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Partisan Polarization, Social Identity, and Deliberative Democracy in the United States

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PARTISAN POLARIZATION, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES

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ABSTRACT

As of late, political theory, research, and practice have taken a deliberative turn, extolling the benefits of public discourse guided by norms such as inclusion, respect, and open-mindedness. Can these ideals, though, be approximated in the current era of partisan polarization? If so, what factors contribute to high quality, productive discourse?

These are the questions this project addresses, assessing how partisanship and polarization impact the public’s propensity to adopt the key deliberative attitude of reciprocity (or mutual respect) towards political argumentation. Drawing on social identity theory, the project conceptualizes partisan attachment as containing interrelated, yet separate ideological and social identity dimensions. Through a series of survey experiments, it then shows that partisan social identity attachment—in other words, the extent to which one views being a Democrat or a Republican as an important part of “who one is”—weakens one commitment to reciprocity in a variety of ways. Partisans with strong social identity attachments are more likely to heed party cues, as opposed to argumentative substance, in considering whether to afford reciprocity towards political disagreement. Partisans with strong social identity attachments are also less likely to support displays of reciprocity by an inparty political representative. The same effects, however, are not present for partisans with strong ideological commitments to their party. Moreover, the effects are not weaker for partisans who have regular social contact with outparty members.
Recent research shows that the partisan public has increasingly polarized not based on ideology or issue positions, but based on growing negative outparty affect and cross-party social distance. The research here thus shows that mass “social” polarization is creating a fundamental barrier to productive cross-party discourse, one that will need to be addressed if we want to establish a more deliberative democracy.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**........................................................................................................ iii

**ABSTRACT** .......................................................................................................................... iv

**LIST OF TABLES** .................................................................................................................. ix

**LIST OF FIGURES** ............................................................................................................... xi

**CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW** ........................................................................................................ 1

1.1 **DELIBERATION AND RECIPROCITY** ........................................................................... 4

1.2 **DELIBERATION AND PARTISANSHIP** ........................................................................ 9

1.3 **SHORTCOMINGS OF EXTANT RESEARCH** ............................................................... 12

1.4 **THE DUAL BASES OF PARTISAN IDENTITY** ......................................................... 17

1.5 **PLAN FOR PROJECT** .................................................................................................. 22

**CHAPTER 2: RECIPROCITY AND ITS ROLE IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE** ............................. 24

2.1 **THE CONCEPT AND BOUNDARIES OF RECIPROCITY** ......................................... 27

2.2 **DELIBERATION AND THE PUBLIC** ......................................................................... 34

2.3 **BENEFITS, AND CRITIQUE, OF DELIBERATION** .................................................. 37

2.4 **RECIPROCITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF PERSUASION** ..................................... 42

2.5 **CONCLUSION** ............................................................................................................ 47

**CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH** ................................................................. 49

3.1 **OVERALL APPROACH** .............................................................................................. 49

3.2 **ON THE CONCEPTS OF RECIPROCITY AND PARTISANSHIP** ................................. 52

3.3 **ON OPERATIONALIZING RECIPROCITY AND PARTISANSHIP** ............................... 55
3.4 Online Survey Instrument ................................................................. 59
3.5 Telephone Survey Instrument ......................................................... 63
3.6 Analytical Strategy ........................................................................... 65

Chapter 4: Deliberate with the Enemy? ......................................................... 67
  4.1 Partisan Polarization and Social Identity ........................................... 70
  4.2 Theory .......................................................................................... 75
  4.3 Descriptive Statistics ........................................................................ 79
  4.4 Experimental Results ....................................................................... 83
  4.5 Discussion and Conclusion .............................................................. 97

Chapter 5: Can We Talk? Deliberation, Partisanship, and Social Contact ..... 103
  5.1 Social Contact and the Nature of Prejudice ...................................... 106
  5.2 Comparing Two Types of Partisan Contact ...................................... 108
  5.3 Theory .......................................................................................... 112
  5.4 Data and Method ........................................................................... 113
  5.5 Results ......................................................................................... 117
  5.6 Conclusion ................................................................................... 127

Chapter 6: Personality and the Prospects for Deliberation ......................... 131
  6.1 The Foundations of Personality ....................................................... 132
  6.2 Personality as Applied to Politics .................................................... 136
  6.3 Hypotheses ................................................................................... 139
  6.4 Data and Method ........................................................................... 141
  6.5 Results ......................................................................................... 143
  6.6 Conclusion ................................................................................... 148
LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1 Structure of Online Survey Questionnaire ............................................................. 59
Table 4.1 Distribution of Respondents among Partisan Subgroups, Online Survey ........ 80
Table 4.2 Partisan Respondents’ Attitudes Towards Deliberation, by Social Identity ..... 82
Table 4.3 Immigration Vignette Results, Online Survey ...................................................... 85
Table 4.4 Civil Liberties Vignette Results, Online Survey .................................................. 88
Table 4.5 Vignette Response by Ideological Partisanship, Online Survey ....................... 92
Table 4.6 Liberties Vignette Response by PSI, Telephone Survey ..................................... 94
Table 5.1 Number of Named Members in Discussion Network ....................................... 114
Table 5.2 Number of Outparty Members in Discussion Network, Online Survey ........ 116
Table 5.3 Number of Outparty Members in Discussion Network, Past US Surveys .... 117
Table 5.4 Immigration Vignette Response by Network Composition ............................. 118
Table 5.5 Liberties Vignette Response by Network Composition ................................. 120
Table 5.6 Vignette Response if First Person Mentioned is Outparty Member ............... 122
Table 5.7 Vignette Response by Number of Outparty Discussants ............................... 124
Table 6.1 Personality Scores, by Partisanship and Self-Reported Ideology .................... 142
Table 6.2 Response to “Reasonable” Question, by Openness to Experience ................. 144
Table 6.3 Differences in Response to Immigration Vignette, by Argument Received and
  Openness to Experience ............................................................................................ 147
Table 6.4 Mean PSI Score, by Openness to Experience ................................................ 148
Table C.1 Demographic Data for Both Surveys .............................................................. 202
Table C.2 Immigration Vignette Results for Democrats Only, Online Survey ..........203
Table C.3 Immigration Vignette Results for Republicans Only, Online Survey ..........204
Table C.4 Liberties Vignette Results for Democrats Only, Online Survey ..........205
Table C.5 Liberties Vignette Results for Republicans Only, Online Survey ..........206
Table D.1 Regression Table for Figures 5.2 and 5.3 .......................................................208
Table E.1 Vignette Response by Conscientiousness .......................................................210
Table E.2 Vignette Response by Agreeableness ..............................................................211
Table E.3 Response to “Reasonable” Question, by Openness and PSI .........................213
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Dimensions of Partisan Identity .................................................................21
Figure 4.1 Partisan Emotion, by Social Identity Salience .............................................81
Figure 4.2 Attitudes toward Deliberation by Party, Online Survey ...............................83
Figure 4.3 Online Immigration Vignette Results, by Social Identity .........................86
Figure 4.4 Online Liberties Vignette Results, by Social Identity .................................89
Figure 4.5 Online Vignette Results, by Ideology ..........................................................93
Figure 4.6 Telephone Vignette Results, by Social Identity ...........................................95
Figure 4.7 Online Representative Vignette Results, by Social Identity ......................96
Figure 4.8 Telephone Representative Vignette Results, by Social Identity ...............97
Figure 4.9 Telephone Representative Vignette Results, by Party ...............................98
Figure 4.10 Partisan Emotion over Time, Democrats ..................................................101
Figure 4.11 Partisan Emotion over Time, Republicans ...............................................101
Figure 5.1 Response to Immigration Vignette, by Social Contact and Identity ..........121
Figure 5.2 Response to Liberties Vignette, by Social Contact and Identity ...............121
Figure 5.3 Mean PSI Score by Outparty Network Size, Online Survey .......................125
Figure 5.4 Feeling Toward the Parties, by Outparty Social Contact ...........................126
Figure 6.1 Differences in Response to Counterargument, by Openness to Experience ...145
Figure 6.2 Response to Liberties Vignette, by PSI and Openness to Experience ........149
Figure 6.3 Response to Immigration Vignette, by PSI and Openness to Experience ....149
Figure 6.4 Distribution of Openness to Experience Score for U.S. Adults .................152
Figure A.1 Distribution of PSI Measure, Online Survey..................................................191
Figure A.2 Distribution of Ideological Partisanship Measure, Online Survey..............192
Figure A.3 Distribution of PSI Measure, Telephone Survey.............................................192
Figure E.1 Openness to Experience Results Across Parties, Immigration Vignette ......212
Figure E.2 Openness to Experience Results Across Parties, Liberties Vignette ............212
"The political parties created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties."

- E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government, 1942

“Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation. The stronger the party bond, the more exaggerated the process of selection and perceptual distortion will be.”

- Campbell et al., The American Voter, 1960

During the run-up to the 2012 Presidential Election, the radio show This American Life produced an episode entitled “Red States Blue State,” where they declare that “everyone knows that politics is now so divided in our country that not only do the sides disagree on the solutions to the country’s problems, they don’t even agree on what the problems are.” The episode then profiles a host of average Americans who have had their families torn apart and close friendships ruined due to opposing, polarized politics. In one particularly evocative example from the show, interviewer Lisa Pollack profiles Frank Mills and Ron Sexton. The two men were close friends who repeatedly discussed political issues on the phone. This is until, as Pollack describes on-air in their interview, “Ron urged Frank to support a Republican candidate for Congress. Frank balked. Didn't Ron know he supported Democrats?
Frank Mills: And he (Ron) said, ‘Who did you vote for for president?’ And I said, ‘I voted for Obama.’

Lisa Pollak: Apparently this had not come up before.

Frank Mills: And then he said, ‘You must be a Socialist.’

Lisa Pollak: He said this seriously or jokingly?

Frank Mills: No, seriously. ‘You must be a Socialist.’ And I said, ‘How can you make that assumption?’ He says, ‘Well, you voted for Obama. He's a socialist, and therefore you are.’ And then I took it as if he had called me a dirty name. And we got into an argument. And then after a while, he said, ‘Well, I'm writing you off my list, Frank. Don't ever talk to me again. You're no longer a friend of mine,’ is how that conversation ended,” (Glass 2012).

The story of Frank and Ron may be common in America, and, for many, it is troubling. With the rise of partisan polarization debated by academic and popular commentators alike (Abramowitz 2010; Haidt and Hetherington 2012), many point to a link between divergent political views and an incivility and breakdown of political discourse (“Civility in America 2013”). Dating back to the ancient Greeks, political theorists have extolled the virtues of deliberative democracy, predicated on the ability of the public (or at least their representatives) to see divergent perspectives as legitimate and to be open to opinion change (Rawls [1993] 2005; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Dryzek 2010). The closed-mindedness and lack of consideration evinced by Frank and Ron calls this possibility into question.

It is also perhaps puzzling, as many public opinion scholars demonstrate that, while conservatives and liberals may have increasingly sorted into their “correct” party
based on ideology, the public writ large is as moderate as it has been in the past half century (Fiorina 2011). The acrimony may be real, but it may be relatively untethered to ideological or issue position conflict; in other words, it is comprised of “a nation that agrees on many things but is bitterly divided nonetheless,” (Mason 2015, 128). To help explain this puzzle, a body of recent research in political psychology (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2014; Mason 2015; Huddy, Mason, and AaroE 2015) has drawn a distinction between the ideological and social identity bases of partisanship to suggest that it is not Democrats’ and Republicans’ political views, but social identities, that are polarizing. Drawing from social psychological theories of identity (Tajfel et al. 1971; Turner 1987), these authors posit that the motivation to establish a positive differentiation between one’s inparty and outparty drives the anger and conflict that is suggested between Frank and Ron.

Drawing on this concept of “social identity” polarization, the goal of this project is to explain the effect of partisan attachment on the quality of political deliberation in American democracy. The founding fathers, as well as many modern political theorists, extol the virtue of open-minded public discussion and consensus building. Both theoretical and empirical research on deliberative democracy, however, underexplore the impact of partisanship on the propensity of the public to engage in meaningful, high-quality deliberation. Moreover, while recent research into “social identity” polarization examines the impact of partisan identity on emotional responses to politics (Mason 2015), political activism (Huddy, Mason, and AaroE 2015), and even non-political attitudes such as marriage or hiring decisions (Iyengar and Westwood 2014), it has not made the connection to the discussion characteristics or citizen attitudes that deliberative
theory prioritizes. Today, there is continued academic and practical interest in fostering deliberative discourse and institutions. Thus, examining how the social psychology of partisanship impacts these efforts, and bridging deliberative political theory with research in political psychology, is of vital importance.

This chapter lays the theoretical groundwork for the project. After a discussion of deliberative democracy and the key role that the concept of reciprocity plays in deliberation, the chapter explores the ambivalent role parties play in historical and modern American political thought. As the academic debate over partisanship and partisan polarization today has focused on its effect on representation and electoral accountability, this literature does an inadequate job connecting polarization to its effect on deliberation and political discourse. In turn, empirical deliberative democracy research tends to focus on whether deliberation produces normatively positive benefits; it does not adequately examine prior characteristics (such as partisanship) which encourage or preclude individuals from engaging in deliberation in the first place. From this point, the chapter advances social identity theory (SIT) as a way to connect the debate on polarization with the concerns of deliberative theory. Then, the chapter draws on SIT to lay out the theoretical expectations guiding the project. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a plan for the rest of the project.

1.1 DELIBERATION AND RECIPROCITY

In the 21st century, democracy is generally seen as a good thing; Americans take pride in having the oldest democratic Constitution in the Western world, and both domestically and internationally, we prefer to see political change that creates more, rather than less, of it. However, like other valence terms such as “freedom” or “justice,”
“democracy” is a universal good with many and at times conflicting interpretations. For example, some see democracy as primarily a competition between groups (Dahl 1956), and others see guaranteeing rights or liberty (Nozick 1974) as essentially “democratic.” Many scholars and citizens, though, conceptualize democracy primarily in terms of “the electoral connection.” As one example, both normative theory (Mill [1861] 1991; Pitkin 1967) as well as empirical political science (Miller and Stokes 1963; Ansolabehere and Jones 2010) view the ideal democratic representative as one who directly enacts the wishes of his or her constituency. If the representative fails to do so, the constituency holds him or her accountable come election time. Indeed, from public opinion research cataloging the “uninformed” and “irrational” voter (Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Lodge and Taber 2013) to Congressional research discussing the incumbency advantage (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2006) and capture by moneyed interests (Gilens and Page 2014), much of the American politics literature consists of an exploration of the breakdown of the “electoral connection” as well as institutional changes that could be made to fix it.

The view of democracy as primarily an “electoral connection” has roots in a “minimalist” conception typified by Schumpeter (1942 [2003]) as well as the assumption latent in much public opinion research that it would be difficult to demand much more from the American citizenry. However, democratic theorists have of late increasingly moved beyond the electoral connection and have considered the discursive requirements of democracy (Dryzek 2010; Young 2000; Gutmann and Thompson 1996). These deliberative democratic theorists do not focus on specific institutions or election procedures, and they moreover do not argue that deliberation should replace an electoral
connection. They do argue, though, that the quality of political communication that connects citizens both with each other and the ruling class matters. Dryzek lays out a complete, succinct definition of the core elements of deliberative democracy:

“A system can be said to possess deliberative capacity to the degree it has structures to accommodate deliberation that is authentic, inclusive, and consequential. To be authentic, deliberation ought to be able to induce reflection upon preferences in noncoercive fashion… and involve communicating in terms that those who do not share one’s point of view can find meaningful and accept…To be inclusive, deliberation requires the opportunity and ability of all affected actors (or their representatives) to participate. To be consequential, deliberation must somehow make a difference when it comes to determining or influencing collective outcomes,” (2010, 10).

Thus, at its core, deliberative democracy is about reason giving (Thompson 2008); decisions are not made by fiat, but with collective, interactive discussion, and with justification towards those disagree. Normative theorists vary in their requirements for the quality of reasons given, the role (if any) of power or bargaining, the proper site for this discussion, as well as the place for consensus as a discursive goal (Bächtiger et al. 2010). In a seminal work, though, Gutmann and Thompson (1996) argue that this reason giving should be guided by a norm of *reciprocity*, or offering justifications that others, even if they disagree, can find legitimate. As such, the back and forth of political discussion comes from a place of mutual respect and open, good faith consideration of alternate views (Fishkin 1995). While some confine deliberation to power brokers such as legislators or jurors (for example, Rawls [1993] 2005), many deliberative theorists see
the necessity for “everyday talk” of the public to hew to these norms (Dryzeck 2010, Mansbridge 1999), in a way that places a primacy on inclusion (Young 2000).

The connection between deliberative discussion and democracy has roots in Athenian democracy, where speechmaking and discussion in the Assemblies was viewed as integral to decision making processes (Held 1987, Ch. 1). The focus on deliberation in modern times, though, has only taken in the past few decades. Since, though, it has become a central focus of political theory (Rawls [1993] 2005; Gutmann and Thompson 1996), empirical social science (Barabas 2004; Mutz 2006), and practical political reform (Gastil and Levine 2005). Democratic theorists argue that deliberation comes with a host of benefits for political power and decision making, including a greater normative and empirical legitimacy, a more informed citizenry, better and more consistent attitude formation, higher tolerance for diverse viewpoints, greater engagement and social capital building, and higher quality, more consensual decisions (Mendelberg 2002, 153-4). While empirical research has shown mixed results (for reviews, see Thompson 2008; Mutz 2008), and the benefits of deliberation hinge on the individual and environmental context (Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs 2004), there is enough evidence to suggest that, at times, the public can buck the assumptions of irrationality and apathy that dominate public opinion research. For example, while some have found that the public prefers a low level of political involvement (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs (2004, 323-4) find that the public is willing to talk about the issues with their peers, with 58% of their national survey respondents engaging in at least two “discursive activities” in the past year. Prior and Lupia (2008), moreover, use a survey experiment of a representative, national sample to show that the public can draw on
higher levels of political knowledge if given the time and motivation to do so. Many studies employing “deliberative forums” or “deliberative polls” also show that, with time and motivation, citizens can engage in “reciprocal” decision making through deliberation\(^1\) (Fishkin 1995; Stanford University 2013). For example, Barabas (2004) finds through a forum on Social Security reform that, even for those with strongly held prior opinions, deliberation produces opinion change in a way “ordinary discussion” about the issue does not. Moreover, List et al. (2012), using data from nine deliberative polls, finds that deliberation can create “meta-agreement” or “single-peakedness” in policy preferences, particularly for issues that have a natural left-right dimensionality. Thus, they argue, deliberation can create opinion constraint and avoid social choice problems (Arrow 1951) that arise with multi-dimensional preferences.

Beyond being simply a theoretical and empirical research endeavor, deliberative democracy has also made in-roads into real-world politics. Certainly, efforts at fostering greater public participation in decision making are nothing new; for example, the Administrative Procedures Act has required that agencies solicit public comments on rulemaking for half of a century. More recently, though, governments have either instituted or consulted institutions founded explicitly on deliberative democratic principles. The most prominent example of this is the “deliberative polling” done by James Fishkin and Stanford’s Center for Deliberative Democracy. Since 1988, Fishkin and the Center have organized dozens of deliberative forums across the world focused on a myriad of issues, where results have been used to inform policy processes (Fishkin

\(^1\) With these forums, “the basic design involves interviewing a good-quality random sample; gathering its members for a weekend to deliberate in randomly assigned small groups; allowing them to put questions arising from the small group discussions to panels of competing policy experts and policy makers; and reinterviewing them at the end,” (List et al. 2012, 81).
Another example is the Australian Citizens’ Parliament. A national convention of 150 citizens modeled on the ancient Athenian assemblies, the Citizens’ Parliament was tasked with proposing reforms to the Australian political system through online and face-to-face deliberations. Even beyond the content of their proposals, Dryzek argues that it shows that “if you give people the opportunity to deliberate, they see the political system as something that is theirs and worthwhile,” (Dryzek 2009, 4). Warren and Gastil (2015), moreover, highlight the potential role of deliberative “minipublics” in serving as intermediaries bridging complexities in the policy process and the limited information citizens often bring to bear on political decisions. They point to the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly and Oregon’s Citizens’ Initiative Review—two deliberative institutions comprised of a near random sample of the citizenry—as successfully serving as impartial, transparent, and knowledgeable trustees for helping citizen decision making. These are just a few of many instances of deliberative ideals making inroads into practical political reform.

1.2 DELIBERATION AND PARTISANSHIP

The deliberative ideal of reciprocity extols a “universalization” of political discourse; at its fullest expression, politics does not consist of winners and losers, but a community trying to figure out what is in the common good through productive discussion. As such, there is a historical concern over the group considerations brought about by political parties. Prior to the ratification of the Constitution, in Federalist #10 Madison sees political parties as fostering the “mischiefs of faction,” creating “instability, injustice, and confusion” in popular government ([1787] 2003). Nearly a decade later,

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2 Indeed, deliberative democratic theory is often criticized for ignoring the aspects of power and conflict that, it is asserted, are essential to understanding politics. For example, see Shapiro 1999.
Washington warns in his Farewell Address of “the spirit of party,” as it “agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms, kindles the animosity of one part against another, (and) forments occasionally riot and insurrection” ([1796] 2008).

Only four years after Washington’s warnings, Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans were vying against Adams and the Federalists for control of the new United States government. And for the two centuries that followed, the two-party system has been ensconced in the American political landscape. Formal theory suggests that it must be so; Duverger and others contend that the institutional and electoral structure of the government drives the creation and maintenance of two broad, national parties (1954; Cox 1997; Aldrich 2011). What’s more, Downs’ (1957) spatial theory of voting suggests that, given that the bulk of the United States populace is ideologically moderate (Fiorina 2011), the party system will converge on two parties ideologically near the median voter. In addition to the formal necessity of two parties in the American democratic system, many have suggested that they play a normatively positive role in translating citizen preferences into government action. By establishing a clear, consistent “brand,” they provide an important cueing function to voters, allowing the average citizen with a low level of political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) to effectively participate in politics (Lupia 1994). Responsible party theorists, moreover, argue that healthy competition between two parties can serve to offer distinct choices to voters and ensure that, once voters make their choice, electoral change is translated into policy change. Indeed, in *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, V. O. Key shows how the Democratic party in the post-Reconstruction South maintained a one-party dominance through
various means of voter suppression. Without viable competition from the Republican party, Key argues that the Southern states did not have a functioning democracy (1949).

Key is correct that competition is necessary for democracy; deliberative theorists, too, argue that a healthy democratic discourse needs a diversity of competing claims. They argue, though, that the nature and tone of this competition also matters. As such, many popular commentators, political activists, and the public writ large, in line with these theorists and echoing the historical warnings of Washington and Madison, have expressed concern with the current era of mass partisan polarization. Opinion makers across media outlets, for example, claim that polarized parties “neither trust nor understand each other” (Dionne 2013), and that “the number of persuadable voters has shrunk to a tiny segment of the electorate” (Cohen 2016). A recent Pew Center report, moreover, claims that “Republicans and Democrats are more divided along ideological lines – and partisan antipathy is deeper and more extensive – than at any point in the last two decades,” (2014, 5). The report points to not only more points of policy conflict, but a partisan-based antipathy “bordering on sense of alarm” as well as an increasing disinclination to marry, have friendships with, or live near out-partisans. Bishop likewise reports the public’s increasing aversion to out-party neighbors, arguing that, as Americans increasingly migrate into ideologically homogenous, “balkanized” communities, the result is “a growing intolerance for political differences that has made national consensus impossible” (2008, 14).

Furthermore, the gridlock and disaffection produced by 21st century partisan politics has prompted political organizations such as No Labels to actively promote greater compromise and consensus among party leaders. It has also produced movement
politics, as exemplified by then-*Daily Show* host Jon Stewart’s 2010 “Rally to Restore Sanity and/or Fear” (Tavernise and Stelter 2010). While some critiqued the rally as less of a call for civil discourse and more of a rally for the Democratic party, Stewart himself saw it as a repudiation of the divisive partisan punditry of all stripes, a divisiveness that makes one question:

“Why would we work together? Why would you reach across the aisle to a pumpkin assed forehead eyeball monster? If the picture of us were true, of course, our inability to solve problems would actually be quite sane and reasonable. Why would you work with Marxists actively subverting our Constitution or racists and homophobes who see no one’s humanity but their own? We hear every damn day about how fragile our country is—on the brink of catastrophe—torn by polarizing hate and how it’s a shame that we can’t work together to get things done, but the truth is we do. We work together to get things done every damn day!... Most Americans don’t live their lives solely as Democrats, Republicans, liberals or conservatives. Americans live their lives more as people that are just a little bit late for something they have to do—often something that they do not want to do—but they do it--impossible things every day that are only made possible by the little reasonable compromises that we all make” (quoted in Examiner.com 2010).

1.3 SHORTCOMINGS OF EXTANT RESEARCH

In addition to Stewart and other popular commentators, political scientists have paid increasing attention to partisan polarization; scholars, however, tend to study polarization as an ideological construct, examining whether Democrats and Republicans are increasingly comprising ideologically homogenous, ideologically distinct camps.
From this literature, there is a clear consensus that political elites – politicians, activists, donors, and media, are more polarized today than they have been in the past century (McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Theriault 2008; Prior 2007). With this observation, some scholars have argued that the public is now similarly polarized, harboring homogenous, distinct worldviews and issue positions (Abramowitz 2010; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). The majority consensus, though, is that while partisans in the public may be better “sorted” (Levendusky 2009), they are just as ideologically unconstrained as Phillip Converse and his colleagues surmised in the 1960’s (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964). Fiorina contends that much of the hand-wringing over “culture wars” or “polarized America” incorrectly conflates closely contested elections with deep public divisions over the issues (2011); the public, instead, is much more centrist and amenable to compromise than the political class (2009). Hill and Tausanovitch (2015), moreover, construct a measure of public ideology similar to the NOMINATE scores used for Congress, based on 67 policy questions asked in the ANES over a 50-year period. They find that, while the public has always been less ideologically extreme than their elected leaders, the disconnect has gotten stronger in recent years. Along the lines of this dialogue, too, scholars debate whether the public is polarized on economic and/or sociocultural issues (Frank 2004; Gelman et al. 2008; Carsey and Layman 2002) as well as whether ideological mass polarization has a geographic dimension (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003; Gelman et al. 2008; Bishop 2008).

The literature examining ideological mass polarization (or the lack thereof) provides vital, yet incomplete, insight into the impact of 21st century partisanship on the quality of American democracy. This literature is primarily motivated by a normative
concern over the quality of representation in America, and the electoral connection between representatives and the represented. As Pitkin states, in a representative government there must be “machinery for the expression of the wishes of the represented, and that the government respond to these wishes unless there are good reasons to the contrary,” (1967, 232-3). Given the clear ideological rift between parties in government, if the public is not similarly split ideologically, there is a clear breakdown in this machinery. Fiorina (2009, 72-4) argues that this is precisely what is happening today. He points out that while some theories of representation suggest that the representative is supposed to be reasonable, moderating the passions of the public, today’s representative is exaggerating the moderate differences of a reasonable public. If, on the other hand, the public is ideologically polarized, the electoral connection is then healthy. As Abramowitz states, “the conditions for responsible party government have largely been met” (2010, 159), and overcoming governmental gridlock will require either extended dominance from one party or reforming institutional checks and balances.

Concern for the quality of representation is not misplaced; if Schattschneider says that American democracy is “unthinkable” without political parties, it is also unthinkable without representation. Direct democracy is impossible given a large, heterogeneous society like the United States. However, considering partisan polarization solely in the context of ideology and representation is incomplete. To do so would presume a minimalist or aggregate vision of democracy, where public involvement in the democratic process is limited to an occasional “competitive struggle for the people’s vote,” (Schumpeter [1942] 2003). Election procedure and outcomes would take precedence over the processes of political discussion and opinion formation, as well as
input and justification of policymaking processes between elections. The sites of
democracy would be limited to the polling place, excluding the media, public forums, or
the streets. The citizenry, moreover, would be assumed to be motivated by a “thin and
individualistic form of rationality” (Young 2000, 20), where preferences are immutable
and the collective good (outside of its effect on one’s self interest) is not taken into
account. According to this view, if the ideological elite polarization matches polarization
of the public, democracy “works” as citizen interests are reflected through election. The
concerns voiced by deliberative theorists as well as popular commentators like Stewart—
of incivility, aggression, and a lack of reciprocity in elite and lay political discussion, and
of gridlock and lack of consensus in the policymaking process—do not factor in.

