function that the individuals depend on in their daily lives. For the current dissertation, one of the focuses is on how public diplomacy influences the way people understand the society and then react to it with such understanding. Thus, currently only the understanding and the orientation facets of media dependency is used. This composite, namely “media dependency for understanding and orientation”, is measured using the twelve corresponding items in previous works. For simplicity, it will be termed as just dependency or media dependency hereafter. The items are statements of daily tasks of media functions, and the respondents are asked to rate how much they rely on foreign or domestic media by selecting the degree of helpfulness (1= not at all, 7= extremely). Thus, in total there are two composites measured: dependency on foreign media and dependency on domestic media, each containing six items.

Antecedent Variables of Communicative Actions

The previous three variable sets focus on the relationship between governmental interference (accessibility), perception of media credibility, and people’s dependence on foreign and domestic media. The next step is to connect these psychological traits with psychological antecedents of people’s communicative actions. This is because this dissertation hopes to find out whether relationship with foreign and domestic media, under the influence of governmental policies, could influence how people communicate about important social problems (in this case air quality in China).

The situational theory of problem solving from the field of public relations informs the operationalization of this variable set. The theory explains people’s communicative patterns by looking at how people conceptualize social phenomena: Kim

and Grunig (2011) have discussed extensively how *problem recognition*, *constraint recognition* and *involvement recognition* influence people's communicative behavior about a social problem.

After consulting the proposers of the STOPS model, our measures of these three constructs (*problem recognition*, *constraint recognition* and *involvement recognition*) were adopted from the 2010 Kim's study (Kim, Grunig, & Ni, 2010) and 2011 Kim & Grunig's study (Kim & Grunig, 2011). Measurement items were carefully selected from the original list of items obtained in order to: 1. Ensure that the items are unambiguous and easy to comprehend and 2. avoid multiple negatives, double-barreled sentences, ambiguous pronoun references, and misplaced modifiers (Netemeyer, Bearden, & Sharma, 2003). For example, under constraint recognition, more government-related items were selected in order to generate more face validity. The questionnaire used a unidimensional 7-point scale in all items of STOPS model: this is in line with most of the STOPS studies and most importantly, with the proposers of the STOPS models (see Kim 2010 for more explication on the choice). Every item asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement from absence of agreement (Not at all) to full agreement (absolutely). The finalized items can be seen in Appendix A.

Translation of Questionnaire

As mentioned above, the questionnaire includes survey questions to represent the operationalized variables. This questionnaire (shown in Appendix A) was created in English, and were translated into Mandarin Chinese (simplified). The translation process was done by the author, who worked as a professionally trained translator and interpreter. After translation, the translated questionnaire was examined by five native Mandarin

speakers who currently reside in China to check for any grammatical error or inappropriate use of words and phrases. The finalized Chinese version of the questionnaire can be seen in Appendix B.

5.3 Stabilization of Scales: Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Why a confirmatory factor analysis is needed.

With the demographic variables discussed above, the next step is to conduct a confirmatory factor analysis (henceforth CFA), and there are two reasons why a CFA is needed before we conduct any further analysis of path models and structural equation modelling (*i.e.* SEM).

The first is that, based on previous literature on media and information accessibility, the current dissertation created a new composite measurement of *media accessibility* in the context of foreign vs. domestic media competition. This new composite psychometric measurement needs achieve reliability within itself and discriminant validity against other variables in our path models and SEM.

The second reason is that all variables, even if they derive from previous measurements that have been successfully applied in international communication research, need to achieve reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity in the current context. Using measures of Composite Reliability (CR), Average Variance Extracted (AVE), Maximum Shared Variance (MSV) and Average Shared Variance (ASV) as key parameters, the dissertation examined these with thresholds and rules

proposed by Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson & Tatham (2010) and Malhotra & Dash (2011).

Exploratory Factor Analysis as Preparation

Before CFA, an exploratory factor analysis (henceforth EFA) was performed on the items measuring latent variables. This is because that although some latent variables (e.g. media believability and media affinity) have discriminant validity in previous studies, it is more secure to ensure that this is also true in the current dataset. Given the path models and SEM models proposed in chapter III and chapter IV, the following latent variables and their indicators were taken into the EFA: foreign and domestic media accessibility, foreign and domestic media believability, foreign and domestic media affinity, foreign and domestic media dependency, problem recognition, involvement recognition and constraint recognition.

The current study adopted Principal Component Analysis for factor extraction (using a minimum eigenvalue = 1.0 as cutoff), and given that some of the latent variables are known to be correlated (e.g. media believability and media affinity), Promax (an oblique rotation method for large datasets) rotation was adopted. This first attempt yielded not 11 (expected), but 9 factors. It showed that media *believability* tends to always rotate together with media *affinity*, and the EFA also identified items in *problem recognition*, *involvement recognition* and *constraint recognition* that had cross-loadings among the three factors. After careful consideration, media affinity and media believability were included under a 2nd-level latent factor named media credibility. Items 4 of problem recognition, and Items 1, 2 of involvement recognition and constraint recognition were removed from list.

The second EFA yielded better results: the analysis yielded a KMO & Bartlett's test result of .902 in terms of sample accuracy, and all of the communality readings were above .60. The EFA yielded 9 factors (exactly the expected number of factors after combining foreign/domestic *media affinity* and *media believability*) explaining 72.43% of the variance, the redundant residuals were less than 7% percent. As an initial evidence of convergent validity, all the indicators have a loading above .68 onto their respective factors, with no strong cross-loadings above 0.3 level (initial evidence of discriminant validity). The factor correlation matrix did not show anything above .60 among non-diagonal readings. Thus, the factors were stabilized for further examination in the CFA process.

Obtaining Good Model Fit

The first step for the CFA is to check the model fit indexes. To judge model viability, the current study also applied the Hu and Bentler (1999) joint-criteria approach: A model was considered viable when it achieved Comparative Fit Index (CFI) $\geq .96$ and SRMR $\leq .10$ or Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) $\leq .06$ and SRMR $\leq .10$. These indexes will also be applied to the evaluation of the final SEM model.

After the pattern matrix from the EFA was transcribed into SPSS Amos (ver.24), two 2nd-level latent variables were created on top of *media affinity* and *media believability*. This is in accordance to both previous theory (Wanta and Hu, 1994) and the result of the EFA. The 2nd-level latent variables were named *foreign media credibility* and *domestic media credibility*. Initial CFA has a CFI = .925, with unacceptable RMSEA and PCLOSE (p value testing the null hypothesis that RMSEA is less than .05 in the population) readings.

First the loadings of each indicator on its latent variable were examined to make sure there were no extremely low loadings, then according to theory, some errors were correlated with their counterparts among indicators of another latent variable. For example, error terms of media affinity and believability, and foreign and domestic media accessibility were correlated. Some other indicators were dropped from a factor because it shared much variance with a series of other variables. After this process, Table 5.1 shows the indicators retained for each item, and with the exact indicators and items in Table 5.1, the CFA model has a CFI = .935, RMSEA = .048, PCLOSE = .797 and SRMR = .047. All indicators showing that the model has a good fit, the proposed model fits the estimated model in terms of major correlations inherent in the dataset.

Validity and Reliability Tests

Using the above-mentioned CFA model, the correlation matrix of all the latent variables in the model were produced, with Composite Reliability (CR), Average Variance Extracted (AVE), Maximum Shared Variance (MSV) and Average Shared Variance (ASV) calculated. Two discriminant validity issues emerged for problem recognition's discriminant validity against involvement recognition. Actually, as Kim (2010) and Kim and Grunig (2011) explained when they developed the cognition measurement, the discriminant validity among the three recognition variables may vary depending on the actual topic of the "problem". Given that the problem presented to the respondents was air pollution, it is reasonable to assume that most citizens, as long as they need to breathe, would feel involved with the problem if they think it is a problem. Which means that problem recognition and involvement recognition are likely to covary in the current context.

Table 5.1 Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities of Latent Constructs

Latent Construct Items	Mean	SD	Cronbach's Alpha
Perceived Foreign Media Accessibility	3.70	1.67	
my social environment facilitates me to access foreign online news media	3.70	1.67	0.845
people around me usually have access to foreign online news media	3.65	1.67	
foreign online news media contents are readily available in my life	3.75	1.67	
Perceived Domestic Media Accessibility	5.31	1.64	
It is easy for me to access domestic online news media	5.31	1.66	0.893
people around me usually have access to domestic online news media	5.22	1.63	
domestic online news media contents are readily available in my life	5.41	1.63	
Perceived Foreign Media Credibility	3.74	1.50	
foreign media orgs get facts accurately.	3.95	1.45	0.902
foreign media orgs deal fairly with all sides of political or social issue.	3.69	1.50	
foreign media orgs separate facts from opinions.	4.09	1.38	
foreign media orgs is generally not biased.	3.43	1.59	
foreign media orgs are concerned with my community's well-being	3.24	1.61	
foreign media orgs are concerned about the public welfare for my people	3.75	1.52	
foreign media orgs report socially meaningful stories	4.01	1.45	
Perceived Domestic Media Credibility	4.39	1.44	
domestic media orgs get facts accurately.	4.50	1.35	0.898
domestic media orgs deal fairly with all sides of political or social issue.	4.17	1.44	
domestic media orgs separate facts from opinions.	4.27	1.40	
domestic media orgs are concerned with my community's well-being	4.28	1.51	
domestic media orgs are concerned about the public welfare for my people	4.54	1.49	
domestic media orgs report socially meaningful stories	4.72	1.38	
domestic media orgs are in touch with average Chinese people	4.27	1.53	
Perceived Foreign Media Dependency	3.76	1.18	
Gain insight into why you do some of the things you do			0.93
Observe how others cope with problems or situations like yours			
Keep up with world events			
Stay on top of what is happening in the community			
Imagine what you'll be like when you grow older			
Find out how the country is doing			
Decide where to go for services such as health, financial, or household			
Figure out what to buy			
Plan where to go for evening and weekend activities			
Discover better ways to communicate with others			
Think about how to act with friends, relatives, or people you work with			
Get ideas about how to approach others in important or difficult situations			
Perceived Domestic Media Dependency	4.57	1.04	
<i>Same as above, but focused on domestic media</i>			0.916
Problem Recognition	5.57	1.37	
I think air pollution is a serious social (or national) problem.	5.82	1.44	0.845
I am concerned about air pollution a lot.	5.48	1.38	
About air pollution, I see a huge gap between what it should be and what it is now.	5.17	1.35	
Something needs to be done to improve air pollution.	5.81	1.31	
Constraint Recognition (Reversed)	3.84	1.63	
I find no obstacles in doing something for air pollution.	3.22	1.49	0.776
I feel I can improve the problematic situation of air pollution.	4.12	1.64	
I feel that my ideas or opinion matter to those who are addressing air pollution.	4.18	1.75	
Involvement Recognition	5.39	1.38	
Air pollution has serious consequences for my life and someone I care.	5.53	1.38	0.843
I am connected with air pollution and its consequences.	5.28	1.33	
I think air pollution could affect me personally.	5.35	1.43	

