Race, Class, Gender, and Linked Fate: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of African American Political Partisanship, 1996 and 2004

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RACE, CLASS, GENDER, AND LINKED FATE: A CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP, 1996 AND 2004

by

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DEDICATION

At times our own light goes out and is rekindled by a spark from another person. Each of us has cause to think with deep gratitude of those who have lighted the flame within us.

Albert Schweitzer

It is with sincere gratitude that I dedicate this dissertation in loving memory to my father, Richard Brown, Jr. who taught me how to triumph in any given situation, and to my mother, Inell Evergene Brothers Brown from whom I learned to persevere and to prevail. They dared to dream during a moment in time when reality seemed to obscure the vision they held for each of their children. Nonetheless, my parents’ steadfastness, hope, and confidence in Christ kept their flame alive within us. The completion of this research is a tribute to their determination.

Throughout this effort, and especially after the passing of my parents, my husband, Furman Guinyard, was my constant source of support and rekindling. I am ever grateful to him for his great sacrifice on my behalf. It is with incredible joy, love, and appreciation that I also dedicate this dissertation to him.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A number of individuals, in one way or another, contributed and extended their valuable assistance in the preparation and completion of this study, and for that I am truly grateful. Nonetheless, it would be remiss of me not to mention the following persons without whom this dissertation would not have been possible.

I am particularly honored to have the direction, dedication, attention, advice, feedback, and critiques of my committee, which have served me well. My utmost gratitude is extended first to Dr. Laura R. Woliver, my committee chair, for her presence, patience, encouragement, inspiration, and unwavering support; to Dr. Todd C. Shaw, a strong advocate and constant motivating force, for his unequivocal guidance and demonstrated quiet confidence in my research; to Dr. C. Blease Graham, whom I consider one of my most cherished mentors, for his encouragement and advice throughout the course of my graduate studies; and to my friend and colleague, Dr. Barbara A. Woods, the lone historian, for her expertise in African-American civil rights and invaluable assistance on both a professional and a personal level.

My deepest appreciation is further extended to colleagues, family, and friends, Dr. Michael Boatwright, Yumin Zhao, Dr. El Raya A. Osman, Dr. Teshome Tadesse, Deborah Gramling, Stephanie Brown-Guion, and Keala “Regina” Inciong-Ako, my beloved friend (kona hoaloha). Above all, I acknowledge with humble devotion the Almighty God who has been my perpetual light, constant comfort, and enduring strength throughout this journey. To God be the glory! (Nui Loa I ke Akua ka ho'onani ia!)
OBJECTIVE: To determine the predominance of linked fate and socio-demographic predictors race, class, and gender in the political partisanship of African Americans, and in the political partisanship of comparison racial and ethnic group populations.

METHODS: Data obtained from the 1996 National Black Election Study panel series were used to examine the political attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs of 824 adult African Americans. In addition, data collected for the 2004 National Politics Study examined 3,087 American adults from comparison racial and ethnic population groups. These groups included 706 African Americans, 868 White Non-Hispanics, 676 Hispanics, 466 Asians, and 371 Black Caribbeans. Multinomial logistic regression models were used to analyze linked fate and socio-demographic predictors of African American political partisanship.

RESULTS: In the 1996 sample about 69% of African Americans were Democrats, 20% Independent, and 4% Republicans. Similarly, in the 2004 sample Democratic preferences were held by 70% African Americans followed by about 66% Black Caribbeans, 44% Hispanics, 37% Asians, and 36% White Non-Hispanics. In the multinomial logistic regression models linked fate was less likely to influence African American political partisanship in 1996. Still, when considering the unique contribution of linked fate and social demography—race, class, and gender—used to predict political partisanship among comparison populations in 2004, support for the Democratic Party was more
likely among respondents with perceptions that linked fate has some affect on them; and among all racial and ethnic population groups when compared to Non-Hispanic Whites. On the other hand, as class increased the likelihood of Democratic partisanship decreased, whereas gender was not significantly associated with predicting political partisanship ($p>0.05$).

**CONCLUSIONS:** Race continues to be the predominant predictor of significant and distinctive partisan preference attitudes in the African American racial group. The relationship of race, class, gender, linked fate, and partisanship shows some reliance on a (black) racial or ethnic group heuristic for political decision-making. Still, further investigation is needed to assess whether such group cues in partisan decisions actually reflect perceptions of a (black) linked racial fate rather than a sense that one’s fate is linked to that of the Democratic Party.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................... iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................. iv

ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................................... v

LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... xi

LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ xiv

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER 2 TOWARD A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PARTISANSHIP ........................................ 13

2.1 FROM CLASSIC CONCEPTUALIZATION TO REVISIONIST CRITIQUES ............................................. 14

2.2 BACK TO THE BASICS? THE DEBATE CONTINUES .................................................................... 16

2.3 SOURCES OF CHANGE IN POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION .......................................... 18

2.4 A BROADER ACCOUNT OF PARTY CHANGE: ISSUE EVOLUTION .......................................... 19

2.5 AFRICAN AMERICAN PARTISANSHIP: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ............................ 21

CHAPTER 3 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND: 1863-1964 ...................................... 31

3.1 OVERVIEW .................................................................................................................................. 32

3.2 BACKGROUND: AFRICAN AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY STRATEGIES .................................... 33

3.3 THE DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY SCHEME AND SLAVERY ........................................ 41

3.4 PERIOD OF RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1877 ......................................................... 48
5.8.2 Model 2: The Impact of Race on Partisan Assessments ................................................................. 149

5.8.3 Model 3: Test of Gender Distinctions by Race ............................................................................. 149

5.8.4 Model 4: Factors that Determine Partisanship ............................................................................. 150

Chapter 6 Findings ................................................................................................................................. 153

6.1 Descriptive Findings ......................................................................................................................... 154

6.1.1 Distribution of Party Identifications ............................................................................................ 156

6.1.2 Distribution of Linked Fate by Gender, Race, and Party ............................................................ 160

6.1.3 Distribution of Income by Race and Gender ................................................................................. 165

6.2 Inferential Findings .......................................................................................................................... 169

6.2.1 Inferential Findings: Model 1 ......................................................................................................... 171

6.2.2 Inferential Findings: Model 2....................................................................................................... 177

6.2.3 Inferential Findings: Model 3 ....................................................................................................... 183

6.2.4 Inferential Findings: Model 4....................................................................................................... 189

6.3 Study Findings ................................................................................................................................. 199

Chapter 7 Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations ................................................................. 201

7.1 Summary of the Study Problem and Methodology ......................................................................... 201

7.2 Main Conclusions of the Study ...................................................................................................... 204

7.2.1 Linked Fate and African American Partisanship ........................................................................ 205

7.2.2 Gendered Perspectives of Political Partisanship ...................................................................... 206

7.2.3 Evaluation of Democrats’ Work on Black Issues ...................................................................... 207

7.2.4 Racial Group Identity Cues and Partisanship ............................................................................ 208
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH .................................................209

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................213

APPENDIX A – TABLES OF SURVEY QUESTION WORDING ..............................................228
   A.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PARTY IDENTIFICATION .............................................228
   A.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES .................................................................................229
LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1 Symbolic Generation: African Americans in Congress, 1870-1887 .......................................................... 54

Table 4.1 Founding Members: The Congressional Black Caucus .............. 103

Table 5.1 Determinants of African American Partisanship ......................... 141

Table 6.1 Percentages of Political Party Identifications by Race .................. 155

Table 6.2 Percentages of Party Identifications by Race and Gender 2004 ........ 158

Table 6.3 Percentages of Linked Fate by Gender for African Americans, 1996 ................................................................. 161

Table 6.4 Percentages of Linked Fate Perceptions by Race and Gender, 2004 ........ 163

Table 6.5 Distribution of Household Income for African Americans by Gender ................................................................. 167

Table 6.6 Percentages of Annual Family Income by Race, 2004 .................... 168

Table 6.7 Model 1: Significance Test of the Model Log Likelihood .............. 172

Table 6.8 Model 1: Output of Statistical Significance of Each Predictor Variable ............................................................................. 173

Table 6.9 Logistic Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Republican Partisanship for 824 Adult African Americans in 1996 by IBM SPSS 20 ......................................................... 174

