

2016

# A Call To Every Citizen: The South Carolina State Council Of Defense And World War I

Allison Baker

*University of South Carolina*

Follow this and additional works at: <http://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd>



Part of the [Public History Commons](#)

---

## Recommended Citation

Baker, A.(2016). *A Call To Every Citizen: The South Carolina State Council Of Defense And World War I*. (Master's thesis). Retrieved from <http://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/3866>

This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [SCHOLARC@mailbox.sc.edu](mailto:SCHOLARC@mailbox.sc.edu).

A CALL TO EVERY CITIZEN: THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATE COUNCIL OF DEFENSE AND  
WORLD WAR I

by

Allison Baker

Bachelor of Arts  
University of South Carolina, 2008

---

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of Master of Arts in

Public History

College of Arts and Sciences

University of South Carolina

2016

Accepted by:

Allison Marsh, Director of Thesis

Lana Burgess, Reader

Paul Allen Miller, Vice Provost and Interim Dean of Graduate Studies

© Copyright by Allison Baker, 2016  
All Rights Reserved.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my advisors, Allison Marsh and Lana Burgess, for their patience and wisdom, and without whom this project would not be complete. Thank you as well to my friends and family, who coaxed and cajoled, and feigned ignorance when needed. Thank you especially to my husband, Isaac Adelman, for your unending support and understanding.

## ABSTRACT

The South Carolina State Council of Defense (SCSCD), under the auspices of the Council of National Defense (CND), worked to convince citizens to voluntarily change their daily habits in the name of the World War I home front effort. The CND developed programs designed to get people to eat less of specific foods, cut back on unnecessary spending, and to participate in war bond drives like the liberty loans. The SCSCD brought the national programs to the local level. This project also demonstrates the strained relationship between the SCSCD and its auxiliary organizations, the Woman's Committee and the Colored Branch.

The research is presented as an exhibit script, with the intention of showing the exhibition at McKissick Museum. The script contains panel and object label text, images of the objects and posters to be shown in the exhibit, and a proposed layout. Also included is a process statement that provides the research and historiography on which the exhibit is based.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
LIST OF FIGURES.....	vi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	viii
CHAPTER 1: PROPOSED EXHIBITION LAYOUT.....	1
CHAPTER 2: EXHIBIT SCRIPT FOR <i>A CALL TO EVERY CITIZEN: THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATE COUNCIL OF DEFENSE AND WORLD WAR I</i> .....	5
CHAPTER 3: PROCESS STATEMENT .....	21
REFERENCES.....	56
APPENDIX A – ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	58

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Sample Exhibit Layout.....	4
Figure 2.1 <i>I Want You for U.S. Army</i> .....	6
Figure 2.2 <i>Enlist</i> .....	7
Figure 2.3 <i>Enlist On Which Side of the Window Are You?</i> .....	7
Figure 2.4 <i>The South Carolina Handbook of the War</i> Page 35 .....	8
Figure 2.5 <i>A Call to Every Citizen</i> .....	9
Figure 2.6 <i>Woman Your Country Needs You!</i> .....	10
Figure 2.7 Letter from Reed Smith to F. Louise Mayes, January 30, 1918 .....	11
Figure 2.8 Letter from F. Louise Mayes to Reed Smith, February 1, 1918 .....	11
Figure 2.9 <i>Seymour Carroll</i> .....	12
Figure 2.10 Letter from D. R. Coker to Joe Sparks, April 1918 .....	13
Figure 2.11 <i>Sow the Seeds of Victory!</i> .....	14
Figure 2.12 <i>Can Vegetables, Fruit, and the Kaiser, Too</i> .....	14
Figure 2.13 Letter from Reed Smith to the State Council Section of the Council of National Defense, June 21, 1918 .....	15
Figure 2.14 Letter from George Porter to Reed Smith, November 24, 1917 .....	16
Figure 2.15 <i>The U.S. Government Has Asked Us to Help</i> .....	17
Figure 2.16 Letter from Reed Smith to Melvin T. Copeland, c. 1917 .....	18
Figure 2.17 <i>That Liberty Shall Not Perish from the Earth</i> .....	19

Figure 2.18 Letter from George Seay to Reed Smith, May 21, 1918..... 20



## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CPI ..... Committee on Public Information

CND ..... Council of National Defense

SCDAH ..... South Carolina Department of Archives and History

SCSCD ..... South Carolina State Council of Defense

## CHAPTER 1

### PROPOSED EXHIBITION LAYOUT

This exhibit is conceptualized as an archival exhibit focusing primarily on the documents of the South Carolina State Council of Defense (SCSCD) papers housed at the South Carolina Department of Archives and History (SCDAH). The objects to be exhibited are circulars and bulletins from the Council of National Defense (CND) to the SCSCD, and correspondence between the SCSCD and the CND, and also within the state organization and county councils. Posters produced during World War I are the other main element of the objects, representing national messages viewed at the state level. The exhibit is composed of two main sections, one reflecting the goals and actions of the national council, and the other analyzing the response of the South Carolina state council. They can be viewed together thematically, based on organizational makeup and the two groups' activities, or the two sections can be viewed separately.

#### **1.1 LIST OF PANELS**

Panel 1: America Goes to War

Panel 2: Council of National Defense: Fighting from the Home Front

Panel 3: Propaganda

Panel 4: South Carolina State Council of Defense

Panel 5: Woman's Committee

Panel 6: Colored Branch

Panel 7: Programs

Panel 8: Thrift and Economy

Panel 9: Grocery Delivery

Panel 10: Liberty Bonds

Panel 11: Lessons Learned

## **1.2 LIST OF OBJECTS AND THEIR LABELS**

Object Label 1: *I Want You for US Army*, c. 1917, James Montgomery Flagg.

Object Label 2: *Enlist*, c. 1916, Fred Spear; *Enlist On Which Side of the Window Are You?*, c. 1917, Laura Brey.

Object Label 3: *The South Carolina Handbook of the War* excerpt, pg. 35.

Object Label 4: *A Call to Every Citizen*

Object Label 5: *Woman Your Country Needs You!*, 1917, Anonymous.

Object Label 6: Letter from Reed Smith to F. Louise Mayes, January 30, 1918; and Letter from F. Louise Mayes to Reed Smith, February 1, 1918.

Object Label 7: *Seymour Carroll*, c. 1918, Anonymous.

Object Label 8: Letter from D. R. Coker to Joe Sparks, April 1918

Object Label 9: *Sow the Seeds of Victory!*, c. 1918, James Montgomery Flagg; and *Can Vegetables, Fruit, and the Kaiser Too*, c. 1918, J. Paul Verrees.

Object Label 10: Letter to the State Councils Section of the Council of National Defense from Reed Smith, June 21, 1918.

Object Label 11: Letter from George Porter to Reed Smith, November 24, 1917.

Object Label 12: *The U.S. Government Has Asked Us to Help*, c. 1917,

Anonymous.

Object Label 13: Letter from Reed Smith to Melvin T. Copeland, N.D.

Object Label 14: *That Liberty Shall Not Perish from the Earth*, 1918 Joseph Pennell.

Object Label 15: Letter from George Seay to Reed Smith, May 21, 1918.

### **1.3 PROPOSED LAYOUT**

The panels and objects for the national council section should go on the walls of the exhibition space. Panel 1 should go to the left of the entrance to the exhibition space, so that if the viewer chooses to go in order, they will go clockwise around the exhibition space from the entrance. Panels 2, 3, 7, and 11 will be on the walls, with panel 11 being on the other side of the entrance. Next to Panel 2, on the left, will be the poster *I Want You for US Army* with object label 1. To the left of panel 3 will be the posters *Enlist* and *Enlist On Which Side of the Window Are You?* with object label 2. Panel 7 will be on the wall, near case 1 and 2.

The South Carolina state council panels and objects should go into cases near correlating national council wall panels. Case 1 will be near panel 3, but not so close that they appear associated. Panel 4 should go in case 1 with object labels 3 and 4. *The South Carolina Handbook of the War*, associated with object label 3, should be open to pages 34 and 35, with the top of page 35 as the emphasized text. Panel 5 will be in case 2 with object label 6 and the letters associated with it. Object label 5 and *Woman Your Country Needs You!* will be on the wall next to case 2. Case 3 contains panel 6, object

labels 7 and 8, and the associated objects. Since *Seymour Carroll* is a poster, this case will be larger than the rest. Case 4 will contain panel 8, object labels 10 and 11, the letter from Reed Smith to the State Councils Section of the Council of National Defense, and the letter from George Porter to Reed Smith. The posters *Sow the Seeds of Victory!* and *Can Vegetables, Fruit, and the Kaiser Too* will be on the wall with object label 9 near case 4. Case 5 contains Panel 9 with object labels 12 and 13, and their objects. Case 6 contains panel 10, object label 15, and the letter from George Seay to Reed Smith. Object label 14 and its associated poster, *That Liberty Shall Not Perish from the Earth*, should be on the wall nearby.




Figure 1.1 Sample exhibit layout.

## CHAPTER 2

### EXHIBIT SCRIPT FOR A *CALL TO EVERY CITIZEN: THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATE COUNCIL OF DEFENSE AND WORLD WAR I*

The text below is formatted as it will appear on the panels and object labels. The image captions contain citation information and institution that owns the object or image. Object labels assume that the original document or poster will be displayed in the exhibit. Images of the posters or objects come before their associated labels.

#### **2.1 INTRODUCTORY PANEL**

Panel 1 (146 words):

America Goes to War

World War I broke out during a time of unprecedented industrial growth and social mobility for many combatant countries. New demand on resources in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century created unexpected resource allocation problems and altered how wars are fought. The US had over two years to observe how new industrial and economic factors affected the European battle zone.

The Council of National Defense (CND) developed to influence civilian support of WWI by convincing them to change spending habits to keep vital resources available for military use, such as wheat, meat, and metal. The federal government believed citizens could be convinced to forego necessities and comforts to support the war effort, rather than force rationing through legislative action as they did during World War II. The CND created a system of state and county councils meant to get national propaganda to every citizen.

#### **2.2 COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PANELS**

Panel 2 (124 words):

Council of National Defense: Fighting from the Home Front

United States Congress established the Council of National Defense to assess war preparedness, address identified issues, and to coordinate state-level preparedness

initiatives. The CND was a large organization overseen by an executive council, which included the Secretaries of War, Navy, Labor, Interior, and Commerce. Congress also created an advisory council, composed of civilian experts in industry, raw materials, and other areas of interest to wartime mobilization.

