GOVERNING TERRORISM THROUGH PREEMPTION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RADICALIZATION IN THREE WESTERN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES

by

Derek M.D. Silva

Bachelor of Arts
University of Ontario Institute of Technology, 2012

Master of Arts
Carleton University, 2014

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in

Sociology

College of Arts and Sciences

University of South Carolina

2017

Accepted by:

Mathieu Deflem, Major Professor

Andrea K. Henderson, Committee Member

Carla A. Pfeffer, Committee Member

Wadie E. Said, Committee Member

Cheryl L. Addy, Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
DEDICATION

For Ali, Gilmour, and Gator.

Gilmour, you were my best friend and true companion. I will never, ever forget the memories we shared as a family. You will live on in my heart forever. Rest in peace my boy.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, whose now infamous proclamation against “committing sociology” when considering issues of terrorism was in many ways the impetus for this project and my entire graduate research career.

More importantly, I would like to express my sincerest of thanks to my Major Professor, mentor, and friend, Dr. Mathieu Deflem, whose guidance over the past three years has taught me invaluable lessons in how to provide mentorship and stimulate academic growth through critical engagement with your own work. The lessons I have learned from Dr. Deflem will undoubtedly follow me for the rest of my professional career.

I would also like to thank my committee members, Andrea Henderson, Carla Pfeffer, and Wadie Said, for their input, feedback, and support throughout the completion of this project.

To my former advisors, Nicolas Carrier and Arshia Zaidi, thanks kindly for believing in my work and advocating for me on numerous occasions. Without the support, I would not be in a position to complete this project.

I would also like to thank Steven Hutchinson for being an instrumental source of inspiration, friendship, and professional advice. In addition, I would like to thank Sarah
Lamble and the staff at Birkbeck College, University of London for housing me in the United Kingdom while I completed portions of this project.

To my colleagues in sociology and criminology at USC and Carleton University, not least of which include Brian Clarke, Rhys Williams, Justin Tettrault, Alex Castleton, Alex Luscombe, Anna Rogers, Adrienne Dues, Calley Fisk, and Zachary Butler, thanks for welcoming critical and important theoretical and conceptual discussions which have helped this project greatly.

I must also acknowledge the financial and institutional resources afforded to me by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Department of Sociology, and the Graduate School at the University of South Carolina. More specifically, I would like to sincerely thank Anne Hodasi and Alicia Hope for assisting me with my countless requests for administrative guidance.

To Ali and Lee, words do not exist that would accurately reflect my gratitude for continuous friendship and encouragement. Finally, to my family, especially my Mom and Dad, who never lost faith in me, thanks for the support as I chased my dream.
ABSTRACT

In recent years, issues related to terrorism and counterterrorism are increasingly being understood through the construct of ‘radicalization.’ At its most basic level, radicalization is most often conceptualized as a transition from “normal,” conventional political, religious or otherwise ideological beliefs towards extremist views and ultimately violence. The process is now adopted by governmental officials and politicians, police authorities, journalists, and even scientists to justify various forms of governmental intervention, such as policing, social and public policy, education, and surveillance. Notably missing from the scholarly literature is a distinctly sociological understanding of the implications of the proliferation of radicalization discourse in contemporary society. Considering the relative absence of sociological research on radicalization as a construct, this project develops a theoretical perspective based on insights from the sociology of social control to explore the emergence and genesis of radicalization discourse and its social implications.

In particular, this study engages with theories of governmentality, literature within critical policing studies and the othering paradigm traced back to the work of Edward Said, to explore the global diffusion of radicalization discourses across three Western liberal democracies – the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada – from 1969 to the present. More specifically, utilizing critical discourse and case study analysis, I explore how social institutions of law, politics, media, and science conceptualize radicalization
and investigate the material practices of risk, security, and policing for which such discourses give rise. Following the analysis of thousands of publicly available governmental and non-governmental documents, this study finds that not only has radicalization become a dominant framework for understanding terrorism, but that modern discursive labeling mechanisms associated with preemption disproportionately affect certain cultural and ethnic minorities. The data illustrate this trend across social institutions in all three countries. The findings also highlight how notions of risk and security are increasingly embedded in the daily lives of citizens through discourses of radicalization in order to more efficiently govern the threat of terrorism. The study therefore broadens sociological and criminological debates on processes of social exclusion, social control, and cultural change in the context of terrorism and highlights some of the ways in which social distance is constructed and represented in the public sphere.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication................................................................................................................... iii

Acknowledgements........................................................................................................ iv

Abstract.......................................................................................................................... vi

List of Tables .................................................................................................................. ix

List of Figures ................................................................................................................ xi

Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................. 1

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework ............................................................................... 9

Chapter 3: Methodology ............................................................................................... 24

Chapter 4: The New Politics of Terror ........................................................................ 43

Chapter 5: Seeing Radicalization Through Law ......................................................... 85

Chapter 6: Discourses of Radicalization in the Public Sphere ..................................... 107

Chapter 7: Scientific Discourses and Radicalization .................................................. 147

Chapter 8: The Policing of Radicalization .................................................................. 174

Chapter 9: Conclusion ................................................................................................. 224

References .................................................................................................................... 235
LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1: References to Religions in Major Reports on Terrorist Threats ............... 57
Table 4.2: Use of The Term ‘Radicalization’ in Major Governmental Communications
Pre- and Post-2000 ................................................................. 63
Table 4.3: References to Islam in National Security Strategies .............................. 75
Table 4.4: Top Themes Referenced in Counterradicalization Strategies ................. 76
Table 4.5: References to Religions in Counterradicalization Frameworks .............. 78
Table 5.1: Federal Case Law References to Islam and Radicalization by Country ................................................................. 101
Table 5.2: References to Religions in Federal Case Law ........................................ 101
Table 6.1: Number of Sources and Coding References ........................................ 117
Table 6.2: Top 10 Words Referenced in Canadian Newspapers, 1969-2016 .......... 122
Table 6.3: Top 10 Words Referenced in UK Newspapers, 1969-2016 .................. 124
Table 6.4: Top 10 Words Referenced in US Newspapers, 1969-2016 .................. 126
Table 6.5: References Using the "Radicalization of" Strategy in Canadian Newspapers ................................................................. 128
Table 6.6: References using the "radicalization of" strategy in UK Newspapers ...... 130
Table 6.7: References Using the "Radicalization of" Strategy in US Newspapers ....... 131
Table 6.8: Comparison of Themes Pre- and Post-2000 in Newspapers by Country ..... 138
Table 6.9: Comparison of 'Othering Frames' Pre- and Post-2000 in Newspapers by
Country ............................................................................................ 141
Table 7.1: Typology of Scientific Radicalization Discourses Pre- and Post-2012 .... 157
Table 7.2: Funded Government Research Projects and Citations in Governmental Counterradicalization Strategies since 2007 .......................... 166

Table 7.3: References to Academic Scholarship in News Media .................................. 167

Table 8.1: Primacy of Counterradicalization Policing Techniques and Logics .................. 203

Table 8.2: Current Status of Counterradicalization Initiatives ........................................ 212
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 4.1: Number of Terrorist Attacks in Each Country, 1970-2015.............................. 58

Figure 4.2: References to “Radicalization” in Political Debates .................................. 61

Figure 4.3: References to “Radicalization” and Islam in Congressional and Parliamentary Debates ............................................................... 79

Figure 5.1: Federal Case Law References to Islam and Radicalization ......................... 100

Figure 6.1: Number of Articles Referencing 'Radicalization' vs. Number of Terrorist Attacks, 1970-2016 ................................................................. 122

Figure 7.1: References to Radicalization and Islam in Academic Publications .......... 149

Figure 8.1: Percentage Distribution of Funding for Prevent Policing Initiatives ........... 181

Figure 8.2: National Police Chiefs’ Council Anti-Terrorist Hotline PSA .................... 192

Figure 8.3: Structural Mapping of Counterradicalization Programs ............................. 205

Figure 8.4: Conceptualization of Radicalization in Calgary's ReDirect Program ....... 216
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

I think that in terms of radicalization... Our security agencies work with each other and with others around the globe to track people who are threats to Canada and to watch threats that may evolve... I think, though, this is not a time to commit sociology, if I can use an expression...

- Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper

In 2012, following the foiled plot to derail a VIA passenger train travelling from Toronto to New York, former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper unknowingly set an undergraduate student studying criminology outside of Toronto on a path towards understanding the ways in which we, as social beings, comprehend terrorism and the practices of counterterrorism which now proliferate our daily lives. His disregard for the value of sociological insight in matters related to counterterrorism challenged those, like me, interested in exploring the social dynamics of terrorism and, in particular, the myriad counterterrorism interventions which now proliferate our airports, schools, universities, hospitals, religious institutions, and community organizations. Meanwhile, his official evocation of the concept of radicalization stood out as an assault to the very core of knowledge production processes that might produce such theories of individual trajectories towards political violence – for pathways to unconventional behaviors and activities seem quite explicitly in the purview of scientific discourse. This paradoxical understanding of radicalization thus spurned questions related to how the concept is adopted, configured and reconfigured, and deployed in different contexts and by various authorities. What is this idea of radicalization? What does the frame mean and how do we
use it? How has radicalization become such a dominant framework for understanding terrorism that a Prime Minister of a major Western liberal democracy is adopting it? What are some of the social implications of the development of radicalization as a central concept for understanding transitions towards political violence? While the former Canadian Prime Minister did not know at the time of his remark, and likely would not have cared, it was his undermining of the value of sociological insight that gave an impetus to the present work.

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, terrorism has become a central theme of concern for academics, government officials, and policymakers alike. While there has been much terrorism-related research conducted in various social sciences, it was not until quite recently that scholarly studies of terrorism and related issues have also been taken up in sociology (Deflem 2010, 2015). Recent work by American sociologists Mathieu Deflem (2004, 2010), Austin Turk (2004), and Donald Black (2004), and internationally by Domenico Tosini (2007), Lorne Dawson (2010), and Ulrich Beck (2002), have contributed to the development of the study of terrorism as a new specialty area within the sociological community. Scholars have addressed important questions related to terrorism in modern societies by focusing on diverse issues such as policing (Bonino 2012; Grabosky 2008; Greene 2011), globalization (Ericson 2007), surveillance (Lyon 2003, 2007), intelligence (Hutchinson 2014), and criminalization (Pieth 2006).

With some notable exceptions, much of this work conceives of terrorism as a form of behavior or activity (exceptions include Beck and Miner 2013; Deflem 2010; Hutchinson 2014; Oliverio and Lauderdale 2005). Most of the existing literature on terrorism thus focuses on a search for causes of terrorist activities and behaviors and/or the practical
arrangements of counterterrorism strategies, and thus fail to problematize how terrorism and related phenomena come to be socially constructed. Relatively less attention has been paid to the symbolic, cultural, discursive, and linguistic frames by which society’s influential institutions come to communicate about, intervene upon, and shape understandings of terrorism related phenomena.

One novel framework for understanding terrorism focuses on the concept of ‘radicalization.’ Since the early 2000s, a growing body of literature has emerged which seeks to understand how individuals and groups shift from relatively moderate and accepted political, religious, or ideological beliefs to radical extremist views and violent activities (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009; Koehler 2017; Sageman 2004; Silber and Bhatt 2007). Often referred to as radicalization, this process has received increasing political, legal, and popular media attention. Perhaps nothing has heightened the attention paid to radicalization discourse more than the tragic events that took place in Boston (April 15, 2013), Paris (January 7, 2015), and Brussels (March 22, 2016), and the media frenzies that ensued. Particularly salient in this respect has been the dominance of governmental discourses which postulate a process whereby individuals and groups become indoctrinated into extremist activities in order to formulate counterradicalization policy and law enforcement strategies. These discourses typically evoke conceptualizations of radicalization to justify various forms of governmental intervention, such as policing, social and public policy, education, and surveillance.

While the psychological and practical aspects related to the transitional matrix from conventional political and religious beliefs to violence has been widely addressed (see Bjørgo and Horgan 2009; Horgan 2009), much less discussed is how radicalization
has emerged as a dominant discursive framework for understanding terrorism. Notably missing from the literature is a distinctly sociological understanding of the implications of radicalization discourse in contemporary society. Considering the relative absence of sociological research on radicalization as a construct, this project will develop a theoretical perspective based on insights from the sociology of social control to explore the emergence and genesis of radicalization discourse and its social implications. In particular, I engage with theories of governmentality, othering, and discourse analysis to explore the global diffusion of radicalization discourses throughout dominant institutions and illustrate how practices of governing terrorism disproportionately impact certain individuals and groups preemptively identified as risky. I also examine some of the sociohistorical shifts related to the governance of terrorism. Here I investigate how counterterrorism has transitioned from a reactive logic based predominantly on military, law, and security, to a proactive, preemptive style of governance founded on notions of risk that attempt to make unknowable futures known. This discursive shift related to counterradicalization, as I shall illustrate, has now spread throughout the social system to entrench our schools and universities, local law enforcement agencies, and community organizations, and these discourses help construct the very notion of radicalization used to disproportionately label certain individuals and groups as a risky.

In the following chapters, I explore how three Western liberal democracies have come to manage the problem of terrorism through the identification, intervention, and suppression of individuals and groups who are judged to be at risk of radicalization. Many scholars argue that post-9/11 counterterrorism strategies, designed to increase powers for law enforcement and intelligence agencies and criminalize terrorist related
activities are insufficient, on their own, for dealing with the threat (Hutchinson and O’Malley 2007; Lyon 2003; Pieth 2006). Many governments agree, as anti-terrorism policies in several Western countries have been significantly re-articulated around pre-empting radicalization, here understood as strategies which aim to intervene at an early stage in the development of radical or extreme political views to the manifestation of violence. However, relatively little research has been conducted on the pattern and causes of this shift towards radicalization preemption. This dissertation therefore investigates the complex and interrelated processes that have presupposed and influenced this new way of thinking about terrorism and practices of counterterrorism.

I highlight how the project situates the dynamics of radicalization as part of a broader trend toward governance through preemption. This study will thus contribute to an important emerging body of work on theorizing this new mode of governance. From an empirical standpoint, this study examines ways in which radicalization has been, and is being, problematized and addressed in three different countries: The United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. These countries were selected because of their political, social, and cultural synergies as well as substantial policy transfer between them (see Monaghan 2014). In the following chapters, I will discuss how I explore the radicalization framework empirically, and outline methods of textual analysis, discourse analysis, and case-study analysis which will be employed to investigate political archives, debates, and reports, legislation and case law, news media, and academic texts related to radicalization. These sources will be used to examine the proliferation of discourses about radicalization and how such frames lead to the emergence of practices that seek to govern political violence through preemption.
Structure of the Dissertation

The following eight chapters present the theoretical and methodological perspectives and approaches adopted in this study, and provide empirical data and analysis to unpack some of the sociostructural implications of the diffusion of radicalization discourses throughout the public sphere.

In Chapter Two, I outline the key theoretical frameworks used to explore the shift towards governing terrorism through preemption. In this chapter, I engage with broad theoretical traditions advanced in the sociology of social control, including the well-established notion of governmentality developed by French social philosopher Michel Foucault, theories of governance through practices of preemptive intervention, and the analytic approach to society as structural systems developed by German sociologist Niklas Luhmann.

Chapter Three highlights the methodological approaches utilized in the empirical chapters which follow. In this chapter, I outline how the study adopts a broadly abductive comparative-historical approach which utilizes critical discourse and content analysis and case studies to explore the structural conditions for which counterradicalization, as an overarching governmental logical, emerges in Western liberal democracies. I also sketch out the ways in which this project approaches methodological pluralism, utilizing methodological triangulation, to explore a diverse corpus of data.

In the next four chapters, I discuss various dimensions of radicalization discourse, more specifically political, legal, media, and scientific conceptualizations. Chapter Four sketches out some of the shifts in political discourse related to counterradicalization and
counterterrorism more generally. Through an analysis of official government documents related to counterterrorism, congressional and parliamentary debates, and high-ranking governmental speeches, this chapter argues that counterterrorism strategies throughout the West have been significantly rearticulated around notions of counterradicalization, and practices of surveillance, intelligence gathering, and policing, rather than the more reactive, military understandings which have been relied upon by past governments.

In Chapter Five, I explore legal communications related to counterterrorism to explore questions related to how law, and the legal system more generally, understands and constructs radicalization as a legal element. Through an in-depth analysis of legal decisions making use of the concept of radicalization, I argue that law is able to creatively adopt extra-juridical radicalization discourses to legitimize legal decision-making on issues of terrorism and criminality. I also maintain that law’s adoption of ambiguous definitions of radicalization are reflective of its own biases and discriminatory practices towards cultural and ethnic minorities. I thus advance established notions of related to legal violence and exclusionary mechanisms.

Chapter Six examines the proliferation of media discourses about radicalization through the analysis of nine high-profile newspapers, three from each of the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, to highlight how media conceptualizes issues related to radicalization and counterradicalization. In total, 8,072 newspaper articles are analyzed within traditions of content and discourse analysis to advance the argument that radicalization discourses in the cultural apparatus, reflected by media coverage, have increasingly focused on cultural and ethnic minorities, most notably Muslims. This chapter highlights the historical transformation of media conceptualizations of
radicalization, from a concept denoting political opposition to a symbol of religious opposition to Western liberal democracies. I further argue that our cultural representations of radicalization influence public understandings of a variety of issues related to risk, security, surveillance, and policing.

In Chapter Seven, I explore scientific discourses about radicalization and related issues and highlight how the scientific system adopts a very narrow definition of the concept. I further illustrate how scientific discourses related to radicalization are taken up in other social systems and how such adoption is indicative of a preoccupation with framing Muslims in terms of ‘risky’ identities.

In the final empirical chapter, I ground the findings from the previous four chapters in a case-study analysis of three counterterrorism policing programs which have emerged in each of the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. I thus explore the New York Police Department’s Community Affairs Bureau, the Calgary Police Service’s ReDirect Program, and the City of London Police’s Muslim Contact Unit, to highlight how changing political, legal, cultural, and scientific understandings of counterterrorism, around notions of governance through preemption, influence the material practices of law enforcement officials. As a sociology of terrorism policing, this chapter represents the first attempt to draw out connections between broad understandings of radicalization and the practices of police aimed at countering such behaviors.
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical perspective adopted in this research is rooted in the tradition of the sociology of social control, specifically the governmentality framework associated with French philosopher Michel Foucault and its relevance for theories of preemption. A brief literature review of existing research on radicalization will help situate my perspective.

Literature Review on Radicalization, Deradicalization, and Counterradicalization

As noted by Della Porta (1995), “radicalization” emerged in academic discourse during the 1970s as a term to describe the interactive and processual dynamics associated with the formation of violent, most often clandestine, social movement groups. Here, radicalization denoted the actual manifestation of violence and focused on its differentiation and escalation vis-à-vis form and intensity (Della Porta and LaFree 2012). Since then, however, the concept of radicalization and the related term ‘radicalism’ have become more prominent in research on terrorism seeking to explain individual-level processes influencing transitions toward violence and memberships in violent groups.

Outside of sociology, researchers have identified different ‘risk factors’ or ‘soft pressures’ which steer individuals and groups toward radicalization and, ultimately, terrorist activity (Aly 2015; Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009; Bartlett, Birdwell, and King 2010; McCauley and Moskalenko 2008, 2013; Waldmann 2009). Some studies focused on the role of groups and particular environments (i.e., mosques, religious and political associates) in relation to general trajectories of radicalization and de-
radicalization (Ali 2015; Bjørgo 2004; Bjørgo and Horgan 2009; Cronin 2009; Horgan 2009; LaFree and Miller 2008). Others approach radicalization and deradicalization as psychological processes and thus search for causes that may form the basis of government interventions (King and Taylor 2011; Kruglanski, Gelfand, and Bélanger 2014). Much of this body of work seeks to identify a generalizable trajectory from conventional political beliefs towards violence at the individual level, on ideological and psychological processes, and on producing case studies of extremist groups disconnected from particular social and political contexts (Della Porta and LaFree 2012). As such, much of this research is largely etiological and approaches ‘radicalization’ as an unproblematic and taken for granted concept.

Some scholars have problematized counterradicalization governance strategies in other disciplines. Most notable in this respect is the work of political scientist Lasse Lindekilde (2012a) who argues that Danish counterradicalization policies are oriented around “logics of repressive liberalism” (p. 123) – that is, radical identities can be prevented by disciplining those with counter-liberal identities into liberal (read: productive) democratic citizens. By situating Danish counterradicalization policies and practices in relation to neoliberal governance strategies, Lindekilde (2012a) simultaneously problematizes the logic of Denmark’s radicalization policies whilst illustrating how targeted populations (i.e., the Muslim community) demonstrate skepticism about the effectiveness of the measures. While Lindekilde’s (2012a) analysis is based on in-depth interviews and fieldwork, it focuses solely on the perceived impact of counterradicalization policies. It was therefore not within the study’s scope to highlight more than the historical antecedents for the implementation of
counterradicalization policies rather than grounding the explanations and logics for such strategies in particular social, political, and cultural contexts.

Others working in areas such as international relations and global politics have also interrogated the logic of radicalization which underpins modern counterterrorism efforts (Birt 2008; Heath-Kelly 2013; Martin 2014). This body of work, mostly focusing on counterradicalization efforts in the British context and drawing on theories of governmentality, have highlighted some of the disciplinary practices embodied in state engagement with Muslim communities. A dominant theme of academic discourse has been the focus on counterterrorism policies as indicative of an overall trend towards securitization of the state’s interaction with ‘risky’ communities (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009; McGhee 2008). The Prevent strategy, for these scholars, creates a context of security and integration policies while increasing state control of Muslims across areas of social, cultural and religious life (Birt 2008; O’Toole et al. 2016). Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2013), for instance, argues that the invention of the concept ‘radicalization’ and related discourses about pathways to terrorist activity has led to the adoption of a series of practices which render certain communities as ‘risky’ through the application of ‘vulnerability indicators.’

Radicalization is therefore a series of discourses that perform the function of risk governance within the British counterterrorism apparatus. While these studies have contributed to our understanding of the dynamic, constructed, and often paradoxical nature of radicalization discourses, they are most often grounded in the empirical study of a jurisdictionally isolated location or single government policy (i.e., the Prevent strategy in the UK) – thereby approaching the construction of discourses related to radicalization
within the realm of public policy or security studies. The present study, by contrast, aims to approach radicalization discourses in a more topographical way. In other words, this project aims to explore the transformation of counterterrorism discourses, practices, and policies, around the logic of radicalization throughout the social system.

Sociologists, on the other hand, have yet to pay much attention to radicalization practices and strategies as a topic of research (Della Porta and LaFree 2012). Yet, there are some notable recent exceptions, such as Jeffrey Monaghan’s (2014) work on Canadian counterradicalization practices and Therese O’Toole and colleagues’ (2016) exploration of UK counterterrorism policies, which offer sociological analyses of the implications of counterradicalization strategies. This body of work moves beyond the study of specific policies and governmental practices to explore the interconnectivity of radicalization discourses within social systems and answer questions related to how those discourses are linked with practices external to the policy development process.

Jeffrey Monaghan (2014) eschews a one-size-fits-all model of radicalization to address the emergence of governance practices aimed at countering radicalization as a dynamic and complex process affecting a variety of individuals and groups. He engages with surveillance theories to argue that counterradicalization practices are not reflective of the current context of violent extremism, but rather they are premised on abstractions of an ominous and threatening Islam. The author thus raises questions of what he calls the “dubious categories and motives in contemporary practices of the ‘war on terror’” (Monaghan 2014: 485). Monaghan (2014) highlights some of the implications for counterradicalization policy which has spread to the Canadian prison context, and how it
is reflective of overall shifts in penal discourse surrounding notions of preemption rather than punishment.

In other contexts, Monaghan (2015) has also focused on Canadian counterradicalization policy transfer in penal settings, arguing, from a criminal justice standpoint, that Canada is what he calls a “norm-taker” of counterradicalization policies – that in the context of transnational counterradicalization policy transfer, Canada is a net importer of the “best-practices” (p. 394). While approaching Canada as “norm taker” might be premature and, as this project will demonstrate, empirically inaccurate, this research does highlight problematic and often contingent nature of counterradicalization discourses and illustrates how related practices may lead to what he calls a “security trap,” or how counterradicalization practices have diffused to such an extent that all may be captured in a ‘net’ of security. Additionally, Monaghan (2014) seems to overlook the potential for whatever gains and positive contributions of such practices in providing security (p. 487). In line with a common critique of the field of surveillance studies (see Deflem and McDonough 2015), Monaghan’s research approaches counterradicalization practices and policies as inherently negative and focuses solely on their menacing characteristics. As such, there remains a scarcity of scholarship on governance strategies that accounts for the multiple logics, contradictions, and inconsistencies involved in counterradicalization practices.

In the UK, Therese O’Toole and colleagues (2016) draw on theories of governmentality to highlight the disciplinary nature of state engagement with Muslims through the UK’s counterradicalization strategy known as Prevent. The authors maintain that Prevent is highly problematic for engagement between Muslims and the state.
because of its often contradictory, incoherent, and contested practices. They suggest that the governance-as-discipline model in the governmentality literature may not completely capture the contested practices of governing through the Prevent strategy, and that while disciplinary mechanisms are still at work, actors across governance arenas do not necessarily comply with all of its logics (O’Toole et al. 2016).

In other words, the authors argue that governance practices are often “messier” than many scholars suggest and highlight the possibility that actors may not align with the logics of the governance framework (Birt 2008; McGhee 2008; O’Toole et al. 2016: 15). This critique opens up new ways of thinking about Prevent as not only a form of discipline but also a set of contested practices that engage with actors in different governance arenas in unexpected, contradictory, and sometimes paradoxical ways. This work is therefore a useful theoretical springboard for the present study. Approaching counterradicalization as a set of contested governmental practices, this dissertation explores how the logic has been constructed and adopted by a variety of actors within the social system.

As the use of the concept of radicalization has increased in academic and popular discourse (Heath-Kelly, Baker-Beall, and Jarvis 2015; Kundnani 2015) and has been the basis of numerous governmental and law enforcement interventions, so too has the need to understand the historical, cultural, and social contexts by which the concept takes shape, transforms, and both constitutes and is constitutive of innovative logics aimed at governing terrorism. While the psychological and practical aspects related to the transitional matrix from conventional political and religious beliefs to violence has been addressed, much less discussed is how radicalization has emerged as a dominant
discursive framework for understanding terrorism and its implications across society. Notably missing, then, is a distinctly sociological understanding the implications of the radicalization framework in contemporary society. Considering the relative absence of sociological research on radicalization, this project will develop a theoretical perspective based on insights from the sociology social control – in particular Michel Foucault’s notion of governmentality – to explore the emergence and genesis of the framework and its social implications.

**Theoretical Perspective: Governing Terrorism Through Preemption**

The proposed research is theoretically based on two traditions in the in the sociology of law and social control: 1) Michel Foucault’s framework of governmentality, which refers to the complex and interrelated processes of how collectivities come to be governed and 2) theories of governance through preemption.

**Governmentality**

Theoretical contributions in the sociology of social control have been relied upon in studies of terrorism, but have yet to make substantial contributions to the study of radicalization. Within the sociology of terrorism, scholars have drawn upon the work of Max Weber (1922) and Michel Foucault (1977) to examine the role of policing as a mechanism of social control deployed against terrorism (see Deflem 2004, 2010). In this context, policing extends beyond conventional understandings of the practices and activities of the police and is conceived as one of the most important forms of social control in modern society. This body of research often highlights the transformation of
policing activities as part of broader social changes in the post-9/11 world (De Guzman 2002; Turk 2013).

In studies of radicalization, however, little attention has as yet been paid to policing. Relevant sociological investigations have approached counterradicalization strategies in terms of the actual activities of police institutions and the practices involved therein (see Akbar 2013; Monaghan 2014), but have not focused specifically on counterradicalization policing as a new governing logic. This research points to some of the important implications relating to the policing of radicalization vis-à-vis transnational policy transfer, human rights, security, and surveillance, but underpins the relative lack of sociological work that currently exists on the topic. In addition, policing is but one form of social control. It is thus important to investigate the policing of radicalization in relation to other influential aspects of social control such as legal structures, intelligence and surveillance, economic policy, and culture.

Engaging with theoretical perspectives that conceive of policing as part of a broader context of social control would, I argue, contribute to a more complete understanding of the radicalization framework and its implications across society. One such perspective is developed in Michel Foucault’s (1991a) later work on the transformation and evolution of rationales of social control, which he labeled governmentality. Foucault’s ideas of governmentality are extended from in his theory of disciplinary power (Deflem 1997), outlined in *Discipline and Punish* (1977), which posits that practices of correction, oriented at the normalization of subjects in prison, have gradually spread throughout all of society. The perspective of governmentality explains how the expansion of disciplinary power has led to the production of a citizenry
capable of fulfilling governmental needs. According to Foucault (1991b),
governmentality, also referred to as the “art of government,” entails the organized
practices through which all aspects of thought and action of members of a population are
rendered governable. In other words, governmentality focuses on representations of
social problems, the logics, means, and rationalities of remedy, and how these
representations and remedies effect constructions of subjectivity. Social control, for
Foucault, it is not simply a matter of the control of crime, but it is a myriad of power-
knowledge systems that combine with a series of techniques, practices, and technologies
to ensure the maintenance of government rationalities and thus the security of the nation
(Walters 2012). In this way, governmentality can be approached as a lens to explore the
heterogeneous discursive and material elements that develop as part of a logic of
governing terrorism through preemption.

Although Foucault focused on the analysis of prisons and punishment, his ideas
about governmental power provide an ideal backdrop for which to consider modern
techniques of governance (see Dean 2010; Rose and Miller 1992), including modern
counterradicalization strategies. Positioning their analyses of political power beyond the
state, scholars from the Foucauldian tradition have noted already that the global ‘war on
terror’ has led to the emergence of a myriad of new risk-based governmental techniques
which seek to manage the risk of terrorism as part of a broader shift toward governance
through preemption (Amoore and de Goede 2008a, 2008b; de Goede 2008a). In line with
neoliberal mechanisms of social control that characterize much of the developed world,
these strategies work to intervene in the daily lives of various populations and groups in
order to affect an uncertain future and ensure so-called national security. The shift
towards preemption has been read in the context of migration (Amoore 2006), risk (Aradau and Van Munster 2007), legal exceptionalism (Said 2015), surveillance (Amoore and de Goede 2005), citizenship (Salter 2008), uncertainty (Ericson 2007), criminalization (Garland 2001; Simon 2007), and policing (Bonino 2012; Ventura, Miller, and Deflem 2005).

Theorizing Governance Through Preemption

Based on the governmentality framework, this project approaches radicalization discourse as a new form of governmental power aimed at governing populations through preemption. Studies of preemption and counterterrorism form part of an emergent body of work seeking to establish linkages and continuities between the governmentality literature and Ulrich Beck’s (2002) notion of the risk society (see de Goede 2008b; Amoore and de Goede 2008a). Aradau and Van Munster (2007), for instance, adapt Beck’s macro-sociological thesis that maintains all practices of security can be reduced to one form of risk to argue that the ‘war on terror’ is a novel type of governmentality that reconfigures risk based on elements of ‘precaution.’ The authors contend that new conceptualizations of risk as ‘precautionary risk’ is governmental inasmuch as it provides a set of logics, practices, and technologies that deal with social problems, most notably terrorism.

In this way, counterterrorism policies, such as the targeting of Muslim communities by counterterrorism measures or executive detention of suspected terrorists, can be viewed as a function of a so-called “dispositif of risk” – a heterogeneous constellation of both discursive and material elements of precautionary governance through risk (Aradau and Van Munster 2007). I maintain that one such element in the
‘war on terror’ is the framework of radicalization, which has its own assemblage of diverse rationales and practices which aim to govern terrorism through preemption. The proposed study will thus explore the heterogeneous logics, rationalities, practices, and technologies that have developed and transformed historically in order to deal with emergent problems of terrorism through preemption. As such, this project is informed by, and contributes to, the governmentality literature on terrorism and counterterrorism measures.

The term preemption has been used in criminological research on management practices associated with terrorism. Richard Ericson (2008), for example, used the term to illustrate how preemptive security measures, enacted to deal with terrorism, require a reconfiguration of law which he calls “counter law” (Ericson 2008). Counter law, according to Ericson (2008), acts in the form of ‘law against law,’ in which “new laws are enacted and new uses of existing law are invented to erode or eliminate traditional principles, standards, and procedures of criminal law that get in the way of preempting imagined sources of harm” (Ericson 2008: 57). He further suggests that terrorism reconfigures law around “surveillant assemblages” (Ericson 2008: 57; Haggerty and Ericson 2000), or constellations of surveillance practices that result in the abstraction of human subjects from their territorial contexts and separates subjects into a series of “discrete flows” (Haggerty and Ericson 2000: 605).

As an expansion of Giorgio Agamben’s (2005) “state of exception,” Ericson (2008) highlights how the logic of preemptive security has led to the erosion of traditional legal standards, principles, and procedures to the extent that it has resulted in the permanent reconfiguration of law. Here, Ericson certainly problematizes legal
structures aimed at facilitating preemptive security, however he fails to account for the complex and heterogeneous developments which led to the emergence of those legal structures in the first place. In other words, Ericson (2008) proclaims that the state of preemption has become the rule, yet assumes that the rule is determined by particular legal structures. In this way, he fails to account for how law takes shape and transforms within particular social, political, and historical contexts. The proposed study will aim to examine questions of legal preemption by exploring the relationship between sovereignty and the rule of law and problematizing sovereignty as a central modality of power (Foucault 1977).

The developing body of research on risk and counterterrorism law highlights how the notion of preemption has become a key way of theorizing governance. Particularly salient in this respect is the emergence of policing strategies aimed at intervening before individuals engage in criminal activity (Bonino 2012; Grabosky 2008). These so-called community-policing projects are not new (Stenson 1993), but they are increasingly being relied upon in counterterrorism policing under the framework of countering radicalization (Akbar 2013). Despite the attention paid to preemptive policing strategies, little sociological attention has been paid to the policing of radicalization in analyses of preemption. This dissertation will thus be informed by, and contribute to, this important scholarly work by analyzing how preemption has emerged as a novel framework for practices which seek to govern the problem terrorism and how radicalization discourses are objects through which these practices are further transformed and refined. By investigating strategies, techniques, practices, and technologies involved in preemptive governance related to radicalization, this project explores the complex dynamics involved
in counterradicalization rationales without reducing developments to a single propositional explanation. Instead, radicalization will be approached in terms of the specific historical, political, and institutional contexts through which it emerged and developed as an innovative mechanism of social control.

**Said’s Orientalism and the Othering of Muslim Communities**

Added to the theoretical perspective of governmentality outlined above is the influential work of legal scholar Edward Said (1978, 1981). In his highly influential book *Orientalism* (1978), Said transformed the ways that we conceptualize traditional power relations between the mostly Christian West and Islamic East. In it Said offers a critique of the inaccurate cultural representations that form the basis of the ‘Occident’ (the Western world) perceptions of the ‘Orient’ (the East). Said (1978) broadly defines Orientalism at the intersection of three levels: (1) Orientalism is an academic discipline; it is a set of ‘objective’ ideas whose function is to build an edifice of knowledge about the Orient; (2) Orientalism is, as Said puts it, a “style of thought based on an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident’” (Said 1978: 2); and (3) Orientalism is the corporate institution that holds authority over, makes statements about, and discursively configures the Orient (Said 1978: 2).

In other words, Orientalism is a Western style of thought used to maintain hegemonic power over the East. Furthermore, as Said argues, Western Occident scholarship has been quite successful in maintaining power over the Orient because it is the emergence of that scholarship that constructed the concept of the Orient in the first place. On the basis of these three characteristics, the West is able to create distinctions between itself and ‘other’ cultures of the Islamic East. To maintain social hierarchies, the
Occident produces false perceptions of Islamic cultures, including the assumption that “Islam remained forever the Orientalist’s idea (or type) of cultural effrontery, aggravated by the fear that Islamic civilization originally (as well as contemporaneously) continued to stand somehow opposed to the Christian West” (Said 1978: 42).

Sociologists, anthropologists, and criminologists have engaged with Said’s perspective to explore the proliferation of counterterrorism practices throughout society and highlight how they disproportionately impact Muslim populations living in Western jurisdictions (see O’Toole et al. 2016; Poole 2002; Poole and Holohan 2011). While this perspective has been highly influential in media studies, it has yet to be fully developed as a critical tool for exploring the host of discursive mechanisms put in place in a variety of social contexts to further marginalize individuals and groups. To this end, I adopt Said’s Orientalist perspective as a critical analytic perspective that is complimentary to Foucault’s ideas on governmentality and the governance through preemption framework.

Said’s Orientalism is an exploration of Western representations of the East, thereby contributing to discourses of the West’s power and authority over the Eastern world. Certain chapters of this study recognizably contribute to this discourse by epistemologically grounding its analysis in American news media coverage of Islamic fundamentalism (most notable Chapter Six). While scholars have proclaimed that this perspective is by nature Eurocentric (Khatib 2006), this study does not assume that such a relationship exists. Rather, this research explores the strategies by which Western representations might work to ‘other’ the Islamic community. This project does thus not make use of the terms Orientalism/Islam or East/West, as mutually exclusive monolithic dichotomies, but rather engages with them as conceptual frameworks for understanding
of how influential discourses are formed in very strategic ways about particular cultural
groups. My aim is to identify the hegemonic discourses which are constructed,
restructured, and transformed and which influence popular imaginaries of the Islamic
community. I also seek to empirically demonstrate how the construct of radicalization has
emerged as a proxy for specific issues associated with Islamic cultures and how it is
deployed to conceal practices which would otherwise be considered discriminatory,
problematic, and unjust.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This dissertation seeks to address a number of important issues related to the governance of terrorism and related phenomena. The project is guided by the central question: How have distinct Western liberal democracies come to manage the problem of terrorism through discourses of radicalization? I hypothesize that the shift to managing terrorism through preemption is part of broader historical, cultural, and political developments resulting in the emergence of a variety of governance strategies aimed at preventing social problems by acting on uncertain futures. As more than simply descriptions of how counterradicalization emerged as a governmental framework, this study will explore how radicalization has been deployed in various domains as a guiding logic that rationalizes and justifies material and discursive elements resulting in the permanent realignment of traditional forms of preemptive intervention vis-à-vis terrorism.

In other words, this study pays particularly close attention to how the underlying logic of radicalization discourse has permeated influential social institutions such as politics, law, media, and science, and how that logic is connected to a series of novel counterterrorism practices that work to preemptively deter terrorism before it takes place. This study thus aims to address important questions related to the diffusion of radicalization discourses throughout political, cultural, academic, and legal discourses, including:
1. How has ‘radicalization’ come to be understood and represented throughout the cultural apparatus?

2. What legal frameworks have been put in place to deal with legal problems related to radicalization? In what socio-political contexts do these legal frameworks emerge? And how do these emergent legal frameworks differ from reactive anti-terrorism policies which have been deployed in the past?

3. How is ‘radicalization’ understood and constructed by nation-states and formal governments? How is this similar, or dissimilar, to legal and cultural understandings of the concept?