If polarization studies often miss the concerns of deliberative theorists, empirical
and theoretical work in deliberative democracy often glosses over the potential impact of
partisanship on deliberation that our founders worried about. While more attention to
empirical work on deliberation will be paid in Chapter Two, broadly, much of this
literature takes a “forum” approach (eg. Fishkin 1995; Barabas 2004), where a
deliberative situation is carefully constructed out of whole cloth, or a “case based”
approach (eg. Mansbridge 1980; Gastil 2000), where insights are gleaned from observing
real-world deliberative situations. These studies tend to take deliberation as an
independent variable, assessing its effects on dependent variables such as trust, tolerance,
consensus, etc. They also operationalize deliberation holistically, arguing that the
package of conditions theorists prioritize (reciprocity, reason-giving, non-domination,
accurate information, etc.) create the effects they study. There is certainly value in taking
this approach; many argue that, as deliberation is a synergistic, communal process,
breaking the characteristics of deliberation down to their component parts means studying something that is not deliberation (Thompson 2008).

This being said, the holistic case based and forum based studies of deliberation are incomplete. For one, the forum based studies of Fishkin and others suffer from issues of endogeneity. Is the open-mindedness, opinion change, greater understanding, etc., created by the deliberative process in these forums, or is it driven by the type of people that choose to participate in the extensive forum process? To address this issue, many of these studies employ random sampling of the population (List et al. 2012), stratified sampling of the population to ensure that key race, class, and gender subgroups are represented (Dryzek 2009), or post-hoc statistical adjustment such as matching (Barabas 2004). However, this does not fully deal with the issue, as unobservable characteristics (such as personality—see Chapter Six) can motivate some, as opposed to others, to participate even if a random sample of participants is contacted.

What’s more, Ryfe is correct in positing that “researchers have been less interested in deliberation itself than in measuring its effects” (2005, 54). In other words, what specifically produces the salutary benefits that case based and forum based studies of deliberation find? Is it the access to accurate, expert information? The encouragement of open-mindedness? Social contact with persons of a different opinion? By setting up a holistic deliberative process and not subjecting each of these components of the process to scrutiny, Mutz thus contends that deliberation becomes a “moving target,” which “insulate(s) the theory from falsification” (2008).

Mutz is correct that studying the specific components of deliberation in isolation, with an eye towards internal validity, is a necessary addition (but not replacement) to the
extant holistic research that case based and forum based studies provide. Indeed, her work (2006) as well as other work (eg. Jackman and Sniderman 2006; Druckman and Nelson 2003; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002) takes such an approach, using survey experiments and other experimental techniques to examine isolated characteristics of deliberation such as interpersonal network diversity or exposure to counterargument. However, like case based and forum based research, this experimental work, with few exceptions, takes characteristics of the deliberative setting as independent variables, examining if they produce the salutary effects theorists contend they do. Less research from this subfield takes the deliberative setting as the dependent variable, exploring its preconditions. This is unfortunate, as Thompson argues that “the aspect of deliberation about which empirical inquiry has potentially the most to say is the set of conditions that are necessary for, or at least contributory toward, good deliberation,” (2008, 509). He posits that more research into the cultural and institutional preconditions that lead to higher-quality deliberation can help to explain the mixed results of the effects of deliberation studies find. To wit, despite the extended popular and academic debate over the rise of partisan polarization, little work has examined the role of parties in fostering or inhibiting deliberation. However, recent work examining the partisan social identity can provide a useful tool with which this project can do just that.

1.4 THE DUAL BASES OF PARTISAN IDENTITY

Fiorina, Abramowitz, and other polarization scholars tend to work with an “ideological” concept of polarization, where partisan affiliation is (or is not) linked to ideological and/or policy preference. In a recent paper, however, Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012) argue that negative affect towards an “outgroup” party, not ideological
difference, is the most important dimension of partisan polarization. They draw on social identity theory (SIT) to explain how, as partisanship has become an increasingly salient social identity in American culture, dislike towards, and stereotyping of, partisan outgroups has increased in survey responses. This phenomenon is not evident for other groups; there is not a similar antipathy between liberals and conservatives, and outgroup hatred/stereotyping has increased for partisans even as it has (overtly) decreased for ethnic, religious, and other traditionally-maligned groups over time. They also show that ideology is only, at best, a very weak predictor of “affective” partisan polarization, which suggests that the salience of the partisan social grouping is primary, and it is not caused by a prior ideological or issue-based difference.

The study of “affective” or “social” partisan polarization, may be relatively novel, but it ties into a canon of research that suggests partisanship is a long-term, psychological attachment (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). It also resonates with psychological research on attitude formation and group identification. Social identity theory has long posited a “minimal group paradigm,” where even the most insignificant and arbitrary of group categorizations can have a substantial effect on cognition and behavior (Brewer 1979; Tajfel et al. 1971). Socially-constructed group identification is a necessary part of human experience, as “an undifferentiated social environment makes very little sense and provides no guidelines for action,” (Tajfel et al. 1971, 153). Experimental research has also shown that subjects focus on the relative difference in resource between one’s ingroup and outgroup, even when alternatives that are to the absolute advantage of all are present (see Brown 2000 for a review).
“Minimal” groups, however, are not very relevant in real-world settings. Humans inhabit a dense, overlapping network of group categories (and potential group categories); a central insight from self-categorization theory (SCT), given this fact, is that only certain group categorizations will be salient at certain times. In defining SCT (which builds directly from SIT, and is often used interchangeably)\(^3\), Turner emphasizes that humans do not identify a “personal” self that is independent of group relations; instead, one’s self-concept is defined by an interrelated continuum of personal and group self-categorizations (1987, 43-4). One’s group categorization, as opposed to a personal categorization, becomes a salient self-categorization when the group category is easily accessible in one’s mind, and environmental stimuli fit well with the categorization (Ch. 6). How much the group category is valued or prioritized by the individual, as well as the perceived differences between the ingroup and outgroup, also help explain salience of group categories (Yzerbyt and Demoulin 2010, 1029). With their salient groups, though, individuals develop a host of behaviors, including engaging in “self-stereotyping” by changing attitudes and behavior (Terry and Hogg 1996), exaggerating ingroup similarity and outgroup difference (Brown 2000), and favoring the ingroup and bias toward the outgroup (Tajfel et al. 1971; Brown et al. 2001).

Iyengar et al. (2012) provide valuable insight into the social psychological nature of partisan polarization via SIT; it would be wrong, however, to suggest that ideological polarization is completely irrelevant or unrelated to this affective identity formation process. If affect is all that matters, it would be difficult to explain how individuals are increasingly sorting into the “correct” party ideologically (Levendusky 2009). It would

\(^3\)The key difference is that SIT focuses on the motivational drivers of in-group formation (in particular, building esteem), while SCT focuses on the cognitive processes of group categorization in a given intergroup setting (Huddy 2001). Both lines of theory predict similar behavioral outcomes, though.
also be difficult to explain how the public is increasingly knowledgeable about partisan differences in policy, and can place Democrats to the left of Republicans on a variety of issues (Hetherington 2001; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006).

Lodge and Taber, moreover, argue that humans are “motivated reasoners,” facing implicit pressure to bring their ideological worldview in line with their affective feelings of partisan support (2013; see also Kunda 1990). This pressure is evinced from studies demonstrating that citizens will change their views on specific policies solely based on their partisan attachment (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Carsey and Layman 2006). It is also suggested from SIT research that shows individuals engage in “self-stereotyping” activities concerning salient in-group norms (Branscombe et al. 2002; Mason 2015). However, this phenomenon is not universal, as the need for consistency between affect and ideology varies across personalities, across time, and across culture (Nisbett et al. 2001; Kitayama et al. 2004).

In short, with regards to partisanship, it is important to look at social identity and ideology, not one or the other. Figure 1.1 presents a proposed schematic for individual-level partisanship, which consists of two dimensions of one’s attachment to his or her party. On the x-axis is “ideological” partisanship, or how close one’s policy views are from the median individual in his or her inparty. The right side of the axis represents one who is ideologically similar from his or her inparty, the left side represents one who is ideologically dissimilar. On the y-axis is “partisan social identity,” or the level of group identity-based attachment one registers for his or her inparty. The top of the line represents a strong partisan social identity, and the bottom of the line represents party being a weak part of one’s identity.
While specific hypotheses drawing from social identity theory will be developed in Chapters Four through Six, the general argument for this project is that partisan identity salience is negatively related to deliberative attitudes and the key attitude of reciprocity in particular. This connects to the insight from SIT that, for salient group identities, one finds outgroup bias and exaggeration of difference from the ingroup (why engage in good faith discussion with someone who’s opinion you hold in low regard?). It also connects to recent research on partisan psychology that suggests that, far from open-mindedness, one’s partisanship conditions the quality and hue of information that he or she receives from their environment (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Ramsay et al. 2010), as well as how that information is processed and interpreted (Gaines et al. 2007; Lodge and Taber 2013). I expect separate effects for both partisan social identity and ideological partisanship. While I expect the strongest effect for the social dimension of partisanship, since “self-stereotyping” and adopting in-group norms is also an indicator of social
identity salience (Mackie 1986; Mason 2015), I expect one’s ideological partisanship to be a secondary contributor to a negative relationship to reciprocity.

1.5 PLAN FOR PROJECT

Chapter Two expands on the discussion of deliberative democratic theory, including the debate on its possibility and its normative desirability. It also offers a full conceptualization of reciprocity and its place in political discourse. It further delves deeper into the empirical literature on deliberation and addresses a key critique from Mutz (2008) that, even in ideal deliberative situations, rational decision making cannot result. Chapter Three discusses the methods used to assess the impact of partisan attachment on reciprocity. This includes a justification of the experimental approach primarily used, a description of all the data sources used and how the data were collected, and a discussion of the structure of the original survey instruments used as well as the operationalization of key concepts such as reciprocity, partisan social identity, and others.

Chapters Four through Six present the empirical results of this project. Chapter Four explores the impact of the social and ideological aspects of partisan identity on one’s willingness to engage in reciprocal political discussion with peers, as well as one’s desire to see reciprocity displayed in his or her elected representative. The experimental results show that those for whom partisan social identity salience is high are particularly likely to respond to party cues in determining whether to seek out reciprocity. This is true both in interpersonal political discussion and for considering whether to support representatives’ deliberative efforts. These results suggest that the deliberative capacity of the public is eroding with modern mass “social” polarization. Chapter Five explores how one’s political discussion network impacts the effect of social partisanship on
reciprocal attitudes. This chapter builds off the work of Mutz (2002; 2006), who broadly suggests that cross-cutting political discussion is beneficial for deliberative public attitudes but detrimental for public political engagement. The chapter will thus see how Mutz’s insights relate to the “social” and “ideological” dimensions of partisans. Chapter Six explores the relationship between reciprocity and one’s personality. The theoretical foundation for this chapter draws largely from Mondak (2010), and it will rely on a ten-question “Big Five” personality scale (Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003). In line with Mondak’s work, here both the direct effect of personality on reciprocal attitudes, as well as the indirect effect of personality mediated through “social” and “ideological” partisan identity, will be examined. Chapter Seven concludes, discussing the results in the context of the academic and popular debate on polarization as well as the theoretical and empirical research in deliberative democracy.
CHAPTER 2

RECIROCITY AND ITS ROLE IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE

“When citizens and accountable officials disagree, and also recognize that they are seeking deliberative agreement, they remain willing to argue with one another with the aim of achieving provisionally justifiable policies that they can recognize as such”

- Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, 1996

According to the New York Times’ David Brooks, American politics today nothing more than “good-versus-evil bloodsport” (2016a). Echoing sentiments widely shared across much of the pundit class, the conservative columnist feels that modern campaigns are marked by “single storyism,” where policy differences are viewed by others as having “false allegiances” and being “complicit in a system of oppression,” (2016b). In a similar vein, Frank Bruni argues that current political discourse is imbued “with a vulgarity that’s absolutely breathtaking,” including “surreal” and “sickening” ad hominin attacks and red herring references to genitalia size (2016a). For him, American politics is moreover in an “era of irresolution,” where electoral processes yield “cries of illegitimacy and a determination to neuter the victor,” not compromise or acceptance (2016b). What’s more, William Galston contends that the hallmark of politics is now “legislative gridlock and damage[d] trust and confidence in political institutions,” causing “observers question America's ability to govern itself as the times require,” (2014). These commentators give varying perspectives on the cause of these troubles, who or what should be blamed, and how to fix them. They all contend, though, that there is a
bellicosity, crudeness, and moral certitude in our political discourse that needs to be changed.

Changed to what, though? In contrast to the vitriolic rhetoric decried by Brooks, Bruni, and Galston, the “deliberative polls” developed by James Fishkin (1995; 2011) and colleagues offer an alternative, seeking to establish a more cooperative tone for collective political reasoning. Deliberative polls are multi-day forums, where randomly sampled participants engage in intensive discussion of a set of policy issues. Participants are given issue briefing materials and access to experts for questioning. Moderators are trained to facilitate “informed and balanced discussion” and “establish an atmosphere where participants listen to each other in a safe public space where no one is permitted to dominate the discussion” (Fishkin 2011, 26). The participants are polled both before and after the deliberative event; the poll results afterwards, Fishkin argues, reflect “the considered judgment of the public” (1995, 162). In the dozens of deliberative polls he has conducted, he consistently finds with participants significant opinion change, greater consensus, more knowledge of the issues at hand, and greater respect for different perspectives (2011).

Others have constructed similar deliberative forums, with similar discussion guidelines for participants. For example, in a 1998 deliberative forum entitled Americans Discuss Social Security, organizer Dr. Carolyn Lukensmeyer articulated that “every person’s voice is heard who’s in this room,” “everyone is listened to and respected,” and that participants should adopt a “spirit of open-heartedness and open-mindedness,” (Barabas 2004, 691, emphasis in original). For another example, in facilitation materials available from the National Issues Forums Institute (which supports community-led
deliberative forums across the country), moderators are told to instruct participants that “everyone is encouraged to participate” and “examine the pros, cons, and potential trade-offs of each approach,” and that “listening is an important as talking” (NIFI 2014).

Fishkin contends that the discursive guidelines give the results of deliberative forums “a recommending force,” as they “are the conclusions people would come to, were they better informed on the issues and had the opportunity and motivation to examine those issues seriously” (1995, 162).

These forum guidelines—inclusiveness, open-mindedness, full examination of an issue, etc.—all point broadly to the general concept of *reciprocity*. Reciprocity is a key discursive ideal in deliberative democratic theory, and reciprocity is the conceptual focus of this project. Thus, this chapter explores its form, potential, and potential limitations. After defining the term and situating its role in the expansive literature on deliberation, this chapter defends a “fuzzy” conceptualization of reciprocity, where debates on how permissive or strict it should be as a discursive standard need not be completely settled. From there, it defends the importance of reciprocal norms in particular for citizen discussion. The chapter then explores the theoretical and empirical literature pointing to the benefits of reciprocity in political discourse, as well as key theoretical and empirical-based critiques of the concept. The chapter closes by looking at one particular salient critique offered by Mutz (2008)—that ideally “reciprocal” discussion does not produce considered, higher-quality decision making, as proponents of deliberative democracy believe. Here, a discussion of social psychological literature on persuasion can give us more optimism for the potential of reciprocity than Mutz allows.
2.1 THE CONCEPT AND BOUNDARIES OF RECIPROCITY

As stated in the previous chapter, deliberative democracy is, at a minimum, about reason giving. In contrast to an “aggregate” view, where democratic decision making amounts to individualistic preferences summed through election procedures, deliberative theory prioritizes collective decision making through processes of claim making, discussion, and reflection. What’s more, when an empowered entity makes a decision, it requires justification given to those affected. The normative rationale here is that if Max Weber is correct that the state is a “monopoly of legitimate physical force” ([1919] 1946, 78), democracy requires some sort of rationale given towards the citizens whom presumably control and acquiesce to that force.

However, deliberative theorists argue that not just any reason giving or political discussion will do. “More political talk” is not normatively desirable when, for example, it is confined to like-minded enclaves, fueling sectarian division rather than consensus (Sunstein 2003). Neither is more talk beneficial if it reflects existing power dynamics and further marginalizes minority groups, or if the discourse is effectively ignored once governmental decisions are made. Instead, political discussion according to these theorists must be guided by a set of (at times conflicting) values. For example, a basic discursive prerequisite is the articulation of a diversity of viewpoints. Echoing J.S. Mill’s contention that intellectual diversity implies that “we have neglected nothing that could give the truth a chance of reaching us” ([1859] 1978, 20), Manin argues that a clash of conflicting claims helps citizens “to clarify information,” “sharpen their own preferences,” and perhaps even “modify their initial objectives, should that prove necessary” (1987, 351). Closely following the ideal of ideological diversity, Young
argues that political discourse should be as inclusive as possible. She contends that deliberative theorists should, in fact, relax stringent communicative standards to allow in debate forms such as “greeting,” “narrative” and “rhetoric” (2000, Ch. 2), in order to allow voice for individuals and groups that may be disadvantaged by a strict adherence to rational argumentation. Other theorists spell out the need for additional requirements, such as that the discussion has a consequential effect on decision making (Dryzek 2010, Ch. 1), or that decision making be open to further revision if conditions change (Gutmann and Thompson 2004).

In a seminal work, though, Gutmann and Thompson (1996) argue that the primary ideal to guide deliberation should be a norm of *reciprocity*. This basic moral concept broadly means that “we should return good for good, in proportion to what we receive,” (Becker 1986, 4). A complete operationalization for this project is given in Chapter Three, but broadly, Gutmann and Thompson apply it to the realm of democratic politics by stating that “when citizens deliberate, they seek out agreement on substantive moral principles that can be justified on the basis of mutually acceptable reasons,” (1996, 55; see Ch. 2 of same work for a full account). Recognizing the collective nature of democratic decision making, political reasoning is given in terms that those that disagree could, at least in theory, accept. A consensus is sought, but in recognizing the reality of often-intractable moral disagreement (particularly in contemporary American politics; see Jacoby 2014), reciprocity only requires the honest effort to forge moral agreement, and mutual respect for competing legitimate viewpoints when consensus fails. There is thus a balance in reciprocal discourse between pure self-interest and pure altruism. Unlike stricter formulations of ideal deliberation (Habermas 1983), Gutmann and Thompson’s
ideal does not bar personal morality or self-interest from political reason giving. However, it must be tempered by the requirement of mutual justification to, and mutual respect for, other citizens. Furthermore, reciprocity applies to empirical claims, allowing only those that can be mutually seen as acceptable based on “relatively reliable methods of inquiry” (56). While (as with decision-making broadly) there is not one single standard here, it does preclude empirical claims that cannot be verified or are strictly made on authority.

Beyond Gutmann and Thompson (1996), the idea of reciprocity can be found across the work of deliberative theorists. Its roots are in Habermas’s work on “communicative rationality,” where ideal discourse (shorn of power dynamics, exclusion, and strategic behavior) creates understanding and consensus based on the “unforced force of the better argument,” (1993, 163; see also Habermas 1983). The idea of mutual acceptability is also found in Rawls’ concept of “public reason” ([1993] 2005); for Rawls, political discussion should be confined to areas of “overlapping consensus,” where claims are offered with reasons that can be seen as justifiable to all 4. Dryzek, similarly, calls for “communicating in terms that those who do not share one’s point of view can find meaningful and accept,” which encourages “reflection upon preferences in noncoercive fashion” (2010, 10). Moreover, Mansbridge et al. state that “mutual respect and equal concern” are “central” to any formulation of deliberative theory (2010, 65-6). Like Gutmann and Thompson, they also contend that individual values and self-interest, constrained by principles of reciprocity, can play a role in the deliberative process.

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4 This similarity aside, deliberative democrats such as Gutmann and Thompson disagree with Rawls on the procedure for determining the content of “public reason.” As a “constitutionalist,” they contend, Rawls only has us figure out what qualifies as public reason through private reflection, while Gutmann and Thompson insist that “if we are to increase our chances of resolving moral disagreements, we must not check our deliberative dispositions at the door to the public forum,” (1996, 38).
In their work (1996), Gutmann and Thompson situate reciprocity between two other norms of political decision making—“impartiality” and “prudence.” With reciprocity, there is not one standard for political agreement; the content of consensus depends on the particular parties (and their vantage points) involved. With impartiality, however, decisions are made based on a single moral standard and apply universally. In other words, it implies that there is a “right answer,” and all we need to do is find it; anything short of this is a deliberative failure. Following an ideal of impartiality, thus, requires citizens to have pure altruism and prevents one from drawing on not just self-interest but also a personal moral worldview with political reason giving. On the other end of the spectrum, a discursive ideal of prudence acknowledges the reality of moral pluralism, but it forgoes any effort to explore these differences or forge a consensus on shared values. While reciprocity requires the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of moral disagreement, and a good faith consideration of countervailing views, prudence only asks for us to merely tolerate diverging opinion. Those we disagree with, in other words, are and remain wrong, and the only concessions given to them (beyond mere toleration) are through a strategic bargaining process.

Moving too closely to impartiality fails to acknowledge the legitimate differences in moral values citizens have. With regard to very divisive issues of the day (abortion, transgender rights, gun control, etc.), it thus asks us to either take a universalistic (and dogmatic) position, or to not deliberate these issues at all. Gutmann and Thompson do, though, acknowledge that there is a role for prudence and bargaining in the broad spectrum of real-world political discourse. When deliberation reveals a pre-existing value consensus, there is no need to bridge moral differences, and bargaining to resolve
disputes on details is appropriate. Moreover, when deliberation reveals irreconcilable moral claims, such as for very divisive issues, prudential bargaining is again necessary; to do nothing at that point would arbitrarily privilege the status quo (Warren and Mansbridge 2013; Gutmann and Thompson 2012). With differences too great to bridge, Gutmann and Thompson (1996) contend that decision makers should, while maintaining their moral convictions, seek “an economy of moral disagreement” through negotiation, and remain open-minded to the possibility for greater future consensus. Likewise, many deliberative scholars more recently have acknowledged the necessity of “deliberative negotiation” when reciprocal efforts at forging consensus fail (Mansbridge et al. 2010; Warren and Mansbridge 2013). They argue that deliberative consensus should always be the first option, but barring this voting or negotiation procedures are acceptable ways to resolve disagreement. These “non-deliberative” procedures, scholars now argue, can be seen as components of a deliberative framework if they are guided by the same principles—mutual respect, open-mindedness, limiting of power disparities, etc.—that guide reciprocal moral deliberation.

Indeed, the line between “deliberative” and “not deliberative” is fuzzy at best, drawn at different places by different scholars. As deliberative democracy is increasingly being used as a theoretical lens to examine real world communication (Ryfe 2005), many scholars have in turn stretched the concept of deliberation, incorporating seemingly non-ideal aspects of decision making such as fair bargaining (Warren and Mansbridge 2013), self-interest, power, and voting procedures (Mansbridge et al. 2010). Warren even argues that deliberative institutions should not focus on open-minded and good-faith argumentation—values fundamental to reciprocity. He instead claims that
“from the point of view of democratic institutions and systems, we should be more interested in outcomes of communication than communicative intent” (2007, 278, emphasis added). In contrast, as Bächtiger et al. (2010) point out, other scholars have remained truer to the strict standards of communicative rationality that earlier deliberative theorists posited. An example of this is the Discourse Quality Index, which is designed to compare legislative deliberation against a counterfactual of discursive ideals articulated by Habermas. Steenbergen et al. (2003) develop this measure and envision its use in both assessing how deliberative institutions could be improved as well as how deliberation affects policy outcomes.

Bächtiger et al. suggest that this “dual tendency to construe deliberation both too broadly and too narrowly can lead to serious confusion” (2010, 33). More cynically, some suggest that this makes deliberation a “moving target” and unproductive as a field of study (Mutz 2008, 527). As such, theorists will continue to develop and refine their normative standards. That being said, for much of the recent work on deliberative theory, completely clearing up this confusion is not necessary. Over the past couple of decades, deliberative democratic theory has “‘come of age' as a complete theory of democracy rather than a simple ideal of legitimacy” (Bohman 1998, 401). Scholars have increasingly moved beyond a focus on theoretical development, examining empirically how deliberation manifests in policy forums, governmental institutions, and communication between citizens (Dryzek 2010, Ch. 1)\(^5\). This line of research certainly must, as Bächtiger et al. insist, avoid the extremes of both over specification and under specification of deliberative standards. Deliberation cannot be simply “all talk.” At that

point it ceases to be an ideal and simply describes something that already exists; political communication happens every day. At this extreme, one fails to see how the benefits of deliberation theorists have articulated, vis a vis “everyday talk,” would materialize. At the other extreme, ideals of deliberation cannot be too overly specified, demanding standards of rationality, selflessness, and non-coercion that are impossible or nearly impossible to meet. Even as a critical ideal, it would be difficult to obtain empirical traction with a conceptual standard that demands, to quote James Madison in Federalist #51, that citizens become “angels.” It also runs the risk of excluding marginalized modes of communication and perspectives that fail to meet an “angelic” standard—perspectives that need to be included if deliberation is to maintain its democratic legitimacy (Young 2000).

In addition, as Thompson insists, “researchers must be clear about what practice they are investigating,” (2008, 501). It is acceptable (and even likely) to have differing empirical results for “looser” or “stricter” definitions of deliberation, as long as scholars acknowledge that their results apply to their conceptualization. Ideal deliberation is a nuanced idea, and differing conceptualizations of what it means can help produce a nuanced, collective picture of its role and potential for society. Overgeneralizations based on a single operationalization of deliberation (or even a single study) obfuscate this nuance. These caveats aside, while there is still plenty of room for theorists to refine deliberative standards, some diversity and “fuzziness” of deliberation as a working theory is perfectly acceptable for empirical inquiry.

More to the point of this project, the general standards of reciprocity outlined earlier, even if they remain “fuzzy” at the edges between “impartiality” and “prudence”,

33
also suffice. We can, for example, take the reciprocal ideal of “public reason”—the effort to offer claims that can be seen as legitimate by all reasonable citizens—seriously without an exact specification of which individuals or groups are “reasonable” or “unreasonable.” Likewise, we can have reciprocity demand tolerance towards diverse perspectives without stipulating specifically at what point a perspective ceases to be worthy of tolerance. This is particularly true with regard to studying deliberation in the public, the scope of this project. Given the fact that the American public often falls short of even loosely defined deliberative ideals (even the strongest supporters of deliberation would admit as such), reciprocity can remain a concept “fuzzy” at the edges while providing empirical traction for inquiry into what factors contribute or detract from its realization.

2.2 DELIBERATION AND THE PUBLIC

Often, scholarship on deliberation focuses on discursive norms for small scale, formal political institutions. A reason for that is, for deliberative democracy to matter, it cannot be just “idle talk;” it has to be, as Dryzek argues, “consequential” in government decision making. Many empirical studies on deliberation thus either examine decision making practices of legislative bodies (Bächtiger et al. 2007) or specific empowered public bodies such as juries (Schkade, Sunstein, and Kahneman 1999) and advisory boards (Warren and Gstyl 2015). This being said, most scholars correctly argue that deliberative democracy is an idea that applies to elites and citizens alike. Dryzek (2010), for example, argues that a key part of a deliberative system is a vibrant, inclusive “public space, ideally hosting free-ranging and wide ranging communication,” which plays a consequential role in influencing the “empowered space” of policymaking (2010, 11).
The “public space” consists of all manner of formal and information political participation, including policy forums, traditional and social media, and face to face political talk. If it is unfeasible for the public writ large to deliberate directly in policymaking decisions, engaged “public space” political discussion can nonetheless work to ensure that all legitimate perspectives are represented in policymaking processes (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008). In a similar vein, Mansbridge and colleagues (2012) take a “systematic” approach, seeking to reconcile ideals of collective deliberative discourse with the reality of large-scale, representative democracy. A “deliberative system” is comprised of many points of political communication—legislative bodies, media, campaigns, and interpersonal public political talk are all included. For them, the point is less to measure each component against a uniform set of discussion ideals, but to assess the quality and inclusiveness of discourse and decision making for the system as a whole. Even seemingly non-deliberative discourse can contribute to the overall health of the system. For example, partisan media, they argue, can facilitate deliberation in other venues, as this media can clarify policy differences and facilitate engagement in the political process.

In addition, normative calls for reciprocity have a place in guiding public, not just elite, rhetoric. “Everyday talk,” certainly, is different from deliberation in governing bodies; while the latter is focused on a binding consensus and decision making implemented with the force of law, public discussion leads to “decision making” that is collective but not consensual, and it influences government action only indirectly (Mansbridge 1999). Thus, it is unrealistic to expect the same standards of public reason, open-mindedness, and noncoercion in the public as with the legislature. That being said,
the difference between ideals of reciprocity in these two domains is “not in kind but only in degree” (Mansbridge 1999, 228), and the “fuzzy” standards for reciprocity outlined above have a place guiding citizen political talk in a deliberative democracy. This is because, for one, the public and the political elite inhabit the same social and cultural context, and widespread open-mindedness or intransigence in public political culture can impact future elites’ attitudes towards dialogue and decision making. The “rhetorical cue” elites can take from the public is further enhanced by the formal dependence of elites on the public’s support via the electoral connection (Mayhew 2004 [1974]) as well as the demonstrated responsiveness of elites to public opinion (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002). If representatives engage in pork barrel spending or adopt policy positions to demonstrate responsiveness to their constituents (Mayhew 2004 [1974]), it is reasonable to suspect they adopt their constituents’ preferred rhetorical style or attitude toward ideological difference as well.