The CND created national campaigns to limit purchases of certain foods, how people made purchases, and to convince people to invest money and time into the war effort. They sent the details of these campaigns to the state council with the expectation of complete compliance at the state level.



Figure 2.1 *I Want You for U.S. Army.*

Object Label 1 (39 words):

*I Want You for U.S. Army, c. 1917*  
*James Montgomery Flagg*  
*Color Lithograph*

In his first poster appearance, Uncle Sam singles out the individual viewer for service. His stare, his pointing hand, and the emphasis on “YOU” create a sense of urgency for the viewer to enlist at their local recruiting office.

*Courtesy of World War I Posters, Prints and Photograph Division, Library of Congress, LC-DIG-ppmsc-03521*

Panel 3 (141 words):

Propaganda

The national council used multiple tools to convince South Carolinians to support and join in the efforts of the state council. Both the South Carolina State Council of Defense (SCSCD) and the Woman's Committee wrote letters to newspapers. The Woman's Committee went on speaking tours, and distributed leaflets. The Four Minute Men, a program under the Committee on Public Information, spoke in movie theaters while movie reels changed. They often partnered with the state council so that a speech at the movie theaters reinforced pamphlets or other speaking campaigns.

Posters are the most enduring form of World War I propaganda. They were a versatile medium, and relatively inexpensive to produce. Posters could be displayed in store fronts or on the street, or printed in magazines and newspapers. The images were both simple and complex, and created an emotional appeal to support the war in general, and specific war preparedness programs.



Figure 2.2 *Enlist.*



Figure 2.3 *Enlist On Which Side of the Window Are You?*

Object Label 2 (42 words):

*Enlist, c. 1916*  
*Fred Spear*  
*Photomechanical Print*

*Enlist On Which Side of the Window Are You?, 1917*  
*Laura Brey*  
*Color Lithograph*



Both of these posters urge men to join the military, but they use different emotional pulls. One draws on anger for the death of innocent victims, while the other shames the bystander into action.

*Courtesy of World War I Posters, Prints and Photograph Division, Library of Congress, LC-USZC4-1129, and LC-USZC4-9659*

### 2.3 SOUTH CAROLINA STATE COUNCIL OF DEFENSE PANELS

Panel 4 (150 words):

South Carolina State Council of Defense

The South Carolina legislature established the SCSCD in June 1917. The state council consisted of an executive committee and one representative from each county, who also acted as the chair for their county council of defense. The executive committee took two months to find men who could represent their counties. The men were white and middle class, active in their communities. They could also afford to travel to Columbia once a month for the council meetings.

Governor Richard I. Manning appointed D.R. Coker as chair the SCSCD by. Coker was the proprietor of an experimental farm in Hartsville, SC. Coker and his father also ran J.L. Coker & Company, the largest department store between Richmond and Atlanta. His understanding of both agriculture and retail prepared him to lead the SCCD's efforts to conserve food and understand the retailer's perspective of changing consumer spending habits.




Figure 2.4 *The South Carolina Handbook of the War, Page 35.*

Object Label 3 (34 words):

*The South Carolina Handbook of the War, 1917*  
*South Carolina State Council of Defense*

The SCSCD produced a propaganda book called *The South Carolina Handbook of the War* to explain how the war started, how the US got involved, and why every South Carolinian should support the war.

*Courtesy of the administrative records of the South Carolina State Council of Defense, S192068, South Carolina Department of Archives and History*




Figure 2.5 *A Call to Every Citizen.*

Object Label 4 (20 words):

*A Call to Every Citizen, c. 1917-1918*

*Anonymous*

*Ink on Paper*

The state council relied on its county branches to hold meetings to spread the CND's message, particularly in rural areas.

*Courtesy of reference material received by the South Carolina State Council of Defense, S192152, South Carolina Department of Archives and History*

Panel 5 (135 words):

Woman's Committee

Women were a crucial part of the CND's plans for conserving resources. As managers of the pantry, women controlled the food for their household. The Woman's Committee

was a state-level organization that worked almost parallel to the South Carolina State Council of Defense. F. Louise Mayes, chair the Woman's Committee, was active locally as State Regent of the Daughters of the American Revolution.

The state government gave the SCSCD a sizeable operating budget, but the Woman's Committee relied on a monthly stipend from the men's council that barely covered postage. Originally, women were left out of the SCSCD monthly meetings until Mayes insisted she be included. She secured a larger stipend that included a stenographer for the Woman's Committee meetings, but still had to request funding for larger expenditures, like traveling to conferences.



Figure 2.6 *Woman Your Country Needs You!*

Object Label 5 (35 words):

*Woman Your Country Needs You!, 1917*

*Anonymous*

*Color Lithograph*

Women could not fight at the front, but they could serve their country other ways. Women who join their local councils of defense help keep Liberty safe with their work at the home front.

*Courtesy of World War I Posters, Prints and Photograph Division, Library of Congress, LC-USZC4-9547*




Figure 2.7 Letter from Reed Smith to F. Louise Mayes, January 30, 1918.



Figure 2.8 Letter from F. Louise Mayes to Reed Smith, February 1, 1918.

Object Label 6 (37 words):

*Letter from Reed Smith to F. Louise Mayes, January 30, 1918*

*Letter from F. Louise Mayes to Reed Smith, February 1, 1918*

F. Louise Mayes believed that the Woman’s Committee did the bulk of the war work in South Carolina. Smith did not contradict her assessment. Instead he tried bundle council work together as one, downplaying the women’s contributions.

*Courtesy of correspondence files of the South Carolina State Council of Defense, S192069, South Carolina Department of Archives and History*

Panel 6 (166 words):

Colored Branch

Despite the CND’s call for “broad-minded cooperation of all units” of the organization, the SCSCD council members were indifferent about gaining African-American support for the war. The national council asked southern states to organize state and county Colored Branches to include African-Americans in the war effort. Executive Secretary Reed Smith cautioned against organizing African-Americans along the same lines as the rest of the organization. He suggested that having one active individual could accomplish more than an organized group. Essentially, Smith’s plan amounted to tokenism. It would be just enough to keep the CND happy without actually encouraging African Americans to participate in South Carolina’s political discourse.

Some Colored Branches developed at the county level, despite the state council's reluctance to take African-American participation seriously. Both Sumter and Union counties had highly organized branches. The CND regularly held up Sumter's Colored Branch as an example to the rest of the south, and the Union's Colored Branch launched speaking events targeted at both blacks and whites.



Figure 2.9 Seymour Carroll.

Object Label 7 (41 words):

*Seymour Carroll, c. 1918*  
*Anonymous*  
*Poster*

At first glance, the testimonials for Seymour Carroll seem to praise skills as a speaker. The testimonials come from white men who approve of what Carroll says, because Carroll did not push for equality for African Americans while advocating war preparedness.

*Courtesy of reference material received by the South Carolina State Council of Defense, S192152, South Carolina Department of Archives and History*



Figure 2.10 Letter from D. R. Coker to Joe Sparks, April 1918.

Object Label 8 (49 words):

*Letter from D. R. Coker to Joe Sparks, April 1918*

D. R. Coker’s suggestion for getting African Americans to buy war bonds intentionally misremembers history in the name of propaganda. Not only does he equate three years of German war crimes with four hundred years of slavery, but also ignores that “Uncle Sam” enslaved Africans in the first place.

*Courtesy of correspondence files of the South Carolina State Council of Defense, S192069, South Carolina Department of Archives and History*

Panel 7 (75 words):

Programs

The national council devised an ambitious, wide-ranging operation to reach every person and every dollar that person spent. These programs included a number of campaigns designed to change negative perceptions of the war, attitudes towards labor, and behavioral and consumption habits. These national campaigns attempted to bring all citizens into the war effort, including those traditionally excluded from the political process, like women and African-Americans. At the state level, including these groups was problematic.



Figure 2.11 *Sow the Seeds of Victory!*




Figure 2.12 *Can Vegetables, Fruit, and the Kaiser, Too!*

Object Label 9 (31 words):

*Sow the Seeds of Victory!*, c. 1918  
 James Montgomery Flagg  
 Color Lithograph

*Can Vegetables, Fruit, and the Kaiser Too*, c. 1918  
 J. Paul Verrees  
 Photomechanical Print

Posters advertising the CND's national campaigns turned planting and canning vegetables into acts of patriotism. Home-grown and canned vegetables could supplement or even replace grocery purchases, saving resources for soldiers overseas.

*Courtesy of World War I Posters, Prints and Photograph Division, Library of Congress, LC-USZCA-10234 and LC-USZCA-10671*

Panel 8 (169 words):

Thrift and Economy

The thrift and economy campaign was the Council of National Defense's most ambitious attempt to influence how consumers spent their money and how retailers sold their goods. The CND politicized purchased goods by emphasizing the "heavy strain" overly large purchases or wasteful habits placed on essential war-related resources. Wheat and meat were essential to keeping soldiers fed, and they traveled overseas better than other foods. To keep the demand low at home, the CND called for meatless Mondays and wheatless Wednesdays, and suggested corn meal and fish as alternatives.

During the 1917 holiday season, the CND asked shoppers to rethink their Christmas gifts. The national council suggested that gifts be utilitarian rather than frivolous. They also asked that shoppers not go after normal shop hours and that retailers not hire extra employees or have extended hours to conserve coal. Materials used to make toys or other recreational gifts could go to manufacturing military supplies instead. For the CND, the best gift would be a war bond.




Figure 2.13 Letter from Reed Smith to the State Council Section of the Council of National Defense, June 21, 1918.

Object Label 10 (40 words):

*Letter from Reed Smith to the State Councils Section of the Council of National Defense, June 21, 1918*

Claiming that the south is wasteful is one way of saying that South Carolina is critical to the thrift and economy program. Reed Smith believed that the state council's propaganda could convince South Carolinians to buy less and save more.



Courtesy of correspondence files of the South Carolina State Council of Defense, S192069, South Carolina Department of Archives and History.




Figure 2.14 Letter from George Porter to Reed Smith, November 24, 1917.

Object Label 11 (34 words):

*Letter from George Porter to Reed Smith, November 24, 1917*

The SCSCD partnered with other groups that worked on similar campaigns, and used public places to reach people. Libraries were one place where the CND could be sure to reach a wide variety of people.

Courtesy of correspondence files of the South Carolina State Council of Defense, S192069, South Carolina Department of Archives and History

Panel 9 (181 words):

Grocery Delivery

An early thrift and economy measure the Commercial Economy Board of the national council developed was to cut back grocery delivery. The CND tried to encourage customers in South Carolina's six largest cities to carry more of their groceries home to cut down on the number of delivery boys needed. According to the CND, these young men could better serve their country by working in a war industry, agriculture, or fighting in Europe.