4. In what ways has the scientific system contributed to our understandings of the concept or ‘radicalization’ in the public sphere? In what ways have counterradicalization discourses in the academic system been adopted by media, government, law, and politics, and how have these discourses contributed to the reorientation of antiterrorism policy around notions of preemption?

In addition to exploring how radicalization has emerged as a set of conceptual tools used to frame diverse practices seeking to prevent terrorism, this study seeks to investigate how radicalization comes to be discursively (re)constructed in politics, law, culture, and science. Subsequently, one of the aims of this research is to interrogate power relationships between influential institutions and the procedures, practices, and apparatuses that are involved in the production of discourses and knowledge about radicalization. To put it differently, this dissertation explores the social, institutional and historical conditions under which authorized statements about radicalization are constructed and widely accepted as valid (Miller 1999). It is important to note, however,
that this study does not give ontological or epistemological primacy to questions of who is authorized to make truth claims. Instead, I aim to connect how truth claims about radicalization come to be made and taken up elsewhere, while also considering the material elements that emerge based on those truth claims.

The independent variable considered most central to this project is the emergence of material radicalization preemption programs, strategies, and/or interventions. This dissertation therefore seeks to ascertain the socio-political context in which interventions seeking to prevent terrorism through preemption materialize in similar or contradictory ways in various jurisdictions. Most, but not all, of these preemption programs are state-sponsored (i.e., UK and Canada’s Prevent strategies and the Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism strategy in the United States). Therefore, this study approaches the state as one of the central modalities of power, but not the only powerful institution in society. I approach the state as an influential institution that is able to enact policy and pass legislation related to counterradicalization. However, such decisions are not made in a vacuum but, rather, in response to (and influenced by) a complex set of heterogeneous discursive and material conditions that take place outside of the state apparatus. Indeed, while there are certain similarities in the material development of counterradicalization interventions, there are simultaneously many inconsistencies among Western states. Canada and the UK, for instance, both have official policing programs aimed at engaging with Muslim communities, while the US does not. This dissertation thus utilizes a comparative-historical dimension to explore how counterradicalization intervention programs develop in similar, or distinct, ways dependent upon different cultural, political, legal, or scientific contexts.
To answer the research questions outlined above, I will trace discursive formations of radicalization that take shape and transform within some of the important institutions of society noted, including: 1) the political system; 2) culture; 3) law; and 3) science. This dissertation, therefore, seeks to explore how radicalization discourse emerges within each of these four institutions and is used (or not used) to justify various governance strategies oriented around preemptive intervention. Thus, the current project adopts a mostly qualitative research dimension to assess the continuities, overlap, and interconnectivity of radicalization discourses while also exploring the conditions of possibility, inconsistencies, and contradictions.

Research Design

In general, this project adopts an analytic approach to society that aligns with the functional perspective of classic and contemporary systems theory (Parsons 1951; Luhmann 1995). While that is not to suggest that this project evokes a grand theory of society which dovetails structural functionalism, but that a functionalist perspective is useful when considering complex social phenomena which transverse between influential social systems. Adopting an analytical approach to society in terms of subsystems (see Luhmann 1995) does not necessarily lead to structural-functional hypothesis or findings, but rather allows for the organization of the project in terms of: 1) social systems (i.e., explore the unit of analysis, in this case counterradicalization discourses and practices, through various social systems); and 2) efficient sampling of data (i.e., to identify a ‘sample’ of data from all communications related to counterradicalization discourses and practices). For example, this study challenges the idea that radicalization is a static
concept used consistently throughout the social apparatus. Evoking a functionalist-analytic, rather than functionalist-theoretical, approach allows for the researcher to explore how different subsystems of society communicate about radicalization without necessarily advancing theoretical claims related to intersystemic causality.

One of the principal methodological concerns of this project relates to the construction of theoretical ideas based on empirical data. Generally speaking, there are two broad traditions in social scientific approaches to theory construction: deduction and induction. Deductive analyses impose analytic frameworks a priori, whereas inductive approaches let theoretical assumptions emerge from within the analysis of the data. Deductive analysis has a long tradition in the social sciences, and much of the mainstream sociological and criminological literature remains to this day based primarily around deductive approaches to theory generation. Inductive approaches, largely led by the emergence of grounded theory within the social sciences (see Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss 1987; Charmaz 2006), emphasize the efficacy of data-driven theory construction. However, in spite of grounded theory’s widespread popularity in sociology, anthropology, law, criminology, and other academic disciplines, even key proponents of the grounded theoretical tradition have questioned whether the framework is capable of constructing new empirically driven theories (Bryant 2002; Charmaz 2006; Clarke 2003). For example, Kathy Charmaz (2006; 2009), a student of Glaser and Strauss, has called upon social scientists to adopt a “constructivist” grounded theory, drawing attention to the reflexive and fluid nature of the inductive theoretical perspective.

Challenges to the inductive approach of grounded theory have led some sociologists to adopt a new form of theory construction, one rooted in an abductive
approach that aims to produce new hypotheses and theories based on interesting and surprising research evidence (Timmermans and Tavory 2012, 2014). Whereas deduction begins with some rule and proceeds to analyze a case to arrive at an observation and induction begins with the collection of cases and then examines their implied results to develop an inference, abduction starts with consequences and then proposes reasons (Timmermans and Tavory 2012; Peirce 1934).

Abduction thus implies the recursive, reflexive, and incessant movement between data and theory. It involves, as both inductive and deductive approaches do, a preliminary hypothesis based on the relationship between existing theories and research for which data either verifies or contradicts. When observational anomalies emerge, both at the empirical and theoretical level, abductive approaches develop new tentative theories built upon inductive conceptualization of data through coding and other methodological techniques (Timmermans and Tavory 2012). However, an abductive approach moves beyond induction because it accepts that one observational anomaly suggests other elements in the original hypothesis may no longer be appropriate within the emergent theoretical model (Timmermans and Tavory 2012; Agar 2006). Abduction therefore does not reconfigure an original hypothesis by including an observational anomaly a priori, but recursively explores the anomaly’s relationship with other elements which may or may not remain present.

This dissertation therefore makes use of an abductive approach to generating theoretical claims from empirical data. By approaching abduction as a guiding principle of empirically based theory construction, this study aims to produce truly reflexive and fluid theoretical contributions based constant revisitation of theory, method, and data
throughout the research process. Adopting an abductive approach also allows for the use of complimentary forms of analysis and methodological techniques. I therefore deploy well-established methodologies to a broad corpus of data. This methodological approach, combined with the abductive approach to theory generation, I argue, produce rich and ‘thick’ descriptions of some of the social processes involved in the reconfiguration of counterterrorism around logics of radicalization and counterradicalization. In the pages that follow, I highlight the specific methodologies utilized in this chapter and highlight how they coalesce to produce methodologically triangulated and abductive theoretical claims.

Comparative Historical Methods

This study is broadly defined as a comparative-historical project that utilizes a mostly qualitative methodology, using a combination of document analysis in the form of critical content and discourse analysis of political, scientific, legal, and mass media texts on terrorism and the problem of radicalization, and case studies of counterradicalization programs. The project’s design can be described as a comparative-historical study of the radicalization framework across three major Western Liberal democracies: Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. As noted above, these countries were selected due to cultural and political similarities in addition to notable policy transfer between them, particularly in the case of antiterrorism policy (Monaghan 2014; Monaghan and Molnar 2016). For example, Canada, the US, and the UK are all democratic nation-states. Canada and the UK share parliamentary monarch political systems and are both commonwealth countries. Canada and the US share the longest border in world whilst
also cooperating on intelligence and border policing policies and practices (Deflem 2010). All three are active members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UK and US hold permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council. Canada has held a seat on the Security Council six separate times, with the last term ending in 2000 and a planned bid to win a seat announced for 2021 (Nichols 2016). Finally, all three countries are signatories to United Nations conventions on international police cooperation and international counterterrorism issues (Deflem 2010). Due to practical limitations and the scope of this scholarly endeavor, some culturally and politically similar and dissimilar cases, including France, Australia, and Saudi Arabia, are excluded. While this case selection strategy limits the generalizability of the research, it will lay some of the empirical and conceptual foundations for comparative analyses beyond Western liberal democracies.

Comparative case studies utilizing methodological triangulation are often better suited to offer historically grounded explanations of substantively important outcomes (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). This project will thus employ a comparative-historical approach to compare and contrast the social processes involved in the emergence of radicalization frameworks across time and space in order to offer sociologically relevant explanations of how preemption has become a dominant form of governance. Comparative-historical methods offer tools for causal and descriptive inference that in many ways go beyond statistical techniques associated with mainstream quantitative sociology (Mahoney 2004). As James Mahoney (2004) notes, comparative-historical methodologies offer rigorous tools for exploring hypothesis about necessary and sufficient causes and conditions of social phenomena that evade traditional statistical
tools since standard regression frameworks will incorrectly factor temporal causal effects (see Brady and Collier 2004; Ragin 2000). Comparative-historical scholars have offered several solutions to such concerns that are relevant to this study, to wit strategies of analyzing necessary or sufficient causes in some probabilistic fashion (e.g. necessary or sufficient X% of the time), “typological theory,” and process analysis (George and Bennett 2005).

Comparative-historical research can be characterized in part by the analysis of temporal sequences of events that occur among and between cases. Commonly referred to as ‘process analysis,’ this methodological technique works to examine the specific mechanisms through which independent variables influence and effect dependent variables (George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney 2003; 2004). The researcher begins with an observed association and then evaluates hypotheses of causation based on examining mechanisms that link cause and effect in a series of cases (Mahoney 2004). For instance, if one hypothesizes that in modern globalized societies, police autonomy and operational motives to combat international crime are almost always sufficient for the emergence of international police cooperation networks (see Deflem 2002), then a process analysis can be useful to further explore the connections through which structural conditions and operational motives generate such networks. If the researcher cannot discover clear processes, any causal relationship is put in question.

This type of analysis is thus a powerful tool for exploring cause and effect because the researcher points to specific connecting mechanisms through which independent variables influence dependent variables. For example, one might find a direct quantitative correlation between increase in media references to radicalization and
counterradicalization policing programs, but claims of a causal relationship would be strengthened with information on the processes through which media accounts of radicalization are adopted by, and permeate, the policy generation process. This project utilizes process analysis to explore the linkages between discursive formations of radicalization in various contexts and the material structures and practices which emerge to counter so called radicalization. The aim of this study is thus to uncover some of the necessary and sufficient causes of the diffusion of the radicalization framework while at once highlighting the process through which discourses are adopted and spread throughout the most influential social systems.

Comparative-historical analyses of necessary and sufficient causes have been adopted by sociologists exploring a variety of topics, including: international police cooperation (Deflem 2002), emergence and maintenance of political democracies (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992), the creation of a welfare state (Hicks, Misra and Ng 1995; Walters 2000), and likelihood of social revolution in agrarian-bureaucratic societies (Skocpol 1979), among others. The use of comparative-historical methods to explore intervening processes has led to robust theoretical and conceptual understandings of complex phenomena which continue to elude (or differ from) findings of statistical research (see Lange, Mahoney and Hau 2006; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). Focusing on processes whilst engaging in methodological triangulation also lends legitimacy to claims of causality related in inherently complex social phenomena, such as the unit of analysis for this study. While the language of cause-and-effect might be evoked here, I do not underestimate the complexity involved in social relations and processes. I therefore timidly evoke the language of causality and approach
comparative-historical methods not to identify definitive causal links, but rather I seek to uncover social processes which make counterradicalization frameworks, strategies, and practices more or less likely in various social domains.

This study will highlight the extent to which certain conditions make radicalization preemption interventions more or less likely. As such, this dissertation aims to explore primary data vis-à-vis governmental, political, cultural, legal, and academic discourses on radicalization to offer an historically grounded sociological account of how governance strategies directed at preventing radicalization come to take shape and transform, whilst highlighting the discursive and material effects of those interventions. Adopting this approach, this study will make use of critical discourse and content analysis and in-depth case studies of official governmental counterradicalization programs as new forms of governing terrorism through preemption.

Critical Discourse and Case Study Analysis

To analyze the data, I employ two specific methodologies often used within the comparative-historical literature: critical discourse analysis and case study analysis. Critical discourse analysis is used to examine differences, patterns, and similarities in any number of statements, problem-objects, concepts, and themes (Fairclough 1995), where possible with the aid of qualitative software (e.g. NVivo). By deploying critical discourse analysis, this study focuses on the ways in which radicalization comes to be represented within popular, legal, scientific, and government discourses, such as mass media frames, academic papers, legislation, and political debates and speeches. As this project focuses on the body of discourse by which statements about radicalization are organized, I first
conduct textual analyses of data outlined above to explore how radicalization is presented and represented in terms of the internal relations of the text: the vocabulary (specific words chosen to describe something), grammatics (the use of active or passive, neutral or positive phrases), and its structure, to identify general linguistic features (Fairclough 1989: 110-111). I then explore the external relations of the text vis-à-vis identification of the action (how texts represent acting in social events), representation (how text represents aspects of the social and material world), and identification (relation of the text to the persons involved) that give meaning to the text (Fairclough 2003). Following this, I deploy discourse analysis of political, cultural, legal, and scientific narratives related to radicalization.

Based on the results of the textual analysis, I identify the genres (ways of acting), discourses (ways of representing), and styles (ways of being) in order to uncover what Fairclough (2003) calls the ‘order of discourse,’ i.e., “relatively durable structuring and networking of social practices,” which links particular texts with more abstract structures in society (p. 3). In other words, orders of discourse can be conceived of as the “social organization and control of linguistic variation,” or the network of social practices as reflected by language (Fairclough 2003: 24). They are the relatively fixed ways of acting and speaking in particular contexts (i.e., politics, law, culture, and science). In governmental practice, for instance, evoking notions of national security when speaking about terrorism is acceptable and often indeed accepted while referencing the score of the local baseball team’s game may be impossible, or at the very least unusual. I am thus most interested in the ‘orders of discourse’ that are present in texts on radicalization.
To explore each institution’s (politics, law, science, and culture) radicalization discourse, I follow the same systematic analysis: textual analysis, analysis of external relations, and discourse analysis. I then compare and contrast the synthesis of the genres, discourses, and styles in each of the communicating institution’s texts on radicalization in order to explore the similarities and differences of radicalization discourse across institutions and highlight the power relations at play which result in a set of material and discursive elements relating to preemption.

This project also makes use of in-depth case studies of counterradicalization programs in each of the three countries. Case studies have a long tradition in social science, particularly in comparative sociological and criminological work (see Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg 1991; George and Bennett 2005). Case studies are in-depth investigations, using both qualitative and quantitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon (Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg 1991). The research is conducted in great detail and often makes use of several sources of data. The case can be a geographic location (i.e., city), an individual or group (i.e., a police agency) a role (i.e., terrorists) or role-occupants (i.e., the Boston Bombers, Parliament Hill Shooter, or Osama Bin Laden), policies or investigations.

While many traditional case studies in sociology and criminology utilize methods such as ethnography and examinations of total biographies, researchers have recently utilized document and discourse analysis of specific cases to highlight connections with broader social phenomena (see, for example, Larsen and Piché 2009; Luscombe and Walby 2014; Monaghan and Molnar 2016). The key to case study analysis is that the case is usually observed as an instance reflective of broader social phenomena, or as part of
parallel instances. In other words, the case tells us something about patterned social life (Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg 1991). When we compare cases, we are able to highlight some of the tensions, consistencies, and inconsistencies in those patterns and highlight some of the social implications associated with those case studies.

A case study approach helps uncover some of the concrete practices and logics engrained in counterradicalization governance strategies. By combining critical discourse, content analysis, and case studies, this project explores how discursive and non-discursive practices related to radicalization come together in ways that may never be assembled in a coherent or logical pattern. In addition, the aim of this project is to explore how the social world, expressed through practices and discourses, is affected by various sources of power. As such, it fulfills the critical goal of breaking through the taken-for-grantedness of the concept of radicalization and its associated practices, techniques, and implications. In addition, combining multiple methods and approaches will strengthen the overall project by providing a triangulated explanation for the emergence of the counterradicalization framework, which, I argue, will lead to a more robust, ‘thick’ description (Geetz 1973).

I triangulate the findings of discourse analyses with in-depth case studies of several counterradicalization intervention programs in each of the three countries. Each of the ‘cases’ are defined as official policing initiatives with the intended goal of countering radicalization toward terrorism. I will then conduct a multiple-case study design, with each case representing an official counterradicalization intervention program in each of the US, UK, and Canada. Following this, I will conduct analyses of each case
with the methodological strategies comparative-historical, critical and content analysis outlined above.

*Sample and Data Collection*

The proposed project will keep to the 20th and 21st century to explore how the construct of radicalization has emerged and has reconfigured governance around notions of preemption. While the scope of this research is intentionally broad (see ‘Scope and Limitations’ below), the analysis of each institution will require careful operationalization and discussions of its limitations. Due to the limitations of this project in terms of scope, I am unable to explore the entire sociocultural apparatus by which discursive formations relating to radicalization take shape and transform. Rather, as highlighted above, I will approach important institutions of society (i.e., politics, law, culture, and science) in analytical terms. While the analysis of each institution will provide rich, thick, and deep interpretations of how narratives of radicalization contribute to a variety of discursive and material elements, they will inevitably be limited by the scope of the project. I will therefore be purposefully selective in the data included as part of the analysis of each institution. For example, I plan to explore cultural representations of radicalization vis-à-vis in-depth analyses of news media frames and texts on radicalization and related phenomena.

To explore political discourse related to radicalization, I analyze archival materials held at the National Archives in Washington, Toronto, and London, data for which were gathered in a series of trips to each location from Summer 2016 to Spring 2017, political and parliamentary debate accessed through the Hansard database, policy
documents and reports from different eras, and the deliberations of, and publications relating to relevant parliamentary committees (for example, the United States’ Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and Canada’s Special Senate Committee on Anti-Terrorism). In addition, I explore key governmental counterterrorism programs and policies, such as the United States’ *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism*, Canada’s *Building Resilience Through Terrorism*, and UK’s *Prevent Strategy* for their linguistic construction, guiding logics, and material practices. These policies and programs represent the overarching counterterrorism strategies in each country and include, to varying degrees, elements of counterradicalization practices.

It is also important to examine the ways in which the legal system has responded to the problem of terrorism by reviewing legislation and major legal cases (e.g. the PATRIOT Act, Anti-terrorism Act, and the Terrorism Act 2000). In addition, I adopt a case study approach to analyze various counterradicalization police initiatives, such as London Police Service’s Muslim Contact Unit (UK), Calgary Police’s ReDirect Program, and NYPD’s Community Affairs Bureau (US), in terms of both their logic, mission and rationale, and their jurisdiction and concrete practices. I collected public data available on law enforcement websites, reports and publications pertaining to each program’s rationale and practices, and governmental debate and policy regarding counterradicalization policing programs from September 2014 to January 2017 on a rolling basis.

This study also makes extensive use of the databases LexisNexis, Factiva, and Communication and Mass Media Complete to examine news media through a sample of print and television outlets reporting on terrorism and related phenomena. This project
approaches the analysis of cultural representations of radicalization with a narrower scope than other institutional communications (i.e., politics, law, and science), and thus explores a selection news articles pertaining to radicalization from a diverse set of news outlets (i.e., moderate, left, and right outlets) from each country. The purpose of this portion of the project is to identify themes of radicalization discourse which contribute to collective understandings of terrorism and related phenomena. This dissertation will broaden the scope of our understanding by engaging in a comparative analysis of how different countries’ news outlets frame radicalization and the implications of this on certain populations. I return to questions related to methodology throughout the dissertation.

This project adopts an analytic perspective of functional subsystems developed by Niklas Luhmann (1995; 2004). While that is not to suggest that this study develops a functionalist perspective of society – i.e., that each system of society functions as a vital organ of a working whole – Instead, I approach how radicalization discourse is constructed and permeates each social system. No system is given ontological or epistemological priority in this approach (i.e., that legal constructions of radicalization are more important than political constructions), nor is each system considered in vacuum. Rather, I approach data in this study as reflective of particular samples of the entire subsystem (i.e., the population of available communications). In other words, data gathered in this study reflect some purposive samples of all possible communications that relate to radicalization. I therefore do not intend to analyze every systemic communication regarding radicalization and counterradicalization. Instead, I will present
justification for the sampling and data selection methods and highlight how I aim to empirically examine data in each chapter of this project.

Critiques of the governmentality literature sometimes center on the framework’s inability to distinguish between social institutions (Lemke 2002). Where might law end and governmental power begin? While I do not seek to explicitly address this question here, I attempt to overcome some of the potential methodological shortcomings within the governmentality literature by adopting an approach to social systems as my empirical foundation. A functionalist analytic perspective is deployed here on strictly empirical grounds; to explore the construction, diffusion and adoption of radicalization discourses throughout the public sphere requires an understanding of what makes up the very social institutions being examined.

The scope of this project is purposively broad, albeit sufficiently restricted to illustrate how the logic of radicalization has proliferated throughout several Western liberal democracies. There are two reasons for this restriction. The first is practical and is related to challenges arising from access to sensitive information (i.e., data related to national security). Problems associated with the collection of so-called ‘dirty-data’ (Marx 1984) have been illustrated in studies related to counterterrorism and national security (Monaghan and Walby 2012), but scholars have suggested that broadening strategies can be used to assist researchers in gathering sufficient and reliable data (Larsen and Walby 2012). As such, engaging with an intentionally broad scope yields more results in the data collection process and therefore provides a backdrop for richer, more theoretically descriptive, analysis.
The second reason that this study takes a relatively broad scope is more empirical. Simply put, in order to adequately explore the complex social dynamics involved in the emergence and transformation of radicalization frameworks, the research design must include data from a myriad of institutions (i.e., politics, law, media, culture, religion, economy, etc.). As such, this dissertation focuses on the intersections of communication about radicalization without reducing them to one dimension or giving primacy to certain political ideologies. This, however, is viewed as a strength of the project. The evolution and development of internet technologies relating to archive materials is such that more information is presently available than ever before.

A Brief Note on Conceptualization of Radicalization Discourses

Prior to engaging in the empirical analysis of radicalization discourses throughout the public sphere, it is important to highlight a conceptual note that marks the object under investigation in this study. Following my previous work (see Silva 2017), this dissertation focuses on conceptualizations of radicalization as its unit of analysis. I therefore do not focus on related terms such as “radicalism,” “radical,” or “radicalized” because these emphasize not a process of becoming, but a state of already become, and must therefore be distinguished from the term radicalization. While these terms will become secondary to empirical investigations into radicalization discourses, I make a conceptual distinction between radicalization as a process and the state of already become.
CHAPTER 4

THE NEW POLITICS OF TERROR

In the immediate aftermath of the first World Trade Center attacks in 1993, Western governments, particularly so in the United States, took an overwhelmingly reactive approach to countering terrorism. States used criminal and penal policy, military interventions, and investigative techniques to criminalize, detain, and punish perpetrators of terrorist activities targeting the West. United States President Bill Clinton’s now infamous refusal to modernize law enforcement and intelligence operations by launching preemptive investigations into terrorism risks is reflective of the US government’s longstanding approach to terrorism as first and foremost a military concern (Washington Times 2003). Similar approaches to combating terror were often adopted in other Western liberal democracies. Canada’s enactment of the War Measures Act during the 1970 “October Crisis,” a period of political conflict between Québec nationalist group Front de libération du Québec and the Canadian government resulting in the kidnapping and murder of provincial cabinet minister Pierre Laporte, illustrates the country’s own application of a reactive, military-centric logic to threats of terrorism. In the United Kingdom, the government’s deployment of the British Army to Northern Ireland, known as Operation Banner (lasting from 1969 to 2007), highlights the historically reactive approach taken to issues of terrorism and counterterrorism in Europe.

Following the 2005 London Bombings, however, the government took a very different approach to countering terrorism. In the months following the attacks, the UK
government passed a series of legislation and public policies directed at combatting the terrorism threat through mechanisms of preemptive intervention. Eleven days after the bombing, the Home Secretary announced that the Home Department would fast-track an anti-terror bill, to become known as the *Terrorism Act 2006*, focusing not on persecuting terrorist activities following an attack but of criminalizing a series of activities that might put individuals at risk of perpetrating such attacks.¹ In the United States, following the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, the Bush administration passed the PATRIOT Act, which enhanced domestic security and surveillance, tightened anti-money-laundering provisions, expanded law enforcement investigative powers and criminalized a host of activities leading up to the commission of terrorist activities. Analogous approaches have been recently adopted in Canada, where, immediately following the 9/11 attacks, the Government passed Bill c-36, to be known as *The Anti-Terrorism Act 2001*, which included provisions for “preventative arrest,” expanded law enforcement’s intelligence apparatus and criminalized a series of activities in support of terrorism. Recent legislative responses to terrorism throughout the West highlight political reconfigurations of terrorism and practices of counterterrorism around notions of preemptive intervention rather than more traditional military or penal concerns.

As I shall demonstrate, such developments are not entirely new. What is relatively novel, however, is the reconfiguration of the guiding logical framework of counterterrorism practices in Western liberal democracies around notions of preemption. While certainly forms of prevention existed prior to 2001 – for instance, governments

¹ Such criminalized activities include: encouragement of terrorism, dissemination of terrorist publications, preparation of terrorist acts, training for terrorism, attendance at a place used for terrorist training, amongst others.
have long criminalized activities leading to the commission of terrorism through legal mechanisms of conspiracy and aiding and abetting – preemptive has historically been most often viewed as supplementary, rather than a primary form of counterterrorism practices. It is therefore important to trace the sociohistorical conditions under which the redevelopment of counterterrorism around the framework of preemption has taken place and flourished throughout the political sphere, and how a new governmental paradigm has developed in relation to ideas of radicalization and counterradicalization.

In this chapter, I attempt to highlight some of the social conditions whereby current discourses and practices related to counterradicalization emerge and proliferate. I therefore seek to offer empirically grounded evidence to answer the following research questions: What political and legal frameworks have been put in place to deal with legal problems related to radicalization? In what sociopolitical contexts do these legal frameworks emerge? And how do these emergent strategies differ from reactive anti-terrorism policies which have been deployed in the past?

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first outlines some of the sociolegal, political, and historical antecedents to the emergence of counterradicalization policies in the US, UK, and Canada. In the second section, I explore shifts in approaches to terrorism and counterterrorism centered on notions of preemptive intervention and counterradicalization. In this section, I empirically examine some of the changing discourses of counterterrorism and counterradicalization in the political system through an in-depth analysis of governmental policies and political debates, official government documents and policies, and high-ranking government official communications. Here I deploy methodological approaches to (mostly) content and (sometimes) discourse
analysis of numerous governmental communications. Data were derived from several sources, including political databases such as Hansard and Congress.gov, public reports and publications available on numerous governmental websites, speeches and government communications gathered from repositories and archival research conducted in the Summer of 2016 (and some in the Summer of 2017) at the National Archives in Ottawa, Washington, and London. Data were inputted in qualitative software suite NVivo and coded on the basis of numerous important themes. In the third and final section, I highlight how the system of politics aims to represent its counterradicalization strategies in a relative agnostic, apolitical way, while illustrating how the underlying logic of official counterradicalization programs contribute to conceptual and practical understandings of radicalization centered on problems associated with ‘at risk’ Muslim communities.

_Historical and Legal Antecedents of Counterradicalization Strategies in the US, UK, and Canada_

**United Kingdom**

To many observers, the United Kingdom’s preventative policy has been the benchmark for effective counterterrorism governance strategies throughout the West, with other countries acting as ‘net policy importers’ (Monaghan 2015). Indeed, the first organized counterterrorism unit in the UK was developed by Home Secretary Sir William Harcourt

---

2 I used the same coding schema as deployed in Chapter Six. Data were coded based on the following sixteen themes: activities, adjectives used to describe radicalization, age of subject, government agencies involved, references to specific events, groups subject of radicalization discourse, individual subject of radicalization discourse, geographic locations, governmental and public policies, political affiliation, religious problematization, political problematization, prospective solutions, target of radicalization/terrorism, nationalism (i.e., references to Britishness, Canadianness, patriotism, etc.).
in the 1880s to deal with increased political conflicts with Irish republican terrorism. The Special Irish Branch was formed as part of the London Metropolitan Police in 1883, and Harcourt envisaged a unit devoted to countering politically motivated violence through traditional policing techniques such as undercover infiltration and intelligence gathering (Masferrer and Walker 2013).

While the United Kingdom has adopted a mostly reactive approach to issues of terrorism throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, certain events were the impetus for a realignment of priorities and strategy after 2001. Largely due to a rise in terrorist attacks throughout the Western world before the turn of the 21st century, and propelled by the attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, the British Parliament passed a series of omnibus anti-terrorism acts that shifted the focus from Irish republican violence to a more generalized conceptualization of terrorism and political violence. In July 2000, the Terrorism Act 2000 received royal assent and was the first counterterrorism legislation introduced since the amendments made to the Terrorism Prevention Act in 1989. This legislation offered a broadened redefinition of terrorism and provided new powers to police related to preventative stop, searches, and arrests. In 2001, following the events of 9/11, British Parliament passed the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 which denoted a shift towards legislating tangential aspects of terrorism, such as property used during the commission of a terrorist crime, financial tracking and civil forfeiture, new confidentiality and disclosure of information for law

3 The broadened definition of terrorism outlined in the Terrorism Act 2000 expanded the definition of terrorism beyond activities related to terrorism in Northern Ireland. The legislation allowed police to detain suspects for questioning related to terrorism activities for up to 7 days. It also allowed police to stop and search any persons or vehicle in designated areas without the need to suspect that person of terrorist activities.
enforcement, and detaining non-British citizens suspected of terrorism. While the Act received notable resistance and criticism from civil society organizations and scholars who argued that civil rights would be violated under the new legislation, ultimately it passed with little political opposition (Walker 2002). In 2003, UK Parliament extended some of law enforcement’s proactive powers by doubling the period allowed for detention of a terrorist suspect for questioning to 14 days.\(^4\) The preemptive turn in legislation was again demonstrated in 2005, when the \textit{Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005} established the “control order” – an order made by the Home Secretary that restricts an individual’s freedom (what the person can possess, where they can work and live, whom they can speak to, and where they can travel) for the purpose of “protecting the members of the public from a risk of terrorism” (\textit{Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005}). From 2006 to 2010, a series of \textit{Acts} were passed relating to increased powers for government and police in terms of civil forfeiture (see \textit{The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006}), policing questioning of suspects after charges (see \textit{Counter-Terrorism Act 2008}), and the freezing of assets of suspected terrorists (see \textit{Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act 2010}). Finally, in 2015, British Parliament passed the \textit{Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015}, which is most reflective of the preemptive turn in government legislation, gives new powers that enable: (1) the seizure and retention of the passport of a person suspected of leaving the UK for purpose of terrorism-related activities; and (2) enable the “temporary” exclusion of individuals from the UK if they are believed to be involved in terrorism-related activities.\(^5\) The legislation also requires certain authorities,

\(^4\) As outlined in Section 306 of the \textit{Criminal Justice Act 2003}.
\(^5\) This provision allows for the “temporary” exclusion of individuals for up to two years.
including universities, schools, and some private companies such as internet service providers, to cooperate with authorities when they suspect that individuals are at risk of becoming involved in terrorist activities. The legislation thus provides provisions for the Prevent leg of the UK’s ‘CONTEST’ strategy, now legally requiring specified authorities to align with and deliver the program’s initiatives.

The Prevent strategy was developed in response to the 2005 London bombings and other cases of ‘domestic’ terrorism and revealed in 2007 as an all-encompassing, proactive, and community-participatory counterradicalization strategy. As part of the country’s overarching counterterrorism strategy known as ‘CONTEST,’ Prevent is one of four key components: (1) Pursue, the surveillance and detection leg; (2) Prepare, the civil emergency and preparedness led; (3) Protect, the domestic security leg; and (4) Prevent, the leg tasked with countering so-called radicalization. I shall return to an analysis of the Prevent strategy in the next section.

**United States**

As noted by elsewhere by Mathieu Deflem (2010), similar to other Western jurisdictions, the development of counterterrorism law in the United States progressed in a piecemeal fashion, evolving from legislation oriented around activities tangentially associated with terrorism to a more omnibus approach. In the months following the events of 9/11, President George W. Bush signed *Executive Order 13224*, which authorized the seizure of assets of organizations or individuals whom assist, sponsor, or otherwise provide material support or who are associated with terrorists or terrorist organizations. Shortly thereafter, the Bush administration passed the *Uniting and Strengthening America by

With the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, prevention became a fundamental aspect of the US approach to terrorism, reflected in its mandate, which includes: “preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing the vulnerability of the United States Terrorism at home, and minimizing the damage and assisting in the recovery from any attacks that may occur” (U.S. Congress 2002). To these ends, the Department of Homeland Security is charged with oversight of a diverse group of governmental agencies, among them: US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Secret Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the US Coast Guard.

On the level of law enforcement, the FBI was given lead-agency counterterrorism authority in 1982. The FBI also leads coordination efforts among DHS agencies through the establishment of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (partnering the FBI with the CIA, ICE and Department of Defense), and Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).
JTTFs bring together agents from a variety of law enforcement agencies, including federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies as well as first-responders, to share intelligence, investigate terrorist activities, and arrest those suspected of terrorism (Deflem 2010). Currently, task forces are based in 104 US cities, 71 of which have been created since September 11, 2001 (FBI 2017).

While the US has been a world leader in developing post-2001 counterterrorism legislation and modeling operational governance structures for increasing inter-agency coordination, the country has thus far remained relative adverse to the development of an official counterradicalization strategy. However, governmental policies and Offices have been developed that aim to investigate and combat pathways to terrorism. In the United States, the Department of State leads the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, which oversees governmental efforts to counter terrorism abroad. The predecessor of the Bureau was the Office for Combatting Terrorism, created in 1972 following the recommendation of President Nixon following an attack at the Olympics in Munich. The committee suggested an office to increase coordination and develop policy responses by the U.S. government to foreign terrorism. In 1985, the Office changed its name to the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in 1985, and then the Bureau of Counterterrorism in 2012. Congress officially mandated the Bureau of Counterterrorism (Public Law 103-236 [H.R. 2333] in 1994, and further defined the role of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in 1998 (Public Law 105-277 [H.R. 4328]). The Bureau, and the Office which preceded it, were formed with the intention of combatting foreign terrorist threats through coordinating disparate government agencies with the aim of eliminating redundancy and silos of intelligence amongst them to efficiently track and
counter international terrorism threats. In 2016, the Bureau’s name was expanded to include “countering violent extremism” within its mandate (Hudson 2016).

This notable shift was reflective of broader changes to US counterterrorism policy towards proactive, preventative policies and practices, but also highlighted the country’s timid approach to countering so-called radicalization. Following 2001, US policy operatives began focusing widely on issues of domestic terrorism and local, state, and federal counterterrorism policing initiatives, aiming to combat the threat of terrorism through more preventative measures. Much slower in terms of development was an official federal counterradicalization strategy. While the US does possess a set of domestic counterradicalization guidelines – in the form of a 2011 paper entitled “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States” and follow-up paper called the “Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States” – it remains far less robust and developed than alternative strategies in the West (i.e., in the UK and Canada). The US counterradicalization guidelines offer mostly knowledge-based initiatives that seek to understand the radicalization process and how to build community engagement networks with American Muslim communities. This focus on research and engagement is evinced by steps taken by the Department of Homeland security, which was tasked by Congress with overseeing counterradicalization in 2007. I will return to these policy guidelines in the following section.

Canada

Much like the development of counterterrorism legislation in the United States, pre-2001 Canadian law concerning terrorism was primarily restricted to immigration and refugee
regulations, border security, and aviation security. Beforehand, Section 19(1) of the Immigration Act (1976) provided perhaps the most robust characterization, stating that those involved in ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist organizations’ were to be refused entry into the country. However, the Act fell short of formally defining the concept of terrorism and focused predominantly on terrorism as an issue of international immigration. Other legislation, including the Aeronautics Act (1985), the National Defence Act (1985), and the State Immunity Act (1985) also failed to provide a legal definition of the concept and instead increasingly legislated criminal offences germane to terrorist activities.

In 2001, following the attacks in New York and Washington, and in line with the UK and US, Canada passed its omnibus Anti-Terrorism Act (2001), which for the first time introduced the definition of ‘terrorist activity’ into section 83 of the Criminal Code of Canada, and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which replaced the Immigration Act 1976. The Anti-Terrorism Act expanded the powers of government and institutions under the Canadian security establishment umbrella, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and the Communications Security Establishment of Canada (CSEC). The legislation included provisions allowing for ‘secret’ in-camera trials deemed issues of national security, preemptive detention of individuals suspected of carrying out, or planning to carry out, terrorist activities, and an expansion of police powers. The extension of police powers, however, were notably focused around preventative arrest and the expansion of investigative mechanisms, such as compelling a person to answer questions relating to

---

6 One notable changed brought about by Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act was that suspects cannot refuse to answer questions relating to terrorist activities on the grounds of self-incrimination.
terrorist activities (Roach 2004). In February of 2007, led by opposition from the Liberal and New Democrat parties, provisions related to preventative arrest and in-camera investigative hearings were not renewed. However, in 2012, the Conservative majority government led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper introduced Bill S-7, known as the Combatting Terrorism Act, which again renewed the expired Anti-Terrorism Act provisions for a new five-year term and introduced new crimes for leaving Canada to join or train with entities labelled as terrorist organizations by the Government. Following the bombings at the Boston Marathon in 2012, the Conservative government fast-tracked Bill S-7 to a vote on April 23, 2003, and the Bill became law on April 25, 2013.

In response to notable attacks against Canadian Armed Forces soldiers and the infamous shootings at Parliament Hill in Ottawa, deliberations on a new omnibus antiterrorism bill began in the House of Commons in 2014. Bill C-51, a series of new legislative mechanisms to become known as the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015, broadened the authority of Government agencies to monitor the activities of all global citizens on the Internet, as well as expanded the mandate of CSIS to include more powers related to obtaining court-ordered warrants authorizing security investigations abroad. Additionally, the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015 established and amended several Acts including the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, Secure Air Travel Act and changes to the Criminal Code, Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. New legislation and amendments offered provisions related to the disclosure and coordination of information amongst Canada’s security intelligence community, new legislation for identifying and responding to persons who pose a threat to transportation security or critical infrastructure, and new Criminal Code offences
relating to assisting in the commission of terrorist offences and new powers of preemptive detention. The development and expansion of Canada’s counterterrorism policy thus aligns with the historical and legal development across other Western liberal democracies. The broadening of counterterrorism legislation and the expansion of police powers related to preemptive detention and investigative techniques highlight the Country’s approach to terrorism post-2001 in terms of shifts towards more proactive legal frameworks for countering terrorism.

Canada’s governmental counterterrorism structure was realigned beginning with the introduction of the Anti-Terrorism Act 2001. From 2001 to 2003, in a reorganization of the federal government, Canada worked to create Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to establish a single entity to oversee all programs related to public safety in Canada. In 2005, the Department was established and, in similar fashion to the US Department of Homeland Security, included other offices, agencies, and review bodies within its portfolio, such as: Canada Border Services, RCMP, CSIS, Correctional Service Canada, the Parole Board of Canada, the Department of National Defence, the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (CRCC), the Office of the Correctional Investigator (OCI), and the RCMP External Review Committee. The Department changed its name to Public Safety Canada in 2006, and its mandate includes “ensuring coordination across all federal departments and agencies responsible for national security and the safety of Canadians. Our mandate is to keep Canadians safe from a range of risks such as natural disasters, crime and terrorism” (Public Safety Canada 2017).