Table 5.2 Check for Reliability, Discriminant Validity and Convergent Validity

		CR	AVE	MSV	MaxR(H)									
	Factor Code					A*	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
Credibility of Foreign Media	A	0.889	0.801	0.527	0.908	0.895								
Dependency on Foreign Media	B	0.864	0.614	0.527	0.866	0.726	0.783							
Dependency on Domestic Media	C	0.873	0.581	0.349	0.883	0.360	0.560	0.762						
Accessibility of Foreign Media	D	0.892	0.734	0.152	0.894	0.135	-0.059	0.201	0.857					
Accessibility of Domestic Media	E	0.845	0.646	0.283	0.848	0.532	0.529	0.232	0.155	0.803				
Problem Recognition	F	0.840	0.570	0.457	0.856	0.050	-0.072	0.168	0.390	0.042	0.755			
Constraint Recognition	G	0.792	0.567	0.256	0.845	-0.373	-0.506	-0.464	-0.062	-0.393	-0.051	0.753		
Credibility of Domestic Media	H	0.860	0.757	0.349	0.918	0.386	0.308	0.591	0.316	0.285	0.195	-0.445	0.870	
Involvement Recognition	I	0.843	0.642	0.457	0.844	0.093	0.113	0.303	0.291	0.046	0.676	-0.218	0.279	0.801

Note: Composite Reliability (CR), Average Variance Extracted (AVE), Maximum Shared Variance (MSV), and Max Reliability (MaxR)

*The bolded number on the diagonal line is the root of AVE for each factor, then it is compared with any of the inter-factor correlation beneath it.

Thus, given this theoretical support, error terms of items 3 in involvement recognition and item 5 in problem recognition were covaried. With this improvement, model fit was improved (CFI = .943, RMSEA = .048, PCLOSE = .827, SRMR = .045).

Then, the correlation matrix of all the latent variables and relevant parameters were requested and calculated again. Table 5.2 shows the final correlation matrix and relevant CR, AVE, MSV and ASV readings. The results demonstrate that the latent variables pass the tests of reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity.

5.4 SEM Specification and Identification

Model Specification and Illustration

After the latent variables were stabilized in terms of their indicators, reliability and validity, **variables were created from averaged scores of the indicators** retained in the SEM analysis. Although detailed hypotheses and models were already explained in Chapter III and Chapter IV, it is necessary to explain why structural equation modelling was chosen as the modeling strategy instead of other similar types of variance- or covariance-based multivariate analysis methods.

First of all, an important feature of the current dissertation is that it is a structural-functional reorganization of existing theories in public diplomacy and international political communication. This means that it is concerned with the relationship of the actors and their influences on each other. Thus, a multiple regression, as Zhu and He (2002) did in their study, would be insufficient to explore the relationship between “independent variables”, because in a multiple regression, much of the directionalities between variables is invisible. For example, including media accessibility as an indicator

of perception of governmental control on information resource, the first set of models in Chapter III hopes to study governmental influence on media credibility perception. Thus, the direction here is from government to citizens, not the other way around.

Since variables such as perception of media credibility require model comparisons to test some of the hypotheses in Chapter III and Chapter IV, the analytical strategy is: the dissertation will first test model in figure 5.1 (the same as figure 3.1) proposed in Chapter III. And once the initial model and hypotheses testing for Chapter III is done and the competitive relationship between foreign media and domestic media is confirmed, a post hoc analysis will be done on the model in figure 5.1 to determine if there are any missing links that were ignored.




Figure 5.1 Model Testing Chapter III Hypotheses (Model 1)

If there is theoretical support to supplement the original model with extra links, these links will be added to the model and the model will be reevaluated in the post hoc analysis. This process will yield a final model for hypotheses in chapter III, which will then be used in the model testing for chapter IV hypotheses.

The next step is to combine the models in chapter III and chapter IV using media dependency variables (Grant, 1996) (dependency on foreign media and dependency on domestic media) as mediators to behavioral antecedents, namely *problem recognition*, *involvement recognition* and *constraint recognition* (Kim and Grunig, 2011). For the initial test, the possible loop between the two types of dependencies (on either foreign or domestic media) is not allowed to maintain the simplicity of the model. After all, theoretical discussion about competition between different types of system dependencies goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. In sum, the model shown in the following figure will be tested as the final model, as a combination of the theoretical arguments and hypotheses in chapter III and chapter IV.

Covarying Error Terms of Latent Variables

Covariance of error terms of endogenous variables in SEM has been explained by statisticians. In the models proposed by the current chapter, it is important to mention the necessity to covary error terms of some of endogenous variables and justify why they should be covaried.

First of all, as can be seen in both figure 5.1 and figure 5.2, the models were theoretically conceptualized as an influence chain between *blocks* of variables: that is,




Figure 5.2 Final Model

theoretically, variables in the same block tends to be spurred by a common latent variable. For example, numerous studies found that dependencies on different types of media are positively correlated. This shows the possibility that either foreign media dependency or domestic media dependency is a part of people's general dependency on all media.

This means that although the model expects them to be different constructs, their error terms (the variance that cannot be explained by distinguishing *foreign* from *domestic*) are very likely to be spurred by a common latent variable of *general media dependency*, which is not observed by the indicators in our questionnaire. This same rationale applies for variables in the media credibility block, however, both model 1 and model 2 already hypothesized direct interactions between foreign credibility and

domestic credibility, thus their shared variance is already considered in the model. Therefore, in these two models, the error terms between foreign media dependency and domestic media dependency will be proposed as covarying.

As for the variables in the communicative behavior antecedent block (see figure 5.2), previous study on the STOPS model have predominantly treated these as exogenous variables, and thus they are theoretically hypothesized as covarying. Considering that they usually covary and constitutes to a common latent factor called *situational motivation* in previous models, in the current study their error terms will be proposed as covarying.

That said, it is important to remember that this study does NOT covary any error terms *across* blocks: so far, theoretical support is evident only for errors covarying *within* a block, and the ultimate purpose of this dissertation is to illustrate 1) the interactions between different blocks of variables and 2) the comparison of psychometric effects of foreign v.s. domestic media, when controlling for their common variance.

Model Identification

Now the next step is to make sure model 1 (figure 5.1) and model 2 (figure 5.2) are identified models that can be analyzed using SEM strategy. For model 1, because there is a non-recursive block (i.e. loop between credibility of foreign media and credibility of domestic media), it is necessary to evaluate whether the model is rank-identified. Kline (2016) proposed a simple way to do this by constructing a system matrix. After following this method, it is known that model 1 satisfies the rank condition since every endogenous variable has a rank number equal to the total number of endogenous variables minus 1. Since $df_M = p - q$, where p is the number of observations

($p = \frac{v(v+1)}{2}$, v = number of latent variables in the model) and q is the number of estimated parameters (including latent variable variances, covariances, and the variances and covariances of their residuals). We can calculate that $df_{\text{Model1}} = 6*7/2 - 14 = 7$. Obviously, df_{Model1} is larger than zero, making model 1 identified. For model 2, the df_{Model2} is calculated to be 20. df_{Model1} and df_{Model2} will later be used to determine sample sizes given desired power (refer to the next two sections).

5.5 Sample

Sampling

Although Chapter II proposed an inclusive theory to explain public diplomacy phenomena around the world, Chapter III and Chapter IV explained that the current empirical analysis will be focusing on testing the psychological model in the Chinese context. Thus, gaining access to a representative Chinese sample for survey research is critical. Given the political and social conditions in China, previous studies gathering survey data in China usually did so by either collaborating with a Chinese research institution or using a qualified Chinese market research firm. This dissertation chooses the second option by contracting with Baidu MTC to recruit respondents. Baidu is not only the largest search engine in China with around 870 million users, but is also able to provide advanced solutions for higher requirements of respondent demographics. Moreover, IRB approval was sought and granted before data collection.

However, recruiting a representative national sample out of the vast Chinese population requires a more precise definition of *representativeness* in the first place: previous studies having Chinese respondents usually choose to focus on some particular

demographics in accordance with their thematic and theoretical focus. Zhu and He (1994) and other studies researching Chinese's reception of foreign media have found several demographic variables that are influential to the effect of international political communication: education, age, party membership, type of residency (*i.e.* whether a person lives in metropolitan areas or in the less-developed areas). Thus, the sampling of our respondents will require the sampling company to recruit a quota sample mimicking the national statistics of the demographics mentioned above.

The sampling process was initiated with collaboration of the Chinese survey firm Sojump on January 28th, 2018. To ensure the balance of risk and benefit for the respondents, they received local currency equivalent to 1.5-2.5 USD after completing the survey voluntarily.

Sample Size Determination and *A Priori* Power

At this point, it is necessary to explain how this dissertation determined a suitable sample size for the empirical tests. The responses gathered by Sojump have two primary characteristics: first, they are survey data and thus should be considered in terms of survey sample size requirements to achieve acceptably small levels of margin of error; second, they are designed to be analyzed in a structural equation model, this means that sample size considerations for SEM were also taken into account.

In terms of defining sample sizes for surveys, its influence on standard errors of statistics has been an important concern. However, Groves et al. (2004, p. 381) have the following arguments: first of all, sample size is only one of the elements that influences, the stratification, clustering and assignment of probabilities of selection are all at play when it comes to standard errors; secondly, they mentioned that the standard error should

be considered relative to the hypothetical decisions to be made. In other words, the researcher needs to make compromises about standard error when its increase would have little effect on the hypothetical decisions.

In the current dissertation, if the actual value of “foreign media credibility” is X and the ideal measured value is “ $0.9X$ ”, suppose that with a smaller sample size the measured value is “ $0.8X$ ”. The “ $0.8X$ ”, in comparison to “ $0.9X$ ”, does not necessarily endanger the dissertation’s hypothetical decisions: what the dissertation is trying to compared is not whether foreign or domestic media credibility have higher influences on exogenous variables, but that their influences are directionally different.