Further, despite presumptions to the contrary, the public does engage in political discussion more than commonly presumed (Cook, Delli Carpini, and Jacobs 2007). If deliberative discussion norms can lead, as theorists posit, to better informed, higher quality opinions and decisions for elite policymakers, they can certainly do so for the majority of the public that engages in political talk. Public opinion can then encourage elites to produce better informed, higher quality policymaking. Given the literature’s dismal portrayal of the average American’s political reasoning ability (Converse 1964; Achen and Bartels 2016), and the often ad-hoc nature of the policymaking process (Kingdon 2011), this is no small benefit. Finally, as a critical ideal, a deliberative democracy that takes both the word “deliberative” and the word “democracy” seriously
requires widespread, and reciprocal, public political participation. While there is a clear tension between fostering both engaged participation and ideal standards of deliberation (Mutz 2006), it is up to deliberative theorists and empirical researchers to explore how institutional reform and changing cultural context can help move us closer to this ideal.

2.3 BENEFITS, AND CRITIQUE, OF DELIBERATION

The “deliberative turn” in political theory and empirical political science is driven by a strong belief in the benefits it can bring to a polity. For one, theorists argue that deliberative decision making has greater normative legitimacy than decisions made by fiat (Benhabib 1996). Policies that are collectively made by, and accountable to, the governed through discussion and justification are inherently more “democratic” that policies made by fiat through empowered leaders or representatives (even if they are elected). Citizens also perceive a greater legitimacy in the decisions when they are “treated not merely as objects of legislation…but as autonomous agents who take part in the governance of their own society” (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 3). This is particularly valuable in heterogeneous societies like the United States, where scarcity of resources, reasonable moral pluralism, and the necessity of collective action make political disagreement inevitable. Deliberation can reveal lines of consensus across individuals’ moral values, and clarify differences as well as create “an economy of disagreement” when consensus is not possible (Gutmann and Thompson 1996). Through the consideration of a diversity of perspectives, moreover, decisions made are in an important sense “better” because they incorporate more information and follow the most meritorious arguments (Gastil 2000, 23-5). Theorists also argue that citizens engage in learning with this deliberative process and become more knowledgeable and civic
oriented (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, Ch. 8). They moreover contend that citizens
become tolerant and empathetic (Mendelberg 2002).

Some of the claims made above are purely deductive and not amenable to
empirical testing. The empirical evidence assessing the other contentions is, to be sure,
mixed and context dependent (Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs 2004; Mendelberg 2002).
Some studies show that deliberation can at times, instead of producing consensus,
exacerbate disagreement (Mendelberg and Oleske 2000), produce attitude polarization
(Jackman and Sniderman 2006), or encourage attendance to group norms rather than
argument strength (Mendelberg and Karpowitz 2007). However, there is enough
research to suggest that, at least at times, citizen deliberation can produce salutary
outcomes. For example, a key testable claim from theorists is a tendency towards (but
not necessarily requirement of) consensus. Fishkin’s numerous deliberative polls attest to
the viability of this empirical implication (Fishkin 1995; 2011), as he finds that
participants often reach greater consensus, as well as have a significant change in their
opinion, as a result of deliberation. Critically, these deliberative polls also find that
citizens are more knowledgeable about the issue at hand as a result of deliberation; this is
a finding echoed by a similarly constructed deliberative forum set up by Barabas (2004).
In Barabas’ research, participant consensus is accompanied by significant learning, in a
way that ordinary discussion is not. As a result, he contends that deliberation produces
“enlightened consensus,” not merely groupthink or group polarization. Moreover,
barring complete consensus or erstwhile substantive agreement, List et al. (2012) show
that discussion through deliberative procedures can help overcome social choice
dilemmas that can hamper voting-based decision making (see Arrow 1951). Through a
meta-analysis of polling from nine deliberative forums, they find that deliberation increases the “proximity to single-peakedness” on the preference ordering of issue alternatives, particularly for forum participants engaging in the most amount of learning. Other examples of benefits found through empirical research on deliberation include greater political efficacy (Nabatchi 2010), increased tolerance (Mutz 2006), and resistance to manipulation from elite framing (Druckman and Nelson 2003).

This all being said, there have been a number of critiques, both normative and empirical, leveled against deliberative democracy and its call for reciprocal standards of discourse. Broadly, the main normative critique is that deliberative ideals ignore the role power plays in political life, and how power and hierarchy can disrupt efforts at non-coercive decision making. The roots of this critique are in the work of Foucault, who insisted that the omnipresence of power can be obfuscated by seemingly benign or objective language and social norms. For him, “power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of non-equalitarian and mobile relations,” (1978, 94). In the context of political decision making, then, this point suggests that standards such as “rationality” or “mutual respect” are more effective at squelching dissent than fostering legitimate, inclusive consensus. This suppression, critics have asserted, happens on both the left and the right. For instance, many argue that deliberative democracy disadvantages already marginalized groups that lack the resources to access deliberative decision making institutions, or the tools and training to effectively (“rationally”) participate in these institutions (Sanders 1997; Young 2000). It thus preserves a conservative status quo. Others, in turn, assert that requirements of
reciprocity and mutual respect disadvantage religious claims (or any other claims not amenable to reflection and revision) in deliberation, thus privileging a liberal, secular status quo (Fish 1999).

Deliberative theorists themselves even acknowledge that power is unavoidable; Mansbridge et al. point out that politics without coercion “is not only impossible to achieve but even hard to envision. We are all the products of power relations and exercise power by our very presence in the world” (2010, 82). These authors suggest that some use of power-based decision mechanisms, such as voting or bargaining, can be compatible within a deliberative system that seeks to minimize the influence of power. Others, however, argue that, as long as there is any significance difference in opinion, power and self-interest are going to overshadow any efforts at forging moral consensus (Shapiro 1999). The necessity, and theoretical challenge, of power and coercion in deliberative democracy is magnified when one moves from small-scale settings, like forums or town meetings, to a large-scale “deliberative system” conceptualization offered by Mansbridge and colleagues (2012). Here, “non-deliberative” institutional features such as representation, voting, and bureaucratic implementation necessarily take a larger role. Indeed, some as a result argue that deliberation can only work successfully in small, homogenous community settings (Bryan 2004).

Empirical social scientists have critiqued the “deliberative turn” in political science as well, arguing that the ideal of deliberative democracy is too unrealistic as to be useful. Certainly, as a critical ideal, it is acceptable to set deliberative standards that are attainable but not often met in reality. If those standards are flatly impossible to achieve in real political settings, however, the relevance of deliberative theory can be called into
question. This is what many scholars contend, pointing to the public’s lack of the 
requisite knowledge or well developed political preferences necessary for productive 
deliberation (Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Achen and Bartels 2016). 
Indeed, lampooning the lack of knowledge of the public is a cottage industry for public 
opinion scholars and late night comedians alike. Even beyond this, Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse (2002) point to survey and focus group evidence suggesting that the public has a 
basic lack of interest in participating in deliberative decision making processes. Their 
findings suggest that the U.S. public is uninterested in policy outcomes and averse to 
political conflict; instead, it would prefer “a stealth democratic arrangement” led by 
“neutral decision makers who do not require sustained input from the people” (7). 
Summing up this line of critique, Achen and Bartels (2016) suggest of deliberation that 
“most ordinary citizens do not want politics to be more like a philosophy seminar,” (302, 
emphasis in original).

M potentially damning to deliberative theory, though, is the assertion that even if 
a Habermasian “ideal speech situation” is achieved, the benefits many theorists purport 
would not materialize. Mutz, for example, makes the point that persuasive 
communication hinges on “characteristics of the listener or message recipient, the 
speaker, the message itself, and the context in which the deliberation occurs. Notably, 
only one of these sources of influence (the message) should matter in a theory where ‘the 
force of the better argument’ is assumed to carry the day,” (2008, 533). She then 
catalogues a host of cognitive biases that can carry a discussant away from consensus 
based on “the message itself” and towards influences of the listener, the speaker, or 
context characteristics. She draws from an extensive literature in social and political
psychology on selective exposure (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Levendusky 2013), biased interpretation of objective information (Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; Gaines et al. 2007), the primacy of affect in cognition and attitude formation (Zajonc 1984; Lodge and Taber 2013), among other biases. In an earlier work (2006), she also suggests that achieving a more deliberative discourse may come at the cost of encouraging public political participation. Drawing on a pair of national surveys, she demonstrates that, while exposure to disagreement through one’s social network (a requisite for deliberative discourse) fosters greater tolerance, it also depresses the likelihood of voting as well as participating in other political activities. Based on this and the other disconfirming previous evidence she reviews, Mutz concludes that deliberative democracy does not meet the standards for “productive social theory,” (2008, 535).

2.4 RECIPROCITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF PERSUASION

In sum, both theorists and empiricists have offered strong arguments against both the viability and desirability of political discourse guided by ideals of deliberation. A full discussion of these authors’ critiques is beyond the scope of this chapter. Although more in the way of normative assessment is offered in the conclusion, the goal of this project is to analyze how partisan polarization impacts the public’s willingness to embrace the deliberative ideal of reciprocity, not to assess the ideal as such. That being said, Mutz’s (2008) critique is particularly urgent, as it calls into question the value of any research on deliberative democracy. It also reflects a decades-old cynicism of citizen reasoning that guides most public opinion inquiry. However, as I will discuss below, social psychology research on persuasion can provide some optimism that deliberative democracy may be “productive social theory.”
While consensus is not required from the ideal deliberative setting advanced here or by theories from most “post-Habermasian” deliberative theorists (Bächtiger et al. 2010), and ideal deliberation has a host of purported benefits beyond opinion change or greater likelihood of consensus, Mutz is correct that, as a critical ideal for deliberation, the standard of reciprocity must open up the possibility of consensus. She is also correct in pointing to the difficulty in fostering rational, persuasive consensus, given what we know about the irrational biases that can influence attitude formation. Drawing from concepts in social psychology literature, she is questioning whether deliberation can allow discussants to overcome prejudice and induce potential (non-coercive) persuasion. The formidable power of group prejudice has been long documented (Allport 1954; Sherif 1966), and strong prejudices can be fostered in even arbitrary or “minimal” group pairings (Tajfel et al. 1971). Prejudice can also often work at an unconscious, implicit level (Nosek et al. 2007), and the research on automaticity suggests it is very difficult, if not impossible, to control an implicit prejudice once it is activated (Bargh 1999).

This all being said, dual processing theories such as the elaboration likelihood model (ELM) suggest that, in certain contexts, the effortful thinking encouraged by deliberative settings can overcome these prejudices (see Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Petty and Brinol 2008). The ELM conceptualizes processing of arguments as simultaneously occurring along two cognitive routes—the “peripheral” route and the “central” route. When one’s ability to process an argument is low (i.e.—one is distracted or has a time constraint) or one’s motivation to engage in contemplation is low (i.e.—the issue is not important, or one is not vested in an accurate conclusion), the periphery route dominates, and individuals primarily use cues such as group prejudice, groupthink, overall source
credibility, or personal mood to form an opinion. When motivation or ability to process an argument is high (for example, if one is vested in “the right answer”), the central route dominates, and one will reflect carefully on the argument at hand\(^6\). When one is engaged in central route processing, one is more likely to respond to the message strength of an argument, moving her opinion towards a relatively strong claim (Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman 1981)\(^7\). Moreover, when persuasive opinion change occurs primarily through central route processing, the opinion change is longer lasting and more resistant to subsequent counterarguments (Petty, Haugtvedt, and Smith 1995).

The motivation and ability to engage in central route processing can vary based on a number of situational factors, many of which ideal deliberation, and reciprocity in particular, seek to promote. For example, research shows that decision makers are more likely to engage in accuracy-motivated reasoning, as opposed to peripheral or “confirmatory” reasoning, when they will held accountable to others who are interested in accuracy (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). Many deliberative institutions actively foster this sort of accountability that is sufficient for accuracy-focused, “central route” reasoning; one such institution is Oregon’s Citizen Initiative Review (CIR). The CIR convenes a random sample of state citizens to, over the course of five days, deliberate over and offer an advisory statement on ballot initiatives subsequently given to voters. CIR statements are mailed to all registered voters in advance of the election; opinion polling of residents

\(^6\) This does mean that only the message matters; speaker or context variables still influence the persuasiveness of a message, but these factors are processed as arguments themselves, not as valence cues. For example, if a professor is arguing for a policy change, a listener engaging in “central route” processing would consider the relevance of the professor’s credentials to the claim being made, while a listener engaging in “peripheral route” processing would rely on the cue of a positive or negative valence towards professors or intellectuals.

\(^7\) Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus (2013) provide evidence of this in a political setting, showing partisans responding primarily to the strength of a policy-related argument in the absence of partisan cues, and primarily to partisan cues when they are present.
shows that the CIR statements both increase the knowledge of and influence the opinions of voters on the initiatives (Warren and Gastil 2015, 569-571). By requiring a binding statement that can influence the outcome of ballot initiatives, participants in CIR deliberations are encouraged to engage in learning and accuracy-motivated thought. In fact, in an assessment of the CIR efforts to meet ideal standards of deliberation, participants uniformly reported having “enough information” to make an informed decision and did “an excellent job of weighing the pros and cons of the measure [at hand]” (Knobloch et al. 2013, 114-5). What’s more, panelists exhibited mutual consideration and respect towards opposing views, and many experience a (non-coercive) change in opinion due to the process (Knobloch et al. 2013). In sum, by engaging in “consequential” deliberation, CIR participants rely on exploratory thought and central route information processing, as opposed to relying on cognitive biases, to reach a collaborative decision.

Research on perspective taking also suggests that the ideal of reciprocity can overcome prejudice and encourage long-lasting persuasion through Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) “central route” argument processing. Reciprocal listening and reason-giving demands “the active consideration of alternate viewpoints, framings, hypotheses, and perspectives” (Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000, 708). Studies have found that this sort of active perspective taking encourages seeing commonalities between one’s self and the cognitive target (Davis et al. 1996) and discourages stereotyping biases towards both outgroup and ingroup members (Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000). Moreover, a recent field experiment by Broockman and Kalla (2016) shows that even a short exercise in perspective taking can create a long-term reduction in prejudice towards outgroups (in
their case, the transgender community). In their study based in Miami, canvassers representing LGBT rights groups went door-to-door to inform voters about a recent, local anti-discrimination ordinance and efforts to repeal the ordinance through a ballot referendum. After informing the voter about the ordinance and playing a video giving pro/con perspectives, the canvasser:

“asked each voter to talk about a time when they themselves were judged negatively for being different. The canvassers then encouraged voters to see how their own experience offered a window into transgender people’s experiences, hoping to facilitate voters’ ability to take transgender people’s perspectives. The intervention ended with another attempt to encourage active processing by asking voters to describe if and how the exercise changed their mind” (221).

While this is framed as a “perspective-taking” intervention, here one finds a clear connection to the deliberative ideal of reciprocity. The canvasser is asking the voter to connect their own experience to the experience of transgender individuals, and by doing so is asking the voter to move beyond a self-interested take on the anti-discrimination ordinance. It encourages the voter to consider what would be viewed as legitimate by the transgender community, even if her gender identity or values differ from that community. The canvasser is, in other words, attempting to establish moral common ground between the voter and the transgender community, or, failing common ground, the canvasser is encouraging mutual respect across moral difference. And it works; the results show that those exposed to canvassing had substantially more positive attitudes towards transgender individuals and more support for the non-discrimination ordinance than a control group even three months after the intervention. This effect is consistent for both Republican
and Democrat identifying subjects, and it holds up even after a subset of the treatment group was shown a television ad attacking the ordinance. The authors theorize that, for the voters canvassed, reciprocal perspective taking helped to produce the active, “central route” claim consideration that Petty and colleagues show leads to long-lasting, resistant attitude change.

2.5 CONCLUSION

Thus, while Mutz (2008) is correct in pointing to the cognitive biases that impede deliberation-driven consensus, she is wrong to argue that deliberative democracy is not “productive social theory.” While the benefits the theory claims do fly in the face of much previous evidence on attitude formation, other evidence supporting the elaboration likelihood model of cognition suggests that, with the ability and motivation to do so, individuals can overcome prejudices and other heuristic biases and experience lasting opinion change through effortful, “central route” thinking. While context and arguer characteristics still matter, the strength of a claim plays a more prominent role in central route processing. And, indeed, a reliance on “central route” thinking seems to be what the “ideal speech situation” is trying to create. As the Broockman and Kalla (2016) study demonstrates, incorporating aspects of reciprocity into even a short political discussion mitigates the biases potentially produced by listener, the speaker, or context—biases Mutz characterizes as inevitable—and produces lasting persuasion in opinion towards a maligned outgroup. Certainly, cognitive biases are not easily washed away, and even in

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8 Broockman and Kalla, though, are careful to note that their field experiment cannot fully establish which cognitive mechanisms are at work; subsequent research will be needed to completely support the mechanism of the change they theorize is at work.
the most ideal setting they may still appear\textsuperscript{9}. However, research on persuasion suggests that deliberative settings can give “the message” a fighting chance.

Deliberative settings, however, do not come automatically. This can be seen by comparing the findings of Broockman and Kalla (2016) with the generally dour description of group prejudice and motivated reasoning that comes from most public opinion research; it can also be seen by comparing Fishkin’s deliberative polls to what David Brooks calls the “good vs. evil bloodsport” of modern politics (2016a). If there are benefits to be had, reaping them requires a structural, cultural, and political context amenable to deliberation. However, research on the conditions that contribute or hinder public deliberation, while it would create a “clearer sense of its place in democratic theory and practice,” is underdeveloped (Thompson 2008, 500). For example, how does the recent rise of partisan polarization impacts the public’s propensity to adopt deliberative attitudes toward discussion, such as an orientation toward reciprocity? After a discussion of methods used, this is where the project now turns.

\textsuperscript{9} In fact, Broockman and Kalla’s research shows that, unlike with transgender issues, perspective taking does not lead to persuasion on the issue of abortion. More research needs to be done, but they postulate that this may be because abortion has been a salient social issue for decades, and opinions may be more crystallized (Glass 2016). Using the framework of Gutmann and Thompson, abortion then may be an issue where moral disagreement is too strong, and prudential bargaining may be more appropriate.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

This chapter outlines the data sources and methodological approach of this project. It also provides a detailed description of the survey instruments and experimental manipulations employed, as well as a discussion of the analytical approach that will be used. Subsequent empirical chapters will reference the information in this chapter. Overall, through the use of an online survey experiment, a telephone survey experiment of a representative state-based sample, and observational survey data from representative national surveys, the project maximizes both the internal validity and the external validity of the results.

3.1 OVERALL APPROACH

The primary means by which this project assesses the impact of the ideological and social identity components of partisanship on deliberation is through a series of survey experiments. After a pilot test, the first is an online experiment of 1,619 respondents conducted during the summer of 2015. The online survey was developed and administered through Qualtrics web-based survey software, and respondents were recruited through Amazon’s mTurk human intelligence task service. Each recruited respondent was paid $0.90 to complete the survey. While this portion was conducted for a relatively inexpensive cost, there is strong debate as to whether mTurk experiments are externally valid (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011; Krupnikov and Levine 2014). Thus, the second experiment was conducted with
representative telephone sample (802 respondents) of the South Carolina population in the fall of 2015, partnering with the University of South Carolina’s Institute for Public Service and Policy Research. Marrying experimental techniques with a representative sample addresses simultaneously both concerns of internal and external validity (Mutz 2011); as such, replicating results in this way attests to their reliability.

The first experiment is a framing experiment. Here, the relevant considerations the respondent receives are manipulated, then the respondent answers a series of questions on political attitudes. Issue or emphasis framing effects experiments like this have been well developed in studies on partisanship and political communication, notably by Druckman (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Druckman 2001; Druckman and Nelson 2003). There is a long lineage of political communication research on framing; a typical example is framing a question on whether a hate group has the right to conduct a rally as a “free speech” versus a “public safety” issue, and measuring the difference in aggregate opinion (Chong and Druckman 2007, 105-6). According to Chong and Druckman (2007, 115), emphasis framing is conceptually similar to priming in social psychology literature (eg. Miller and Krosnick 1996; Bargh, Chen, and Burrows 1996), where what occurs is “a procedure that increases the accessibility of some category or construct in memory,” (Sherman, Mackie, and Driscoll 1990, 405). Here, I am suggesting that, for Democrat or Republican respondents, manipulating partisanship as a consideration one receives (or does not receive) in a frame will affect the salience of partisanship to them as a social identity. This in turn (per social identity theory) will have a negative effect on reciprocal attitudes.
The second set of experiments are interpersonal vignette experiments (see Mutz 2011, Ch. 4). The first two vignettes ask the respondent about a political issue, and then introduce a counterargument to the respondent’s position on the issue. This approach draws from Jackman and Sniderman (2006); the key manipulation, though, is that the counterargument is attributed to either a Democrat, a Republican, or a person without a party identifier (the respondent will randomly be assigned one of these three groups). Respondents are then asked a series of questions to see how they responded to the argument; the hypothesis is that partisans are more likely to respond deliberatively to an inparty counterargument, and less likely to respond deliberatively to an outparty counterargument. The final experiment is a representative vignette; a question that gauges the respondents’ support for candidates that exhibit deliberative behaviors. It presents a scenario which manipulates whether an inparty candidate (either a Democratic or Republican) “worked across the aisle” to pass legislation, or simply “worked” to pass legislation. I expect partisans to be less likely to support inparty candidates that work across the aisle, and more likely to support candidates that work in opposition to the opposing party. Text for all three sets of experiments can be found in the Appendix.

The results of these three survey experiments—the framing experiment, the interpersonal vignettes, and the representative vignette—are compared to over-time observational data from the American National Election Study (ANES). Conducted periodically since 1948, these face-to-face interviews of a representative national population have been a gold standard for public opinion and voting behavior research for decades. The ANES contains multiple measures for partisanship, political discussion, as well as other variables of interest such as efficacy and personality. Supplementing
experimental results with analysis of this data will thus speak to the robustness of the findings. Also, as discussed in the sections below, many of the items incorporated in the online and telephone survey experiments have been asked by the ANES over multiple years. As such, using over time ANES data allows me to speak to how the effects found in the experiments have manifested over time, as partisan polarization and ideological sorting/polarization has waxed and waned in the electorate. The project thus makes a valuable contribution to the debate on mass polarization.

3.2 ON THE CONCEPTS OF RECIPROCITY AND PARTISANSHIP

A pivotal task is to construct valid measures for the key concepts used in the project, the foremost being *reciprocity*. While empirical work in deliberative democracy has been impeded by a failure to agree on what makes a discursive act “deliberative,” nearly all scholars insist on a basic level of reciprocity (as it is defined here). Adcock and Collier’s methodological insights can help in fleshing out this concept. In their seminal paper (2001), they contend that, while the field of political science has advanced tremendously with regard to research sophistication and attention to causal inference, inadequate attention has been paid to the foundational issue of measurement validity, or “whether operationalization and the scoring of cases adequately reflect the concept the researcher seeks to measure” (529). Obtaining measurement validity for any concept requires developing a “systemized concept” that reflects on shared understandings of the concept, developing indicators that consistently and in an unbiased manner measure the systemized concept, and developing an accurate (qualitative or quantitative) scoring system for the indicators chosen. Inaccuracies in the connection between systemized
concepts and indicators, or indicators and scores, result in systematic measurement error (bias) or random measurement error.

The “systemized concept” of reciprocity used here is, in short, a willingness to engage in good faith argumentation with those that morally disagree. This is a minimal standard that most deliberative theorists, even those with weaker requirements for discussion (Bächtiger et al. 2010), can agree. Drawing from the work of Gutmann and Thompson (1996; 2004), Thompson (2008), Dryzeck (2010), Bächtiger et al. (2010), and others, the core components of the concept of reciprocity used here include:

- Tolerance of viewpoints one disagrees with (as a necessary, but not sufficient, aspect of reciprocity)
- Acknowledgment of the legitimacy of other viewpoints
- A willingness to consider, in good faith, countervailing arguments
- Giving reasons/justification in political debate that all, even those that disagree, can see as legitimate
- Having the goal of consensus (while maintaining one’s moral convictions; in other words, no ‘compromise for compromise’s sake)

The concept of citizen reciprocity consists of two dimensions; first, citizens can debate issues or receive arguments in everyday life in a reciprocal way. Second, they can vote or support candidates that are committed to working towards consensus or willing to change their mind through discussion. Given the necessity of representation in modern democracy, as well as the emphasis on producing “consequential” (Dryzeck 2010) or “binding” decisions in deliberation, it is important to consider the extent citizens seek out deliberative qualities in their political leaders, as well as with everyday talk.
The “systemized concepts” of partisan identity—ideological partisanship and partisan social identity—draw on recent literature in partisan social psychology and “affective” or “social” partisan polarization (Huddy, Mason, and AarøE 2015; Mason 2015; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). While previous studies have debated the extent to which partisanship is an instrumental or a psychological construct, this recent research rightly contends that an either/or approach is incomplete, and it conceptualizes and measures the effects of both aspects of party identification. Ideological partisanship is the extent to which an individual adopts an overall political ideology that consistently and strongly adheres to either the Democratic or the Republican party platform. One is, for example, a “strong” Democrat with regard to ideological partisanship if he or she consistently expresses strongly liberal opinions on the issues.

Partisan social identity, on the other hand, is the extent to which one thinks of his or her party as a key part of “who they are,” as well as the extent that affinity with one’s party (and against the other party) is a primary group affiliation. According to Mason, partisan social identity:

“means that a partisan behaves more like a sports fan than like a banker choosing an investment. Partisans feel emotionally connected to the welfare of the party; they prefer to spend time with other members of the party; and when the party is threatened, they become angry and work to help conquer the threat, even if they disagree with some of the issue positions taken by the party. The connection between partisan and party is an emotional and social one, as well as a logical one” (2015, 129).
While this construct may be a relatively new one in the literature, it connects to the description in *The American Voter* of partisanship as primarily a psychological attachment (Campbell et al. 1960; see also Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). It also connects to a long line of political psychology work on the role of partisanship in information processing and opinion formation (e.g., Lodge and Hamil 1986; Lodge and Taber 2013; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Gaines et al. 2007; Rahn 1993).

### 3.3 ON OPERATIONALIZING RECIPROCITY AND PARTISANSHIP

In assessing the validity of the link between systemized concepts and indicators/scores, Adcock and Collier (2001, 538-543) propose three criteria. First is “content validation,” or the extent that measures used gather the “full content” of the systemized concept. Second is “convergent/discriminant validation,” or the extent which measures predicted to be correlated converge on the same result, and measures expected to be divergent diverge. Finally, there is “nomological/construct validation,” or the extent to which the measures confirm well-supported hypotheses about the systemized concepts. This latter validation can only be assessed at the end of this project (and is only appropriate with hypotheses that have a strong prior backing). “Content” and “convergent/discriminant” validation, though, were closely considered in choosing measures for the concepts of reciprocity and partisanship in this project.

With regard to reciprocity, the basic strategy is to employ multiple measures that tap into aspects of the concept in different ways. With the *framing experiment*, some of these measures include multiple choice questions that gauge general attitudes towards open-mindedness and the value of discussion. In addition, a series of “forced choice” questions were also included, in an effort to mitigate any social desirability bias that
comes from wanting to be “open-minded” or “deliberative” (who doesn’t want to be like that?). Another series of questions measure political tolerance, a necessary condition for reciprocity, with a measure developed by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982).

With the interpersonal vignettes, the surveys measure how the respondents perceive a counterargument to opinions they hold with regard to immigration and civil liberties. Questions will measure whether the respondent feels that the counterargument is reasonable and/or worth considering, as well as if the respondent’s opinion moves towards the counterargument position (or, in other words, towards consensus). These measures, it is fair to acknowledge, do not capture completely the concept of reciprocity; they are focused on how individuals receive and respond to political argument, while much of the deliberative democracy literature focuses on the reason-giving process of argument. This focus is due to a decision to maximize internal validity, creating clean, close-ended survey questions and an ability to employ clear, quantitative experimental analysis. That being said, the vignettes across two policy domains, tapping into different facets of the process of receiving and processing political argument, can make for a strong case for “content validation” and “convergent validation.” Finally, with the representative vignette, the survey goes beyond the “everyday talk” of the interpersonal vignettes and measures attitudes toward reciprocity in elite policymaking.