Justifications for the notable shifts in political and legislative discourses surrounding preemptive intervention in the case of counterterrorism often reflects a perceived increase in threat level amongst certain populations. Legislators and government officials in the UK, US, and Canada have overwhelmingly pointed to Islam as the source of the most pressing terrorist threats to the Western world. Part of the legislative changes brought about by the diffusion of omnibus anti-terrorism legislations following 2001 was an increase in governmental reporting on terrorist “threat levels.” In the United States, the State Department has released an annual “Country Reports on Terrorism” report since 2003. The Home Office in the UK has published a similar report since 2012, and Public Safety Canada introduced a terrorist threat annual report to be published annually in its overarching counterterrorism strategy in 2011. The aim of these reporting systems is to highlight emerging trends in terms of terrorist threats to each country. Each report is similar in structure, albeit the US’ report is far more detailed, and indicates an overall terror threat level,\(^7\) lists groups labelled as “terrorist entities” by government officials, and offers “strategic assessments” of the threat level by geographic area and by group. The reports often isolate specific religious backgrounds as sources of those perceived threats.

\(^7\) The “terror threat” level is often illustrated in the form of, or similar to, the color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System, which associates the perceived threat level on the basis of five colors: green for “low,” blue for “guarded,” yellow for “elevated,” orange for “high,” and red for “severe.”
An analysis of all “threat level” reports in the US, UK, and Canada reveals how each country frames terrorist threats by religious background (see Table 4.1). While reports from the US quantitatively overshadowed threat assessments from the UK and Canada in terms of number and depth, the analysis did indicate some similar trends. Threat assessments in the United States and Canada overwhelmingly framed Islam as the source of perceived threat. In the United Kingdom, associations between terrorism and religious threat were few, but most often referenced Islam as a source of such threats. Other religious backgrounds, such as Christianity, Judaism, and Catholicism, were sometimes referenced, but they were notably included as a juxtaposition to so-called Islamic fundamentalism. Other religious backgrounds were therefore most often referenced in terms of victimization, rather than perpetrator of terrorist activities.

Table 4.1: References to Religion in Major Reports on Terrorist Threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4566</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judaism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from Annual reports on terrorist threats available online at the State Department website since 2003 (https://www.state.gov), Public Safety Canada since 2013 (http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca), and the Home Office, since 2012 (https://www.gov.uk). US terrorist threat reports were, on average, 300 pages longer than those from the UK and Canada, which results in a massive discrepancy between the reports’ references.

*a Other includes Buddhism, Hinduism, Atheism, Hellenism, and Paganism.
The use of “threat” reports has proliferated Western security, intelligence, and law enforcement communities and is often referenced by politicians and governmental officials in response to legislative debates regarding counterterrorism. Indeed, in both Canada and the United Kingdom, the government’s overarching counterradicalization strategies begin with an outline of the “terrorism threat” prior to outlining governmental response initiatives and programs.

However, threat assessments conducted by governmental offices do not seemingly align with historical and modern trends in terrorist attacks and radicalization. Since the 1970s, terrorist activity in the US, Canada, and UK has substantially declined (see Figure 4.1). While, since 2007, there has been a minor increase in the prevalence of terrorist attacks on the West, terrorist activity was much more pervasive in the United Kingdom and United States during the 1970s and 1960s. In Canada, terrorism has remained relatively rare since the 1970s. Despite these trends, governments are producing more threat assessments which indicate quantitatively heightened threat levels than the data would suggest are necessary.

![Figure 4.1: Number of Terrorist Attacks in Each Country, 1970-2015](image)

---

58
Not only have terrorist attacks against the US, UK, and Canada declined in number since the 1970s, data suggests the perception of terrorist threats coming from Islam are disproportional to actual and planned terrorist attacks. As Charles Kurzman (2011, 2014) notes, since 9/11, 33 Americans have died as a result of terrorist activities perpetrated by Islamic practitioners. During that same period, over 180,000 Americans were murdered for reasons not related to terrorism. In 2016, 46 Muslim Americans were associated with violent extremism, which represents a 40 percent drop from 2015, and 65 Americans were identified as having traveled to join Islamic inspired terrorist groups overseas (Kurzman 2017). Lorenzo Vidino (2009) has suggested that homegrown ‘jihadist,’ despite receiving notable political and media attention is actually a more stable, but relatively occasional phenomenon. In addition, according to the FBI (2005), 94% of terrorist attacks carried out in the United States from 1980 to 2005 were perpetrated by non-Muslims. Even RAND corporation, which is notorious for representing terrorism as an issue amongst primarily Muslim communities (I return to this in Chapter Seven), suggests that the threat of homegrown Islam-inspired terrorism is exaggerated (Jenkins 2010). According to Europol, the European equivalent to Interpol, less than two percent of terrorist attacks in the European Union from 2009 to 2013 were ‘religiously motivated’ (Europol 2010). In Canada, of the 74 recorded terrorist attacks in University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database, five have been carried out by individuals associated with Islam (6.8% of all terrorist attacks).

---

8 This number would be increased by 63 following the attacks in Orlando (2016) and San Bernardino (2015). However, the overall point remains valid.

9 The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open-source database including information on terrorist events worldwide from 1970 to 2015. It was developed by Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan, and Erin Miller and is housed at the University of Maryland. It can be accessed at https://www.start.umb.edu/gtd.
Kurzman (2011; Kurzman, Schanzer and Moosa 2011) has repeatedly shown that terrorism perpetrated by those associated with Islam remains extremely rare in the United States and hypothesizes that part of the reason has to do with demographic differences of American Muslims in comparison to Muslim populations in places like the United Kingdom. American Muslims, so Kurzman and colleagues suggest, are less segregated and more aligned with the political views of the American mainstream. Another explanation offered by Kurzman is that US law enforcement has been aggressive in preventing the carrying out of terrorist threats through the use of undercover informants, expansion of surveillance practices, and heightened security measures at airports and other critical locations (Kurzman, Schanzer and Moosa 2011). More interestingly, Kurzman and colleagues suggest that there have been relatively few acts of terrorism related to Islam in the US because Muslim communities have been effective in “self-policing” (Kurzman, Schanzer and Moosa 2011: 475). Through public denunciations of terrorism from Muslim community leaders and civil society organizations and community-level monitoring against “signs of radicalization,” Kurzman and others suggest (2011), Muslim leaders have been successful in preventing terrorism within their communities. I will return to the idea of “self-policing” in the final section of this chapter.

Despite data and scholarly research findings that suggest otherwise, politicians and government officials have largely focused on terrorism threats from cultural and ethnic minority communities (see Table 4.1). Part of the political response to perceived threats has been the rearticulation of counterterrorism strategies around notions of counterradicalization, guided by the logic of combatting terrorism by identifying and
intervening in the process by which individuals shift towards violent extremist views and activities. Since the mid-2000s, political approaches to issues of counterterrorism have been significantly reconfigured around discourses of counterradicalization (see Figure 4.2 and Table 4.2). In data collected from Parliamentary and Congressional debates from 1969 to 2016, there were notable increases in use of the term radicalization in the US, UK, and Canada. Moreover, government officials increasingly used the construct of radicalization to frame counterterrorist strategies. For instance, both Canada and the United Kingdom released specific policies directed at countering radicalization. While the United States released no such policy, there was a notable increase in usage of the concept of radicalization amongst Congressional debates following 2004.

Figure 4.2: References to “Radicalization” in Political Debates

---

The rearticulation of counterterrorism strategies around notions of preemptive intervention is reflected both in governmental discourse as well as public and social policy. Across the Western liberal democracies analyzed by this study, political efforts have been made to shift from the reactive approaches traditionally associated with counterterrorism through military intervention, towards a more preemptive, proactive approach that engages local communities, law enforcement, research and knowledge production, and techniques of surveillance and intelligence in order to intervene prior to perpetration of terrorist activities. The policies, strategies, and practices associated with these novel intervention mechanisms aim to disrupt the “radicalization process” by which individuals and groups adopt radically extremist views. In many ways, they have reconfigured the entire logic and approach of counterterrorism in the West, and have been driven, at least partially, by political and public pressure to move beyond military intervention strategies. The United States, United Kingdom, and Canada have each developed their own approach to counterradicalization. While there are indeed notable similarities amongst the three approaches, there are also several important differences. This chapter now turns its attention to the exploration of each country’s approach to counterradicalization.

**Table 4.2: Use of The Term ‘Radicalization’ in Major Governmental Communications Pre- and Post-2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Governmental Speeches</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative debates</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major CT policies</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Prevent (UK) program explicitly seeks out the participation of communities labelled ‘at risk,’ most notably Muslim community members, in hopes of countering radicalization before it culminates in terrorism. It thus presents a significant rearticulation of counterterrorism practices around notions of preemptive intervention and community engagement. As the strategy suggests, “we believe that radicalisation – in this country – is being driven by: an ideology that sets Muslim against non-Muslim, highlights the alleged oppression of the global Muslim community and which both obliges and legitimizes violence in its defence” (The Home Office 2011a: 18). Building on the international, multi-agency “Channel” program, it also entails major changes in the government’s relations with cultural and ethnic minority comminutes. As noted by O’Toole et al. (2016), the Prevent (UK) strategy focuses on Muslim community engagement, with a particular focus on religious, youth, and women’s de-radicalization projects. Prevent (UK) is delivered by three government departments: The Home Office

11 “Channel” is a multi-agency intervention strategy designed to safeguard people from being drawn into extremist or violent behavior. It brings together leaders from the European intelligence, law enforcement, and social services communities to refer vulnerable individuals and groups to the “channel process” where those individuals and groups are put through screening, assessments, and, if necessary, monitoring and interventions are conducted.
(in particular the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, created in 2007), the Department for Communities and Local Government, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Prevent (UK) was the impetus for government funding of a range of community-based projects with the goal of providing counter-narratives to religious and ideological sentiment. For example, the New Labour majority government funded the establishment of the Radical Middle Way project, an intervention project aimed at preventing youth radicalization, and the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) to regulate the growing body of UK mosques. Prevent also aimed to “fundamentally rebalance” government engagement with Muslim women and youth by creating the National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group and the Young Muslims Advisory group in 2008, which created a direct link between the government and Muslims women and youth. The diffusion of Prevent (UK), and the expansion of counterradicalization practices in the United Kingdom is made explicit in the strategy:

- Over the lifetime of this strategy, DfE will undertake the following Prevent-related work in England: Over the lifetime of this strategy, DfE will undertake the following Prevent-related work in England:
- ensure that teachers and other school staff know what to do when they see signs that a child is at risk of radicalisation;
- continue to collaborate and encourage collaboration with policing and the development of products for teachers;
- as part of the planned changes to the inspection arrangements for maintained schools, give due weight to schools’ activities in support of our shared values, and for any concerns to be reflected in the report;
- strengthen the Independent School Standards to ensure that schools understand their obligations;
- establish a set of standards for teachers which clarifies obligations regarding extremism;
- provide effective financial and non-financial ‘due diligence’ to minimise the risk that those with unacceptable views can set up Free Schools or gain control of academies or other publicly-funded schools;
• work with the Charity Commission to ensure that schools that are charities and under their jurisdiction comply with charity law;
• work to reduce the risk that children and young people are exposed to extremist views in out of school hours provision; and
• help children’s services work with schools and other agencies, including Channel, to identify children at risk of radicalisation and take necessary steps to protect them from harm. (The Home Office 2011a: 73)

Critics of Prevent (UK) have offered several important challenges to some of the programs key features. Pantazis and Pemberton (2009), for instance, argue that Prevent’s (UK) focus on preemptive intervention and community engagement construct Muslims as a ‘suspect community,’ thereby making individuals and groups part of such communities more susceptible to governmental interventions. Thomas (2012) echoes this concern, and suggests that by focusing on Muslim communities, Prevent (UK) and the set of heterogeneous practices therein, securitizes state engagement with Muslim community members. Even more, Thomas (2012) argues that connecting community engagement practices emphasized the connection between those communities and themes of terrorism, thereby discursively linking Islam explicitly with terrorism. Birt (2009) also highlights this tendency, but argues that Prevent might work to stigmatize individuals in already vulnerable communities, thereby further alienating and isolating some community members and thus pushing them towards radicalization. Finally, O’Toole and colleagues (2016) highlight the disciplinary mechanisms at work in Prevent (UK) and critique the program on the grounds that it creates a problematic form of Muslim-state engagement, rather than the program’s objective of building positive community relations.

The United States, on the other hand, does not currently have an analogous strategy to the UK’s Prevent program. It does, however, have a loosely connected set of
guidelines for counterradicalization initiatives for which stakeholders may consult when drafting their own policies. The guidelines, entitled *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, is a concise document drafted by President’s Office which provides a set of overarching ideas to counter radicalization. The title of the document highlights its approach to the broadening of counterterrorism across a variety of organizations at the local, state, and federal levels. Unlike the UK’s Prevent strategy, however, the guidelines do not reflect an all-encompassing governmental strategy nor does the President’s Office grant specific authority to individual organizations.

Despite the lack of strategic organization, several attempts have been made to centralize the counterradicalization apparatus in the United States. In 2010, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano designated the Homeland Security Advisory Council’s Countering Violent Extremism Working Group – comprised of community leaders, security experts, and local and state police representatives – with responsibility for drafting recommendations for how the Department could better support efforts to combat violent extremism (Homeland Security Advisory Council 2010). Based off the Working Group’s recommendations, Napolitano released a series of recommendations to counter crime and violent extremism at the local and state law enforcement levels (DHS 2010), therefore falling well short of adopting an overarching counterradicalization strategy.

A second aspect of the DHS’ counterradicalization strategy centers on engagement with American Muslim communities. For example, the 2010 National Security Strategy suggests that the “best defense” against radicalization is to foster “well informed and quipped families, local communities, and institutions” and “broader
engagement with Muslim communities around the world will spur progress on critical political and security matters” (The White House 2010: 4, 19). Official DHS responses to community engagement with American Muslim comminutes, however, reflects a reserved approach to framing engagement not solely in relation to issues of terrorism and radicalization. The DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (OCRCL) is the office tasked with engaging American Muslim, Arab, Somali, South Asian, and Sikh community leaders through a variety of initiatives. The OCRCL, for instance, established the National Security Internship Program which provides internship positions at the DHS and FBI for Arabi-speaking college undergraduates. The FBI has also established community-engagement programs with Muslim and Arab community members. For example, the FBI’s Community Relations Unit established a Specialized Community Outreach Team, pioneered in Minneapolis, to engage local communities (predominantly Muslim communities) who are labelled at risk of radicalization. Finally, a variety of jurisdictions with larger Muslim populations have created engagement initiatives at the local level, not least of which have been developed in New York and Los Angeles.

Interestingly, unlike other jurisdictions, steps have been taken to define the concept of radicalization in US law. In 2007, Jane Harman introduced the Violent Radicalization and Home-grown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007, which would have, among other things, defined “violent radicalization,” and establish grant programs and university-based knowledge centers for the study of radicalization, but ultimately died in

---

12 According to the testimony of DHS Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Margo Schlanger, at the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment hearing in 2010, Muslim communities are viewed as at risk to be “targeted by violent extremist recruitment efforts…but as solutions if they are appropriately engaged, supported and included.”
the Senate during the 110th Congress due to concerns over Internet censorship, racial profiling, and potential constitutional violations (Giraldi 2011). Still, however, even if the legislation were successful, changes would have remained predominantly knowledge- and research-based, rather than based in intervention practices and/or law enforcement.

On a political level, amongst the most active politicians to focus on counterradicalization has been Representative Peter King, who is a member of the Homeland Security Committee and Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. King has been a vocal proponent of the development and diffusion of counterradicalization initiatives and programs at the local, state, and federal levels. Indeed, Representative King’s website explicitly mentions his approach to issues of international and domestic terrorism: “the threat of homegrown terrorism and violent Islamic extremist radicalization, as evinced by the terrorist attacks at Orlando, San Bernardino, Times Square, and Boston, is the most prolific threat facing the Homeland” (King 2017). In 2011, following an attack at Fort Hood, King held a series of congressional hearings on the threat of “homegrown Islamic extremist radicalization” titled “The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and That Community’s Response.” This followed Senator Joseph Lieberman’s 14 hearings between 2006 and 2009 and Representative Jane Harman’s six hearings from 2006 to 2008, on similar issues relevant to ‘homegrown’ terrorism.

Like the United Kingdom, Canada has an official counterradicalization strategy. Introduced in 2013, the strategy, called “Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” is overseen by Public Safety Canada and includes four strategic arms modelled similarly to the UKs CONTEST strategy. The four arms
include: (1) Prevent, focusing on the prevention of individuals from engaging in terrorism; (2) Detect, in charge of identifying the activities and individuals who may pose a terrorist threat; (3) Deny, which aims to stop the means and opportunity to carry out terrorist activities; and (4) Respond, which focuses on proportionate and rapid response and mitigation strategies to mediate effects of terrorist activities.

One of the overarching goals of the *Building Resilience Against Terrorism* strategy is to “help focus and galvanize Canadian law enforcement, and the security and intelligence community around a clear strategic objective” (Public Safety Canada 2013: 4). The purpose of the Canadian Prevent strategy is to prevent individuals from engaging in terrorism by: (1) establishing community level engagement initiatives to counter violent extremism; (2) work with international partners to coordinated “like-minded countries to stabilize fragile states and limit the conditions conductive to the development of violent extremism globally” (Public Safety Canada 2013: 17); and (3) providing counternarratives to contradict “sophisticated propaganda and outreach strategies” from terrorist organizations (Public Safety Canada 2013: 17).

Unlike the UK’s Prevent strategy, the Canadian program does not explicitly mention Islam in the Prevent portion of the strategy. However, as data analyzed here suggest, Canada’s – like the US and UK – plan does frame its Prevent strategy in relation to problematics of Islam and with issues of engagement with Muslim communities. For example, the foreword of Canada’s Prevent strategy sets up the “terrorist threat” as an issue of “violent Islamism extremism” and approaches it as “the leading threat to Canada’s national security” (Public Safety Canada 2013: 2). As I have demonstrated,
statements such as those do not appear to align with objective empirical reality nor the findings from some of the areas foremost experts.

An important difference in the emergence of counterradicalization programs in the US, UK, and Canada, is the establishment of large scale federal commissions to investigate issues of terrorism post-2001. While the United States established the 9/11 Commission Report following the attacks in Washington and New York on September 11, 2001, the government has not commissioned an investigation into issues of terrorism since. The United Kingdom and Canada, on the other hand, have had substantial public pressure to adopt new counterterrorism prevention measures in response to the release of highly publicized public inquiries. In the United Kingdom, the bombings in London in 2005 spurned a federal investigation into the country’s counterterrorism and, more specifically, its preventative mechanisms in response to perceived failures of the government to stop the attack. In Canada, the Government called a Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 as a result of increasing public and political pressure to prevent similar incidents in the future. In June 2010, the Commission released its final report, *Air India Flight 182: A Canadian Tragedy*, which found massive failures in Canada’s terrorism prevention strategy. The damming indictment of Canada’s terrorism prevention apparatus thus called on the Government to reevaluate and modernize its terrorism prevention strategy, particularly so following cases of effective law enforcement investigations, such as the successful conviction of the “Toronto 18” in 2006. The amount of political and public pressure on

---

13 The “Toronto 18” case refers to the plotting of a series of terrorist attacks against targets in Southern Ontario during 2006 and the preventative investigation which led to terrorism raids in the Greater Toronto Area and resulted in the arrest of 14 adults and 4 youth (the “Toronto 18”)
the government, evinced by the launch of public inquiries, to focus on prevention of terrorism through community-level engagement, monitoring, and intervention, might explain the emergence of explicit counterradicalization strategies, which followed closely after the completion of both inquiries.

Another potential structural difference between the US, UK, and Canada, which may make the emergence of explicit counterradicalization programs more or less likely is the established domestic surveillance and security apparatus in the UK and Canada. As noted by Deflem, Silva and Rogers (forthcoming), Canada and the UK have a long and established history of engaging in surveillance and intelligence gathering on within their borders and on their own citizens. The United States, on the other hand, has no official government agency responsible with collecting information on American citizens.14

Moreover, important difference which may explain the development of official counterradicalization initiatives in the UK and Canada has to do with government responsibility for issues of counterradicalization. Both countries have tasked individual government agencies or offices with responsibility over counterradicalization strategies (Public Safety Canada and the UK’s Home Office). In the United States, as noted by Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman (2010), there is no such office:

[I]t is fundamentally troubling, given this collection of new threats and new adversaries directly targeting America, that there remains no federal government agency or department specifically charged with identifying radicalization and interdicting the recruitment of U.S. citizens or residents for terrorism (p. 29)

14 Although recent information released from whistleblowers such as Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden suggest that the US government is indeed collecting information on its citizens.
The result has been a fragmentation of responsibility over counterradicalization initiatives, with local and state law enforcement agencies, the intelligence community, DHS, and the State Department all employing different strategies with different operational motives and outcomes. Indeed, the large bureaucratic structure, Vidino (2009) maintains, is part of the explanation for why governmental counterradicalization strategies have been slow to develop in the United States.

Finally, constitutional concerns have in some ways prevented the expansion of police powers of surveillance and intelligence gathering in the United States. While Canada and the UK have had traditionally less public opposition to advanced forms of government surveillance (illustrated in part by the existence of a domestic intelligence agency in each country). According to a survey of US citizens conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2014, a 54 percent of US citizens disapprove of governmental collection of telephone and Internet data as part of counterterrorism efforts (Pew Research Center 2014). In comparison with Canada and the UK, 64 percent of Canadians say that government surveillance is acceptable in certain situations, such as counterterrorism (Canadian Internet Registration Authority 2013), and when asked about the balance between privacy and security in the UK, only 17% percent of British citizens responded that the government must do more to protect privacy considering counterterrorism threats (YouGov 2016).\textsuperscript{15} The Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007, introduced by Jane Harman, would have gone some length in legally authorizing new surveillance measures on American citizens. The

\textsuperscript{15} 34 percent of British citizens responded that the government should “do more to help security forces” and 28 percent indicated that the “balance is about right.”
legislation would have prevented DHS’ intelligence efforts from violating constitutional and civil rights protected by the First Amendment. Ultimately, however, those provisions of increased surveillance were a large part of why the bill died in the Senate in 2007. While Canada and the UK have a long history with domestic intelligence gathering practices, which might reflect on public opinion related to privacy and terrorism, the United States public strongly opposes such intervention. Consequently, governmental and law enforcement authorities tend to be averse to official counterradicalization strategies that emphasize preemptive intelligence gathering due to First Amendment rights and freedoms.

Governmental counterradicalization strategies in the UK and Canada, at least officially, attempt to represent radicalization as a process that can affect any individual or group, regardless of cultural, religious, or ethnic background (Molnar and Monaghan 2016). For example, the Prevent (UK) strategy explicitly suggests that “Prevent will address all forms of terrorism but continue to prioritise according to the threat they pose to our national security” (The Home Office 2011a: 6). Indeed, counterterrorism policies are quick to remind us that “the threat of violent extremism does not originate from a single source, but a diverse range of groups and individuals who either actively participate in or who support violent extremist activities” (Public Safety Canada 2013: 16). Official responses to the threat of radicalization, however, are underpinned by an increasing focus and problematization of Islamic communities in relation to so-called radicalization processes. The final section of this chapter explores the underlying logic and construction of counterradicalization strategies and highlights how even those
explicitly referencing the ‘diversity’ of threats are based primarily in constructions of Muslims as risk communities vis-à-vis radicalization.

*Beyond the ‘Agnosticism’ of Prevention Strategies*

While UK, US, and Canadian governments continue to assert that counterradicalization policies are not directed solely at Islam, the data suggest that is not necessarily the case (See Tables 4.2-4.4). While explicit counterradicalization policing policies and government strategies indeed approach radicalization in a relatively agnostic manner (see Table 4.2) – as if the process can affect anyone – the underlying logics of those policies and frameworks, and the discourses in which they are constructed, include numerous explicit references to radicalization as a fundamental issue amongst predominantly Muslim communities (see Tables 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4). Echoing previous research into counterterrorism policing and surveillance strategies (see Breen-Smyth 2014; Croft 2012a; de Goede and Simon 2013; Eroukhamanoff 2015; Monaghan and Molnar 2016), findings here suggest that while surface-level analyses of counterradicalization strategies might indicate an agnostic approach to processes of radicalization (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4), the discourses that construct those very frameworks are imbued in disproportionate levels of fear, distrust, and suspicion of Islamic communities.

**Table 4.3: References to Islam in National Security Strategies**

---

16 Canada’s 2014 *Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada*, for example, defines “radicalization to violence” as: “radicalization to violence is a process by which individuals are introduced to an ideology that encourages movement towards extreme views which, in turn, lead to violence. Radicalization to violence can occur anywhere: in religious institutions, schools, prisons, online and other places where like-minded people come together” (Public Safety Canada 2014: 40)
The a religious manner in which official governmental discourses problematize terrorism and radicalization are reflected in Table 4.3. An analysis of official counterradicalization programs in each country highlights the dearth of explicit references made to religious ideologies and backgrounds. Counterradicalization strategies in the US, UK, and Canada problematize issues, ideas, and concepts that are not associated with one particular religious group or institution. For example, the Canadian strategy, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism*, most often problematizes terrorism (and radicalization more specifically) as an issue of national security and focuses on the prevention solutions planned to combat radicalization (i.e., intelligence, law, community building, etc.). The US and UK programs similarly focus on strategies of community building, while problematizing radicalization in a general way through frames of violence.
and extremism. As noted above, the data here suggest that the US indeed frames research and knowledge production as a key aspect of the counterradicalization strategy, while offering very little by way of intervention strategies (i.e., law enforcement, intelligence, law).

Table 4.4: Top Themes Referenced in Counterradicalization Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building Resilience Against Terrorism (Canada)</th>
<th>Weighted Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Similar Words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>security</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>secure, securing, security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threats</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>threat, threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>international</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>international, internationally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counter</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>counter, countered, countering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>response</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>response, responses, responsibility, responsible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>support, supported, supporters, supporting, supportive, supports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intelligence</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agencies</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>agencies, agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>informed</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>inform, information, informed, informs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>communities, community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>law</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>law, lawful, laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>building</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>build, building, builds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>respond</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>respond, responder, responders, responding, responds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prevention</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>prevent, preventative, preventing, prevention, preventive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTEST (UK)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prevention</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>preventability, preventable, preventative, prevented, preventing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terrorism’</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>terror, terrorism, terrorism’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>secure, secured, securely, securing, security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>communities, community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policing</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>police, policed, policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>countering</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>counter, countering, counters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>supported, supporter, supporting, supportive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>locally</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>local, localism, locally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>countries, countries’, country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>activity</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actively</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>activism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Counterradicalization plans in Canada and the US rarely reference Islam in their official documents (See Table 4.4). Comparatively, the United Kingdom does reference Muslim communities far more often than other countries, however, as Table 4.4 illustrates, the Prevent strategy (UK) focuses much more on generalized risks and prevention strategies to deal with those threats. Counterradicalization strategies in all three countries do reference Islam more than any other religion, but that most often occurs in the lead up to outlining institutional responses and initiatives to combat the problem. For example, in Canada’s *Building Resilience Against Terrorism* strategy, Islam is not mentioned one time in the Prevent section. Rather, all 20 references to Islam in the document were made in an introductory section entitled, “The Terrorist Threat” (Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>attack</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attacked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attacking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attacks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>threats</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>risk</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>risked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>risking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>risks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>organisation</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organisational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organised</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organising</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism (US)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communities, community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cve</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>local</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local, locally</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>extremism</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extremism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>support</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support, supported, supporters, supporting, supportive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>engaging</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>engage, engaged, engagement, engagements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>violence</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>force</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>force, forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>extremist</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extremist, extremists, extremists’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>prevention</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prevent, preventing, prevention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>stakeholders</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stakeholder, stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>development</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>develop, developed, developing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>research</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>research, researchers, researching</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>TF-IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>information</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inform, information, informed, informs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This discursive strategy is unsurprising and highlights how official governmental counterradicalization initiatives strategically problematize threats coming from Islamic communities while remaining a-religious in their outline of operational practices seeking to counter those threats. Framing counterradicalization programs in this way diffuses questions and critique related to discriminatory practices, while also emphasizing that the supposed “threat” is coming from particular cultural and ethnic groups (see Table 4.1 and subsequent discussion highlighting the paradoxical nature of “terror threat” assessments).

### Table 4.5: References to Religions in Counterradicalization Frameworks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>2 (0.01%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>2 (0.01%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (0.01%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>174 (0.17%)</td>
<td>14 (0.14%)</td>
<td>20 (0.06%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judaism</td>
<td>2 (0.01%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: Building Resilience Against Terrorism, UK’s Prevent Strategy, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States

Other includes Buddhism, Hinduism, Atheism, Hellenism, Paganism

As data suggest, the discourses in which official government counterradicalization strategies are constructed reflect an overwhelming focus on Islam as the predominant source of so-called radicalization. In Congressional and Parliamentary debates in the US, UK, and Canada since 1969, which represent the most influential stages of the governance policy creation process, radicalization has been increasingly used to frame terrorism and counterterrorism practices (see Figure 4.3). Even more notable in light of
this chapter’s discussion is the overwhelming association of radicalization with Islam in Congressional and Parliamentary debates. Governmental debates are fundamental aspects of the legislative and social policy creation process; debate amongst legislators fuels legislative decisions and policy frameworks which form the output of government.

Approaching social policy and law as a byproduct of the legislative process in terms of, to borrow from Luhmann (1995), ‘structural coupling’ or more traditional approaches to sociological jurisprudence (Pound 1954; Parsons 1959), one can identify how problematizations vis-à-vis political discourses about radicalization influence subsequence policy outputted by the political system.

Figure 4.3: References to “Radicalization” and Islam in Congressional and Parliamentary Debates

---

17 References to Islam are here only included when used in relation to communications about radicalization. Parliamentary debates were analyzed for inclusions of references to Islam in the main clause or sub-clauses of references to radicalization. Data: US congressional debates (https://www.congress.gov), Parliamentary debates in the UK and Canada (http://hansard.millbanksystems.com and http://www.parl.gc.ca)
By framing the “terrorist threat” of so-called radicalization as an issue amongst predominantly Islamic communities, despite evidence that suggests otherwise, official counterradicalization policies are able to construct practices of counterradicalization in a generalized manner whilst still discursively connecting the concept to those already marginalized communities. The political system’s focus on Islam as the source of radicalization, evinced by governmental debates and self-referenced “threat levels,” is thus masked in its approach to the practices and intervention strategies that are included in its counterradicalization programs. Political officials are therefore able to profess the agnostic characteristics of counterradicalization practices, such as community engagement interventions and surveillance and monitoring programs, while indirectly and inexplicitly indicting Muslim communities. In other words, official counterradicalization strategies like Prevent (Canada and UK) and Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism, frame the “threat” of radicalization in terms of Islam, but the intervention practices outlined in the strategies are represented as areligious. This, I argue, is strategic based on political and legal pressures which prevent government from discriminating against particular populations. The practices must, officially speaking, be agnostic and applied equally across the populous to avoid charges of discrimination, however the logic and development of those intervention strategies are imbued with connections between the radicalization subject and Islam. This is particularly evident in the US, where counterradicalization strategies have been slow to develop because of the potential civil rights violations involved in preemptive intervention practices. The political system must ensure it does not present radicalization interventions focused on specific populations or risk violating the very legal mechanisms for which it constructs.
Finally, as highlighted in Table 4.4, each country’s current counterradicalization policy highlights the importance of community level policing initiatives. The focus on community policing is particularly relevant in the United Kingdom, which has the most developed counterradicalization framework of the three countries. Also in the United Kingdom and Canada, and to a lesser extent the United States (which provides very little detail regarding concrete intervention practices), counterradicalization strategies focus greatly on law enforcement-community engagement initiatives. Indeed, as noted in the United States’ guidelines, “well-informed and equipped families, local communities, and local institutions are considered “the best defenses against violent extremist ideologies” (The White House 2011: 2). The logic of such strategies are to build “resilience” (Public Safety Canada 2013), “cohesion” (The Home Office 2011a: 27), or “empower” local communities to “help them protect themselves” (The White House 2011: 1, 3).

In the Foucauldian tradition, scholars have highlighted how these community-level preemptive counterterrorism strategies seek to create a sense of self-discipline amongst Muslim communities by aligning ‘technologies of the self’ with ‘technologies of government’ (see Birt 2008; Dean 1997; Heath-Kelly 2013; McGhee 2008: Martin 2014; O’Toole et al. 2016). Such programs can therefore not be entirely disconnected from relations of power which disproportionately impact cultural and ethnic minorities. Indeed, practices of preemptive policing cannot be approached as ‘objective’ merely because the policing apparatus is *supposed* to be autonomous from political influence. Rather, as Mann and Lee (1979) and Brodeur (2010) illustrate, policing is intimately connected with government and political institutions and therefore also implicated in the construction and maintenance of hegemonic power. As the analysis here suggests, the very logics that
form the basis of counterradicalization strategies is one founded primarily in the construction of a “terrorist threat” coming from Islamic communities.

Whereas Charles Kurzman (2014) has argued that Muslim communities have been successful in “self-policing” and thus effective of countering radicalization from within, a broader approach to governance strategies, even largely disjointed ones like the current structure of counterradicalization in the United States, suggests that any such “self-policing” are potentially effected by legislative and public policy changes. In other words, political constructions of the “threat” of counterradicalization amongst certain populations puts those individuals and groups under a public microscope, making said groups more susceptible to adopting “self-policing” strategies, even if the objective “threat” level is not present. Furthermore, as the above analysis has illustrated, the diffusion of policing programs – now extending far beyond law enforcement, to areas such as schools and universities – and the political construction of terrorist threats vis-à-vis Islam highlight the relative impossibility of disconnecting the logic of such initiatives with the material practices outlined in those strategies. The strategies are constructed, justified, and maintained through continuous reference to the “threat” of radical Islamic extremism, regardless of political statements highlighting the agnostic approach of counterradicalization practices.

Conclusion

This chapter has sketched out some of the historical, legal, and political developments antecedent to the emergence of counterradicalization as a policy framework. Through the in-depth analysis of anti-terrorism law, political debates, official government
communications and reports, and counterradicalization strategies in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, I have aimed to highlight how radicalization has become a dominant framework for counterterrorism governance throughout Western liberal democracies. In the first part of the chapter, I traced some of the legal and political precursors to counterradicalization governance. Here, I explored questions related to how counterterrorism legislation has developed throughout the US, UK, and Canada, and how anti-terrorism policy has shifted from a relatively reactive approach to terrorist activities focusing on issues of military intervention and penal policy, to a more proactive, preemptive approach guided by notions of security, surveillance, intelligence, and community law enforcement.

I then moved to a discussion of how the political system has followed a similar, if not more pronounced, trajectory in terms of political approaches to counterterrorism and radicalization. I argued that shifts in governmental discourses around preemptive intervention strategies are reflective of a broad new approach to countering terrorism. I also outlined some of the structural and political conditions which make the emergence of official counterradicalization programs, centered on this innovative approach to terrorism, more or less likely. Finally, through the in-depth analysis of official counterradicalization strategies in the US, UK, and Canada, and the discursive contexts in which those strategies are constructed, I illustrate how the logic of counterradicalization is inextricably linked with representations of Islamic communities as the source of so-called radicalization. Even when official deradicalization programs, political leaders, and government officials emphasize that radicalization is a process that can affect any individual, regardless of religious background, the very construction of intervention
strategies related to counterradicalization are imbued with meaning that constructs Muslim communities as the problematic.

Following the discussion of how radicalization and counterradicalization are framed in the legal and political systems, the following chapters present similar analyses of the counterradicalization framework in some of the other dominant social institutions which influence the ways in which the public sphere approaches issues of terrorism. To this end, the next chapter highlights the discursive construction of radicalization in news media as a sample reflective of the broader cultural apparatus.
CHAPTER 5

SEEING RADICALIZATION THROUGH LAW

As demonstrated in Chapter Four, policies have been enacted that enlist teachers, professors, and community leaders, who are to be turned into informant systems that stretches beyond Muslim communities to areas of education, religious institutions, hospitals, and other community organizations. This is particularly evident in the United Kingdom, where the Counterterrorism and Security Act 2015 has mandated state-run organizations, such as schools, university, hospitals, and government-funded community organizations, to enact counterradicalization initiatives and report to government authorities when radicalization if suspected. Similar, albeit less juridically authorized, governance structures have been enacted in Canada and the United States. For instance, Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act 2015 has expanded the country’s law enforcement apparatus by criminalizing promotion of terrorism and expanding interagency information sharing networks. While I have thus far approached legislation that adopts such strategies as an output of the political system, it is also important to explore how similar issues are conceived of, and communicated about, by the legal system in relation to such legislation. This chapter thus aims to investigate juridical conceptualizations of radicalization in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada in order to understand the ways in which legal systems adopt, maintain, and communicate about the construct. Through in-depth analyses of federal case law in each country, this chapter offers an
empirically grounded exploration of juridical communications about radicalization and related phenomena.

Data for this chapter were derived from online searches of federal case law in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. United States’ state and federal case law were gathered from Westlaw, Google Scholar law, and The Public Library of Law.\(^\text{18}\) In the United Kingdom, data were gathered through Westlaw, and in Canada, federal case law was identified using the Canlii database. Databases were searched for the terms “radicalization” and “radicalisation,” and duplicate documents were excluded. In total, the search resulted in the inclusion of 103 legal decisions referencing radicalization, 58 in the United States, and 26 in the United Kingdom, and 19 in Canada. Analytic techniques adopted in this chapter include discourse and content analysis of federal case law. More specifically, I analyzed the data based on several emergent themes, including how case law defined, or attempted to define, radicalization; who, or what extra-legal elements, did the legal system refer to when offering defining characteristics of radicalization; and how radicalization was represented in reference to other social phenomena (i.e., religious background, criminality, psychology, social characteristics, etc.). Themes are presented qualitatively as well as quantitatively, in the form of theme counts, below.

The chapter is broken down into two sections based upon the advancement of separate, albeit interconnected, arguments. In the first section I highlight the legal systems’ apprehension to employing radicalization as a legal construct and suggest that

the conceptual ambiguity of radicalization allows it to be used by law in specific contexts (most notably when referencing Islam-related terrorism). In the second chapter, I build upon the first argument by illustrating how law uses the frame of radicalization in association with Islam to differentiate those cases from other crimino-legal elements, despite its noted ambiguity. I therefore aim to demonstrate the legal system’s creativity in terms of how it defines and gives meaning to radicalization and suggest that this inventiveness is founded in discriminatory legal practices. Prior to the empirical sections of the chapter, however, a brief outline of theoretical approach to the study of law is necessary.