At first, the SCSCD ignored this program. Reed Smith, secretary for the state council, argued that changing grocery delivery would be pointless because most of the state was rural. The change would be equally pointless in the cities because “The delivery system in Columbia . . . is mainly operated by negro drivers, whose time is not worth a great deal,” but in the spirit of cooperation, Columbia started to limit grocery delivery. At the time, African Americans made up 40% of South Carolina’s population, meaning Smith was willing to dismiss the efforts of almost half of the state as useless because they were not white.



Figure 2.15 *The U.S. Government Asked Us to Help.*

Object Label 12 (29 words):

*The U.S. Government Has Asked Us to Help, c. 1917*

*Anonymous*

*Color Lithograph*

Viewers and grocery retailers could contribute to the war effort by limiting their grocery deliveries. The CND considered grocery delivery a luxury that took food and supplies from soldiers.

*Courtesy of World War I Posters, Prints and Photograph Division, Library of Congress, LC-USZC4-9460*

Mr. Melvin T. Copeland,  
 Commercial Economy Board,  
 Council of National Defense,  
 Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Copeland: Your letter of Sept. 4, to Mr. D. H. Cober,  
 has been turned over to me for answer.

I have been in Washington twice recently and  
 have talked in person with a member of your board, Mr. Buchanan,  
 I think, the I do not recall his name just now.

As I explained to him in person, South  
 Carolina is almost exclusively composed of small towns with  
 a large rural population, Charleston is the only city over  
 20,000 in the State. Columbia comes next, with about 40,000.  
 One half of the population of this city are negroes.

The matter of cutting down deliveries was taken  
 up, I understand, in Charleston some weeks ago and the merchants  
 themselves decided against it. I have personally seen several  
 of our leading grocers and doubt whether such a plan would  
 accomplish much. The delivery system in Columbia, as in every  
 other South Carolina town, is mainly operated by negro drivers,  
 whose flow is not worth a great deal. No considerable equipment  
 could be released with the plan you propose to be put into  
 effect.

The South Carolina Council of Defense wishes to  
 co-operate in every way possible with your board, and we hold  
 ourselves ready at any moment to do whatever we are called upon  
 to. In these cases, however, unless you consider it advisable  
 for us to go ahead for the sake of the National organization,  
 I do not think the result would be worth while.

Yours very truly,  
 Executive Secretary

Figure 2.16 Letter from Reed Smith to Melvin T. Copeland, c. 1917.

Object Label 13 (45 words):

*Letter from Reed Smith to Melvin T. Copeland, c. 1917*

Reed Smith dismissed the African American delivery boys as useless to the war effort, both as soldiers and workers in war industries. The national council never directly addressed his racist justification for ignoring this program, but they did continue to press the SCSCD into compliance.

*Courtesy of correspondence files of the South Carolina State Council of Defense, S192069, South Carolina Department of Archives and History*

Panel 10 (99 words):

Liberty Bonds

Liberty bonds were a way for citizens to invest financially in the war effort. Citizens purchased securities from the federal government to finance the military and loan money to other allied countries. Theoretically, all the money saved as part of the Thrift and Economy campaign could go toward liberty bonds. There were four Liberty Loans during the war, and one Victory Loan in 1919, to which South Carolina contributed over \$82 million dollars. Overall, the US collected \$18 billion dollars in two years, which one estimate may have been two thirds of the total cost of war.



Figure 2.17 *That Liberty Shall Not Perish from the Earth.*

Object Label 14 (34 words):

*That Liberty Shall Not Perish from the Earth, 1918*

*Joseph Pennell*

*Color Lithograph*

The state and national councils wanted to make the war personal, even for those without a loved one fighting overseas. Posters like this one warned viewers that buying liberty bonds prevented Germany from invading.

*Courtesy of World War I Posters, Prints and Photograph Division, Library of Congress, LC-DIG-ppmsca-18343.*




Figure 2.18 Letter from George Seay to Reed Smith, May 21, 1918.

Object Label 15 (35 words):

*Letter from George Seay to Reed Smith, May 21, 1918*

George Seay’s best estimate of South Carolina’s contribution to the Second Liberty Loan would be worth approximately \$256 million today. Based on Seay’s data, South Carolinians contributed about \$500 apiece on average, or \$7,000 today.

*Courtesy of correspondence files of the South Carolina State Council of Defense, S192069, South Carolina Department of Archives and History*

**Conclusion**

Panel 11 (118 words):

Lessons Learned

World War I ended November 11, 1918. Every American citizen who bought a Liberty Loan, cut back on wheat and meat, or grew their own vegetables could claim a part of that victory. The Council of National Defense and its state branches like the South Carolina Council of Defense were flawed organizations, but their biggest success was to recognize the impact every person at the home front had on an overseas war. When the US entered World War II, Congress formalized the CND’s thrift measures as rationing. The US was able to sustain four years in a European war partially because of the work done on the home front by groups like the CND during WWI.

## CHAPTER 3

### PROCESS STATEMENT

With American entry into World War I, the Council of National Defense (CND), through its branches at the state, county, and township levels nationwide, sought to influence and alter the daily lives of every citizen in the name of supporting the American war effort. World War I erupted during a time of unprecedented industrial growth and social mobility in many of the combatant countries. The daily lives the CND tried to alter was one in which many Americans, particularly the growing middle class, had access to foods and luxuries that new technology and industry made affordable and readily available. This new demand on resources altered how the US conducted war, and created new problems for the military in allocating those resources. The Council of National Defense was the federal solution to that problem. Rather than imposing rationing laws, The CND opted to target the hearts and minds of the American people, as well as their wallets. The national council devised an ambitious, wide-ranging operation meant to reach every person and every dollar that person spent. The CND developed state, county, and even township councils to disseminate their programs and goals at the local level. These programs included a number of campaigns designed to change negative perceptions of the war, attitudes towards labor, and behavioral and consumption habits. The national campaigns attempted to bring all citizens into the war effort, including those traditionally excluded from the political process, like women and

African-Americans. Despite the CND's inclusive policies, the SCSCD had strained relationships with its auxiliary organizations, the Woman's Committee and the Colored Branch.

This project focuses on the papers of the South Carolina State Council of Defense (SCSCD), housed at the South Carolina Department of Archives and History (SCDAH). The SCSCD papers show how the national council tried to implement its goals at the state and local level, as well as how the organization itself worked within the Progressive mindset of the time.<sup>1</sup> This collection has not been researched or published previously. *A Call to Every Citizen* will display the work of the South Carolina State Council of Defense during World War I and to place that work in a national context. The bulk of the primary research came from the SCSCD papers at the SCDAH. The poster images come from the Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division<sup>2</sup> for the purposes of this document. This exhibit builds off of the theoretical frameworks of progressivism of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries and consumer activism as a tool of social change. To further explain the research and rationale behind the content of the exhibit, I will show in each section how these ideologies influenced the work of the CND and the SCSCD.

The CND and SCSCD conducted war preparedness work across a broad spectrum. They used propaganda to change how people felt about American involvement in a European war, studied conditions at the new training camps that emerged around the

---

<sup>1</sup> I first encountered this collection as part of an internship at the South Carolina Department of Archives and history. My tasks were to arrange, and when necessary to conserve, documents from this collection, as well as the Civil War papers of the Soldier's Board of Relief.

<sup>2</sup> High resolution image files of the posters are available online at <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/collection/wwipos>.

country, and launched other programs to funnel as many vital resources to the military as possible. This exhibit examines how the state and national council tried to change the details of daily life for South Carolinians, rather than catalog every CND program in South Carolina. South Carolina went to war only fifty before WWI in part because the state refused to recognize federal authority over what was considered a state matter. The CND and the SCSCD never doubted that South Carolinians would fall in line with the national agenda, but the two organizations sometimes differed over the relevance of the national agenda to South Carolina, such as how best to organize African Americans and the proposed grocery delivery service changes.

This exhibit focuses on what the national and state councils attempted to accomplish, not on whether or not they were successful. The source material for this project contains the optimism of the state and national organizations, but give little indication as to whether people grew more of their own food, ate less wheat and meat, or participated in any of the other preparedness programs the organizations developed. The liberty loans are the only CND and SCSCD programs that have statistical data available. The bonds themselves were successful, but the source of this success is difficult to determine. The SCSCD and CND are partially responsible for the success, but other organizations also promoted liberty bonds and similar programs.

### **3.1 INTRODUCTORY PANEL**

To understand the content of this exhibit, the viewer should have a basic understanding of World War I history. I assume that the viewer knows roughly when WWI took place, the underlying causes, and that it was the precursor to World War II.



The viewer probably has a basic understanding of WWII rationing by the federal government, but not of supply issues during WWI. The federal government relied on voluntary individual participation, aside from selective service, and panel one introduces this concept to the viewer.

### **3.2 COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PANELS**

In August 1916 the United States Congress established the Council of National Defense to assess war preparedness, and to address identified issues. The Council was a large organization overseen by an executive council, which included the Secretaries of War, Navy, Labor, Interior, and Commerce.<sup>3</sup> Congress also created an advisory council, composed of civilian experts in industry, raw materials, and other areas of interest to wartime mobilization.<sup>45</sup> The ambitious goals of the CND are possible because progressivism of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries created an environment where activists, largely middle-class, believed they could reshape the nation in their own image. Reformers saw their activities as being in everyone's best interest. Progressive reformers, building on the grassroots framework built by populism, worked to protect American citizens from the real or perceived abuses of corporations<sup>6</sup>, and to change behavior of the working class and elite to match those of the middle class.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> William James Breen, "The Council of National Defense: Industrial and Social Mobilization in the United States, 1916-1920" (PhD. Diss., Duke University, 1968, 20.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 52.

<sup>5</sup> Among the civilians appointed to the advisory council were Bernard M. Baruch for his financial savvy and access to raw materials, and Samuel Gompers to oversee labor and worker welfare.

<sup>6</sup> Jackson Lears, *Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877-1920* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), p. 168-169.

<sup>7</sup> Michael McGerr, *A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. xv.