It is somehow common sense in research method textbooks that for a nationally representative sample, or for any sample to get publication-wise tolerable margin of error, the ideal sample size would be around 1,000-1,200 (Babbie, 2015). However, as mentioned earlier, this dissertation does not intend to empirically test the models on the whole Chinese population, but is rather interested in key populations meaningful to public diplomacy: who are educated, have a baseline socio-political status, and can possibly participate in the expressions of public opinions⁵. Moreover, the budget of the current survey is limited, resulting in limited abilities to gain large sample size.

Another necessary consideration when determining sample size is statistical power. Power, instead, does not pertain to the differentiation of data collection methods like survey or content analysis. How to use power analysis to determine a minimum

⁵ The empirical tests are only concerned with these demographics for now. There are other types of public diplomacy phenomena that also fit into the theoretical models in Chapter II, such as foreign-aided militia, terrorist groups, or underground rebel groups. Identifying possible populations that contain such groups are extremely difficult and could suffer from political surveillance. This dissertation does not have enough resources to go further into this direction.

sample size is more related to the statistical test itself. Since the final step of the modeling strategy is structural equation modeling, the power analysis here should consult relevant literature in SEM methodology.

Kline (2016), however, mentioned two considerations of sample sizes of SEM analysis: the first one is the number of cases needed for statistical precision: Kline (2016, p. 16) mentioned a heuristic proposed by Jackson (2003), which is the $N:q$ rule. It is suggested that the N (number of cases): q (number of parameters needing estimation) to be ideally 20:1, or at least 10:1. Earlier discussions already show that q is 27 for both model 1 and model 2, thus, the $N:q$ rule would require a minimum sample size of 540.

However, the $N:q$ rule is only a rough way to estimate minimum sample size. Kline (2016, p. 291) also introduced a method to estimate sample size given the desired power level. Two types of minimum sample size (close-fit and not-close-fit null hypothesis of RMSEA) could be computed given α level (usually .05), degree of freedom of the model (df_M), ε_0 (null hypothesis of RMSEA, either close-fit or not-close-fit) and ε_1 (alternative hypothesis of RMSEA, usually set as $\varepsilon_1 = .08$ for close-fit $\varepsilon_0 \leq .05$, and $\varepsilon_1 = .01$ for not-close-fit $\varepsilon_0 \geq .05$) (MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara, 1996; Preacher and Coffman, 2006). Fortunately, Preacher and Coffman (2006) developed an online tool which generate R codes that can be simultaneously executed to calculate minimum sample size. Since df_{Model1} and df_{Model2} are both 18, the minimum sample size for the two models are the same after estimation. Because the $N:q$ rule suggested a sample size of 540, we also computed the power at $N = 540$. Table 5.3 shows the results of this power analysis.

Thus, we can see that when $N=540$, the model's *a priori* power is at a good level of .83 (not-close-fit) and .85 (close-fit). And the minimum sample size is around 500. It is then reasonable to set 540 responses as the goal of sample collection.

Table 5.3 Power Analysis Results

<u>Power at $N = 540$</u>	
Close Fit ^a	.851
Not Close Fit ^b	.835
<u>Minimum N for Power $\geq .80$^c</u>	
Close Fit	470
Not Close Fit	510

Note. df_{Model1} and $df_{Model2} = 20$, $\alpha = .05$. All results were computed using Quantpsy (Preacher and Coffman, 2006).

^a $H_0: \varepsilon_0 \leq .05$, $H_1: \varepsilon_0 = .08$

^b $H_0: \varepsilon_0 \geq .05$, $H_1: \varepsilon_0 = .01$

^cSample Size rounded up to closest multiple of 5

Sample Demographics

The research company collected a total of 572 responses among users of Baidu.com in China, the survey was provided to Baidu users on a first-come-first-get basis for a cash reward no greater than 15 renminbi (about 2.5 US dollars). The sampling frame is 870 million registered users of Baidu.com in China mainland, this means that the current sampling frame does not include provincial regions such as Hongkong, Macau and Taiwan⁶.

⁶ In relevant legislations of either the People's Republic of China (PRC) or the Republic of China (ROC), Taiwan is regarded as a provincial region of the administration. This dissertation has no intention to include any analysis, review or debate on these legislations.

The 572 respondents reside across 29 provinces (or provincial regions such as autonomous region or autonomous cities) out of 31 possible, with no responses collected from Xizang province (Tibet province) and Qinghai province. Meanwhile, to ensure that the sample is sensitive to the development gaps between metropolitan cities (tier 1), provincial capitals (tier-2) and county-level areas (tier 3), quota sampling was adopted to ensure that there is a 1:2:2 ratio of respondents from respectively the three tiers. Table 5.4 shows the geographical distributions of our respondents in terms of their provincial residence and tier of residence. It shows that the sample has mimicked a ratio of 1:2:2 in terms of development tiers of cities, as well as a geographical balance of the Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western part of China in each category.

Gender-wise, 52.4% of the sample is female, slightly more than male respondents. It has a mean **age** of 30.3 with a standard deviation of 7.2 (range being 19 to 63). Regarding **highest education levels**, 2.1% hold middle school diploma, 9.1% hold high school diploma, 30.9% hold a 2-year college degree, 50.9% hold a bachelor degree and 7.0% hold a master degree or above. Also, because the psychometric model measures respondents' recognition of air quality problem in China, **Air Quality Index** (*i.e.* AQI, as measured by the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China, the higher it is, the worse the air quality) was matched to each respondent according to their residence. The AQI recorded in the dataset corresponds to the date of responding the questionnaire of each participant ($M = 101.1$, $SD = 53.3$). Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 show the details of the above-mentioned demographic variables. To be comparable with the national population census, some of the categories were recoded in our data.

Table 5.4 Comparison of Demographics

	Current Study (N = 572)		2010 Chinese National Population Census* (in thousands, N =133,972)		Two Sample Proportion Test (<i>p</i> value) **
	N	%	N	%	
Gender					
Male	272	48%	68,685	51%	
Female	300	52%	65,287	49%	
Age					
15-19	12	2%	76,215	8%	
20-24	106	19%	99,704	10%	0.06
25-29	176	31%	128,614	13%	0.00
30-34	155	27%	104,886	10%	0.00
35-39	70	12%	92,998	9%	
40-44	22	4%	114,560	11%	
45-49	24	4%	124,891	12%	
50-54	3	1%	104,364	10%	0.05
55-59	2	0%	80,581	8%	
60-64	2	0%	78,456	8%	
Education					
Illiterate	0	0%	5,466	4%	N/A***
Primary School	0	0%	35,876	29%	N/A
Middle School	12	2%	51,966	42%	0.00
High School	229	40%	18,799	15%	0.00
Bachelor and above	331	58%	11,964	10%	0.00
Residence					
City	448	78%	66,558	50%	0.00
Rural	124	22%	67,415	50%	0.00

* Data from the 2010 Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the People's Republic of China, available at: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/pcsj/rkpc/6rp/indexch.htm>

** Tests comparing proportions of two independent samples using z-score; if no p value is reported, then such test was not significant at $p < .10$ level, providing support for small or minimal proportional difference.

*** Not available because one of the proportion was zero, which inhibits calculation

Table 5.5 Comparison of Sample's Geographical Distribution

	Current Study (N = 572)		2010 Chinese National Population Census* (in thousands, N =133,972)		Two Sample Proportion Test (p value)**
	N	%	N	%	
Provincial Administrations					
Beijing	44	7.7%	1,961	1.5%	0.00
Tianjin	8	1.4%	1,294	1.0%	
Hebei	34	5.9%	7,185	5.4%	
Shanxi	18	3.1%	3,571	2.7%	0.00
Inner Mongolia	1	0.2%	2,471	1.8%	
Liaoning	29	5.1%	4,375	3.3%	
Jilin	10	1.7%	2,746	2.1%	0.01
Heilongjiang	8	1.4%	3,831	2.9%	
Shanghai	30	5.2%	2,302	1.7%	
Jiangsu	30	5.2%	7,866	5.9%	0.00
Zhejiang	33	5.8%	5,443	4.1%	
Anhui	11	1.9%	5,950	4.4%	
Fujian	11	1.9%	3,689	2.8%	0.00
Jiangxi	5	0.9%	4,457	3.3%	
Shandong	44	7.7%	9,579	7.2%	
Henan	18	3.1%	9,402	7.0%	0.00
Hubei	13	2.3%	5,724	4.3%	
Hunan	4	0.7%	6,568	4.9%	
Guangdong	61	10.7%	10,430	7.8%	0.07
Guangxi	29	5.1%	4,603	3.4%	
Hainan	2	0.3%	867	0.7%	
Chongqing	26	4.5%	2,885	2.2%	0.02
Sichuan	59	10.3%	8,042	6.0%	
Guizhou	6	1.0%	3,475	2.6%	
Yunnan	4	0.7%	4,597	3.4%	0.00
Xizang	0	0.0%	300	0.2%	
Shaanxi	25	4.4%	3,733	2.8%	
Gansu	5	0.9%	2,558	1.9%	0.02
Qinghai	0	0.0%	563	0.4%	
Ningxia	1	0.2%	630	0.5%	
Xinjiang	3	0.5%	2,181	1.6%	0.00

* Data from the 2010 Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the People's Republic of China, available at:
<http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/pcsj/rkpc/6rp/indexch.htm>

** Tests comparing proportions of two independent samples using z-score; if no p value is reported, then such test was not significant at $p < .10$ level, providing support for small or minimal proportional difference.

CHAPTER 6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES RESULTS

This chapter reports the hypothesis tests and analyzes the models proposed in chapter III and chapter IV, following the modelling and analytical strategies illustrated in chapter V for hypotheses testing.

6.1 Review on Data Analysis Strategy

The study first conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of all the variables to remove low- or cross-loading items and to check for equivalence of factor structures. An internal consistency test was also conducted using Cronbach's Alpha. The analysis consisted of a two-step structural equation modeling (Kline, 2016).

In the first step, the measurement phase, the study analyzed and selected the best measurement items for each construct. The study checked for correlated residuals and cross-loadings using Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests and removed low-loading items. In the second step, the structural phase, this study compared the final confirmatory model with the proposed structural models. When necessary, the study respecified the initial structural model with applications of the LM test and Wald test (*i.e.*, error covariances).