*The Social System of Law and Legal Violence*

Within the governmentality literature, the rule of law is often viewed as a mechanism of governance and therefore sometimes ignored as an object of study in Foucauldian-inspired work. Indeed, law was not one of Foucault’s major objects of inquiry, nor did he advocate for a specific theory of law. Scholars working within this framework have grappled with contemporary issues in legal studies (for instance, see Hunt and Wickham (1994) or the more recent contribution from Golder (2013)), but, for the most part, Foucauldians continue to side-step analyses of law in their work, instead highlighting law as part of the art of government. While this has resulted in fruitful analyses of governmental power vis-à-vis law, governmentality studies have yet to develop robust theoretical tools for exploring the mechanisms by which legal decision-making specifically justifies and sustains new forms and strategies of government. Broadly within the governmentality framework, then, I attempt to broaden understandings of legal
decision-making in the context of terrorism. I do this by utilizing a theory of communication that can make sense of how law maintains and justifies new forms of governance aimed at intervening in the so-called radicalization process.

German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (2004) conceives of law as the autopoietic system that maintains normative expectations in the face of counter-factual examples. When there is a violation of normative expectations of law, the legal system counter-factually reaffirms those expectations with the binary code legal/illegal (Deflem 2008: 168). However, the coding legal/illegal is not self-sufficient – it is not enough to say that the autonomy of law stems from its orientation to stabilize normative expectations. As Luhmann (2004) maintains that “since the values legal and illegal are not in themselves criteria for decisions between legal and illegal, there must be further points of view that indicate whether or not and how the values of the code are to be allocated rightly or wrongly” (p. 192; italics in original). Here, Luhmann evokes the concept of law’s programs to which the application of the code is associated. The program of law, which Luhmann maintains are always conditional and a purely cognitive matter, consist of all the pre-existing principles, procedures, rules, statutes, and rulings that are made valid by past decisions linked to the code legal/illegal. Law’s programs include the selection of extra-juridical communications to justify its indication based on law binary code. For example, when faced with a legal decision without precedent (i.e., another one of law’s programs), the legal system can select from its environment – for example, scientific research, governmental communications, international law – to justify its decisions.

These programs operate on the bases of an “if-then” structure: if certain legal conditions are met, then a certain legal decision will be made (Deflem 2008: 168; Nobles
and Schiff 2013). However, the operational closure of the legal system is not obliterated by violations of legal norms. For Luhmann, it is quite the opposite: any disappointment of institutionalized expectations of law actually reaffirms the normative expectation through prosecution and punishment. For example, in the context of anti-terror law, the legal system maintains that one ought to not commit ideologically or politically motivated violence regardless of counter-factual examples (i.e., events of ideological or politically motivated violence). Any disappointment of such legal norm does not invalidate the norm; it confirms it by producing further legal operations (i.e., charges, trials, legal decisions etc.).

As Luhmann’s (2004) theory suggests, the function of the legal system is to decide on social conflicts through the distinction legal/illegal. However, what establishes the distinction legal/illegal in the first place is the legal system; law establishes what is legal and illegal. This paradox, which is unavoidable, must then be deparadoxified with law’s programs in order to legally decide on social conflicts (i.e., precedent, legal codes, extra-juridical observation, etc.). The system must therefore find justification for its decisions in law or elsewhere. This deparadoxification of law is therefore where analyses of legal decision-making are most appropriate – the so-called ‘critical’ aspect of his theory is derived from deconstructing the ways in which law justifies and maintains its decision-making in the face of juridically ambiguous and opaque social phenomena.

Luhmann’s theory of law as a society system is useful in analyses of law’s contingency. While it is here adopted in terms of its analytic value for exploring inter-
systemic relationships, his sociological approach provides a sound theoretical basis for critical explorations of legal decision-making and its effect on individuals and groups. I therefore deploy Luhmann’s theory of intersystemic communication with critical approaches to law that emphasize law’s tendency to justify and sustain hierarchies based on hegemonic social order. Perhaps no work is more influential in this respect than Sarat and Kearns’ (1995) influential book *Law’s Violence*. Since its publication in the mid-1990s, scholars across the social sciences have adopted questions related to the ways in which law remains indifferent while inflicting harm on those under its authority. This body of work moves beyond approaches to law that emphasize its normative influence on complex societies, and highlights how law and the legal system can be the producer of social harm rather than the arbiter of justice.

Researchers working within the area of counterterrorism have noted how law justifies and maintains forms of violence against cultural and ethnic minorities. Sherene Razack (2009), by example, highlights how Muslims have been casted out of Western law and politics through the creation of categories of people and perpetuation of myths about Islam in the legal system. As Razack (2009) puts it, her work “explores some of the places in law and society in the West where these figures animate a story about a family of white nations, a civilization, obliged to use force and terror to defend itself against a menacing cultural other” (p. 5). Razack argues that law is not immune to the climate of fear of Muslims permeating the public sphere and that, in Canada and elsewhere, laws

---

19 As noted in Chapter Three, this dissertation adopts a systems theoretical approach to exploring discursive formations of radicalization throughout society’s most fundamental institutions. That is not to suggest that I approach each system as an organ, or necessity, for the ‘proper’ functioning of the whole social system. I simply utilize a systems analytical perspective to best illustrate inter-systemic relationships as they relate to radicalization discourses.
have been enacted that suspend rights and create an isolated area for those labelled a ‘terrorist.’ As noted in Chapter Two, others have highlighted this trend through the deployment of notions such as ‘counter-law’ or state of exception, where law is suspended in order to deal with issues of terrorism and insecurity (see Ericson 2008 and Larsen and Piché 2009).

Within the theoretical approach of systems theory, researchers have illustrated the utility of Luhmann’s legal theory when adopting a critical perspective. As Nicolas Carrier (2007) observers, law’s extra-judicial selection of various discourses highlights its creativity when dealing with ambiguous, and often contentious, social phenomena. Katayoun Baghai (2015), on the other hand, has used this theoretical perspective to demonstrate how the US Court was able to deny African Americans equal protection under the law by through creative, and inconsistent, application of legal principles.

Approaching law as a functional system does not posit a functional relationship between law and other social systems. Rather, it offers an analytic framework for exploring inter-systemic communication by highlighting the functional aspects of the social system. It is thus important to reflect on the ways in which law creatively selects from possible extra-legal communication and, perhaps more importantly, how juridical selectivity (re)produces forms of inequality that effect already vulnerable individuals and groups.

As such, this chapter aims to explore the legal construction of radicalization by paying particular attention to how law justifies its conceptualization of the concept through hetero-reference to external communications regarding terrorism, risk, and security. Through engagement with Luhmann’s sociology of law and critical approaches to legal violence, this chapter contributes to a more general theory of shifting strategies of
governance by highlighting how juridical anxieties over its deployment of radicalization discourses are indicative of law’s own biases and discriminatory practices.

“Seeing” Radicalization Through Law: Juridical Anxieties and Legal Constructions of Radicalization

As Figure 5.1 illustrates, the legal systems in all three countries have timidly deployed the concept of radicalization its decision-making. This is particularly evident in the United Kingdom and Canada, where the concept was only used in federal case law 26 and 19 times respectively (cf. the United States, where the construct was referenced 58 times). While the construct was used sporadically in federal law from the 1970s to the late 1990s, legal usage of the term increased substantially in the mid-2000s. In fact, the United Kingdom did not use the construct once until 2001, Canada did not reference radicalization until 2000, and the United States used the concept only 10 times prior to 2002. Since 2002, the concept has been used 91 times (48 in the US, 25 in the UK, and 18 in Canada), which represents 88% of the total references to radicalization in all federal case law since 1970 (95% in Canada and the UK).

A deeper analysis of juridical constructions of the concept in federal case law suggests that legal systems avoid defining radicalization in legal terms. In fact, most references to radicalization throughout the jurisdictions offer no legal definition of the concept at all, but rather use extra-juridical observations of the construct to justify legal decision-making. These non-legal elements are utilized by juridical decision makers (i.e., judges) to provide authoritative legitimization to the courts’ own observation of legally ambiguous social phenomena, in this case the radicalization frame. Examples of legal observation of extra-legal communication are numerous in the data:
In essence, the controversy is over the question of whether the West continues to face a grave threat from Al Qaeda or whether the true menace comes from loose knit cells of Western born Muslims or Muslim immigrants studying and working in the West; what Sageman calls disaffected "bunches of guys" who undergo the process of radicalization together. (Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263)\(^{20}\)

An expert witness, Professor Wark, testified in relation to these allegations and informed the Court on HCI, A. Khadr’s involvement and his radicalization through time. Mr. Khan, an ex-member of the Board of Administration of HCI and old acquaintance of A. Khadr, testified as well. (Harkat (Re), 2010 FC 1241)

One of the two academics contacted by the Research Directorate—an adjunct professor of political science at Philadelphia’s Temple University—sees the screening process as a kind of pre-emptive strategy, one used to discourage Tamils from pursuing “a new wave of Tamil radicalization” (Adjunct Professor 13 Jan. 2011), while the other fellow—a senior fellow at the New Delhi-based Center for Land Warfare Studies—describes it as a means to cleanse the Tamil population of any remaining LTTE cadres (Senior Research Fellow 28 Dec. 2010). (Sivapathasuntharam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 489)

In these cases, the Canadian federal legal system selects from extra-juridical communications to help define radicalization for use by law. Selecting Marc Sageman’s “bunch of guys” hypothesis – that individuals who become radicalize often do so with a groupthink mentality, radicalizing together based on similar interests, characteristics, and experiences – to define characteristics of radicalization. In addition, through hetero-reference to security scholars such as Wesley Wark, the legal system presents a relatively narrow conceptualization of the so-called radicalization process. By selecting from a specific group of academic knowledge claims, the legal system thus adopts a conceptualization of radicalization in terms of what Arun Kundnani (2012) calls a

---

\(^{20}\) See Chapter Seven for an in-depth analysis of scholarly discourses related to radicalization and the critiques regarding much of the discipline’s methodological and empirical approach. Marc Sageman’s work represents only a portion of radicalization discourses available for the legal system to select.
“theological-psychological” approach (see Chapter Seven for in depth analysis of this approach). For law, radicalization is in part theological and in part a social psychological framework for understanding processes towards ideologically motivated violence.

Interestingly, law also thought it appropriate to employ observations from academically questionable sources, including an adjunct professor, rather than seeking out more diverse perspectives and expertise widely available (see Chapter Seven).21 The legal system thus evidences its selectivity in how it defines the concept. As we shall see in Chapter Seven, the legal system has access to other scholarly interpretations of issues related to counterradicalization, selecting amongst a particular group of perspectives, while ignoring others, highlights law’s own approach to conceptualizing radicalization. We can therefore analyze how law gives meaning to radicalization through its hetero-reference to external definitions.

This trend was not solely evident in Canada, but also in the United Kingdom, where the legal system almost exclusively referenced external definitions of radicalization rather than providing its own. An analysis of the data highlight the numerous discursive strategies evoked by the legal system to distance conceptualizations of radicalization from law:

In the Appendix, Dr Seddon dealt with the rise in Islamic fundamentalism and its connection with Afghanistan…Dr Seddon quoted from a book "Afghan Wars" which described how charitable organisations mushroomed and that many were involved in teaching radical or fundamentalist versions of Sunni Islam to the displaced Afghan population in Pakistan. The author of the book considered that had led to the development of the Taliban. Around 1993, the appellant said, the Algerian authorities asked the Pakistan Government to return all Algerians

21 While I do not here advance the idea that adjunct status is to be conflated with a lack of expertise, I do suggest that law’s selection of such communications over research conducted by more established scholars is puzzling.
who were in that part of Pakistan. **He said that one of the main reasons was the fear of large-scale radicalisation** of those Algerians who remained in Pakistan, with the possibility of their involvement with emerging fundamentalists like the Taliban and their later return to Algeria to join the paramilitary opposition. (*Terrorist Suspects, HS Algeria CG [2009] UKAIT 00023*)

Mr Parker [Governor of a UK prison] said that there were also concerns about "maintaining the safety of some high profile inhabitants of the unit and to managing issues of radicalisation of prisoners". (*Bary & Ors. R v Secretary of State for Justice and Anor [2010] EWHC 587*)

In a Government Reply to the Report of Lord Carlile of Berriew QC of July 2007, the then Secretary of State, Ms Jacqui Smith MP, also referred to exit strategies when she stated that: "**The Government believes it important to consider whether de-radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes could be deployed to help individuals subject to a control order.** Such initiatives would form another potential exit strategy, though consideration would need to be given – as part of the Control Order Review Group process – to the appropriateness of such action in relation to each individual..." (*AM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 2486*)

Professor Andrew Silke and Doctor Catherine Brown prepared detailed reports looking generically at the evolution of radicalisation as well as how it can most effectively be addressed. (*London Borough Tower Hamlets v B [2016] EWHC 1707*)

As evinced by the above examples, on numerous occasions the legal system was hesitant to adopt the concept of radicalization as a legal element. Rather, it evoked non-juridical observations of characteristics and features of radicalization, and a so-called radicalization process, to adopt the framework in UK law. Most often the extra-juridical conceptualizations of radicalization were deployed to reference offenders’ (or offender

---

22 Andrew Silke has published widely on issues of terrorism and counterterrorism. His major titles, including *The Psychology of Counter-terrorism* (2013) and *Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform* can be considered theological-psychological analyses of terrorism and radicalization. See Chapter Seven for a discussion of academic discourses related to radicalization.
groups’) trajectory towards criminality, thus constructing the frame “radicalization” as synonymous with more established legal principles related to motive clauses. This tendency was evident in several legal cases regarding radicalization, not least of which included a “fact finding” exercise in the United Kingdom’s High Court of Justice, where a series of security experts from think-tanks and government agencies provided testimony and “vulnerability assessments” on case studies to establish radicalization as motive for criminal activities (C, D & E (Radicalisation: Welfare) [2016] E WHC 3088). Rather than providing its own definition of the legally ambiguous concept, the law evoked external definitions of radicalization to establish motives for problematic activities. The legal system could thus translate radicalization into more established legal notions related to motive.

The trend of legal avoidance to the concept of radicalization was made explicit in UK law:

Having read this material overnight, I am satisfied that its author reveals a radicalised and extreme perspective on the world. Those words are sadly now so much a part of contemporary life – 'extremism' and 'radicalisation' – that they scarcely need definition. Nonetheless, to avoid ambiguity I adopt the July 2015 Revised 'Prevent Duty' Guidance for England and Wales: Guidance for specified authorities in England and Wales on the duty in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. There, radicalisation is defined as referring to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups. (K (Children), Re 2016)

Despite the explicit observation that radicalization, and discourses therein, are juridically vague, the legal system thought it necessary to evoke a governmental definition of the term. As highlighted in the previous Chapter, law thus adopts governmental discourses
which are problematic in several respects, not least of which relate to the constructs disproportionate focus on Islam and Muslim communities.

The United States federal legal system also reflected similar trends in its deployment of radicalization discourses. To a lesser degree than the UK and Canada, US federal courts avoided defining the concept in law, but legal focus on cultural and ethnic minorities in its communications about radicalization were more explicit. While the analysis of case law highlights the legal systems use of the term as a common discursive frame, it falls short of legally defining the concept whilst contributing to conceptual associations between radicalization and Islam:

During his employment, Alomari conducted or participated in presentations or trainings for different law enforcement-affiliated groups, often discussing Arabic/Islamic culture and radicalization. Some of Alomari's presentations were met with conflicting, and some controversial, information from co-presenters. In fall 2008, Alomari spoke about radicalization at a Terrorism Liaison Officer ("TLO") training. (Alomari v. Ohio Department of Public Safety 2014)

Subjects and their associates may also be investigated because they are suspected of or involved in the recruitment, training, indoctrination, or radicalization of individuals for terrorist activities or fundraising for terrorist organizations. More directly, individuals subjected to counterterrorism investigations may be involved in plotting terrorist attacks. In the nearly eleven years that have passed since September 11, 2001, Islamic extremists have continued to plot and attempt to carry out numerous terrorist attacks both on U.S. soil and abroad against U.S. targets and allies. (Fagaza v Federal Bureau of Investigation 2012)

The US federal legal system also used quotations in its references to radicalization on several occasions, denoting its own apprehension with the concept or its use of extra-juridical definitions of the term (United States of America v John Doe 2015; Alomari v Ohio Department of Public Safety 2015). This, I argue, further demonstrates law’s relatively timid approach to using the term as a legal element, and highlights how law
uses the construct to connect behaviors associated with terrorism with more established legal standards of patterned behaviors and criminal motives.

Federal legal systems in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada thus presented a selective and relatively narrow conceptualization of radicalization in their decisions. Rather than defining the term for use is law, judges deferred to extra-legal conceptualizations of radicalization to lend authority to the legal systems’ decision-making. The extra-juridical communications selected by the legal system were most often academic discourses or ‘expert’ analyst discourses representing only a portion of available radicalization research. While this development is not new in law – the system often references extra-legal expertise to justify its decisions – the juridical selectivity in this case has notable implications.

Firstly, as I shall demonstrate in Chapter Seven, academic discourses are not always ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ truth claims, but they are often imbued in sociopolitical contexts and thus can be reflective of the maintenance and configuration of social hierarchies. Academic knowledge productions related to radicalization must therefore be examined in terms of their logic, mission, and rationale, as well as their methodological, empirical, and theoretical foundations, in order to understand potential biases and implications of the work. Juridical construction of legal elements from only a particular sample of scholarly discourses related to radicalization is indicative of the legal system’s adoption of some biases which, I shall demonstrate later, influence scholarly research in the area.

Secondly, through the creative adoption of governmental conceptualizations of radicalization by law, the legal systems were able at once avoid defining the concept
while using it to connect problematic activities with established legal elements (i.e., motives). The creativity law demonstrates in this respect also highlights some of law’s discriminatory power. As I illustrated in Chapter Four, governmental conceptualizations of radicalization are disproportionately focused on Muslim communities since the apparent “risk” of terrorism in those communities is exaggerated by a corpus of governmental ‘experts.’ Through the adoption of those same discourses in the legal system, law contributes to the very idea that radicalization is predominantly an issue amongst Muslim communities. The idea that law contributes to disproportionate problematizations of Islam with respect to its communications about radicalization is expanded upon in the next section of this chapter.

“Seeing” Law’s Violence: Legal Conceptualizations of Radicalization and the Othering of Islam

Important trends were evident in the detailed analysis of legal systems’ use of the term radicalization in case law. As Figure 5.1 illustrates, federal case law in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom overwhelmingly used the concept when referencing Islam or Muslim communities. While associations between radicalization and Islam in law occurred periodically from the 1970s to the 1990s, the majority of references to both Islam and radicalization occurred after 2005 (see Figure 5.1). In some cases, most evident in 2013 and 2015, every single reference made to radicalization by law also mentioned Islam.
A more detailed analysis of the data highlight how each jurisdiction’s legal system represented radicalization in relation to specific religious faiths (See Tables 5.1 and 5.2). As Table 5.1 illustrates, the majority of federal case law references to radicalization were accompanied by references to Islam. This trend was particularly relevant in the United Kingdom, where all case law mentioning radicalization also referenced Islam. Interestingly, Canadian law did not explicitly reference Islam as often as the US or UK federal case law. However, as we shall see, the Canadian legal system did often use the concept of radicalization to denote social issues rooted in religious conflicts.
Table 5.1: Federal Case Law References to Islam and Radicalization by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>References to Islam</th>
<th>Total Cases</th>
<th>% of References to Islam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Further analysis highlights how Islam was the overwhelming focus of case law decisions referencing radicalization (see Table 5.2). References to religious backgrounds other than Islam were made only 16% of the time, the overwhelming majority of which were made to distinguish activities of radicalization from more conventional behaviors of other religion’s patrons. A topographical perspective of federal case law in each jurisdiction suggests that the Canadian legal system takes a much more agnostic approach to communications about radicalization, whereas the US and UK frame religion as a much more central characteristic in its legal case law.

Table 5.2: References to Religions in Federal Case Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judaism</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other includes Buddhism, Hinduism, Atheism, Hellenism, Paganism.
In-depth qualitative analysis of federal case law in the US, UK, and Canada highlights some of the discursive strategies employed in legal decision making related to radicalization and issues of terrorism and terrorist activities. Case law most often referenced Islam as a fundamental cause, or correlate, of a process of radicalization. When referencing other religions, the legal systems most often used such notations to indicate difference – difference between conventional activities and ‘radical’ Muslim ideologies. An example of this can be found in the Canadian Federal Court’s ruling in the case of Mohamed Harkat: 23

Abu Zubaydah has a questionable past. He is associated with Khalid Sheikh Mohamed (alias Mokhtar), “the one behind 9/11”. He was also convicted and sentenced in absentia unsuccessful millennium bomb attacks in Jordan in 2000, along with Sakka, an Al-Qaeda member. The Jordanian officials tie him to terrorist plots to attack a hotel as well as Christian holy sites in their country. He is also considered to be a “travel facilitator”, a “fixer” for radical Muslim ideologies, a “travel agent” and a “safe house keeper” (Harkat (Re), 2010 FC 1241)

In the United Kingdom, the High Court has made the distinction between Muslim/non-Muslim vis-à-vis radicalization explicit, highlighting the teachings of Sharia as a problematic form of religious activity:

I have come to the clear conclusions that the remaining findings sought in relation to the mother (paragraphs 3, 5, 6 and 13) have been made out both in relation to her actions and in exposing the children to her radical views (whether it be free mixing, alcohol, homosexuality, democracy, Judaism and more worryingly how and in what way Sharia and the caliphate should be established across the world). M’s views about the Paris murders are chilling. There is the clearest, strong evidence (whether it be from the photographic evidence, all the way to what the children have said whilst in foster care) that they have been exposed

23 Mohamed Harkat is an Algerian-Canadian who was arrested in 2002 under suspicion of links to terrorist organizations and detained under Canada’s security certificate mechanism. Security certificates are a controversial mechanism by which the Government of Canada can detain and deport foreign nationals and non-citizens living in Canada if suspected of violating human rights, having membership within organized crime or terrorist organizations, or pose a threat to national security.
to such thoughts and have adopted them. (A Local Authority v M & Ors 2016)

Mr Bandegani referred also to paragraph 77 of the expert report. Being a Yezidi was a risk-increasing factor. The ability to relocate in central and southern Iraq was severely inhibited by the general security situation. It could be seen from the Operational Guidance Note that there were a number of checkpoints both military and illegal and these were real limits on freedom of movement. The increase of Islamic radicalisation in Iraq point underlined the relevance of the appellant being Yezidi. He did not go to the mosque on Fridays and did not pray five times a day and he could not be expected to deny his ethnicity and religion and change to accommodate this and therefore he would be recognised as being a non-Muslim. (NS Iraq CG [2007] UKAIT 00046)

The Yazidi religion, one of the oldest minority groups in Iraq, is adopted by the legal distinction of Muslim/non-Muslim, with Islam explicitly being problematized in terms of radicalization. Being Yezidi is presented by law as a “risk-increasing factor” insofar as being victimized by “Islamic radicalization” due to “being non-Muslim.” The UK High Court thus constructs a distinction between Muslims/non-Muslims in terms of radicalization – and radicalization indicates one side of the distinction. The UK’s use of a Muslim/non-Muslim distinction for understanding radicalization was again made clear by the UK High Court of Justice in 2016:

The mother is about forty. She was born and initially brought up here in England. When she was aged about nine her parents emigrated to Canada where she was to live for about the next eighteen years. She is a British citizen. The mother's own parents are clearly committed and active Christians of the Presbyterian leaning. It was in that faith that the mother was brought up and to which she adhered. However, in her later twenties, whilst at college in Canada, she herself was attracted to, and later converted to, the Muslim faith. (M (Children), Re [2014] EWHC 667)

Later in the same case, the High Court of Justice concluded:

If any child is being indoctrinated or infected with thoughts involving the possibility of "terrorism" or, indeed, hatred for their native country, which is England, or another religion, such as Christianity…then that is
potentially very abusive indeed and of the utmost gravity. (M (Children), Re [2014] EWHC 667)

The above example illustrates two important developments. The first is that the UK High Court of Justice presented radicalization in terms of religious conflict between Islam and other religious faiths. This was a common discursive strategy used in UK law, particularly in the High Court, where the distinction Muslim/not-Muslim was often used to explicate issues related to radicalization. For the legal system, radicalization, as ambiguous as it is as a legal construct, is useful when referencing a certain type of problematic activity: transitions in thought and belief towards Islamic extremism. Framing radicalization in this way allows the legal system to observe a host of “risk factors” that would otherwise be considered non-socially obtuse. In other words, deploying radicalization as a proxy for motive, legal systems are able to observe practices that are normally considered socially productive – increased participation in religious organizations, devotion to religious teachings, community membership – as precursors to criminal activity. Rather than break away from the ambiguity of radicalization by ignoring the concept, legal systems analyzed here utilize the term to denote risk and insecurity amongst Muslim communities. Additionally, when other religious faiths were referenced, they were most often positioned on the ‘right’ side of the radicalization distinction.

The second, and perhaps more indicative of the diffusion of radicalization discourses throughout the public sphere, is that this case was heard by the Family Division of the High Court. The case is therefore not a criminal case, but a domestic decision case determining parents’ suitability to supervise their children. As Chapter Four illustrated, this is interesting because radicalization discourses have moved beyond the
security and law enforcement apparatuses to other dominant institutions, here evinced by
the family Court’s inclusion of radicalization as a frame of legal decision-making. This
trend was most evident in the United Kingdom and aligns with much of the literature
which suggests the UK has the most diffused counterradicalization apparatus in the West.
However, as I aim to demonstrate in this dissertation, similar developments are taking
place in Canada and the United States. In Canada, legal radicalization discourses have
already spread to the areas of immigration, and in the US, the term has been employed in
legal decision-making in areas of corporate enterprise and Internet technologies (Fields v
Twitter 2016). These developments, I argue, in part illustrate the diffusion of
radicalization discourses throughout the public sphere.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I aimed to highlight how Western legal systems conceptualize
radicalization in their communications. Through an analysis of federal case law
mentioning the concept in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, I explored
questions related to how law defines radicalization and what are some of the implications
of legal definitions of the term. No legal definition of radicalization could be found in
law. Instead, the legal system deferred to extra-legal communications in the form of
scientific, political, and industry expertise in terms of how to define the construct. The
legal systems thus adopted extra-legal definitions of the term to legitimize their decisions
in cases brought in front of the court. As I shall demonstrate in Chapter Seven, many of
these extra-juridical radicalization discourses are imbued in biases and discriminatory
approaches to terrorism focused on Muslim communities. I therefore argue that legal
usage of the term is also reflective of a disproportionate fear of Muslims when
considering issues of terrorism. The legal system’s adoption of radicalization as a proxy for religious conflict is thus indicative of what Sarat and Kearns (1995) call ‘law’s violence’ whereby law discriminates against certain individuals and groups while remaining, at the surface at least, aloof to its own paradoxes and biases.

In the next Chapter, I extend this analysis beyond law and consider how radicalization is conceptualized, framed, and (re)configured in our cultural system. I explore mass media representations in the form of major newspaper articles as a sample reflective of the broader population of cultural communications. In this way, I continue to develop a theory of the diffusion of radicalization discourses throughout the entire social system. With the analysis conducted thus far, of politics and law, and the analyses yet to come, of culture and science, I aim to paint a broad picture of how radicalization as a framework and overall governmental logic has proliferated throughout the public sphere.
CHAPTER 6

DISCOURSES OF RADICALIZATION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE

As noted above, radicalization has become a pervasive concept used in political, government, and media discourse alike. Generally understood as a process whereby individuals and groups transition from conventional political, religious, or ideological beliefs to extremist views and activities, radicalization is now a dominant theme for understanding contemporary terrorist activity. The concept is increasingly being relied upon in official governmental discourses – such as the *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* strategy in the United States, the PREVENT strategy in the United Kingdom, and the *Building Resilience Against Terrorism* strategy in Canada – in addition to popular and scientific communications. The adoption of radicalization discourse is thus reflective of the generally agreed upon nature of the term. While recently scholars have begun to problematize discursive constructions of radicalization (Kundnani 2015; Pisoiu 2013; Silva 2017), the development of the concept has yet to be fully explored on an empirical level.

While there is much literature on representations of Muslims in respect to terrorism and terrorist activity (see Nurullah 2010; Poole 2002; Saeed 2007; Shaheen 2003), there remains a dearth of research exploring the emergence of frames which try to make sense of why individuals and groups engage in such activities. One such novel framework for understanding terrorism is the so-called radicalization process. In light of
the considerable attention being paid to radicalization by governments and media in the West (see Silva 2017), it is thus important to continue a critique of the very construction of the concept of radicalization, and the impact of such constructions on the social apparatus. Previous work has started this dialogue and has opened opportunities to further develop, both theoretically and conceptually, the social construction of radicalization discourse and its implications vis-à-vis governmental policy, law enforcement techniques, and security and surveillance, as well as its effect on local communities.

This chapter thus more deeply explores news media representations of this emergent discourse, which has increasingly been referenced in various governmental and law enforcement strategies. Relying on theoretical and empirical contributions in the area of sociology, governance practices, and the othering paradigm, this chapter is guided by the central question: How has ‘radicalization’ come to be understood and represented throughout the cultural apparatus?

Scholars have noted that media has the ability to influence public opinion and policy alike (Baum and Potter 2008). It is therefore important to examine the construction and configuration of cultural representations of radicalization because of their potentially influential effect on popular understandings of terrorism related phenomena and government counter-radicalization policies. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to examine the proliferation of national news coverage related to ‘radicalization’ in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom in the past several decades using discourse and content analysis to offer insight into how the social system of media defines the concept and, equally important to this analysis, how the concept is constitutive of, and constructed by, the social world. This chapter aims to understand the
discursive strategies used in Western text to construct certain social groups distant ‘other.’ Drawing on the Orientalism framework developed by Edward Said (1978), in addition to contemporary work within the governmentality framework (see O’Toole et al. 2016), this paper argues that the producers of radicalization discourse employ strategic discursive mechanisms to treat the Muslim community as subject of negativised radicalization, thereby utilizing the concept to position Islam in opposition to the West. Furthermore, I advance the established idea that the cultural apparatus might influence the reconfiguration of counterterrorism practices around notions of preemption. In line with the logic of radicalization, mass media influences the popular imagination regarding radicalization, the subjects of radicalization discourse, and the practices of counterradicalization through its representations and discursive frames.

The ‘Othering’ Paradigm, Cultural Representations of Terror, and Media Constructions of Radicalization

This chapter is analytically guided by the systems theoretical approach outlined in chapter three, in addition Edward Said’s (1978; 1981) Orientalism perspective. Theoretically, this chapter adopts the framework of governmentality, developed by Michel Foucault and broadened in this area by the work of Therese O’Toole (2016) and others (see Croft 2012b; Edmunds 2012; Mythen, Walklate and Khan 2009), which posits that new forms of governance have emerged which subject cultural and ethnic minorities to a series of pervasive scrutiny practices in the name of preemption and security. Added to these theoretical approaches, are perspectives on the diffusion of proactive governance practices (Anderson 2010; Aradau and van Munster 2007; Collier and Lakoff 2008; de Goede 2008a, 2008b), which are here reflected by cultural representations of
radicalization which have proliferated throughout Western liberal democracies over the past few decades. A brief review of these bodies of work are therefore useful prior to engaging in the analysis.

Media studies in this area often point to Edward Said’s *Covering Islam* (1981) as the first systematic, and one of the most influential, analyses of Western media’s coverage and representations of Islam. Written shortly after the Iranian Revolution, the book argues that Western media represents Arabs and Muslims predominantly in terms of “noteworthy issues,” here conceptualized as oil production or terrorism, and thereby obscure representations of Islam (Said 1981). Contributing to the misrepresentation of the Muslim community is the fact that these “noteworthy issues” are determined by a select few powerful Western groups (i.e., media conglomerates). As such, he argues, that the interpretations of Islam provided by Western media “can be attributed to the political influence of those people or institutions producing it rather than necessarily to truth or accuracy” (Said 1981: 169). The political influence of the media, Said (1981) maintains, enables it to form the “cultural apparatus’ through which the Western world derives its consciousness. In this way, Western media is able to represent Islam as a distant and unrecognizable ‘outsider’, whilst ‘covering up’ its true nature (Said 1981).

The othering paradigm has been quite influential in media discourse, particularly so in the case of representations of Islam and Muslim communities (i.e., Nurullah 2010; Said 1981). Scholars working in this tradition tend to argue that one of the most common mechanisms for constructing dichotomies between ‘us’ on the one hand, and ‘them’ on the other, is to emphasize differences among people in terms religious belief systems (Silva 2017). Saeed (2007), for example, suggests that discursive strategies represent
British Muslims as ‘alien other’ through continuous reference to ‘un-Britishness’ and ‘deviant’ behaviors, which place emphasize social distance. In this way, Saeed’s (2007) argument aligns with the classic work of Georg Simmel (1921), who introduced the notion of ‘the stranger’ as a distinct and emergent social category – one whom is a member of the group in which she lives yet remains distant from members of the group. Poole (2002), also explores this tendency, and argues British media coverage of global Muslim issues (i.e., through themes of terrorism, conflict, and ‘fundamentalism’) quantitatively overshadow local accounts of Muslim affairs. Subsequently, she suggests these representations construct a public imagination of Muslims ‘out there’ which influences lay perceptions of British Muslims (Poole 2002). To borrow again from Simmel (1921), just as the stranger comes today and stays tomorrow, Muslims in modern liberal democracies have been subject to a variety of social mechanisms, particularly so in relation to images of terrorism, which emphasize distance rather than proximity. Findings that underscore the ‘othering’ Islam have been found in analyses of news media in Finland (Creutz-Kåmppi 2008), Australia (Dunn 2001), and in American motion pictures and television programs (Shaheen 2003; Nurullah 2010).

Othering, or the ‘othering’ process, has indeed become an influential theoretical framework in its own right, one that has been applied to research programs in disparate academic disciplines, from sociology to nursing and health (see Canales 2000; Grove and Zwi 2006) and media studies (Creutz-Kåmppi 2008). Within analyses of mass media representations of Islam, the othering perspective is largely indebted Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978), which transformed the ways that we conceptualize traditional power relations between the East and the West. In it Said offers a perspective for understanding
the cultural (mis)representations that form the basis of West’s, which he calls the ‘Occident,’ perceptions of the East, referred to as the ‘Orient.’ Said broadly defines Orientalism on three levels. The first is that Orientalism is an academic discipline, a set of ‘objective’ ideas whose function is to build an edifice of knowledge about the Orient (Said 1978). Second, as Said suggests, it is a “style of thought based on an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident’” (Said 1978: 2). In other words, it is a system of thought premised on a dichotomy between East and West that forms the basis for accounts of the Orient in the first place. Third level of Orientalism is the corporate institution that holds authority over, makes statements about, or restructures the Orient (Said 1978: 2). Orientalism is thus a Western style of thought used to dominate and hold power over the East. In fact, Said (1978) argues, Western orientalist scholarship is a fundamental aspect of the West’s authority of the East as it was what constructed the concept of the Orient in the first place. On the basis of these three levels, according to Said, the West is able to create distinctions between itself and ‘others’, namely Islamic cultures in the East. In addition, Said (1978) contends that Orientalism produces false perceptions of Islamic cultures, including the assumption that that “Islam remained forever the Orientalist’s idea (or type) of cultural effrontery, aggravated by the fear that Islamic civilization originally (as well as contemporaneously) continued to stand somehow opposed to the Christian West” (42).

Before I move on, I must make one important conceptual note. Said’s Orientalism is an exploration of Western representations of the East, thereby contributing to discourses of the West’s power and authority over the Eastern world. This chapter recognizes contributes to this discourse by epistemologically grounding its analysis in
Western news media coverage of radicalization. While scholars have proclaimed that type of sampling is by nature Eurocentric (Khatib 2006), this study does not assume that such a relationship exists. Rather, this research explores the strategies by which Western representations ‘other’ the Islamic community. This project does thus not make use of the terms Orientalism/Islam or East/West, as mutually exclusive monolithic dichotomies, but rather engages with them as conceptual frameworks for understanding of how influential discourses are formed in very strategic ways about particular cultural groups. My aim is to identify the hegemonic discourses which are constructed, restructured, and transformed and which influence popular imaginaries of the Islamic community.

Added to the perspectives utilizing the Orientalism framework, this chapter engages with scholarly literature highlighting shifts in governance practices and techniques which increasingly adopt a preemptive, preventative logic. This body of scholarship, mostly aligned with Foucault’s notion of governmentality (1977; 1991a), focuses on the ways in which actors exercise control over, or govern, the public vis-à-vis new logics of preemptive counterterrorism (see Heath-Kelly 2013; Martin 2014; O’Toole et al. 2016). Governmentality, famously referred to as “the art of government,” explores the emergence of forms and types of governmental rationality which lay the foundation for techniques and strategies by which a society is rendered governable (Foucault 1991a; Lemke 2002; Rose, O’Malley and Valverde 2006). As discussed in chapter five, scholars working within this tradition have situated preventative logic in terms of a wider shift toward what Aradau and van Munster (2008) call a “dispositif of risk,” defined broadly as the “heterogeneous assemblage of discursive and material elements for governing social problems” (p. 24-25). This “dispositif of risk” in part renders the future
‘knowable,’ de Goede and Simon (2013) argue, through the ideal and material construction of “anticipatory epistemic objects,” which refers to a set of practices and knowledge claims aimed at governing the future in the present (p. 321). This epistemic object is mobilized, according to de Goede and Simon (2013), through representations of the threat, knowledge practices, and intervention strategies aimed at prevention – in this case, the prevention of terrorism. The future is made knowable and, equally important, actionable through ideal and material representations and claims to knowledge about the anticipatory object. In the case of terrorism, the anticipatory object is the radical; the individual or group at risk of transition from problematic political or ideological belief to violence. While scholars have indeed highlighted the important development of an “anticipatory epistemic object” of radicalization, in the domains of governmental discourse and policy, there remains a dearth of empirical research exploring the mechanisms by which such representations are constructed. Aside from some notable contributions (Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2009; Neumann 2013; Silva 2017), representations of the radicalization object outside of political and government discourses has yet to be adequately explored. I have previously examined cultural representations of radicalization in a single newspaper (see Silva 2017), but scholars have yet to widely adopt a comparative approach to the analysis of such cultural representations.

This chapter therefore approaches media as partly reflective of some of these discursive and material elements which seek to govern populations through discourses of terrorism. Further, this chapter explores how the mass media – here conceptualized as a sample of the cultural apparatus – defines and constructs radicalization discourses, in order to answer two related, albeit equally important, questions: (1) how is radicalization
understood within the cultural system? And (2) how might media influence our cultural understandings of governance mechanisms as they relate to counterterrorism and counterradicalization? The first question is therefore descriptive by nature, while the second is more analytic because it highlights the complex relationships between media, public policy, and law enforcement practices which make up the counterradicalization apparatus. I argue that media representations of radicalization in the West contribute to the discursive and material construction of what de Goede and Simon (2013: 321) call “anticipatory epistemic objects,” and are thus complicit in rendering particular individuals and groups actionable in anticipation of criminal offences vis-à-vis terrorist activities. By overwhelmingly focusing on Muslims as the object of radicalization discourses, this chapter argues that the anticipatory logic of preemption is not only discriminatory, but perhaps influences how radicalization is understood in the realm of social and public policy and law.