Table 6.10 Model 1: Logistic Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Political Independence for 824 Adult African Americans in 1996 by IBM SPSS 20 ............................................. 175

Table 6.11 Model 2: Significance Test of the Model Log Likelihood .............. 178
Table A.4 Class-Family Income Measured in Dollars:
  Independent Variable Survey Questions ..........................................................231

Table A.5 Gender: Independent Variable Survey Questions ........................................231

Table A.6 Age: Independent Variable Survey Questions ................................................232

Table A.7 Ideology: Independent Variable Survey Questions ........................................232

Table A.8 Presidential Job Approval: Independent Variable Survey Questions ..........................232

Table A.9 The Nation’s Economy: Independent Variable Survey Questions ...................................................233

Table A.10 Democratic Party Works Hard on Black Issues:
  Independent Variable Survey Questions ..................................................................233
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1 Determinants of African American Partisanship: 1996 and 2004 ................................................................. 28

Figure 5.1 A Sequential Party Decision-Making Process Based on Party Identification Survey Questions for 1996 and 2004 ................................................................. 137

Figure 5.2 A Sequential Party Decision-Making Process for African Americans ................................................................. 138

Figure 5.3 Arrow Diagram: Determinants of African American Partisanship: 1996, 2004 ................................................................. 144

Figure 6.1 Percentages of Political Party Identifications, 1996 and 2004 ................................................................. 156

Figure 6.2 Percentages of Party Identifications for Women by Race, 1996 and 2004 ................................................................. 158

Figure 6.3 Percentages of Party Identifications for Men by Race, 1996 and 2004 ................................................................. 159

Figure 6.4 Summary Percentages of African American Partisanship by Gender ................................................................. 159

Figure 6.5 Percentages of Linked Fate by Gender Among Samples of Adult African Americans, 1996 ................................................................. 161

Figure 6.6 Percentages of Linked Fate by Race Among Samples of Men, 2004 ................................................................. 164

Figure 6.7 Percentages of Linked Fate by Race Among Samples of Women, 2004 ................................................................. 164

Figure 6.8 Distribution of Annual Family Income for African Americans, 1996 ................................................................. 166

Figure 6.9 Distribution of Annual Family Income by Race, 2004 ................................................................. 168
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Ever since the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964, there has been considerable speculation and debate among scholars that as improved social, economic and political opportunities expanded for African Americans they would assimilate into the mainstream United States population like white ethnics that preceded them.\footnote{In \textit{Who Governs} (1963), Robert Dahl developed the political assimilation theory referenced.} Most importantly, they were expected to hold more diverse political party preferences. The subsequent emergence of a larger black middle class accompanied by the appearance of greater economic diversity (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989) during the post-civil rights era furthered suppositions that African Americans would become more conservative in their ideological orientations and partisan predispositions. Despite noticeable improvements in black economic class standing, African Americans emerged as a politically distinctive and cohesive group with a strong Democratic bias (Black and Black 2002; Stanley and Niemi 1991). Consequently, scholars raised questions about the extent to which improved economic standings could compete meaningfully with racial group identities, and thereby prompt changes in African American decisions about the two main political parties.
To investigate this long-term relationship between the African American electorate and the Democratic Party, the present study draws from Michael C. Dawson’s general theory of African American racial group interests as advanced in *Behind the Mule* (1994). Specifically, this dissertation focuses on his study of “African American Partisanship and the American Party System,” and the supposed lack of political diversity within the black community. Dawson’s empirical research on the importance of race and class develops a systematic framework—the Black Utility Heuristic—that assumes race has a profound impact on African American political decisions. This includes decisions about which political party better addresses issues of most importance to African Americans. Thus far, no other study has applied Dawson’s theory of African American racial group interests and his Black Utility Heuristic paradigm to measure the relative degree of racial group solidarity and political cohesion beyond his own research using the 1984 and 1988 National Black Election Studies (Jackson 1984; 1988). I test a modification of Dawson’s Black Utility Heuristic using the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997), and extend his model to test the extent to which such heuristics apply to both racial and ethnic groups surveyed in the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009).

In keeping with Dawson’s theory, I agree that the Black Utility Heuristic is applicable and reliable as long as race continues to determine prospects of life in the United States. This is true as long as historical as well as contemporary social and demographic structures shape perceptions of circumstances within the African American

---

community, particularly with regard to black life chances.\(^3\) While race is considered the prime factor explaining African Americans’ overwhelming and consistent political choices, their Democratic partisanship reflects a rational decision calculus that only one political party of the limited U.S. two-party system meets median racial group policy preferences. Besides, decisions about which political party is more responsive to African American racial group interests denotes a rational assessment of how each governing party fares in promoting the well-being of the racial group (Fiorina 1981). In this regard race, rather than class and/or other social demography typically shown to influence partisanship, is central to judgments about policy congruence, or the lack thereof, between each political party and the African American racial group. Hence, the group rationale for making political choices is easily transmittable to individual members. This is primarily because of the continuing significance of race in American society, and because of the political parties either ignoring or overlooking race-based issues.

Both theoretical and practical political reasons reinforce the basis for this ongoing relationship. For instance, African Americans perceive the Democrats as having the best over-time record of addressing wrongs against the race; of having a better approach to dealing with issues of most importance to them; and, of elevating their status in the economic, social, and political order (Bositis 2002; Tate 1994). So, their long-term assessments of the policies and performance of the two governing parties (Fiorina 1989)

---

should point them to the Democratic, not the Republican, Party. Moreover, affiliation with the Democratic Party is important for practical political reasons as well. Through this association African Americans have access to the party organization, to institutions of government, and to both appointive and elective offices. In short, the meaningful long-term political clout realized by African Americans derives from association with the Democrats. Hence, this association is efficient in that voting for Democrats allows African Americans to maintain a sense of group position while engaging the political system. Correspondingly, Democratic control or “capture” of the black vote is a crucial factor in securing electoral success (Frymer 1999).

This study contributes to the larger body of literature investigating how social group identifications shape individual political orientations toward the two main political parties, as well as to studies of African American politics. Explicitly, the primary focus of this dissertation is African American political partisanship, and the extent to which race versus class or other social demography explain their seemingly stable Democratic Party preferences. In other words: why do African Americans think the way they do politically, and what induces them to change? To investigate this question I test Dawson’s Black Utility Heuristic (1994) using data collected for analysis of African American politics. Secondarily, the research aim is to assess the extent to which the African American form of group-based identity politics influences politically emerging racial and pan-ethnic minority groups. Important to this examination are individual perceptions about which party better serves racial group interests, but is this merely a

4. Specifically, data collected for the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997), and for the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009).
“black” phenomenon or does Dawson’s heuristic provide a viable (and similar) explanation for party choice among other racial and ethnic minority groups as well? To investigate this question I include comparison populations of African Americans, White Non-Hispanics, Hispanics, Asians, and Caribbean Blacks. Typically, mainstream research of American party identifications include only a cursory statement about African American partisanship\(^5\) or apply the traditional black-white dichotomy in explanations of party identifications (Hajnal and Lee 2011). Although this standard relationship is important, understanding how race and ethnicity matters overall is just as important. This dissertation fills this gap.

In the 1970s tension between race and class as factors determining black life chances erupted into intense debate primarily among sociologists from two competing theoretical perspectives. The “class” perspective, proposed by William J. Wilson in *The Declining Significance of Race* (1978; 1980), claims that since the mid-1960s economic class\(^6\) has become the most important factor determining the personal life styles and external living conditions of African Americans. On the other hand, the “race” perspective, articulated by Charles V. Willie (1978) holds that integration and affirmative action programs, implemented after passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, place middle-

---

5. African Americans are the most loyal supporters of the Democratic Party, i.e. in relation to other socio-demographic constituent groups. They are, therefore, often dismissed as highly predictable and virtually resistant to partisan change.

class blacks in direct contact with whites where extensive interactions make the resurgence of race quite evident. However, Wilson’s (1980) thesis fueled speculations about the increasing importance of class interests versus racial group interests in African American politics, and raised expectations that improved economic class situations would create greater political diversity within the racial group.