To evaluate the proposed structural equation model, the study adopted commonly used model fit indices. They are χ^2 and its degree of freedom, comparative fit index (CFI), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), standardized root mean square

residual (SRMR), and Akaike information criterion. Often, χ^2 values are sensitive to large sample sizes; thus, the χ^2 statistic would be significant even if the differences between observed data and model-implied covariances were small (Kline, 2016). To judge model viability, the current study also applied the Hu and Bentler (1999) joint-criteria approach: A model was considered viable when it achieved $CFI \geq .96$ and $SRMR \leq .10$ or $RMSEA \leq .06$ and $SRMR \leq .10$. When the test models achieved a reasonable model-data fit, the study interpreted their paths to evaluate the hypotheses and research questions.

6.2 Hypotheses Testing for Chapter III

Chapter III proposed hypotheses 1-3 respectively about 1) the relationships between perceived accessibility and perceived media credibility; 2) the mutual effect between foreign media credibility and domestic media credibility and 3) the effect of media credibility on media dependency.

In this subsection, the proposed structural equation model in Figure 5.1 is examined to test the hypotheses. Because a confirmatory analysis has already been performed, at this stage the analysis will directly proceed into the second step of the SEM process: testing the full hypothesized model. Using SPSS Amos (ver.24), a path diagram representing the model was drawn and the proposed model was estimated. $RMSEA = .164$, $PCLOSE = .000$, $SRMR = .075$). These numbers show that there is a significant difference between reality and our proposed model. Although it is not meaningful interpreting the path coefficients given the current model, it is nevertheless helpful to




Figure 6.1 Hypotheses Testing of Model 1


The original model had poor model fit ($\chi^2 = 114.4$, $df = 7$, $p = .000$; CFI = .924, have a preliminary examination on whether the directionality of the hypotheses was correct: using model 1 as the prototype (shown in Figure 6.1), hypotheses 1 and 3 are both supported, while the results provide reverse evidence to hypotheses 2a and ab (the effect between foreign media credibility and domestic media credibility). While it was expected that foreign media credibility would negatively influence domestic media credibility, and the latter would positively influence the former, the results shows that domestic media credibility has an insignificant, yet negative influence on foreign media credibility, and foreign media credibility has a significant positive influence on domestic media credibility.

6.3 Post Hoc Analysis on Model 1 (Chapter III model)

Given the fact that the originally proposed model 1 does not reflect reality (the real distribution of covariances among all latent variables), it is necessary to ameliorate model 1 so that hypotheses testing for chapter IV model (model 2) can start on a solid basis.

The first step of the post hoc analysis is checking if there is any excess residual covariances between error terms as well as the latent variables. The modification indices output from Amos indicated that there were notable excess covariances between perceived media accessibility and media dependency. These relationships are considered and are accepted, given the fact that accessibility could be directly linked with media dependency: in chapter III, they are originally conceptualized as *passive* reliance and *active* reliance. Thus, it is more than reasonable to expect that a passive phase would lead to an active one.

After consulting literature and finding abundant support, the study argues that the addition of these links is not just chasing sampling error, but are theoretically sound links that chapter III ignored. Thus, the links from perceived accessibility to domestic media to both foreign and domestic media dependency were added, also the link from accessibility to foreign media to foreign media dependency was added. Moreover, the insignificant path from domestic media credibility to foreign media credibility was removed (hypotheses 2b thus not supported), yielding a respecified model 1 shown in the following figure (model 1b):



Note: AF = Accessibility of Foreign Media; AD = Accessibility of Domestic Media
 CF = Credibility of Foreign Media; CD = Credibility of Domestic Media
 DF = Dependency on Foreign Media for Understanding and Orientation
 DD = Dependency on Domestic Media for Understanding and Orientation
➔ : Links added in *Post Hoc* analysis

Figure 6.2 Respecification of Model 1: Model 1b

After the model1b was respecified, the model was run again and good local model fit was achieved ($\chi^2 = 18$, $df = 5$, $p = .003$; CFI = .991, RMSEA = .067, PCLOSE = .167, SRMR = .052). This is to say that given the factors considered in this model at the current stage, the model has a good fit with the data. In the current theoretical context, this model is able to explain the causal relationships among the variables considered in model 1. While H1a, H1b, H3a, H3b are supported, H2 is rejected. The parameter estimates and the squared multiple correlations for endogenous variables are shown in Table 6.1.

At last, a post hoc power analysis was performed to see how much confidence this study has in the explained variances of endogenous variables it found out. For all the observed R squared of the 4 endogenous variables, the results suggest that all observed R squared readings have post hoc statistical power above .99.

Table 6.1 Hypothesis Testing in Model 1 (shown in figure 5.1)

Hypothesis	Hypothesized Path Start	Hypothesized Path End	Hypothesized Relationship	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standardized Coefficient	<i>p</i>	Accepted or Rejected
H1a	Foreign Media Accessibility	Foreign Media Credibility	+	0.35	0.54	< .001	Supported
H1b	Domestic Media Accessibility	Domestic Media Credibility	+	0.12	0.23	< .001	Supported
H2a	Foreign Media Credibility	Domestic Media Credibility	-	0.37	0.42	< .001	Rejected
H2b	Domestic Media Credibility	Foreign Media Credibility	+			N.S.	Rejected
H3a	Foreign Media Credibility	Foreign Media Dependency	+	0.9	0.69	< .001	Supported
H3b	Domestic Media Credibility	Domestic Media Dependency	+	0.8	0.63	< .001	Supported

Note: N.S. = Not Significant

6.4 Hypotheses Testing for Chapter IV

Chapter IV proposed hypotheses 7-10 about the relationship between two types of media dependency and the three psychological antecedents of public activeness about air pollution.

In this subsection, the proposed structural equation model in Figure 5.2 is examined to test the hypotheses. Because a confirmatory analysis has already been performed, at this stage the analysis will directly proceed into the second step of the SEM process: testing the full hypothesized model. Using SPSS Amos (ver.24), a path diagram representing the model was drawn and the proposed model was estimated.

The original model 2 (see figure 5.2) predicting had mediocre model fit ($\chi^2 = 120.0$, $df = 20$, $p = .000$; CFI = .951, RMSEA = .094, PCLOSE = .000, SRMR = .065). As for hypotheses 4-6, hypotheses 5a (dependency on foreign media positively influences

involvement recognition) and 6b (dependency on domestic media reduces constraint recognition) were not supported, while all others were supported.

6.5 Post Hoc Analysis on Model 2 (Chapter III and Chapter IV combined)

The first step in post-hoc analysis of model 2 is to determine if the modifications to model 1b could make model 2 better. After checking the modification indices, the identical problems were found for model 2.

Secondly, the modification indices showed that there are direct relationships between perception of domestic media accessibility and problem recognition, as well as involvement recognition. This is theoretically sound: if a person thinks there is easy access to domestic news about air pollution and such news is abundant, it is more likely for him/her to feel the problem and feel involved. It also suggests a direct link between perceived domestic media credibility and constraint recognition: while theoretically this link is spurred possibly through common trust in domestic media as government agencies, and thus government trust, it was added into the respecified model. Moreover, perception of access to foreign news about air pollution is linked with constraint recognition.

Thus, model 2 (shown in figure 5.2) was respecified into model 2b (shown in Figure 6.3), in the same way by which model 1 was improved into model 1b. The model 2b was estimated again (Figure 6.3), which achieved great model fit ($\chi^2 = 36.2$, $df = 15$, $p = .002$; CFI = .990, RMSEA = .050, PCLOSE = .475, SRMR = .040). The parameter estimates and the squared multiple correlations for endogenous variables are shown in the following Table 6.2. At last, a post hoc power analysis was performed to see how much

confidence this study has in the explained variances of endogenous variables it found out.

For all the observed R squared of the 4 endogenous variables, the results suggest that all

observed R squared readings have post hoc statistical power above .99.




Figure 6.3 Respecification of Model 2: Model 2b

Table 6.2 Hypotheses Testing in Model 2 (Shown in Figure 5.2)

Hypothesis	Hypothesized Path Start	Hypothesized Path End	Hypothesized Relationship	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standardized Coefficient	<i>p</i>	Accepted or Rejected
H1a	Foreign Media Accessibility	Foreign Media Credibility	+	0.35	0.54	< .001	Supported
H1b	Domestic Media Accessibility	Domestic Media Credibility	+	0.12	0.23	< .001	Supported
H2a	Foreign Media Credibility	Domestic Media Credibility	-	0.37	0.42	< .001	Rejected
H2b	Domestic Media Credibility	Foreign Media Credibility	+			N.S.	Rejected
H3a	Foreign Media Credibility	Foreign Media Dependency	+	0.9	0.69	< .001	Supported
H3b	Domestic Media Credibility	Domestic Media Dependency	+	0.8	0.63	< .001	Supported
H4a	Foreign Media Dependency	Problem Recognition	+	-0.09	-0.1	.007	Rejected
H4b	Domestic Media Dependency	Problem Recognition	+	0.23	0.21	< .001	Supported
H5a	Foreign Media Dependency	Involvement Recognition	+			N.S.	Rejected
H5b	Domestic Media Dependency	Involvement Recognition	+	0.34	0.29	< .001	Supported
H6a	Foreign Media Dependency	Constraint Recognition	-	-0.27	-0.23	< .001	Supported
H6b	Domestic Media Dependency	Constraint Recognition	-			N.S.	Rejected

Note: N.S. = Not Significant

CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

7.1 Important Findings

This dissertation has several findings that can be highlighted:

- firstly, it hypothesizes and supports the existence of a passive reliance process before the formation of media credibility perception;
- secondly, it illustrates a way of distinguishing foreign media credibility from domestic media credibility, and their respective relations with individuals' dependency on each kind of media;
- thirdly, it illustrates the different mechanisms by which dependency on either foreign or domestic media lead to communicative activeness about a social issue.
- Last but not the least, the dissertation comes up with a new structural-functional theory of public diplomacy as governmental projects.

The first finding about the passive reliance on media illustrates the importance of government policy about media access. Controlling which media citizens can access have been the de facto practice of many governments: such control, from a Western

perspective, can be detrimental to media democratization, but can also be necessary for sovereignty from the perspective of more centralized, authoritarian cultures.

Accessibility to foreign media has a significant, and powerful, positive effect on the perceived credibility of foreign media in China. Such link also exists for domestic media, yet it is not as strong as the one for foreign media. However, the positive effect of credibility perception on media dependency was similarly strong for both foreign and domestic media: this illustrates that controlling for media accessibility can effectively lead to an indirect control on the level of individual level media dependency.