With regard to both ideological partisanship and partisan social identity, multiple different, yet related measures were also employed in an effort to maximize content

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10 Whereas adding measures of the reason-giving aspect of reciprocity would be very complicated, requiring open-ended questions asking respondents why they hold the opinions they do, or creating a discussion situation and measuring the reasoning respondents provide in argumentation. While this may be possible, and it would certainly be an interesting avenue for future research, given concerns of the subjectivity of argument coding, concerns of social desirability bias in responses, and the fact that other methods besides a survey experiment are likely better to measure the reason-giving process, the decision was made with this project to focus primarily on the reason-receiving aspects of reciprocity.
validation. First, for *ideological partisanship*, one way this is measured is through the respondents’ ideological self-identification. Another way is through a series of 11 questions, used to create an ideological index score. Six of these 11 items are items that have been asked every year in the American National Election Study Times Series study since 1982. As such, using these questions will allow for the comparison of changes in ideological partisanship over time with how, in the experiments, ideological partisanship impacts deliberation. There is also precedent for using these six items to construct indices of respondent ideology (Mason 2015; Abramowitz 2010; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). Moreover, using issue questions to assess ideological extremity, in addition to an ideological self-identification question, is advantageous because, often, individuals are attracted to ideological labels for their symbolism rather than their value as opinion summaries or constraints (Ellis and Stimson 2012). The five additional questions beyond these six were added based on the 2012 ANES survey data. Principal component factor analysis was conducted on every pre-election survey item in that survey that asked a question concerning policy. The questions that loaded highly on the first factor (which loaded primarily on economic and scope of government questions) and the second factor (which loaded on gay rights and abortion questions) were included.

Following a technique employed by Carsey and Layman (2002) as well as Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012), the 11 policy items were then used to create ideological partisanship scores for each respondent using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). This measure assesses respondents' commitment to their party's ideological platform. For Republicans, a higher score indicates a more conservative ideology, and for
liberals, a higher score indicates a more liberal ideology. More information on index construction and CFA results can be found in the Appendix.

Beyond the standard, ANES measure of party identification, partisan social identity is measured in a number of ways. For instance, the Online Survey has a series of three questions that come from a 1999 Roper Starch National Survey conducted by Green and colleagues (see Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002, 37-8). These questions assess directly how much the respondent sees his/her in-party as part of their identity, or “who they are.” As in the Roper Starch survey, these three questions will be used to create an index of partisan social identity. The telephone survey will use a different, yet similar series of four questions to assess feelings on partisan identity developed by Huddy, Mason, and AarøE (2015). By using two different measures in the Online and Telephone Survey, content validation is maximized, as the project can assess whether results hold up across survey mediums as well as across operationalizations of partisan social identity

In addition to these social identity indices, there are a series of questions in the Online Survey that measure the felt emotion toward the Democratic and Republican parties. These are almost directly based on the “candidate affect” questions that are found in the ANES. This is useful as a second operationalization, as emotion (particularly, outgroup anger) is a signifier of group identity salience (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000). Moreover, as these questions are also asked in the ANES, these questions can be used to compare the experimental results here with the observational ANES data through time.

11 Pure replication will not be sacrificed, though, as both the online and telephone survey ask the standard, ANES partisan identification measure. As such, I can see if the online survey results for partisans (based on the ANES measure) replicate based on identical questions in the telephone survey.
3.4 ONLINE SURVEY INSTRUMENT

The ordering of the questionnaire is listed in Table 3.1 below:

<table>
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<th>Section Order</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Ideological Partisanship Questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Partisan Social Identity Questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. “Big Five” (TIPI) Personality Scale</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Screener Question</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Efficacy Questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Discussion Group Questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Framing Experiment - Manipulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Framing Experiment – Reciprocity Questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Interpersonal Vignette</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Representative Vignette</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Demographic Questions</td>
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1. *Ideological Partisanship Questions:* This ideological self-identification question, and the 11 issue questions, are discussed in the section above. They are asked first in order to prevent any of the questions about partisanship from causing the respondents to sort their answers with the “correct” party view (see Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Levendusky 2009, Ch. 5), biasing the results.

2. *Party Social Identity questions:* This includes, first, the standard ANES partisan identification measure, and then a three-question measure of partisan social identity developed by Green et al. (2002). The exact questions the respondent receives hinges on his/her response to the ANES measure. For those that identify or “lean” Democratic, they get questions concerning their social identification with the Democratic Party. For those that identify or lean Republican, they get Republican social identification questions.
These questions are discussed further in the section above. It is important to ask these questions, as well as all other questions that could be influenced by the experimental manipulation, early. If these questions were later in the survey, there would be concern that the experimental stimuli would influence how these questions are answered (see Gerber and Green 2012, Ch. 2). Thus, asking about partisan social identity here maximizes the chance of getting an unbiased response.

3. **Efficacy Questions**: These are standard questions for efficacy used by the ANES. Efficacy is a key construct to measure; a “deliberative democracy” requires a citizenry that is not only participating in politics in the “right” (ie – reciprocal) way. It requires that the citizenry actively participates in a consequential way (see Young 2000, Dryzeck 2010); Mutz (2006), however, suggests that there is a direct tension between deliberation and participation. A key prerequisite for participation that Mutz and others, though, do not explore is efficacy, or believing that your voice will make a difference. I expect that “socially polarized” respondents will have higher levels of efficacy, as previous research shows they have higher levels of political engagement (Huddy, Mason, and AarøE 2015). As such, “discriminant validation” hinges on the extent that this measure negatively correlates with the measures of reciprocity below.

4. **Discussion Group questions**: This question text draws from Mutz (2002; 2006), and are designed to see if the impact of partisan social identity on reciprocal attitudes is mitigated by exposure to out-partisans in one’s discussion network. The questions ask respondents to name up to three people they often discuss politics with, as well as the respondents’ perception of their political affiliation.
5. **Ten-Item (TIPI) “Big Five” Personality Measure**: Next will be a brief index developed by Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann (2003) to assess the respondent’s personality along the “Big Five” personality dimensions. This will serve two purposes; first, it will allow one to assess the differences in responses to treatment across personality types. Drawing on Mondak’s discussion of personality and tolerance (2010), I expect that respondents that score high on the “openness to experience” personality trait will be more likely to exhibit reciprocal attitudes. Second, they serve as a buffer between the party social identity questions and the rest of the questionnaire. The non-political personality questions may erode any priming effect the party ID questions create. If the erosion does not work or is only partial, though, that would only weaken my results, as the impact of the experimental manipulation would be weaker in that case.

6. **Screener Question**: Here, and once again at the end of the survey, there is a screener or “paying attention” question. Following Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances (2014), those that fail the screener will not be thrown out of the analysis, but the analysis can show results for a full sample and a sample not including the “screened out” individuals.

7. **Framing Experiment, Experimental Manipulation**: Before the next set of questions, the questionnaire will include a preamble/information page. Following work from Druckman et al. (2013) and Levendusky (2009, Ch. 5), there will be three versions of the preamble—a “non-partisan,” “partisan,” and “partisan polarization” version. Three equal sized groups will be randomly assigned to each version. Moving from the “nonpartisan” towards the “partisan polarization” frame, I expect to see the frame
creating weaker attitudes of reciprocity. With the mTurk survey, there are other potential ways to introduce partisan frames, including using pictures and multimedia. However, the end goal for this survey was to replicate, as closely as possible, findings with a telephone survey. Thus, here I opt for a simple, text-based frame, where the text can be easily read by a telephone interviewer down the line.

8. **Framing Experiment, General Reciprocity Questions**: These questions seek to tap the respondents’ general attitude towards reciprocal political discussion. Admittedly, social desirability bias looms large here; of course, everyone will want to say that they keep an open mind. However, if there is a response to treatment from high partisan social identity salience (High PSI) respondents, despite the bias in the answers, that still creates a valid result. The reciprocity questions will be asked in three ways:

- First, there are four “agree/disagree” statements concerning general predispositions
- Second, there are four “forced choice” responses. These may be better than the “agree/disagree;” they present two desirable options that the respondent must choose from, and thus mitigate social desirability bias
- Finally, there are a series of questions that tap into political tolerance using the “least liked” approach developed by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982). As mentioned earlier, tolerance is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of reciprocity.
These questions were developed to tap into as many of the aspects of the construct of reciprocity as possible. I expect that High PSI respondents will respond the most to the treatment of partisan frames.

9. *Interpersonal Vignettes*: The vignettes are discussed in the “Methodological Approach” section above. While specific hypotheses are discussed and tested in the next chapter, I expect the strongest response to the vignettes will come from High PSI respondents. The counterarguments for the “immigration” vignette draw from recent newspaper articles (Gearen 2015; Hook 2015). The “civil liberties” vignette draws from a recent Pew Research Center survey (2014).

10. *Representative Vignette*: With this vignette, the respondent is given a scenario where her representative is working to increase domestic energy production. It is a 2x2 vignette design; the manipulations consist of whether it is a Democratic or Republican representative, and whether the representative is “working across the aisle,” or simply “working” toward this policy goal. This vignette prompt is developed wholly by the author. Text for both the interpersonal and representative vignettes can be found in the Appendix.

11. *Demographic Questions*: The few basic demographic questions here will help to assess the comparability of the treatment and control groups, as well as the comparison of this survey to the telephone survey. Analyzing the results using these controls can also increase the efficiency of the results.

3.5 TELEPHONE SURVEY INSTRUMENT

The telephone survey will be conducted in partnership with the University of South Carolina’s Institute for Public Service and Policy Research. Since the spring of
1990, twice a year the Institute conducts a representative telephone survey of roughly 800 South Carolina residents (incorporating both a landline and a cell phone sampling frame), where questions are included by clients for a fee\textsuperscript{12}. The clients include researchers, policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, businesses, and anyone else that has an interest in the opinion of South Carolina residents. Data collection occurred from April to June in 2016.

Due to budget constraints, only a handful of key items could be included in this telephone survey. Thus, the Telephone survey only replicates the “civil liberties” interpersonal vignette, as well as the representative vignette. The latter was included in the Telephone Survey verbatim. The question wording and experimental manipulation of the “civil liberties” interpersonal vignette was included verbatim; the only change made here was to the response choice. To facilitate ease of response via telephone, the “0-10” scale in the Online Survey was changed into a 5-point, “Strongly Agree” through “Strongly Disagree” scale. Thus, responses for partisans (measured through the ANES party ID scale) can be directly compared to responses in the Online Survey. In addition, instead of the Green et al. (2002) partisan social identity scale, the telephone survey incorporates four questions on partisan social identity developed by Huddy, Mason, and AarøE (2015). In addition to providing a different operationalization of partisan social identity, the Huddy et al. scale assesses social identity with regards to being “independent” as well as to third parties. Thus, it can assess whether the hypothesized effect of partisan social identity apply to independents\textsuperscript{13} and those outside the two-party

\textsuperscript{12} The Institute also asks a series of demographic questions, as well as incorporates the ANES partisan identity scale that is included in the Online Survey in this project.

\textsuperscript{13} Unlike in the online survey, in the telephone survey independent “leaners” will be asked about the \textit{independent} partisan social identification. As such, while the online survey will assess the extent to which
Finally, the ideological partisanship scale is not included in the Telephone Survey; only the results as they pertain to partisan social identity could be replicated.

3.6 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

I am primarily interested in the conditional average treatment effect (CATE) for different partisan subgroups, based on the measures of partisan social identity salience and ideological partisan attachment. In both the Online and Telephone surveys, both the PSI and ideological partisanship measures are used to divide partisan respondents into binary “high” and “low” subgroups at the medians. Following Gerber and Green (2012), this approach is taken because, as opposed to being evenly distributed across the range of values, most respondents are near the median of these measures (see Appendix for details). A simple, clean comparison across two subgroups thus avoids an unwarranted assumption of linear effects that would come with treating the measures as continuous.

As the measures of reciprocity are all ordinal, analysis is primarily conducted through ordered logistic regression. Again following Gerber and Green (2012; see also Rothwell 2005), treatment effect heterogeneity is assessed through the use of interaction terms. Indicators of vignette group are interacted with dummy PSI and ideological partisanship measures; a 1 on these measures indicates that a respondent’s score is above the median. These interaction terms provide a formal test of the significance of differing responses to the vignettes across subgroups. The regression models also include a host of control variables to improve the efficiency of treatment effect estimate; more information on these variables can be found in the Appendix. Any additional analysis not done through regression is conducted through simple comparison of means or proportions.
across experimental groups, with significance assessed through nonparametric tests such as $\chi^2$ tests.

The experimental results are also assessed against observational data analysis from the ANES. This observational analysis is in part descriptive (for example, what do the experiment results imply about mass polarization over time, given changes in the levels of social identity and ideological polarization?) as well as replicative (for example, do regression-based analyses of ANES data tell a similar story as compared to the experimental results?).
CHAPTER 4
DELIBERATE WITH THE ENEMY?

“There’s nothing short of Trump shooting my daughter in the street and my grandchildren — there is nothing and nobody that’s going to dissuade me from voting for Trump.”

- Lola Butler, Donald Trump supporter from Mandeville, LA (quoted in Barbaro, Parker, and Martin 2016)

Throughout the 2016 Presidential election campaign, it appeared that Donald Trump is doing everything he could to lose the Presidential Election. To give a partial account (off the top of the author’s head), just in this election season Trump has period-shamed a debate moderator, alluded to his penis size in a debate, mocked a disabled reporter, feuded with a Gold Star family, refused to immediately disavow support from ex-Klansman David Duke, tweeted an anti-Semitic picture of Hillary Clinton, suggested that “Second Amendment people” could stop Hillary Clinton, argued that Barack Obama is the “founder of ISIS” and had a role in a mass shooting in Orlando, suggested that Muslim Americans cheered the 9/11 attacks, suggested that a federal judge could not possible be impartial due to his Mexican-American heritage, repeatedly encouraged violence against protestors at his rallies, and has had a tape leak where he brags about committing sexual assault. He has refused to release his tax returns (standard practice for candidates since the 1970’s), and PoliFact found that 78% of his campaign statements are false, “mostly false,” or “pants on fire” (Sharockman 2016). Beyond these statements,
the pillars of his policy platform are either unconstitutional (i.e., his proposal to ban Muslims from entering the United States) or immoral and unworkable (i.e., Muslim ban, proposal to deport all illegal immigrants and build a wall across Mexico). Moreover, while Trump needed the Republican base to turn out in droves to have a shot at winning the election, Trump’s other policy proposals sharply cut against Republican orthodoxy. While he does have some typical Republican positions, his anti-free trade and isolationist foreign policy stances are closer to Bernie Saunders than Paul Ryan.

And yet the Republican electorate voted for him. In a Fox News Poll conducted the first week of October 2016, 81% of Republican registered voters said they will vote for Trump in November, comparable to the 83% of Democrat registered voters who said they will vote for Clinton (who, safe to say, has flaws of her own) (Fox News 2016). Trump and Clinton were both historically rare for Presidential candidates for their low favorability ratings; as of the first week of August 2016, 39% of the adult public had a favorable view of Clinton, and 32% had a favorable view of Trump. Despite this, 73% of Democrat identifiers and leaners had a favorable view of Clinton, and 68% of Republican identifiers and leaners had a favorable view of Trump (Newport 2016). As Lola Butler opines above, short of shooting a family member, it seems that Republican public was happy to support Trump. As a result, while high-profile Republicans such as Mitt Romney and the Bush family did not support Trump in the election, few Republican politicians who faced serious election competition in November followed suit.

There are a host of potential explanations for how a candidate (or candidates) so loathed by the public is so loved by their party. There are institutional factors, such as gerrymandering and primary processes, that allow for candidate that solely appeal to a
party’s base. There is the fragmentation of the media and the psychological propensity toward selective exposure, which help partisans to see a rosier picture of their candidate than they otherwise would. There is the process of motivated reasoning, our natural cognitive inclination to defend prior beliefs (and thus beliefs about candidates). Partisans, moreover, may simply like what their candidate is saying and the platform he/she espouses. However, a key explanation also has to be polarization, and in particular the “social” or “affective” polarization experienced by the partisan electorate. As discussed earlier, scholars have shown that, in recent years, the partisan public has polarized. However, what characterizes this era of mass polarization is less divergence on ideology or issue opinion, and more an increase in the social identity salience of party; for partisans, being a Democrat or Republican is a more important part of “who they are” as a person. As social identity theory suggests, this increase in the salience of partisan social identity has come with greater pride and boosterism for one’s party, as well as greater prejudice and negative affect towards the “other party.”

In this chapter, I will assess whether this same partisan social identity attachment also drives the public away from the deliberative ideal of reciprocity. The chapter starts with a discussion of the extant research on mass partisan polarization and its connection to social identity theory. Then, through both online and telephone vignette survey experiments, I show that partisanship impacts the amount of reciprocity one evinces towards disagreement. This effect is particularly pronounced for partisans from whom party is more salient to their social identity. Partisan social identity also has a substantial effect on whether one wants their representative to evince deliberative attitudes. These
results point to the impact of modern partisan polarization as well as the possibility of a more deliberative democracy in the United States.

4.1 PARTISAN POLARIZATION AND SOCIAL IDENTITY

The popular punditry argues that polarization is at a high-water mark, with Democrats and Republicans having little in common ideologically, culturally, demographically, or geographically. These pundits are certainly tapping into a real phenomenon, although the details are still in debate today. Researchers do agree that the ideological distance between partisan elected leaders is at the highest levels for the past century (Theriault 2008; Hill and Tausanovitch 2015). What’s more, division across parties in Congress goes beyond ideology, spilling over to contentious debates on even valence and procedural issues (Lee 2009). A number of explanations are offered for this. McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal attribute elite polarization, across history and today, to a rise in economic inequality and a subsequent move to the right by the Republican Party to prevent redistributionist policy (2006). As such, they claim that elite polarization is an asymmetrical phenomenon (see also Barber and McCarthy 2013). Fiorina (2011, Ch. 10), however, points to a change in the party donor and activist base, where party careerists interested in patronage have been replaced by “purists” interested in ideological fidelity. This has only increased given the increasing demands campaign financing has placed on candidates in the 21st century (Lessig 2011). This explanation can also help account for, in contrast to the trends documented by McCarthy and colleagues, Democrats’ move to the left in the past few years (Campbell 2016); in 2012, for instance, the average Congressperson (both Democrats and Republicans) had to spend $10.2 million to win a Senate seat and $1.5 million to win a House seat. Increased fundraising
demands create greater reliance on, and fidelity to, ideologically “pure” donors.

Additional explanations for elite polarization focus on institutional features such as gerrymandering and direct primary elections, as well as a breakdown of informal norms of bipartisanship (for a discussion, see Barber and McCarthy 2013, 23-35).

Somewhat less clear, though, is the extent of polarization in the partisan public. Some such as Abramowitz (2010) claim that the electorate is splitting apart ideologically in much the same way partisan elite are. While much of the popular polarization narrative has focused on culture wars (Frank 2004), Abramowitz contends that Democrats and Republicans are farther apart on economic, cultural, and racial issues. Campbell (2016), in turn, contends that deep ideological rifts have existed in the public since the late 60’s, and the ideological polarization in the public has driven elite party polarization (not the other way around). In contrast, Fiorina contends that the electorate today is “closely” but not “deeply” divided (2011, 14). He argues that, once one digs past “red state” vs. “blue state” voting patterns, the public is ambivalent on even controversial issues such as abortion, gay marriage, and the war in Iraq. What’s more, differences in opinion are minimal across parties and across racial, gender, and other demographic groups. Representing the majority view in the literature (Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2006; Bafumi and Herron 2010; Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman 2008; Fiorina 2009, 2011), Levendusky (2009) likewise contends that the public is no more ideologically polarized than in the past; the partisan public is, though, “sorting,” with Democrats increasingly more likely to adopt liberal positions and Republicans increasingly more likely to adopt conservative positions. This partly occurs through
citizens choosing a “correct” party based on their beliefs, and partly by citizens shifting their beliefs based on their party attachment (Carsey and Layman 2006).

While the consensus is that the partisan public is “sorted” but not necessarily more ideologically extreme, recent research has pointed to a growing social and affective mass partisan polarization. This research draws on social identity theory (Tajfel et al. 1971; Oakes 1987) and its insights as to how salient social identities are primary drivers of attitude formation and behavior. Social identities are not the same as simple group membership or identification; the term refers to psychological attachments to groups that make an important contribution to how one sees herself, or “who one is.” Thus, individuals can be white (or any other race) but have varying levels of white identity (or any other racial identity) salience. While other theories of ingroup bias and intergroup conflict focus on instrumental motivations for group association and behavior (Sherif 1966; Rabbie, Schot, and Visser 1989), the motivations for identity formation with SIT are primarily expressive and symbolic in nature. The goal with SIT is to build self-esteem through comparison with relevant outgroups. Social identity formation has thus been found in experimental settings where only minimal and arbitrary groups are created (Tajfel et al. 1971). SIT has also been used to study group-based attitude formation and behavior for racial and ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995), nationalities (Feshbach 1994), allegiance to sport teams (Taylor and Doria 1981), college majors (Spears, Doosje, and Ellemers 1997), and many other group affiliations.

Beyond one’s individual-level commitment to a group, social identity salience can change based on social context. Given the fact that individuals identify with many different groups, if a particular ingroup stimuli or intergroup conflict is present, then that
identity moves to the cognitive fore and becomes a primary motivator for attitude formation and behavior. Other structural factors, such as the similarity of members within groups and the level of permeability between groups, influence the salience of a social identity for an individual (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 2002). With salient groups, though, individuals develop a host of behaviors, including:

- **Engaging in “self-stereotyping” by changing attitudes and behavior**: The strength of a group member’s affinity with a group is positively related to the adoption of group norms (Terry and Hogg 1996), driving a process of attitude polarization across groups (Mackie 1986). In a series of survey experiments, Suhay shows that this process is driven by “self-conscious” emotions. Adoption of ingroup norms, as well as rejection of outgroup norms, creates pride in perceived ingroup approval; in contrast, non-adoption of ingroup norms, and adoption of outgroup norms, creates embarrassment (Suhay 2015).

- **Exaggerating in-group similarity and out-group difference**: Evidence of outgroup stereotyping as a “cognitive monster,” unable to be tamed (Bargh 1999) is more prevalent than evidence of ingroup stereotyping. However, research in SIT shows that group identity salience creates intragroup homogeneity perceptions for both ingroup and outgroup members (Brown 2000), particular in the presence of intergroup competition (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 1997)

- **Favoring the in-group and prejudice toward the out-group**: With the motivational basis for forming social identities being positive esteem (Tajfel et al. 1971), in a review of research Brewer finds that intergroup discrimination is more often motivated by ingroup favoritism rather than direct hostility towards an outgroup
(Brewer 1999). Despite this positive motivational basis, prejudice and negative attitudes towards salient outgroups still do result (Allport 1954; Brown et al. 2001; Vignoles and Moncaster 2007).

The observation that political behavior is connected to group or social identity is certainly not new (Bentley 1908; Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964). However, as Achen and Bartels (2016, Ch. 8) assert, since the 1970’s both political science and psychology have more away from a group focus towards more individualistic studies of political cognition and behavior. This is in part a reaction to the radical group-based politics of the late 60’s, and part a result of the advent of random digit dialing surveying of individuals in studying public opinion. Beginning in the 1990’s, however, political science scholars have drawn on social identity theory to take a renewed look at group processes (Huddy and Norris 1997; Deaux et al. 1995; Dawson 1994; Huddy 2001). Recently, scholars have pointed to the role of racial social identity in driving increasing polarization in party identification and issue positions (Tesler 2016; Magnum 2013). Other scholars have illustrated the role of white identity salience in fueling conservative ideology and movements such as the Tea Party (Craig and Richeson 2014; Skocpol and Williamson 2012). At a more general level, Kinder and Kam draw on SIT to develop a theory of ethnocentrism in American politics. They then illustrate how ethnocentrism plays a role in ingroup favoritism and outgroup denigration across a variety of group contexts and issues, such as immigration, affirmative action, public assistance, and gay rights, among others (2009).

While social identity theory has been used to examine group identification and politics for a myriad of groups, studies of partisan identification have not used it until
Huddy (2002) suggests that this is because partisanship is long perceived as a stable attachment (see Converse 1969; Sears 1983), while social identity and self-categorization theory suggest that group identity salience is fluid and can vary given context. Polarization scholars, though, have lately just begun to draw on SIT, suggesting that the partisan public is indeed polarizing. But despite the stability of partisan identification, it is a polarization of social identity salience. Iyengar et al. (2012), for example, find that partisans' outparty dislike and stereotyping has increased significantly since the 1970's, and that ideology is a weak predictor of this trend. Mason also finds that partisans increasingly display anger and bias towards their outparty (2015); she moreover finds an increase in “social sorting,” where partisans will align other relevant group identities to match their partisanship (2016). Iyengar and Westwood show that partisans harbor implicit biases against outparty members, which manifests in even nonpolitical attitudes and behavior such as hiring decisions (2015). Hetherington, Long, and Rudolph, further, find evidence of an asymmetric “trait polarization,” where partisans are more likely to ascribe negative personality traits towards outparty candidates (2016). Issues still do matter; otherwise, it would be difficult to explain how individuals are increasingly sorting into the “correct” party ideologically (Levendusky 2009). But a social identity perspective on polarization allows one to see how the public is increasingly divided beyond ideology or issues.

4.2 THEORY

The general expectation is that, for both Democrats and Republicans, partisan social identity salience produces anti-deliberative attitudes. Instead of relying on Habermas's “unforced force of the better argument,” I expect those with strong partisan
social identity (PSI) salience to condition their response to disagreement based on party cues. “High PSI” partisans, as opposed to “Low PSI” partisans, will be less likely to evince reciprocal attitudes towards outparty argumentation and more likely to evince reciprocal attitudes towards inparty argumentation. This connects to the insight from SIT that, for salient group identities, one finds outgroup bias and anger, ingroup homophily and activism, and exaggeration of differences across groups. It also connects to recent research on partisan psychology that suggests that, far from open-mindedness, one’s partisanship conditions the quality and hue of information that he or she receives from their environment (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Ramsay et al. 2010), how that information is processed and interpreted (Gaines et al. 2007; Lodge and Taber 2013), and the attitude that results (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013). The project here extends the theoretical purview of SIT and partisan psychology research by positing a negative connection to deliberative democratic ideals.

I also expect High PSI respondents to be less likely to support an inparty representative if she displays an attitude of reciprocity across the aisle. The focus is on inparty representatives here because the theoretical expectations are much clearer than they are for outparty representatives. SIT suggests that those with strong social attachments to their inparty would be loathe to see a member of their ingroup cooperating with or affording mutual respect to an outgroup member. For those with outparty representatives, they may support their representative trying to engage in cross party deliberation or work across the aisle (and potentially incorporating inparty views), but they may also be generally opposed to an outparty member trying to work with “their
team.” Thus, I do not establish theoretical expectations for respondent attitudes to outparty representatives.

Much previous research has primarily focused on negative outparty attitudes produced by partisan social identity salience (e.g. Iyengar et al. 2012; Lelkes and Westwood 2015; Hetherington, Long, and Rudolph 2016). Iyengar and Westwood (2015) attributes this outparty effect to the absence of partisan egalitarian norms. While explicit expression of racial or gender prejudice are often discouraged through social norms, negative campaigning and candidate rhetoric remove such barriers to outparty prejudice. However, with SIT, the theoretical motivation for group identity formation is self-esteem created by positive intergroup differentiation. Thus, much of the psychological literature on SIT suggests that salient identities primarily produce ingroup bias (Tajfel 1971; Brewer 1999), although the presence of intergroup conflict creates both positive ingroup and negative outgroup attitudes (Brown et al. 2001). This is different from other group theories. For example, in his canonical work on prejudice, Allport argues that social group stereotyping is an inevitable human process which leads to outgroup prejudice. For him, social categorization “dominates our entire mental life…A new experience must be redacted into old categories,” (1954, 20). SIT also differs from theories of group conflict, such as realistic conflict theory (Sherif 1966) and integrated threat theory (Stephan and Stephan 2000). With these theories, the presence of competition over scarce resources or symbolic threats to values and beliefs produce outparty prejudice and hostility. Further, other research emphasizes that outgroups are often perceived as more homogenous than ingroups (Mullen and Hu 1989), and that people associate negative outcomes related to outgroups as caused by dispositional rather than situational factors.
(Pettigrew 1979). If it is true that partisan social identity salience solely or primarily produces outparty, as opposed to positive inparty, bias, perhaps one of these theories, and not SIT, is more appropriate for studying the effects of partisanship on deliberation.

This being said, and while much research on partisan social identity has focused on outparty bias, there are some studies that have found inparty effects. Huddy et al. argues that partisan identification should be understood as fundamentally expressive in nature, where partisans “wish to defend or elevate their party’s political position,” and the party’s “failures and victories become personal” (2015, 3). The authors assess this claim through four surveys, two of which contain experimental manipulations of partisan threat and reassurance of success; they find that partisan social identity salience is strongly associated with past and current inparty campaign activity. They also find that reassurance of party status produces enthusiasm and greater commitment to future inparty campaign involvement. Other studies have also likely social identity and inparty activism (Mason 2015) as well as positive inparty emotions (Suhay 2015). As such, and in line with social identity theory, I expect partisan social identity to have both an inparty and outparty effect on reciprocal attitudes.