Michael C. Dawson (1994) responded explicitly to these two competing theoretical arguments and to social scholars’ persistent query about the single most important determinant of African-American politics. Furthermore, in response to Wilson’s declining significance of race hypothesis, Dawson contends that race interests supersede class interests primarily because of the continuing significance of race in the United States. Moreover, the historical circumstances of race shape perceptions of common interests and racial group solidarity among African Americans producing a sense of common/linked fate. From Dawson’s perspective, African-American politics as subsumed within cognitive processes, presupposes that the structure of group perceptions is on a psychological level where the degree of distinctive actions by individuals depends on the presence of certain group characteristics. The most notable variables are racial group identification, a black consciousness, group cohesiveness, and the salience of one’s racial identity. A relatively high degree of salience means that there is sufficient information about one’s identity and about “the fit of that identity with social reality” (Dawson 1994, 11). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the reality is that race remains a major force in African American lives.

First, with regard to those prominent racial group characteristics noted above, the origin of the concept of “linked fate” is closely related to that of group consciousness
(McClain et al. 2009), and to the idea that there is an intimate association between individual and group life chances (Simien 2005). This common or linked fate results when members of a racial grouping face common experiences such as economic exploitation, social subordination, and psychological oppression (Dawson 1994). It is for this reason that ascriptive characteristics of race, like the identity of “blackness” and the African phenotype, have a significant influence on life chance opportunities or the opportunity to attain meaningful goals in life rather than one’s knowledge, skills and/or abilities. Being “black” is a visible stereotypical differentiation from those who determine accessibility to social, political, and economic power in the United States. Dawson attributes linked fate primarily to perceptions when “economic domination of blacks by whites became inter-twined with a sense of political domination as well” (Dawson, 55).

Second, a resulting group political cohesion becomes rational as individual members follow race-group cues to evaluate and interpret the political world of objects like parties, issues, candidates, and events. According to Dawson, group political cohesion is also efficient because individual members can rely on their perceptions of racial group interests to make the appropriate political choices. Dawson’s theory of African-American racial group interests employs the economic theory of administrative decision-making as advanced by Herbert Simon in *Administrative Behavior* (1947). Simon argues that multiple factors, including psychological influences, can explain rational human choice or bounded rationality whereby an individual opts for a satisfying or “satisficing” solution (Simon 1955). In this regard, the African-American outlook, or black worldview, provides a sense of “community” where individual members identify
self with the racial group, and with the relative position of the race—predominantly within the bottom tiers of a stratified social hierarchy. As individuals become more politically aware of their group’s social class position, they develop a racial group or “black” consciousness and commit to collective action (Miller, Gurin, Gurin and Malanchuk 1981).

Here Dawson agrees with seminal studies of political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981; Shingles 1981) that what distinguishes African Americans from their White counterparts are “the development of self-conscious awareness of group membership” (Verba and Nie 1972, 150). There is, therefore, a sense of “belongingness” or identification with the racial grouping revealed in such self-identifications, as “I am an African American,” “I am a Liberal,” or “I am a Democrat” (Sherif and Sherif 1961; Verba and Nie 1972). Herein lies the difference between blacks and whites, a racial group or black consciousness and a perception of linked racial fate—us versus them—that serves as a mechanism for political cohesion and mobilization, and guarantees solidarity in attitudes about appropriate decisions and behavior. Linked fate insulates individual members against the changing effects of other structures of attitudes, such as economic class. Most importantly, Dawson (1994) finds that race continues to be the most powerful explanatory variable for predicting African American politics because of its continued, profound influence on black life chances, particularly within the social and economic arenas of life.

According to Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk (1981) politicization of the racial group produces a sense of black consciousness that occurs when an individual becomes aware of the relative position of her or his racial group in society. The concepts
of group identification and race consciousness based on perceptions of linked fate confirm the highly distinctive attitudes and behaviors produced by race (Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981) as previously reported in *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960). In this regard, identification is a causal factor that, once politicized, determines individual decisions that adhere to the group political standard. For African Americans that position tends to be disproportionately at the lower end of the socio-economic scale (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989). This, coupled with the reality of their struggle for basic civic inclusion, serves as a catalyst for consensus and solidarity among individuals who perceive their similarly situated class status. Such individuals respond politically by forming a stable and cohesive bloc to advance African American racial group interests in partisan politics and within the electoral arena.

Finally, Dawson’s empirically grounded political research demonstrates how linked racial fate and/or the Black Utility Heuristic influence contemporary African American orientations toward the two main political parties. He employs his theoretical framework to analyze African American group political cohesion on this wise: a (black) racial group consciousness shapes individual perceptions of self-interests and links them to perceptions of race group interests, both economic and political. Henceforth, individual perceptions of linked fate stimulate solidarity and direct political orientations. This is important because there are considerable differences in individual perceptions of the political world; however, it is imperative for the member to develop a sense of “community” with the racial group. In so doing, there is a greater likelihood that one will deem significant the attitudes and behaviors expected by the race, and assume the group

partisan standard. This is what Dawson refers to as the Black Utility Heuristic, a mechanism employed to determine which political decisions to make in advancing racial group goals. It is a reliable shortcut for accurate political preference attitudes, voting decisions, and public opinions.

Race is most significant in determining party identifications. If the Black Utility Heuristic serves as the primary factor used to decipher political messages, and as a strategic causal factor within the African American decision calculus, as Dawson contends, then individuals should correctly identify the political party that is most responsive to [black] racial group interests in accordance with the current racial group political standard, the Democratic Party. Such a finding for this research study would support the “race” perspective as articulated by Willie (1979), and further demonstrate the significance of linked racial fate and Dawson’s (1994) model, the Black Utility Heuristic.

This dissertation addresses an important and timely topic in contemporary American politics. The current chapter introduces the basis for my theoretical framework, the Black Utility Heuristic as formulated by Michael C. Dawson (1994) in his theory of African American racial group interests. Additionally, this chapter establishes the focus of the present research study, and introduces briefly scholarly debates about the single most important factor that best explains African American life chances: race or class. Dawson’s response to the race versus class sociological debates is essential to understanding key variables employed in explaining his theory of African American racial group interests: racial group identification, a black consciousness, group cohesiveness, and the salience of racial identity. These factors serve to clarify distinctive
African American politics, and the rational and efficient African American decision calculus.

Chapter 2 provides the principle theoretical goal for this dissertation. I begin with a discussion of the traditional conceptualization of party identification using classic literature formulated in the Michigan School. I also present literature regarding alternative explanations of partisanship from rational theorists and the revisionists. In addition, later approaches returning to the “Michigan” tradition are included in the discussion, as well as explanations of partisan change based primarily on Carmines and Stimson’s (1989) issue evolution. It is, therefore, within the context of this general body of literature on American party identifications that I review explanations of African American partisan identifications. The value of the Black Utility Heuristic model, for comparison among racial and pan-ethnic minority groups, is also considered within the frame of the theoretical goal.

A core theme of this dissertation is the reality or perception of policy congruence between African Americans and the two main political parties, and how the parties responded to secure the black vote. This idea is considered in the historical perspective discussed in Chapter 3, which covers historical periods from the Reconstruction era to the Post-New Deal era. Additionally, Chapter 3 sets a background discussion leading up to the 1860 presidential election of Abraham Lincoln. This historical perspective continues with a discussion of strategies employed by African Americans to demand that the political parties provide attention and action to issues that address racial group interests. African American strategies, the emergence of race to the national political agenda, and responses from the political parties are further discussed in Chapter 4 during historical
periods representing the Civil Rights and Post-Civil Rights eras. The methodological approach and model construction used to test research hypotheses explored in this study are covered in Chapter 5, while reports of statistical analyses and study findings are presented in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses both study results and conclusions, and proffers recommendations for future research endeavors.
CHAPTER 2

TOWARD A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN PARTISANSHIP

Of extreme importance to this investigation of African Americans’ partisanship is the conceptualization of party identification. Hence, reviews of some major orientations that have most influenced explanations of citizens’ attitudes toward the two main political parties, and changes thereto, are enumerated in this chapter. In addition, I attempt to identify particularly important theoretical issues that underlie different orientations that contribute to our understanding of African Americans’ decisions about the Democratic and Republican parties. Lastly, the theoretical framework guiding this dissertation is formulated.