The United States had over two years to observe how important new industrial and economic factors affected the battle zone, issues previously seen as being mostly unrelated to war. Based on its observations, the federal government recognized that the domestic, economic, and industrial factors of war as equally important to military planning as troop movements and battle plans. Wars prior to World War I were won and lost based on fine control of troop movements, and reserves of trained soldiers waiting to replace those that fell in battle. The Council of National Defense was developed to have the same command over civilian labor and industrial resources as the military had over the traditional military resources. As part of his 1968 dissertation, "The Council of National Defense: Industrial and Social Mobilization in the United States, 1916-1920," William Breen analyzed the forces that lead to the creation of the Council of National Defense. He argues that despite a general lack of foresight concerning how industrialization changed warfare in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some people saw that the next major war would be conducted in an entirely different manner. He asserts that prior to World War I very few people considered industry or other civilian concerns as being relevant to war efforts, despite the United States' shift away from an agrarian economy to one based on industrialization.<sup>8</sup> Breen provides statistical data in key areas of industry, including wheat and coal production, to illustrate this shift, and to show how critical American products were to the global community, particularly Europe.<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> Breen, 2.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 3-5.

Breen's discussion of the state of the military prior to United States' involvement in WWI illustrates the problems that the industrial and economic factors would cause once the United States entered the war. He argues that early efforts at assessing United States war preparedness focused on the extremely decentralized nature of the military, and this decentralization hindered cohesive preparedness plans.<sup>10</sup> American military observers in Europe early in WWI were amazed by the rate resources, including everything from bullets to soldiers, were used, and how difficult it could be to replenish them. While few people considered the possibility of American entry into WWI prior to 1916, they did take the opportunity to compare the United States' current arsenal against what was being used daily in Europe. Henry Stimson, Secretary of War from 1911 to 1913, estimated that the United States could only muster enough men and supplies for two days of battle.<sup>11</sup> Henry Breckinridge, Assistant-Secretary of War, noted in a lecture to the Army War College in October 1914 that, at that point in the war, Great Britain had lost more soldiers than the United States had in reserves.<sup>12</sup> Major General Leonard Wood, Chief of the American General Staff, also realized that munitions took time to produce, and that only handguns would be relatively easy to procure. He estimated that it would take American industry years to produce the necessary munitions and equipment at prewar rates of production.<sup>13</sup> One of the main military organizational problems was that each branch, and even departments within

---

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 10.

the branches, competed for resources and funds, both from Congress and in the marketplace.<sup>14</sup>

The first significant attempt at a pre-war preparedness movement came from a former member of the military. Breen describes the attempts of Representative Richard Hobson of Alabama in 1910 to create an organization to account for the changes that industrialization made on warfare. Hobson was in the Navy before he was elected to the House of Representatives, and understood that the United States may not have been prepared for its next military encounter. Hobson's proposal did not meet any significant opposition, nor it did not have significant support. Despite introducing the bill several times, nothing ever came of it.<sup>15</sup> This reluctance of elected officials to pursue military preparedness measures likely comes from sensitivity to how their constituents would have viewed such actions. Even as late as January 1916, only six months before legislation created the Council of National Defense, representatives were opposed to war preparedness measures because it looked too much like Congress preparing to go to war, rather than taking stock of the American military machine given the new first-hand information on how wars would be fought in the twentieth century.<sup>16</sup>

The rapid change in opinion regarding an organization to manage the industrial and economic resources needed during wartime came in large part from a few dedicated individuals who were able to demonstrate the usefulness of this type of

---

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 18-20.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 22.

group.<sup>17</sup> Howard Coffin was appointed to the Naval Consulting Board, an early advisory group whose purpose was to be a civilian think tank to address the problem that submarines posed to transporting goods overseas. Though the original scope of the Naval Consulting Board was limited, Coffin was able to expand the scope to more general war preparedness because of his background in industry.<sup>18</sup> Coffin was formerly of the Hudson Motor Company, and he was a strong advocate for standardization, and developed many of the early standards in the automotive industry. He also understood that companies could sway public opinion in their favor by using specific advertising campaigns. These experiences made him well suited for the Naval Consulting Board, and his work there formed the basis for the legislation enacting the Council of National Defense.<sup>19</sup>

### **3.3 PROPAGANDA PANEL**

Prior to American entry into World War I, the majority of the country thought that the United States should stay out of what was seen as a European war. President Woodrow Wilson won his campaign for reelection in November 1916 in part by promising to keep the US out of the fighting. Shortly after his reelection he started working toward a propaganda machine that would alter public opinion in favor of American intervention. President Wilson issued an executive order in mid-April, right after Congress declared war in Europe, to create the Committee on Public Information.

---

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 24-26.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 52.

He intended this organization to control the flow of information from the government about the war to the public.<sup>20</sup>

Stephen Vaughn details the origins of the CPI and its publicity mission. He described how Arthur Bullard created a two-way attack to change public sentiment in favor of the war. Bullard, after paying close attention to British and German propaganda efforts, argued that the American propaganda campaign had to have a “clear call to arms, and a plan that would tell every citizen what to do.”<sup>21</sup> His 1917 publication *Mobilizing America* emphasized that the call to arms needed to have a fervently patriotic zeal to appeal to the widest American audience.<sup>22</sup> Propaganda had to create an American ideological basis for the war. Since the fighting never entered American borders, citizens did not feel their personal safety was threatened by combatants. Instead, World War I became about protecting democracy and a “war to end all wars.” The second part of Bullard's plan was to give citizens clear instructions they could follow to support the effort. Various organizations developed propaganda campaigns that made use of a variety of media to spread their war messages. For example, Herbert Hoover as head of the United States Food Administration, called on consumers to eat less meat, wheat, and sugar. The specifics of self-rationing were left to the individual to determine, but the committee's purpose was to spread the message more than enforce compliance.<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> Stephen Vaughn, “First Amendment Liberties and the Committee on Public Information,” *American Journal of Legal History* 95 (1979): 96.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 101.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> Marsha Gordon, “Onward Kitchen Soldiers: Mobilizing the Domestic during World War I,” *Canadian Review of American Studies* 29, no. 2 (1999).

The Committee on Public Information thought that tailoring the national war message to local communities would have a bigger impact than having a “one size fits all” message. To that end, George Creel developed the Four Minute Men. This was a national organization under the auspices of the CPI that operated at the local level. The Four Minute Men gave short speeches in movie theaters across the country. The name refers to the Minute Men of the Revolutionary War, civilian soldiers fighting for their right to independence and democracy. The four minutes refers to the amount of time it took to switch reels during movies.<sup>24</sup>

The CPI designed the Four Minute Men to be local mouthpieces of the national wartime message. To accomplish this, the CPI sent pamphlets instructing volunteers in public speaking. The volunteers needed to be a prominent local figure, someone well respected and trusted within the community. The CPI sent regular updates of information for the speakers to share. This information was specifically designed to be shared in four minutes, and the CPI encouraged its volunteers to bring information of local relevance into their presentations.<sup>25</sup> They spoke on a variety of topics, similar to the topics covered by war posters. By speaking in movie theaters, the four minute men could reach a wide audience over various racial, gender, and socioeconomic groups.<sup>26</sup>

The CPI carefully controlled its intended message. Even though volunteers could bring in information to make the speech relevant to the local community, the CPI did not tolerate deviance from the pre-approved message. President Wilson relied on the

---

<sup>24</sup> Lisa Mastrangelo, “Four Minute Men: Convergent Ideals of Public Speaking and Civic Participation,” *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 12, no. 4 (2009), 608.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 608-609.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 610.

four minute men to spread his ideas and messages.<sup>27</sup> The four minute men acted as agents of the top-down nature of civic involvement in World War I. They were trusted local leaders spreading the President's message. It gave the impression of local, grassroots support.

Posters were the second major tool the CPI used to craft its message, but the CPI was not the only organization to create posters. Pearl James reminds researchers that studying a poster collection in an archive or museum gets only a small portion of what may have been the original meaning or effect on individuals. James notes that often posters were part of a literary landscape.<sup>28</sup> In collections, the objects lose their provenance, much like archaeological artifacts removed from a site without proper documentation. It is also difficult, if not impossible, to discern the effect of a given poster on the war effort. James discusses the example of the British poster of Lord Kitchener, who points at the viewer captioned, "Wants You." This poster was designed to create favorable impressions about enlisting in Britain, but aside from the very beginning of the war, British enlistment rates dropped steadily. There is no way to know if the poster caused the decreased enlistment rate, had no effect on the enlistment rate, or maybe bolstered already low rates.<sup>29</sup>

Posters can and should be studied in a contextual way, as this exhibit attempts to do. Individually they may or may not have had a meaningful impact on public opinion. When they are considered with work of the programs they support, posters become a

---

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 611.

<sup>28</sup> Pearl James, "Introduction: Reading World War I Posters," *Picture This: World War I Posters and Visual Culture* ed. Pearl James (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 18.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., "Introduction," *Picture This*, 19.



powerful visual reminder of what the federal government expected of its citizens and why. Jay Winter argues that posters were more important than any other form of print media because of the images. He asserts that “what people see affects them more than what they read.”<sup>30</sup>

Posters, according to James, both reflected and shaped public opinion about the war, culture, and the citizen's place in relation to the wartime state.<sup>31</sup> She argues that posters changed the boundaries between public and private spaces. People often brought posters intended for wide audiences into their homes.<sup>32</sup> They literally and figuratively brought the war effort into private spaces. Faced with a constant visual representation, posters served as agents of quiet coercion. Those brought into the home implied a targeted charge to the viewers. Even in the privacy of their homes, posters reached out to individuals to attempt to change the way people saw the world around them, and the goods they purchased. These posters brought people closer, “in an imaginary yet powerful way, to the war.”<sup>33</sup> Especially for those on the American home front, posters made the European war relevant to American needs, and played on American fears.

Posters helped politicize food and women's work. By 1917, food and consumerism was closely tied to women, as rulers of the domestic sphere. Women's work gained political significance during World War I, despite not having the right to vote. When women appear in posters, they appear in several different roles. These

---

<sup>30</sup> Jay Winters, “Imaginations of War: Posters and the Shadow of the Lost Generation,” *Picture This: World War I Posters and Visual Culture* ed. Pearl James (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 37.

<sup>31</sup> James, 3.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

roles create an “historical conundrum,” as Susan Grayzel notes. On the one hand, women appear in traditional feminine roles centered around the home, children, and managers of food consumption. On the other hand, women also appear “emancipated,” in factory positions, wearing military uniforms, or on the battlefield as nurses and ambulance drivers. Grayzel argues that the various roles women play in the war posters reflect the wider public discussion on the proper place of women in society. James argues that the contradiction reflects or explores potential radical options for women during World War I. She creates several categories to explain women's roles in propaganda posters.<sup>34</sup> While she has some good evidence for her framework, I think she oversells it. James acknowledges that these posters originated from advertising. It is possible that these patriotic advertisements simply use women to fill whatever role the artist needs women to fill. Advertisers seem to understand that a variety of techniques will reach a variety of audiences. These posters target women as wives and mothers, as the backbone of their families, and young women who were willing to test the boundaries of traditional female domesticity.<sup>35</sup>

The posters included in this exhibit are a sample of those used to promote the activities of the CND and SCSCD. Artists across the nation submitted images to be used as war propaganda. Artists worked with the CPI, as well as other independent federal and state agencies, like the United State Navy.<sup>36</sup> The state councils also worked with the CPI to request posters whose themes were likely to resonate with the local community.