- **H1a**: “High PSI” partisans will hold less reciprocal attitudes towards outparty disagreement, as well as more reciprocal attitudes towards inparty disagreement, as compared to “Low PSI” Partisans.

- **H1b**: “High PSI” partisans will be less likely than “Low PSI” Partisans to support displays of reciprocity from inparty representatives

I expect separate effects for both the social identity and ideological dimensions of one’s partisan identification. Given the strong role that party stereotyping and party-based
affect plays in political cognition (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Achen and Bartels 2016), I expect partisan social identity salience to have the strongest effect on reciprocity. However, since self-stereotyping is also an indicator of social identity salience (Mackie 1986; Mason 2015), I expect one’s "ideological partisanship" (as an indicator of adopting prototypical in-group norms) to have a secondary effect on reciprocal attitudes. Thus, for more conservative Republicans and more liberal Democrats, I expect to see less reciprocal attitudes towards their outparty and more reciprocal attitudes towards their inparty.

- **H2a**: All else equal, both more conservative Republicans and more liberal Democrats ("High Ideology" partisans) will hold less reciprocal attitudes towards outparty disagreement and more reciprocal attitudes towards inparty disagreement.

- **H2b**: "High Ideology" partisans will also be less likely than "Low Ideology" partisans to support displays of reciprocity from inparty representatives.

4.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

As discussed in Chapter Three, the hypotheses above are primary tested through experiments embedded in two survey instruments – an Online Survey, and a Telephone Survey that seeks to replicate key results. The two surveys samples, in some ways, contain similar sets respondents; both the Online and Telephone Survey have samples that are whiter and more educated than the nation as a whole. However, as the Appendix indicates, the samples have stark differences in partisanship. Mirroring past research on mTurk survey respondents (Krupnikov and Levine 2014), Online Survey respondents are more liberal and prefer the Democratic Party more than the country’s population writ
large. The Telephone Survey sample, reflecting the state of South Carolina as a whole, skews Republican. Individually, the proportion of partisans in each survey may raise concerns of external validity. Together, though, a consistent effect across both sets of surveys would attest to the robustness of the results across parties.

Table 4.1 indicates what proportion of respondents fall into each of four subgroups in the Online Survey. As one can see, partisans are allayed across the range of social and ideological attachment, and there is a low correlation between the two measures. Given the prevalence of partisan ideological sorting (Levendusky 2009), one may have expected fewer “High PSI, Low Ideology” and “Low PSI, High Ideology” respondents. This may, though, highlight the line of research suggesting that, even for partisans, the public does not have ideologically consistent or polarized attitudes (Converse 1964; Fiorina 2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High PSI</th>
<th>Low PSI</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Ideology</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Ideology</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>615</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total N = 1336 for PSI, 1322 for Ideology; r = 0.17

The Online Survey contains questions on emotions towards the Democratic and Republican parties. As Figure 4.1 demonstrates, partisans scoring above the median on the social identity measure have uniformly stronger emotional reactions to the two parties. High PSI partisans, as opposed to Low PSI partisans, are much more likely to report feeling pride and hope towards their inparty “most of the time” or “always.” There are also more likely to feel anger and fear towards their outparty “most of the time” or
This difference is statistically significant at \( p < 0.05 \) in all cases, and it is consistent with intergroup emotion theory (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; Suhay 2015), which suggests that salient social identities produce positive emotions towards one in-group and negative emotions towards one out-group. It also serves as a robustness check for the PSI measure used in this project, confirming that it in fact taps into respondents’ social identity salience.

Even though non-representativeness in the sample compels one to focus primarily on the experimental results, some non-experimental statistics concerning attitudes toward deliberation are worth noting. Table 4.2 provides results from partisan respondents for the series of “forced choice” questions in the survey. As one can see, High PSI partisans are more likely than Low PSI partisans to believe that political discussion can lead to finding common ground. However, High PSI partisans are also more likely to see issue

---

14 This difference is consistent for both Democratic and Republican respondents.
stances as clearly right or wrong, as opposed to believe that intelligent people can disagree. This seems to suggest that those with a strong social attachment to their party are more likely to feel that consensus is possible, but are also more likely to demand consensus on their terms.

Table 4.2 Partisan Respondents’ Attitudes Towards Deliberation, by Social Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prompt</th>
<th>Low PSI</th>
<th>High PSI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>On important issues facing America today…</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians should work towards compromise</td>
<td>80.87%</td>
<td>80.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians should stand firm</td>
<td>19.13%</td>
<td>19.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>When people discussion issues of the day…</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They tend to find common ground</td>
<td>20.99%*</td>
<td>27.57%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It tends to highlight their differences</td>
<td>79.01%*</td>
<td>72.43%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>When I vote for a politician…</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important for her to stick to her platform</td>
<td>55.09%</td>
<td>56.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is fine for him or her to have a change in mind</td>
<td>44.91%</td>
<td>43.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>On most political issues…</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a clear right and wrong</td>
<td>20.78%*</td>
<td>29.45%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is reasonable for people to be on opposing sides</td>
<td>79.22%*</td>
<td>70.55%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 1338; *significant χ² statistic at p < 0.01

There were no significant differences between High and Low PSI partisan respondents for the two forced choice questions from the survey asking about attitudes towards representatives’ willingness to compromise. This, though, belies different dispositions towards compromise across parties, as suggested by Figure 4.2. Democrats in the sample are much more likely than Republicans to want a representative to work toward compromise, and they are much more likely to tolerate a change in mind from their representative. These group differences are significant with a χ² test at p < 0.01. This may be, in part, due to differences in values underlying the parties, but it also may be due to the politics of the day. For Republicans in 2015, representative “compromise” might simply imply the Republican Congress working with the Obama administration.
(and thus forgoing policy priorities). Likewise, for Democrats in 2015, “compromise” might simply mean moving parts of a Democratic agenda through Congress. The desire for compromise in one’s representative, in other words, may well reverse with a Republican president and a Democratic Congress.

Figure 4.2 Attitudes toward Deliberation by Party, Online Survey

4.4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

4.4.1 FRAMING EXPERIMENT

As discussed in Chapter Three, the Online Survey included three sets of experiments—a framing experiment, a set of interpersonal vignette experiments, and a representative vignette experiment. The Telephone Survey replicated the interpersonal vignette that focused on the issue of civil liberties as well as the representative vignette. While the framing experiment in the Online Survey produced some interesting non-experimental statistics discussed above, there were no significant results from experimentally manipulating the frame one received. This is, in part, likely do to the
weak treatment that a frame on an online survey screen (which one can easily click through) provides. The concern over processing of the frame is redoubled by the nature of mTurk respondents. Often “mTurkers” take surveys as a source of supplemental income; while in this survey they have a remarkably high per question response rate (no question with a response rate less than 99%), they are nonetheless motivated to move through a question-less screen quickly. In addition, many of these questions ask about the respondents’ general disposition to argument and disagreement; as such, there may be an inherent desire to “appear deliberative” that washes out any treatment effect from the frames provided.

4.4.2 INTERPERSONAL VIGNETTES

Table 4.3 displays key results for the interpersonal vignette focused on the issue of immigration. Two models were run for both the question that asks if the counterargument is “reasonable” and the question that asks if the counterargument is “worth considering.” Both “base” and “interactions” models include binary indicators for whether the counterargument comes from an inparty or outparty interlocutor, but the latter models also includes terms interacting these indicators with a dummy variable for a PSI score above the median. Negative coefficients indicate a more reciprocal response (i.e. – a greater inclination to find the counterargument reasonable or worth considering). As the base models show, partisan respondents overall are significantly more likely to find disagreement on immigration reasonable and worth considering if it comes from an inparty arguer. There is not a statistically significant outparty effect. This, however, belies differing responses based on partisan social identity, as the outparty interaction
terms are positive and significant. This indicates that partisans who have a stronger social attachment to their party are significantly more likely to respond to outparty treatment.

Table 4.3 Immigration Vignette Results, Online Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reasonable Base Model</th>
<th>Reasonable Interactions</th>
<th>Considering Base Model</th>
<th>Considering Interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inparty</td>
<td>-0.29**</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>-0.22**</td>
<td>-0.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outparty</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inparty x PSI</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outparty x PSI</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.61**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.50*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.24*</td>
<td>0.59***</td>
<td>0.59***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cutpoint)</td>
<td>-1.68</td>
<td>-1.76</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>-1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cutpoint)</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1314</td>
<td>1314</td>
<td>1314</td>
<td>1314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
High PSI partisans thus respond to outparty immigration arguments with less reciprocity, while Low PSI partisans do not. This is illustrated by Figure 4.3, which shows predicted proportions for the interactions models. Displayed are the proportions of respondents stating that the counterargument is “not at all” reasonable or worth considering, by their treatment group and partisan social identity. While Low PSI respondents view inparty arguments more favorably than neutral arguments for both questions, High PSI respondents are both more likely to view inparty arguments favorably and less likely to view outparty arguments favorably. For this subset, the predicted proportion responding “not at all” reasonable jumps from 0.35 in the neutral condition to 0.43 in the outparty condition, and the predicted proportion responding “not at all” worth considering jumps from 0.25 in the neutral condition to 0.32 in the outparty condition.

Figure 4.3 Online Immigration Vignette Results, by Social Identity
There are also differences in response to the civil liberties interpersonal vignette by partisan social identity salience. The base models in Table 4.4 indicate that partisans overall are significantly less likely to view outparty civil liberties arguments as reasonable or worth considering, but they are not significantly more likely to view inparty arguments as reasonable or worth considering. The interactions models, though, indicate that High PSI partisans are more likely than Low PSI partisans to respond to the inparty vignette. For the “reasonable” model, this difference in response is statistically significant; while the difference is not significant for the “considering” model (p = 0.15), the inparty interaction term is in the same direction and nearly as substantively large as for the “reasonable” model. The differences in response across PSI subgroups are illustrated in Figure 4.4. All partisans are more likely to state that a civil liberties counterargument is “not at all” reasonable or worth considering if it comes from an outparty, as opposed to a neutral, interlocutor. High PSI partisans, though, are also less likely to state that the argument is not at all reasonable or worth considering if it comes from an inparty interlocutor.

In sum, High PSI partisans consistently use party cues when deciding whether to respond to disagreement with an attitude of reciprocity. This is true across the two issue domains examined. What’s more, this is true for both inparty as well as outparty vignette groups; this runs counter to much of the extant literature on partisanship and social identity, which focuses primarily on outparty biases (Iyengar et al. 2012; Lelkes and Westwood 2015). It accords with social identity theory, however, as SIT suggests that salient group identities produce both ingroup boosterism and outgroup bias.15

15 Results are consistent when looking at solely Democrats or Republicans. For details, see Appendix.
Table 4.4 Civil Liberties Vignette Results, Online Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reasonable Base Model</th>
<th>Reasonable Interactions</th>
<th>Considering Base Model</th>
<th>Considering Interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inparty</strong></td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outparty</strong></td>
<td>0.35**</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.30**</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inparty x PSI</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.67**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outparty x PSI</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PSI</strong></td>
<td>-0.36***</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.28**</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>White</strong></td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.32**</td>
<td>0.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td>0.31***</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>College</strong></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South</strong></td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cutpoint)</td>
<td>-2.13</td>
<td>-2.08</td>
<td>-1.47</td>
<td>-1.43</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.25)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(cutpoint)</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>1314</td>
<td>1314</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>1315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive $\beta$’s indicate less reciprocity

$^* p < 0.1$, $^{**} p < 0.05$, $^{***} p < 0.01$
There are also interesting nonexperimental results with regards to the demographic variables. Across conditions for the immigration vignette, white respondents, as well as older respondents, are more likely to take an anti-deliberative stance towards the counterargument offered. Part of this may be due to the more conservative positions taken by older and white individuals in the sample. As those higher in age and whites are statistically more likely to take a conservative stance, they are more likely to receive a pro-immigration counterargument. Group-based racial biases, thus, may be in play as these respondents consider their counterargument (although more research will need to be done to confirm this suspicion).

For the liberties vignette, across treatment conditions males are more likely to take an anti-deliberative stance. Similarly, this may be due to the specific pro-liberty stance that, in the sample, is statistically more likely to be taken by males than females. If males are more ardent in their beliefs concerning civil liberties, then may be apt to
respond less deliberatively if they receive a pro-data collection counterargument. As these are nonexperimental results with a convenience sample, though, at best this is speculative. More research will need to be done to assess if and how age, race, and gender bias deliberative attitudes, and if the same insights from social identity theory used in this project can apply to these groups. Or, conversely, more research will be needed to confirm whether these differences in attitude toward deliberation are driven by specific issue positions taken, rather than an overall approach to argumentation.

While the questions asking whether the counterarguments are reasonable or worth considering elicited a response to treatment, none of the vignettes produced a significant difference in whether respondents changed their opinion. In fact, for both vignettes, only roughly 20% of respondents changed their mind in the direction of the counterargument when asked of their opinion a second time. It is perhaps not surprising given that the argument is a one-sentence statement displayed on a computer screen. However, the lack of demonstrated persuasive power suggests that the vignette treatment is weak. This makes presence of a significant effect for the “reasonable” and “worth considering” questions all the more remarkable.

What about ideology? Table 4.5 displays treatment effects across subgroups based on ideological partisanship, focusing on the “reasonable” question. There are no statistically significant differences in effects between respondents based on their commitment to their party’s ideological platform. Both interaction terms do run in the theoretically expected direction for the immigration vignette. However, for the civil liberties vignette, those with weaker, not stronger commitments to their party’s ideology are more likely to respond to the outparty vignette. This is illustrated with Figure 4.5; the
right side shows that Low Ideology partisans are more likely to state that the civil
liberties counterargument is not at all reasonable if it comes from an outparty, as opposed
to a neutral, interlocutor. This is not true, though, for High Ideology partisans. This could
be because Low Ideology respondents may be less politically sophisticated than High
Ideology respondents (Zaller 1992). Civil liberties may also be a more complex issue
domain than immigration. If these are both the case, Low Ideology respondents may be
relying on party cues as an informational shortcut with the civil liberties question,
whereas High Ideology respondents have less need to do so. More research would be
needed to confirm exactly why different issue domains produce different patterns of
responses across ideological partisanship. But in sum, while partisan social identity
consistently produces stronger responses to both inparty and outparty treatment
(confirming H1a), differences in response to treatment based on ideological partisanship
are insignificant and mixed (disconfirming H2a).

The civil liberties vignette was moreover reproduced through a telephone survey
of a representative sample of South Carolina adults. Table 4.6 displays these results,
which incorporate survey weights and account for weighting loss using the Kish method
(1965). As with the Online Survey, the results from the Telephone Survey suggest
primarily an outparty effect. Although only the “reasonable” model is close to
conventional statistical significance (p = 0.052), the outparty terms for both base models
indicate that partisans as a whole are less likely to view outparty, as compared to neutral,
arguments as reasonable or worth considering. Moreover, the lack of significance for the
outparty term in the “worth considering” model belies a difference in response between
High PSI and Low PSI partisans. This is illustrated with the predicted probabilities
displayed in Figure 4.6. While both High PSI and Low PSI respondents are more likely to view a counterargument as “not at all” reasonable if it comes from the outparty, only

Table 4.5 Vignette Response by Ideological Partisanship, Online Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immigration Base Model</th>
<th>Immigration Interactions</th>
<th>Liberties Base Model</th>
<th>Liberties Interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outparty</td>
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<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.36**</td>
<td>0.55**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inparty x Ideo</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outparty x Ideo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
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<td>0.62***</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
<td>0.50**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>0.32***</td>
<td>0.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
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<td>South</td>
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<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(cutpoint)</td>
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<td>-1.59</td>
<td>-1.87</td>
<td>-1.78</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cutpoint)</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Figure 4.5 Online Vignette Results, by Ideology

High PSI respondents are more likely to view outparty arguments as “not at all” worth considering. For this subgroup, the predicted probability of responding “not at all” worth considering jumps from 0.17 in the neutral condition to 0.26 in the outparty condition. Due to the weighting loss as well as a sample size smaller than the Online Survey, the interaction term in this model is not significant. However, while they cannot offer a complete confirmation, the results from the Telephone Survey are in line with the Online Survey results.

4.4.3 REPRESENTATIVE VIGNETTE

The final experiment is a 2x2 vignette analyzing the impact of partisanship impact on respondents’ willingness to support efforts towards consensus by representatives. Figure 4.7 displays the percentage of partisan respondents from the Online Survey stating that they would be “more likely to support” a Congressperson, broken out by treatment
group. The graph on the left contains results for High PSI partisan respondents, and the graph on the rights contains results for Low PSI partisan respondents. Here, the results

Table 4.6 Liberties Vignette Response by PSI, Telephone Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reasonable Base Model</th>
<th>Reasonable Interactions</th>
<th>Considering Base Model</th>
<th>Considering Interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inparty</td>
<td>0.05 (0.26)</td>
<td>0.20 (0.33)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.27)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outparty</td>
<td>0.44* (0.27)</td>
<td>0.45 (0.31)</td>
<td>0.23 (0.27)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inparty x PSI</td>
<td>- (0.52)</td>
<td>-0.34 (0.52)</td>
<td>- (0.52)</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outparty x PSI</td>
<td>- (0.54)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.54)</td>
<td>- (0.54)</td>
<td>0.63 (0.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>-0.64*** (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.53*** (0.39)</td>
<td>-0.32 (0.23)</td>
<td>-0.44 (0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.25)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.26)</td>
<td>0.16 (0.26)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.01* (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01* (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01** (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.12 (0.22)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.21)</td>
<td>0.23 (0.24)</td>
<td>0.23 (0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>0.33 (0.21)</td>
<td>0.32 (0.21)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.22)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cutpoint)</td>
<td>-1.09 (0.46)</td>
<td>-1.05 (0.46)</td>
<td>-0.63 (0.42)</td>
<td>-0.70 (0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cutpoint)</td>
<td>1.47 (0.46)</td>
<td>1.52 (0.46)</td>
<td>2.20 (0.42)</td>
<td>2.15 (0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>466 466 472 472</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
are in line with hypothesis 1b. While High PSI partisans are not significantly more likely to support an inparty representative if she works “across the aisle” as opposed to alone to change policy ($\chi^2$ p value of 0.25), Low PSI partisans are more likely to offer support for representatives working across the aisle (p = 0). High PSI, but not Low PSI, partisans are significantly more likely to support an outparty congressperson working across the aisle as opposed to alone (p = 0 for High PSI respondents; p = 0.47 for Low PSI respondents). These results are replicated with the results from the Telephone Survey displayed in Figure 4.8. For Low PSI, but not High PSI, respondents in this survey, there is a marginally significant inparty effect in the same direction as the Online Survey (survey weighted $\chi^2$ p = 0.07).

Figure 4.8 also provides non-experimental evidence that partisan social identity produces both positive inparty bias and negative outparty bias. Here, High PSI partisans in the Telephone Survey are uniformly and substantively much more likely than Low PSI
partisans to offer support to representatives in both inparty conditions. High PSI partisans are also less likely in both conditions to offer support to outparty representatives than Low PSI partisans, but the substantive difference is smaller. Finally, Figure 4.9 suggests that the differences in response to treatment between High and Low PSI partisans may be driven primarily by Democratic Party norms. The figure breaks down results of the experimental vignette by Democratic and Republican respondents. Partisan identity still clearly matters most, as both sets of partisan respondents are less likely to support a Congressperson’s policy efforts if she is from the outparty as opposed to the inparty. Democrats, moreover, are also less likely to support a Congressperson if she worked alone as opposed to “worked across the aisle.” This is true for both inparty and outparty representatives, with the strongest effects being with the inparty. Republicans do not respond to treatment in a similar way, however. For them, we find similar percentages of support comparing a Congressperson who “worked across the aisle” to a

![Figure 4.7 Online Representative Vignette Results, by Social Identity](image)

Figure 4.7 Online Representative Vignette Results, by Social Identity
Congressperson who simply “worked” to pass legislation. This difference in partisan response could be fueled by Democratic norms supporting compromise and consensus, less prevalent with the Republican Party. This explanation is in line with social identity theory’s prediction that group salience drives in-group norm adoption. It could also be fueled by the current political context; Republicans may well be the ones seeking legislative consensus if Democrats gain control of Congress. More research needs to be done to explain this differential response to treatment across parties. The takeaway, though, is that the negative impact of partisan social identity on support for inparty representative consensus building is consistent across surveys.

4.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Does partisanship, and in particular partisan social identity salience, impact the possibility of a more deliberative democracy? The survey experiments discussed here suggest that it does. As opposed to following Habermas’s “unforced force of the better
Diverging from past research on partisan social identity that primarily focuses on outparty effects (Iyengar et al. 2012; Lelkes and Westwood 2015), “High PSI” partisans both display less reciprocity towards outparty arguments and more reciprocity toward inparty arguments. These results for social identity are moreover consistent across issue domains and across both online and telephone survey experiments. Partisan ideological attachment, though, has at best a secondary effect on reciprocal attitudes, one that is statistically insignificant and hinges on the specific issue being considered.

In addition to a disinclination to afford reciprocity in interpersonal disagreement, partisans with strong social attachments are also less likely to look for attitudes of reciprocity in their representative. The results show that this subset of partisans did not
condition their support for an inparty representative based on whether or not she works “across the aisle.” Partisans with less strong social attachments, though, were more likely to support consensus building inparty representatives. What’s more, the results from the representative vignette also suggest that partisan social identity produces positive inparty bias as well as negative outparty bias; regardless of whether or not she looks to build consensus across the aisle, “High PSI” partisans are both more likely to support an inparty Congressperson, as well as less likely to support an outparty Congressperson, than “Low PSI” partisans.

While the experimental approach used maximizes the internal validity of the findings, a lack of external validity is a potential limitation to this study. For one, while results are replicated across different samples and survey modes, neither the Online nor Telephone Surveys are completely demographically representative of the U.S. population as a whole. Another concern with external validity is with the use of a survey approach more broadly. For example, it can be questioned as to whether receiving a counterargument statement through a computer screen or telephone interviewer adequate simulates encountering “real world” political argument. Also, it can be questioned whether a small set of survey questions can adequate tap into nuanced, multifaceted concepts such as reciprocity, ideological partisanship, and/or partisan social identity. This latter limitation is fundamental to the survey experimental approach. Future research could thus continue this exploration of the relationship between partisanship and deliberation through, for example, embedding an experimental design in deliberative forum (see Barabas 2004 or Mendelberg and Karpowitz 2007 for examples), or analyzing deliberation in field settings (see Bryan 2004 or Mansbridge 1980 for examples).
Limitations aside, the results nonetheless help us to understand the impact of partisan polarization in the 21st century. Recall from Figure 4.1 that partisans with higher social identity salience are more likely to express positive emotion towards their inparty as well as negative emotion towards their outparty; Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show that this affective response that characterizes “Social Partisans” has only amplified in the past two decades. This ANES data are from questions that probe partisans’ emotions towards Democratic and Republican presidential candidates. It is an imperfect substitute for emotion towards the parties, and electoral and candidate context adds considerable variability to this measure. However, since 1996, there is a clear secular trend; a majority of partisans now feel anger and fear “most of the time” to their outparty candidate, as well as hope and pride “most of the time” to their inparty candidate. These graphs support the notion that the public is indeed splitting along partisan lines, but it is a social and affective, not ideological, split. The experimental results in this study, in turn, illustrate how this social polarization is impacting political discourse. In everyday interpersonal talk, it makes good faith discussion and efforts at forging consensus across party lines more difficult. Moreover, social polarization may have a “trickle up” effect on Congressional deliberation, as the experimental results suggest that partisans are becoming less likely to demand attitudes of reciprocity with their representative. In sum, to the extent that democracy demands political discourse at the elite and mass level guided by tolerance, mutual respect, and open-mindedness, the results show that our current era of polarization makes this ideal increasingly more difficult to obtain.

16 The graphs begins at 1996 as this is the first year the ANES asks how often respondents feel these emotions. Response wording changed in 2012. For 2012, graphs reflect percentage of partisans feeling emotion “most of the time” or “always;” prior data reflects percentage of partisans feeling emotions “fairly” or “very often.”
The goal of this study is empirical—to examine how partisanship impacts the attainment of ideals of deliberative democracy, not to examine those ideals as such.
Nonetheless, this study can contribute to the normative assessment of modern democracy in the United States. This assessment hinges on the yardstick one is using. If one hews to a procedural or minimal view of democracy, the results here are not terribly problematic. If, however, one takes the deliberative ideals of Dryzeck, Gutmann and Thompson, and others seriously, the results here are more troubling. If the ideal of deliberative democracy requires an engaged public adhering to norms of reciprocity—participating in political talk with an open mind, offering arguments that all could see as legitimate, and working towards a final consensus—mass social polarization is driving us away from this ideal.
CHAPTER 5
CAN WE TALK? DELIBERATION, PARTISANSHIP, AND SOCIAL CONTACT

“Civilized men have gained notable mastery over energy, matter, and inanimate nature generally, and are rapidly learning to control physical suffering and premature death. But, by contrast, we appear to be living in the Stone Age so far as our handling of human relationships is concerned.”

- Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1954, xv)

The previous chapter painted a bleak picture for the possibility of deliberative public discourse in the United States. As the social and affective distance between partisans has increased over the past quarter century (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012), the chapter demonstrated that stronger social identity ties to one’s party are related to stronger and more consistent anti-deliberative biases when encountering disagreement, as well as a disinclination to support deliberative behavior in one’s representative. If research on the benefits of ideal deliberation—better decision making, citizen learning, tolerance and empathy, etc.—are to be believed, citizens are now in a particularly poor position to reap these benefits. What’s more, mass social polarization and the resultant unwillingness to engage in good faith, reciprocal discourse has become increasingly untethered from debates on issues or ideology (Hill and Tausanovitch 2015). Thus, as elected leaders occupy the extremes of the ideological spectrum, there is a disconnect in
representation and an inability of the partisan public to hold leaders accountable to their interests (Fiorina 2009). Normatively, this is troubling.

But what should be done? One option is a radical reconceptualization of American democracy based on the empirical realities of 21st century political behavior. For example, many deliberative theorists have focused on developing structured forums where only a small sample of citizens participate. These forums, it is argued, can serve as bridging institutions between citizens and representatives (Warren and Gastil 2015); with a small group, ideals of deliberation can be approximated and the irrationalities that come with partisanship can be mitigated. Achen and Bartels, moreover, argue that normative theorists should walk away from democracy as the “justifying political ideology of our era,” (2016). They instead call for a rethinking of democracy based primarily on group identity and power, and they make the normative call for providing roughly equal power between groups through reducing social and economic inequality as well as implementing campaign finance reform. Brennan calls for an even stronger move away for democracy, claiming that citizens should have “the right to competent government” and that democracy, as a broad class, fails in this regard (2016, 140). He contends that epistocratic changes—providing more political power to an educated elite—can make government more just.

Empowering forums or moving towards epistocracy can make government decision making more deliberative or reasoned, but it also makes it less democratic. As such, a second option is to develop strategies to better encourage an attitude of reciprocity in the mass public, so that government is both more deliberative and more democratic (or at least not less democratic). It is not obvious that this is possible; past
research suggests that there is an inherent conflict between deliberative and participatory democratic ideals (Mutz 2006), and social polarization has only encouraged greater participation at the expense of citizen deliberation (Huddy et al. 2015; Ch. 4 in this project). One potential solution, though, is through a process of social contact. Interpersonal contact theory has consistently shown that building relationships with outgroups can reduce prejudice towards that group and even other groups with whom one is not in contact (Pettigrew 1997; Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Perhaps outparty social contact can encourage individuals to engage in cross-party discussion with an attitude of reciprocity. If so, it presents an opportunity for policymakers to encourage deliberative discourse by providing opportunities for citizens to develop relationships with those from “the other side.”

This chapter explores the potential for cross-party social contact to promote deliberative attitudes in the electorate. Focusing on the interpersonal vignettes in the Online Survey discussed previously, the chapter examines whether one particular form of contact—regularly discussing politics with a member of the outparty—mitigates partisan biases against deliberation. Overall, experimental results do not demonstrate a direct effect on bias. However, nonexperimental results, corroborated by data from a 2008 representative national survey, do show that those with cross-party social contact have weaker social identity attachments to their party. This suggests that contact may have an indirect positive effect on attitudes of reciprocity through weakening partisan social identity salience. Given the non-representative nature of the Online Survey as well as inherent limits to causality in the research design (discussed in the conclusion), this claim
is only tentative. More research is needed to disentangle when, where, and how social contact can promote deliberation by reducing strong partisan social ties.