The relationship between American citizens’ social identifications and their orientations toward the two main political parties has received considerable attention from political scientists. Key questions guiding this extensive body of research are: What is party identification, and what causes partisan change? Some scholars contend that party identification is a deeply rooted psychological attachment (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Miller and Shanks 1996) or social identity (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) that shapes political preferences. Others suggest that partisanship is largely an informational short cut (Downs 1957) comprised of a “running tally” of other political attitudes and evaluations (Achen 1992; Fiorina 1981). This on-going debate, primarily regarding the conceptualization of partisan identification in keeping with the
social-psychological prototype and critical challenges from rational choice theorists and the revisionists, has spanned half a century and includes a number of pivotal research studies.

2.1 FROM CLASSIC CONCEPTUALIZATION TO REVISIONIST CRITIQUES

The predominant view of party identification in classic voting behavior research is advanced in the “Michigan” model of electoral decision-making. Formulated by Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes in their seminal study of *The American Voter*, this social-psychological paradigm emphasizes “the role of enduring partisan commitments in shaping attitudes toward political objects” (Campbell et al. 1960, 135). According to Campbell, et al. and subsequent scholarship that has adopted this perspective (Goldberg 1966; Kelley and Mirer 1974; Miller and Shanks 1996), party identification is as an “unmoved mover” (Johnston 2006); a deeply held long-term psychological and/or group attachment that is largely unchanging even as events and other political objects change. This is primarily because candidates and issues are election specific whereas citizens’ orientations toward the two main political parties endure since the parties themselves remain relatively stable. Furthermore, party identification is framed as a conceptual screen through which citizens view and interpret new political information. While shaping policy preferences and other political attitudes, party identification remains largely unchanged by them.

On the other hand, revisionist scholars contest strongly the concept of Party identification as formulated in the social-psychological perspective. Instead, revisionists contend that party identification is not unmoved; it is shaped by political attitudes and evaluations. This critique is developed most fully in *Retrospective Voting in American*
Elections (1981), in which Morris Fiorina frames party identification as a “running tally” of citizen evaluations of other political objects and events. Christopher Achen (1992) further articulates the revisionist conceptualization of partisanship as a Bayesian updating, or learning process model.

Revisionists build their theoretical perspective on the rational approach employed by Anthony Downs in An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), and V.O. Key’s treatment of partisan preference, in The Responsible Electorate (1966), as an information shortcut based on which political party’s ideological and policy positions are relatively closer to those held by the citizen. Thus, in the revisionists’ perception party identification is not considered a psychological or group attachment independent of citizens’ evaluations of contemporary politics. Rather, partisanship represents a summary of the political evaluations individuals have formed over time. So, while party identification might be quite stable from one election to the next, it also may change over time in response to policy preferences, candidate evaluations, evaluations of party performance, and vote decisions (Jackson 1975; Page and Jones 1979; Markus and Converse 1979; Fiorina 1981; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Franklin 1984).

The revisionist view clearly supports the idea that individuals might change their party loyalties in response to their attitudes on policy issues, particularly those salient, emotional, and polarizing issues commonly associated with periods of partisan change. Yet, similar to the social-psychological argument, revisionist scholarship acknowledges the possibility of a long-term component to party identification stemming from childhood socialization (Fiorina 1981; Achen 2002). Revisionists further purport that partisanship may shape expectations of future party performance (Fiorina 1981), or that party
identification may cause policy preferences as well as be caused by them (Franklin 1984; Jackson 1975; Page and Jones 1979; Markus and Converse 1979). Most importantly, the general position of revisionists is that partisanship is more a summary of other political attitudes than a shaper of them. Fiorina characterizes the revisionist view of party identification as “an evolving indicator of an individual’s relationship to the parties” (Fiorina 2002, 98).

2.2 BACK TO THE BASICS? THE DEBATE CONTINUES

Responding to the revisionist case, Warren Miller (1991) initiates defense of the social-psychological paradigm that he and J. Merrill Shanks further articulate in *The New American Voter* (1996). Suggesting that party identification may not be far from the theoretical framework constructed in *The American Voter* (1960), Miller and Shanks indicate that party identification is primarily an attitude of preference that provides a meaningful explanation for candidate and policy preferences, especially when uncertainty is present. In addition, Donald Green and his colleagues fully develop a critique of the revisionist perspective on party identification. They show that when random measurement error is corrected party identification is almost entirely exogenous in the short-run to issues, candidates, and performance evaluations (Green and Palmquist 1990; 1994; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). Furthermore, Alan Gerber and Donald Green (1998) reject Christopher Achen’s (1992) conceptualization of party identification as a Bayesian updating process suggesting instead that it is incompatible with the reality of partisan stability. Green, et al. argues that party ties represent an attachment to a group similar to religious identification (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). “People maintain their partisan identities as long as their image of the partisan groups remains
intact. But when secular realignment is afoot, the public image of the partisan groups shifts, which in turn produces a shift in party identifications and perhaps further alters perceptions of partisan groups” (Green et al. 2002, 816). In short, the works of Green and his colleagues reaffirms the view of partisanship as a deeply rooted social identity independent of other political evaluations that is firmly held by most citizens.

In spite of this reaffirmation, Green et al. depart from one very important component of the traditional American Voter model. They argue against the idea of selective perception, and hold instead that Democratic and Republican identifiers update their political evaluations in similar ways. In doing so Green and his colleagues reject the idea that party identification serves as a perceptual screen that shapes the evaluation of new political information (Gerber and Green 1999; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002). Additional scholars contend that partisanship causes change in other political evaluations. For example, Zaller (1992) suggests that partisan predispositions regulate the flow of information from political elites to the mass public; thusly, individuals tend to bring their own policy attitudes into line with those of their party’s leaders. Bartels (2002) provides even stronger support for the American Voter model with his evidence of the effect of party identification in shaping political evaluations. He argues that Gerber and Green’s (1999) unbiased updating actually confirms that there is a partisan bias. Both Bartels (2000) and Hetherington (2001) provide further support for the role of party identification as a causal force based on evidence of the strengthening of party identification and its impact on vote choice.

Finally, while the American Voter model emphasizes the idea that party identification is a “durable attachment not readily disturbed by passing events and
personalities” (Campbell et al. 1960, 151), it does not rule out the possibility of some issue-based change in party loyalties. Here Campbell et al. acknowledge the possibility of party realignment, suggesting that when individuals hold particularly strong feelings about issues on which they differ with their party, “this pressure is intense enough, [that] a stable partisan identification may actually be changed” (Campbell et al. 1960, 135). The political attitudes most likely to create enough pressure that individuals may shift their party loyalties are deeply held attitudes on the emotional and polarizing issues associated with partisan change, such as racial and economic issues (Carmines and Stimson 1989). Therefore, while party identification may be the causal force in its relationship with most policy preferences, attitudes toward certain issues that structure party conflict may lead to shifts in party ties for some citizens. In short, this body of research revalidates party identification as a principle mover of other political attitudes; however, it is not an unmoved mover in every situation.

2.3 SOURCES OF CHANGE IN POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION

In order for individuals to change either their party identifications or their issue preferences they must first recognize that there are differences in the policy positions of the two main political parties. Research has established the relationship between issues and party change (Carmines and Stimson 1989; MacDonald and Rabinowitz 1987; Sundquist 1983) when parties and candidates assume distinct positions on important issues, and when citizens are aware of the parties’ differences. Citizens that do not recognize partisan conflict based on divergent policy stands should have no cause for change. On the other hand, for individuals that are aware of party differences on particularly polarizing and emotion-laden issues, the salience of those issues is critical.
Therefore, when considering the centrality and stability of party identification, the only individuals that should change their political party preferences on the basis of their issue attitudes are those that find the issues to be particularly salient. Conversely, citizens that are not aware of polarizing partisan policy stands on particularly powerful easily understood, emotional, or symbolic issues have no reason to change their partisanship.