Methods
This chapter offers an empirical analysis of media discourse related to radicalization to explicate some of the theoretical contributions of the governmentality framework in addition to contemporary work within the othering paradigm. The empirical basis for this exploration are newspaper articles related to radicalization, sampled in such a way that they are reflective of the broader population of all cultural representations. While I do not necessarily make claims regarding causal linkages between sample and population, I do here argue that the sample of news media frames regarding radicalization is reflective of broader trends in media coverage of radicalization in the United States, United Kingdom,
and Canada. The research takes an abductive theoretical approach (see Timmermans and Tavory 2012) and was conducted using both inductive (i.e., categories derived from the data) and deductive (i.e., categories from previously determined categories) approaches to discourse and content analysis. It is based primarily on qualitative textual analysis techniques (Fairclough 1992), but also makes extensive use of quantitative techniques such as content analysis and theme frequency counts. Since this research makes use of a more qualitative strategy, it is oriented towards a hermeneutic understanding of the use of radicalization in news media, which allows for a more abductive approach to theorizing, rather than testing hypotheses developed in advance of the research (Deflem 2015). I therefore develop theoretical claims based in the governmentality and othering literature through ongoing reflexive interaction with data. By uncovering themes through the analysis of data, and being keenly aware of the emergence of new themes and their impact on broader theoretical assumptions, this chapter pays particularly close attention to the complexity and fluidity of radicalization discourses in news media, and problematize the taken-for-grantedness of the construct (Timmermans and Tavory 2012; Walters 2012).

Following my previous work (see Silva 2017), the sample was drawn from a LexisNexis search for the terms “radicalization” and its corresponding U.K. spelling “radicalisation” in three newspapers from each of the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom from January 1, 1960 to December 31, 2016.24 Newspapers were

24 Throughout this dissertation, I will at times quote directly from primary sources’ communications about radicalization to exemplify key arguments. When I cite primary sources (such as news articles, government documents, etc.), I will use the appropriate spelling of words to the country of origin. When I am analyzing such communications, however, I will use spelling protocol of the American Sociological Association, and therefore refer to ‘radicalisation’ as ‘radicalization.’
selected based on three characteristics: (1) their high readership measured by circulation rates (Alliance for Audited Media 2013); (2) their centrality in domestic and international culture; and (3) their diverse political orientations (i.e., efforts were made to select one liberal, one centrist, and one conservative newspaper from each country). The analysis included three newspapers from each country, and are as follows: (1) United States: the New York Times, Washington Post, and USA Today; (2) Canada: the Toronto Star, National Post, and The Globe and Mail; and (3) United Kingdom: (1) The Daily Telegraph; (2) The Guardian; and (3) The Independent. The search resulted in 9,832 articles about radicalization. The results were then filtered according to the following inclusion and exclusion criteria: (i) the article must be reporting on concrete rather than fictitious incidents (i.e., a book review, novel, etc.); (ii) must not be a duplicate article. This resulted in the inclusion of 8,072 articles in the analysis (See Table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Number of Sources and Coding References

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>2456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td>1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 Political orientation of Canadian newspapers derived from political endorsements in the past two federal elections (see Globe and Mail 2011; National Post 2011; Toronto Star 2011).

26 Political orientation of the New York Times (center-left), Washington Post (center), and USA Today (center-right), Daily Telegraph (center-right), The Guardian (center), and The Independent (center-left) based on the analysis of Papacharissi and Oliviera (2008).
Data were downloaded from LexisNexis in a single Microsoft Word document separated by newspaper and inputted to qualitative analysis software NVivo and systematically coded on the basis of sixteen themes. To make analysis more efficient, Python computer programming scripts were run on the single Word documents to automatically separate each news article and export as single PDFs (portable document format), prior to importing the data into NVivo. Following importation, the articles were read in detail to ensure scripts were successful, facilitate engagement with the data, and determine appropriate guiding and themes. Themes were derived abductively by theorizing important thematic frames before the coding process (i.e., codes regarding how radicalization is problematized, solutions to the problem of radicalization) as well as reflexively revising theoretical themes throughout the coding process (i.e., codes

---

27 Data were coded based on the following sixteen themes: activities, adjectives used to describe radicalization, age of subject, government agencies involved, references to specific events, groups subject of radicalization discourse, individual subject of radicalization discourse, geographic locations, governmental and public policies, political affiliation, religious problematization, political problematization, prospective solutions, target of radicalization/terrorism, nationalism (i.e., references to Britishness, Canadianness, patriotism, etc.)
The aim of this chapter is to provide a systematic analysis of written texts that have referenced radicalization in order to identify important themes and examine ways in which they construct the concept. As such, the analysis follows the methodological strategies of discourse analysis and content analysis. Discourse analysis is widely used in studies on news media (e.g., Gough 2007; KhosraviNik 2010; Silva 2017). As a methodological approach, discourse analysis highlights how texts draw upon particular social contexts in which they are situated and in turn work to produce social realities through the organization and structuring of social life (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). In this way, discourses, here understood as language used in texts, are a form of ‘social practice’ that is dialectically constructs the social world (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). In other words, cultural texts such as newspaper articles both reflect and produce the ways in which the cultural apparatus gives meaning to common discursive frames.

This chapter thus seeks to identify broad discourses of radicalization presented within news media while being cognizant of the ways in which these discourses shape, and are shaped by, social power relations. As Lemke (2002) suggests, from a Foucauldian tradition, ‘text’ represents concrete realizations of abstract forms of knowledge (what Foucault calls ‘discourse’) that are inextricably connected to various power structures. The job of the researcher is thus to explicate the connections between those forms of knowledge (discourse) and those power structures. Approaching discourse analysis in this, more critical, manner, Lemke (2002) maintains, allows the analyzer to highlight the

---

28 The ‘references’ category in Table 6.1 refers to the number of times articles were coded based on the sixteen themes. In total, there were 29,789 coding references in the data.
mechanisms by which orders of discourse are constructed, maintained, and reconfigured in such ways as to legitimize, maintain, or even resist powerful hegemons (Foucault 1971). This ‘critical’ element of discourse analysis has evolved into an entire sub-discipline of its own (e.g. Fairclough 1995; Wodak and Meyer 2009), and focuses on the structural relationships of power manifested in language. To this end, I adopt textual analysis guidelines provided by Fairclough (1995, 2003; Fairclough and Wodak 1997) and critical discursive analysis strategies developed by van Dijk and colleagues (1991; Lemke 2002; Krippendorff 2004; van Leeuwen 1996, 2008) to identify how radicalization discourses emerge and transform over time whilst paying particular attention to how orders of discourse produce and reproduce, constitute, and legitimize forms of social hegemony and inequality (Wodak and Meyer 2009).

The analysis makes use of qualitative and quantitative approaches to discourse analysis. Although critics of content analysis techniques have rightly challenged proponents for uncritically restricting the approach to practices of quantification (see George 1959), recent scholars have highlighted how quantification is not a defining criterion for content analyses (Krippendorff 2004). Advocates of this approach highlight the necessary, and indispensable, nature of ridding textual analysis of the quantitative/qualitative dichotomy (see Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Krippendorff 2004), by demonstrating the utility of both hermeneutic and holistic approaches to content analysis. This chapter therefore approaches textual analysis in a recursive manner, utilizing both quantitative and qualitative measurements of the interpretation of data. I thus argue that much can be interpreted from both the holistic analysis of linguistic patterns of text (i.e., qualitative discourse analysis) and the hermeneutic numbering of textual themes and
patterns (i.e., quantitative content analysis). Aligned with the abductive approach to theorizing outlined in chapter two, this mixed methodological technique, I suggest, allows for both complex interpretations in addition to rich descriptions of radicalization discourse as represented in news media.

The following pages systematically present the data in three sections. The first, is a general topographical view of radicalization discourse in all newspapers, presented by country and by newspaper. This section is intended to give the reader an overarching visual and textual depiction of radicalization discourses and therefore paints a general, and relatively static, picture of how the concept is used throughout the cultural apparatus. The second section presents more in-depth analyses of the data. Here I explore temporal changes in representations of radicalization in each newspaper and by period. Theme counts are presented in three mutually exclusive time periods: 1970-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2016. These periods were chosen based on the conceptual and theoretical approach adopted in my previous work (see Silva 2017), and emphasize different temporal periods where shifts in radicalization discourse has been noted. Finally, in the third section, I explore the implications of news media representations of radicalization on already marginalized Muslims and Islamic communities.

*Constructing Radicalization Discourse Throughout the West*

The use of the concept of radicalization has a long history in national news media coverage in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. The first references to radicalization in national newspaper coverage in the United States were in 1969 (in the *New York Times*), 1984 in the United Kingdom (*The Guardian*), and in 1978 in Canada
(Globe and Mail). In total, radicalization was referenced in 2,063 articles in the United States, in 2,670 articles in the United Kingdom, and in 1,789 articles in Canada. As figure 6.1 illustrates, there was a substantial increase in use of the term radicalization across all newspapers and countries from 1970 to 2012. Specific trends in the data indicate that radicalization discourses were rarely evoked in the 1990s, but often used in the 1970s and 1980s prior to considerably increasing post-2000 (See Figure 6.1).

![Graph](image)

**Figure 6.1: Number of Articles Referencing ‘Radicalization’ vs. Number of Terrorist Attacks, 1970-2016**

**Table 6.2: Top 10 Words Referenced in Canadian Newspapers, 1969-2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Weighted Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Similar Words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Globe and Mail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>govern, governance, governed,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>governing, government,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>muslim, muslims, muslims'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
General searches for the words most often used in each country’s newspaper articles about radicalization indicate few, but important, differences in how the concept was deployed in relation to other themes and ideas. In all newspapers, for example, Islam and the Muslim community were amongst the ten most often referenced words (See
Tables 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4; in terms of coverage area by weighted percentage). In seven out of nine newspapers, terrorism and/or terrorist activity and governments or governance were amongst the concept most often referenced. Police and/or policing were referenced in six out of the nine newspapers, as was war. In the United Kingdom, references to Islam were exclusively amongst the top two, whereas references to the Muslim community were often in the second half of the most cited words in the United States and Canada. Interestingly, newspapers considered most right of center referenced most often referenced Islam or Muslims, with the exception of Canada’s *National Post*. Center and center-left newspapers, however, still referenced Islam often.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.3: Top 10 Words Referenced in UK Newspapers, 1969-2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Count</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Guardian</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Independent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britishness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isis'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In terms of intra-country representations of radicalization, several notable thematic differences existed, particularly in Canada and the United States. Canada’s *National Post*, for instance, used eight words more often than references to Islam or the Muslim community in its coverage of radicalization (see Table 6.2). Instead, the newspaper’s representations most often referenced issues related to Somalia, famine, and food crises. This is noteworthy because of the *National Post’s* history of coverage relating to government fiscal policy, as well its well-documented history of anti-Islamic portrayals in its coverage (Hess 1998; Petricevic 2007). Another interesting difference is the way in which newspapers in the United States connected radicalization discourses with other concepts. For example, both the *Washington Post* and *USA Today* referenced

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims’</td>
<td>1766</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism’</td>
<td>1235</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britishness</td>
<td>1166</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists’</td>
<td>1117</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremists’</td>
<td>1042</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools’</td>
<td>1029</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamism</td>
<td>1006</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governments</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publicly</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Islam most in stories about radicalization. The *Times*, on the other hand, focused (by coverage area) much more on political issues, most notably economic and political conflicts in Central America, which has been illustrated elsewhere (Silva 2017). While a notable aberration, this may be indicative of overall changes in news coverage techniques, which have shifted to more sensationalist style representations (see Skinner 2000; Wiltenburg 2004), because the *Times* did reference radicalization over a decade before any other newspaper in the sample. However, as I have argued in other work, this is suggestive of shifts in how radicalization is being represented and deployed throughout the cultural apparatus, a trend in which I now turn my attention.

Table 6.4: Top 10 Words Referenced in US Newspapers, 1969-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Weighted Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Similar Words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>New York Times</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1022</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>nicaragua, &quot;nicaragua&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandinistas</td>
<td>9538</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>sandinista, sandinistas, sandinistas'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governs</td>
<td>7196</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>govern, governance, governed, governing, government, governments,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics'</td>
<td>6353</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>polite, politely, politic, political, &quot;political, &quot;political&quot;, politically, &quot;politically,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Islamism</strong></td>
<td>5863</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>#islic, islam, islamism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>5488</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>presidency, presidency&quot;, president, president&quot;, 'president, &quot;president, presidents, presiding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muslims'</strong></td>
<td>5194</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>muslim, muslim', muslim&quot;, 'muslim, &quot;muslim, muslims, muslims', muslims&quot;, &quot;muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimes</td>
<td>4789</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>regime, regime&quot;, regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wars</td>
<td>4482</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>war, war&quot;, 'war, &quot;war, &quot;war&quot;, warring, wars, wars&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisons</td>
<td>4403</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>prison, &quot;prison, prisoner, prisoners, prisoners', prisons, prisons'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Washington Post</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamism</td>
<td>2486</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>Islam, Islamic, islamism, islamization, islamized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims'</td>
<td>2183</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>Muslim, Muslimness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicals'</td>
<td>1878</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>radical, 'radical, radicalism, radicalization, radicalization', 'radicalization, radicalize, radicalized, radicalizer, radicalizers, radicalizes, radicalizing, radically, radicals, radicals'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From Politics to Religion: News Media Representations of Radicalization

I have previously highlighted how radicalization discourses in news media have shifted from deploying the concept to denote political or economic conflicts towards focusing overwhelmingly on religious differences (see Silva 2017). The exploratory study argued that the concept of radicalization was deployed by news media in such a way as to contribute to our cultural understandings of terrorism focusing primarily on the Islamic community. Radicalization, as a construct, therefore increasingly denotes religious conflict between the Islamic nations in the East and predominantly Christian nations of the West (Silva 2017). The present analysis moves beyond my previous work by adopting...
a comparative approach (see chapter three) that explores representations of radicalization across the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada.

One of the most notable discursive mechanisms for linking the concept of radicalization to individuals, groups, and other concepts, was to use the form “radicalization of” to denote the subject of the representation. This chapter therefore grounds part of its analysis in the in-depth exploration of how newspapers deployed this linguistic form. By combining the analysis of this form with broader content analysis of themes and discourse topics, I highlight how radicalization narratives are indeed indicative of what I argued elsewhere as the othering of Muslims through references of radicalization. In Canadian newspapers, only one reference was made to Islam before the year 2000 (see Table 6.5). Prior to 2000, articles using this frame focused on a diverse set of subject topics, including leftist groups (such as student and labor unions, socialist groups, civil rights organizations, etc.), political opposition groups, right-wing nationalist groups, or simply in reference to the public sphere or popular opinion. Although Canadian newspapers did often reference the Middle East or Arab populations using the “radicalization of” form (18 times total prior to 2000), only once did they use the form to subjectify Muslims. This trend was also evident in newspaper articles from the UK and US, which made very few mentions of Islam prior to 2000 (6 and 7 mentions, respectively; see Table 6.6 and 6.7).

| Table 6.5: References Using the "Radicalization of" Strategy in Canadian Newspapers |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Public sphere/opinion          | 3               | 6               | 5               | 7               | 8               | 3               | -               | 4               |

128
News articles in the pre-2000 period most often represented the ‘radicalization of’ form in descriptive terms without referencing particular problematic activities or behaviors and often highlighting the positive benefits of so-called radicalization. An article that appeared in UK newspaper *The Independent* on April 5, 1990, highlights many of the documented themes in radicalization discourse during this period, particularly how the frame had been used to denote social progress in a relatively descriptive nature:

Raphael Samuel, a prominent socialist historian, was one of the first to voice concern about political interference. However, he now believes that history teachers, politicians and newspaper reporters have fallen victims of "hysteria" and says he finds the idea of a Tory takeover of history "absurd". He points out that there are few Tory historians in Britain and says that "the quiet but serious radicalisation of history over the past 30 years" has fostered majority support for social history.

Another example where news media used the ‘radicalization of’ form in a descriptive manner can be found in the *Times*:

Growing guerrilla activities, indiscriminate official repression and steady radicalization of peasants, workers and students are expected if reforms are not forthcoming. Moderate critics have begun openly discussing the possibility of a coup d’état that would pave the way for free elections. (September 14, 1979)

References such as these were most common when the subjects of the story were part of leftist groups, such as communists, members of trade unions, student groups, or civil
This trend was reflected in other newspapers, where the frame was used to denote general references to the public or popular opinion, for example: “the radicalization of Americans” (*New York Times*, October 6, 1972), “radicalisation of the middle classes” (*The Independent*, September 13, 1989), “we are witnessing the radicalization of the public sector” (*Globe and Mail*, April 6, 1978). These representations rarely linked radicalization with problematic activities or behaviors. Most notable in this respect is the dearth of connections between ‘radicalization of’ narratives and references to terrorism or terrorist activities. As noted elsewhere (see Silva 2017), activities most often associated with radicalization during this period included relatively minor forms of civil disobedience, protest, and political opposition.

### Table 6.6: References using the "radicalization of" strategy in UK Newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Independent</th>
<th>The Guardian</th>
<th>The Daily Telegraph</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public sphere/opinion</td>
<td>- 10 4</td>
<td>7 9 11</td>
<td>- - 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist groups</td>
<td>- 3 3 3</td>
<td>5 6</td>
<td>- - 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing/Nationalist</td>
<td>- 1 7 1</td>
<td>- 10</td>
<td>- - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church/Priests</td>
<td>- - - - 1</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East/Arabs</td>
<td>- 2 3 3 1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>- - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Opposition</td>
<td>- 8 11 15 8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>- - 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>- 3 177 1</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>- - 138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students/Youth</td>
<td>- 1 18 18</td>
<td>- 4</td>
<td>- - 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>- 2 13 1 5</td>
<td>- 3</td>
<td>- - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnostic</td>
<td>- - 2 - 7</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0 30 238</strong></td>
<td><strong>31 28 397</strong></td>
<td><strong>0 0 161</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast to the previous period, following the year 2000 radicalization narratives were significantly rearticulated around notions of religious conflicts, rather than political opposition. In similar fashion to the *New York Times* (see Silva 2017),
newspapers in the US, UK, and Canada focused substantially on Islam in their
deployment of the ‘radicalization of’ discursive frame. As Tables 6.5-7 illustrate, from
2000 to 2016, all nine newspapers used the radicalization of [Islam] frame in the
overwhelming majority of times they made use of the form.

Table 6.7: References using the "radicalization of" strategy in US Newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The New York Times</th>
<th>Washington Post</th>
<th>USA Today</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public sphere/opinion</td>
<td>12 4 10 6 1 8 - - 1</td>
<td>- - - - - - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist groups</td>
<td>23 14 4 22 6 8 - - 1</td>
<td>- - - - - - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing/Nationalist</td>
<td>- 6 6 1 1 6 - - -</td>
<td>- - - - - - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church/Priests</td>
<td>4 - 1 - - - - - -</td>
<td>- - - - - - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East/Arabs</td>
<td>12 4 5 13 1 7 - - 1</td>
<td>- - - - - - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Opposition</td>
<td>18 8 32 15 6 16 - 1 3</td>
<td>- - - - - - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>2 1 153 2 1 66 - 1 25</td>
<td>- - - - - - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11 1 15 4 1 7 - 1 2</td>
<td>- - - - - - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnostic</td>
<td>- - - - - - - - - -</td>
<td>- - - - - - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>82</strong> <strong>38</strong> <strong>226</strong> <strong>64</strong> <strong>17</strong> <strong>118</strong> <strong>0</strong> <strong>3</strong> <strong>33</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite a notable drop in terrorist attacks in each country from 1970 to 2016,
representations during this period also increasingly referenced criminal behaviors – most
notably activities often understood as terrorism, including bombings, hijacking, murders,
and kidnappings – rather than mundane forms of civil unrest (See Figure 6.1). Examples
of this strategy are numerous throughout the newspapers, with some articles even
suggesting that radicalization is a source of violence a priori: “In the past three years,
sectarian violence associated with the radicalization of Islam has killed at least 10,000
people” (Washington Post, November 28, 2002).

With 1.2 billion Muslims on this planet, the radicalization of even one
in 10,000 is simply unaffordable. The response to international
terrorist crimes needs to be aggressive, but it also needs to be
disaggregated from the discredited "war on terror." (Globe and Mail, August 18, 2006)

Other instances highlight the combative nature of so-called radicalization while simultaneously demonstrating the conflictual approach to such coverage by the authors.

In an article appearing in The Daily Telegraph titled “These men are fanatics and must be beaten,” directly links radicalization with Islam while illustrating the author’s own, potentially extremist, perspective:

It is surely undeniable that Iraq and Afghanistan have contributed to the radicalisation of Muslims across the world, adding a new pebble to the mountain of grievances that militant fanatics have erected. But those conflicts have stimulated an attitude which existed quite independently of them… The fanatics must be defeated… Individuals such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who may be coming to the UK next month, must be banned summarily. And those who blame Britain for the tragedy of 7/7 must be anathematized (July 20, 2005).

In addition, a common discursive strategy employed by newspapers across the West is what Theo van Leeuwen (1996) calls ‘backgrounding.’ In his socio-semantic perspective, narratives can include or exclude social actors to align with particular interests and goals pertaining to how authors represent information to its audiences (van Leeuwen 2008). Through strategic linguistic and textual construction mechanisms, van Leeuwen (1996, 2008) maintains, authors of text are able to emphasize, or ignore, the presence of social actors in relation to social phenomena. Further, as a discursive strategy, the narrative can thus devalue certain individuals or groups, or ignore them altogether. These strategies of ‘backgrounding’ can be realized through several mechanisms, most notable with respect to representations of radicalization are

29 See my previous work highlighting specific backgrounding strategies in the New York Times coverage of radicalization (Silva 2017).
genericization and collectivization, which treat social actors in narratives as homogeneous groups and therefore ignore the presence of individual characteristics (van Leeuwen 1996). Each newspaper made use of several important backgrounding strategies, not least of which are exemplified in the following examples:

More broadly, European nations like Britain need to end reflexive multiculturalism -- for example, lax language and cultural education requirements for naturalization -- that perversely discourages Muslims from learning the ways of their new countries, thus isolating them from the mainstream and fueling radicalization. (*New York Times*, February 1, 2003)

In the longer term, we must somehow stimulate young Muslims to identify with the Calvinist values of the majority. The radicalization among small groups of young Muslims, a threat that cannot be fought within Holland's borders alone, is a time bomb. (*New York Times*, July 15, 2005)

IS [Islamic State], as with al-Qaeda before it, is waiting for them - online and sometimes right in their neighbourhood - with narratives connecting their local troubles to faraway wars and a clash of civilizations. (*Globe and Mail*, November 21, 2015)

Flights should be laid on to take would-be jihadists to Syria so they are not "festered" here, a former counterterrorism chief suggests. Bob Quick, the one-time Scotland Yard assistant commissioner, claimed it may be safer to help fanatics move to the war-torn country and ban them from Britain. (*The Daily Telegraph*, July 8, 2015)

Interestingly, the United Kingdom was much more explicit than the US or Canadian in their usage of backgrounding strategies. Newspapers in the UK were explicit in their use of an us/them dichotomy and strategies of collectivization and genericization, often employing them in the title of major news stories. Some of which include articles titled “The sanest response to teenage numpties who blow themselves up is simply to laugh at them” (*The Daily Telegraph*, August 13, 2005), "PM vows to 'drain the swamp' that fosters UK extremism” (*The Guardian*, June 4, 2013), “NOTHING TO FEAR BUT
ISLAM ITSELF” (*The Independent*, March 9, 2014, emphasis in original), and even “After Londonistan” (*The New York Times*, June 25, 2006). These representations highlight discursive strategies stereotypical of the us/them dichotomy, presenting Islam and diverse Muslim communities in direct opposition to notions of Britishness and national identity. Even more, they dehumanize individual practitioners of Islam with references to “teenage numpties,” or “draining the swamp,” as if to devalue those individuals and groups.

Treating diverse Muslim populations as homogeneous collectivities, and subsequently mocking those groups, is prototypical of van Leeuwen’s (2008) concept of backgrounding, which suggests that such linguistic strategies cannot be detached from attempts to maintain dominant social hierarchies. In this case, news media employ the radicalization narratives to present diverse groups of believers in Islam as not only unanimous in terms of belief systems, but also ideological approaches, which are represented in dialectical terms that conflict with the West. As a form of social practice, sociolinguistic strategies of backgrounding often work to construct and maintain social hierarchies (van Leeuwen 1996, 2008). In this case, backgrounding mechanisms represented Islam as incompatible with Western ideals of national identity, and sought to undermine and diminish individual practitioners through explicit mocking strategies.

Some articles internally identified tendencies of news media to focus on religious characteristics in its coverage of radicalization, not least of which is exemplified by UK newspaper *The Independent*. The paper’s coverage of political conflicts in Palestine observed: “the radicalisation of the conflict is morphing from a political one into a religious one” (*The Independent*, November 30, 2011). Moreover, even when news
articles approached the concept of radicalization in a more agnostic, areligious manner, they often included representations – by example or by illustration – that link the story with Islam in one way or another. For example, in an article published in The Independent on March 1, 2015 referencing the “radicalization of young people,” the newspaper linked the article to another story regarding so-called Muslim extremism:

Conservative Party chairman Grant Shapps admitted there was a "difference of opinion" over the guidance to be issued as the Government tries to prevent the radicalisation of young people. Read more: Muslim convert given five-year preaching ban Chief of Global Aid Trust 'resigns' over alleged links to extremism [link to another article].

This type of representation strategy was used often in ‘agnostic’ news coverage of issues relating to radicalization. While the substance of the article makes no mention of Islam, linking the story to one that does – by choice of human actor or computer algorithm – reinforces associations between radicalization and Muslim communities.

As noted above, some articles made mention of the problematic nature of the radicalization label used in media narratives, political frames, and governmental discourses. While these articles were relatively few, they did posit opportunities for different narratives relating to radicalization. For instance, several articles in the United States questioned why the radicalization label is not placed on right-wing nationalists such as Dylann Roof, the infamous perpetrator of a mass shooting in Charleston, South Carolina (USA Today, June 26, 2015; Washington Post, June 26, 2015; The New York Times, December 5, 2015). However, not only are these representations quantitatively

30 All emphases denoted in the qualitative analysis were added to highlight the most important aspects of each illustration.
overshadowed, they also make continuous reference to radicalization through a lens of Islamic fundamentalism or related concepts:

The social forces that have assisted in the Islamic State's radicalization of dozens of Americans are very similar to what drove Dylann Roof to embrace an extreme racist ideology before he allegedly launched an attack that left nine dead inside an iconic African-American church… "(It's) very similar to Roof," [Attorney General Loretta] Lynch said. "People disaffected, people being radicalized online. Roof picked this racial hatred theme and that's what fueled him. Others picked the ISIL theme, and that's what fuels them." (USA Today, June 25, 2015)

Even in narratives of radicalization that posit the impartiality of the term (i.e., that ‘anyone’ can be entrenched by radicalization), news media does so through reference to Islam or by unintentionally (or, some may argue, intentionally) connecting those stories to other representations of Muslim communities. The few times when news media used the concept in association with non-Muslims, even if used to problematize the narrowness of the label, did not evoke radicalization as a descriptive of non-Muslim activities.

_A Culture of Preemption? Discursive Formations of Radicalization and the Preemptive Shift_

The second question this chapter seeks to address is related to exploring how media might influence cultural understandings of governance mechanisms as they relate to counterterrorism and counterradicalization. To address this question, I analyze each country’s media representations of potential, observed, or proposed solutions to the issue of radicalization, which the previous section illustrates, is mostly grounded in threats of (Islamic) terrorism targeting Western liberal democracies. Data were coded based on a number of important themes, including representations regarding how radicalization is
problematized (see Rose and Miller 1992), or observed as a problem, and how media references possible solutions to those problems. Data were then examined for trends in references to the thematic coding as well as coverage area of the themes. Coverage area refers to the frequency of the word relative to the total words counted. The coverage area is presented as a weighted percentage, which assigns a portion of the coded themes relative to all words in the document. With a body of text as large as this data set (over 6500 articles and hundreds of thousands of words), the weighted percentage will be extremely low and even minor changes are indicative of important trends. An increase in the weighted percentage of coverage area indicates a higher proportion of references to a theme in the body of text.

With respect to how counterradicalization strategies were framed by news media, several important trends emerged in all three countries’ post-2000 narratives on radicalization (see Table 6.8). Most notable in this respect is the emergence of preemptive frames as governance strategies counter to the problem of so-called radicalization. Interestingly, the issue of radicalization was increasingly represented as a matter of law enforcement (+.04-.11% coverage) and police (+.11-.13% coverage), rather than a military (.04-.07% decrease in coverage), concern requiring military intervention (.01-.04% decrease in coverage). While other important themes remained stagnant – for instance, references to law as a principal solution to the problem – radicalization governance was increasingly represented as an issue of proactive, preemptive intervention themes. News media progressively focused more on themes of intelligence.

31 It is also important to note that in this case the theme counts are somewhat misleading because of the substantial increase in articles during the post-2000 timeframe. I therefore analyze discursive shifts relative to the coverage area of each theme.
(+.10-.17% coverage), surveillance (+.03% coverage), risk (+.02% coverage), prevention (+.02-.08% coverage), threat (+.04-.08% coverage), and even education (+.01-.05% coverage). These trends highlight the discursive shift in news media understandings of counterradicalization governance strategies, from a predominantly reactive, military approach to a much more proactive, preventative approach.

Table 6.8: Comparison of Themes Pre- and Post-2000 in Newspapers by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law Enforcement</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>540 (.04%)</td>
<td>2 (.01%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing</td>
<td>85 (.06%)</td>
<td>9682 (.19%)</td>
<td>2 (.01%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3090 (.08%)</td>
<td>3 (.01%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance</td>
<td>3 (.01%)</td>
<td>893 (.04%)</td>
<td>4 (.01%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>13 (.01%)</td>
<td>2637 (.11%)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>91 (.09%)</td>
<td>1810 (.05%)</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>204 (.07%)</td>
<td>3635 (.03%)</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>96 (.06%)</td>
<td>2384 (.04%)</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>11 (.01%)</td>
<td>1883 (.03%)</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>20 (.01%)</td>
<td>2943 (.08%)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>66 (.06%)</td>
<td>6605 (.17%)</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>41 (.03%)</td>
<td>2264 (.08%)</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>38 (.02%)</td>
<td>2562 (.02%)</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Safety</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54 (.01%)</td>
<td>1 (.01%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References to “prevent” were excluded from the analysis, as they overwhelmingly referenced the United Kingdom’s PREVENT strategy. Inclusion of the word “prevent” would have resulted in an extreme skew in this theme towards post-2000 articles.

As Table 6.8 illustrates, there are numerous examples in the text reflective of the discursive shift towards preemptive counterradicalization governance strategies. Prior to 2000, references to preemption mostly focused on international and military affairs and highlighted desires to prevent international or civil conflicts in a variety of countries. For example, in an article on conflicts in communist countries, The Guardian suggested the need for preemption to avoid military conflicts:

Some see the collapse of party unity as a step forward, the vital condition for real debate on the various options for Latvia's future. Others fear that the party is the only force which can hold society together and prevent conflicts exploding into violence, with unpredictable consequences.

Another example can be found in a The Washington Post (February 8, 1977) story on civil unrest in Mozambique:

Establishment of the new party came as a new Revolutionary Party, was formed in neighboring Tanzania and as reports reached here that Angola intends to create a Marxist-Leninist party this year in what appears to be a trend toward the radicalization of southern Africa that former U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger was anxious to prevent.

Not only are these two examples reflective of how radicalization was often used to denote political and/or economic conflicts between Western democratic capitalism and governments aligned with forms of socialism or communism, they are also suggestive of the use of the concept to denote the prevention in the form of military intervention or diplomatic affairs. Contrast this with more modern examples of news media’s
problematization of radicalization and framing of counterradicalization governance strategies:

To **prevent the next attack in the United States we need a similar coordinated intelligence effort at home.** In New York City, the F.B.I. and Police Department share this responsibility. And although they do not always love each other, they find ways to work together. The Police Department brings grit, creativity and street smarts to the investigative programs. The F.B.I. connects local efforts with information from national and **international intelligence databases**. (*The New York Times*, September 10, 2006)

The Government is concentrating on trying to **prevent young Muslims being attracted to extremist groups**… The Home Office's five-year plan will emphasise that people need to feel safe before they can go out and enjoy their lives. "**Safety is the foundation," says Miss Blears, who is also responsible for the police and tackling anti-social behaviour.** (*The Daily Telegraph*, July 19, 2004)

The emphasis will **be on funding existing programs at the neighbourhood and school levels for what the government sees as a "growing problem" of the radicalization of Dutch youth.** (*Toronto Star*, August 28, 2007)

These examples illustrate some of the important discursive shifts outlined in Table 6.8. The drastic differences in language used to describe counterradicalization governance strategies, and the policing practices therein, based on notions of risk, public safety, and preventative community policing are indicative of the cultural trend towards treating radicalization as an inherently preventable governing logic. The above illustrations also highlight the ways in which news media follow governmental discourses of prevention, with each focusing on particular government policy changes. Such counterradicalization narratives thus uphold and legitimize those governmental strategies, rather than challenging or critiquing them. While certainly news media at times challenged the discriminatory logic of counterradicalization governance throughout the West, those critiques were vastly outnumbered by representations such as those
highlighted above. News media thus contributes to public(s) understandings of accepted and effective counterradicalization strategies based on notions of preemptive intervention, regardless of the consequences of such policies.

The Emergence of ‘Othering Frames’: National Identities and Cultural Conflicts

The final theme I will discuss in this chapter is the emergence of what I call ‘othering frames.’ Othering frames are here conceptualized as discursive frames which denote distinctions between us on the one hand, and them on the other. As Georg Simmel (1921) aptly put it many years ago, societies have a history of placing social distance between the ‘native’ and the ‘stranger,’ to the extent that new social groups emerge. These extraneous social groups, referred to as ‘strangers,’ are often represented in terms of their social distance rather than proximity (Simmel 1921). It is with this theoretical perspective that the analysis of ‘othering frames’ employed by news media is based. The following represents an exploratory analysis of some sociolinguistic strategies in place that work to construct social distance between the ‘natives’ and the ‘strangers.’ I present a quantitative content analysis of some dominant themes by which news media references social distance between groups in its radicalization narratives. Further, I highlight some of the sociolinguistic strategies put in place by news media to further distinguish value systems “out there” as dialectically incongruent with Western values and culture.

Table 6.9: Comparison of 'Othering Frames' Pre- and Post-2000 in Newspapers by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Results from the content analysis of ‘othering frames’ are included in Table 6.9.

While references to patriotism, nationalism, and Western values in general remained relatively stagnant over time, there is some evidence to suggest that each country’s news media utilized discursive ‘othering frames’ to illustrate social distance between those aligned with cultural values of the country and those viewed as outsiders (most often of which was associated with Islam). Several examples from the test illustrate these trends:

Muslims, so it went, must accept those British values (liberty, tolerance, democracy, etc.) that make up the essence of "Britishness". (The Guardian, June 4, 2007)

Young Muslim children attending after-school madrasas should be taught about Britishness as well as the principles of their faith, the Government said as it launched a fresh attempt to counter violent extremism. (The Independent, April 6, 2007)

Local councils are to be encouraged to promote "citizens' days" to emphasise the country's heritage and the importance of civic pride. The measures follow Gordon Brown's focus in his Labour conference speech on Britishness and the importance of integration. (The Daily Telegraph, October 6, 2007)

I'm not a politician so won't make any assertion that work and economic security make for better buy-in to Britishness. I am a citizen though: a concerned citizen seeing a few million people being demonised by the
actions of a few - albeit seemingly more by the day. (*The Independent*, March 17, 2015)
For too long we have allowed communities to go their own ways and live separate lives. Building "Britishness" and a multicultural cohesive identity has to be done in practice, developing common values around a common agenda. (*The Guardian*, June 15, 2011)

It is important to note that some news stories explicitly challenged the problematic nature of the social distance implied by concepts like ‘Britishness’: “critics complain that Islam is being presented as separate from Britishness and needs to constantly prove its compatibility - a demand not made of other faiths” (*The Independent*, January 20, 2015). Yet even when those frames highlight the “absurdity” of the notion of “Britishness” (*The Guardian*, January 16, 2016), they do so through using Islam as the reference point. Media thus constructs the dichotomy of Britishness/Islam even when it challenges the very notion of Britishness. While such critiques of the notion, which became more common following 2013, go some length in challenging the problematic nature of concepts like “Britishness,” they also highlight the embeddedness of othering frames in public discourse.

The data analyzed here provide support for the work of Elizabeth Poole (2002) and colleagues (Saeed 2007), who suggest that media utilizes terms such as ‘Britishness’ to indicate social distance between Muslim communities and the rest of the British populous. These distancing frames have become so entrenched in public discourse that we employ them in reference to entire groups of people. While this is not the only context whereby national identities are constructed, it is an important one, as radicalization has become such a dominant governmental framework for understanding issues of security, risk, and terrorism.
Similar, albeit less explicit, concepts were deployed within Canadian and US media coverage of radicalization. For example, the similar concept of “Canadianness,” was used to explain the difficulty faced by the Canadian intelligence community in identifying those who might pose a threat of terrorist activities: "Increasingly, we are learning of more and more extremists that are homegrown," says the Canadian Security Intelligence Service document, adding that the "Canadianness" of the new generation makes them more difficult to detect” (National Post, November 19, 2005). In news media coverage of radicalization in the United States and Canada, othering frames often reflected concepts related to national values, such as the form “American values” or “Canadian values.” These concepts were mostly absent from news articles related to radicalization pre-2000, notably before the substantial increase in references to Islam and Muslim communities.

We will win it [war on terror] by working with the Muslim community to combat radicalization. And we will also win it by asserting the importance of Canadian values, including the equality of men and women, freedom of speech, and yes, the right to one's religious beliefs. (National Post, January 22, 2015)

Our military power remains extraordinary. But winning this fight requires projecting a narrative about American values and interests. And we have failed to do that. (Washington Post, September 11, 2016)

Following 2000, however, news media increasingly focused on differences in “values” between the West and Islam, representing each in dichotomous and incompatible terms. As Edward Said (1978) reminds us, the news media is part of the corporate entity which makes authoritative statements about the East. The Orientalism framework is thus illustrated by Western news media focus on cultural conflict between Western liberal democracies, based on notions of democracy and neoliberalism, and the
Islamic East, presented as culturally dialectic to the West. Moreover, news media deployed linguistic frames and ideas which emphasize the social distance between the ‘native’ and the ‘stranger,’ increasing the conflictual foundations of the liberal democratic West and the Islamic East. In this case, the ‘natives’ are those embedded in the cultural value systems of the West. The ‘strangers,’ on the other hand, are those isolated, disconnected, and culturally distinct from normative value systems of the West. The stranger, in the case of radicalization discourse, is represented as obtuse to the native way of life; isolated from modern society and from the value systems in which those societies exist. What was true for Simmel (1921) in his analysis of the stranger, and still true for scholars working in the othering paradigm, is here reflected by cultural representations of Islam as distinct social category – one that is characterized as analogous to radicalization.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has focused on news media representations of radicalization in the aim of explicating how the concept is constructed, maintained, and deployed as representative of the cultural system. Approaching news media as a sample of all possible cultural representations of radicalization, this chapter sought to examine two important questions: (1) the first is how is radicalization represented in news media across three Western liberal democracies; (2) and the second has to do with how those discourses might influence, or be influenced by, shifts in discourses regarding radicalization and the governance strategies which work to counter it. This chapter highlighted how radicalization narratives increasingly focus on Muslim communities and Islam more
generally. Over the course of past 40 years, radicalization has shifted from a concept denoting mostly political or economic conflicts between overarching government approaches to a symbol of religious differences rooted in a dichotomy of the Christian West and the Islamic East.