It is especially important to note that the results suggest that increased perception domestic media access would lead to a reduced individual level dependence on foreign media. This is an interesting, but not surprising, finding which may have something to do with how Chinese domestic media cut short citizens' reliance on foreign media.

Moreover, it was found that foreign media and domestic media creates different effects in terms of the psychological activation. Comparing with domestic media, foreign media do not relate to people's involvement recognition, and reduces the extent to which respondents think air pollution as a problem. At the same time, foreign media dependency has a direct constraint-relieving effect on respondents' activeness, while domestic media does not have.

7.2 Foreign Media as a Concept: Identification and Credibility

After a new conceptualization of public diplomacy actors illustrated in chapter II, the dissertation zooms in on the particular links that involves the process of governmental modification of the effect of "foreign media" on its domestic publics. Chapter III and

Chapter IV based their hypotheses on the theoretical assumptions of chapter II: most importantly on the assumption that governments would be motivated to modify how foreign mediating actors interact with their domestic publics.

Chapter III already had a detailed discussion on why concepts such as foreign media and domestic media were used in the actual empirical analysis, rather than asking the respondent questions about a “foreign state actor” or “foreign mediating actor”. The reasons are straight forward: publics are not likely to elaborate on questions about the ownership or funding of transnational media organizations, and famous transnational media seem to be good anchors for ordinary citizens to understand what the questions are about. Although media ownership was discussed earlier as a key criterion to identify whether a public diplomacy actor is a state actor or a mediating actor, for citizens who are not expert or not specifically sensitive to the issue, ownership of a particular media is sometimes difficult to identify and validate.

But this is not to say that citizens are not sensitive to media ownership, or media identification in terms of their information sources or editorial tradition. Previous research has showed that citizens tend to develop good psychological relationships with a not-locally-funded or operated media, when they have abundant access and perceive the source as credible. In these studies, such kind of media are usually labeled as “American media” or “Chinese media”, despite whether they receive governmental or public funding. This is not against the theoretical proposals in chapter II: it is highly likely that ordinary people don’t distinguish mediating state actors (*e.g.* BBC) and mediators (*e.g.* New York Times). This is because that for ordinary publics, or even for researchers on public diplomacy, the linkage between state actors and mediators are often *assumed* when

these two types of actors are in the same country (which means the two are highly inter-dependent) without much elaboration. After all, most public diplomacy research tends to downplay such links to perhaps avoid being politically unwelcomed by the actual public diplomacy promoters (see chapter II for a detailed elaboration on “why state actors want to operate in camouflage”), and that data relevant to these government-media links are more difficult to obtain and validate than public opinion data.

Lastly, the conceptual differences between foreign and domestic media are important determinants of the generalizability of the models tested in the dissertation. It is important to know that how “foreign” is differed from “domestic” media can be different across countries given the different regulations on media, as well as citizens’ perception of what is foreign and domestic. When it comes to international trade and tariffs on foreign products, a complex system is used to decide whether a product is foreign or domestically made. This system takes a series of factors into consideration, such the origin of materials, place of assembly, origin of labor used in the production, the origin of the technological patent, the registered location of the manufacturer’s headquarters, etc.

Thus, considering the complex but effective regulations already established in the international trade system to distinguish a foreign product from a domestic product, media content or international news faces very different regulations in different places. The criteria used in section 3.2 could be extended into a more detailed and more generalizable set of regulations determining what is a foreign media, or a foreign mediator of public diplomacy. If there is agreement among governments and within international organizations about what is “foreign media”, the global trade of ideas could be more fluent. Moreover, a common or similar conceptualization of the boundary

between foreign and domestic media could facilitate the application of the activation model in various national or cultural backgrounds.

7.3 Controlling Accessibility: Key to Modification

In the results chapter, Hypotheses 1-6 were tested and confirmed. These hypotheses were proposed to illustrate one possible way by which policy makers can modify their citizens' trust in, as well as dependency on, foreign media (*i.e.* using the terms proposed in chapter II: foreign, or non-local, mediating state actors or mediators).

First of all, support for H1 implies that publics' perception of the accessibility of the media positively influences their perception of media credibility accordingly. Linking accessibility to credibility is important, for a media environment where foreign information is less controlled, this means that a reduction to the accessibility to foreign media could cut short their perceived credibility. Secondly, comparing the coefficient of the H1 link and H2 link, there is a noticeable gap between the access-credibility relations for foreign and domestic media: in the current Chinese context where access to foreign media is technically restricted, such access will contribute more robustly to foreign media credibility than what domestic media access can do for domestic media credibility.

This implies that credibility of domestic media may be subject to the influence of a series of other variables, such as trust in social institutions, government and people's own ideological inclination. And in an environment where foreign media access is restricted, people rely more on access to form a perception of foreign media credibility.

H2 hypothesized about the mutual influence between foreign media credibility and domestic media credibility. However, it was not supported by data analysis. While

conceptually it might be the case that the more credible people perceived foreign media, the less credible they perceived domestic media, it is possible that this mutual influence is only realistic when the study adopts a relative measurement and conceptualization of media credibility: for example, in Zhang et al and Choi et al' (2002) s study, credibility of different types of media are ranked by respondents, which means the more credible some types of media, the lower ranks would other media get.

This finding can be the starting point of a new debate: it is acceptable to assume that media usage, or media dependency, or gratification are resource-like concepts, meaning that if someone uses media for one purpose for a longer time, then he/she would use media for other purposes for less time, because of the total time available for them to use media is limited. But, the findings of H2 lead to another question: could media credibility be conceptualized as a kind of resource as well?: meaning that credibility invested in one media would result in the reduction of credibility in other media. To conceptualize media credibility as a resource, and to make such measurement actually usable in a questionnaire, the conceptual boundaries between foreign and domestic media need to be drawn in the academia, in the industry and, most importantly, among general publics: it is only possible for policies hoping to distinguish foreign and domestic media to success when the general public knows first what are the differences.

The findings of H3 support the positive influence of perceived media credibility on individual media dependency. The results show that for both foreign and domestic media, increased credibility can lead to dependency on such media. This is in accordance with the findings in previous literatures.

Nevertheless, it is important for the dissertation to stress again that the above-mentioned model was not tested with the purpose to criticize any policy of any government around the world. The Chinese context was chosen because of the author's familiarity with the Chinese context. Similar mechanism is also existent in the United States, Russia, and anywhere else on the world: after all, if the adequate boundaries are drawn, then in any national context, accessibility to certain types of media organization will be different in comparison to those of other types of media. For example, an ordinary American citizens' perceived accessibility to Russian TV, or CCTV America, could be lower than the perceived accessibility of CNN or Fox News. Thus, this model is conceptualized to suit a wide range of contexts, given the adequate typology of media organizations (mediating actors) in any context.

Thus, the psychological mechanism could be validated in future studies in other national or cultural contexts. It is a question for the policy makers whether to exploit such mechanism for a firmer control of publics' relationship-building or not. And this dissertation, at the current stage, has no political preference or inclination in terms of policy choice.

7.4 Situational Motivation as Outcome of Relationship with Media

Chapter IV extends the hypotheses proposed in chapter III to the behavioral antecedents of publics. In the current dissertation, this extension is examined in the context of Chinese public's situational motivation to engage in communicative action about the problem of air pollution. In other words, chapter IV is interested in knowing if dependency on foreign media and domestic media would make the public more likely to think air pollution is a social problem, to feel more involved in the problem and to feel

less constrained in speaking out about it. Moreover, chapter IV is interested in comparing the magnitude of influence on situational motivation by foreign media vs. domestic media.

The result of hypotheses testing in chapter VI showed that dependency on foreign or domestic media would have different and sometimes separate effects on people's behavioral intentions for communicative actions about air quality in China. Firstly, for H4a and H4b, dependency on foreign media suppresses problem recognition about the issue, while dependency on domestic media increase problem recognition. This is an interesting finding not in the initial expectations of the dissertation. Considering that for Hypotheses 5a and 5b, foreign media again was not significantly related to involvement recognition, but domestic media was: it is plausible that attachment to foreign media means a detachment from domestic social problems, and thus less problem recognition and insignificant involvement recognition. Future studies may further explore the effect of foreign media usage or consumption on public's social involvement level, it is possible that dependency on foreign media could increase the perceived distance between the media user and his/her social environment, or vice versa.

In sum, comparing the different effects of foreign media and domestic media on Chinese citizens about the air pollution issue, the dissertation finds that foreign media could be more directly effective in reducing people's constraint recognition to speak out or act about the issue. At the same time, domestic media seems to be more effective in hearten public's problem recognition and involvement recognition. In a comparatively more controlled media environment, foreign media use seems to be associated with the perceived distance between the society and the individual. This might be the reason why

higher dependency on foreign media lead to a reduced problem recognition, and does not encourage involvement recognition.

Moreover, H6a and H6b showed a different picture: that dependency on foreign media decrease publics' constraint recognition on speaking about the air quality issue in China, while dependency on domestic media did not have a significant relationship with constraint recognition. This implies that, with the current sample, foreign media and domestic media activates the Chinese domestic publics by different mechanisms, foreign media activates by leading to a reduced constraint perception, while domestic media activates by increasing problem and involvement recognition.

Another finding of chapter IV is that the total effect of foreign media on situational motivation is much less than the total effect from domestic media. This potentially means that publics in China are replying predominantly on domestic media to understand the issue perceptually. It is interesting that dependency on foreign media did not contribute significantly to publics' problem & involvement recognition about air pollution, but dependency on foreign media does explain to a considerable extent why Chinese publics are feeling less constrained to speak about the issue.

Provided a more politically acute topic which would be depicted very differently in foreign media and domestic media, the activation effect of foreign media organizations could be more significant than domestic media. However, including a politically acute topic in a Chinese questionnaire is unrealistic given local legislative settings. Future studies can pick a more conflicting topic (between foreign and domestic media) to further examine the activation effect of foreign media in another social context.

7.5 Media Ownership and Actors in Public Diplomacy

This dissertation proposed a structural-functionalist conceptual model of public diplomacy. In other words, it drew boundaries between different types of actors in public diplomacy by identifying their links with the publics and state governments. Two-types of links were considered: the first is the ownership-finance link, and the second is their interest in other actors (the purpose and motivation of their public diplomatic behavior).