2.4 A BROADER ACCOUNT OF PARTY CHANGE: ISSUE EVOLUTION

A prominent position relegated to issues, especially between the 1964 and 1972 presidential elections, is attributed to the polarizing policy positions of the two main political parties and their candidates (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Black and Black 1987). Carmines and Stimson’s predominant explanation of partisan change during this decisive election period is articulated in Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics (1989). They argue that major changes in the policy stands of the two main political parties occur in response to the type of issues that command center stage in American politics. Certain economic, foreign, racial, and social policies that dominate electoral campaigns evoke powerful emotional responses from the parties and candidates, and cut across traditional party cleavages such as the New Deal coalition, causing conflict. According to their theory of issue evolution race is the prime factor explaining post-New Deal transformations in the partisan balance of identification in the American electorate (Pomper 1989); and, changes in the doctrinal stances of the political parties where the Democratic Party emerges as racially liberal and actively pro-civil rights (Feinstein and Schickler 2008).

Subsequently, defections among white southerners from the New Deal coalition (Petrocik 1987), who were “going Republican,” (Black and Black 1987) correspond to
ideological transformations of Democratic, and Republican, Party policies with regard to racial issues (Feinstein and Schickler 2008). Apart from white southerners, the most noticeable shifts to the Republican Party among other social groupings within the electorate include whites, self-designated conservatives, and both younger and older cohorts (Norpoth 1987, Petrocik 1987, Black and Black 1989; Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989). Social status group factors, especially differences in educational background, are also prominent forces explaining increased preferences for the Republican Party among white citizens during the period spanning the 1960s and extending into the late 1980s (Miller 1992). Carmines and Stimson (1989) further contend that party-based changes reflect attitudes toward race-related policies regarding integration, black civil rights, and voting rights for the disenfranchised.

By the mid-1960s African Americans, seemingly impervious to change, culminate their realignment that began with the 1936 presidential election of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Weiss 1989). This attachment to the Democratic Party continues to intensify into the late 1980s. Thereafter, most African Americans perceive the Democrats as having the best over-time record of giving attention to, and taking action to address issues of most importance to the African American racial group. Moreover, African Americans’ distinctive and enduring Democratic partisanship appears to confirm the significance of race, or of particular issues that focus on racial group interests, when making decisions between the two main political parties. Even though important demographic differentiations are also present within the African American community, variables commonly associated with predicting political partisanship do not typically provide meaningful explanations of persistent racial distinctiveness in political partisanship.
Because of persistent racial group solidarity Democratic, not Republican partisanship appears rational, at least from the perspective of procedural rationality (Simon 1955). While the Democrats may not be the best choice, they may be the “lesser of two evils.” Still, the extent to which political distinctiveness and durable partisan predispositions persist at any point in time depends upon continued perceptions of the Democratic Party as best capable of addressing racial group interests. Nevertheless, Bositis (2002) shows evidence of increased conservative ideological preferences among African Americans in the 1980s Reagan era that furthered speculation of increased preferences for the Republican Party. Luks and Elms (2005) contend that Democratic attachments have declined since passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, particularly among younger cohorts. Correspondingly, Lee and Hajnal (2007) reveal a discernible pattern of fluctuations in African American party affiliation. In spite of such empirical evidence African Americans continue to prefer the Democrats.

2.5 AFRICAN-AMERICAN PARTISANSHIP: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Therefore, in formulation of a theoretical perspective for studying partisanship among African Americans the theory of African-American racial group interests provides a more useful paradigm than the traditional prototypes. This is mainly because “to understand black politics one needs to draw on many methodologies, and one clearly needs to pay more attention to the boundaries between society and the individual, with the group as the intermediary phenomenon” (Dawson 1994, 13). Of particular value to the development of this theoretical framework is the Black Utility Heuristic that provides a parsimonious explanation for the group-based decision calculus of individual African Americans. The present model of partisanship endeavors to construct a conceptual
framework based on Michael C. Dawson’s synthesis of “psychological theories of the social group” with “Simonesque approaches to rational decision-making” (Dawson, 12). In so doing, Dawson “provides a rational choice foundation for the formation of group identity [where] rationality is procedural, based on assessments of what works as opposed to what is best [which is useful] to gain insight into the decision-making processes of African Americans both as individuals and as part of a politically active group within the American polity” (Dawson, 12).

The theoretical background of African American racial group interests is a group process perspective of the relationship between the individual and the group, where the racial grouping is construed as a psychological group. According to John C. Turner (1987) such groups, descriptively speaking, are psychologically relevant to individual members subjectively for social comparison. Psychological groups influence individual members since it is from the group that the individual acquires norms, values, and beliefs. Herein lies the utility of group membership for such persons. Individuals can accept membership in, and identification with the group (privately) based on a view of themselves in relation to those persons that constitute the group (Turner 1987, 1-2). This makes the group relevant to the establishment of their own socio-political reality. Henceforth, the psychological group becomes an important frame of reference that shapes the individuals’ own attitudes, orientations and ideas. In this way, a deference to group interests as opposed to individual interests is located within the individual. Therefore, the individual decision is consistent with the notion of procedural rationality, an important component of the Black Utility Heuristic (Dawson 1994). Moreover, recognition of the
individual by others as a group member reinforces the perception of \textit{us} versus \textit{them} and enhances the importance of identification with the group.

Instrumental to this theoretical approach, and consistent with the theory of African-American racial group interests, is the idea that individuals are social beings. Fundamentally, the influence of individuals on one another, particularly in relation to change is inherent in the political motives of African Americans. Any change among a substantial proportion of individual members or within subgroups is potentially detrimental to the group as a whole. Movement in opposition to the political standard could threaten the African American racial group position within the polity. As a psychological group this collectivity of individuals exerts powerful influence on individual attitudes toward the two main political parties in the United States. This is denoted in the seemingly habitual, stable, and enduring relationship between the Democratic Party and the African Americans. Perceptions of interconnectedness explain the presence of an “interdependence of fate,” a perceptual realization that one’s fate depends on the fate of the group as a whole, and “task interdependence” or the dependence of individual group members on each other for goal achievement (Lewin 1946).

Kurt Lewin (1946, 165-166) explains his principle of interdependence of fate in relation to the position of Jews in 1939 thusly:

[I]t is not similarity or dissimilarity of individuals that constitutes a group, but rather interdependence of fate. Any normal group, and certainly any developed and organized one contain and should contain individuals of very different character…. It is easy enough to see that the common fate of all Jews makes them a group in reality…. What is more, a person who has learned to see how much his own fate depends upon the fate of his entire group will ready and even eager to take over a fair share of responsibility for its welfare.
The historical case of African Americans is most applicable to this concept. As a psychological construct, linked fate measures the degree to which an individual’s own self interests are tied to the interests of the entire group. Nonetheless, the perception of relationship with the group waxes or wanes depending upon the extent to which self becomes less, and group becomes more important. Hence,

Hypothesis 1: African Americans with stronger (black) linked fates are likely to support a political party whose policy preferences are perceived as consistent with (black) racial group interests.

The case of African American women suggests distinct historical and contemporary life situations that make even more significant the role of interdependence of fate (Gay and Tate 1998; Simien 2005). This is coupled with making decisions in the face of multiple identities, such as race and gender. So, to further investigate this underlying dimension of African American racial group partisanship, the following proposition is formulated.

Hypothesis 2: African American women are more likely to support the Democratic Party than African American men or women of other ethnicities.

Of further significance to this theoretical perspective is the concept of task interdependence that sheds light on the inducing influence of certain group attributes. Understandably, individuals choose membership with the group based on their perceptions of a common purpose, and on their interest in achieving a common goal. Bound by perceptions of interconnectedness, individuals often view group goals as more important than their own. This is because they consider that their goals are interrelated with the goals of the individuals that compose the group and with whom they share ascriptive characteristics, an important component of the black utility heuristic. Even though group strategies and outcomes may not produce the best possible (optimizing)
solution for the individual, the decision to align oneself with a collectivity of individuals similarly situated is both procedurally rational and efficient. In so doing individuals satisfactorily assess the pursuit, and accomplishment, of racial group goals as fulfilling their own aspirations.

Hypothesis 3: African Americans are more likely to identify with the political party that they perceive best helps their racial group.