Building on my previous work (see Silva 2017), this chapter illustrates the diffusion of this trend throughout Western liberal democracies and suggests that the use of othering mechanisms by news media is not solely an issue in the United States, but of equal or greater concern in the United Kingdom and Canada. Furthermore, through in-depth content and discourse analysis, this chapter investigated how governance strategies seeking to counter radicalization were represented in news media and how those representations are reflective of broader shifts towards understanding radicalization in terms of proactive, preemptive governing. I argued that media narratives of radicalization present the issue as one of risk, security, intelligence, and preventative intervention, and emphasize how discourses of radicalization are most often problematizing it as an issue of proactive policing rather than reactive military concern. In the next chapter, I continue to explore the proliferation of radicalization discourses throughout the social system through analysis of scientific knowledge claims related to counterterrorism and counterradicalization. I aim to examine and explicate some of the justifications provided by science for approaching, and intervening in, the so-called radicalization process.
CHAPTER 7

SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSES AND RADICALIZATION

The preceding chapters have highlighted the lack of empirical research on the construct of radicalization. One notable exception to this gap is in the area of scholarly constructions of radicalization and their impact on certain communities and groups. Arun Kundnani (2012) has highlighted how the diffusion of discourses related to radicalization within and amongst government industry scholarship has led to the construction of Muslim populations as “suspect communities” (p. 3). Since the release of his influential Spooked: How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism (2009), Kundnani has been at the forefront of explorations into how discourses of violent extremism, terrorism, and radicalization are constructed by scholars, ‘expert’ analysts, and industry professionals. He has illustrated how radicalization discourses have produced a relatively narrow conceptualization of the term and how those discourses have been quite influential in terms of impact on public and social policy. Since scholarly research is often employed in the political and mass media realms to justify a host of public policy decisions, it is important to empirically investigate how academic knowledge claims related to radicalization are produced and, equally important, how those are adopted in other social contexts.

Missing from Kundnani’s (2012, 2013) analysis, I argue below, is an emergent typology of scholarly counterradicalization discourses associated with critical analyses of radicalization as a governmental framework. In this way, I revisit and build upon his
typology to highlight some of the more contemporary trends in academic discourses related to the concept. Moreover, Kundnani’s (2012, 2013) work highlights the discursive construction of radicalization by scholars and industry ‘experts.’ Much less addressed in his work, at least empirically, is how those discourses are adopted by influential individuals and groups in other social systems. Not least of which are how ‘academic’ discourses of radicalization are adopted, taken up, and communicated by governmental officials, politicians, and by media. In the final section of this chapter, I will explore the diffusion, uptake, and configuration of claims to knowledge about radicalization in the political, governmental, and mass media systems. Through an in-depth analysis of governmental counterterrorism strategies, I will explore the network of scholarship employed by governments to justify their selected counterradicalization initiatives and practices therein. I argue that government officials are relatively selective in their adoption of scholarly knowledge claims related to radicalization, thereby ignoring emergent, and important, scholarly developments in the area.

In total, this chapter analyzes 503 academic titles and abstracts representing a range of scholarly disciplines. Data were gathered from academic search engines JSTOR and Sociological Abstracts, and includes all references to “radicalization” or “radicalisation” made in the title or the abstract of books, peer-reviewed journal articles, and doctoral dissertations. Data were then coded line-by-line on the basis of similar emergent themes outlined in Chapters Four and Six. Figure 7.1 illustrates the number of academic sources included by year and highlights the number of sources that also reference Islam or Muslim communities.
Towards a Typology of (Pseudo)Scientific Radicalization Discourses

As noted above, Arun Kundnani has been at the forefront of exploring how radicalization discourses are represented in the scientific system. Through an in-depth analysis of leading academic and industry scholar’s use of the term radicalization, Kundnani (2012) offers a typology of how radicalization has been deployed throughout the scientific apparatus. With the proliferation of radicalization and counterradicalization discourses since 2004, Kundnani (2012) notes, emergent scholarship tends to conceptualize...

---

32 Following Kundnani (2012), this Figure was generated using searches of peer-reviewed journals, doctoral dissertations, and academic books for the terms “radicalization” or “radicalization” and any combination of references to Islam, including “Islam,” “Islamic,” “Islamist(s),” “Muslim(s),” and others. I used the databases JSTOR and Sociological Abstracts as search engines due to their ability to output spreadsheets of search results and their inclusion of many journals not explored in Kundnani’s study. I also only searched the abstracts, as Kundnani (2012) has already explored similar trends in full-text format. The search resulted in 503 articles and abstracts included in the analysis.
radicalization in one of four sometimes overlapping ways: (1) a cultural-psychological disposition; (2) a theological process; (3) a theological-psychological process; and (4) radicalization models as policing tools.

The first type, radicalization as a cultural-psychological disposition, can in many ways be traced back to the work of Walter Laqueur (2004), whose arguments centered on moving away from traditional approaches to terrorism that focus on political and structural conditions leading to violence and rather descend to analyses of the micro-level characteristics of terrorism. In doing so, Laqueur (2004) maintains, one can identify the “cultural-psychological disposition” of those engaged in terrorist activities and search for root causes of such dispositions (p. 53). Framing this type of ‘root cause’ approach to identifying dispositions, Kundnani (2012) argues, can then be used by the intelligence community and law enforcement as a “proxy for terrorist risk and to structure their surveillance efforts accordingly” (p. 8). Since the work of Laqueur, he and other scholars have attempted to apply his ideas in a more systematic way as the basis of law enforcement and intelligence screening initiatives (see Horgan 1999, 2003, and 2009). Especially relevant in this respect is subsequent work which aims to identify sets of religious beliefs and activities that can be identified as ‘indicators’ of radicalization and, ultimately, of terrorism.

The second type of scientific discourse conceptualizes radicalization as a theological process. These studies try to highlight the significant role of theology in the radicalization process (Kundnani 2012). This type of research is most exemplified by the work of Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman (2009), whose influential *Homegrown Terrorists in the US and UK: An Empirical Examination of the*
Radicalization Process, aims to identify how individuals are “indoctrinated” into so-called jihadist ideologies (p. 26). Approaching radicalization as a predominantly theological process whereby an individual’s self-identity is viewed as a causal mechanism toward political violence, these studies aim to highlight ‘indicators,’ or “specific behavioral changes that homegrown terrorists went through as they radicalized” (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009: 29). Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009) argue that those behavioral changes include: the adoption of a “legalistic” interpretation of Islam, trusting only a “select and ideologically rigid” group of authorities, viewing the West and Islam as irreconcilable different, possessing a low tolerance for religious transgressions, attempting to impose religious beliefs on others, and expressing radical political views (p. 29). Similar to conceptualizations of radicalization as a cultural-psychological disposition, studies of this type focus more specifically on the religious dispositions of those who engage in terrorist activities. This body of work, therefore, is often used as the basis for indicator models of ‘extremist’ religious views and behaviors.

Despite well documented criticisms of this type of scholarship, the work of Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman and others working in this tradition (see Jenkins 2002, 2006, 2010, 2011), attempt to assert that their research is premised in an empirically rigorous method, and as such has been readily adopted by policy makers in a variety of contexts. But as Kundnani (2012) illustrates, these studies tend to suffer from numerous empirical and methodological weaknesses – not least of which include the lack of control groups, failure to establish a causal link between religiosity and terrorism despite claiming so, the ignorance of possible alternative explanations, confirmation biases with claimed causal mechanisms, and even serious concerns over the validity of the criteria to
determine cases’ status as ‘terrorists.’ Nonetheless, scholarship of this type continues to be adopted by governments who seek indicator models of risk to frame counterradicalization strategies and initiatives.

The third archetype of scholarly radicalization discourse attempts to connect theology with psychological processes in order to develop theories of radicalization. This type of research has gained influence in part due to its acceptance of the complexity involved with any process whereby one moves from ideological extremism to political violence (Kundnani 2012). These studies attempt to move beyond simplistic causal linkages between theology or disposition and radicalization in favor of a more interactive relationships between theological and social-psychological processes (Kundnani 2012). Rather than religious ideologies alone causing individuals to adopt violence, radicalization is related to extreme responses to ‘identity crises’ or sudden and unexpected changes in group bonding processes (Sageman 2004). As such, studies in this typology reflect the acceptance of a more complex approach to radicalization that addresses some of the interdependencies between theology, social psychology, and structural group dynamics.

While efforts to express the complexity involved in theorizing about the radicalization process break with some of the empirical and methodological issues of previous explanation attempts, they still problematically conflate religion and terrorism. As Kundnani rightly points out regarding Marc Sageman’s (2008) highlight influential Leaderless Jihad:

[T]he object of his study lacks any definition. The closest we get to a description of the category of activities he is analyzing is the statement that he is interested in “the men responsible for the September 11, 2001,
attacks and all those who, like them, threaten the United States”
(Kundnani 2012: 14; Sageman 2008:15 as cited in Kundnani 2012: 14)

In addition to Kundnani’s critique, Sageman’s work aligns with other theories of radicalization with respect to its failure to adequately, and empirically, demonstrate the causal link between theology and violence which lies at the heart of its model. In this way, despite claims to the contrary, theological-psychological theories of radicalization, as with the other typologies of radicalization adopted in the scientific system, fail to adequately justify their assumptions within the traditional framework of the scientific method; claims which Kundnani (2012) and others (Neumann 2013; Neumann and Kleinmann 2013) have argued are pseudoscientific in orientation.

However empirically invalid these studies might be, they have been highly influential in terms of their impact on governmental policy. Studies such as Sageman’s Leaderless Jihad attempt to explore the interconnectivity of theological extremist ideologies with social networks and therefore aim to identify how a breakdown in group dynamics increases the likelihood of radicalization amongst individuals and groups. In this way, Sageman’s work, and the work of others in this area (see Wiktorowicz 2005), has been highly influential for law enforcement who continue to try to understand radicalization networks in order to create strategies and initiatives to combat it.

The final cluster of Kundnani’s typology of scientific discourse are approaches to radicalization as a tool for law enforcement. Law enforcement agencies and governmental offices have commissioned several notable studies that adopt a mostly theological-psychological approach to radicalization, but differ in terms of their intended audience and applications (Kundnani 2012). Most notable in this respect is the highly influential NYPD Intelligence Division’s Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown
Threat, prepared by intelligence analysts Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt and published in 2007. The report offers a relatively simplistic model theorizing radicalization whilst claiming scholarly and methodological thoroughness.\(^{33}\) Silber and Bhatt (2007) argue that there are four “stages” of a generalized radicalization process: (1) pre-radicalization, denoting an individual’s life situation before they are exposed to “jihadist-Salafi Islam as their ideology”; (2) self-identification, the phase where individuals begin to explore “Salafi Islam”; (3) indoctrination, a period in which an individual “intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the cause”; and (4) jihadization, in which members of the group “self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen” (p. 6-7). Following the work of Sageman, Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) analysis highlights the intergroup dynamics whereby radicalization is supposedly cultivated, referring to the identification of “radicalization incubators” which can be infiltrated and subjected to various intervention strategies (p. 20)

Such policing-oriented analyses of radicalization also suffer from similar methodological and empirical deficiencies as other theories outlined above. In their overgeneralizations of radicalization, which narrowly focus on men from Islamic communities, studies such as Silber and Bhatt’s simply offer a less complex version of the theoretical model adopted by Sageman. Relying on less data and relatively absent of any methodological or empirical transparency, Silber and Bhatt (2007) maintain that “the four stages of the radicalization process, each with its distinct set of indicators and

\(^{33}\) It is of note that the report included an “Outside Expert’s” evaluation in an effort to imbue the report with an aura of analytical and methodological legitimacy. The ‘outside expert’ was Brian Michael Jenkins.
signatures, are clearly evident in each of the nearly one dozen terrorist-related case studies reviewed in this report” (p. 9). Despite the lack of methodological rigor, studies by Silber and Bhatt, Sageman, and Wiktorowicz have been highly influential in the formulation of counterradicalization policing strategies adopted by the NYPD and other law enforcement agencies (Kundnani 2012). By focusing on group dynamics and the “radicalization incubator” approach outlined by Silber and Bhatt, law enforcement agencies and government officials have reconfigured their policing intervention strategies around the theological-psychological approach to issues of radicalization.34

However, following this approach is potentially problematic for specific communities of groups, particularly cultural and ethnic minorities already targeted by post-9/11 counterterrorism practices of surveillance. As Kundnani (2012) concludes, “in the hands of the NYPD, Sageman and Wiktorowicz’s radicalization scholarship becomes a prospectus for mass surveillance of Muslim populations” (p. 19). I will return to the development and application of counterradicalization policing strategies in the next two chapters. The goal of this chapter, however, is to explore the evolution and diffusion of these and other claims to knowledge about radicalization to highlight how discourses spread throughout the public sphere. The following section builds on the work of Arun Kundnani and traces some of the more recent developments in radicalization scholarship. The final part of the chapter then moves to an empirical analysis of the proliferation of scholarly radicalization discourses throughout the public sphere.

34 As Kundnani (2012) points out, the theological-psychological process outlined by Silber and Bhatt, and the intervention strategies named in their report, appear very similar to the strategies outlined in the White House’s Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism guidelines.
The ‘Critical Turn:’ Radicalization as Governmental Framework and Governmental Ignorance

In 2004, Walter Laqueur proclaimed the presence of a “new terrorism,” distinguishing between traditional forms of political violence associated with older terrorism and a “new” form of “Islamic fundamentalist violence rooted in fanaticism” (p. 51). As I noted in the previous section, this led to important shifts in how issues of terrorism are approached and understood amongst scholars, industry researchers, and a host of ‘expert’ analysts. Laqueur’s influential work reconfigured notions of counterterrorism around the concept of radicalization, and prompted academic research, government initiatives, and public policy to focus on the identification of, and intervention in, the so-called radicalization process. While other observers have questioned the scholarly validity of ‘research’ into these phenomena, studies suggesting that we can observe a generalized trajectory from political or religious ideology to extremist forms of violence have remained influential in the cultural and political apparatuses, evinced by the substantial increase in use of the term radicalization in mass media (Chapter Six) and in governmental discourses (Chapter Four).

A similar, albeit antithetical, trend is evident in recent scholarly discourses related to radicalization, which are increasingly focusing on critical explorations into radicalization as an overarching logic of governance.\(^{35}\) Since 2012, there has been an increase in academic studies published which aim to provide analyses of both the historical development of scientific claims regarding radicalization as well as critical investigations into how those discourses influence shifts in strategies of governing

\(^{35}\) This dissertation itself thus contributes to this shift in academic discourses of radicalization.
terrorism (see Table 7.1). It is therefore important to revisit Kundnani’s (2012) typology of radicalization discourses in light of recent developments which have taken place within the scientific system. This section of the chapter offers an in-depth analysis of emergent frames of academic research related to radicalization and counterradicalization in hopes of highlighting how an emergent body of work has surfaced explicitly challenging some of the dominant tropes in scholarly research on radicalization. I argue that we must reconsidered and build upon Kundnani’s typology in order to paint a more complete picture of the state of academic radicalization discourses.

Table 7.1: Typology of Scientific Radicalization Discourses Pre- and Post-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-2012</th>
<th>Post-2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural-psychological</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theological</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theological-psychological</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing tools</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical studies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data gathered from academic search engines JSTOR and Sociological Abstracts. In total, 503 academic texts (books, peer-reviewed journal articles, dissertations) were examined from 1970-present. Book, peer-reviewed journal article, and dissertation abstracts were search for use of the terms "radicalization" or "radicalisation."

A search for academic publications referencing radicalization highlights some of the pre- and post-2012 trends in scientific knowledge claims related to radicalization and counterradicalization. As Table 7.1 illustrates, most academic publications prior to 2012 employed understandings of radicalization as a cultural-psychological disposition, highlighting scholarly approaches to the concept with reference to mostly political, and sometimes psychological, transformations at the level of the individual. The overwhelming scholarly focus on radicalization as cultural-psychological phenomenon
aligns with much of this study’s findings highlighting more traditional approaches to the construct; pre-2000 radicalization constructions in other public spheres most often denoted a specific politically oriented transition from conventional political beliefs to extreme ideologies. Additionally, scholarly publications focusing on radicalization as a theological process, or as a more complex relationship between theology and social psychological characteristics, were central in academic discourse. These trends align well with Kundnani’s (2012) typology of academic discourses related to radicalization.

However, the analysis suggests that Kundnani’s fourth type, radicalization as policing tool, was not often applied in academic publications. While the lack of focus on this type is relatively unsurprising given Kundnani’s focus on non-peer-reviewed research claiming to be methodologically rigorous and scientific, it is indeed indicative of the scientific system’s dedication to uncovering some of the structural, social psychological, and theological ‘root causes’ of radicalization, rather than providing concrete tools for law enforcement.

Following 2012, there were notable changes in scholarly discourses related to radicalization. While most academic publications remained focused on generalized cultural and psychological transitions towards extremist violence, there was a substantial increase in attempts to offer analyses of more complex interconnections between theology and social psychological characteristics and resources (see Table 7.1). Meanwhile, relatively simplistic publications representing radicalization as a predominantly theological process decreased considerably. These trends are indicative of academics’ preoccupation with offering models of a radicalization process based primarily in religious, psychological, and group dynamic forces. Several studies are
emblematic of this preoccupation, not least of which include analyses of the “psychological factors associated with support for suicide bombing in the Muslim diaspora” (Victoroff, Adelman and Matthews 2012), “what moves an individual from radical opinion to radical action” (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008), and “social interaction and psychological pathways to political engagement and extremism” (Thomas, McGarty and Louis 2014).36

These studies, and similar work in the area of social network analysis (see Klausen 2015; Medina 2014; Perlinger and Pedahur 2011), tend to begin their analysis with a problematic group or social location (i.e., Muslim communities or attacks perpetrated by Muslims), and extend their findings to broader populations. This is particularly relevant in the case of so-called radicalization. As the chapters of this dissertation have demonstrated, radicalization is a concept most often evoked with reference to terrorism and terrorist activities perpetrated by individuals associated with Islam. Scholarship adopting this perspective in advance of the research, by using network analysis tools of case study approaches, may provide partial or inadequate theoretical explanations due to their ignorance of alternative explanations and control groups.

Despite often using similar methodological techniques and approaches that Kundnani (2012) appropriately critiques,37 the data here suggest that academic publishers continue

---


37 Of note here is that, even in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, methodological concerns are present and sometimes must be addressed. An example of a theological-psychological approach to radicalization claiming scientific authority through questionable methods is a 2014 study entitled “A Cognitive-
to disseminate research attempting to find the social psychological and theological causes associated with radicalization.

The analysis also indicates a notable increase scholarly publications related to the use of radicalization theories as tools for police and law enforcement agencies (see Table 7.1). Studies in this area focused on law enforcement perspectives of factors leading to so-called radicalization (Selim 2016), ‘best practice’ approaches to policing and surveillance (Caldwell 2012), and comparative studies of public policy and policing initiatives (Lindekilde 2012b; Smith 2014; Southers 2014). These mostly program-oriented studies aimed to highlight the most, and least, efficient policing and surveillance strategies that have been deployed throughout (mostly) the United States and United Kingdom. Rather than critiquing the problematic application of policing and policy initiatives on specific cultural and ethnic minority communities, these studies approach radicalization as a problem a priori amongst Muslim populations and seek to highlight the most efficient means given the goal of countering radicalization. While such academic discourses did indeed increase post-2012, they remained relatively rare in broader discourses of radicalization.

The most notable development in scholarly publications related to radicalization was the emergence of a discourses critical of the current academic tropes being engaged in broad bodies of counterradicalization research. This collection of work aims to highlight the illogicality, paradoxes, deficiencies, and problematic state of current scholarly work related to the conceptual and theoretical framing of radicalization.

Behavioral Approach to Violent Radicalization, Based on a Real Case.” In this article, the author attempts to trace a “feasible, coherent pathway” through which some people engage in violent extremism through the analysis of a particular case study, with no comparative or control group present.
Scholars working in this area highlight the problematic nature of academic radicalization discourses in a variety of contexts, not least of which includes security and surveillance (Harbisher 2015; Monaghan 2015), governmental policy and programs (Akbarzadeh 2013; Lemons and Chambers-Letson 2014), mass media (Silva 2017), and even academic discourses themselves (Kundnani 2012; Neumann 2013; Neumann and Kleinmann 2013).

Scholars have challenged the traditional tropes imbued in scholarly radicalization discourses for not only their methodological and theoretical deficiencies, but also their predetermined set of assumptions which often disproportionally focus on a perceived threat of Islamic terrorism (a detailed analysis of this paradoxical “threat” is provided in chapter four). For instance, Jeffrey Monaghan and colleagues (2015; Molnar and Monaghan 2016), demonstrate how law enforcement counterradicalization strategies in Canada have adopted international academic and policy discourses while reaffirming preemptive and discriminatory security practices. Peter Neumann (2013), on the other hand, illustrates the how academic and policy-makers’ conceptualizations of radicalization lack logical clarity and thus calls for a more systematic and coordinated effort amongst researchers to resolve ambiguity. Academic discourses such as these and others turn the focus away from creating models of radicalization toward providing deeper analyses and understanding of how the concept of radicalization and the practices of

38 While I do maintain that Molnar and Monaghan’s (2016) work is exemplary of what I have called the ‘critical turn’ in academic radicalization discourses, I must note that the work is not exemplary in terms of theoretical and methodological rigor. The authors’ use of Freedom of Information data is well outlined and grounded in the emergent body of literature employing such methods. That being said, the article makes sweeping claims regarding law enforcement focus on Islam which are not effectively demonstrated empirically (aside from highlighting few examples to back up their claims).
counterradicalization are constructed and how those discourses have implications for a variety of organizations and communities.

This body of work thus challenges dominant academic attempts to identify generalized radicalization trajectories that have been the basis for numerous governmental initiatives. Rather than investigating case studies or other empirical data on ‘terrorists’ which otherwise might be considered problematic, critical scholarship has emerged which focuses on the theoretical, conceptual, and empirical issues with their unit of analysis; critiquing the very academic discourses which have influenced the creation of a myriad of counterradicalization intervention practices. Researchers have thus illustrated some of the inconsistencies and problematic practices involved in governmental strategies constructed in the name of counterradicalization. For instance, as I have noted in previous chapters, O’Toole and colleagues (O’Toole, DeHanas and Modood 2012; O’Toole et al. 2016) have documented some potential blind spots in the Prevent strategy (UK) where governmental policy might be further developed – for example, beyond a solely critical analysis of the strategy, the authors point out ways in which Prevent can better align with the realities of Muslim-state engagement. Academics in this area tend to call for the abolition of (at least some) governmental counterradicalization strategies and initiatives (Birt 2009; Molnar and Monaghan 2016; O’Toole et al. 2016), however, they also provide useful insights for governmental officials to create social and public policy that is more conscious of the experiences and characteristics of communities for which they aim to intervene.

In this respect, critical academic dialogues regarding radicalization may be of great use to governments as they continue to reflect on their counterradicalization
programs. The Home Office in the UK, for instance, published a follow-up Prevent strategy in 2015 which highlighted some concerns raised by the public and ways in which the Government are attempting to address community issues. Notably missing from The Home Office’s report is any citation from scholarly research here identified as critical of government policy. While this is unsurprising, it is suggestive of the UK Government’s aversion to some forms of academic research on issues of radicalization. The important question thus emerges: what scholarly discourses related to radicalization and counterradicalization are being adopted by governments? And, equally important, how do those scientific discourses influence the configuration of governmental counterradicalization strategies and the set of practices therein? The final section of this chapter aims to address these important questions.

The Inter-Systemic Adoption of Academic Radicalization Discourses

To explore the inter-systemic adoption of academic radicalization discourses, I used a variety of data sources and collection methods. First, counterradicalization strategies in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom were analyzed on the basis of references to scholarly research. Each reference was categorized based on the typology outlined in the previous section and any reference made to funding initiatives for research or ‘evidence-based’ analyses. With the results of this search, I was able to uncover the most important bodies of empirical research and funding programs used by government officials in the creation of counterradicalization initiatives. I then searched pertinent governmental and federal research granting websites for information on the research projects funded as part of official counterradicalization strategies. Each funded proposal
was then analyzed in detail to identify how the authors understand radicalization and issues of counterradicalization. Following the analysis, I then categorized each proposal in the same typology as I have used throughout this chapter.

The importance of government funding with respect to knowledge claims about radicalization is twofold: (1) there has been well-documented structural transformations within the scientific system that illustrates the importance of government funding in the pursuit of research outcomes (see Deflem 2013; Geuna 2001; Sageman 2014); and (2) governmental counterradicalization strategies, as I have noted, increasingly focus on knowledge production and “evidence-based” research to advise authorities on best practices, to wit explicitly mentioning funding programs in those official strategies. Since academic research is often in need of governmental funding, and governments explicitly request scholarly work from the scientific system in their counterradicalization initiatives, identifying the output of those funding programs is central to an analysis of how academic discourses are adopted by governments and government officials. Unlike the United Kingdom’s Prevent strategy, Canadian and United States’ counterradicalization guidelines did not explicitly cite academic research. The analysis therefore includes only government funded research projects in Canada and the US. This analysis is also exploratory in nature, and further investigations into how academic discourses of radicalization are adopted by governments is still necessary and welcomed.\(^{39}\)

\(^{39}\) The next logical step in this analysis is to explore the adoption of academic research in Parliamentary and Congressional debates. Due to the already broad scope of this dissertation, and the resources required for such an endeavor, I use this chapter to build an empirical basis for further research into political usage of academic radicalization discourses.
Findings from the analysis are presented in Table 7.2. The data indicate that most government adoptions of radicalization research are focused on identifying theological, psychological, or group dynamics amenable to a radicalization process. This is particularly evident in the United Kingdom, where both the Prevent strategy and the governmental funding apparatus continue to seek out studies detecting indicators of a generalized radicalization process. In the United States and Canada, however, much more attention is paid to the identification of best practices for the law enforcement, intelligence and security communities. This area of radicalization research has received the most government funding through Canada’s Kanishka Project and Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society (TSAS)\textsuperscript{40} and the US National Institute of Justice’s Domestic Radicalization and Terrorism Program and Researching Solutions to Violent Extremism Network (RESOLVE). Of note is the lack of reference to, or funding of, research projects critical of current or former counterradicalization practices.

None of the projects analyzed in Canada or the US provided critical analyses of radicalization and only five projects were funded in the UK. However, a deeper analysis of the UK’s governmental response to radicalization illustrates its own aversion to critical radicalization scholarship. Of the 46 scholarly citations in the UK’s Prevent strategy, 28 sought to identify causes or explain pathways toward radicalization and three of them focused on best practices for countering radicalization. Notably missing from the UK’s Prevent Strategy is any reference to critical analysis of governmental strategies, despite

\textsuperscript{40} It is important to note that the Kanishka Project funded the establishment of TSAS, but the Network has since established its own internal fund-granting projects.
the inclusion of numerous “community concerns” regarding law enforcement and security measures (The Home Office 2011a, 2011b).

**Table 7.2: Funded Government Research Projects and Citations in Governmental Counterradicalization Strategies since 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural-psychological</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theological</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theological-psychological</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing tools</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical studies</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UK Sources: CONTEST and Prevent Strategies, research funded by the Economic and Social Research Council through the “Radicalization Research” (74 projects); Canada Sources: funded research projects from the Kanishka Project Contribution Program (37 projects; five rounds of funding) and the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society ([TSAS] four major projects and 18 working papers); US Sources: Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, all research projects funded as part of the National Institute of Justice's "Domestic Radicalization and Terrorism Program" from 2012 to 2016 (25 projects) and the Researching Solutions to Violent Extremism Network (RESOLVE) from 2007 to 2017 (19 publications)

And while counterradicalization strategies continue to call for ‘evidence-based’ research as a fundamental requirement for governmental initiatives, the evidentiary standards of the research they seek out remains questionable (Neumann and Kleinmann 2013). In addition, as the data here suggest, governments ignore research critical of status quo surveillance, intelligence, and policing strategies in favor of such questionable ‘indicator’ and ‘evidence-based’ studies attempting to identify the cultural, theological, psychological, or even social characteristics of those immersed by the so-called radicalization process. The overwhelming focus of governments and funding organizations on identifying ‘root causes’ of radicalization and ‘best practices’ of law enforcement vis-à-vis counterradicalization thus legitimizes a body of empirically questionable research while simultaneously justifying its own counterradicalization
interventions. This mutually beneficial relationship between government and academic researchers has been explored by numerous scholars (see Galliher 1973; Manski 2013), and is here accompanied by the exclusion of an entire emergent body of work that may be of use for governments as they aim to create just and equitable security and policing measures.

Outside of the governmental apparatus, academic discourses related to radicalization have been adopted by news media to lend legitimacy to stories related to terrorism. Mass media has a long history of including interviews and comments from scientists and researchers to provide authoritative discourses to media accounts of diverse social phenomena, particularly issues related to crime and security (Greek 1995; Barak 2007). In a similar way, academic knowledge claims have been employed by news media to legitimize journalistic accounts of issues related to radicalization. Media most often represent academics as ‘expert analysts’ or scholars whom have deeper knowledge of the so-called radicalization process. Since media uses scholars and academic research to lend authority to its news reporting, it is noteworthy which academic discourses are being included in media accounts of radicalization. The final section of this chapter thus seeks to explore the uptake of scholarly research related to radicalization by news media. Employing the typology developed by Kundnani (2012), and built upon in this Chapter, I explore the adoption of various types of academic radicalization discourse in major news coverage of radicalization in the UK, US, and Canada.

Table 7.3: References to Academic Scholarship in News Media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural-psychological</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theological</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theological-psychological</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Media most often sought out analysis from scholars working to understand the theological and social psychological precursors to radicalization. News articles in the United States overwhelmingly focused on the work of a very select few academic researchers, not least of which included the work of Marc Sageman (85 references), Bruce Hoffman (91 references), and Peter Neumann (208 references). In the United Kingdom, news media mostly relied on Peter Neumann’s analysis (72 references), while also employing research from Hoffman (15 references), and UK scholars Bartlett, Birdwell, and King (8 references), who notably authored research referenced by the Prevent strategy. In Canadian news coverage of radicalization, the work of Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (20 references), Sageman (22 references), Hoffman (25 references), Neumann (20 references) and Canadian scholars Wesley Wark (17 references) and Lorne Dawson (10 references) were among the most cited. News media thus referenced the work of (mostly) scholars working to explore the theological and psychological underpinnings of a generalized radicalization process, with but notable focus on law enforcement tools used to counter radicalization.

Few critical scholars were relied upon in news media coverage of radicalization. Despite publishing newsworthy, attention grabbing titles such as *The Muslims are Coming!*, the work of Arun Kundnani, focused on advancing critical approaches to the construct of radicalization, was only referenced five times in news media (four of which were related to the release of the book rather than Kundnani’s expertise in radicalization.)
studies). In addition, the release of Christopher Baker-Beall, Charlotte Heath-Kelly, and Lee Jarvis’ *Counter-Radicalisation: Critical Perspectives* received only one mention by news media; none of the authors were referenced as ‘experts’ in the news articles. Sageman’s *Leaderless Jihad*, meanwhile, was referenced fifteen times. It is important to note that the Prevent strategy (UK) did point to one meta-analysis that reflects on some of the empirical issues raised in academic studies on radicalization, however the citation was not made in reference to such a critique, but rather to the author’s finding that many scholars focus individuals’ search for community when involved in radicalization processes.\(^{41}\)

While the adoption of scholarly discourses related to radicalization in news media warrants further attention in its own right – as there are many complex reasons for the adoption of particular discursive formations over others – the exploratory analysis here suggests that mass media, like government, is preoccupied with the pursuit of indicator-based models of radicalization. By seeking out scholars who advocate for this type of radicalization research, media contributes to popular understandings of a particular style of radicalization; one rooted in theology and social psychological processes. While there is nothing inherently problematic with such a development, it does simultaneously point to a blind spot amongst media coverage of academic discourses. By highlighting the ‘expertise’ of only a portion of scholars whom work on diverse issues within

---

\(^{41}\) The meta-analysis referenced by Prevent (UK) was Dalgaard-Nielsen’s (2010) exploration of “what we know and what we do not know” about violent radicalization in Europe (p. 797). In it the author highlights several empirical and methodological concerns besetting scholarly research on radicalization, however The Home Office (2011a) cited the work to justify its claim that: “some recent academic work suggests that radicalisation occurs as people search for identity, meaning and community. It has been argued in particular that some second or third generation Muslims in Europe, facing apparent or real discrimination and socio-economic disadvantage, can find in terrorism a ‘value system,’ a community and an apparently just cause” (p. 17).
radicalization research, media lends both legitimacy to the work while also delegitimizing other, excluded work.

These trends are not new in media representations of counterterrorism. As Edward Said (1981) noted long ago, media and ‘experts’ influence the ways in which we understand the world, global conflicts, and even how the West understands Islamic cultures of the East (see Chapter Six). Part of Said’s now classic analysis is that Western media evokes discourses from an ‘expert’ class whom offer prepackaged, and sometimes false, claims about Islam and Muslim communities in order to influence public ideas about Islamic cultures.

As previously noted by David Garland (1992) and Pasquino (1991), Foucault himself saw criminological knowledge claims, particularly modern twentieth-century criminology, as instrumental insofar as they cannot be disconnected from relations of power that permeate governmental decision-making. The results here provide some evidence for these arguments and what others have called the state of “politicized scholarship,” where scientific knowledge claims are taken up in rather selective ways to justify social policy decisions (Savelsberg, King and Cleveland 2002). While I do not here suggest that academic discourses of radicalization are entirely false, I do build on well-established critiques of the current state of the discipline based on methodological and empirical inadequacies and weaknesses. I therefore maintain that the adoption of such scientifically questionable research in media and in governmental discourse alike is reflective of some of the trends I have illustrated in politics (Chapter Four), law (Chapter Five), and media (Chapter Six). Furthermore, I argue that the cyclical relationships between government-counterradicalization research-media reflect a broader
preoccupation with problematizing radicalization as a predominantly religious issue, one that affects (mostly) Muslim communities.

Conclusion

Charles Manski (2013) has illustrated how public policy decisions made based on incredulous ‘expert’ analysis feigning methodological and scholarly rigor have effected issues ranging from security to FDA drug approvals, and how those analyses are often based on strong assumptions rather than empirical evidence. The development and adoption of expert analyses in the area of radicalization studies seems to have followed a similar trajectory. Scholars studying a wide array of issues related to radicalization have largely advocated for government to seriously consider theories of theological and psychological radicalization processes often based in questionable research methods and inadequate empirical sites. Governments, in turn, have rewarded those academic discourses with funding and exposure in national counterradicalization strategies. By funding and adopting only a certain kind of scholarship, government (and media) send messages to the academic system with respect to the types of research that are valued and valuable.

Perhaps most exemplary of this trend is that despite the emergence of numerous critical analyses of some counterradicalization practices in the UK, the Home Office’s Prevent strategy chose to cite from a for-profit magazine rather than seek out peer-reviewed, methodologically rigorous scholarship to legitimize its claims regarding the structure of ideological violence (The Home Office 2011a: 35). The governments’ refusal to adequately screen its sources for scholarly legitimacy based on systematic and
historical methodological standards is indeed suggestive of governmental selectivity in the academic discourses for which it uses to justify and legitimize counterradicalization practices. Governments thus, through its exclusion of emergent bodies of research, encourage the advancement and provide legitimacy for certain academic discourses on radicalization, while simultaneously delegitimizing others. In this way, academic discourses of radicalization can be approached as instrumental for government decision-making related to counterterrorism. From an academic perspective, this trend is problematic for numerous reasons, not least of which relate to the future of radicalization research and the relative dearth of critical empirical research receiving financial and institutional recognition. From a governance perspective, this trend highlights a preoccupation with an indicator- and evidence-based approach to counterradicalization that suffers from not only empirical inadequacies, but fails to account for the complexity of radicalization as social phenomena.

As I have demonstrated, academic knowledge claims related radicalization, and appropriate counterradicalization strategies therein, continue to advocate for community-level policing initiatives grounded in ideals of community-engagement and theological surveillance, monitoring, and intervention. Governments, meanwhile, continue to adopt these scholarly discourses in the formation of innovative counterradicalization policing strategies throughout the West. But what are the actual practices being developed in different countries for dealing with problems of radicalization? What new community-level law enforcement initiatives are being deployed in various contexts and jurisdictions? How do these policing initiatives configure notions of radicalization and the material practices of risk, security, and surveillance upon which they are founded?
Following the in-depth analyses of how radicalization is constructed in the political, legal, media, and scientific systems, this study now turns to an analysis of actual law enforcement practices seeking to counter radicalization. The final chapter of this work thus connects the discursive with the physical and the ideal with the material while exploring questions to how radicalization discourses influence the myriad of law enforcement practices deployed in the name of counterradicalization.
CHAPTER 8

THE POLICING OF RADICALIZATION

The body of this study has thus far focused primarily on the construction and proliferation of discourses related to counterradicalization in the public sphere. Through the analysis of the development and adoption of discourses of radicalization by law, politics, media and science, the present work has illustrated how the construct of radicalization has been deployed as a symbolic marker of difference between the mostly Christian West and Islamic East. Relying on work within the governmentality and othering literatures, the preceded chapters sought to investigate the ideal and material elements involved in the construction and maintenance of radicalization discourses as a frame of both modern preemption governance and as a technique of othering Islamic communities.

The project thus attempts to trace the historical, social, and political diffusion of radicalization discourses throughout the public sphere to help understand how we, as social beings, conceptualize radicalization and practices of counterradicalization and how those conceptualizations reflect the emergence of some material practices of counterterrorism. The present chapter seeks to build on this project by investigating the interconnectivity between radicalization discourses in society’s dominant social institutions and material policing practices which emerge in the construct’s name. This discussion is therefore guided by three important research questions:
(1) How do official counterradicalization policing initiatives emerge in specific Western liberal democracies?

(2) How do these policing programs develop in similar, or different, ways in terms of their logic, rationale of remedy, and concrete practices?

(3) What structural and institutional conditions are amenable to the emergence of official policing programs oriented around countering terrorism through preemption?

This chapter is broken down into three sections. In the first I provide some sociohistorical antecedents related to the emergence of official counterradicalization policing programs in the US, UK, and Canada and further explore some of the ideal and material practices involved in such initiatives. Secondly, through the analysis of the data, I provide evidence for the overarching argument of this chapter, that specific structural and institutional conditions as well as operational motives make the emergence of counterradicalization policing more or less likely, and highlight those conditions. Finally, I focus my attention on the rationale of preemptive policing in relation to terrorism to illustrate how it is imbued in a discriminatory logic that disproportionately focuses on cultural and ethnic minorities. Counterradicalization policing, therefore, cannot be disconnected from such discriminatory logics even when it adopts agnostic notions of terrorism, security, and radicalization.