The new conceptualization is helpful for researchers of transnational persuasion to capture some of the new dynamics with which transnational influence is currently being performed. One emerging trend is the increased sensitivity of global media platforms to government-funded content or operations. This includes CBS accusing RT (Russian TV) for being a propaganda machine of the Russian government, as well as the pan-social critique in the United States or even the Western world towards the alleged Russian political campaign on Facebook and Twitter to influence the 2016 US election. Such sensitivity peaked in early 2018 when Youtube, as an Alphabet company (who also owns Google), started to “roll out notices below videos uploaded by news broadcasters that receive some level of government or public funding”.

While companies and governments in the United States start to become sensitive to transnational persuasion campaigns coming from a foreign-state-funded program or organization, governments in other states such as China, were already alert to the operation of foreign “mediating actors” targeting their population. Some of these mediating actors are state mediating actors (such as Radio Free Asia, Al Hurra, or Voice of America, etc.), others are performing mediators (such as the National Endowment for

Democracy), while some others are channeling mediators (such as Facebook, Twitter, CNN, etc).

Thus, identifying the ownership of mediating actors is very important for a government to come up with a strategy, with which it can assess, monitor, and potentially control the effect of transnational persuasion from foreign governments. This controlling link between government and foreign mediators was an important part of the general model shown in Figure 2.4, and was thus the focus in chapter III and chapter IV for further empirical analysis. In conclusion, the theoretical elaboration in chapter II helped to illustrate the theoretical assumptions on which hypotheses in chapter III and chapter IV are based. These assumptions are also important implications this dissertation hopes to bring to the examination and debate within public diplomacy scholarship:

Implication I: For the public diplomacy scholarship and practice, it may be important to answer the question of “Is X not Y?” (distinguish different types of actors in public diplomacy) before asking “could X also be Y?”

Implication II: The differentiation between different actors in public diplomacy can be made with consideration of the actors’ *interests* in other actors in order to function or survive (either ownership, mediation, persuasion, information dependency or collaboration).

Implication III: Actors with *conflicting* interests would have the intention to modify their rivals’ relationship with other actors in the context of public diplomacy.

Implication IV: There is a necessity to systematically explore possible strategies (limiting access, defamation, etc.) with which actors can achieve the above-mentioned modifications and evaluate the effectiveness of these strategies.

Still, the categorization of actors into simply three categories (state actors, mediating actors, and publics) means that there would be always more details and exceptions to be added into this new conceptualization of public diplomacy. The conceptual structural models proposed in chapter II are nevertheless based on the authors' personal experience and knowledge with public diplomacy and transnational persuasion, as well as most of the existing literature on public diplomacy, international broadcasting, soft power, etc. The field is yet to become a fully explored one with complete theoretical, operational and quantified models. Much of the literature usually either favors a political-science-based conceptualization (favoring organizational actors and formal modeling) or a mass-communication-based conceptualization (favoring individual psychometrics). This dissertation could be one of the few attempts to combine traditions of thoughts in both fields. Although formal modeling about public diplomacy in a political-science-fashion is yet to come, there are reference points that political scientists can use (Putnam, etc.) to build a formal theory about the "why public diplomacy occur" and "is public diplomacy really effective" at the macro-level.

7.6 Theoretical and Geographical Extension

So far, this dissertation developed a theoretical model of public diplomacy with a focus on the structural relationships between different types of actors and their relative functions. It then empirically examined a part of the structural relationships in the

theoretical model: by proposing and examining a structural equation model of publics activation, this dissertation empirically supported:

- the potential of policy makers to modify foreign mediating actors' relationship with domestic publics by adjusting media accessibility.
- that domestic publics' relationship with different types of media can increase publics' situational motivation to speak out about a social problem.

The empirical tests give preliminary support to the new conceptualization of public diplomacy illustrated in chapter II. However, not all the structural links shown in figure 2.0 (the competition model of public diplomacy) were empirically tested. For example, how government collaborates with non-state mediating actors is yet to be fully explored and examined with empirical models and real-world data: for example, Jiang and Bowen (2011) explored the link between power and ethical decision making in the relationships between governments, NGOs and activist groups. Also, how performing mediators (such as the Olympics committee) interact and collaborates with channeling mediators (such as Facebook, Snapchat or NBC) in the context of public diplomacy is also an important part of the theoretical model. For example, the North Korean government took the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in South Korea as an opportunity of non-traditional diplomacy. It would be meaningful to examine how do channeling mediators modifies public perception of governmental interaction with performing mediators.

Moreover, international organizations such as IOC, WTO, UN and IMF are categorized as performing mediators in chapter II. However, these international organizations can be different in terms of their relationship with individual governments.

Indeed, they are international venues where state actions and policies are presented to the global audience, but organizations such as the United Nations are also a collection of government and may have the same time certain restrictive power on state behavior. If powerful international organizations publish negative information about a government's policy, how would such government, as well as other governments, respond in its power to modify the effect of such message on global audience? In short, many other links in the chapter II are worth future exploration.

The second possible extension of the current study may be geographical. This is to say that the model could be empirically examined in other areas of the world. While not necessarily every country or region have governments that regulates foreign media content, several places are absolutely of future research interest. For example, the Middle East has been a region of ideological realignment and conflict in recent decades, and the 9-11 tragedy attracted numerous scholars to explore ways to curb anti-Americanism in the region. Research has also showed that people in Iraq, Qatar, Egypt and some other Middle Eastern countries are aware of the differences between foreign and domestic media. The next step would be finding out if these different perceptions lead to different media use, exposure, cognition and political or even terrorist behavior. Could government control on foreign media accessibility or perception be effective in stabilizing the region ideologically? And what does control mean for numerous new-born democracies in terms of social construction? Research on media control can definitely help us to better answer these questions.

Research and global public opinion have been anxious about the influence brought by new economic powers like China to the existing world order. Even with in

American administrative and legislative processes, politicians and academics paid their attention to foreign influences in domestic media environment. Many examples, such as the RT and Confucius Institute case, were already introduced earlier in the dissertation. It is possible that the U.S., being the *de facto* hegemon currently maintaining world order⁷, could be leading a project to sweep out potential disturbance in a (previously) unified global public opinion sphere. This project may be necessary for the reconstruction of *Pax Americana* given the policies laying out by the Trump administration. This dissertation responds exactly to the potential competitions between global media, and such competitions between media for persuasion and ideological alignment may not be distant if we have two or more parallel economic systems in the future: as China builds its Belt Road Initiative, some people may at the same time want public opinions along the Belt Road Initiative to be akin to Chinese policies and less inclined to Western values⁸.

7.7 Level of Analysis of Public Diplomacy: Connecting to Soft Power

One last, but not the least, important note about the implications of this dissertation is about the level of analysis within public diplomacy research. With the current conceptual set-up, this dissertation builds theoretical arguments about how boundaries help to clarify public diplomatic actors' interactions in different kinds of events. However, boundaries between different actors may not be efficient in explaining problems in the conceptualization of soft power. Soft power should definitely not be forgotten or ignored in the study of public diplomacy, for policy makers and nation

⁷ see research on the debate about the superiority of hegemonic and bi-polar world system for more detail

⁸ Again, this dissertation does not, and has no intention to research the quality, benevolence or disadvantages of either Chinese or Western values: it is important to keep in mind that they are different, but differences do not mean a judgement in their nature.

leaders around the world are using this concept for statecraft, the word “soft power” was also written into the Chinese constitution.

So how does this dissertation help with future research on soft power? Simply put, the current conceptualization of the ecology model or the competition model discussed in Chapter II is two-dimensional: after all, it is written on 2D surface in its best effort to show the structural differences between actors. Future studies should consider level of analysis in public diplomacy studies and practice: with special attention paid to *relationship-building, image-building, persuasion* and *activation*. When these four levels of analysis are taken into consideration, the 2D conceptual model then has a *depth* to better illustrate the different functional links between actors.

These four levels analysis helps to answer Baldwin (2016)’s question raised critically against the concept of soft power (Nye, 1990; 2008). He argued that soft power as a concept of power does not have a stable and measurable *source*. Perhaps it is true that Nye has yet answered this question, and political scientists would argue that soft power’s source is still largely economic and military, thus it is difficult to separate soft power from hard power.

Maybe it is eloquent that soft power is dependent on hard power, or at least highly associated with it, however, it would not be difficult to see that their overlap decreases as the level of analysis (of public diplomacy) decreases gradually from relationship-building to activation. At the highest level of public diplomacy, relationship building can benefit from international trade, educational programs, foreign aid, and even war⁹, but persuasion

⁹ Japanese Annexation of Korea, Taiwan in the WWII, as well as the recent Iraqi war are examples of how wars could be as starting points of relationship building of foreign government with local citizens.

and activation are less in the military and economic arena: they usually relate to international broadcasting or incitation campaigns, and are more subject to the target government's monitoring and control.

The highest level of analysis *relationship-building* is determined by how psychologically foreign citizens (*e.g.* Chinese citizens) feel they are related or connected with products, services and policies of a foreign country (*e.g.* U.S.). It is indeed a kind of *source* of power, and it is also less visible than an aircraft carrier: but it does not mean we cannot capture it. Barometers of public opinions are one way to observe the relationship resource that a country has overseas.

The second level *image building*, relies on the resources (economic, technological and cultural) a country has available for promoting favorable views *about* the *relationship* it has with foreign citizens. For example, European citizens may feel they are related to Russia for natural resources (relationship), however, they may still feel Russia has a hostile policy about exporting natural resources (image). Also, American people may be using Chinese-made products everyday (relationship), yet they would still think Made-in-China means poor quality and would prefer not to use Chinese product given an alternative (image).

The third level is persuasion. Even if there are good relationship and images, foreign citizens' cognitive opinion about international affairs and policies are still dependent on a government's ability to communicate with foreign publics, and explain issues in frames and agendas of domestic or closely-related global media agencies. This has many names: international broadcasting, propaganda, transnational persuasion. But no matter how it is named, a government's ability to speak to the outside is important, for

an undisturbed channel of promotion and explanation is key in maximizing the utility of *relationship* and *image* resource.

The last level, activation, is reliant on all previous three levels. Activation is usually spontaneous and has a *target*. This means that it is also reliant on the *target's* ability in gaining and using the previous three types of resources. Activation also requires specialized personnel and funding from the acting government and organization: for example, activating citizens in North Korea would be way more difficult than doing so in Syria, for the North Korean regime may be weak economically, but it has a highly institutionalized internal persuasion system, and policy-wise has high relationship with its citizens, but in Syria, activation campaigns or incitation campaigns suffer less from surveillance and local control.