Interdependence plays a significant role in understanding the dynamic processes of the African American racial group. Using the framework of the black utility heuristic, Dawson demonstrates how linked racial fate affects political attitudes and decisions of group cohesion. Additionally, the concept of linked fate guides Dawson’s later work on the root of contemporary African American politics in *Black Visions* (2002). In this regard, his interpretations and systematic findings confirm the race perspective (Willie 1979). Nonetheless, Dawson also finds “limited evidence” confirming the declining significance of race hypothesis or class perspective (Wilson 1979; 1980) in determining life chance opportunities (Dawson, 38). Recent relevant research studies that also employ the concept of linked fate and the black politics model demonstrate its profound effect on explanations of the political attitudes and behavior of ethnic minority population groups representing Latinos (Sanchez & Masuoka 2008; Sanchez 2008; Nicholson, Pantoja & Segura 2005), Asian Americans (Junn & Masuoka 2008), Afro-Caribbeans (Watt 2009), and West Indians (Rogers, 2001). Correspondingly, the concept of linked fate also provides a meaningful explanation for predictors of pan-ethnic group consciousness and the use of group identity cues among Asian Americans and Latinos (Masuoka 2006). Then,
Hypothesis 4: The more a person views that the fate of their racial/ethnic group affects their own fate, the greater the likelihood of support for the political party perceived as addressing racial/ethnic group interests.

Explaining the theory of African-American racial group interests, Dawson considers the following variables: Individual perceptions of racial group interests, Individual socioeconomic status, Evaluations of the economy, Liberalism, Local black economic conditions, Approval of Reagan’s presidential performance, and Demographic characteristics—age, gender, and region (Dawson, 113 – 115). Using data from the 1984 and 1988 National Black Election Studies (NBES) panel series (Jackson 1984; 1988), Dawson tests his model to assess the strength of interrelationships. He shows that “a key to African-American partisanship is the economic status of the race.” Moreover, “any party that wants to attract and hold African-American political support must be seen as more effective than its rivals in improving the economic health of the black community” (Dawson, 116-117).

This research study is a modification of Dawson’s (1994) empirical test, employing data feasible for such analysis: the 1996 National Black Election Stud and the 2004 National Politics Study. The focus is African American partisanship. In the theoretical framework, an influence on decisions about which political party is most responsive to racial group interests is largely a factor of race, class, and gender (Figure 2.1 below). In addition, race structures individual orientations and determines the extent


to which ideological predispositions influence partisanship, and frames perceptions of how the parties perform when in control of government. Moreover, race has a profound effect on individual perceptions about historical experiences, and on contemporary encounters with White, and other Americans that have resulted in confinement of the racial group along the perimeter of the social, economic, and political order. In short, race matters.

What then is race? It is a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and language, always of common history, traditions and impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of life.

W.E.B. DuBois

According to DuBois racial classifications tend to follow physical traits, but ascriptive characteristics do not, and cannot, explain such group features as cohesiveness and continuity. In this he sees that differences transcend race and represent more fully “spiritual, psychical,” distinctions that bind people together. The group is therefore composed of individuals that share “first, their race identity and common blood; secondly, and more important, a common striving together for certain ideals of life” (DuBois 2003, 159). For this purpose African Americans work for race solidarity in that they acknowledge their interconnectedness and interdependency. Then perceptions and real-life experiences most often lead to the development of a sense of interdependence or linked fate, identification with one’s social group, as well as a black consciousness that results in solidarity and collective action to advance racial group goals.

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In the diagram above, perceptions of linked fate influence African American (race) evaluations and affective attitudes, as well as individual decisions about which of the two main political parties works harder to promote racial group interests. Most importantly, the model shows three focal effects on partisanship: race, class, and gender. As can be
seen, race has a direct influence on partisanship; race also influences class and gender effects on partisanship, where class denotes a strong relationship that influences party choice in different ways for the racial group.

Race matters for African Americans as a group. Nonetheless, what may be a valid account of the centrality of race to partisanship within the African American racial group may not necessarily depict the relationship between race/ethnicity and political partisanship for other groups of minority status. Therefore, an important element of this extension of Dawson’s (1994) study is looking across other groups to see how the effects specified above apply particularly to African Americans and broadly to other racial/ethnic groups included in this examination. A comparative population of African Americans, White Non-Hispanics, Hispanics, Asians, and Black Caribbeans are also included in the analysis. Even though perceptions of linked racial fate tend to be more explicit among individuals constituting the African American racial group, such perceptions may also be inferred from the political attitudes and actions of other population groups. My position is that a “sense” of linked fate is important to individuals in all groups represented, but in different ways. To this degree the investigation will further explore that phenomenon.

Additionally, the present research study takes into account the integral role of race, class, and gender in structuring political partisanship. Race, economic class position, and gender are sociopolitical constructs that determine individual life chances, or the opportunity to attain meaningful goals in life. They form the basis for imposing inequalities resulting from structures of superior-subordinate relationships, that include white-black or men-women, and signify sociopolitical conflict and interests that
differentiate the two main political parties’ platform agendas, and their administrative agenda when in control of the Executive and Legislative departments of government. As such race, class, and gender tend to serve as the basis for divisions, and for the allocation of resources (Kendall 1997). For African Americans race, class, and gender are sociopolitical factors that play an integral part in explaining their positions relative to second-class citizenship; denial of the American promise of life, liberty, property and of the protections thereof; and confinement along the periphery of the social, economic, and political order.

Among African Americans I expect to see an interaction between race and class in which a decreasing effect of race corresponds to the increasing effect of economic class, if the importance of race has declined, as Wilson supposes. This would then decrease psychological Democratic partisan identifications and thereby yield weakened political preference attitudes, or stronger political independence. Such a finding would support the “class” perspective advanced by Wilson (1980), and might also offer a relevant explanation for the pattern of partisan fluctuations that began in the post 1960s (Hajnal and Lee 2007; Luks and Elms 2005). On the other hand, if the Black Utility Heuristic serves as the principle factor for deciphering political messages, and as a strategic causal component within the decision calculus of African Americans, then individuals should correctly identify the political party that is most responsive to racial group interests in accordance with the racial group standard. This finding would support the race perspective as articulated by Willie (1979), and further demonstrate the significance of linked racial fate as applied by Dawson (1994) in his study.
Furthermore, I expect African-American women to demonstrate a keen sense of linked fate based on both race and gender that prompts them to support the racial group political standard—the Democratic Party. Because of their unique historical and contemporary status disadvantages, particularly regarding income, African American women are expected to more closely affiliate with the political party viewed as best addressing issues of most importance to the racial group. They are expected to more closely affiliate with the Democratic Party than African American men and women of other racial/ethnic groupings within the United States. The distinctive plight of African American women and men is reviewed in the historical chapters that follow.
CHAPTER 3

BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AFRICAN AMERICAN PARTISANSHIP, 1863 - 1964

*The Democrat won’t have us, and the Republicans don’t want us. Is there anything to do but impotently wring our empty hands? ... May God write us down as asses if ever again we are found putting our trust in either the Republican or Democratic Parties.*

W. E. B. Du Bois\(^10\)

Historically, most African Americans consider themselves Democrats, and anecdotal evidence further substantiates this claim. Nonetheless, their partisan roots lay in the Republican Party, and from “Emancipation in 1863 up until 1912 Negroes voted the Republican ticket as a matter of religion” (DuBois 1922). This chapter bears historical evidence for the conceptual framework laid out in the previous chapter. While race, class, and gender are integrated factors explaining African American ties to the Republican Party initially, and then subsequently to the Democratic Party, interdependence of fate and task interdependence makes race the prime factor explaining African American partisan preferences. In what follows I review African American political partisanship over the course of three historical periods, which I identify as the Radical Reconstruction Period from 1863 to 1877; the Post-Reconstruction Period from 1877 to 1936; and the New Deal Coalition Period from 1936 to 1964.