The following pages seek to build off of the other chapters of this present work by grounding the empirical findings in regard to discursive formations of radicalization in analyses of material counterradicalization policing initiatives. The discussion presented here is intended to highlight the interconnectivity of radicalization discourses with
governmental practices of law enforcement. Through demonstrating the connections between constructions of radicalization discourse and governance practices, the present chapter argues that the very foundation of counterradicalization policing is premised on a discriminatory logic that frames Islamic communities as the central foci of danger. Therese O’Toole and colleagues (2016) have highlighted how the UKs Prevent strategy, and the policing practices associated with it, results the emergence of “risky subjects” within Muslim communities. In this dissertation, I advance the less agnostic argument that Western cultural, political, legal, and scientific systems have contributed to the creation of “Muslim Strangers” – to the configuration of a social category of religious difference that creates social distance between Islamic communities and the broader population. This figure masks and legitimizes new forms of surveillance, policing, and intelligence gathering that spread throughout the social apparatus. One such area is law enforcement, where policing strategies have been erected on a logic of Muslim radicalization and can therefore not be distinguished as agnostic or equally distributed.

Prior to engagement with the data and the illustration of evidence which supports these claims, I will outline my adoption of a comparative case study approach and illustrate its utility with respect to explorations of innovating policing programs.

To explore representational and material strategies and practices deployed by governments to prevent transitions towards political violence, I examine the policing initiatives developed in the name of counterradicalization and counterterrorism from each of the US, UK, and Canada. The policing programs analyzed in this chapter are as follows: Montréal’s Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV), Calgary’s ReDirect and Extreme Dialogue programs, London Metropolitan
Police Service’s (MPS) Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) and Community Engagement Team, and the New York City Policy Department’s (NYPD) Community Affairs Bureau (CAB) and Demographics Unit. My rationale for comparing these cases is threefold. First, all programs are under the purview of, or involve, local law enforcement agencies and therefore connect governmental logics of counterradicalization with material practices of governance. Second, they each represent a relatively new and emergent form of policing aimed to some degree at countering trajectories towards terrorism through preemption. Lastly, all programs here analyzed focus on community engagement and information sharing between police and local communities. The purpose of comparing law enforcement strategies is therefore to highlight the (in)consistencies between jurisdictions in relation to the policing of radicalization.

Historical Development of Counterradicalization Initiatives

United Kingdom

The UK is most often said to be a global leader in counterradicalization strategies and initiatives (Monaghan and Molnar 2016; Rascoff 2012). Indeed, many of the current developments in countering radicalization in the West seem to be at least in part influenced by British approaches, not least of which is highlighted by Canada’s adoption of the same name for its counterradicalization strategy (i.e., Prevent). The rearticulation of counterterrorism practices around notions of preemption in the UK can officially be traced back to the country’s development of the overarching counterterrorism strategy
called Contest in early 2003. Contest represented one of the first holistic governmental initiative for countering terrorism following the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Its stated goal is to provide disparate governmental agencies with an organized strategy to counter-terrorism in the United Kingdom. Its practices include aggressive law enforcement and prosecution campaigns, preventative monitoring and arrest, protecting critical infrastructure, and organizing response strategies in case of terrorist attacks.

The UK’s Prevent leg of its overarching counterterrorism strategy Contest is the country’s guiding framework in all matters of counterradicalization. It brings together disparate agencies, governmental offices, and private sector stakeholders under one umbrella to officially: (1) challenge the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it; (2) protect citizens and other vulnerable people; and (3) support sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalization. To meet these objectives, Prevent outlines numerous strategies for schools and universities, internet service providers, healthcare providers, private sector stakeholders, religious organization, and the criminal justice system, to assist in the counter radicalization process.

Contest offered a dramatic new approach to counterterrorism based predominantly in combatting the risk of future terrorism rather than traditional reactive approaches founded in military and law. The UK’s reconfiguration of its counterterrorism strategy around such notions of risk provided a governmental framework for the emergence of new law enforcement initiatives structured by a similar guiding logic. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that London’s Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has

---

42 For a discussion of the historical antecedents of Contest see Chapter Four of the present work.
developed some of the most innovative policing strategies aimed at countering radicalization.

In 2002, London’s MPS’s Anti-Terrorism Branch, which had been dealing with issues of terrorism since the 1970s campaigns against the IRA, established a pilot unit to work closely with Muslim communities to identify, intervene, and disrupt ‘jihadi’ extremists from recruiting in Mosques in the Finsbury Park and Brixton areas of London (Lambert 2011). This unit, called the Muslim Contact Unit, was set up by former undercover officer and head of the MPS Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) – a Special Branch Unit used famously in the 1960s to infiltrate the New Left through undercover police work – Bob Lambert to focus on building trust with Muslim communities. The founder of the MCU has written extensively on its creation, highlighting that a key remit of the MCU was to open lines of communication and information sharing between the law enforcement and Muslim communities in London (Lambert 2011).

In the aftermath of 9/11, Lambert immediately began discussing how to prevent similar attacks in the UK with other members of the Special Branch. Together with other members of the Special Branch, Lambert established the MCU in January of 2002 as a small unit within the MPS Special Branch. The MCU’s model was germane to the Special Branch’s ‘E Squad,’ which focused on foreign international terrorist threats and for which Lambert was a member, which attempted to counter threats of terrorism in Britain throughout the 1980s through practices of engagement with Sikh’s in Southall. In his reflections on the MCU, Bob Lambert (2011) stated that the Unit’s primary mission was “establishing partnerships with Muslim community leaders both equipped and located to help tackle the spread of al-Qaida propaganda in London” (p. 35). Contrary to
prevailing counter-terrorism policing of the early 2000s, the MCU’s mandate called for engagement with all Muslim community leaders, not just “moderate” leaders aligned with governmental directives.

As the Labour administration of the late 2000s developed and implemented the Prevent strategy to deal with threats of radicalization, the Special Branch was merged with the Anti-Terrorism Branch of the MPS in October of 2008. Meanwhile, with the establishment of Prevent came a cut to funding and resources available to the MCU, whose activities were being undercut by Prevent’s Communities Together Strategic Engagement Team (CTSET) and Prevent’s own officers (Quick 2009). The operational space for the MCU was thus reduced with the advent of Prevent, which aimed to foster a broader strategy of community engagement not explicitly focused on Muslim communities. Under a conservative-led coalition government, the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) took over many of the autonomous activities of the MCU and reinforced a version of Prevent (revised in 2011) that streamlined and organized community policing initiatives under its banner and the MCU became nonoperational sometime after 2011.

Prevent has established what it calls Prevent Engagement Officers within local police forces that work to “develop community connections, understand communities, identify risks and share information with partners to support prevent objectives” (The Home Office 2011a). This structure of nationally coordinated policing initiatives has replaced the locally-autonomous MCU structure and aligns with the coordinated, centralized, and layered approach to governing terrorism through preemption highlighted in Prevent. The emergence of this policing system is thus also reflective of a
rearticulation of policing around less explicit notions of vulnerable communities. As highlighted in Figure 8.1, the 2011 revision of Prevent distributes more 99% of its policing funding to policing initiatives which make no explicit mention of Islam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Activity type</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70%</td>
<td>Police officers and staff in forces and CTUs</td>
<td>Prevent Engagement officers working to develop community connections, understand communities, identify risks and share information with partners to support Prevent objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>National coordination of Prevent by ACPO (TAM)</td>
<td>ACPO (TAM)’s Prevent Delivery Unit supports police forces with their contribution to Prevent by overseeing their delivery of ACPO’s Prevent strategy, working with OSCT to allocate resources according to risk, building capability in forces to deliver Prevent activities, developing guidance to instil best practice and rolling out programmes to engage communities in Prevent events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Channel Coordinators</td>
<td>Channel coordinators lead multi-agency partnerships that evaluate referrals of individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism, and work alongside safeguarding partnerships and crime reduction panels to provide tailored support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit</td>
<td>A dedicated police unit to assess and investigate terrorism-related illegal internet content and take remedial action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Development of CTLPs and information sharing</td>
<td>The development of comprehensive assessments of threat, risk and vulnerability in local areas for sharing with police partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Training and awareness raising</td>
<td>Developing and delivering police Prevent awareness-raising exercises such as Operation Nicole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Other activities focusing on engagement with vulnerable individuals</td>
<td>Activity aimed at Muslim communities, enabling discussions with the police and local partners around issues such as radicalisation, supporting vulnerable individuals and terrorism legislation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.1: Percentage Distribution of Funding for Prevent Policing Initiatives

United States

As noted in previous chapters, the United States does not currently have, nor has it attempted to create, a unified governmental counterradicalization framework. However, that is not to suggest that counterterrorism in the US has not been significant rearticulated

---

around notions of preemption over the past decade. Reforms made to governmental structure, particularly in the areas of intelligence and law enforcement, following 9/11 have made the prevention of terrorist attacks a central concern. Part of the justification for the 2003 reorganization of security agencies and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was to increase attention paid on the prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks against the US before they occur.

In the United States, two key intelligence projects provided much of the impetus for the reorientation of local policing terrorism around notions of preemption. In 2006, the FBI’s *The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad* and the 2007 NYPD report *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*. These ‘research’ projects advocated for and informed the development of an intelligence gathering-led approach to policing that would seek out patterns of so-called radicalization that might lead to violent terrorism. The FBI report identified a fourfold generalized typology of ‘stages of radicalization’ that could form the basis of policing initiatives in a variety of contexts. These stages included “preradicalization,” “identification,” “indoctrination” and “action” and therefore offered a generalized and predictable process by which Muslims move towards terrorism. While the merits of this type of work are investigated in the previous Chapter, it is important to note that this project – an immense 12 pages with five citations and no apparent methodology – helped aligned law enforcement practices across the United States around notions of preemption and intervention in such generalized processes (Akbar 2013; Huq 2010).

---

44 Although this report was not originally made public, the document was leaked and subsequently declassified by the FBI in 2010.
Another pivotal moment for the reconfiguration of counterterrorism practices was the 2007 release of the NYPD Intelligence Division’s near 100-page report, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*. Similar to the FBI report, Silber and Bhatt (2007) theorize a processual trajectory whereby Muslims move from conventional religious beliefs to terrorist violence. This report adapted the FBI’s fourfold model to suggest that Muslims move through processes of “pre-radicalization,” “self-identification,” “indoctrination” and “jihadization” (Silber and Bhatt 2007). Even more, the authors highlight that each stage has “specific signatures associated with it” thus highlighting the presence of risk markers for radicalization (Silber and Bhatt 2007: 19).

These reports helped engrain in political discourse an approach to radicalization as not only a predictable process, but also one that is predominantly associated with Islamic communities. For example, as Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Peter King cited the FBI’s report in his comments made during a series of hearings on ‘Islamic radicalization’ in 2012. Furthermore, during the same hearings, Mitchell Silber, one of the authors of the NYPD report was called as an expert witness to testify about the presence of an identifiable and comprehensive radicalization process coming from Muslim communities.

In the case of the NYPD, the rearticulation of its counterterrorism strategy has resulted in three groups overseeing new initiatives: The Counterterrorism Division, the Intelligence Division, and the Community Affairs Bureau (CAB). The first two handle traditional policing and intelligence policing programs to identify and intervene upon threats of terrorism. The third, the CAB, handles community outreach initiatives which are most similar to other counterradicalization policing programs investigated here, yet
does not explicitly label itself as such. Since this chapter focuses on the emergence and genesis of counterradicalization policing programs, I will focus primarily on the CAB.\footnote{It is noted that the CAB is not explicitly focused on counterradicalization as its modus operandi, however, for the purposes of comparison, the Bureau is relatively similar in terms of objectives, scope, and practices. I therefore argue that it is germane to policing initiatives in other counties which focus on community engagement and cooperation to combat terrorism.}

**Canada**

Similar to the UK and unlike the US, Canada does have an official counterradicalization strategy. Through the establishment of a framework that uses UK’s Prevent as its namesake, Canada is often viewed as a ‘norm-taker’ with respect to post-2001 counterterrorism policy and legislative frameworks, particularly with respect to the country’s counterradicalization strategy (Monaghan 2015). While Canada’s national counterradicalization program adopts the same name as its UK counterpart, the development of the country’s initiatives aimed at countering transitions towards terrorism have a complex history of their own. As Kent Roach (2011) demonstrates, Canadian responses to terrorism are much more complex than theorizations of input-output models of policy transfer. In this context, Canada has also had its own distinct experiences with terrorism which cannot be approached as a mirror of the history of political violence in the UK or US. While, as Chapter Four of the present work illustrates, Canada has, for the most part, experienced relatively few incidents of terrorism since the 1970s, there are definite differences between political violence in Canada and other countries.

As Leman-Langlois and Brodeur (2005) illustrate, Canada experienced a period of extreme political violence in the 1960s and 1970s, where numerous high-profile incidents occurred mainly in the province of Québec. A separatist group that called itself
the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) engaged in demand-based terrorism to achieve a dyadic goal of Québec independence from Canada and the emancipation of the working class. Following the abduction of the vice-premier of Québec, Pierre Laporte, during the 1970 ‘October Crisis,’ the Canadian government employed measures rarely ever used in the West – the country evoked the War Measures Act, which is a form of emergency power that suspends habeas corpus and provides sweeping powers of arrest and detention to law enforcement. To deal with problems of political violence, then, Canada has historically relied upon more traditional strategies of interference, target-hardening, infiltration, and arrest (Leman-Langlois and Brodeur 2005). Experiences of counterterrorism in Canada, like the US and UK, have thus been significantly reconfigured around new response strategies based on surveillance, insecurity, and actionable futures.

In the years following 9/11, the Canadian government developed an approach to counterterrorism that shifted from the national space to the global. This move from counterterrorism as national issue to international concern was reflected in both governmental communications about countering terrorism as well as international cooperation on matters of public policy. For instance, in the latter years of the decade, Canadian politicians overwhelmingly adopted the notion of a ‘global fight against terrorism,’ whilst establishing international cooperation networks and adopting similar policies to combat terrorism (i.e., omnibus antiterrorism legislation passed immediately following the September 11th attacks). One of the most well documents instances of the adoption and implementation of germane counterterrorism policy is the establishment of a national counterradicalization framework. In 2012, following the release of the Air
India Flight 182 commission report and at least influenced by a 2006 foiled terrorist plot against a variety of targets in Southwestern Ontario (known as “Toronto 18”), then Minister of Public Safety Vic Toews, released the Government’s strategic plan entitled *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-terrorism Strategy*. The Strategy, in some ways explicitly similar and in other ways clearly influenced by the UK’s Contest framework, outlined the Canadian response to building a “resilient society.” As Toews (2012) himself suggests: “in a resilient society, everyone – including governments, first responders, critical infrastructure operators, communities and individuals – knows what they need to do when faced with a terrorist attack, ensuring a rapid return to ordinary life.”

In an almost identical approach as the UK’s Contest framework, the Canadian strategy adopts a fourfold strategy to build resilient communities, including: Detect, Deny, Prevent, and Respond. As one part of the fourfold Strategy, the Government introduced the Prevent framework aimed at preventing the uptake, adoption, and proliferation of ‘terrorist ideologies’ among vulnerable individuals and groups. As an explicit counterradicalization framework, Prevent seeks to work with local, national, and international partners to counter violent extremism and provide alternative narratives to individuals and groups whom may be transitioning towards violent activities. In this way, and similar to Prevent in the UK, Canada’s version overtly seeks to engage local communities as stakeholders in countering radicalization in their communities and highlights the need for local officials to engage with community members. However, as I will discuss in the next section of this Chapter, the practices of Canada’s variety of Prevent are very different than those in the United Kingdom.
The Canadian trajectory of establishing legal frameworks aimed at diffusing techniques of preemption throughout the public apparatus seems to, at present, be following the UK. However, these developments have seemingly progressed mostly at the provincial and municipal, rather than national, levels. Federal legislation mandating public organizations to engage in counterradicalization practices have for the most part proven difficult to establish in country. As such, the country has been less successful in downloading responsibility for monitoring and intervening in suspicious activities related to terrorism. I will return to this in the following section of this Chapter.

Canada’s Prevent provided impetus for the establishment of official policing programs aimed at countering radicalization and transitions towards violent extremism. Two such programs have been developed in very different geographic locations within the country: the Calgary Police Service’s Redirect program and the City of Montréal’s Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV). In September 2015, Inspector Mike Bosley of Calgary Police Service (CPS) unveiled a new police-led program aimed at preventing youth from becoming involved in what they refer to as “criminal radicalization.” When the program was first launched, Bosley explicitly highlighted both the fact that Prevent (CAN) provided CPS with the necessary foundations for establishing ReDirect and noted its influence from “international best practice” (CBC 2015). In Québec, the CPRLV was created in March 2015 by the City of Montréal in cooperation with the Québec Government. It represents the first independent non-profit organization in North America aimed explicitly at countering radicalization. It is quite different from ReDirect insofar as it is not primarily a law enforcement initiative, but rather an autonomous entity aimed at policing radicalization.
With the variety of institutional structures thus evident in law enforcement counterradicalization strategies across the West, it is important to reflect upon how they are arranged in terms of their material and ideal practices and techniques as well as their logics and guiding rationales. The following section thus outlines some of the key strategies and techniques adopted in each counterradicalization policing initiative outlined above. Here I pay particularly close attention to the connections, consistencies and inconsistencies between the techniques and the guiding logics of such techniques in order to explore some of the material and ideal practices that encompass counterradicalization policing. To conclude, I then connect these policing techniques and logics to a broad analysis of counterradicalization as a coherent policing framework that embodies a discriminatory approach to social inclusion.

*Embedding Preempting in Everyday Life: Practices of Counterradicalization Policing*

While policing strategies of counterradicalization in London may not be the most nuanced of the cases analyzed in terms of practices and guiding logics, the overarching Prevent strategy is by far the most developed, coordinated, and embedded in the United Kingdom. As of July 2015, for example, all schools in the United Kingdom have a legislated duty to cooperate with Prevent to assist in safeguarding institutions from radicalization and extremism. The adoption of Prevent within British schools largely stemmed from UK’s Department for Education (DfE) published guidance on promoting

---

46 While I suggest that policing radicalization in London is less nuanced than similar projects in Calgary and Montréal, I do not suggest that London’s strategies are not complex and robust. The argument I advance here is that counterradicalization policing programs specific to London have been mostly disbanded and the City’s practices are now embedded in a more national, networked approach to countering radicalization.
‘British values’ in schools to “ensure young people leave school prepared for life in modern Britain” (Department for Education 2014). In addition, as of February 2015, all staff working in UK’s National Health Service (NHS) are now required to complete Prevent framework training and align with the objectives of the Prevent strategy. The UK’s broad responsibilization of counterterrorism practices across social institutions remains quite innovative today, and highlights the widening of counterradicalization practices across agencies and private interests.

Unveiled in 2007, as a response to the 2005 London bombings, the Prevent strategy represents an approach to community engagement based on ‘capacity-building’ which focuses particularly on counterradicalization projects which intervene on local theologically- and youth-based communities. The strategy reflects a move away from traditional policing strategies such as the use of crime mapping, confidential informants, and secretive police infiltrators (see Figure 8.1). The analysis here suggests that although these techniques remain in use by UK government officials, they are not primary aspects of the UK’s shift towards preemption. The Strategy focuses much more on community-building practices; practices which may have traces of ‘traditional’ policing techniques, but are not foundational characteristics of the country’s counterradicalization program. For instance, police agencies have long utilized crime mapping as a means of deducing geographical areas ‘at-risk’ of increased crime and deviance. The analysis of the UK’s Prevent, focusing particularly on policing in London, indicates that while the mapping of

47 See Chapter Six for a discussion of the use of ‘othering frames’ such as the aforementioned ‘British values.’
risky geographic or institutional locations is conducted, it is not a primary logic of London’s counterradicalization program.

The use of ‘agent provocateurs’ – or government authorities, typically police or intelligence agents, who infiltrate at-risk groups with the goal of provoking criminal activities – is evident in some of London’s counterradicalization projects, not least of which are outlined in Lambert’s (2011) account of MCU officer conduct. In the early years of the MCU, the unit deployed officers who might be considered ‘agent provocateurs’ in order to incite criminal behavior amongst Islamic communities for which they could predict and prepare. Notwithstanding these practices, the disbanding of the MCU highlighted the MPS’s aversion to utilizing such techniques in modern counterradicalization policing. Under Prevent, the MPS now utilizes more novel policing techniques with the rationale of building communities of trust and communication rather than focusing on infiltration, arrest and prosecution.

Prevent has led to shifts in policing techniques associated with counterradicalization around notions of police-led interventions which focus on building linkages between government authorities and at-risk communities. This reconfiguration has resulted in the use of inter-agency cooperation schemas which emphasize the need for community-building through the targeted deployment of education initiatives aimed at providing counter narratives and support to individuals identified as at risk of radicalization. In London, these programs are most often police-led but involve inter-agency cooperation in the form of providing support for those subjected to such programs. Those involved in providing support include teachers and school administrators (as mentioned above), university employees, health professionals, and
local community organizations and religious leaders. Prevent has also led to the proliferation of an aggressive public service announcement (PSA) campaign to embed notions of insecurity into the populous. These PSAs are now pervasive in London’s transit stations, known as the ‘Tube,’ Underground, or simply London Transit, and responsibilize the citizenry with reporting suspicious activities. PSAs often include explicit references to counterterrorism as a main goal of such responsibilizing techniques (see Figure 8.2). Advertising for “counterterrorism hotlines” or simply advising individuals to report suspicious activities can be found in trains and buses and heard repeatedly over the public speaker system in major train stations and even on individual buses. PSAs are also present at locations where large numbers of people often congregate, including football stadiums, tourist attraction, and university campuses.

The goal of these techniques often reflects law enforcement strategies of embedding notions of preemption and security into citizens’ everyday lives. The logic of embedding preemption therefore serves a twofold purpose: (1) embedding preemption makes the population aware of the omnipresent threat of terrorism and downloading responsibility for reporting possible threats, law enforcement officials are able to engage communities as stakeholders in the preemption process; and (2) to borrow from Foucault (2010), inserting these notions of preemption across the social apparatus – in schools and universities, on television and radio, and in public places – constructs a population that is capable of the self-governance of, in this case, terrorism. Through the responsibilization of the population vis-à-vis counterterrorism, Prevent ensures increased efficiency with respect to the policing of radicalization by constructing practices of observation, surveillance, and information sharing within and among the populous (Foucault 2010).
The citizenry therefore becomes agents of counterradicalization and notions of preemption diffuse to areas of the population which had not previously held responsibility over counterterrorism (i.e., teachers, professors, medical professionals, lay citizens, etc.).

Figure 8.2: National Police Chiefs’ Council Anti-Terrorist Hotline PSA

In Canada, counterradicalization policing strategies are seemingly the most nuanced and perhaps even innovative, yet not widely adopted. Contrary to much of the scholarly literature in this area, the analysis here suggests that local counterradicalization policing structures are certainly more intricate than the United States’ and likely more than the United Kingdom’s. While Canada’s version of Prevent is heavily indebted to the
UK, both case studies examined here highlight that local level counterradicalization policing programs are much more nuanced than those carried out in London or New York. Both Calgary Police Service’s and Montréal’s Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV) offer complex inter-agency and multi-interest group networks for the prevention of so-called radicalization processes. This is perhaps highlighted by the CPRLV’s own assertion that there exists a “Québec model” of counterradicalization that has received international recognition and is now the basis of several memoranda of agreement with European nations for practice-sharing (CPRLV 2016).

In Calgary, the entire purpose of ReDirect is to provide micro-level interventions that are delivered in partnership between the City of Calgary Community & Neighbourhood Services, the CPS, private sector organizations,48 certain schools and education representatives, and other public-sector entities. As a referral based program, ReDirect works to firstly identify and assess young people who are ‘vulnerable to being radicalized’ and secondly provide support and prevention strategies to work with those individuals before engaging in violent activities. When ReDirect receives a referral, the following process is engaged:

(1) The ReDirect Coordinator reviews the referral to decide if the program is needed based on the individuals’ engagement with a radical ideology, intent and ability to cause harm. If the individual in question is judged to be at risk

48 Through the Safe Communities Opportunity and Resource Center (SOURCe), ReDirect enlists the help various public and private organizations to assist in countering violent extremism, including: the United Way, Alpha House, The Alex, Neighbourhood Link, Office of the Chief Crown Prosecutor, Chief Probation Officer Calgary, Alberta Health Services, and the Calgary Homeless Foundation.
of committing criminal behavior not related to radicalization, the coordinator may deflect the referral to another youth program.

(2) If the individual is deemed a fit for ReDirect by the Coordinator, the case is reviewed by the Case Planning Team (CPT). The CPT is made up of a number of representatives from all stakeholders listed above.

(3) If the CPT decides the individual should be accepted into the program, they develop an individualized support plan which may include referrals to other programs, support from police officers and social workers, and meetings with the CPT and the individual to work through an individualized support plan.

(4) The individuals’ progress through ReDirect is measured through periodic and regular evaluations by the CPT. Once the CPT is confident that the individual is no longer ‘vulnerable to radicalization’ the person has completed the program.

(5) Following completion of the program, the CPT follows up with individuals regularly to determine if the person requires further support.

ReDirect is thus based on a several notable assumptions. The first is that individuals will accept and be willing to participate in the program. Since it is referral based, and not court-mandated, individuals are not obligated to participate in the program. Second, since ReDirect is premised on community referrals, it assumes that community members have the ability and desire to report others to ReDirect (which is explicitly led by law enforcement). Thirdly, the program assumes that its ‘individualized’
support programs help prevent, rather than potentially cause or precede further radicalization.\footnote{This is an important assumption which has been challenged elsewhere, most notably by O’Toole et al. (2016) and Mythen, Walklate and Khan (2013).}

Calgary is also the home of an education-based program called Extreme Dialogue which aims to “build resilience to radicalization among young people” through new media, such as art and short films, which foster critical thinking and digital literacy. Co-Funded by Public Safety Canada’s Kanishka Project (see Chapter Seven) and the Prevention of and Fight Against Crime Programme of the European Union, the program brings together public and private sector entities, such as the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, film-makers, and the charity Tim Parry Jonathan Ball Foundation for Peace. While the program is not embedded in educational institutions, its aim is to provide information and disseminate knowledge about tactics of radicalization and critical exploration of potentially harmful activities and beliefs. Extreme Dialogue aims to offer counter narratives to extremist ideologies through short films, art displays, testimonials and other forms of new media.

Québec’s CPRLV is another innovative counterradicalization initiative developed in partnership between the City of Montréal, the Québec Government, and numerous community organizations. The structure of the CPRLV includes three teams: (1) research team, responsible for analysis and publication of research projects; (2) prevention and skills development team, focusing on prevention, public awareness, and training; and (3) psychosocial intervention team, which focuses on intervention, counseling, and providing psychological support. These specialized teams work together to provide an all-
encompassing cross-sectoral approach to develop and implement strategies for dealing with radicalization, as well as “hate crimes and incidents” (CPRLV 2017). The Centre is guided by a Board of Directors consisting of former and current academics, social workers, school board and education officials, lawyers, mental health professionals, and government officials.

The aim of the CPRLV includes the development of a strategy that “favours prevention over repression, psychosocial counselling over prosecution and social ostracization” (CPRLV 2017). Noting that the Centre “rejects stigmatization of all kings, and seeks to prevent all forms of radicalization,” the CPRLV, like ReDirect, adopts an explicitly agnostic approach to developing strategies for countering radicalization. The CPRLV is also operationally autonomous from government authorities, even though it was created in partnership with government institutions. The Centre is thus not a policing- or law enforcement-based program, but a community-level organization which engages in some policing techniques. This strategic and operational structure allows the CPRLV remain autonomous from law enforcement and governmental mandates while employing researches from governmental agencies. For example, the CPRLV operates an anti-radicalization hotline similar to Calgary’s ReDirect program, called “Info-Radical,” that mobilizes law enforcement officials in extreme cases, but operates primarily as a helpline for families rather than a tip-line for police.

The Centre has established partnerships with numerous local or provincial, national, and international organizations and governmental agencies. Partnership agencies include: City of Montréal, Dalhousie University, Ordre des travailleurs sociaux et des thérapeutes conjugaux et familiaux du Québec, Dawson College, Fédération des Cégeps, Concordia University, Ordre des Psychologues du Québec, Forum Juennesse de L’Ile de Montréal, Collège de

---

50 Agencies include: City of Montréal, Dalhousie University, Ordre des travailleurs sociaux et des thérapeutes conjugaux et familiaux du Québec, Dawson College, Fédération des Cégeps, Concordia University, Ordre des Psychologues du Québec, Forum Juennesse de L’Ile de Montréal, Collège de
agreements include funding arrangements, training programs, information sharing, and CPRLV-led workshop for organization employees. The Centre offers practical training in psychosocial intervention, education, criminal justice, and public safety, to stakeholder employees, government officials, and other stakeholders. Developed for “front-line workers and administrators,” training courses developed and led by CPRLV employees offer those in attendance with strategies for countering radicalization that takes place in prisons, local communities, public and private organizations, and education institutions.

One of the innovative features of the CPRLV is that it provides psychosocial training for individuals tasked with identifying and intervening in processes of radicalization (i.e., police officers, teachers, public sector employees). Finally, the Centre also provides training for negotiating provincial statues related to workforce and labor standards, including Québec’s Act Respecting Labour Standards. As highlighted above, and unlike the UK, Canada has yet to fully develop legal frameworks which force public and private workplaces to monitor and intervene in suspected cases of radicalization. While provincial statues do provide some mechanisms for the reporting of such activities, federal lawmakers have been mostly unsuccessful in developing legal frameworks that force employers to monitor and report potential cases of radicalization to governmental authorities. Unlike ReDirect, then, CPRLV is much more of a research- and training-led

initiative which fosters collaboration and information sharing between numerous stakeholders – only one of which is law enforcement.

While ReDirect and CPRLV may be nuanced in terms of practical arrangement at the community level, such programs represent very localized examples of counterradicalization policing initiatives. The UK’s Prevent strategy has embedded techniques of policing radicalization into everyday life much more successfully than in Canada. Practices of counterradicalization policing might be deployed in specific geographic contexts in Canada, but the UK has developed a much more networked approach in its version of Prevent which unites stakeholders in a number of social institutions at the national level. In Canada, very similar policing arrangements are evident, but they are only deployed in very specific geographic locations with very little national, or even provincial, coordination.

Canada’s policing radicalization strategy is thus much more focused on referral-based initiatives which direct individuals and groups judged to be at-risk of radicalization into intervention programs aimed at providing institutional and social psychological support (See Table 8.1). While the precise techniques are different in each context, the overarching logic of governance is similar between ReDirect and CPRLV – focus on preempting radicalization by providing socio-psychological support to individuals judged to be at risk of radicalization. Both programs also adopt an explicitly agnostic approach to threats of radicalization. While the UK has somewhat moved away from focusing on specific populations in its own counterradicalization strategy, Canada has adopted a much more neutral attitude towards the construction of the subject of radicalization processes.
This trend is highlighted by the County’s refusal to develop law enforcement strategies explicitly focusing on certain communities by name.

Federal counterterrorism efforts in the United States are designed to work together with local authorities to provide a layered approach of information collection, sharing, and intervention to counter potential threats. Again, dissimilar to the UK and Canada, the US counterterrorism strategy aggressively utilizes traditionally “hard” counterterrorism measures such as the use of electronic surveillance of suspects and the insistent use of confidential informants to penetrate terrorist networks.

In New York, counterterrorism operations are layered with four distinct, yet interconnected, operational objectives: (1) support the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF); (2) provide real time surveillance in lower Manhattan through the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative (LMSI); prepare for terrorist attack through training with the Counterterrorism Division; and identify and disrupt terrorist attacks before they occur through the Intelligence Division, which has developed a network of officers, informants, and surveillance mechanisms within the city. The LMSI focuses primarily on security issues and safeguarding communities through the installation of security cameras and other forms of surveillance. The Counterterrorism deploys mostly “hard” counterterrorism practices of intelligence, investigations, and arrest, while the Intelligence Division’s mandate focuses on intelligence collection and dissemination to other Divisions within the Department. However, since the mid-2000s, the Department has increased focus on community relations and engagement through a Bureau known as the Community Affairs Bureau (CAB). While not explicitly focusing on counterradicalization, the Bureau is the NYPD’s unit aimed primarily at preventing crime
through community policing and development. As such, the CAB’s mandate includes the prevention of all forms of crime, including terrorism.

The NYPD’s Community Affairs Bureau developed out of the former community relations division and Community Affairs Division. In 1966, the NYPD incorporated a community relations division to oversee relations between the community and law enforcement. In 1971, the division was expanded under the Deputy Commissioner and renamed the Community Affairs Division. Finally, in February of 2006, the Community Affairs Division was restructured and named the Community Affairs Bureau. Within the CAB, the NYPD has established a number of programs, not least of which include the Immigrant Outreach Unit and the Clergy Liaison Program. They thus present forms of community-oriented policing which aim to foster communication, tolerance, and understanding amongst police and diverse communities. In fact, the CAB hosts periodic meetings with clergy, community organizations, and law enforcement with the explicit goal of fostering information and promoting stronger relationships in mind (NYPD 2017).

As part of the NYPD’s counterterrorism strategy, the department has developed the New Immigrant Outreach Unit (NIOU), Clergy Liaison Program, and the Community Partnership Policing Program, all of which focus in some way on fostering lines of communication between officers and local communities. None of these programs are explicitly aimed at countering radicalization, however they are the Department’s only programs primarily focusing on preempting crime through some sort of community intervention. As part of these programs, NYPD officials visit schools, businesses, and community-based organizations to raise awareness of community programs offered by
the CAB. Such programs include the establishment of NYPD United, a community cricket and soccer league organized by the Department, a civilian observer ride along program, terrorism awareness training, civilian observation patrol program, and citizen policy academy.

The NIOU focuses explicitly on new immigrants within African/Caribbean, Muslim, Asian, Eastern European, and Hispanic communities to maintain and strengthen relationships with community leaders and organizations within immigrant communities (Kelly and Banks III 2007). The Clergy Liaison Program formalizes relationships between the clergy, their congregations, and law enforcement to address “mutual concerns” (Kelly and Banks III 2017). Clergy Liaisons are nominated by Commanding Officers based on their work with faith-based organizations to receive specialized training related to hate crimes, domestic violence, drug abuse prevention, gang awareness, and counterterrorism. As of 2013, the department had approximately 300 liaisons enrolled in the program. Both the NIOU and the Clergy Liaison Program are explicitly agnostic in terms of the subject of possible law enforcement intervention, advocating for an approach that does not single out specific religious groups.

While the current community engagement schema in the NYPD adopts a mostly agnostic approach, past strategies have focuses primarily on Islamic communities. In 2011 and 2012, a series of exposés were published by Matt Apuzzo and Joseph Goldstein documenting the development of a specialized unit within the NYPD that focused primarily on Muslim communities in the name of preventing terrorism. Following the publication of the article, the NYPD announced that it would disband the unit known as the Demographics Unit. According to the American Civil Liberties Association (ACLU),
the unit had been in operation since at least 2002 (ACLU 2017). Comprised of a handful of NYPD officers, the DU focused on 28 “ancestries of interest” and detectives were advised to gather information related to how members of Islamic communities perceive America and foreign Policy (Goldman and Apuzzo 2012a).

The Unit, part of the NYPD Intelligence Division, operated in practice as a surveillance mechanism that singled out Islamic communities and those who appeared to be practicing Muslims (Neuman 2014; Sledge 2014). The Unit mapped Muslim communities both inside and outside of the city, tracking where individuals frequent and send clandestine officers into those locations to document conversations and gather information (Goldman and Apuzzo 2012a). The DU also captured photo and video surveillance of individuals leaving and entering places of worship, recorded the license plate numbers of worshippers attending services, and tracked the movement of those individuals (Goldman and Apuzzo 2012a). In addition, the DU made use of police informants and even reportedly deployed agent provocateurs – known as ‘rakers’ – to act as inside observers in mosques and “bait” conversations about jihad or terrorism (Goldman and Apuzzo 2012c).

Relying on more traditional techniques of informants, surveillance, infiltration, and detention and arrest of suspects, the DU is a case study of the NYPD’s commitment to “hard” tactics of counterterrorism outlined in the approach adopted by the US government as a whole (see Table 8.1). Yet, despite this commitment, the DU was highly unsuccessful in terms of producing traditionally acceptable measures of law enforcement quality. As NYPD Assistant Chief Thomas Galati stated, the Demographics Unit did not result in a single investigation resulting in terrorism-related arrests, stating that the unit
“has not commenced an investigation” (Goldman and Apuzzo 2012b). The relative failure of the DU to produce leads for law enforcement investigations, coupled with public and legal criticisms related to potential constitutional violations, the DU was disbanded in April of 2014 by Commissioner William Bratton.

Table 8.1: Primacy of Counterradicalization Policing Techniques and Logics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Techniques</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mapping</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Interview</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet Monitoring</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informants</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Engagement</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preemptive Arrest</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Prosecutions</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-Risk Programs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent Provocateurs</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Programs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Initiatives</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychosocial Assistance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Service Announcements</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Agency Cooperation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Programs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Programs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Responsibilization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Guiding Logic

| Referral-based | O | X |
| Policing-based | X | X | O |
| Support-based  | O | X |

(X) Primary Tactic/Logic; (O) Secondary Tactic/Logic; (-) Tactic/Logic Not widely adopted (or little evidence to suggest that it is used)

No other country has been more successful in embedding practices of preemption into daily life than the United Kingdom. While Canada has to some extent moved towards building prevention into various institutions and approaches to countering radicalization, the United Kingdom’s approach focuses primarily on the proliferation of a
precautionary logic that extends throughout the social apparatus and explicitly downloads responsibility for counterterrorism to the country’s citizenry, particularly evident in major cities such as London. The UK’s counterradicalization policing strategy is also robust in terms of its deployment of more traditional policing practices in cooperation with novel techniques aimed at providing forms of social assistance to those identified as presenting an increased risk of terrorist activities. The London police therefore make use of traditional policing strategies of mapping, surveillance, and informants in conjunction with education and training programs as part of its application of Prevent.

In Canada, counterradicalization policing is far less networked at the national level, and policing techniques are less embedded in the everyday lives of Canadians. Despite the country’s national counterradicalization strategy being in place for several years, political and structural arrangements make it more difficult for the development of an all-encompassing national policing strategy aimed at preempting radicalization. Unlike the UK, Canada is separated into a number of Provinces and Territories which each have relative autonomy over its own police agencies at both the provincial and municipal levels. While Canada does have a national police force – the RCMP – tasked with leading counterradicalization strategies, each municipal and provincial locality with a police agency has jurisdiction over its own policing operations. It is therefore much more difficult to develop an all-encompassing counterradicalization policing initiative across the country. The development of such policing strategies has thus been more disparate and disconnected in Canada than in the UK. Police agencies have adopted counterradicalization programs, but they remain distinct from one another and reflect a relatively less comprehensive strategy and more of a singular approach which shows
signs of increased networking at the local level to combat terrorism. This has resulted in the development of specific cases of radicalization policing, rather than a national approach adopted in the UK (see Figure 8.3 for an illustration of this trend).