5.1 SOCIAL CONTACT AND THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE

Chapter Four demonstrated that partisans with strong social identity attachments to their party harbor a prejudice that prevents them from engaging in disagreement with a deliberative attitude. In his canonical work on the subject, Allport contends that this and other group-based prejudices are “natural and common capacities of the human mind” ([1954] 1979). He explores a variety of historical, material, social, and psychological theories associated with both “love” and “hate” prejudice formation, but he contends that a key cognitive component that maintains prejudice is the process of stereotyping. Stereotypes both justify discriminatory thinking about a group as well as maintain a process of motivated reasoning about the group and group members. However, for Allport, social contact disrupts stereotyping by providing a richer picture. It helps individuals engages in more nuanced thinking about the outgroup. This, however, is not an automatic process; Allport reviews a series of studies that show that, while casual or superficial contact can actually increase prejudice, prejudice decreases with deeper and more sustained contact. Ultimately, for contact to create a generalized reduction in group prejudice (beyond egalitarian feelings specific to a particular person or situation), it must be 1) between individuals of equal status 2) working together 3) sharing common goals and interests, 4) supported by laws, customs, and other aspects of the institutional environment ([1954] 1979, Ch. 16).

Many scholars have built on Allport’s insights and examined both the conditions in which intergroup contact reduces prejudice as well as the mechanisms by which
contact can work. For the latter, Pettigrew (1998) suggests that intergroup contact works through both cognitive and affective processes, affecting both outgroup and ingroup perceptions. Allport originally stressed the cognitive ignorance reduction that comes with learning about an outgroup member. More recent research, though, stresses the importance of positive affective ties. Stephan and Stephan, for example, find that higher levels of social contact among Hispanic students is related to lower levels of anxiety in interacting with other non-Hispanic students (1985). In a study of Europeans attitudes toward immigration and immigrants, moreover, Pettigrew (1997) finds that friendship with members of outgroup nationalities produces empathy and reduces affective prejudice towards immigrants. The end product of improved affective ties are both a reduction in negative feeling and trait prescription toward the outgroup as well as a reconceptualization—a broadening—of one’s ingroup identity (Pettigrew 1998).

As Allport argues, not all contact results in prejudice reduction. However, intergroup contact theory has proven remarkably resilient across a number of conditions and contextual factors. Contact has been found to reduce racial and ethnic prejudice (Works 1961; Ellison, Shin, and Leal 2011), foster support for pro-LGBT laws such as military inclusion and anti-discrimination policies (Barth and Parry 2009), and reduce the effects of stereotype threat for the elderly (Abrams et al. 2008). Outgroup contact can also reduce prejudiced attitudes towards other groups (Pettigrew 1997; Wright et al. 1997), and even simply imaging positive outgroup member interactions can have a beneficial effect (Crisp and Turner 2009). Exhaustively surveying the subfield, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) conduct a quantitative meta-analysis of 515 studies, spanning 60 years, testing Allport’s contact hypothesis. They find that contact is a “practical, applied means
of improving intergroup relations” (766). Not only does prejudice reduction consistently generalize to an entire outgroup through contact, but prejudice against other outgroups is consistently reduced as well. The authors even find prejudice reduction in situations that do not meet Allport’s four criteria, leading them to conclude that they facilitative, not necessary, conditions.

5.2 COMPARING TWO TYPES OF PARTISAN CONTACT

This being said, Pettigrew and Tropp do find the strongest prejudice reductions in situations where contact is between cooperating members of equal status, working toward common interests with institutional support. These four conditions “provide the participant (of research) the opportunity to become friends,” (Pettigrew 1998, 76). Without this deeper relationship and potential for friendship, prejudice reduction is less likely. The importance of deeper, positive contact can be seen by contrasting two strains of political psychology literature. The first, on partisan motivated reasoning, shows the potential negative effects of superficial cross-party contact. These studies are often experimental, and they often employ a short term partisan prime—for example, a news story about the Democratic or Republican party (Jerit and Barabas 2012), written statements or lists of candidates’ policy positions (Lodge and Hamil 1986; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013), televised statements or advertisements from candidates (Rahn 1993; Dowling and Wichowsky 2015), or implicit measures designed to assess automaticity (Iyengar and Westwood 2014; Lodge and Taber 2013), among many other similar types of stimuli. The consensus from these studies is that short term exposure to a partisan stimulus produces prejudicial cognition. Partisan primes encourages reasoning based on directional, rather than accuracy, goals (Taber and Lodge 2006), so that “the
brain converges on solutions that minimize negative and maximize positive affect states,” (Westen et al. 2006, 1947). The move toward one’s inparty and away from one’s outparty influences many aspects of the reasoning process, including exposure and retention of information (Zaller 1992; Jerit and Barabas 2012), the interpretation of information (Gaines et al. 2007), and resultant attitude adoption (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013). Motivated reasoning through partisan stimuli has also been demonstrated with implicit measures of bias (Iyengar and Westwood 2014), and it even produces markedly different neural processing patterns than non-motivated reasoning (Westen 2006).

To be fair, these studies were not designed to assess intergroup contact theory, nor do they compare results to partisan contact that is longer or more substantial. They nonetheless reflect the key insight from Allport that not just any contact can serve to reduce prejudiced thinking. In fact, minimal outgroup exposure (i.e., a partisan stimulus found in an experiment) can exacerbate bias. Contrast these results to research on cross-party political networks. Here, scholars assess when and how long relationships with outparty members influence one’s own partisanship, issue stances, tolerance, and behaviors such as voting or donating to campaigns. One’s political network is measured in a variety of ways; for examples, the earliest studies used similar group ties, such as being a businessperson or being a Catholic, as proxies for shared political network (Berelson, Lazarfield, and McPhee 1954). Other studies use geography as a proxy for social connectedness—for example, a shared census tract (Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006) or a shared household (Nickerson 2008). Sinclair, moreover, uses a shared behavior, donating to the same political campaign within a Congressional district, as a proxy (2012,
Many studies, though, use “name generator” procedures in survey instruments, where respondents are asked to name individuals with which they discuss politics or “important matters” on a regular basis (Mutz 2002; Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg 2013; Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Parsons 2015). While subject to measurement error with regard to respondents’ perceptions and recollections, these studies have the advantage of directly assessing with whom one talks politics, as opposed to relying on an inevitably imperfect proxy. The names elicited here are likely to be established relationships, not simply passing acquaintances. This procedure also allows the researcher to tap into individuals’ network members that do not live close by, or perhaps do not share similar group affiliations.

As a whole, research on interpersonal political networks suggests that established relationships with the outparty produce attitudes and behaviors distinct from those created by short-term partisan primes. For example, rather than hardening one’s attitude, diverse political networks help maintain dynamic, diverse opinions and voting behaviors. Both observational (Huckfeldt 2001) and experimental (Ahn et al. 2013) research shows that as individuals develop political discussion networks, they seek out those with expertise primarily, and those with shared preferences only secondarily. As a result, individuals can and do develop political communication networks that maintain opinion diversity (Huckfeldt et al. 2004). Diverse networks, in turn, exert social influence; Sinclair (2012) shows that, *cerertis paribus*, one is more likely to vote for an outparty candidate if she discusses politics regularly with an outparty member. One is also more likely to identify less strongly with their party (by close to a full point on the traditional seven-point ANES scale) if she has an outparty discussant.
In a somewhat similar vein, Mutz (2002) finds that those with heterogenous political networks register greater ambivalence in vote choice. This ambivalence, combined with social “cross-pressure,” depresses respondents’ likelihood of voting or engaging in other forms of participation. However, in a later work Mutz (2006) demonstrates that cross-party networks also encourage greater awareness of and tolerance for perspectives with which one disagrees, leading her to conclude that there is a “fundamental tradeoff” (2) between normative values of tolerance and participation. Huckfeldt and colleges (2004), though, are more sanguine about the value of diverse political networks. They find that those with cross-party political discussion networks are more ambivalent about their vote choice and modestly less interested in politics (akin to Mutz), but they do not find that they are less likely to vote.

Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg (2013) suggests that the discrepancy between Mutz and Huckfeldt et al. can be attributed to different standards for measuring intra-network disagreement. While Mutz uses a measure that heavily weights deep perceived disagreement between respondent and discussant, Huckfeldt et al. employ a measure which takes disagreement as simply not voting for the same 2000 Presidential candidate (a weaker measure). Klofstad et al. apply both of these measures to a 2008 ANES Panel Study data set, finding that those with politically heterogenous networks based on Mutz’s measure express more ambivalence and less political interest than those with homogenous networks. Based on Huckfeldt’s weaker measure, though, disagreement does not produce these effects. Interestingly, neither measure of network disagreement has a significant effect on respondents’ likelihood of voting.
5.3 THEORY

Overall, the differences between experimental research on partisan motivated reasoning and research on political networks highlight the point that intergroup contact is much more likely to reduce prejudice if the contact has a strong relationship. The difference between a regular discussion partner versus a short-term exposure through a partisan stimulus is the difference between tolerance, ambivalence, and open-mindedness versus selective exposure and directional reasoning goals. Moreover, as Sinclair (2012) demonstrates, the strongest effects of sustained contact are for our strongest relationships—family members and close friends, as opposed to co-workers and acquaintances. Based on these insights, I argue that meaningful cross-party social contact likewise facilitates possibilities for citizen deliberation, reducing the bias against reciprocity partisans displayed in the previous chapter. Instead of relying on party cues to determine whether disagreement is “reasonable” or “worth considering,” partisans who have meaningful contact with outparty members should instead see less difference in their response based on whether disagreement comes from an inparty, neutral, or outparty interlocutor. Social contact reduces prejudice by both fostering positive assessment of the outgroup as well as a reconceptualization of the ingroup (Gaertner et al. 1993); thus, I expect to see a mitigating effect on both inparty and outparty bias.

-  **H1**: Partisans who have social contact with an outparty member are less likely to harbor an implicit anti-deliberative bias toward both inparty and outparty disagreement, compared partisans who do not have outparty contact.

Social contact can impact prejudice through both cognitive and affective means (Pettigrew 1998). While the cognitive route—ignorance reduction through learning—has
been shown at times to reduce prejudice (Stephan and Stephan 1984), overall the primary mechanism is through generating positive affective ties to one’s outgroup and deemphasizing ingroup identity (Pettigrew 1997; Gaertner et al. 1993). I expect to find evidence of the primacy of this affective route to bias reduction in my project. If this is the case, those with outparty social contact will have lower scores for partisan social identity salience than those without contact. It would suggest that social contact mitigates anti-deliberative indirectly, by reducing strong partisan social ties.

- *H2:* Partisans with outparty contact will register lower scores for inparty social identity salience

Finally, I expect those with stronger relationships to outparty members, as well as more outparty relationships, to have the strongest reduction in anti-deliberative bias as compared to those without outparty social contact. With stronger or multiple relationships, one is more likely to have a relationship that satisfy Allport’s four conditions for prejudice reduction.

- *H3:* Partisans with stronger relationships to outparty members, as well as partisans with multiple outparty relationships, will exhibit a stronger mitigation in treatment effect as compared to partisans with weaker, or just one, relationship

5.4 DATA AND METHOD

Data for this analysis primarily comes from the *interpersonal vignettes* in the Online Survey, outlined at length in Chapter Three. As discussed in the previous chapter, with these vignettes, partisans respond to a policy counterargument with greater reciprocity if the argument came from an inparty interlocutor, and they respond with less reciprocity to an outparty interlocutor. This effect is strongest for those with stronger
social identity attachments to their party (High PSI partisans). This makes it a natural place to test whether response to treatment is conditional not only on social identity, but on social contact with an outparty member as well. The independent variables, dependent variables, and covariates used for statistical control are the same as those in Chapter Four.

Information on outparty social contact is gathered in the Online Survey through a name generator procedure similar to that used in recent research on political networks (Mutz 2006; Huckfeldt et al. 2004; Klofstedt et al. 2013). In an iterated series of questions, respondents are asked who they “generally talk with most about politics,” and they can type in up to three names or initials, one at a time. If they cannot name a person they talk politics with for their first, second, or third name, they are then asked to name the person “with whom [they] were most likely to have informal conversations”\(^{17}\). Thus, every respondent is encouraged to name at least one, and up to three, contacts. Table 5.1 shows the number and percentages of discussant contacts for all partisan and leaning partisan respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number Named</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>High PSI</th>
<th>Low PSI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 (skipped)</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>60.2%</td>
<td>63.1%</td>
<td>61.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>1,336</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{17}\) Discussants are included in the measures of outparty social contact regardless if they “talk about politics” or “have informal conversations” with the respondent. Klofstad, McClurg, and Rolfe (2009) find that political and non-political name generators like these generate very similar sets of names.
For each contact named, respondents are asked two questions with regard to their political leanings. Each respondent is first asked, on a three-point scale, if the discussant’s views are “much the same,” “somewhat different,” or “very different” than her views. The respondent is then asked which party the respondent normally favors—Republicans, Democrats, “both,” or “neither.” The analysis will lean on the latter question, as the focus of this chapter is on how cross-party contact, not just contact across difference, impacts deliberative attitudes. Research using a similar name generator procedure has shown that respondents are generally accurate in their perception of discussion partner political attitudes. With a 1992 survey that followed up by surveys respondents’ named discussants, Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) find that respondents are accurate in their perceptions 78% of the time. Regardless, what is more relevant for a contact effect is the perception of outparty contact, not that the discussant actually be a member of the outparty. Full text for the name generator procedure and questions that follow can be found in the Appendix.

Based on this set of questions, analysis compares differences of treatment response across two groups—those that have an outparty member in their named discussion network, and those that do not. As stated earlier, the questions ask with whom the respondent “generally” talks about politics or important matters; as such, the names given are not likely to be mere passing acquaintances. It is more likely that the respondent has a deeper, standing relationship with these individuals, and thus they are more likely to satisfy the conditions of equal status, working together, common interests,

18 Other research on political networks makes use of scales based on information from all named discussants. As one example, Mutz (2006) creates a dissimilarity index that weights both the extent of disagreement as well as the closeness of the relationships. Here, though, I opt for a simpler test—reported contact versus no reported contact. Future research can assess the marginal impact of different numbers, and types of relationships, of cross-party contact.
and the “potential for friendship” that Allport (1954) and Pettigrew (1998) argue are facilitative of prejudice reduction. Again following Gerber and Green (2012), the differences in treatment response between these two groups will be assessed formally through ordered logistic regression with the use of interaction terms.

Table 5.2 shows that around seven in ten respondents do not have an outparty member as part of their discussion network. Less than one in ten have more than one outparty discussant. The finding that partisans are more likely than not to have an outparty discussant is not isolated to the Online Survey sample. Table 5.3 shows a similar result from three different representative national surveys that employ a name generator procedure. While all three surveys ask a slightly different set of questions, they all ask for either the perceived vote choice or the perceived partisanship of the respondents’ discussion partners. Across years and surveys, the table suggests that engaging in cross-party discussion is the exception, rather than the norm.

Table 5.2 Number of Outparty Members in Discussion Network, Online Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number in Network</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>High PSI</th>
<th>Low PSI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>69.6%</td>
<td>71.8%</td>
<td>67.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>1,336</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1992 CNES and 2000 ANES surveys both collect data on more than three discussion partners; Table 5.2 reflects information only for the first three discussion partners named by the respondent. For the 1992 and 2000 surveys, an “outparty discussant” is defined as someone who voted for the major party candidate that is not in the respondent’s party. For the 2008 survey, an “outparty discussant” is someone that is perceived as an outparty identifier by the respondent.
Table 5.3 Number of Outparty Members in Discussion Network, Past US Surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number in Network</th>
<th>1992 CNES</th>
<th>2000 ANES</th>
<th>2008 ANES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>65.8%</td>
<td>73.0%</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>1,205</td>
<td>1,807</td>
<td>2,086</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5 RESULTS

Tables 5.4 shows the general effect (or lack thereof) of having an outparty network member on whether one harbors anti-reciprocal bias when facing disagreement on the issue of immigration. As illustrated in the previous chapter, the base models in Table 5.4 show a significant inparty treatment effect; partisan respondents are more likely overall to say that an immigration counterargument is “reasonable” and “worth considering” simply if it comes from an inparty, as opposed to neutral, interlocutor. The theory outlined above calls for a significant positive effect for the interaction between the inparty treatment indicator and outparty contact, as well as a significant negative effect for the interaction between the outparty treatment indicator and outparty contact. This is not reflected in the table. While the sign is in the correct direction for both the “reasonable” and “worth considering” inparty interactions, it is nowhere near statistical significance. The outparty interactions have differing signs between the “reasonable” model and “worth considering” model; both coefficients, though, are not significant.

Similarly, there is no interactive effect evident for the civil liberties vignette, as shown in Table 5.5. As the base models indicate, partisans as a whole are less likely to consider a liberties counterargument “reasonable” or “worth considering” if it comes
Table 5.4 Immigration Vignette Response by Network Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reasonable Base Model</th>
<th>Reasonable Interactions</th>
<th>Considering Base Model</th>
<th>Considering Interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inparty</td>
<td>-0.29** (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.35** (0.16)</td>
<td>-0.22* (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.26* (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outparty</td>
<td>0.06 (0.14)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.16)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.21 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inparty x Network</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.17 (0.27)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.12 (0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outparty x Network</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.38 (0.29)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.31 (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network</td>
<td>0.05 (0.12)</td>
<td>-0.13 (0.19)</td>
<td>-0.24* (0.12)</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0.23 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.22 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.60*** (0.14)</td>
<td>0.61*** (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.01** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.01** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.01** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.07 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.16 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.15 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>0.05 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0.12 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.12 (0.11)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.12)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cutpoint)</td>
<td>-1.70 (0.24)</td>
<td>-1.77 (0.25)</td>
<td>-1.10 (0.25)</td>
<td>-1.07 (0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cutpoint)</td>
<td>1.26 (0.23)</td>
<td>1.18 (0.24)</td>
<td>1.91 (0.25)</td>
<td>1.94 (0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>1,314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

from an outparty, as opposed to neutral, source. This outparty effect holds up whether
one has outparty social contact or not; the outparty interaction terms are statistically and
The inparty interaction term in the “considering” model comes closest to statistical significance (p = 0.20), but the sign is wrong; it suggests that social contact exacerbates, not mitigates, the bias produced by inparty treatment. Overall, the results suggest a lack of a direct effect for outparty social contact. The biases partisans display against deliberation appear to not differ whether they regularly discuss politics with an outparty member or not.

Further, as indicated by Figures 5.1 and 5.2 (which focus on the “reasonable” set of questions), there is a similar lack of effect for social contact whether one looks specifically at High PSI or Low PSI partisans. In Figure 5.2, there is a slight suggestion of a weaker response to treatment in the High PSI subgroup if one has, as opposed to does not have, an outparty discussant. There, respondents without outparty social contact react both more favorably to inparty counterarguments and less favorably toward outparty counterarguments; this is not true for discussants with outparty social contact. In contrast, for Low PSI respondents, the effect of social contact is the opposite of what is theorized. In particular, those with an outparty discussant in their network respond less deliberatively to the outparty vignette as compared to the control group, while those without an outparty discussant respond more deliberatively to outparty treatment. For the liberties vignette results displayed in Figure 5.3, it is clear there are no strong differences in vignette response based on social contact for either High PSI or Low PSI partisans. None of the interaction effects for either vignette, moreover, are statistically significant for either High or Low PSI subgroups.

To assess whether the closest relationships are more likely to produce a contact effect, though, Table 5.6 compares the differences in vignette treatment response between
Table 5.5 Liberties Vignette Response by Network Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reasonable Base Model</th>
<th>Reasonable Interactions</th>
<th>Considering Base Model</th>
<th>Considering Interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inparty</strong></td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outparty</strong></td>
<td>0.34**</td>
<td>0.33**</td>
<td>0.28**</td>
<td>0.29*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inparty x Network</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outparty x Network</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Network</strong></td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>White</strong></td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.35**</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td>0.33***</td>
<td>0.33***</td>
<td>0.30***</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>College</strong></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South</strong></td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cutpoint)</td>
<td>-1.93</td>
<td>-1.93</td>
<td>-1.32</td>
<td>-1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cutpoint)</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>1,315</td>
<td>1,315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive $\beta$’s indicate less reciprocity

*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
those that name an outparty member *first* in the name generator procedure versus those who do not name an outparty member at all in the name generator. The first name
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immigration Reasonable</th>
<th>Immigration Considering</th>
<th>Liberties Reasonable</th>
<th>Liberties Considering</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inparty</td>
<td>-0.34***</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outparty</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.22</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

generated is the individual with whom the respondent “generally talks with most about politics;” if there is any effect of outparty contact on deliberative bias, it should be here.
Table 5.6 displays only the interaction model results for both the immigration and civil liberties vignettes, and both the “reasonable” and “worth considering” questions. Here, again, the results do not suggest a great difference in response between subgroups. For the immigration vignette, the interaction coefficients are substantively larger than they were in Table 5.4. Moreover, there is a significant difference in response in outparty treatment in the “considering” model; those with an outparty individual as their first named discussant are more likely to say that an outparty counterargument is “worth considering,” as compared to individuals who do not have any outparty discussants. However, given the fact that this is an “easy test” for intergroup contact theory and it is the only of four coefficients that are significant, one cannot take too much stock in this result. With the liberties vignette, there are no significant interaction coefficients; as with Table 5.5, the only term even approaching statistical significance has the opposite sign of what is theoretically expected.

Similarly, with Table 5.7 there appears to be little difference in treatment response when one looks specifically at individuals with more than one outparty discussant. Here, both the inparty and outparty treatment indicators are interacted with two dummy variables—one indicating whether the respondent names one outparty discussant, and another indicating whether the respondent names two or more outparty discussants. The “2+ Discussants” interaction, thus, compares differences in treatment response between those with zero outparty discussants and those with either two or three outparty discussants. The table shows that in only one of the interactions is there a significant difference between those with two or more outparty discussants and those with none. The remainder of interactions with inparty and outparty treatment indicators, across
Table 5.7 Vignette Response by Number of Outparty Discussants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immigration Reasonable</th>
<th>Immigration Considering</th>
<th>Liberties Reasonable</th>
<th>Liberties Considering</th>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
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<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.33***</td>
<td>0.29*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inparty x 1 Discussant</td>
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<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.35)</td>
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<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inparty x 2+ Discussants</td>
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<td>-0.02</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.43</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.26)</td>
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</table>

N 1,314 1,314 1,314 1,315

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
models, are insignificant. In sum, the results suggest that neither the strength of one’s outparty member relationship nor the number of outparty members in one’s network make a direct difference in mitigating partisan biases toward deliberation.

5.5.1 COGNITIVE VERSUS AFFECTIVE MECHANISMS

Social contact, though, can potentially work in two ways; it can mitigate partisan bias through a cognitive process of learning, or it can serve to produce positive affect towards the outparty and deemphasize inparty salience. If the latter mechanism is at work, prejudice reduction would occur through a weakening of partisan social identity salience (which, as the last chapter shows, produces biases against deliberation). Thus, partisans with outparty network members would register lower social identity salience scores. Figure 5.3 shows evidence that, indeed, this is the case. While there is not a significant difference between those with one versus multiple outparty discussants, a t-test comparing those with zero outparty members versus those with at least one outparty

![Mean Social Identity Score by Number of Outparty Network Members](image)

Figure 5.3 Mean PSI Score by Outparty Network Size, Online Survey
member shows that the difference in PSI score between the two groups is significant ($p < 0.01$).

![Proportion with Countervailing Feeling Toward Parties by Presence of Outparty Contact](image)

**Figure 5.4 Feeling Toward the Parties, by Outparty Social Contact**

This should be taken with a grain of salt, though, as it is merely descriptive data of the non-probability sample gathered for the Online Survey. More weight, though, can be placed on Figure 5.4, which shows differences in feeling towards the parties for a representative sample of US Adults based on whether they have zero, or at least one, outparty member in their discussion network. This data comes from the September and November 2008 waves of the 2008-2009 ANES Panel Survey, and respondents’ discussion networks are generated in a similar way to the method used in the Online Survey\(^\text{20}\). In this survey, respondents are asked if they have any favorable, and then unfavorable, feelings towards the Democratic, then Republican party. Figure 5.4 shows

\(^{20}\) The ANES Panel survey allows respondents to name up to eight discussants. Perceived party affiliations, though, are only asked for the top three discussants named.
that, if a partisan respondent names an outparty member as one of their first three named discussants, they are more likely to have positive feelings toward their outparty ($\chi^2 p = 0.00$), as well as are more likely to have unfavorable feelings toward their inparty ($\chi^2 p = 0.01$). These results, like the non-representative results in Figure 5.3, suggest that outparty social contact mitigates social and affective attachment to one’s party, thus in turn indirectly effecting respondents’ anti-deliberative bias. It is too much to ask of the Online Survey, though, to untangle the causal relationship between social contact, social identity, and deliberative attitudes. This conclusion is thus only speculative. Further research that directly assess this question of causality needs to be done.

5.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter assesses whether one particular form of social contact—regularly discussing politics with members from one’s outparty—serves to mitigate partisan bias against an attitude of reciprocity. Results suggests that having outparty interpersonal contact does not appear to have a direct effect on reciprocal attitudes towards disagreement. Partisans in the Online Survey exhibited the same patterns of bias when assessing counterarguments regardless of whether they regularly discussed politics with a member from “the other side” or not. What’s more, the bias was not significantly diminished when one looks at partisans who have the strongest cross-party relationships, nor was it diminished when focusing on those with multiple cross-party relationships. Further, the effect of outparty contact is null regardless of whether one has weak or strong social identity ties to their party.

This being said, some of the nonexperimental data still suggest that outparty social contact may have an indirect effect on partisan biases against deliberation. Recall from Chapter Four that those for whom party is a stronger part of their social identity
were more likely to display systematic partisan biases when considering a policy
counterargument, and they were less likely to seek out deliberative attitudes in their
representative. Results from this chapter, in turn, show that partisans in the Online
Survey are more likely to have higher partisan social identity salience if they do not have
an outparty member as part of their discussion network. This descriptive finding was
validated from data through a representative national survey. Thus, even though there
does not appear to be a direct effect, social contact could still play a role in encouraging
deliberative public attitudes by reducing partisan social identity salience. This results is
also in line with other research on social contact, which suggest contact reduces prejudice
primarily through producing positive outparty affect and deemphasizing inparty identity

The possibility for significant social contact, be it through a regular political
discussion partner or another type of relationship, to foster deliberative ideals in the
public is intriguing and warrants future research. It is warranted not in the least due to
limitations of the study and the claims that can be made from it. Results that rely on
treatment effect heterogeneity must be treated with caution, as they are a step removed
from the causal framework provided by experiments (Gerber and Green 2012; Kam and
Trussler 2016). In this chapter, the non-null findings are two steps removed, with social
contact having its effect on treatment through a reduction in social identity salience.
Moreover, unlike in Chapter Four, key experimental results were not replicated with a
representative sample. Thus, one cannot say for certain whether results generalize
outside of the Online Survey sample, or if a confounding variable is driving the
relationship between social contact, social identity, and deliberative bias. Moreover, if
there is a relationship between social contact and social identity salience, the results
presented in this chapter are confounded by a difficult problem facing all social contact
research—the issue of homophily. Does outparty social contact reduce partisan social
identity salience, or does lower partisan social identity salience cause people to form
outparty contacts?

The results are at this point exploratory and point to a future research agenda. For
the issue of homophily, one cannot produce long-standing relationships as part of an
experimental treatment. The issue could be addressed through either longitudinal
research, or an experimental design where the response to treatment is measured for the
respondents’ network members. Sinclair (2012) employs both strategies to demonstrate
that social networks effect voting behavior. Moreover, the results from this experiment
could be replicated through a representative sample, such as the Time-Sharing
Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS) program. With a planning document and
theoretical expectations registered in advance, such an experiment would address issues
of external validity as well as appearances of “p-hacking.” It would also offer the
opportunity to more deeply investigate what types of relationships produce a contact
effect. For example, do close friendships and family relationships have a stronger effect
than coworker or acquaintance relationships? Does the frequency of discussion, or
whether the perception of discussions is positive or negative, matter? Do close
relationships through social media produce the same effect as close in-person
relationships, or does the medium matter? Finally, can imagined contact, if constructed
correctly, have an effect, as Crisp and Turner (2009) suggest.
Further, a population-based survey experiment could establish *in what ways* cross-party contact mitigates anti-deliberative bias. For example, some critics suggest that while contact reduces an individual’s prejudice, it does not change attitudes towards policies or systems that maintain group inequality (Dixon, Durrheim, and Tredoux 2005). Thus, it could be the case with this project that having an outparty discussant mitigates general negative feeling toward the outparty, but does not cause one to reconsider partisan cuetaking in forming a policy attitude. A future survey instrument, then, could have a series of experimental and non-experimental components that distinguish between contact’s effect on individual-level prejudice versus policy decision making.
CHAPTER 6

PERSONALITY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR DELIBERATION

“Some citizens are better than others at articulating their arguments in rational, reasonable terms. Some citizens, then, appear already to be deliberating, and, given the tight link between democracy and deliberation, appear already to be acting democratically…In this way, taking deliberation as a signal of democratic practice paradoxically works undemocratically, discrediting on seemingly democratic grounds the views of those who are less likely to present their arguments in ways that we recognize as characteristically deliberative.”