7.8 Limitations

The dissertation is limited in several ways: first, the empirical examinations did not cover all the conceptual relationships proposed in chapter II, leaving some of them at the theoretical stage without real-world evidence. Secondly, the theoretical scope is limited to the author's experience in public diplomacy, knowledge in international relations and perhaps an emphasis on the psychometric aspect of the empirical testing. Formal theory building in the field of political science can significantly solidify the theoretical foundation. Thirdly, the data collected for empirical examination does not come from a national random sampling process in China, and thus should not be interpreted as nationally representative, people who reside in less developed or culturally diverse areas of China are less represented in the sample. However, the sample does have

considerable face validity since it comes from perhaps the main target group of public diplomacy: well-educated, mid-aged people who use Internet.

At a higher level, even the new model for public diplomacy illustrated in chapter II should be used with caution. The purpose of chapter II is to draw boundaries between actors of public diplomacy, yet, there are two important theoretical limitations of a structural-functionalist conceptualization.

The first is that many of the actors in the model are multiple-goal-oriented rather than being motivated by a single goal of public diplomacy. The practice of public diplomacy is actually co-orienting the goals of different actors (including the different levels of government) for transnational relationship building, situational persuasion and feedback-based strategy making. This means that every actor included in model II does not exist simply because of public diplomacy. Thus, their behaviors could be subjects to a more powerful cause.

Secondly, the penetration of government agencies into the (perhaps) neutral ground of social media undermines the purity of the widely respected, attended and studied user-generated content. The boundaries between users and governments are definitely diminishing, or perhaps they have never existed since the beginning of social media. Drawing boundaries in social media is hard, but for governments such work is also necessary, because it would be naïve to assume the absolute benignity of cybersphere.

Then, what comes as a more important topic is how to make ethical decisions about these boundaries: drawing boundaries between people can be disastrous, as can be

seen from the examples of the Holocaust, Cultural Revolution, Arab Spring, etc. Should this be guided by a realist, Machiavellian ethics, or a liberalist, Kantian way of justification, or other ways of ethical elaboration? This should be stressed as a void that public diplomacy literature needs to fill as soon as possible. Moreover, given the fact that chapter III has the need to incorporate relevant concepts and measures from political communication literature, the roles played by other psychometric variables such as political trust, political efficacy or political participation could be important for a fully developed behavioral model. To a certain extent, local regulations in China about conducting survey research limited the types of questions that this dissertation can ask: in fact, the first item in the conventional measure of media credibility has to be dropped, because that item contains the word “manipulate”, and such words are prohibited to be asked in a survey in China. This phenomenon is important for scholars who are interested in getting survey data from China, and because any items or measures developed using English need to be translated, how can researchers preserve as much information as possible in their psychometric construct in another language? This question needs to be considered for communication scholars trying to get international data.

Also, the conceptualization of accessibility in the current context, as discussed in chapter III, has conceptual overlaps with concepts of selective exposure to media and perceived selective control on media. Selective exposure could be a concept which comes closer to the actual media use of respondents, and can even be measured on a much tangible scale of minutes or hours. Selective control could be closer to public’s perception about governmental policy and could be potentially asked in countries where

such questions are allowed. These three concepts (media accessibility, selective exposure and selective control) can be used in accordance to the emphasis of a certain research.

The empirical examinations of this dissertation were performed with the Chinese context, this adds to another level of limitation beyond the overlapping nature of accessibility, exposure and control. The Chinese context involves dramatic differences between foreign and domestic media's availability and accessibility: however, a comparison between foreign media and domestic media's accessibility could have better results if the difference in their accessibility levels was less dramatic. In the Chinese context, access to domestic media can hardly be partial among the population targeted by this study. In other words, access to Chinese domestic media is usually saturated, and such access can be imperative in places where modern communication technology is present.

Thus, what is of most value in this dissertation should be the effect of foreign media access on citizen's activeness. Retrospectively, the competition phenomenon may have been adequately modeled by the empirical models: it could be better named as a "survival" model of foreign media credibility in a saturated environment of domestic media accessibility. When thinking at this level, even the Chinese context starts to lose its uniqueness: perhaps it is reasonable for us to assume that foreign media operate with a "survival" model in any given national context.

7.9 Conclusions

As a final note, this dissertation was written with the sincerest hope that citizens around the world can become literate about the fact that "the medium is the message"

(McLuhan, 1964), and can possess the ability to think critically about the medium or the messages that may guide their perceptions and behaviors. As of 2018, we are all living in an era of unprecedented globalization, cultural integration, and global ideological re-alignment. But, it is also an era of high uncertainty because of the regionalist and protectionist policy-making in various governments around the world.

With new considerations on how information was and is being created, packaged and distributed around the world, it is the responsibility of policy makers, media workers and publics around the world to prevent cultural and political extremism, which can inspire distrust, disrespect and misunderstanding between global communities.

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APPENDIX A: DISSERTATION QUESTIONNAIRE

Informed Consent

Thank you for taking the time to respond to this survey. The purpose of this study is to understand Chinese people's use and understanding of foreign and domestic media, and thus to provide suggestions about how to further construct a benign media and public opinion environment.

Your participation in this study is confidential and no identifying information will be collected. Only the researchers can have access to the data. The online host (Baidu MTC) uses several forms of encryption for data protection, thus there is a minimal risk that security of any online data may be breached.

If you have any questions about the research, please contact the principal investigator Yicheng Zhu at the University of South Carolina at yicheng@email.sc.edu. The survey will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary. You can end your participation at any time by leaving the survey web site.

Agreement:

I have read the procedure described above. I voluntarily agree to participate in the procedure and I have received a copy of this description.

If you agree to participate, you can click the bottom to continue.

Block Zero: Intro

Before answering the survey, please allow me to familiarize you with the background of the study and two key concepts that will be used in the survey.

Firstly,

all the questions, except for “media dependency questions”, are related to **news about air pollution in China**, please keep this in mind when you are answering the questions.

Secondly,

By foreign media, it refers to professional news media organizations, or any representative product of them, that are headquartered or funded outside of China (such as New York Times, BBC, CNN, AP, Asahi Shinbum, etc.).

By domestic media, it refers to professional news media organizations, or any representative product of them, that are headquartered or funded inside of China (such as CCTV, People’s Daily, Xinhua, CPRadio, etc.)

Any news media or media products based or funded in Hong Kong SAR of PRC, Macau SAR of PRC or Taiwan province should not be taken into consideration while answering this survey.

Block I: Perceived Foreign Media Accessibility

Assume that you are looking for news about air pollution in China, please rank the following items according to how credible you think they are.	
General	1. It is easy for me to access foreign online news media
	2. my social environment facilitates me to access foreign online news media
	3. people around me usually have access to foreign online news media
	4. foreign online news media contents are readily available in my life

Block II: Perceived Domestic Media Accessibility

Assume that you are looking for news about air pollution in China, please rank the following items according to how credible you think they are.	
General	1. It is easy for me to access domestic online news media
	2. my social environment facilitates me to access domestic online news media
	3. people around me usually have access to domestic online news media
	4. domestic online news media contents are readily available in my life

Block III: Perceived Foreign Media Credibility

Assume that you are looking for news about air pollution in China, To what extent do you agree with the following statements?	
Believability	1. foreign media orgs don't try to manipulate public opinion (Censored and Not Asked)
	2. foreign media orgs get facts accurately. (FM Believe1)
	3. foreign media orgs deal fairly with all sides of political or social issue. (FM Believe2)

	4. foreign media orgs separate facts from opinions. (FM Believe3)
	5. foreign media orgs is generally not biased. (FM Believe4)
Affinity	1. foreign media orgs are concerned with my community's well-being
	2. foreign media orgs watch out for my interests
	3. foreign media orgs are concerned about the public welfare for my people
	4. foreign media orgs report socially meaningful stories
	5. foreign media orgs are in touch with average Chinese people

Block IV: Perceived Domestic Media Credibility

Assume that you are looking for news about air pollution in China, To what extent do you agree with the following statements?	
Believability	1. domestic media orgs don't try to manipulate public opinion (Not asked-censored)
	2. domestic media orgs get facts accurately. (DM Believe1)

	3. domestic media orgs deal fairly with all sides of political or social issue. (DM Believe2)
	4. domestic media orgs separate facts from opinions. (DM Believe3)
	5. domestic media orgs is generally not biased. (DM Believe4)
Affinity	1. domestic media orgs are concerned with my community's well-being
	2. domestic media orgs watch out for my interests
	3. domestic media orgs are concerned about the public welfare for my people
	4. domestic media orgs report socially meaningful stories
	5. domestic media orgs are in touch with average Chinese people

Block V Foreign Media Dependency:

For the following things, to what extent do you rely on foreign media?
Gain insight into why you do some of the things you do
Observe how others cope with problems or situations like yours
Keep up with world events

Stay on top of what is happening in the community
Imagine what you'll be like when you grow older
Find out how the country is doing
Decide where to go for services such as health, financial, or household
Figure out what to buy
Plan where to go for evening and weekend activities
Discover better ways to communicate with others
Think about how to act with friends, relatives, or people you work with
Get ideas about how to approach others in important or difficult situations
Unwind after a hard day or week
Relax when you are by yourself
Have something to do when nobody else is around
Give you something to do with your friends
Have fun with family or friends
Be a part of events you enjoy without having to be there

Block VI Domestic Media Dependency:

For the following things, to what extent do you rely on domestic media?
1. Gain insight into why you do some of the things you do
2. Observe how others cope with problems or situations like yours
3. Keep up with world events
4. Stay on top of what is happening in the community
5. Imagine what you'll be like when you grow older
6. Find out how the country is doing
7. Decide where to go for services such as health, financial, or household
8. Figure out what to buy

9. Plan where to go for evening and weekend activities
10. Discover better ways to communicate with others
11. Think about how to act with friends, relatives, or people you work with
12. Get ideas about how to approach others in important or difficult situations
13. Unwind after a hard day or week
14. Relax when you are by yourself
15. Have something to do when nobody else is around
16. Give you something to do with your friends
17. Have fun with family or friends
18. Be a part of events you enjoy without having to be there

Block VII: Variables from STOPS model (Public Relations)

Problem Recognition:

I think air pollution is a serious social (or national) problem.
I am concerned about air pollution a lot.
About air pollution, I see a huge gap between what it should be and what it is now.
The news related to air pollution surprised me a lot.
Something needs to be done to improve air pollution.

Constraint Recognition (all reversed as suggested by Kim & Grunig 2011):

I am not afraid to take action to make changes for air pollution
I can make difference and improvement regarding air pollution.
I find no obstacles in doing something for air pollution.
I feel I can improve the problematic situation of air pollution.
I feel that my ideas or opinion matter to those who are addressing air pollution.