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3.1 OVERVIEW

In spite of his denunciation of the two main political parties W.E.B. DuBois, editor of *Crisis* from 1910 to 1934—a publication dealing with “Negro” life (Rudwick 1958), along with a contingency of other prominent black leaders urged a mass exodus from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party. Still, majority of African Americans continued to identify with the Republicans as late as 1928 (Nowlin 1931; Brisbane 1970). For others, particularly the northern contingency that heeded this call, attachment to the Party of Lincoln began to wane as early as 1920 when they made a notable shift to the Democratic Party. This shift was a response to the Democrats’ decision to allow African Americans to attend their 1924 Democratic National Convention. African Americans were also allowed to hold offices at the convention (Jackson 2008). In addition, this partisan shift rejoins various strategies embraced by the Republicans to distance themselves from black constituents. These included the “lily-white” movement, a political faction whose aim was to exclude blacks and “black and tan” societies; reduction of black patronage; relegation of blacks to only token partisan roles; and support of policies resulting in political subjugation of the race (Brisbane 1970). By the mid-1930s the African American racial group began a partisan realignment from the Republicans to the Democrats, which culminated in the mid-1960s.

African Americans’ views about the two main political parties typically point to established patterns of racial group solidarity. According to Dawson (1994) racial group solidarity is predicated on perceptions of shared historical experiences, a linked racial fate and adversity with respect to black life chances or the likelihood of obtaining important goals in life. More than perceptions of a shared or common history of oppression and subordination, Shelby (2005) insists that solidarity relies on a shared
commitment to resist racism and the negative aspects of such experiences. In short, group solidarity is grounded in fundamental principles of how things should be done by institutions of government, and by the political parties when in control of said government. In what follows African Americans’ commitment to withstand racial injustices by appealing to both governmental and linkage institutions are examined.

3.2 BACKGROUND: AFRICAN-AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY STRATEGIES

Throughout the course of U.S. history African Americans engaged the polity for basic civic values—liberty, justice, equality, and civil rights. Toward this endeavor they employed numerous conventional strategies including legal actions; petitions, various other forms of protest—boycotts, sit-ins, lobbying, marches, and conventions; the independent Black Church; and, the independent Black press. At times they sought recourse by calling for resistance through the use of unconventional methods as well. Whether by way of conventional or unconventional means, African Americans looked for ways to elevate their station in life, to gain practical relief, and to secure full recognition of their right to American citizenship and the protections thereof. Prior to the American Revolutionary War and subsequent ratification of the United States Constitution, African Americans sought emancipation and full rights and privileges of citizenship. In a number of court cases individuals challenged the practice of slavery in the colonies. Of interesting note are three related cases filed in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on behalf of Quock Walker (1781-1783); the Mum Bett (1781) case; and, Ned Griffin’s appeal to the North Carolina General Assembly (1784). The Quock Walker case reached

the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1783. The initial issue before the court presented in 1781 was a promise of emancipation upon reaching age twenty-five prior to the death of Walker’s owner, but violated by his mistress’ second husband. Judgment delivered by Chief Justice William Cushing applied the principle of judicial review to render the practice of slavery a violation of the 1780 state constitution. Cushing’s reasoning held [in part]:

…These sentiments [that are favorable to the natural rights of mankind] led the framers of our constitution of government - by which the people of this commonwealth have solemnly bound themselves to each other – to declare – that all men are born free and equal; and that every subject is entitled to liberty, and to have it guarded by the laws as well as his life and property. In short, without resorting to implication in constructing the constitution, slavery is in my judgment as effectively abolished as it can be by the granting of rights and privileges wholly incompatible and repugnant to its existence. The court are therefore fully of the opinion that perpetual servitude can no longer be tolerated in our government, and that liberty can only be forfeited by some criminal conduct or relinquished by personal consent or contract. And it is therefore unnecessary to consider whether the promises of freedom to Quako, on the part of his master and mistress, amounted to a manumission or not.

Chief Justice William Cushing
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts
The Quock Walker Case, 1783

The Massachusetts case of *Brom and Bett v. Ashley* (1781) also tackled the practice of slavery within the Commonwealth. Bett fled after sustaining permanent injury to her face at the hands of her master’s wife, and solicited legal assistance from Attorney Theodore Sedgwick to file her freedom suit. The court ruled in favor of plaintiffs Bett and Brom awarding them freedom and a just compensation of 30 shillings in damages.

The Mum Bett (Elizabeth Freeman) and Quock Walker cases shed light on the injustices of servitude by testing the Massachusetts State Constitution (1780); subsequently as a result, of these cases the slave trade ended in the Commonwealth in 1788. Correspondingly, African Americans’ commitment to freedom was shown in their response to the revolutionary cause. They fought on both sides in the American Revolution as each promised freedom for their service. Ned Griffin, the slave of William Kitchen, was promised freedom to fight in his master’s stead; however, upon Ned’s return Kitchen refused to honor his pledge. Griffin petitioned the state legislative body and was granted his freedom: *Ned Griffin Freedom by the North Carolina General Assembly, 4 April 1784*,¹³ and the right to vote, *An Act for Enfranchising Ned Griffin, Late the Property of William Kitchen* (17 April 1784).¹⁴

Besides appealing to institutions of government, African Americans demonstrated their self-determination from the pulpit. With the 1816 establishment of the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) church by Richard Allen, Absalom Jones, and others in Philadelphia “an autonomous black religious movement” began.¹⁵ The independent Black Church gave African Americans a new forum for political expression. Though not every church allowed the conveying of such thought, the colonial era marked the beginning of using the pulpit to propagate a message of hope that reminded African

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¹². *NC Archives GASR*, April-June 1784 (Box 3, location 3A-464).


Americans of their interconnectedness, whether bound or free, because of their race. Pastor Richard Allen actively protested against any new form of government that would not extend that freedom won in the American Revolution to all. As delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention deliberated in Philadelphia, Allen, Jones and others staged a prayer protest. However, when the framers of the Constitution of the United States failed to take the more honorable course of freedom and justice for all, the black religious movement spread and the independent Black Church became a haven for civil rights protest.

African Americans also utilized the press to circulate, for example, the *Freedom Petition of New Hampshire Slaves*, an appeal for freedom to the New Hampshire state legislature from Nero Brewster and other natives of Africa forcibly enslaved. In addition, the press brought attention to racial inequality and provided a means to articulate grievances and wrongs against the race, to seek redress, and to report news and information about African Americans’ vital statistics and achievements. *Freedom’s Journal*, the first African American owned and operated newspaper, challenged editorials and other attacks against the race published in the mainstream press. A weekly New York publication from 1827 to 1829, the *Freedom’s Journal*, was “circulated in eleven states, the District of Columbia, Haiti, Europe, and Canada” (Danky and Hady 1996-2012). The independent Black press, like the Black Church, grew tremendously calling on African Americans to work together for relief from their common plight. In 1829 the newspaper published four articles by David Walker, a free black activist, to promote his anti-slavery message in which he urged slaves to use resistance. Pamphlets of his appeal,  

often smuggled into Southern ports by black sailors, were to be read primarily by slaves; however, slave owners read them as well. Some states responded by enacting legislation banning both blacks from learning to read, and the distribution of anti-slavery propaganda. Some states also offered a bounty for Walker’s capture and/or death (Danky and Hady 1996-2012).

During the 1830s abolitionist organizations also increased. Though often headed by white males like the American Anti-Slavery Society founded in 1833 by William Lloyd Garrison, the Female Anti-Slavery Society, founded by Lucretia Mott, also joined the movement in that same year and included African American and White women. Since the colonial period women used numerous tactics such as protests, boycotts, meetings, conventions to give voice to anti-slavery and pro-women’s suffrage sentiments. In 1833 black and white women also joined to found the Boston Female Anti-Slavery Society. Similarly, interracial and mixed (female and male) associations were established in New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. Interracial women societies formed to address common experiences, including discrimination, disenfranchisement, and second-class status.

African American women were primarily concerned about the abolition of slavery and about the state of the racial group. They agreed that women’s suffrage was important; however, black women wanted freedom first then suffrage. Many white women, on the other hand, just wanted the right to vote like their male counterparts.