Even from a casual observation of public political discourse, it is clear that some people are more predisposed to discussing politics than others. Take me, for example. As a general rule, I am adverse to conflict. I seek to steer conversations with friends and family members away from hot-button political issues; when conversations go in that direction, I often seek to establish common ground rather than taking an adversarial stand. Compare this behavior to a particular family member of mine. She is very vocal on multiple platforms of social media, and she is not shy about taking a controversial stand. Her ideological outlook is clear to all in the family, and it has even strained relationships with other family members. There are many potential reasons why my family member is more vocal than I am; some if it may be due to my more politically moderate outlook, and some of it may be due to the social and environment context in
which we were raised and currently inhabit. It is reasonable to suspect, though, that differences in personality may play a role in our different approaches to discourse. Perhaps she is fundamentally more apt to vocal, certain, and at time adversarial political communication than I am.

While my family experience is purely anecdotal, it points to the possibility that attitudes towards deliberative democracy vary systematically with one’s personality. This is the possibility that this chapter explores. After a discussion of recent advances in personality psychology and their applicability to political behavior, this chapter tests whether two of the core “Big Five” personality traits advanced by psychology literature—openness to experience and conscientiousness—are mitigating factors for the partisan bias against deliberation that Chapter Four establishes. Running counter to what previous research would suggests, the results show that those scoring higher in openness to experience exhibit less deliberative attitudes towards political disagreement. They are more likely to follow partisan cues, as opposed to the substance of argument, when determining whether to approach a counterargument with an attitude of reciprocity. The results suggest a potential limitation to a “public” or “systematic” approach to deliberation. It suggests that some individuals, because of personality differences rooted in biology, are less apt to participate in discussion with ideals of deliberative democracy in mind.

6.1 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PERSONALITY

It is a banality to state that political behavior has many motivations. At a surface level, individual factors such as attitudes or material conditions, as well as environmental factors such as economic or demographic changes, can influence how one votes or
whether one attends protest rallies. At a deeper level, many argue that social or group-based elements of one’s identity, such as one’s race or partisanship, guide behavior across the range of opportunities for political action. Personality, though, runs even deeper than stable partisan or racial attachments. Personality is a “a biologically influenced and enduring psychological structure that shapes behavior,” (Mondak 2010, 6). This structure includes a package of traits, needs, values, and self-beliefs (Caprara and Vecchione 2013)—components that cannot be directly observed (although they can be measured). While not completely fatalistic, these components make us “who we are,” setting boundaries and producing reliable patterns of behavior. Specific political attitudes that are formed, then, are byproducts of personality and social context (Gerber et al. 2010). Personality also appears early in one’s life and is stable through the course of one’s adult life (Costa and McCrae 1988). Thus, while stable identities do consistently inform political behavior, even more stable personality characteristics influence the formation of identities.

There is some debate as to from where one’s personality comes. Caprara and Vecchione (2013) ask for caution in ascribing too much genetic determinism to personality, arguing instead that it arises through a combination of genetics, environment, and human agency. Mondak (2010, Ch. 2), however, makes a compelling argument that personality should be understood as primarily having biological origins. He points to twin studies designed to disaggregate the influence of inherited genetics and environment in the development of personality traits; these studies demonstrate that the majority of subjects’ trait variance can be explained by genetics, and only little can be explained by subjects’ shared or unshared environment. This research also falls in line with other
research on the genetic basis of political attitude and ideology formation (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005; Smith et al. 2011). As such, cautions from Caprara and Vecchione aside, personality should be thought of as primarily rooted in biology (see also Matthews, Deary, and Whiteman 2003, Ch. 6). This perspective, moreover, absolves issues of endogeneity in research; one can be confident that personality influences political behavior, not the other way around.

Although one’s personality encompasses a wide array of needs, value, self-beliefs, and other components, much research simplifies the study of personality to the examination of traits. Traits are “endogenous basic tendencies to exhibit consistent, stable patterns of experience and action across situations” (Caprara and Vecchione 2013, 24-5). They thus influence behavior and can be measured (Mondak 2010, 7). Even if they present a stylized picture of one’s inner personality, they more amenable to research than needs, values, or self-beliefs. Taking a trait approach to personality has functional value.

There are a host of potential traits that can comprise one’s personality, including many that have been used to study political behavior—racial resentment, authoritarianism, need to evaluate, and need for cognition are prominent examples. Until recently, the myriad of possible traits left researchers with a “bewildering array of personality scales from which to choose, with little guidance and no overall rationale in hand” (John and Srivastava 1999). To better facilitate progressive personality research, researchers have sought to summarize and simplify the battery of personality descriptors; since the 1990’s, personality psychologists have settled on a “Big Five” Taxonomy (John and Srivastava 1999; McCrae and Costa 1990). The Big Five—extraversion,
agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience—represent “core traits” according to this approach, rooted in biology and stable through one’s life. Other traits are “characteristic adaptations” (McAdams and Pals 2006) or “surface traits” (Asendorpf and Van Aken 2003), and are products of the interaction between core traits and social/environmental context. These include traits long of interest to political scientists, such as authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (Akrami and Ekehammar 2006). John and Srivastava (1999, 121) describe the “Big Five” personality traits as such:

  Extraversion implies an energetic approach to the social and material world and includes traits such as sociability, activity, assertiveness, and positive emotionality.
  Agreeableness contrasts a prosocial and communal orientation toward others with antagonism and includes traits such as altruism, tender-mindedness, trust, and modesty. Conscientiousness describes socially prescribed impulse control that facilitates task- and goal-directed behavior, such as thinking before acting, delaying gratification, following norms and rules, and planning, organizing, and prioritizing tasks…emotional stability [refers to an even-temperedness and contrasts with] negative emotionality, such as feeling anxious, nervous, sad, and tense. Openness to Experience (versus closed-mindedness) describes the breadth, depth, originality, and complexity of an individual’s mental and experiential life (italics in original).

  These five traits were discovered through lexical analysis—studies where respondents are given sets of adjectives and asked to assess how well those words apply to them or someone they know. Decades of studies have used this approach, where researchers seek to find a few key factors to simplify the myriad of potential trait
adjectives. This research has identified the five broad factors above as encompassing the wide swath of potential personality descriptors, and the five-factor model is now the consensus for trait researchers (John and Srivastava 1999; McCrae and Costa 1990; McCrae, Gaines, and Wellington 2013). As political scientists increasingly employ this model, it also allows for progressive research on the connection between personality and politics (whereas an ad-hoc trait approach does not).

6.2 PERSONALITY AS APPLIED TO POLITICS

There is a rich history of personality research in political science. For example, many past (Lasswell 1977 [1930]) and modern (Thoemmes and Conway 2007) studies have employed personality concepts to psychoanalyze individual political leaders. There is also a rich history of studying the personality trait of authoritarianism and its relation to political attitudes and behavior (Adorno et al. 1950; Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Since the “Big Five” approach came predominant in personality research during the 1990’s, and brief measures made data collection easier (Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003), a number of studies have researched the connection between personality traits and political ideology (e.g. - Barbaranelli et al. 2007; Jost 2006; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003). Most of these studies find strong correlations between openness to experience and liberalism, as well as contentiousness and conservatism. This connection is strongest for political elites (Caprara et al. 2003), but it is still present for the mass public.

There are less consistent relationships between the other three traits and ideology. Gerber et al. (2010), however, contend that this is partially due to the fact that the effect of dispositional traits varies across issue domain and social context. For these authors,
while the “Big Five” are stable, genetically-produced traits, they do not directly shape our political attitudes. They instead shape how we respond to political stimuli, and how political stimuli is perceived varies based on issue and social context. As such, through a large national survey, they find that, for example, agreeableness is strongly associated with liberal economic views as well as conservative social views. Using race as a proxy for social context, they also find that blacks, as opposed to whites, who rate higher on openness to experience are much more likely to hold liberal views. They also find that whites, as opposed to blacks, who rate high on contentiousness are more likely to hold conservative views. Their study highlights both the importance of considering contexts in studying the political effects of personality as well as the fact that the effects of personality can easily be masked by contextual differences.

One of the most thorough works on the implications of the Big Five framework for politics comes from Mondak (2010). He argues that people do not encounter the political world as “blank slates,” but that “important differences gain shape long before we encounter the political world,” (18). Using three surveys of different populations and employing different measures of personality, he finds that each of the Big Five traits has an effect on ideology as well as other politically relevant attitudes and behaviors. For example, he finds that people that are open to experience and extraverted seek out political information more through the media, have more discussion partners, and are more knowledgeable. They are also more prone to political participation broadly; extraversion leads to more “social” or “group” forms of participation (such as attending rallies), which openness to experience is related to individualistic forms of participation (like contacting a representative). Mondak also finds interactive effects between traits, as
well as between traits and other attitudes. For example, he finds that those that are low on conscientiousness and high on openness to experience have the highest levels of political knowledge. He also shows that the relationship between conscientiousness and participation hinges on external efficacy; if high conscientiousness individuals feel like they can be efficacious, they are more likely to participate. While offering rich and varied analysis of the connection between personality and political behavior, Mondak acknowledges that there is much more to be done. He states that “in many instances, it seems like the influence of personality will operate through mediating factors,” and he calls for more theory building and research to discover these conditional relationships (2010, 185).

Some past research suggests that personality may influence whether one adopts deliberative attitudes to a discussion setting. Marcus et al. (1995), for example, finds that those that are high in emotional stability and openness to experience, as well as those low on extraversion, are more likely to be tolerant of political expression for outgroups. Mutz (2006) uses survey data from a representative national sample to show that those who have a high civil orientation to conflict are more likely to learn of rationales for opposing views through exposure to political disagreement. She also shows through a lab experiment that those predisposed to higher perspective taking ability are more likely to exhibit political tolerance. Further, Mondak (2010) finds that those that score high on openness to experience tend to have an aversion to moral traditionalism and moral judgement. He also finds a curvilinear relationship between contentiousness and a desire for representative compromise, with those scoring lowest and highest on this trait being the least desirous of compromise.
This work suggests a way that deliberation could be exclusionary and normatively troubling. As detailed in Chapter Two, deliberative democracy has long been criticized for excluding various groups and perspectives; this includes socioeconomically disadvantaged groups that may be less likely to be versed in rational norms of discussion (Young 2000), those with claims rooted in religious faith (Fish 2000), or those who wish to make a radical claim more generally (that may be perceived to be out of the bounds of reciprocity) (Sanders 1997). If certain personality traits are also related to a diminished capacity for deliberation, that implies that, to the extent that U.S. political discourse demands a deliberative ideal at a systems level (Mansbridge et al. 2012), individuals with these traits will be less likely to offer their opinion or influence debate. In other words, large numbers of individuals, because of their biologically-determined personality, are more likely to be left out of the democratic process. For advocates of a deliberative system, where ideals of reciprocity extend beyond small-group deliberative polls or elite political institutions, there will need to be a consideration of how to limit differences in discursive participation due to the psychology of personality.

6.3 HYPOTHESES

My hypotheses focus on how a few key personality traits impact the likelihood that one will adopt a deliberative attitude toward political disagreement. First, I posit that those scoring higher on openness to experience will display more reciprocity than those scoring lower on this trait. This is due to the fact that those scoring high on this personality trait tend to be information-seeking (Heinstrom 2003) and seek out a diversity of cultural activities (Kraaykamp and Eijck 2005). Mondak (2010) also finds that those

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21 This normatively troubling conclusion, though, holds for the U.S. political system as it is today, as research shows that individuals vary in their level of political participation currently based on personality traits (Mondak 2010).
high on openness are less likely to expose moral traditionalism or make moral judgments. If individuals high on openness are less judgmental and seek out a variety of information, it stands to reason that they will be more likely to treat disagreeing information with mutual respect.

Conversely, I expect that those scoring higher on the conscientiousness personality trait will exhibit less reciprocity towards political disagreement. This personality trait implies a respect for order, personal responsibility, and traditionalism. Those high on conscientiousness also tend to be risk-adverse (Kowert and Hermann 1997). With regards to political behavior, conscientiousness tends to have the opposite effect of openness to experience. It is positively related to ideological conservatism, Republican identification, and moral traditionalism and judgement (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, et al. 2010; Mondak 2010). If this trait is related to order, risk aversion, and traditionalism, it stands to reason that it will be related to respondents not offering open-minded consideration to political disagreement, as well.

With regards to openness and conscientiousness, I expect to find a direct effect of these personality traits on attitudes of reciprocity. Given the effect that personality, and in particular openness to experience, have on partisan identification broadly (Mondak 2010; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, and Dowling 2010), I also expect to find evidence of indirect effects, with the two traits examined having an effect on deliberative attitudes through influencing partisan social identity salience.

Finally, I expect that the effect of openness and conscientiousness on deliberative bias is not reducible to the differences in partisanship and ideology that previous studies have shown. As such, I expect to find consistent effects when one looks at only
Democrats or only Republicans, and consistent effects based on the issue positions
respondents take.

6.4 DATA AND METHOD

Data for this analysis comes from the Online Survey; again, the focus of analysis
in this chapter will be with the interpersonal immigration and civil liberties vignettes,
where the strongest evidence of deliberative bias based on partisan social identity can be
found. Respondent personality is measured through the Ten Item Personality Inventory
(TIPI) developed by Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann (2003). In developing their measure,
Gosling et al. compare results from the TIPI to an established, 44-item Big Five
personality measure. They find that the TIPI is closely correlated to the longer measure
of personality on self, observer, and peer assessments, has a high level of intra-
respondent correlation when respondents are retested six weeks later, and is nearly as
closely related to external correlates of personality as the longer measure. While longer
measures are best, they recommend the TIPI when a brief measure is needed, or when
personality is not a primary focus of research. The TIPI has since been adopted in much
research on personality and political behavior, and it has been included in “gold-
standard” national political surveys such as the American National Election Study.

Each of the ten items that comprise the TIPI consist of a pair of adjectives by
which the respondent is asked to assess herself; for example, the first item states “I see
myself as EXTRAVERTED, ENTHUSIASTIC” (capitalization present in text of Online
Survey). For each item, the respondent is asked whether she agrees or disagrees based on
a seven-point scale. There are two items that correspond with each of the Big Five traits.
To prevent an acquiescence bias, they are oriented in opposite directions; for one item,
agreeing implies a higher score on the trait, and for the other item, disagreeing implies a higher score. Responses are coded from one to seven (with seven indicating a higher score on the trait), and the scores for the two items for each trait are averaged to produce a final score for the trait. Text for all ten items can be found in the Appendix.

The focus of analysis, again, is on the openness to experience and conscientiousness personality traits. Average respondent scores for these two traits, based on partisanship and self-reported ideology, can be found in Table 6.1. As one can see, Democrat identifiers and leaners score higher on the openness score, and lower on the conscientiousness score, than Republican identifiers and leaners. Self-identified liberals (those that are “slightly liberal” to “strongly liberal”) are also higher on openness and lower on conscientiousness than self-identified conservatives. For both traits, the differences between both Democrats and Republicans, and liberals and conservatives, are significant at $p < 0.01$ based on t-tests. This is what previous research on personality and politics would expect, and it serves as an indicator of measurement validity for the TIPI.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Liberals</th>
<th>Conservatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>4.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscientiousness</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>5.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with previous chapters, respondents are divided into binary subgroups, divided at the median score for the two personality traits. In addition to assessing differences in overall response between groups, following Gerber and Green (2012), the differences in experimental treatment response between these two groups will be assessed formally through ordered logistic regression with the use of interaction terms.
6.5 RESULTS

Table 6.2 displays differences in treatment response for both vignettes based on the openness to experience personality trait, focusing on the question of whether the counterargument is “reasonable.” As a whole, it appears that whether one responds to a counterargument with an attitude of reciprocity hinges on this trait. However, the relationship is the opposite of what is hypothesized, as those higher in openness to experience systematically display weaker attitudes of reciprocity. For the immigration model, openness does not condition how one responds to the treatment conditions. The standalone trait indicator, however, is significant, suggesting that those who score higher on openness to experience are less likely to respond deliberatively regardless if they are in the inparty, neutral, or outparty condition. For the liberties vignette in Table 6.2, however, openness does condition how individuals respond to outparty treatment. Those high on openness to experience are significantly (p = 0.06) more likely than those low on the trait to respond with less reciprocity to a counterargument simply because it comes from the outparty. These results are displayed graphically in Figure 6.1. As one can see, for both vignettes respondents across the board are more likely to state that the counterargument is “not at all reasonable” if they score high on openness to experience. With the liberties vignette, they are also more likely to respond to outparty treatment with a diminished reciprocal attitude. In the outparty condition, the predicted probability of stating that a liberties argument is not at all worth considering rises from 0.31 for those low on openness to 0.47 for those high on openness.
Table 6.2 Response to “Reasonable” Question, by Openness to Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immigration Base Model</th>
<th>Immigration Interactions</th>
<th>Liberties Base Model</th>
<th>Liberties Interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inparty</td>
<td>-0.30**</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outparty</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inparty x Openness</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outparty x Openness</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.50*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
<td>0.41**</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.33***</td>
<td>0.34***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cutpoint)</td>
<td>-1.53</td>
<td>-1.52</td>
<td>-1.72</td>
<td>-1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cutpoint)</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1314</td>
<td>1314</td>
<td>1314</td>
<td>1314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
There are not similar differences in response, though, for contentiousness and agreeableness. Results for these two traits can be found in the Appendix; none of these models has a statistically significant interaction between trait and treatment. Nor are there significant interaction effects for the other two personality traits for which a hypothesis was not generated, extraversion and emotional stability. Thus, personality does appear to have an effect on one’s capacity for deliberation, but openness to experience is the only trait out of the Big Five that matters. What’s more, further predictive margins displayed in the Appendix suggest that while the effect of this personality trait on deliberative attitudes is strongest for Democrats, there is an effect for both Democrats and Republicans.

There is a possibility that the surprising result for openness to experience is driven by the specific questions. Previous research has demonstrated that those high in openness to experience tend to be more liberal (Jost 2006) and are less likely to express moral
judgement (Mondak 2010). The anti-deliberative attitudes evinced by those high on this personality trait, particularly with the immigration vignette, could thus be driven by a socially liberal attitude. In this case, respondents are not willing to accept an argument against their tolerant position toward undocumented immigrants. To test this possibility, Table 6.3 compares the immigration vignette results for those initially giving a pro-immigration response (and thus receiving an anti-immigration counterargument) and those initially giving an anti-immigration response (and thus receiving a pro-immigration counterargument). As one can see, there is a clear difference in responses between the two subgroups. The coefficient for the openness indicator shows that those that are pro-immigration, and receiving the anti-immigration counterargument, are across the board less likely to view the argument as reasonable if they score high on this trait. Those that are anti-immigration do not have that same across-the-board response based on openness to experience. However, anti-immigration respondents do vary in how they respond to experimental treatment based on whether or not they score how on openness to experience. Those opposed to liberal immigration policy are more likely to view a counterargument to their position as reasonable if it comes from an inparty member, and less likely to do so if it comes from an outparty member. While these interaction terms for the anti-immigration subgroup are not statistically significant (due to a small N), there are substantively large. Thus, both subgroups are reacting less deliberatively to their counterargument, by either discounting it across the board (for pro-immigration respondents) or by conditioning their response based on party cues (for anti-immigration respondents).
Table 6.3 Differences in Response to Immigration Vignette, by Argument Received and Openness to Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>“Pro” Argument</th>
<th>“Anti” Argument</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inparty</td>
<td>-0.10 (0.32)</td>
<td>-0.32 (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outparty</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.36)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inparty x Openness</td>
<td>-0.42 (0.52)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outparty x Openness</td>
<td>0.73 (0.56)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>0.01 (0.38)</td>
<td>0.56*** (0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0.57** (0.29)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.02*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.28 (0.21)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>-0.27 (0.21)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0.18 (0.22)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cutpoint)</td>
<td>-1.31 (0.43)</td>
<td>-1.76 (0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cutpoint)</td>
<td>2.08 (0.43)</td>
<td>1.13 (0.30)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[N\] 375 939

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity.

* \(p < 0.1\), ** \(p < 0.05\), *** \(p < 0.01\)

A key question, though, is whether this effect for openness to experience is a direct effect, or if it works indirectly by reducing partisan social identity salience. Table
6.4 suggests that it may be the former rather than the latter. As it indicates, both high and low openness to experience subgroups have similar PSI scores. Figure 6.2, however, tells a different story. This figure displays predictive margins for the liberties vignette by social identity subgroup (regression results are available in the Appendix); here, there is a significant difference in outparty treatment response based on openness to experience for Low PSI partisans, but not for High PSI partisans. This being said, Figure 6.3 suggests that both High and Low PSI partisans are, across the board, less likely to respond deliberatively to an immigration counterargument if they score high on openness to experience. Taken as a whole, Figures 6.2 and 6.3 suggest that personality may have the largest effect for those with lower partisan social identity attachments, but openness to experience encourages deliberative attitudes regardless of one’s social identity attachment to one’s party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Openness to Experience</th>
<th>Mean PSI Score</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>677</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter demonstrates that personality has an impact on whether partisans adopt a deliberative attitude toward political disagreement; the impact, though, is somewhat surprising. Counter to what past research would suggest, partisans scoring high on the openness to experience trait responded less deliberatively to disagreement than those scoring low on the trait. This difference manifested in two ways; for the immigration vignette, those scoring high on the trait were less likely, across the board, to
Figure 6.2 Response to Liberties Vignette, by PSI and Openness to Experience

Is Liberties Argument Reasonable?
by PSI and Openness to Experience

High PSI

Low PSI

Note: predicted probabilities from ordered logistic regression

Figure 6.3 Response to Immigration Vignette, by PSI and Openness to Experience

Is Immigration Argument Reasonable?
by PSI and Openness to Experience

High PSI

Low PSI

Note: predicted probabilities from ordered logistic regression
view disagreement as reasonable or worth considering. For the liberties vignette, those high on openness were more likely to follow partisan cues as opposed argumentative substance (the latter being more desirable from a deliberative standpoint) when determining whether to view disagreement as reasonable or worth considering. Moreover, while there are differences in response patterns based on partisanship or respondents’ issue position, the impact of openness to experience on attitudes of reciprocity is not reducible to partisanship or issue attitude alone. There were not significant difference in respondents’ attitudes towards deliberation, though, based on the other four traits that comprise the Big Five.

It is surprising that those more open to experience adopt less deliberative attitudes. Adjectives that are associated with this personality trait include “imaginative,” “curious,” and “prefer variety” (McCrae and Costa 1990, 3). As discussed earlier, those scoring on this trait are information-seeking (Heinstrom 2003), seek out a diversity of cultural activities (Kraaykamp and Eijck 2005), and are more likely to suspend moral judgement (Mondak 2010). That there are less likely to respond to policy disagreement with an open mind is perplexing. More research needs to be done to assess whether these results replicate. Research done with a representative national survey would be particularly valuable, as some of the conclusions drawn here are based on nonexperimental differences in responses (and thus raise questions of how far the conclusions extend beyond the non-representative Online Survey sample). Moreover, perhaps the quixotic results are driven by the specific issues studied; would these results, for example, hold with an issue that has less of a clear relationship to feelings of political tolerance, such as tax policy? The results in this chapter, in sum, provide a spark to
thinking about the connection between openness to experience and deliberation, and they invite more research.

Cautiousness of the conclusions aside, this chapter does point to an important normative concern for deliberative democracy that proponents, particularly proponents of a “deliberative system” that extends to mass public spaces of discussion, need to address. While reciprocity is a guiding norm for deliberative political discourse, most theorists would argue that democracies should actively ensure that deliberation is as inclusive as possible as well (e.g. – Young 2000). If the results are correct in implying that there are differences in the propensity for deliberation based on personality, this implies that a certain population, because of biologically produced differences, are less able to participate in decision making in an ideal deliberative democracy22.

The number less likely to engage in deliberation may be large. For instance, Figure 6.4 shows a histogram of the U.S. adult population based on how they score on the TIPI openness to experience scale. The median score (5.5) for Online Survey respondents is given with the dotted line; the figure shows that 37% of the U.S. adult population would score at or above the median Online Survey score on this measure, and would thus be coded in the “high openness to experience” subgroup. Theorists have in the past have raised concerns that deliberative democracy may be exclusionary based on socioeconomic status, religiosity, or ideological stance. The results of this chapter and Figure 6.4 suggest that biology (via personality) may also make deliberation exclusionary. This is less of a concern for deliberative polls or other minipublics, where

22 It is not just deliberative democracies, though, that are subject to this critique. Mondak (2010), for example, finds systematic differences in the likelihood of voting or erstwhile participation in politics based on Big Five personality traits. The raises normative concerns of biological exclusion for modern U.S. democracy, not simply ideal deliberative democracy.
a random sample of the population participates. If, however, our society aspires to a “deliberative system,” where discursive norms such as reciprocity imbue media communication, everyday interpersonal discussion, or other more “public” sites of discourse, differences based on personality need to be addressed. Future theoretical and empirical research, then, should tackle the question of how, in a system where deliberation extends beyond minipublics, all voices regardless of personality can engage.

Figure 6.4 Distribution of Openness to Experience Score for U.S. Adults
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

“Through talk among formal and informal representatives in designated public forums, talk back and forth between constituents and elected representatives or other representatives in politically oriented organizations, talk in the media, talk among political activists, and everyday talk in formally private spaces about things the public ought to discuss...people come to understand better what they want and need, individually as well as collectively. The full deliberative system encompasses all of these strands”

- Jane Mansbridge, "Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System" (1999, 211)

This concluding chapter will accomplish three tasks. First, it will summarize the key results of the project, and it will situate the findings within larger discussions on deliberative democracy and partisan polarization. Second, the chapter will highlight both short term and long term directions for future research that build directly from this project. Finally, the chapter will make a normative argument for deliberative democracy and the ideal of reciprocity in guiding both “empowered” and “everyday” spaces of political discourse.

7.1 SUMMARY OF PROJECT AND FINDINGS

This project illustrates the impact of partisan polarization on attitudes towards deliberative ideals of discourse. It speaks to the potential for the U.S. to establish a more deliberative democracy. As opposed to other democratic theory that focuses on elections,
rights, representation, or other concepts, deliberative democratic theory focuses on the processes of decision making and justification in which governments engage. With its roots in Aristotle’s exultation of the Athenian assemblies, deliberative theorists idealize decision making that is preceded by discussion characterized by inclusiveness, publicity, and rational argumentation, among other values. A key discursive norm for nearly all deliberative theorists is a norm of reciprocity, which can be briefly summarized as a mutual respect in argument. It requires arguers to offer reasons that others, at least minimally, see as legitimate, and it requires those receiving arguments to keep an open mind and change their opinion with evidence if appropriate. With reciprocity, there is a goal of, but not an absolute mandate for, consensus. Gutmann and Thompson (1996), thus, place reciprocity in between a demand for complete consensus on moral values and self-interested (even if tolerant) political bargaining.

Since the 1980’s, deliberative democratic theory has been a central theoretical, empirical, and practical focal point in the study of democracy. Critics have asserted that deliberative political decision making, guided by reciprocity, is exclusionary (Sanders 1997; Fish 2000), unrealistic (Shapiro 2000), or simply not good social science theory (Mutz 2008). Proponents (Habermas 1983; Mansbridge 1980; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Dryzeck 2010), however, argue that ideal deliberation leads to a host of benefits, such as greater legitimacy for political decisions, better and more consensual decisions, and learning and empathy for those who participate in the process. While there is not a complete consensus (see, for example, Jackman and Sniderman 2006), many empirical researchers have validated these supportive claims (Fishkin 1995; Barabas 2004; List et al. 2012; Druckman and Nelson 2003). What normative and empirical researchers on
deliberation have failed to do, though, is fully explore the conditions by which one will adopt the deliberative ideal of reciprocity when one enters political discussion. The question for the conditions for deliberation is particularly important, moreover, given the increasing normative attention to “deliberative systems” (Mansbridge et al. 2012). If, in these systems, some form of reciprocity needs to be present in media communication, public advocacy, interpersonal citizens discussion, and other public or “everyday” sites of discourse, it is important for researchers to assess in what context citizens will be willing to adopt reciprocal norms outside a deliberative poll or other small-scale, formally deliberative setting.