---

<sup>34</sup>Pearl James, “Images of Femininity in World War I Posters,” *Picture This: World War I Posters and Visual Culture* ed. Pearl James (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 273-307.

<sup>35</sup>James, “Images of Femininity,” *Picture This*, 278.

<sup>36</sup>“Art as Ammunition: Posters, World War I, and the Virginia Home Front,” *Virginia Cavalcade* 41, no. 4 (1992), 158.

Based on the research for this exhibit, it is impossible to say which, if any, of these posters were in South Carolina. These particular posters reflect the aims of both the CND and the SCSCD, so it is likely that they could have been in South Carolina. Even if these particular posters were not in present in the state, other posters with similar messages would have been in public places. The Woman's Committee, for example, requested posters for an exhibit at the 1918 South Carolina State Fair.<sup>37</sup> Posters also appeared in public libraries<sup>38</sup>, and most likely other public places.

James Montgomery Flagg's *I Want You for U.S. Army* is one of the most recognizable war posters. This poster provides a familiar starting point for the viewer, and will create a framework for viewing the rest of the posters. Uncle Sam represents the United States forcefully requesting aid from the viewer. Uncle Sam is tense because the war effort will succeed or fail based on the viewer choosing to act. Before the Selective Service Act, Uncle Sam cannot force the viewer into action, adding to his intensity. This poster reinforces the voluntary nature of most war activity. By placing this poster first, next to the first two panels that focus on the national context, the exhibit creates a framework in which to understand why the federal government felt it needed to convince South Carolinians to participate.

The posters for Panel 3 emphasize the emotional nature of poster imagery. Both *Enlist* by Fred Spear and *Enlist On Which Side of the Window Are You?* by Laura Brey again ask the viewer to join the military. *I Want You* asks the viewer to join for the sake

---

<sup>37</sup> Letter from Martha Evans Martin to W.C. Cathcart, October 25, 1918, Correspondence files, SC Council of Defense.

<sup>38</sup> Letter from George Porter to Reed Smith, November 24, 1917, Correspondence files, SC Council of Defense.

of his country. These two posters ask the viewer to defend the weak and stand with their fellow citizens. With *Enlist*, Fred Spear created both a plea and a subtle threat. His image of a woman and child at the bottom of the ocean references the German attack on the passenger ship *Lusitania*, which was one of the justifications for the United States to declare war on Germany. Spear implies that if men do not enlist, no American woman or child is safe on the seas. This poster partners with the Liberty Loan poster to create an implied threat of German violence against Americans if citizens do not participate in the war effort. *Enlist On Which Side of the Window Are You* complements the first poster by seeking the same goal but with a different emotional agenda. Laura Brey attempts to shame men into action. She also implies that most men would rather join the military than be left out. The solitary figure looks on as the soldiers march together to defend liberty and the weak.

*Woman Your Country Needs You!* calls on women to act in the name of their country. The woman in the image is not at the front with the soldiers, but Liberty still needs her. Liberty hands her the sword of service under the auspices of the CND and its state branches. The woman takes the sword and looks ahead with clear eyes to the task at hand. She is wife, mother, daughter, and sister, doing what she can at home while her men are fighting at the front. The woman might be in the foreground, but she is protected from real danger by the soldiers, Liberty, and the shield of the CND. She also does not seek out the sword, instead it is handed to her. Women could take part in war efforts without threatening their femininity, and without threatening masculine

supremacy. This poster reflects both the call to action for women, and reinforces their relationship to the state as submissive, even in action.

The two posters associated with panel 8, *Sow the Seeds of Victory* by James Montgomery Flagg and *Can Vegetables, Fruit, and the Kaiser Too* by J. Paul Verrees illustrate two of the elements of the thrift and economy campaign at the national level. Flagg's image portrays Liberty planting a garden while wrapped in an American flag. She is not only planting vegetables, but the means to win the war. The quote at the bottom of the poster equates personal food production with producing supplies necessary for an American victory overseas. Growing food is only the first step. Verrees's poster equates canning fruits and vegetables with military victory over Germany. The image below the title is a compelling one, but the important feature of this poster is the word "CAN." The title plays on the multiple meanings of the word can. In this case, both usages are verbs. The definition of can in the first half of refers to preserving fresh fruits and vegetables for long term storage, but the definition of can shifts after the symbol and "AND" to the slang meaning of putting an end to something, in this case, the Kaiser and subsequently Germany and the war. Another reading of the second half of the statement could be to get rid of the Kaiser by flushing him down the toilet, another slang definition for the word can. It also references the end destination of our digested food. To can, or flush the Kaiser down the toilet, would be a humiliating way to get rid of him and the belligerence of Germany. The prominence of the word "CAN" in the image is an imperative for the viewer to engage in any usages of the word. "CAN" makes a citizen soldier out of the home front viewer. The poster also references the

word can's most common usage, which is the ability, knowledge, or skill to perform a task. It implies that the Triple Entente can win the war, and yes, viewer, you too can help.

The message of this poster is that the viewer's home garden is potentially a site of victory over America and democracy's enemies. People not actively fighting in the war should be growing their own food, and canning what they cannot eat immediately, and in this way they symbolically join the fight. The Kaiser in this poster is the symbol of excessive militarism, and he is defeated by persistence and careful conservation of food at the home front. It addresses women as the managers of household food supply without referring to them directly. The poster's militant message allowed women to channel their own aggression toward America's enemies into traditionally feminine tasks. However, there are limits to the militarized nature of the poster. He is contained and no longer a threat, so he has been relegated to the realm of women.

The text-based poster *The U.S. Government Has Asked Us to Help* associated with panel 9 emphasizes Winter's point about the impact of images. This poster is informative, but not nearly as memorable as the others in the exhibit. The poster is a direct appeal to consumers to alter their consumption habits, both what they buy and how they buy it. Without images, this poster is meant to pose a reasoned argument to the viewer for why they should eliminate the delivery system.

The last poster, *That Liberty Shall Not Perish from the Earth* by Joseph Pennell, dramatically advertises the fourth liberty loan drive. Pennell's image is a threat meant to scare the viewer into purchasing liberty bonds for a fourth time. If the liberty loan

drive fails, the American military will fail, and if they fail, America will fall. Liberty's severed head is on the shore while the bay, and New York City in the distance, burn. Pennell's poster is an example of how posters tried to make an overseas war relevant to the home front. Even if a viewer did not have a friend or loved one fighting in Europe, this image brings the threat of war to US shores.

### **3.4 PAPERS OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATE COUNCIL OF DEFENSE**

The papers for the SCSCD are housed at the South Carolina Department of Archives and History (SCDAH) in Columbia, South Carolina. As part of my master's graduation requirements, I worked with archivist and document conservator Heather South to arrange this collection during the summer of 2012. The SCDAH staff chose to split the SCSCD papers into multiple collections. The first collection is series S192068, the administrative records of the SCSCD. It is housed in twenty-one folders in one box, and contain organizational information. It contains a broad overview of the CND in the form of a chart, forms, meeting minutes, reports made to the SCSCD or to the CND, speeches, and other miscellaneous documents.

Series S192152 contains the reference materials received by the SCSCD from various organizations in one box. Reference materials include documents comparable to the *South Carolina Handbook of the War* created by other organizations, brochures, and other promotional material. This series also contains the oversize documents, including the South Carolina posters in the exhibit. Series S192153 contains the bulletins and circulars of the Council of National Defense organized by originating section of the national council. These bulletins and circulars are how the CND

distributed its programs and goals to the state councils. Series S192154 contains correspondence relating to building projects and the War Industries Board (WIB). The WIB was a federal organization that did not work closely with the CND until the middle of 1918, based on the document record. It contains circulars the WIB distributed, and correspondence with county councils about building projects in South Carolina. Series S192155 contains the livestock conservation program files. This series was part of the material that the previous arranger separated out by subject. It includes papers from livestock agents and owners, railroad companies, and material from other states.

The largest series is S192069, the correspondence files of the SCSCD, and contains the bulk of the SCSCD papers. It is housed in four boxes, with several subseries. The majority of these documents are organized based on point of origin rather than content, however there are twenty-four folders based on letter subject separated in a previous attempt to arrange this collection. Subjects include but are not limited to disloyalty, desertion from South Carolina training camps, information on specific people, and public health campaigns. The time constraints on my attempt to arrange the collection would not allow me to continue this process, so I organized based on who wrote the letter, and the author's organizational affiliation or county of residence.

After the correspondence organized by subject, the next folders contain correspondence from state, county and township council members from all forty-seven of South Carolina's counties, as well as letters to the council from residents of those counties. Many of these letters are organizational or logistical, concerned with finding people to serve as chairs of the various councils, and whether or not members would be



in attendance for council meetings. This series also contains the correspondence of the SCSCD with other organizations, including other state councils and organizations engaged in more specific war or relief work.

This exhibit does not cover many aspects of war work the SCSCD undertook. The national and state councils worked to improve public health, training camp conditions, and to feed hungry children. They also tried to convince people to work in industries critical to the military, like shipbuilding or commercial agriculture. The CND's goal was a comprehensive study and remaking of the American war effort. This exhibit is a sample of what the CND tried to achieve, and the role South Carolina played in the war effort. Many state councils have not been studied, and only a handful of state council documents are easily accessible. Researchers looking to further understand changes in American culture during WWI will find that valuable material remains to be discovered in these papers.