Involvement Recognition

I realized a strong connection between air pollution and me.
Air pollution affects my life.
Air pollution has serious consequences for my life and someone I care.
I am connected with air pollution and its consequences.
I think air pollution could affect me personally.

Block VIII Demographics:

In which year you were born? (Four-digit Arabic Numbers Only, example: 1980)

What is your highest level of education? – custom answers

What type of *hukou* are you registered with? 1- Metropolitan 2-Agricultural

In which type of area are you mainly living? (censored, not asked)

- 1- Metropolitan areas (dushi)
- 2- Provincial Capitals (shi)
- 3- 3rd -4th level municipals (xian, zhen)
- 4- Rural area (xiang, cun)
- 5- Other: specify

Are you currently a civil servant? (censored, not asked)

- 1- Yes
- 2- No

Are you currently a CCP member? (censored, not asked)

- 1- Yes
- 2- No

APPENDIX B: DISSERTATION QUESTIONNAIRE (CHINESE VERSION)

感谢您抽出时间参与本次问卷调查，本次调查结果仅用于研究目的，旨在研究大众对于海外和国内媒体的认知和使用情况。

您的参与是完全并且绝对匿名的。此外，仅有研究小组相关人员能够接触到问卷数据。本次问卷调查的服务平台 Baidu MTC 采用多种数据加密的方式，因此，和此问卷有关的在线数据的泄露是极不可能的。

完成本次问卷的时长在 12 分钟左右，您的参与是完全自愿的，您可以在任何时候退出回答问卷。

知情陈述：

我已阅读上述相关内容。我自愿参加问卷回答，此外，在阅读上述内容的过程中，我有机会保存上述内容的副本。

如果您同意上述知情陈述，请继续。谢谢！

国内外媒体可信度及使用调查

感谢您抽出时间参与本次问卷调查，本次调查结果仅用于研究目的，旨在研究大众对于海外和国内媒体的认知和使用情况。

您的参与是完全并且绝对匿名的。此外，仅有研究小组相关人员能够接触到问卷数据。本次问卷调查的服务平台 Baidu MTC 采用多种数据加密的方式，因此，和此问卷有关的在线数据的泄露是极不可能的。

完成本次问卷的时长在 12 分钟左右，您的参与是完全自愿的，您可以在任何时候退出回答问卷。

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我已阅读上述相关内容。我自愿参加问卷回答，此外，在阅读上述内容的过程中，我有机会保存上述内容的副本。

如果您同意上述知情陈述，请继续。谢谢！

在回答问卷之前，请允许我帮助您熟悉在问卷中将要用到的两个重要概念以及研究的主题背景。

大部分问题，除了“媒体依赖度”相关问题，都是关于“关于中国空气质量的新闻”这一主题的。请您务必留心这一点，因为离开了具体的主题，您可能对某些问题会感到难以回答。

此外，本次问卷对于“海外媒体”和“国内媒体”的定义是：

海外媒体：总部设立在海外，或者仅接受来自海外经济支持的专业新闻媒体机构，以及他们发布的新闻信息或者新闻产品。（比如 CNN，BBC，朝日新闻，华尔街日报中文版等等）

国内媒体：总部设立在国内，或者仅接受来自国内经济支持的专业新闻媒体机构，以及他们发布的新闻信息或者新闻产品。（比如中央电视台，人民日报，新华社，中央广播电台，各省市地方电视台等）

第 2 页：媒体访问度相关问题

1. 如果您想关注中国空气质量这一新闻话题，就**海外媒体**而言，您在何种程度上同意以下说法？ [矩阵量表题] *

	完全不同意	极少的同意	稍微同意	一半程度同意	基本同意	大部分同意	完全同意
对我来说，取得海外媒体新闻很简单	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
我的社会环境方便了我取得海外媒体新闻	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
我身边的人经常获取海外媒体新闻	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
海外媒体的新闻在我的生活中普遍存在	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

2. 如果您想关注中国空气质量这一新闻话题，就**国内媒体**而言，您在何种程度上同意以下说法？ [矩阵量表题] *

	完全不同意	极少的同意	稍微同意	一半程度同意	基本同意	大部分同意	完全同意
对我来说，取得国内媒体新闻很简单	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
我的社会环境方便了我取得国内媒体新闻	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

我身边的人经常获取国内媒体新闻	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
国内媒体的新闻在我的生活中普遍存在	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

第 3 页：媒体可信度相关问题

3. 如果您想关注中国空气质量这一新闻话题，就海外媒体可信度而言，您在何种程度上同意以下说法？ [矩阵量表题] *

	完全不同意	极少的同意	稍微同意	一半程度同意	基本同意	大部分同意	完全同意
海外媒体准确地获得事实	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
海外媒体公平的对待所有社会问题	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
海外媒体区分“事实”和“意见”	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
海外媒体基本上不带偏见	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

4. 如果您想关注中国空气质量这一新闻话题，就国内媒体可信度而言，您在何种程度上同意以下说法？ [矩阵量表题] *

	完全不同意	极少的同意	稍微同意	一半程度同意	基本同意	大部分同意	完全同意
国内媒体准确地获得事实	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
国内媒体公平的对待所有社会问题	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
国内媒体区分“事实”和“意见”	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
国内媒体基本上不带偏见	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

第 4 页：媒体亲和度相关问题

5. 如果您想关注中国空气质量这一新闻话题，就海外媒体亲和度而言，您在何种程度上同意以下说法？[矩阵量表题] *

	完全不同意	极少的同意	稍微同意	一半程度同意	基本同意	大部分同意	完全同意
海外媒体关心我和身边人的福祉	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
海外媒体留心和我利益相关的事	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
海外媒体关心人民的公众福利	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
海外媒体报道有社会意义的新闻	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

海外媒体听取普通中国人的声音	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<p>6. 如果您想关注中国空气质量这一新闻话题，就国内媒体亲和度而言，您在何种程度上同意以下说法？ [矩阵量表题] *</p>							
	完全不同意	极少的同意	稍微同意	一半程度同意	基本同意	大部分同意	完全同意
国内媒体关心我和身边人的福祉	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
国内媒体留心和我利益相关的事	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
国内媒体关心公众福利	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
国内媒体报道有社会意义的新闻	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
国内媒体听取普通中国人的声音	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<p>第 5 页：海外媒体依赖度相关问题</p>							
<p>7. 在以下列出的这些事上，请分别指出您在多大程度上依赖海外媒体来帮助您完成这些事。请从 1（完全没帮助）到 5（非常有帮助）的范围中选择一个选项。 [矩阵量表题] *</p>							
	没有帮助	有极少帮助	有少许帮助	一般	比较有帮助	很有帮助	十分有帮助
理解您为什么会做一些您平时做的事	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

想象您年龄变大后会如何	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
观察他人如何处理那些与您所面临的类似的问题或情况	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
了解社区 / 社会上发生了什么	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
了解自己国家的状况	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
了解世界上的事件	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
决定去哪里找寻健康，金融或家政等类型的服务	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
决定买什么东西	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
计划晚上或者周末去哪里活动	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
发现更好的与他人沟通的办法	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
思考如何与朋友，亲戚或者同事打交道	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
知晓如何在重要或者困难	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

的情况下接近他人							
在劳累的一天后放松	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
在独自一人的时候放松	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
在独自一人的时候找点事做	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
在与朋友一起时找点事做	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
和家人或朋友一起开心	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
在不用到场的情况下参与到您所享受的活动中	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

第 6 页：国内媒体依赖度相关问题

8. 在以下列出的这些事上，请分别指出您在多大程度上依赖国内媒体来帮助您完成这些事。请从 1（完全没帮助）到 5（非常有帮助）的范围中选择一个选项。

[矩阵量表题] *

	没有帮助	有极少帮助	有少许帮助	一般	比较有帮助	很有帮助	十分有帮助
理解您为什么会做一些您平时做的事	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

想象您年龄变大后会如何	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
观察他人如何处理那些与您所面临的类似的问题或情况	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
了解社区 / 社会上发生了什么	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
了解自己国家的状况	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
了解世界上的事件	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
决定去哪里找寻健康，金融或家政等类型的服务	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
决定买什么东西	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
计划晚上或者周末去哪里活动	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
发现更好的与他人沟通的办法	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
思考如何与朋友，亲戚或者同事打交道	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
知晓如何在重要或者困难	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

的情况下接近他人							
在劳累的一天后放松	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
在独自一人的时候放松	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
在独自一人的时候找点事做	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
在与朋友一起时找点事做	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
和家人或朋友一起开心	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
在不用到场的情况下参与到您所享受的活动中	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

第 7 页：空气质量问题积极度

9. 您认为空气质量是一个社会问题吗：您在何种程度上同意下列说法？ [矩阵量表题] *

	完全不同意	极少的同意	稍微同意	一半程度同意	基本同意	大部分同意	完全同意
我认为这是一个严峻的社会问题	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
我非常关心这一问题	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

这个问题的现状和我所期待的状态之间有很远的落差	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
关于这个问题的新闻让我很惊讶	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
必须做些什么来改善这个问题	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
10. 关于空气质量这一社会话题，您在何种程度上同意下列说法？ [矩阵量表题] *							
	完全不同意	极少的同意	稍微同意	一半程度同意	基本同意	大部分同意	完全同意
我不害怕通过自己行动来改善这个问题	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
我可以通过努力改变现状，改善这个问题	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
没什么妨碍我为这个问题做些事	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
我可以改善这个麻烦的局面	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
负责解决问题的人重视我的想法和意见	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
11. 空气质量这一问题和您有关系吗：您在何种程度上同意下列说法？ [矩阵量表题] *							

	完全不同意	极少的同意	稍微同意	一半程度同意	基本同意	大部分同意	完全同意
我和这个问题紧密相连	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
这个问题对我的生活有影响	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
这个问题对我和我关爱的人的生活有严重后果	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
我和这个问题以及它的后果相连	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
这个问题可能影响到我个人	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

第 8 页：个人信息

12. 您何时出生？ [填空题] *

13. 您的最高受教育程度是？ [单选题] *

- ☐ 小学
- ☐ 初高中
- ☐ 本科/专科
- ☐ 硕士
- ☐ 博士

14. 请选择城市：[填空题]

15. 您是公务员或者在事业单位上班吗？ [单选题] *

- ☐ 是
- ☐ 不是