This project makes an important contribution to this regard, assess how partisanship and polarization impact the public’s propensity to adopt an attitude of reciprocity. Drawing on social identity theory, in Chapter Four I argue that partisan social identity attachment—in other words, the extent to which one views being a Democrat or being a Republican as an important part of “who one is”—weaken one commitment to deliberative ideals in a variety of ways. Through a series of survey experiments focused on policy vignettes, I show that, as opposed to following Habermas “unforced force of the better argument” (1993, 163), partisans heed party cues in considering whether to afford reciprocity towards political disagreement. The effects of partisanship on reciprocity are particularly pronounced for those whom partisan social identity salience is especially high. Diverging from past research on partisan social identity that primarily focuses on outparty effects (Iyengar et al. 2012; Lelkes and Westwood 2015), this subset of partisans both display less reciprocity towards outparty arguments and more reciprocity toward inparty arguments. “Social” partisans, moreover,
are also less likely to support an inparty political representative compromising with the
other party. Research shows that the U.S. partisan public has increasingly polarized not
based on ideology, but on social distance (Mason 2015; Huddy et al. 2015). Thus, results
in Chapter Four show that this mass “social” polarization is creating a fundamental
barrier to the possibility of a deliberative system idealized by Mansbridge and others,
with discourse at all levels characterized by a commitment to reciprocity.

Other chapters explored the conditions by which the deliberative bias created by
partisan social identity varies. Chapter Five examined whether outparty social contact
mitigates biases that occur with deliberation amongst partisans. Drawing on
interpersonal contact theory (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998) as well as research on
political networks (Mutz 2002; Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg 2013), it was
hypothesized that having regular political discussions with outparty members would
soften the effect of partisan cues on whether one evinces reciprocity. The results show,
though, that the deliberative bias partisans exhibit is not directly influenced by whether
they have discussions with outparty members. However, nonexperimental results are
suggestive that outparty social contact can have an indirect effect on deliberative attitudes
through reducing partisan social identity salience. This conclusion should be further
explored through experimental and/or representative observational research.

Finally, Chapter Six explores how the deliberative bias produced by partisan
social identity varies by one’s personality. Drawing on a “Big Five” trait
conceptualization of personality (McCrae and Costa 1990), the chapter shows that those
scoring high on one particular personality trait—openness to experience—react less
deliberatively towards partisan policy disagreement than those scoring low on this trait.
This difference, moreover, is not reducible to differences in partisanship or issue attitude. These results are surprising, given that adjectives such as “curious” and “imaginative” are used to characterize individuals high on the openness to experience trait (McCrae and Costa 1990, 3). More theoretical thinking and empirical research will need to be done to validate and explain the effect of the trait on deliberative attitudes such as reciprocity. However, an effect of personality, generally, on attitudes towards reciprocity points to a normative concern that those making an argument for a “deliberative system” need to address. Personality is primarily rooted in one’s genetics and is largely unchanging through one’s life (Costa and McCrae 1988; Matthews, Deary, and Whiteman 2003, Ch. 6). As such, the results of this chapter suggest that an ideal deliberative system may exclude a certain population because their biologically-determined personality leaves them less apt to deliberate.

7.2 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This project only represents a start of inquiry into the relationships between polarization, social identity, and deliberative democracy. For one, future research could push results found in this project further. One way this could be done would be to examine a wider array of issue domains with the interpersonal vignettes. The two issues used were selected for concerns of face validity; immigration and civil liberties, it was argued, are issues where it is plausible that both Republicans and Democrats could take a variety of positions. While partisan social identity informs whether or not one took a deliberative approach to both issues, the patterns of responses differs across issues. Future theoretical and empirical work could thus explore why these differing patterns exist. Which types of issues (social, economic, racial, etc.) are most likely to produce
anti-deliberative attitudes amongst partisans? Is the effect of partisan social identity stronger for “easy” issues that map on clear partisan divides? Or is it stronger for “hard” issues, where respondents are more likely to look for a partisan cue in considering how to approach disagreement? Likewise, future research could manipulate argumentative strength, seeing if partisans with strong social identity attachments are just as likely to not evince reciprocity towards good arguments as bad ones. Some of the results from this study, as well as past research (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Carmines and Stimson 1980), would suggest that partisan deliberative bias is stronger for “easy” issues, and the effects of partisan social identity would hold up regardless of argumentative strength. These intuitions, though, need to be developed into a fully formed theory, subsequently tested through empirical research.

Another way to expand on the results from this project is to validate the findings concerning outparty social contact and personality found in Chapters Five and Six. Both of these chapters presented suggestive results concerning the direct and indirect effects of contact with an outparty member, as well as the openness to experience personality trait, on whether one approaches partisan disagreement with an attitude of reciprocity. These results, however, are not completely conclusive, as they rely heavily on the non-representative Online Survey. What’s more, many of the results in these two chapters focus on respondents’ (nonexperimental) overall attitudes toward counterarguments, not differences in attitudes based on experimental treatment group. These two chapters, thus, invite replication with a survey experiment on a representative sample. This replication, moreover, could ask additional questions that explore the nuances in the relationships between social contact, personality, and deliberation. For instance, the Online Survey
only asked a few basic questions with regard to outparty social contact. A future survey instrument could ask additional questions that do not simply address whether contact matters, but the specific characteristics of cross-party relationships that are likely to be associated with anti-deliberative attitudes. These questions could also assess the extent to which the medium (e.g., social media versus face-to-face) matters in producing a contact effect.

The results of this project speak ill for the prospect of deliberation in “mass public” or “organic” sites of discourse—social media, interpersonal discussions, public meetings, etc. Defenders of deliberative minipublics, though, may argue that social identity biases melt away when one is put in a fully deliberative setting. Whether they actually would or not is not immediately clear. While past research relying on deliberative polls, forums, and other minipublics has found greater likelihood of consensus (Fishkin 1995; Barabas 2004), the mechanism through which this materializes is often not identified (see Mutz 2008 for an elaboration of this critique). It is thus not clear that deliberative forums produce consensus by deemphasizing competing social identities. In fact, Mendelberg and Karpowitz (2007) show that group identity norms do not disappear in deliberative forums, but can inform the decision making process. A task left for future research, then, is to assess whether and how the bias against reciprocity produced by partisan social identity holds up outside of a survey poll, in a structured deliberative forum. If biases are not reduced, it emphasizes the importance of further research how group identities inhibit deliberation, as well as how group identity salience can be mitigated in service of deliberation. If partisan biases are reduced in deliberative forums, it augurs for the important place of these structured minipublics in a deliberative
democratic system. It also invites research into how “everyday” sites of political
discussion can adopt features of the minipublic to promote higher quality discourse.

Further, future research could assess whether other social identities; such as
racial, gender, or class identity, influence attitudes towards deliberation. This research
could also examine whether these other identities serve as antecedent, or intervening,
factors in the relationship between partisan social identity and deliberation. Finally,
future research could address the question of what is to be done, given the effect of
polarization and partisan social identity on deliberative discourse. What can academics,
policymakers, and practitioners do to foster better public deliberation? Are there ways to
foster healthy deliberation, or at least a healthy deliberative system with a division of
discursive labor, without reversing the course of polarization or reducing strong partisan
identities? If not, what would it take to reverse the course of mass social polarization,
and would that be normatively desirable? What tradeoffs are involved?

7.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF (FULLY) PUBLIC DELIBERATION

The goal of this project is primarily empirical—to assess the relationship between
partisan social identity and deliberative ideals, not to pass judgment on these ideals as
such. However, the fact that I am focusing my research on the conditions for productive
public deliberation means I do think deliberative democracy has something to offer for
our society. The goals many would like government to achieve—mitigating climate
change, equitable and affordable health care, vibrant and just economic growth, reducing
the national debt, and others—have become increasingly complex and difficult to write
good policy for. The state is also increasingly intertwined in our economic, social, and
personal lives; small government and anti-regulation rhetoric aside, most citizens, when
asked directly, prefer these government interventions and the benefits they can bring. Given these two realities, good decision making should be a key value government aspires to. Competent leaders, making competent policy, needs to be the norm.

Some democratic theorists argue achieving this norm, given what we know about citizen competence as it stands today, can only come by severely circumscribing public participation (Schumpeter [1942] 2003; Brennan 2016). However, this would take away from a norm of equality, which is also something governments should aspire to. It is possible that rule by technocracy or epistocracy may produce better (for some, or even for many) policymaking. Indeed, some deferral to experts and administrators is necessary for any modern democracy, not matter how participative. This being said, even well-intentioned elite decision making, without wide ranging public input, runs the risk of excluding marginalized groups and voices from decision making. What can result is, at best, a “tyranny of the majority,” where majority interests are catered to and minority interests are excluded or subjugated. At worst, decision making that over-emphasizes competence at the expense of democratic equality can have systematic blind spots; it can cater to narrow or parochial interests as opposed to the public as a whole. This is a potential for even “good faith” political decision making, assuming an absence of corruption or lack of interest in generality.

Deliberative democratic ideals also place a focus on quality of political decision making; ideal deliberation, though, can balance both a norm of competence and a norm of equality for government decisions. By incorporating and seriously considering a variety of perspectives with a discursive process, decisions that are made after deliberation draw on a wider array of information than individualistic decision making processes. The
deemphasizing of power and goal of following the “unforced force of the better argument” also makes ideal deliberation less susceptible to biased or narrow thinking. These components encourage competent decision making. At the same time, requirements of reciprocity and inclusion in argument and decision justification encourage individuals to offer equitable policymaking, or policy that can be seen as legitimate by those that disagree and in the general interest of all. As such, decisions are more likely to attend to all affected groups, not simply a “tyrannical” majority. In sum, deliberative democracy, at its ideal, achieves the competent decision making our times demand as well as values of political equality that democracy has long demanded.

Of course, according to the public opinion literature, citizens are very far from the mutual respect that ideal deliberative democracy calls for. This literature paints a picture of citizens that are incompetent, non-participative, and irrational; many point to this literature to suggest that deliberative democracy is an unrealistic ideal (Mutz 2008; Brennan 2016; Achen and Bartels 2016). Further, some argue that deliberative democracy is fundamentally unrealistic because it removes the unremoveable role of power in discussion and government decision making (Shapiro 2000). But this is what makes deliberation so valuable as a critical ideal. It would be wrong to think of it in binary terms, where we either have ideal deliberation or a failure to deliberate (and thus a failure of normative theory). Even with less-than-ideal discourse, we can have better or worse adherence to deliberative values. For example, the 2016 Presidential election campaign arguably marked a move away from rhetoric based on reciprocity and accountability and towards manipulative and exclusionary rhetoric. Reversing this
development, even short of a perfect ideal, should be seen as normatively positive from the standpoint of deliberative democracy.

Given the unimpressive picture of citizen competence drawn by public opinion scholars, some argue that deliberative theorists should think less about public or “everyday” spaces of discourse, and focus more on deliberation in “empowered” forums such as deliberative minipublics or legislative bodies. There is an argument for this. With the key requirement that deliberative speech being empowered or consequential (Dryzeck 2010), it may not matter that reciprocity is not evinced in social media or workplace discussions, as long as its evinced in citizens’ juries or in Congressional committees. If that is the case, it may not be a problem for deliberative democracy if partisan social identity disrupts deliberative attitudes in the public, as long as structured deliberative spaces temper identity-produced biases. However, as argued in Chapter Two, this line of thinking about deliberative democracy is not very democratic. A tension between deliberative political bodies and an anti-deliberative public, moreover, cannot be sustainable. Policymakers come from the same social and cultural zeitgeist that all citizens inhabit, and research shows that aggregate citizen opinion can influence the actions of policymakers (Erikson et al. 2002). If citizens do not value reciprocity, accountability, publicity, or other deliberative values with “everyday” political discussion, it is not likely that representatives will adopt these values in making policy. If, instead, citizens respond to partisan appeals, outgroup marginalization, and ideological rigidity and brinkmanship, representatives have incentive to adopt these characteristics in policy debate. A deliberative democratic system thus needs a citizenry that, at least to some extent, accepts the value of reciprocity.
Deliberation, thus, a) is valuable for competent and equitable government decision making, b) is a critical ideal that is worth moving towards even if it is never perfectly achieved, and c) needs to extend beyond legislative bodies or empowered small-scale settings like deliberative forums. With all of this in mind, it behooves us to think about under what conditions citizens will want to adopt deliberative ideals organically. Without the structure of a deliberative forums, or the political and financial connections necessary to win a Congressional seat, when will citizens adopt values such as reciprocity, publicity, accountability, inclusion, or other values in their political rhetoric? This project is a start, but this is a question normative theorists, empirical researchers, and practitioners of deliberative democracy need to address. If we can, deliberative democratic ideals may be able to have a lasting impact on how the mass public thinks about politics, talks about politics, and acts on political beliefs.
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APPENDIX A

PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY AND IDEOLOGICAL PARTISANSHIP MEASURES

For the ideological partisanship measure, the Online Survey gives the respondent 11 declarative statements concerning an array of policy issues, allowing for a close-ended response set which includes “Strongly Agree,” “Agree,” “Neither Agree nor Disagree,” “Disagree,” and “Strongly Disagree.” These items draw directly from ANES Time Series surveys. Six of the items have been in every iteration of the ANES since 1982; using these items will allow me in the future to attest to the import of the result of this project, given changes in ideological partisanship over time. An additional five policy items in this survey are drawn from the 2012 ANES Time Series survey. An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using every policy question in the 2012 ANES was conducted, and five items that loaded clearly on either the first or second factors were included. The 11 policy items range in topic from social welfare to offshore drilling to gay marriage. They are all, however, policies that have a clear liberal vs. conservative dimension. Following a technique employed by Carsey and Layman (2002) as well as Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012), the 11 policy items were put on the same scale (from one to five, with lower values indicating more liberal responses), and then they were used to create ideology scores for each respondent using one-dimension confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and extracting factor scores. The CFA model produced an RMSEA of 0.103 and a CFI of 0.850. Both indicate a less than ideal model fit, which may be expected given the
variety of issue items included into the sole factor. However, the scores produced incorporate information from each of the item into a single indicator of ideology, as opposed to focusing on, for example, solely economic or solely social issues. For the sole purpose of dividing respondents into simple subgroups, these scores thus suffice.

The statements are listed below, with the proportion of variance of each item that is explained by the CFA model:

- The government should provide fewer services even in areas such as infrastructure and education in order to reduce spending ($R^2 = 0.407$)
- The government should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living ($R^2 = 0.315$)
- All people’s medical expenses should be paid by individuals through private insurance plans, not the government ($R^2 = 0.519$)
- By law, abortion should never be permitted ($R^2 = 0.279$)
- The government should spend much less money for national defense than it currently does ($R^2 = 0.184$)
- In order to protect the environment and create jobs, the government needs to regulate business ($R^2 = 0.420$)
- The government should allow more offshore drilling for oil and natural gas in U.S. waters ($R^2 = 0.366$).
- The government should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of African-Americans ($R^2 = 0.352$)
- The government should repeal the Affordable Care Act (the health care reform law passed in 2010) ($R^2 = 0.578$)
Gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to legally marry ($R^2 = 0.299$)

The government should make it more difficult for people to buy a gun ($R^2 = 0.328$)

Next, the scores were inverted for Democratic respondents, so that higher scores for Democrats mean more liberal respondents, while higher scores for Republicans mean more conservative respondents. Thus, for all partisan respondents, a higher ideological partisanship score means a stronger commitment to one's party platform (liberalism for Democrats, conservatism for Republicans). Respondents were then placed in “High Ideology” and “Low Ideology” subgroups based on these scores. “High Ideology” Democratic respondents are more liberal than the median scoring Democratic identifier or leaner on the ideological partisanship score (0.50), and “High Ideology” Republican respondents are more conservative than the median scoring Republican identifier or leaner on this measure (0.51). Out of the 1,336 partisan and leaning respondents, only 14 had missing data on the issues questions and thus did not receive a score.

Partisan Social Identity (PSI) is operationalized differently by the two survey instruments; in the Online Survey, the measure is based on the following three statements, where the respondent is asked for their extent of agreement on a five-point scale:

- When I talk about Democrats (Republicans), I usually say “we” rather than “they”
- When someone criticizes Democrats (Republicans), it feels like a personal insult
- I don’t have much in common with most Democrats (Republicans)

Each item was put on the same one to five scale, with higher scores indicating higher social identity salience. The PSI score is an average of partisans' responses on
these three measures, with missing items not included in the average. Out of 1,336 partisan identifiers and leaners, 1,327 answered all three questions, and no respondents did not answer any questions.

For the Telephone Survey, a different set of questions as follows, based on the work of Huddy, Mason, and AarøE (2015) was used to create PSI scores, using different five-point scales for responses:

- How important is being a Democrat (Republican) to you?
- How well does the term Democrat (Republican) describe you?
- When talking about Democrats (Republicans), how often do you use “we” instead of “they”?
- To what extent do you think of yourself as being a Democrat (Republican)?

The PSI score is an average of partisans' responses on these four measures, with missing items not included in the average. Lower scores, here, indicate higher social identity salience. Out of 515 partisan respondents, 482 answered all four questions, and only one respondent did not answer any questions. For both the Online and Telephone Survey respondents, partisans were divided into “High PSI” and “Low PSI” subgroups. For the Online Survey, “High PSI” partisans have scores at or above the median for all partisans and leaners (3.0). For the Telephone Survey, “High PSI” partisans have scores below the median for all partisans (2.5).

As the box plots that follow suggest, the majority of respondents are clumped toward the median of both the PSI and ideological partisanship measure in the Online Survey, as opposed to being evenly distributed across the range of scores. For the PSI measure, the 25th percentile respondent has a score of 2.3, and the 75th percentile
respondent has a score of 3.7. For the ideological partisanship measure, the 25th percentile respondent has a score of 0.2, and the 75th percentile respondent has a score of 0.8. Similar clustering at the median is found in the Telephone Survey for the PSI measure; here, the 25th percentile respondent has a score of 1.75, and the 75th percentile respondent has a score of 3. This clustering at the median for all of these measures lends credence to dividing respondents into subgroups at the median, as opposed to treating the variables as continuous (and assuming linear effects across the entire range of these measures).

![Distribution of PSI Measure, Online Survey](image)

Figure A.1 Distribution of PSI Measure, Online Survey
Figure A.2 Distribution of Ideological Partisanship Measure, Online Survey

Figure A.3 Distribution of PSI Measure, Telephone Survey
APPENDIX B
SURVEY TEXT

B.1 IMMIGRATION INTERPERSONAL VIGNETTE

Next, I would like to ask you for your opinion on some more current issues. Imagine a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for “strongly disagree,” 10 stands for “strongly agree” and 5 stands “neither agree nor disagree.” Where would you place yourself, from 0 to 10, in response to the following statement?

“Unauthorized immigrants in the United States should have a path towards qualifying for US citizenship.”

(SCALE)

The branch the respondent goes down from here for the next two questions depends on his or her answer to the question above. If the respondent chooses 0-4, proceed to branch #1 below. If the respondent chooses 6-10, choose branch #2 below. If the respondent chooses #5, randomize the branch he or she follows.

Branch #1: Others have a different perspective. Some (Democrats/Republicans/no identifier) have argued that many unauthorized immigrants are hard-working and contribute to the economy and their communities. They suggest that denying these individuals an opportunity for citizenship would be unfair.

What do you think of this argument? Is it a very reasonable, somewhat reasonable, or not at all reasonable opinion to have on the issue?

A. VERY REASONABLE (1)
B. SOMEWHAT REASONABLE (2)
C. NOT AT ALL REASONABLE (3)

Responses were coded 1-3, as indicated above, for the analysis that is in the main text.

Do you think this argument is worth considering a good deal, somewhat, or not at all in forming your own view on the issue?

A. A GOOD DEAL WORTH CONSIDERING (1)
B. SOMEWHAT WORTH CONSIDERING (2)
C. NOT AT ALL WORTH CONSIDERING (3)

Now, I would like for your opinion again. Imagine a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for “strongly disagree,” 10 stands for “strongly agree” and 5 stands “neither agree nor disagree.” Where would you place yourself, from 0 to 10, in response to the following statement?

Unauthorized immigrants in the United States should have a path towards qualifying for US citizenship

(SCALE)

{NEW PAGE}

Branch #2: Others have a different perspective. Some (Democrats/Republicans/no identifier) have argued that unauthorized immigrants, if given a path towards citizenship, would compete with American workers for jobs. Offering a path towards citizenship would thus be unfair to workers who are in the country legally.

What do you think of this argument? Is it a very reasonable, somewhat reasonable, or not at all reasonable opinion to have on the issue?
A. VERY REASONABLE (1)

B. SOMEWHAT REASONABLE (2)

C. NOT AT ALL REASONABLE (3)

Do you think this argument is worth considering a good deal, somewhat, or not at all in forming your own view on the issue?

A. A GOOD DEAL WORTH CONSIDERING (1)

B. SOMEWHAT WORTH CONSIDERING (2)

C. NOT AT ALL WORTH CONSIDERING (3)

Now, I would like for your opinion again. Imagine a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for “strongly disagree,” 10 stands for “strongly agree” and 5 stands “neither agree nor disagree.” Where would you place yourself, from 0 to 10, in response to the following statement?

Unauthorized immigrants in the United States should have a path towards qualifying for US citizenship

(SCALE)

{NEW PAGE}

B.2 CIVIL LIBERTIES VIGNETTE, FOR BOTH SURVEYS

Again, imagine a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for “strongly disagree,” 10 stands for “strongly agree” and 5 stands “neither agree nor disagree.” Where would you place yourself, from 0 to 10, in response to the following statement?

The government’s collection of telephone and internet data is necessary as part of its anti-terrorism efforts.

(SCALE)
The branch the respondent goes down from here for the next two questions depends on his or her answer to the question above. If the respondent chooses 0-4, proceed to branch #1 below. If the respondent chooses 6-10, choose branch #2 below. If the respondent chooses 5, randomize the branch he or she follows

Branch #1: Others have a different perspective. Some (Democrats/Republicans/no identifier) have argued that government collection of telephone and internet data has made our country safer, and it is needed to stop the next terrorist attack.

What do you think of this argument? Is it a very reasonable, somewhat reasonable, or not at all reasonable opinion to have on the issue?

A. VERY REASONABLE (1)
B. SOMEWHAT REASONABLE (2)
C. NOT AT ALL REASONABLE (3)

Do you think this argument is worth considering a good deal, somewhat, or not at all in forming your own view on the issue?

A. A GOOD DEAL WORTH CONSIDERING (1)
B. SOMEWHAT WORTH CONSIDERING (2)
C. NOT AT ALL WORTH CONSIDERING (3)

Now, I would like for your opinion again. Imagine a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for “strongly disagree,” 10 stands for “strongly agree” and 5 stands “neither agree nor disagree.” Where would you place yourself, from 0 to 10, in response to the following statement?
The government’s collection of telephone and internet data is necessary as part of its anti-terrorism efforts.

(SCALE)

{NEW PAGE}

Branch #2: Others have a different perspective. Some (Democrats/Republicans/no identifier) have argued that government collection of telephone and internet data violates the liberties that our founding fathers gave us and is unconstitutional.

What do you think of this argument? Is it a very reasonable, somewhat reasonable, or not at all reasonable opinion to have on the issue?

A. VERY REASONABLE (1)
B. SOMewhat REASONABLE (2)
C. NOT AT ALL REASONABLE (3)

Do you think this argument is worth considering a good deal, somewhat, or not at all in forming your own view on the issue?

A. A GOOD DEAL WORTH CONSIDERING (1)
B. SOMEWHAT WORTH CONSIDERING (2)
C. NOT AT ALL WORTH CONSIDERING (3)

Now, I would like for your opinion again. Imagine a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for “strongly disagree,” 10 stands for “strongly agree” and 5 stands “neither agree nor disagree.” Where would you place yourself, from 0 to 10, in response to the following statement?
The government’s collection of telephone and internet data is necessary as part of its anti-terrorism efforts

(Scale)

{NEW PAGE}

B.3 REPRESENTATIVE VIGNETTE

During the course of the 2016 congressional campaign, you hear a speech from a (Democratic/Republican) congressman in your state running for re-election. The speech focuses on energy policy, and it touts how the congressman (worked with both parties to increase domestic energy production/worked to increase domestic energy production).

Upon hearing this, how would it affect your likelihood of supporting for this congressman?

A. I WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE CONGRESSMAN (1)

B. I WOULD BE NEITHER MORE OR LESS LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE CONGRESSMAN (2)

C. I WOULD BE LESS LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE CONGRESSMAN (3)

B.4 DISCUSSANT NAME GENERATOR QUESTIONS

Next, I’d like to know the first names or just the initials of people with whom you discuss government, elections, or politics. These people might be from your family, from work, from the neighborhood, from some other organization you belong to, or they might be from somewhere else.

Who is the person you generally talk with most about politics? Please write their name or initials in the field below.

BLANK FIELD
Aside from this person, who is the person you generally talk with most about politics? Please write their first name or initials in the field below.

BLANK FIELD

Aside from anyone you have already mentioned, is there anyone else you talk with about politics. Please write their first name or initials in the field below.

BLANK FIELD

If the “Don’t discuss” option is selected in any of the three questions above, end with the following question:

In that case, can you give me the first name of the person with whom you were most likely to have informal conversations during the course of the past few months? Please write their first name or initials in the field below.

BLANK FIELD

Repeat the following two questions for all names given:

Compared with (NAME), would you say that your political views are much the same, somewhat different, or very different?

A. MUCH THE SAME (1)

B. SOMewhat DIFFERENT (2)

C. VERY DIFFERENT (3)
Do you think (NAME) normally favors Republicans or Democrats, or both, or neither?

A. REPUBLICANS (1)  
B. DEMOCRATS (2)  
C. BOTH (3)  
D. NEITHER (4)

{NEW PAGE}

B.5 TEN-ITEM PERSONALITY INDEX (TIPI) MEASURE

In the following ten statements, a number of personality traits will appear that may or may not apply to you. Please select a response next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which each of the pair of traits applies to you individually, even if some apply more strongly than others.

For these next ten personality questions, the response will all range from one to seven, with higher numbers indicating more agreement. For each question, the respondent will see all of the choices below:

1. STRONGLY AGREE  
2. MODERATELY AGREE  
3. AGREE A LITTLE  
4. NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE  
5. DISAGREE A LITTLE  
6. MODERATELY DISAGREE  
7. STRONGLY DISAGREE
I see myself as EXTRAVERTED, ENTHUSIASTIC (note here that these traits,
as with the following ones, will appear in all caps to the respondent)

I see myself as CRITICAL, QUARRELSOME

I see myself as DEPENDABLE, SELF-DISCIPLINED

I see myself as ANXIOUS, EASILY UPSET

I see myself as OPEN TO NEW EXPERIENCES, COMPLEX

{NEW PAGE}

I see myself as RESERVED, QUIET

I see myself as SYMPATHETIC, WARM

I see myself as DISORGANIZED, CARELESS

I see myself as CALM, EMOTIONALLY STABLE

I see myself as CONVENTIONAL, UNCREATIVE

{NEW PAGE}
APPENDIX C

CHAPTER FOUR ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS

Table C.1 Demographic Data for Both Surveys

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<th>Online</th>
<th>Telephone</th>
<th>US Population*</th>
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<td>62.8%</td>
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<td>% Female</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
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<td>46.3%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>% Identifying or Leaning Rep.</td>
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<td>45.9%</td>
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*US Population data comes from the 2014 American Community Survey as well as the 2012 ANES Time Series Study

Below are descriptions of the variables used in the regression analyses throughout this text (as well as below in this section):

- inparty: indicator of same-party treatment group
- outparty: indicator of different-party treatment group
- PSI: dummy indicator for social identity salience, respondent scores above the median for all partisan respondents on the PSI measure
- ideology: dummy indicator for ideological partisanship, respondent scores above the median for all partisans on this measure
- white: dummy indicator, respondent is non-Hispanic white
- age: age of respondent, continuous
- male: dummy variable, respondent is male
- college: dummy variable, respondent has a bachelor's degree or higher
- South: dummy variable, respondent lives in South census region
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<th>Reasonable Interactions</th>
<th>Considering Base Model</th>
<th>Considering Interactions</th>
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Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table C.3 Immigration Vignette Results for Republicans Only, Online Survey

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<th>Considering Interactions</th>
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**N** = 372

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table C.4 Liberties Vignette Results for Democrats Only, Online Survey

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Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table C.5 Liberties Vignette Results for Republicans Only, Online Survey

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<th>Considering Interactions</th>
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| N                        | 373                   | 373                     | 373                    | 373                     |

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β's indicate less reciprocity

*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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**Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity**

* *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
APPENDIX E

CHAPTER SIX ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
Table E.1 Vignette Response by Contentiousness

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Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table E.2 Vignette Response by Agreeableness

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Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Figure E.1 Openness to Experience Results Across Parties, Immigration Vignette

Figure E.2 Openness to Experience Results Across Parties, Liberties Vignette
Table E.3 Response to “Reasonable” Question, by Openness and PSI

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Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01