### **3.5 SOUTH CAROLINA STATE COUNCIL OF DEFENSE PANEL**

The purpose of the Council of National Defense was to develop a way to coordinate with state-level preparedness initiatives.<sup>39</sup> The national council created a new committee to deal with the states, and encourage the creation of councils for states without a comparable existing organization. The council sent notice to each governor to send a representative to a May 2-3, 1917 conference about war preparedness in Washington, D.C. A memorandum read at the conference, and later issued to state councils as a bulletin, reminded governors that, "The conditions of

---

<sup>39</sup> Breen, 147-148.

modern warfare require thorough coordination of national, state, county, municipal, and individual resources and abilities. If democracy is successful to defeat autocracy, broad-minded cooperation of all units is imperative.”<sup>40</sup>

In June 1917, two months after the United States declared war on Germany, the South Carolina State Legislature passed an act establishing the South Carolina Council of Defense. The act gave Governor Richard Manning the power to appoint the chair and the members of the state council.<sup>41</sup> Governor Manning selected D. R. Coker, proprietor of an experimental farm in Hartsville, South Carolina, to chair the state council. Coker and his father also ran J.L. Coker & Company, the largest department store between Richmond and Atlanta. Although the records do not explain why or how Coker earned the chair position, it is likely that his combined experience in agriculture and retail represented the breadth of the council's expected influence.<sup>42</sup> The first council meeting was June 6, 1917, in the South Carolina State House. At this first meeting, the appointed state council members created committees, voted on committee chairs, and began the work of appointing county council chairs. The council also requested a budget of

---

<sup>40</sup> Memorandum of State Organization for War, presented to conference, May 2, 1917, Council of National Defense, Administrative Records of the State Council of Defense, South Carolina Department of Archives and History, Columbia, South Carolina (documents other than meeting minutes from this collection will be hereafter cited as Administrative Records, SC Council of Defense).

<sup>41</sup> Minutes of meeting State Council of Defense, South Carolina Council of Defense, June 6, 1917, Administrative Records of the State Council of Defense, South Carolina Department of Archives and History, Columbia, South Carolina (hereafter cited as Minutes, SC Council of Defense).

<sup>42</sup> South Carolina Business Hall of Fame, “David Robert Coker: 1870-1938,” *Legacy of Leadership: Laureates*, <http://www.knowital.org/legacy/laureates/David%20R.%20Coker.html>, Accessed April 16, 2014. D.R. Coker and his father were partners in the family department store before turning to his interest in agriculture full time. He and his father established Coker’s Pedigree Seed Company, an experimental farm, in 1914, one of the first of its kind in the United States. At Pedigree Seed Co., Coker experimented with developing new strains of staple crops, particularly cotton. During the Great Depression, he developed a new strain of cotton that produced a greater yield. According to the SC Business Hall of Fame, by 1963 about 65 percent of the cotton grown in the southeast, 80 percent of oats, and 75% of the flue-cured tobacco were grown from seeds produced by Coker’s scientists.

\$15,000 from the state.<sup>43</sup> At their next meeting on August 10, the state council informed Governor Manning that the council was ready for work.<sup>44</sup>

The CND and SCSCD required voluntary participation in their programs, but the propaganda campaigns created a hostile environment that bullied people into participation. Coercive voluntarism was a subtle and complex force that Christopher Capozzola argues had as much influence over behavior, including purchasing habits, as individual choice to demonstrate patriotism. The coercive nature came from pressure exerted over individuals, whether physical or mental, from the government in the form of sponsored propaganda campaigns, or from community members that internalized the propaganda. Women in particular both were influenced by and exerted coercive voluntarism during the war effort. President Wilson's call to mobilize a country of volunteers created the opportunity for local civic organizations to tap into a national movement at the behest of their elected leader. Before American entry into the war, women's groups had already begun to donate time and resources to European relief efforts. Capozzola notes multiple examples from groups across the country of quotations indicating that participation in war relief efforts was voluntary, but anyone who resisted these "self-imposed" restrictions was considered a traitor.<sup>45</sup>

### **3.7 WOMAN'S COMMITTEE PANEL**

Women were an important part of the Council of National Defense and its plans for wartime mobilization, primarily for their traditional role as homemaker and pantry

---

<sup>43</sup> Minutes, SC Council of Defense, June 6, 1917.

<sup>44</sup> Minutes, SC Council of Defense, August 10, 1917.

<sup>45</sup> Christopher Capozzola *Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 98-103.

manager. Some organizations called women to work in industry while men fought overseas to keep the labor force strong and factories functioning, or to volunteer with aid organization, but women did not enter the labor force in the same numbers they would in World War II. Instead, women were called to volunteer their time and resources, and to limit consumption of certain foods and products. The Woman's Committee formed in South Carolina specifically to coordinate the Food Conservation Campaign. Joe Sparks, the state council's first Executive Secretary, began organizing state and county Women's Committees in July 1917. He was directed to do so by Herbert Hoover, head of the United States Food Administration, who worked closely with the Woman's Committees at both the state and local level to educate women about how to allocate food resources.<sup>46</sup>

The Woman's Committee was a state-level organization that worked almost parallel to the South Carolina State Council of Defense. There was also a corollary Woman's Committee at the national level. The state woman's committee received a stipend from the state council that was supposed to cover its stationary and postage for its correspondence and other costs. The initial amount of \$50 per month did not meet the woman's committee's needs. The state council increased the stipend to \$250 per month, but that amount included pay for a stenographer and travel expenses. The woman's committee had to petition the state council for large expenditures, like sending representatives to national conferences. F. Louise Mayes, chair of the South Carolina Woman's Committee, requested a larger stipend from D. R. Coker to cover

---

<sup>46</sup> Letter from Joe Sparks to Herbert Hoover, July 3, 1917, Correspondence files, SC Council of Defense.

costs for some planned outreach programs, like leaflet campaigns and hosting talks in rural parts of the state.<sup>47</sup>

Between 1870 and 1910, wage earning women were primarily young and unmarried. In 1910, 24% of women over the age of 16 earned a wage. They usually left the work force when they married, and only worked outside the home again if the husband's wages fell or ended. Women typically worked as domestic servants in wealthier homes, in offices, and in factories.<sup>48</sup> Both men and women worked in offices and factories, but their jobs were highly segregated. Women in manufacturing worked in lower paid, unskilled positions and performed tasks such as washing bottles and cans, scrubbing floors, sorting products, and filling cans and bottles. Men worked in the higher paid skilled positions, or positions protected by apprenticeship programs which denied entry to women. They worked as plant and sales managers, or in metalworking and other heavy industry positions.<sup>49</sup> In offices, women worked as secretaries and typists. In 1910 women accounted for 37% of secretaries. Women made ideal secretaries because the position required a high school education and their willingness to accept lower wages.<sup>50</sup> Secretaries may be vital to the smooth operation of an office, but they did not make the important decisions. The same goes for the factory workers. Women workers answered to male bosses or managers, and almost always in a role that was considered appropriate for their gender. Regardless of whether they worked in the home or out of it, women were placed in subordinate positions.

---

<sup>47</sup> Letter from F. Louise Mayes to D. R. Coker, May 6, 1918, Correspondence files, SC Council of Defense.

<sup>48</sup> Maurine Weiner Greenwald, *Women, War, and Work: The Impact of World War I on Women Workers in the United States* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), 5.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-8.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 9-11.

### 3.8 COLORED BRANCH PANEL

Seymour Carroll, featured on the poster associated with Object Label 7, was the son of Reverend Richard Carroll. Reverend Carroll was a prominent leader of Columbia's African American community, and called "Columbia's Booker T. Washington," for advocating for self-improvement over civil rights. His son was also prominent in Columbia, and continued his father's work.<sup>51</sup> His message was one that would not equate war work with civil rights, so the Columbia whites promoted his speaking tour. The SCSCD wanted to present a controlled message to African Americans that while they should participate in the war effort, that participation did not grant them a political voice. The state council went so far as to turn away northern speakers the CND tried to send to black South Carolinians, for fear that the speakers would not adhere to the message of submission the white members of the SCSCD required.<sup>52</sup>

Out of the six-cubic-foot collection, there is only one small folder on any Colored Branch. Paul Ortiz offers an alternative to why African-Americans are absent from this collection. In *Emancipation Betrayed*, Ortiz argues that African-American activism did not begin in the 1950's with the Civil Rights movement, but instead has a much longer history starting with Reconstruction. He chronicles African-American voluntary organizations, and how these organizations mobilized black Floridians from Reconstruction until 1920.<sup>53</sup> Similar groups existed in South Carolina, though they were

---

<sup>51</sup> Andrew H. Myers, *Black, White, and Olive Drab: Racial Integration at Fort Jackson, and the Civil Rights Movement* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006), p. 31.

<sup>52</sup> Unsigned letter from the South Carolina State Council of Defense to Arthur E. Fleming, June 6, 1918, Correspondence files, SC Council of Defense.

<sup>53</sup> Paul Ortiz, *Emancipation Betrayed: The Hidden History of Black Organizing and White Violence in Florida from Reconstruction to the Bloody Election of 1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

not as politically active as their counterparts in Florida. African-American activism in South Carolina focused on trying to make daily life better for African-Americans who did not have ready access to medical facilities or other social services provided by the state or white aid organizations. For example, Matilda Evans worked to train nurses and established the Taylor Lane Hospital. Also, the South Carolina Federation of Colored Women's Clubs established an institution for orphaned and abused girls because the state refused to do so.<sup>54</sup> If these groups turned their efforts to supporting the United States in WWI, they chose not to work with the state council.

Another alternative may be that the black population in South Carolina was denied voluntary entry into the war effort. Christopher Capozzola offers argues that African-Americans were not allowed to volunteer, while being blamed for not upholding their obligations.<sup>55</sup> The US government refused black volunteers for the Navy and Marines, as well as black women who answered the call for nurses. However, draft quotas by region were based on the percentage of people who volunteered for service. In theory, young unmarried men could volunteer to fight, while men with families or in crucial industries could remain home, giving the community as a whole more control over who served in the military, and who stayed behind to care for those who could not fend for themselves. This means that African-American communities were more likely to have breadwinners and family heads drafted than white communities, since their young unattached volunteers were denied the opportunity to willingly serve.<sup>56</sup>

---

<sup>54</sup> Edgar, *South Carolina: A History*, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 469.

<sup>55</sup> Capozzola, 36.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

Poster propaganda targeting African-Americans is rare, and difficult to find. Jennifer Keene analyzed several posters aimed at gaining African-American support for the war effort. She argues that when the US Food Administration and the Committee on Public Information created posters for the African-American community, the federal government opened a dialogue with that community concerning their rights and disenfranchisement in the Jim Crow era.<sup>57</sup> She shows how the two federal organizations developed propaganda specifically to appeal to African-Americans. For example, one poster she describes is titled *Emancipation Proclamation, 1862*, by E.G. Renesch, which depicts Abraham Lincoln in the center of the poster with images of African-Americans participating in American society. The bottom left corner shows a vignette of African-American soldiers; there are portraits of Paul Dunbar, Frederick Douglass, and two African-American military leaders; left of Lincoln's image is a representation of Liberty with her arms around a black and white child; right of Lincoln's image is an image of African-American farming labor; and in the bottom right corner is an image of a well-dressed African-American couple observing their children entering a school. Keene argues that W.E.B. Dubois's argument for an intellectual African-American community, and Booker T. Washington's argument for economic advancement are both present and encouraging the African-American viewer to participate in the war effort.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>57</sup> Jennifer D. Keene, "Images of Racial Pride: African American Propaganda Posters in the First World War," in *Picture This*, 208-219.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 215-218.