Yet despite the separation of local counterradicalization policing in Canada, the country has developed some of the most nuanced preemption policing strategies. Moving away from traditional policing techniques in its counterradicalization specific programming, Calgary and Québec have established some of the most novel practices in terms of preemption. For example, Québec’s focus on psychosocial assistance and its overt use of research- and evidence-based training and education programs has garnered international notoriety as being amongst the most innovative and effective approaches to countering radicalization. This style of programming has decentered the police as the primary authority in terms of counterradicalization while simultaneously utilizing the

Figure 8.3: Structural Mapping of Counterradicalization Policing Programs
resources provided by law enforcement (i.e., powers of search, arrest and detention, surveillance infrastructure, etc.) through the establishment of a community hotline for reporting suspicious activity that connects directly with local police. The explicit separation from law enforcement allows the CPRLV to act as an autonomous community organization divorced from operational motives of the police. In this way, the CPRLV can provide services typically underdeveloped in law enforcement strategies, such as social support, psychological assistance, and community and private sector training. In this way, Canada’s counterradicalization policing can be contrasted to that of the UK with respect to its focus on support- and referral-based programming rather than primarily policing-based.

While the United Kingdom’s strategy is far more complex in terms of its network and embeddedness of preemption techniques, local Canadian efforts have in some ways out-paced techniques of preemption in the UK. Part of the reason that Prevent has been modelled by the Canadian government has been the ability of the United Kingdom to embed the strategy’s practices into everyday lives of its citizenry, and Canadian approaches have utilized similar tactics. In both Calgary and Montréal, phone hotlines have been set up to allow community members to report suspicious activity. However, unlike the UK, Montréal has not yet been the site of a widespread increase in public appeals aimed at responsibilizing citizens in the counterradicalization process. In London, travelling by public transit includes notable references to public duties vis-à-vis reporting suspicious activities, as noted above, which have yet to similarly proliferate in Montréal.

In the United States, counterradicalization policing is very much led by law enforcement and does not appear to focus on building community-level partnerships with
vested organizations. While the CAB does explicitly reference community building and engagement with organizations, the Bureau has relatively fewer formal cooperation with social assistance organizations and other stakeholders in its policing strategies (inexplicitly) aimed at countering radicalization. Unlike Canada, which focuses on formal arrangements between law enforcement and a series of community stakeholders, the CAB represents an overarching law enforcement strategy aimed at preempting radicalization. While it may interact with a host of community organizations, the CAB is first and foremost a law enforcement program and thus utilizes many of the more traditional policing practices while deploying relatively fewer community-based programming than the UK or Canada. The CAB, however, does provide interesting and innovative programs aimed at community engagement, most notable in this respect is the establishment of local sports teams for new immigrants (whom the NYPD approaches as vulnerable populations vis-à-vis risk of terrorism). Yet even the name of such programming reflects the authority of the NYPD and thus cannot be adequately disconnected from techniques of law enforcement.

In Canada and the United States, official counterradicalization policing programs have yet to proliferate throughout the education and health sectors.\textsuperscript{51} While this may be changing, particularly in Canada, institutions such as education and healthcare are viewed principally as \textit{partners} in the so-called deradicalization process. They are relied upon to inform and alert police and other stakeholders of possible threats of radicalization among vulnerable populations. In the US, very few formal arrangements between law

\textsuperscript{51} There have been numerous calls, particularly in Canada, for the explicit inclusion of schools in the national counterradicalization strategy (see Jama, Niyozov and Yusuf 2015).
enforcement and educational and healthcare professionals were identified in this analysis. While, as Vidino (2010) notes, this may be due to the country’s aversion to any breach of the first amendment, it also highlights the lack of embeddedness of practices of policing radicalization.

In the UK, the education and health sectors are formally mobilized in the country’s Prevent strategy – compelled by law to receive Prevent training and inform law enforcement of individuals perceived to be at risk of radicalization. Prevent (UK) has therefore contributed to the formal responsibilization of counterradicalization across whole institutions in addition to attempting to mobilize lay citizens as stakeholders in strategies of preemption. Counterradicalization policing in the United States remains dissimilar from initiatives in Canada and the United Kingdom with respect to its overarching logic. In the United States, police agencies, such as the case of the NYPD, continue to adopt a community-oriented approach to countering radicalization which places the police at the center of any strategy. The United Kingdom and Canada, on the other hand, have developed similar, yet distinct, holistic community-based policing initiatives with the aim of countering transitions towards terrorism.

Finally, differences in logic between the UK and Canadian counterradicalization policing strategies are evident in this analysis. Most notable in this respect is the positioning of police authority in each country’s radicalization preemption programming. In the UK, police remain primary authority tasked with leading inter-agency cooperation and initializing strategies under Prevent. In Canada, by contrast, efforts have been made to explicitly de-center the police as the main authority tasked with leading counterradicalization programs. This is perhaps most evident under the “Québec model”
of counterradicalization, whereby the police are viewed as a resource for the community-led counterradicalization strategy. This novel approach is perhaps the most innovative and new development in the recent trajectory of preemptive intervention practices.

The United Kingdom adopts what is seemingly a hybrid of traditional policing and innovative risk-based techniques in its counterradicalization policing strategy. While the country still deploys many of the traditional law enforcement techniques to disrupt criminal behavior, specific practices at the local level are increasingly focusing on fostering community engagement through means of education, community development, and embedding preemption. Canada, on the other hand, has mostly moved away from more traditional policing techniques in its specific strategies aimed at countering radicalization. Instead, policing radicalization in Canada focuses much more on developing mechanisms of social and psychological support through inter-agency collaboration – with law enforcement as both a stakeholder in a comprehensive strategy, in the case of Québec, and as a central authority in the case of Calgary. The United States, in contrast to both the United Kingdom and Canada, deploys much more traditional law enforcement strategies to combat radicalization. While individual police agencies, such as the NYPD, do attempt to foster community engagement and attempt to adopt more novel policing strategies, they have yet to explicitly move towards the establishment of large-scale network collaboration premised in providing educational and other social support mechanisms for those at risk of radicalization.

In sum, the UK has been among the most successful in embedding a logic of preempting radicalization throughout the public sphere. Through both formal and informal practices, the rationality of preemption has diffused throughout the social
apparatus with the aim of instilling the population with a sense of self-governance or self-responsibility for preventing terrorism before it manifests. Relying on a host of traditional and more innovative policing practices, the UK, and law enforcement in London in particular, has been able to make radicalization preemption a central guiding logic for ensuring security that now extends beyond the police and intelligence community. Through references to Prevent and preemption in public spaces (i.e., public transit, sporting events, on television and radio, etc.), the country has been able to extend responsibility for ensuring security from terrorism to spaces not previously responsible for national security in the past. Similar developments have been highlighted in Canada, although mostly at the local, case-specific level. The United States, as an outlier in this analysis, has yet to adopt similar approaches in its counterradicalization policing strategy. Although the country has yet to develop an explicit counterradicalization program, even the inexplicit policing approaches have yet to proliferate throughout the public sphere.

An interesting finding highlighted by this analysis is the failure of certain types of counterradicalization policing programming. More specifically, two policing programs developed in recent years have failed in spite of the relative success of preemption as an emergent logic for governing issues of terrorism and radicalization – London’s Muslim Contact Unit and NYPD’s Demographics Unit. Despite the proliferation of similar police programming in areas of Canada, the US, and the UK, these two programs have become non-operational, raising questions related to why those particular programs failed while other, similarly framed, programs have succeeded. The next section of this chapter explores some of the conditions by which preemption policing programs are more or less likely to succeed. Here I highlight the importance of the adoption of an agnostic approach
in official counterradicalization policing strategies, while challenging the underlying biases and questioning whether any such program can live up to its agnostic claims.

*The Agnosticism of Counterradicalization Policing: Failures of London’s Muslim Contact Unit and New York’s Demographic Unit*

As noted in the previous section, a number of counterradicalization policing initiatives have been developed in the US, UK, and Canada, not least of which include a series of more or less successful programs operated at varying degrees of autonomy by law enforcement agencies in each jurisdiction. Following the discussion of policing practices and techniques that encompassed the previous section, I now turn my attention to the analysis of the structural and operational conditions which make such counterradicalization programs more or less likely to emerge and continue to operate. While the following discussion is not intended to be an all-encompassing analysis of the sociopolitical context for which the counterradicalization policing programs analyzed have operated, my aim is to outline some of the primary conditions by which programs are more likely to succeed. In doing so, I focus on the ways in which policing programs are framed by government authorities and representations of policing practices and techniques throughout the public sphere.

As an analysis of the framing and representation of new mechanisms of governing radicalization, I move away from explorations of the internal dynamics of the emergence and maintenance of such programs for two reasons: (1) internal discourses related to the development and establishment of counterradicalization policing strategies are increasingly difficult to locate due to national security concerns; and (2) I focus here on
how discourses of radicalization justify/challenge the existence of specific
counterradicalization policing initiatives, rather than the operational structure of such
programs. I thus hope to provide the empirical basis for further analyses into how modern
policing programs founded on notions of preemption emerge and dissipate over time. The
findings from this analysis highlight the importance of officially agnostic policing
strategies as well as important differences in each country’s willingness to tackle
ideology as a fundamental aspect of their counterradicalization programming. A brief
outline of each program analyzed and their operational status is included in Table 8.2.

**Table 8.2: Current Status of Counterradicalization Initiatives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td>ReDirect</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extreme Dialogue</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPRLV</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td>Muslim Contact Unit</td>
<td>Non-operational (since 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Engagement Team</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
<td>Demographics Unit</td>
<td>Non-operational (since 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Affairs Bureau</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the seven policing programs explored in this case study analysis, two have
become non-operational, the UK’s Muslim Contact Unit and the NYPD’s Demographics
Unit, and five remain operational as of the time of this writing. Despite the deployment of
similar policing techniques and practices, both the MCU and DU were disbanded
following a series of notable events, the failure of which offers an opportunity to reflect
on some of the conditions for which they could no longer be maintained. I thus begin by
providing some explanations for why the MCU and DU were disbanded and how other programs utilizing similar policing strategies have been more successful in terms of sustainability.

The MCU and DU both approached radicalization as a fundamental problem amongst predominantly Islamic communities. Built into the logic (and even the name in the case of the MCU) of each program was an inherent bias towards Muslim communities as a source of risky behavior. The surveillance program operated by the NYPD in New York and New Jersey called the Demographics Unit, for instance, explicitly targeted Islamic communities, whereas London’s MCU made its practices of targeting Muslims explicit in its name. The disbanded DU was partly pressured out of existence by the US legal system and increasing public condemnation of the intensification of surveillance techniques. More specifically, two federal lawsuits criticized the Unit it for violating civil rights of those subjected to law enforcement interventions. There was also a mass of public criticism of the DU, not least of which was highlighted by Linda Sarsour of the Arab American Association of New York, who suggested that the “Unit created psychological warfare” on Muslim communities in the city (Apuzzo and Goldman 2014). As Vidino (2010) argues, the United States’ historical anxieties regarding possible violations to the country’s first amendment creates a context whereby government interventions targeting specific religious communities are placed under a microscope, both within the legal system and public sphere.

In similar fashion, the Muslim Contact Unit received numerous complaints regarding its discriminatory policing practices that targeted Muslim communities.

Criticisms directed at the MCU came from both liberal and conservative sources and cited a wide range of issues including discriminatory policing, violations of civil rights, and even problems associated with cooperation with suspected terrorists and terrorism sympathizers (Bright 2008; Milne 2008). Seamus Milne (2008), for instance, condemned the MCU for sympathizing with fundamentalist Islamic leaders, thereby cooperating with individuals suspected of contributing to the radicalization of young people. Unlike the DU in New York, the MCU faced relatively little legal pressure to cease operation, highlighting the UK legal system’s willingness to tackle underlying religious ideology as a foundational source of so-called radicalization. Throughout the mid-2000s, the MCU was a sustained, and well-documented, policing strategy in London, whereas the NYPD’s DU operated overtly under a veil of secrecy. Following a series of articles documenting the DU’s existence, the Unit immediately faced public and legal challenges calling for its termination.

Notably different, then, are the country’s approaches to policing religious difference. The London strategy was able to operate in the public sphere for many years, while the NYPD’s Unit was almost immediately forced to cease operation following its uncovering in the public sphere. While this is a demonstrable difference, both policing programs ultimately became non-operational, illustrating a more interesting development – that targeted policing strategies focusing on specific religious groups are likely pressured out of existence by public criticism and legal challenges. The data therefore illustrate the importance of underlying logic and rationales of remedy vis-à-vis radicalization throughout the West. Official counterradicalization policing programs are
more likely in countries with little overt reluctance to tackle ideology as a fundamental source of transitions toward terrorism.

Conversely, less explicit policing strategies that focus on preventing radicalization across the community in general seem to be much more successful. Of the five counterradicalization programs that remain operational, no publically available documentation officially state that they focus on specific religious communities. In fact, increasingly official documentation related to such programs highlight the agnostic approach of adopted strategies aimed at countering radicalization. For instance, the ReDirect program’s official website maintains that there is “no typical profile of someone who is vulnerable to radicalization” and that individuals might be at risk of radicalization regardless of “region, nationality or system of belief” (see Figure 8.4). Moreover, a survey of the public websites for ReDirect, Extreme Dialogue and the CPRLV in Canada, the NYPD’s CAB, and London’s MPS, make no explicit mention of religion as a fundamental source of so-called radicalization. This agnostic approach is also exemplified by the names chosen by governmental authorities for their counterradicalization programs – Prevent, ReDirect, Extreme Dialogue, Community Affairs Bureau, and Community Engagement Team all present an imaginary of counterradicalization governance as embedded with agnostic techniques that do not focus on specific populations. While some targeted policing strategies remain, such as NYPD’s Clergy Liaison Program and New Immigrant Outreach Program, they do not officially target specific religious groups or communities.

53 I must note that I use the term ‘successful’ not as an indicator of moral success, as if such strategies are good or bad for society. Rather, I use the term to indicate the relative sustainability of each program over time.
Based on these findings, I argue that a key structural condition for the emergence and, more importantly, maintenance of counterradicalization policing programs is an *officially* agnostic stance on the subjects of governmental intervention. As the findings presented above illustrate, policing programs which focus explicitly on building relations with Muslim communities, rather than local communities in general, have for the most part failed in the United States and the United Kingdom. Conversely, programs which highlight the need to strengthen community engagement with members of all at-risk communities have been relatively successful. These programs present a narrative that radicalization can affect anyone regardless of religious or ideological background and have, to date, remained sustainable and visible in the public sphere in all three counties.
Navigating the lines between police intervention, protections of free speech, and freedom of religion is therefore vital to the relative success and failure of counterradicalization policing programs. Even in countries that adopt a predominantly explicit focus on Muslim communities in their overarching counterradicalization strategies, such as the United Kingdom, police agencies must remain relatively agnostic in their deployment of new initiatives in order to survive. In countries adopting a more agnostic approach, such as Canada, the decentering of police as the primary force responsible for countering radicalization as well as the explicit refusal to approach the issue as a fundamentally religious one allows for the opening of a social space in which such counterradicalization programs can operate.

The comparison of legal and political developments in each country, both in this chapter and in Chapters Four and Five, highlights a key area of difference between the United States approach to counterradicalization and that of Canada and the United Kingdom in relation to the embeddedness of preemption in everyday life. As noted above, the proliferation of preemptive governance strategies aimed at countering terrorism seems to be connected to the entrenching of logics of preemption in the daily lives of the populous. It is therefore unsurprising that countries that have developed more networked, overarching preemption strategies – Canada and the UK – have established more robust counterradicalization policing programs. The likelihood of official counterradicalization programs is thus linked with constructions of responsibility that are successfully imbued into the population. Counterradicalization governance is increasingly making use of citizens as stakeholders in the surveillance, information sharing, and preemption process.
Perhaps even more interesting is the fact that despite public challenges to policing strategies which focus on specific religious communities, modern practices of governing terror through preemption have proven sustainable when they do not officially focus on those groups. Instead, representing radicalization as distinct from religious ideology is now a useful strategy for government authorities and other stakeholders in the establishment of innovative governance strategies aimed at preempting terrorist activities. Policing initiatives, most notably archetypal programs such as ReDirect and CPRLV, now increasingly adopt an overtly agnostic conceptualization of radicalization to justify new techniques of intervention. But can such programs ever be disconnected from the very discourses of radicalization which I have explored in detail throughout the chapters of this dissertation? In the final section of this Chapter, I explore this question and highlight how the underlying logic of radicalization discourses cannot be disconnected from emergent law enforcement strategies built in their name.

**Conclusion: The Governance of Radicalization and the Construction of “Muslim Strangers”**

Despite the success of officially agnostic counterradicalization governance throughout the West, the underlying logic of such strategies cannot be disconnected from the very construction of radicalization discourses that increasingly permeate the public sphere. Policing programs, such as those analyzed here, aimed at preempting terrorism through counterradicalization interventions tend to explicitly reference the concept of radicalization while avoiding references to religious background. A notable exception to this is the NYPD, which tends to avoid using the notion of radicalization all together.
despite clear adoption of the construct as an underlying logic of its counterterrorism strategy. But when the layers radicalization discourse produced throughout the public sphere are peeled away, as I have attempted to do in the preceding chapters, one may conclude that any agnostic deployment of the concept is unlikely, if not impossible. Policing strategies that evoke the concept are so embedded with historical, political, and cultural meanings that have been given constructions of radicalization discourses, and thus must be explore through such contexts.

It is therefore unsurprising that modern counterradicalization policing initiatives have adopted a mostly agnostic approach to their preemption programs. For even the evocation of radicalization as a construct is so imbued with significant meaning that an explicit reference to risky Muslim communities is not necessary. Continuous references that link radicalization to Islam a priori throughout the public sphere make focusing on such individuals and groups politically, legally, and culturally unnecessary and therefore ineffective for governance strategies. Linking the cultural, legal, scientific, and political conceptualizations of radicalization which now permeate the public sphere with the material practices of policing radicalization highlights the impossibility of disconnecting those discourses and materialities. When we, as a cultural system, are incessantly presented with the idea that radicalization qua Islamic communities qua terrorism, governance structures aimed at intervening in the so-called radicalization process do not need to explicitly focus on specific activities.

54 Indicated by the NYPD’s influential report Radicalization in the West which explicitly focuses on radicalization as a problematic issue amongst Islamic communities.
Entire apparatuses that embed the logic of preemption are becoming increasingly diffused across Western jurisdictions in the global fight against so-called radicalization. In the UK, this logic of preemption has become an overarching security paradigm which now authorizes a host of new management and surveillance mechanisms, from law enforcement strategies to education and healthcare interventions. In Canada, similar trends are currently taking place but at a much more geographically specific level. However, because of Canada’s adoption of a national counter-radicalization strategy, one might speculate the increasing networking capabilities of local initiatives like the ones in Calgary and Montréal. Further research should be conducted on the proliferation of new counter-radicalization networks across time and space. In the United States, counter-radicalization policing remains relatively underdeveloped compared to initiatives in Canada and the UK. The reasons for this may begin with the government’s refusal to adopt a national counter-radicalization strategy or demographic, political, and legal differences. However, local cases of policing terrorism through preemption have been developed in certain areas and one might expect these types of programs to spread throughout local jurisdictions given the interconnectivity of police cooperation between the US, Canada, and the UK.

Through the explicit and implicit eliciting of specific communities, diverse Islamic communities are approached by law enforcement in two rather inconsistent ways: as suspect communities and as partners in the counter-radicalization process. Counterradicalization strategies in all three countries focus more or less explicitly on engagement with Muslim communities as a fundamental aspect of governing terrorism. Community engagement has emerged in some ways as synonym for engagement with
Islamic communities. Engaging notions of community engagement, rather than more specific practices targeting Muslims, may present law enforcement as an agnostic entity, but the historical and political context for which the entire logic of radicalization has emerge clearly demonstrates that even such engagement initiatives inherently focus on Islamic communities as both risk subject and counterradicalization stakeholder.

As noted in previous chapters, Therese O’Toole and colleagues (2016) have highlighted how modern conceptualizations of terrorism preemption have resulted the emergence of “risky subjects” within Muslim communities. Islamic communities are represented as a risk in terms of radicalization by government officials, news media, and law enforcement agencies, and those representations impact the material elements involved in the governance of terrorism. State engagement with Islamic communities through counterradicalization initiatives such as Prevent (UK) has led to the problematic construction of Muslims as risk subject and, paradoxically, as risk mitigation partner (O’Toole et al. 2016). Based on the findings from this analysis, and borrowing from Georg Simmel (1921), I advance the less agnostic argument that Western cultural, political, legal, and scientific systems have contributed to the creation of “Muslim Strangers” – to the configuration of a social category of religious difference that creates social distance between Islamic communities and the broader population. This figure masks and legitimizes new forms of surveillance, policing, and intelligence gathering that spread throughout the social apparatus. Even in policing strategies that adopt a conceptualization of radicalization disconnected from religious ideology, those programs are based on a logic of preemptive intervention that inherently focuses on Islamic communities.
It is therefore important to theorize about the role of underlying logics that continue to justify and maintain new forms of social control. While policing practices may, on the surface, appear to be agnostic and not directed at specific communities judged to be at risk, the findings here suggest that those very practices are built on a discriminatory logic that disproportionately impacts cultural and ethnic minorities. This chapter thus represents an analysis of modern counterterrorism policing programs not rooted only in official governmental discourse, but in the underlying assumptions and construction of practices which form the basis of radicalization policing initiatives. The present work also contributes to the growing body of literature aimed at challenging techniques of surveillance and intelligence that have emerged in the name of counterterrorism and which help construct risky subjectivities within the population.

Finally, I also advance notions of the responsibilization of citizens in the context of counterterrorism. It is clear through this analysis that part of the logic of governing terrorism through preemption involves downloading responsibility to the populous for ensuring security and reporting suspicious activity. I therefore contribute to the theorizing of new mechanisms of governance which aim to discipline the citizenry and engage the population in the risk preemption process. In this way, this chapter highlights how preemption has emerged as an overarching governmentality which, at least in the context of counterterrorism, works to construct a self-governing populous capable of more efficiently safeguarding security.

With that said, one limitation of the present work is the relative lack of analysis into the geopolitical differences between case studies. While the specific geopolitical differences between the US, UK, and Canada warrant further analysis, this chapter lays
some of the empirical foundations for future research in this area. By illustrating some of
the structural and sociopolitical conditions that make governing through preemption more
or less likely, this chapter offers a starting point for future scholars attempting to theorize
the emergence and maintenance of modern practices of preemptive intervention,
particularly so in relation to counterterrorism. While the aim of this chapter was to
highlight some of the most important structural conditions making counterradicalization
policing initiatives more or less likely, an analysis of the interplay of geospatial and
political arrangements is quite admittedly beyond the scope of the present work. Further
analyses would adequately investigate this area as its own unit of analysis.
CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

The goal of this dissertation was to explore the proliferation of radicalization discourses throughout the public sphere. How has radicalization emerged as a dominant framework by which social institutions understand issues related to terrorism and counterterrorism? How is the construct of radicalization conceptualized by various influential social institutions? What are some of the material implications involved in the adoption and diffusion of counterradicalization as a novel governance strategy? How do governmental strategies of preemptive intervention related to a so-called radicalization process reconfigure more traditional forms of counterterrorism policing? These important questions formed the basis of investigation for this dissertation and provided a foundation for which the empirical exploration of radicalization discourses could commence.

This dissertation represents the first systematic attempt to empirically trace the diffusion of counterradicalization discourses throughout the public sphere and across multiple jurisdictions and social institutions. While scholars in political science and psychology have highlighted the importance of theorizing radicalization processes, the discipline of sociology has yet to adequately address processes of radicalization and the material consequences of techniques of government implemented in the construct’s name. Notably missing from scholarly studies of radicalization, then, is a macro-level, topographical analysis of the very construction of discourses which are increasingly permeating governmental and nongovernmental counterterrorism strategies. The present
work aims to bring such questions to the center of sociological focus and inquiry, by analyzing inter-systemic communications related to radicalization as a governmental logic based on notions of risk, security, and preemption. As an investigation of the emergence and diffusion of radicalization discourses in the public sphere, this dissertation principally develops a sociological analysis of shifts in governing terrorism through notions of preemptive intervention. The findings of this study suggest that the construct of radicalization is not temporally or spatially static, but rather develops in interesting and inconsistent ways across social systems and by different jurisdictional authorities.

The data gathered for this dissertation provided a wealth of information regarding the ideal and material practices of preemptive governance which have proliferated in the public sphere. While the empirical base of this dissertation provided several important insights to the development, configuration, and proliferation of radicalization discourses throughout social institutions, the data also present opportunities for deeper analyses. The data can therefore be used to further explore some of the causal linkages between the adoption and deployment of radicalization and the ‘flow’ of communications across social institutions. While this dissertation provides some of the empirical basis for sketching out such flows of communication between and amongst influential institutions, further analyses might highlight some of the causal linkages of the transmission of radicalization discourses from one institution to another. One prospect in this area would be to adopt theories of social and cultural change and framing, as Christopher Bail (2012, 2015) has done quite extensively, to explore the uptake of radicalization discourses relative to the social and institutional resources of the communicator and audience.
In addition, this dissertation provides a basis for more in-depth analyses of the material policing practices formed under a logic of radicalization preemption. A worthwhile area of future research would thus be ethnographic and interview work of some of the counterradicalization governance programs explored in the preceding chapter. Scholars might build on this project by connecting the findings here with specific techniques and practices of policing taking place on the streets of our local communities. How do community stakeholders conceptualize radicalization and the practices of counterradicalization for which they participate? How do police officers understand their role related to counterradicalization? What can we learn from the experiences of community members who are subjected to new counterradicalization initiatives? How have stakeholders, both those tasked with intervening and those subjected to interventions, navigated public understandings and representations of radicalization?

These are all questions that could be addressed through the deployment of ethnographic and interview based research methods.

Further, this dissertation broadens our understanding of new forms of preemptive intervention which increasingly focus on mitigating risk of crime through early action. By contributing to theorizations of strategies of making futures governable, this study provides an illustration of exploring the diffusion of risk mitigating ideas and concepts in other notable contexts. Future research might explore similar ideal and material trajectories in areas not obviously germane to terrorism or radicalization. For instance, scholars might, as others have done already (Aradau and van Munster 2007; Anderson 2010; de Goede 2008), pay attention to the development of specific ideas or concepts that emerge in the contexts of risk mitigation such as global climate change, disease outbreak
or future health forecasting. These projects might challenge not only the development of seemingly objective frames of understanding, but also potentially targeted and problematic processes involved in the ways we make sense of diverse and complex social harms.

Future research in this area should attempt to grapple with questions of law’s violence as legal systems are increasingly faced with decisions related to terrorism and counterterrorism. While law has typically been avoided by scholars working in the area of risk, security, and preemption, it presents a fertile unit of analysis for explorations into modern techniques of counterterrorism. As more case law emerges that deploys the concept of radicalization in legal decision-making, scholars might explore how lawyers and judges give meaning to both ideas of radicalization and some of the governmental interventions that are challenged on legal grounds.

A common criticism of scholarship within the Orientalist paradigm is that it essentializes diverse communities in the East by referencing an East/West dichotomy. Wherever possible, I have attempted to avoid such essentialist thought by noting the diversity within and among communities subjected to counterradicalization discourses and interventions. Admittedly, this dissertation makes use of an East/West dichotomy to understand cultural representations which take place in the Western hemisphere. But the present study accepts and advocates for an understanding of the internal complexities of individuals and communities who are subjected to such discourses. Further studies would therefore benefit from this analysis by more deeply exploring the intersections of race, class, gender, ethnicity and sexuality which make up the complex demographics of cultures subjected to radicalization discourses. While such interdisciplinary analysis is
beyond the scope of the present work, it is vitally important to move beyond the broad exploration of institutional discourses to the in-depth understanding of personal experiences with discourses and material forms of intervention.

The following four chapters focused on tracing discourses related to radicalization across important social institutions, including politics, law, media, and science. In Chapter Four, I traced out the emergence and development of political conceptualizations of radicalization, highlighting how narratives related to terrorism, risk, and preemption have been evoked to justify new forms of governmental intervention. Following the analysis of political discourses, Chapter Five shifted focus to explorations of legal elements related to radicalization and counterradicalization to highlight the relatively new (and inconsistent) ways in which the construct is deployed in an increasingly focused and potentially discriminatory manner. The tensions imbued in legal decisions making use of the concept of radicalization raises important questions regarding due process and legal equality and in many ways highlights the potential for new forms of legal violence related to issues of terrorism. In Chapter Six’s discussion of mass media representations of radicalization, I highlighted how public narratives about issues germane to terrorism reconfigure ideas of radicalization to focus overwhelmingly on specific cultural and ethnic minority groups. While media has long used the construct of radicalization as a device for labelling politically extreme individuals and groups, the concept is increasingly deployed by Western media systems to create social distance between Western citizens and Islamic populations of the East. In Chapter Seven, I pay particularly close attention to how expert knowledge claims related to radicalization and counterradicalization influence the development and adoption of counterterrorism
interventions explored in previous chapters. Here, I illustrate how the scientific system is embedded in the meaning-giving process on issues related to radicalization, but further contend that academic discourses related to the concept are selectively, and in some ways problematically, taken up in other social systems. Finally, Chapter Eight seeks to ground the analyses of preceding chapters in some of the material, structural, and institutional practices which have emerged in the name of radicalization. Here I explore several notable governmental interventions aimed at governing social harms related to terrorism through practices and techniques of preemptive intervention. Through an analysis of official and unofficial counterradicalization policing initiatives, I explore some of the governmental processes involved in the construction of Muslim identities as primary subjects of control. Myriad new policing strategies formed with an underlying logic of governance through preemption thus construct Islamic communities as a threat and therefore further create social distance between communities and diverse Muslim groups within those communities.

These analyses thus contribute to the development of a sociology of radicalization by adopting a macro-topographical perspective to explore the creation, proliferation, and configuration of modern discourses related to transitions towards political violence. Developing such a perspective allows for the interrogation of inter-systemic discourses which justify new forms of governance aimed at intervening in the daily lives of specific individuals and groups. The chapters of this dissertation therefore begin to challenge the taken-for-grantedness of modern security discourses by investigating the inner complexities embedded in the construction of cultural ideas that aim to understand terrorism and counterterrorism. By unpacking the seemingly presumed logics of
radicalization, I highlight the powerful political, legal, cultural, and scientific systems that structure normative practices developed in the name of security. I consider the material and ideal consequences that emerge through such discourses and urge sociologists to further investigate how logics of radicalization preemption continue to justify and sustain new mechanisms of social control.

This research interrogates a relatively new form of terrorism governance that has emerged to explicitly intervene in, and thus prevent, individual and group trajectories towards political violence. Social scientists have explored similar governance strategies in relation to notions of risk and insecurity, but there remains a dearth of empirical research theorizing the development of specific concepts, ideas and rationales involved in modern practices of terrorism preemption. Articulating the ways in which social systems come to understand and communicate about terrorism preemption, I highlight the tensions involved in understanding terrorism as a social issue and ensuring security of the population (more specifically, the nation-state). These tensions, as I have illustrated here, are both rooted in social anxieties related to ‘outsider’ cultures as well as the basis of new forms of governmental intervention which disproportionately impact specific groups. The empirical analyses here contribute to new theorizations of modern terrorism governance by focusing on how new logics for understanding and countering terrorism emerge, take shape, and justify novel interventions.

Within the governmentality framework, techniques and practices of governance are often (but not always) approached in a relatively apolitical and uncritical manner – as if governmental strategies are based simply on notions of objective efficacy and efficiency. But modern techniques of social control are imbued with meaning about the
foundation of social harms, potentialities of remedy and assessment of risk which cannot be detached from the very construction of cultural ideas about social problems. This dissertation moves beyond descriptions of modern practices of preemptive intervention to highlight and theorize the problematic nature of governmental interventions built in the name of counterradicalization. Challenging discourses of radicalization as sources for the governmental justification of new forms of social control thus broadens understanding of how ideas shape material practices that impact individuals and groups. Studying this contemporary form of understanding terrorism also opens a space for deeper sociological insight into notions of social and cultural change, risk, security and social control. Future analyses should thus build on this work by exploring the specific governmental interventions that have emerged in the name of counterradicalization. I have begun unpacking some of these interventions by analyzing the emergence of preemptive intervention policing programs aimed at preventing terrorism, but further research should expand on this form of analysis.

The evidence presented here suggests that radicalization discourses have been constructed with Islam as the central foci despite a relatively low risk. Notwithstanding all of this, official governmental interventions aimed at countering radicalization remain relatively agnostic at first glance – presenting a narrative that radicalization can affect anyone regardless of religious background. As the findings of this dissertation illustrate, major governmental counterradicalization strategies avoid mentioning Islam at all. Rather, they focus on broad and abstract notions of risk, security, preemption, and community engagement. This governmental logic, as I noted in Chapter Eight, has been relatively successful for justifying and maintaining new policing programs seeks to
preempt radicalization through techniques of community engagement and partnership. But the emergence of such social control mechanisms cannot be detached from the very development and configuration of radicalization as a governmental ideal. While governments and influential stakeholders continue to advance notions of security, risk, and policing as agnostic and hold that practices of counterradicalization do not focus on specific populations, the entire construction of germane discourses make it improbable, if not impossible, to disconnect programs of counterradicalization from programs targeting Islamic communities. As I have demonstrated in the analysis of emergent counterradicalization policing programs, representing practices of counterradicalization as agnostic policing tools has allowed for the increased sustainability and proliferation of novel governance strategies that are increasingly embedded in everyday life. This dissertation, focusing primarily on the emergence of discourses, speaks to the problematic nature of such approaches. Is it possible to disconnect notions of risk and security in the context of modern counterterrorism from the discriminatory contexts in which they emerge? This study provides a foundation for future explorations into some of the biases and potentially problematic assumptions related to supposed objective and neutral ideas of risk, security, and preemption.

Radicalization has emerged as one way to make unknowable futures known and actionable in the present. Modern conceptualizations of radicalization emerged in such a way as to justify governmental interventions that act on possible future behavior and activities. In this way, radicalization has developed into a risk mitigation concept that evokes material practices vis-à-vis new techniques of governance. The data here lend support to the argument that modern practices of risk, emerging in the name of security
and preemption, are subjective and disproportionately focus on specific groups. By uncovering some of the discursive strategies that have emerged to create social distance between citizens of a nation-state and Muslims, this study links discourses with material practices of counterradicalization to show the inconsistencies and problematic nature of notions of risk that are often approached as neutral. The findings of this dissertation also suggest that radicalization has been constructed in such a way that is has relatively little to do with actual terrorist activities or terrorism risks and more to do anxieties rooted in religious differences. Not only have notions of “national identity” and “national values” been adopted by news media, law, and politics across all three countries to construct social distance between itself and perceived outsiders, but there seems to be very little justification for such othering frames in so-called objective assessments of risk. This dissertation, focusing on the development and configuration of the concept of radicalization, illustrates how notions of risk are mobilized in very problematic ways to justify increasingly intrusive mechanisms of social control aimed at preventing terrorism far before it manifests.

This dissertation firmly contributes to the growing body of scholarly literature that challenges new forms of governance that have emerged in the global war on terrorism. I have perhaps even highlighted the possibility that the West is now in a ‘post-war on terror’ period. Governing terrorism once meant the deployment of military interventions to ‘root out’ problematic individuals and groups who support and stimulate terrorism and terrorist activities. Modern notions of terrorism, however, are much more focused on the preemptive identification, monitoring, and prevention of terrorism before it manifests through evocations of radicalization. As I have demonstrated, this
governmental approach to counterterrorism has significantly rearticulated modern intervention strategies which increasingly adopt a community stakeholder and population responsibilization strategy to make practices of identification, monitoring, and support possible and more efficient. This rearticulation has proliferated and continues to expand across Western jurisdictions. One might even speculate that community-based referral strategies which aim to engage communities in the counterradicalization process, are becoming the norm for national and international counterterrorism governance. Scholars might be well-suited to continue documenting this trend through empirically rigorous, evidence-based research.

I opened this project with a brief anecdote outlining how governmental discourse shaped my interest in issues germane to terrorism and counterterrorism. If nothing else, this highlights the power of government authorities to influence what has become a major portion of a young scholars’ academic life. At the very most, it illustrates the ability of governmental authorities to shape the very foundation of public ideas of important issues related to national security and counterterrorism. Nevertheless, my anecdotal experience underlines the value of questioning some of the ways in which seemingly inconsequential ideas give rise to myriad interventions that disproportionately impacts certain groups within our societies. While the words of Prime Minister Harper might have given impetus to the present project, the discourses of current and future government authorities, in Canada and elsewhere, should be equally illuminated and challenged by scholarly research. Future research would do well to develop research questions and empirical projects that begin with taken for granted notions that configure, justify, and sustain new mechanisms of control, despite insistence that such notions may be uncontroversial.
REFERENCES


Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263.

A Local Authority v M & Ors (Fact Finding) (Rev 1) [2016] EWHC 1599 (Fam).

Alomari v. Ohio Department of Public Safety, Dist. Court, SD Ohio 2014.

Alomari v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Safety (6th Cir. 2015).


*AM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 2486.*


Canadian Internet Registration Authority. 2013. “Canadian Internet Registration Authority Poll 2013.” Retrieved May 1, 2017 from (https://cira.ca/)


Harkat (Re), 2010 FC 1241.
Heath-Kelly, Charlotte, Christopher Baker-Beall, and Lee Jarvis. 2015. Counter-

Heath-Kelly, Charlotte. 2013. “Counter-terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing the
‘Radicalisation’ Discourse and the UK PREVENT Strategy.” British Journal of

24.


Martin’s.

Horgan, John. 2009. Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from

(https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac_cve_working_group_recommendations.pdf).


*Foreign Policy*, February 1. Retrieved April 1, 2017


*K (Children), Re [2016] EWHC 1606 (Fam).*


Mahjoub (Re), 2013 FC 10.


Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. 2003. “Comparative Historical Analysis: Achievements and Agendas.” Pp. 3-40 in Comparative Historical Analysis in the


*M (Children), Re [2014] EWHC 667.*


*Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, (c 2).*


Razack, Sherene. 2009. *Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and
Politics*. Toronto, CAN: University of Toronto Press.

Reagan, Ronald. 1986. “Statement on Signing the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism Act of 1986.” Retrieved April 1, 2017

Act*. Ottawa, ON: Research and Statistics Division, Department of Justice.

Roach, Kent. 2011. “Uneasy Neighbors: Comparative American and Canadian Counter-

Rose, Nikolas, Pat O’Malley, and Mariana Valverde. 2006. “Governmentality.” *Annual
Review of Law and Society* 2: 83-104.

Rose, Nikolas and Peter Miller. 1992. “Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of


Saeed, Amir. 2007. “Media, Racism and Islamophobia: The Representation of Islam and
Muslims in the Media.” *Sociology Compass* 1(2): 443-462.

Sageman, Marc. 2004. *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press.


Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.


*Sivapathasuntharam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 489.*


Southers, Erroll G. 2014. “Homegrown Violent Extremism: Designing a Community-Based Model to Reduce the Risk of Recruitment of Radicalization.” PhD
Dissertation, School of Public Policy, University of Southern California, Los Angeles.