Keene's argument of "a thriving cultural exchange"<sup>59</sup> between the federal government and African-American communities is overstated. She provides evidence that the African-American community saw their exchange with governmental bodies this way, but there is no evidence of any meaningful communication from the federal government concerning African-American disenfranchisement. Rather, it seems the government used African-American willingness to open a dialogue on their civil rights as a means to an end: African-American participation in programs to support the war effort. Governmental agencies generated propaganda designed to encourage and inspire African-Americans to participate in the war effort, but those agencies did not make any promises in return. There was no change in African-American political status after WWI in South Carolina. In fact, a special group formed in South Carolina in response to black veterans demanding an end to disenfranchisement. The group, called the South Carolina Constructive League formed in Columbia, South Carolina to maintain the prewar racial status quo.<sup>60</sup>

### **3.9 THRIFT AND ECONOMY PANEL**

A major part of the Council of National Defense's plan for mobilizing resources involved influencing the way people spent their money. In general, the council sought ways to curb discretionary spending and increase civilian investments in the federal government with several programs collectively called the thrift and economy campaign. This second half was the more difficult task, since it relied solely on individual consumers choosing to alter their consumption habits. Overly large purchases or

---

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 219.

<sup>60</sup> Edgar, 481.

wasteful habits contributed to the already “heavy strain” on essential war-related resources. “This war is more than a conflict between armies; it is a contest in which every man, woman and child can and should render real assistance. Thrift and economy are not only a patriotic privilege, they are a duty.”<sup>61</sup>

The call for conservation was important, especially in South Carolina, because the price of cotton steadily rose starting in 1915, and continued to rise through 1920. Cotton was the main agricultural product of South Carolina, making up approximately 70% of South Carolina’s cash crops. At the end of 1914, farmers sold a pound of cotton for about 7¢, and by the end of 1920, a pound of cotton sold for 40¢. This price increase meant that people in every facet of cotton production made money, and had disposable income for consumer goods.<sup>62</sup> The national and state councils wanted to limit this spending and redirect South Carolina’s influx of cash to the war effort.

The CND and its state branches used consumer activism as a tool of thrift and economy to channel necessary resources to the military. Lawrence Glickman asserts that consumer choices are more than simply an individual buying something they want. Consumption can be a political stance.<sup>63</sup> He reexamined periods of American history through the lens of a consciously political consumerism that is “a fundamentally social act, with far-reaching consequences.”<sup>64</sup> Glickman states that consumer movements rarely achieved their goals, whether through boycotts or buycotts, however, home front efforts during World War I can be seen as achieving their goal of contributing to an

---

<sup>61</sup> Circular, “Thrift and Economy,” May 16, 1918, Bulletins, SC Council of Defense.

<sup>62</sup> Edgar, 480-481.

<sup>63</sup> Lawrence Glickman, *Buying Power: A History of Consumer Activism in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 1.

<sup>64</sup> Glickman, 3.

American victory. Glickman identifies both purpose and identity as critical components of what drives consumer activism and its meaning.<sup>65</sup> He also notes that consumer activism historically opened political involvement to those disenfranchised from the traditional political process, such as African Americans and women.

All of these elements can help explain purchasing habits as political activism during American involvement in World War I. In *Buying Power* Glickman uses the term “activism” to imply struggling against an actual or perceived stronger social order. Consumer activism often pits itself against a morally or ethically unjust product or manufacturing practices<sup>66</sup>, but the opposite is true for WWI purchasing habits. Not buying wheat, or not preparing meat on Mondays was to join in a community banding together to defeat an evil military enemy overseas. Rather than combating an undesirable aspect of consumer society, WWI consumer activism mobilized consumer society to act for a greater good. To that end, I use consumer activism to mean the broader act of attempting to bring change through resource allocation.

World War I reversed traditional notions of conspicuous consumption. Instead of large discretionary purchases, saving, conserving, and participating in Liberty Loans became the significant markers of social status. Politicizing food meant that purchases were also politicized. Buying too much meat or wheat could be interpreted as subversive to the war effort. Posters, along with public speakers, the Four Minute Men, pamphlets, brochures, and newspaper and journal advertisements, served as constant measures of what the patriotic individual did or sacrificed for the war effort. During

---

<sup>65</sup> Glickman, 8.

<sup>66</sup> Glickman, 11.

World War I consumers made conscious decisions that showed other citizens the level of their patriotism as propaganda campaigns increasingly politicized food and goods. These decisions included limiting frivolous purchases or foods considered necessary for soldiers. The goods consumers sacrificed to the war effort were just as important as the goods they chose to buy.

Christmas was not immune to the call to sacrifice in the name of the war. The national council urged consumers to continue thrift into the holiday season. Also, like the farmers, the national council asked that consumers purchase Christmas gifts as early as September, with transportation efficiency as the justification. The council acknowledged that commercial gifts already existed and that not purchasing them would be a waste. However, they counseled consumers give utilitarian gifts rather than frivolous ones, except for young children. In addition to changing consumer Christmas habits, the council wanted merchants to maintain normal operating hours and costs. Hiring extra people during the holiday season took them away from other war work. Keeping their shops open used more electricity and valuable coal needed to power the navy. The national council called on the state councils to begin advertising this in September, and merchants to keep reminding customers of the changes.<sup>67</sup>

### **3.10 GROCERY DELIVERY PANEL**

The national council also sought to cut waste by using the state councils to ask that grocery retailers alter their delivery service. The national council asked retailers to deliver an area only once per day, urge customers to carry out small packages, and

---

<sup>67</sup> Press release from the Council of National Defense for release in morning newspapers of Tuesday, September 3, 1918, Bulletins, Council of National Defense.

refuse returned items. According to the national council, excess grocery delivery used vital manpower and equipment that could be better used if redirected toward war efforts, like food production or factories producing munitions, weapons, or ships. Theoretically, limiting grocery deliveries meant that groceries needed fewer delivery boys. These workers could instead contribute their labor to other industries the national council deemed critical to the war effort.<sup>68</sup> The national council partnered with the CPI to use the Four Minute Men to advertise the program by creating speeches for the volunteers, to gain support from the consumers.<sup>69</sup> This delivery service reform represented one program in the Council of National Defense's plans to alter the flow of resources nationwide: the national council sought to directly intervene into local and national markets, and the delivery service reform is one of its earliest programs.

In September, the Commercial Economy Board requested reports describing how the six major cities in South Carolina were adopting the change.<sup>70</sup> The South Carolina State Council of Defense chose to leave the decision to adopt the changes up to the cities rather than making a statewide decision, and Charleston merchants chose to reject the national council's proposed changes. The national council found out through an article in a Charleston newspaper, and contacted the state council to ask about it.<sup>71</sup>

---

<sup>68</sup> "Confirmation of telegram sent to the official representatives of the several state councils of defense" from George Porter, January 22, 1918, Correspondence files, SC Council of Defense.

<sup>69</sup> Bulletin number 42 from the Commercial Economy Board of the Council of Defense to the several state councils of defense, July 9, 1917, Bulletins and Circulars of the Council of National Defense, South Carolina Department of Archives and History, Columbia, SC (hereafter cited as Bulletin, Council of National Defense).

<sup>70</sup> Supplement to Bulletins 42 & 47, from Melvin Copeland, September 4, 1917, Bulletin, Council of National Defense.

<sup>71</sup> Letter from the Chairman of the Commercial Economy Board to D.R. Coker, August 29, 1917, Correspondence files, SC Council of Defense.

Reed Smith responded that, since the majority of South Carolina was rural, this program would have little to no effect. He also added, “The delivery system in Columbia, as in every other South Carolina town, is mainly operated by negro drivers, whose time is not worth a great deal. No considerable equipment could be released with the plan you propose to be put into effect. The South Carolina Council of Defense wishes to cooperate in every way possible with your board . . . however . . . I do not think the result would be worth while.”<sup>72</sup>

The Council of National Defense never directly addressed why the state council dismissed African-American labor as “not worth a great deal,”<sup>73</sup> but the national council was persistent in encouraging South Carolina to adopt the grocery delivery changes. Porter sent a letter with an editorial attached that he wanted to appear in South Carolina newspapers to convince merchants and their customers that this policy was an important war measure.<sup>74</sup> Under a steady stream of letters from the national council cajoling the South Carolina State Council to support the measure, Reed Smith finally conceded the national council's point, “mainly for the sake of cooperating with the National Organization.”<sup>75</sup> Smith made it clear that he thought “there is no place in the United States where the curtailing of delivery systems would accomplish less,” but that “we have already started it in Columbia. . . I feel sure that it will go through so far as

---

<sup>72</sup> Letter from Reed Smith to Melvin Copeland, circa mid-September 1917, Correspondence files, SC Council of Defense.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Letter from George Porter to Reed Smith, September 24, 1917, Correspondence files, SC Council of Defense. The attachment Porter refers to in his letter did not survive to get in this collection.

<sup>75</sup> Letter from Reed Smith to George Porter, December 22, 1917, Correspondence files, SC Council of Defense.

Columbia is concerned.”<sup>76</sup> The Council of National Defense wanted to change consumer habits to keep as many people employed in critical areas. While it never directly addressed the reason the South Carolina council opposed the program, it would not allow the South Carolina council to ignore African-American labor. At the very least, the national council recognized that effort from everyone helped win the war.

### **3.11 LIBERTY LOANS PANEL**

While consumers practiced “thrift and economy,” the federal government solicited citizens to purchase Liberty Loans. Liberty Loans or Liberty Bonds were securities purchased by US citizens from the federal government to finance involvement in the war, and to loan to other allied countries. The loans themselves were purchased from private banks and administered by the Federal Reserve.<sup>77</sup> South Carolina banks printed propaganda advertising the loans, in addition to the posters promoted by other organizations. The Bank of Sumter printed pamphlets with the names of their employees who joined the military. There were four Liberty Loans during WWI, and a Victory Loan in 1919, and the five loan programs raised \$18 billion dollars in all.<sup>78</sup> South Carolina contributed \$5.9 million to the First Liberty Loan, \$17.9 million to the Second Liberty Loan, \$20.1 million to the Third Liberty Loan, and \$38.5 million to the Fourth Liberty Loan. The success of the Liberty Loans is due in large part by the propaganda developed to sell them.<sup>79</sup> Liberty Loan propaganda directly linked dollars to defeating

---

<sup>76</sup> Letter from Reed Smith to George Porter, December 22, 1917, Correspondence files, SC Council of Defense.

<sup>77</sup> Jerry W. Markham, *From J.P. Morgan to the Institutional Investor (1900-1970)*, vol. 2 of *A Financial History of the United States* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2002), 76.

<sup>78</sup> Markham, *From J.P. Morgan to the Institutional Investor*, 76.

<sup>79</sup> Markham, *From J.P. Morgan to the Institutional Investor*, 86.

the enemy. The four Liberty Loan or Bond campaigns were opportunities for the average citizen to financially and voluntarily support the federal government with the promise of interest paid in return. Walton Rawls estimates that Liberty Loans raised two thirds the total cost of war.<sup>80</sup> Each time the Liberty Loan drive occurred, citizens responded by subscribing well beyond what the government offered, even though each loan offer increased the available amount.<sup>81</sup> In all four years of war, Great Britain was unable to raise the funds United States did in eighteen months.<sup>82</sup>

### **2.13 CONCLUSION PANEL**

The conclusion panel is about the legacy of the national and state councils, especially as they relate to World War II. The first months of the CND were plagued by organizational issues resulting in a reorganization where sections were streamlined.<sup>83</sup> When the US entered WWII, the federal government learned from the mistakes of the CPI, and built off of their successes. Relying on the individual to resist purchasing crucial war supplies worked to some degree, but WWII placed a much higher demand on resources than WWI. Instead of encouraging citizens to choose not to use war resources, the federal government rationed valuable resources, including sugar, gasoline, and tires. Gasoline and rubber for tires were not included in WWI conservation efforts despite having military vehicles in Europe. The state-enforced limitation of specific goods helped keep US soldiers fighting in WWII for four years, as opposed to six months of fighting during WWI.

---

<sup>80</sup> Rawls, *Wake Up, America!: World War I and the American Poster*, (New York: Abbeville Press, 1988), 196.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 198-223.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 196.

<sup>83</sup> Organizational flow chart, c. 1918, SC Council of Defense.



## REFERENCES

### Unpublished Sources

Papers of the South Carolina State Council of Defense, South Carolina Department of Archives and History. Series numbers S192068, S192069, S192152, S192153, S192154, and S192155.

### Published Sources

"Art as Ammunition: Posters, World War I, and the Virginia Home Front," *Virginia Cavalcade* 41, no. 4 (1992): 158-165.

Breen, William James. "The Council of National Defense: Industrial and Social Mobilization in the United States, 1916-1920. Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1968.

Capozzola, Christopher. *Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Edgar, Walter. *South Carolina: A History*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998.

Glickman, Lawrence. *Buying Power: A History of Consumer Activism in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.

Greenwald, Maurine Weiner. *Women, War, and Work: The Impact of World War I on Women Workers in the United States*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1990.

James, Pearl. "Images of Femininity in World War I Posters," *Picture This: World War I Posters and Visual Culture* ed. Pearl James. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009: 273-311.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Introduction: Reading World War I Posters," *Picture This: World War I Posters and Visual Culture* ed. Pearl James. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009: 1-36.

Keene, Jennifer D. "Images of Racial Pride: African American Propaganda Posters in the First World War," in *Picture This: World War I Posters and Visual Culture* ed. Pearl James. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009: 207-237.

Lears, Jackson. *Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877-1920*. New York: Harper Perennial, 2009.

- Markham, Jerry W. *From J.P. Morgan to the Institutional Investor (1900-1970)*, vol. 2 of *A Financial History of the United States* New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2002.
- Mastrangelo, Lisa. "World War I, Public Intellectuals, and the Four Minute Men: Convergent Ideals of Public Speaking and Civic Participation," *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 12, no. 4 (2009): 607-633.
- McGerr, Michael. *A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Myers, Andrew H. *Black, White, and Olive Drab: Racial Integration at Fort Jackson, and the Civil Rights Movement*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006.
- Ortiz, Paul. *Emancipation Betrayed: The Hidden History of Black Organizing and White Violence in Florida from Reconstruction to the Bloody Election of 1920*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.
- Rawls, Walton. *Wake Up, America!: World War I and the American Poster*. New York: Abbeville Press, 1988.
- South Carolina Business Hall of Fame, "David Robert Coker: 1870-1938," *Legacy of Leadership: Laureates*, <http://www.knowital.org/legacy/laureates/David%20R.%20Coker.html>, Accessed April 16, 2014.
- Vaughn, Stephen. "First Amendment Liberties and the Committee on Public Information," *American Journal of Legal History* 95 (1979): 95-119.
- Winters, Jay. "Imaginings of War: Posters and the Shadow of the Lost Generation," *Picture This: World War I Posters and Visual Culture* ed. Pearl James. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009: 37-60.

## APPENDIX A – ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

**“Art as Ammunition: Posters, World War I, and the Virginia Home Front,”** *Virginia Cavalcade* 41, no. 4 (1992): 158-165.

Brief summary of the purpose of posters and the Committee on Public Information in Virginia. Contains several images of World War I posters, where they were displayed in Virginia, and what effect they might have had on viewers.

**Capozzola, Christopher.** *Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Examination of the forces that changed the relationship between the federal government and its citizens. He argues that before WWI, people did not see their primary loyalty being to the national government, but WWI changed that perception. Capozzola introduces the concept of coercive voluntarism, a force he argues compelled individuals to participate in the WWI war effort. He examines selective service, pacifism, vigilantism, and Americanization of immigrants through the lens of coercive voluntarism.

**Edgar, Walter.** *South Carolina: A History.* Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998.

Well respected overview of South Carolina history from European colonization to 1990. Very brief treatment of South Carolina’s involvement in WWI, but good information on economic context of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.

**Glickman, Lawrence.** *Buying Power: A History of Consumer Activism in America.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.

Foundational work in the field of consumer history. Expanded the definition of consumer activism, and explores periods of American history in terms of consumer activism.

**Greenwald, Maurine Weiner. *Women, War, and Work: The Impact of World War I on Women Workers in the United States*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1990.**

Examines women's place in the WWI work force. Focuses on national context with little relevance to South Carolina, but provides general overview for conditions of women in the workplace, and the fight for some to retain their positions.

**James, Pearl. "Images of Femininity in World War I Posters," *Picture This: World War I Posters and Visual Culture* ed. Pearl James. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009: 273-311.**

Examines images of women in WWI posters to assess their effect on feminism. Presents a complicated reading of images, where a poster could be both feminist and sexist depending on the perspective of the viewer. Identified five types of women that appear on posters.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Introduction: Reading World War I Posters," *Picture This: World War I Posters and Visual Culture* ed. Pearl James. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009: 1-36.

Assesses the advantages and disadvantages of studying WWI posters.

**Keene, Jennifer D. "Images of Racial Pride: African American Propaganda Posters in the First World War," in *Picture This: World War I Posters and Visual Culture* ed. Pearl James. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009: 207-237.**

Examines the limited number of posters targeting African American communities. She argues that there was a two-way dialogue between African

Americans and the federal government, however nothing in the South Carolina State Council of Defense papers corroborate that claim.

**Lears, Jackson. *Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877-1920*. New York: Harper Perennial, 2009.**

Argues that the period after Reconstruction through the end of WWI was a period where the United States was transitional. He calls it regenerative, and asserts that the primacy of American Protestantism shaped the mindset of the country, in addition to fueling moral-based reform efforts.

**Markham, Jerry W. *From J.P. Morgan to the Institutional Investor (1900-1970)*, vol. 2 of *A Financial History of the United States* New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2002.**

Overview of American financial history in three volumes. Provided valuable detail to how liberty loans and other war bonds functioned during WWI.

**Mastrangelo, Lisa. "World War I, Public Intellectuals, and the Four Minute Men: Convergent Ideals of Public Speaking and Civic Participation," *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 12, no. 4 (2009): 607-633.**

Examination of the four minute men, a public speaking campaign developed by the Committee on Public Information. Examines the relationship between the speakers and their audience, and the role public speaking played in garnering civilian support for the war effort.

**McGerr, Michael. *A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.**

Examines progressivism in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries in terms of social reform, rather than legislative reform. Uses case studies to illustrate changing middle class values, and how at the root of progressivism was the desire to transform American

elite and working class cultures to reflect middle class ideology. Emphasis on voluntary membership organizations as agents of reform.

**Myers, Andrew H. *Black, White, and Olive Drab: Racial Integration at Fort Jackson, and the Civil Rights Movement*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006.**

A history of racial tension as Fort Jackson integrates after WWII. Includes brief biographies of Reverend Richard Carroll and his son Seymour Carroll.

**Ortiz, Paul. *Emancipation Betrayed: The Hidden History of Black Organizing and White Violence in Florida from Reconstruction to the Bloody Election of 1920*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.**

Argues that the basis of the Civil Rights Movement has its roots in African American political activism that started during reconstruction, but the agitation in Florida is not evident in the SCSCD papers. His treatment of African American voluntary organizations offers an example of how African American South Carolinians could have participated in the war effort without belonging to the Colored Branch.

**Rawls, Walton. *Wake Up, America!: World War I and the American Poster*. New York: Abbeville Press, 1988.**

Excellent collection of WWI posters that represent their thematic range. Brief overview of historical concepts, including the rise of the poster as a medium of art and advertisement, and elements of war activism like the liberty loans.

**South Carolina Business Hall of Fame, "David Robert Coker: 1870-1938," *Legacy of Leadership: Laureates*, <http://www.knowital.org/legacy/laureates/David%20R.%20Coker.html>, Accessed April 16, 2014.**

Honors South Carolinians with notable contributions to business and SC economic stability. Brief biography of D. R. Coker and his agricultural and retail achievements.

**Vaughn, Stephen. "First Amendment Liberties and the Committee on Public Information," *American Journal of Legal History* 95 (1979): 95-119.**

Discusses the CPI operated as a censorship and propaganda machine during WWI.

**Winters, Jay. "Imaginings of War: Posters and the Shadow of the Lost Generation," *Picture This: World War I Posters and Visual Culture* ed. Pearl James. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009: 37-60.**

Argues that posters created an idealized version of fighting for the home front during WWI, and did the same for soldiers overseas about their country.