17 Women also joined male-dominated anti-slavery associations after passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law to serve and promote their common cause. [Wilbur H. Siebert, The Underground Railroad in Massachusetts (Worchester, Massachusetts: American Antiquarian Society, 1935), 50.]
Some of the suffragists did not know how they felt about the abolition of slavery, while others like the Grimke sisters, Sarah and Angelina, of South Carolina (later Rhode Island); Lucretia Mott of Pennsylvania; and Elizabeth Cady Stanton of New York were both abolitionists and suffragists. Differences also emerged over the order of priority given to these two issues, abolition and suffrage. The resulting conflict between black and white women, and between men and women or abolition versus suffrage, included women’s rights advocates Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony with Sojourner Truth against “former allies like Lucy Stone, Antoinette Brown Blackwell, Wendell Phillips, and Frederick Douglass” 18 who favored abolition first and foremost. Correspondingly, divergence among white women surfaced over which factor held the greatest significance: race or gender. This conflict inevitably led African American women to establish separate associations in the fight against racial and gender discrimination. For instance, in 1913 Ida B. Wells-Barnett founded the Alpha Suffrage Club in Chicago, the first suffrage club for black women.19 Nevertheless, women took tremendous risks on behalf of both the abolition and suffrage movements, especially during historical periods when it was socially unacceptable for a woman to speak in public, or to serve on committees, for example, having equal status with men. Oftentimes women, particularly African Americans, were violating societal taboos for the sake of civil liberties and equal rights.

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Some African Americans claimed independent leadership in the abolitionist fraternity as shown in the National Negro Convention Movement, which operated from 1830 to 1864. The National Negro Convention Movement brought attention to issues of particular importance to the race such as purchasing land and securing passage for the relocation of African Americans. Since all did not desire colonization, the movement also sought improvement of black livelihood in the United States.\textsuperscript{20} While a great number of local, state, and national conventions were spawned by the movement during this period, of particular note is \textit{A National Convention of Colored Citizens in the United States} (1843) that convened in Buffalo, New York to consider issues of civil rights and the security of American citizenship. Read during the course of this conference, \textit{An Address to the Slaves of the United States of America} authored by David Walker (cited above) was rejected by a small majority of delegates “on these grounds:

1. That the document was war-like, and encouraged insurrection;

2. That if the Convention should adopt it, that those delegates who lived near the borders of the slave states, would not dare to return to their homes.”\textsuperscript{21}

In his \textit{Preface} to Walker’s appeal Henry Highland Garnet (1843) stated: “and now in compliance with the earnest request of many who heard it and in conformity to the wishes of numerous friends who are anxious to see it, the author now gives it to the public praying God that this little book may be borne on the four winds of heaven, until


the principles it contains shall be understood and adopted by every slave in the Union.”

Then in his own 1848 address to the Female Benevolent Society of Troy, New York entitled The Past and Present Condition, and the Destiny, of the Colored Race, Henry Highland Garnet demonstrated just how well-informed African Americans were of their situation. Garnet reviewed a myriad of contributions by Africans to the western world; surveyed the origin and expansion of the slave trade; discussed the end of slavery in the British empire, Haiti, Mexico, French and Swedish possessions; and, warned of the expansion of slavery into Texas as a result of the Mexican War. Most importantly, Garnet called for racial solidarity despite differences over colonization (Africa or Canada), and over whether to call themselves: “Africans,” “colored,” “African-American,” or “black.” Instead, Henry Highland Garnet advocated an alternative strategy to overthrow the shackles of bondage, education (Garnet 1848).

Subsequently, an immediate reaction to passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law prompted a proliferation of abolitionist societies like the Boston Vigilance Committee of Massachusetts, composed of blacks and whites, men and women, whose principle aim was to provide medical and legal aid, passage to Canada, transitory housing/hiding, citizen petitions to government, and/or public notice of the arrival of slave hunters (Jackson 1850: 6-32). The Committee further advocated state laws that would prohibit

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22. David Walker was found dead in his home in 1830.
24. Francis Jackson, The Treasurers Accounts. (Boston, Massachusetts: The Boston Vigilance Committee, 1850, 6-32.)
public officials from assisting in the recapturing of fugitive slaves. Classified in this fugitive slave status were prominent abolitionists, Frederick Douglass and William Wells Brown who propagated their message of emancipation both in the United States and abroad. Accordingly, Martin R. Delany advanced his message of Black Nationalism in *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States, Politically Considered* (1852). He advocated colonization in the Caribbean, Central or South America, or East Africa; and toward this goal, Delany helped organize the *National Emigration Convention of Colored People* that convened in August of 1854 in Cleveland, Ohio. Delany, a pre-Civil War abolitionist and the first African American to reach the rank of Major in the Union Army, led an expedition to Liberia and the Niger River Valley in West Africa in 1859 where he negotiated treaties with local tribes on behalf of the emigration movement.26

3.3 THE DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY SCHEME AND SLAVERY

On the contrary, the Democratic Party, favored predominantly in the South, repeatedly pledged to maintain the social, cultural, economic status quo, and particularly the perpetuation of slavery. Democrats supported the Fugitive Slave Law passed by the United States Congress in 1850 (9 Stat. 462). This law gave Southern slave owners the right to recapture escaped slaves, even if they had relocated to Northern states. So, European supporters of William Wells Brown paid for his freedom before allowing him to return to the United States fearing that his former slave owner would reclaim him (Wesley 1944: 39). Accordingly, after

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publication of his autobiography *The Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass: An American Slave* (1845) Frederick Douglass found sanctuary in London, England, and returned to the United States after friends raised the purchase price for his manumission from Thomas Auld.²⁷

Often tracing their roots back to the Democratic-Republican Party of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, the Democratic Party emerged from various factions united by Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren during the campaign period of the 1828 presidential election (Silbey 2002). Like Jefferson, Jackson viewed government interference with citizens’ rights as an encroachment on liberty itself. This is the basis for the Democrats’ formal statement on chattel slavery.

The liberal principles embodied by Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence, and sanctioned in the constitution, which makes ours the land of liberty, and the asylum of the oppressed of every nation, have ever been cardinal principles in the democratic faith; and every attempt to abridge the present privilege of becoming citizens, and the owners of soil among us, ought to be resisted with the same spirit…²⁸

The Party’s most cherished values of liberty and property form their basis for citizenship (Locke 1689). Yet, because enslaved African Americans were classified as human chattel their official status as a species of property meant they had no legal claim to the liberal values of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (or property). Democrats repeated

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their position on slavery [and states’ rights] in each platform from 1840 to 1856 (Woolley and Peters 1999-2011).

Resolved, That we reiterate with renewed energy of purpose the well considered declarations of former Conventions upon the sectional issue of Domestic slavery, and concerning the reserved rights of the States…That Congress has no power under the Constitution, to interfere with or control the domestic institutions of the several States, and that such States are the sole and proper judges of everything appertaining to their own affairs, not prohibited by the Constitution; that all efforts of the abolitionists, or others, made to induce Congress to interfere with questions of slavery, or to take incipient steps in relation thereto, are calculated to lead to the most alarming and dangerous consequences; and that all such efforts have an inevitable tendency to diminish the happiness of the people and endanger the stability and permanency of the Union, and ought not to be countenanced by any friend of our political institutions.

Democratic Party Platform of 1856
June 2, 1856

Stephen A. Douglas, Lincoln’s Democratic opponent in the 1860 presidential election, advocated a philosophy of popular sovereignty that espoused states’ rights, and the right to own slaves as a natural part of ordered society. For Lincoln and Douglas, both from Illinois, this campaign pit the two in a rematch after having faced each other in the 1856 state congressional election, won by Douglas. Differences over the institution of Slavery and the powers and duties of Congress persisted. The 1860 Democratic Party Platform called on the U.S. Supreme Court to settle party differences over constitutional issues. The Party platform further “Resolved, that the enactments of the State
Legislatures to defeat the faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave Law, are hostile in character, subversive of the Constitution\textsuperscript{29}, and revolutionary in their effect.”\textsuperscript{30}

Formed in 1854, the Republican Party emerged as the Democratic Party opponent in the U.S. two-party political scheme. Republicans distinguished themselves from both Abolitionists that supported immediate freedom and racial equality for the slave population, and Democrats that supported the indefinite continuation of slavery and its expansion into newly acquired territory. Even though tension between separate wings of the Republican Party emerged over questions about the dissolution of domestic slavery as an American institution, the Party seemed to prefer its gradual extinction. Drawing from natural rights philosophy as espoused by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence (1776), the 1856 Republican Party doctrine stated:

[W]ith our Republican fathers, we hold it to be a self-evident truth, that all men are endowed with the inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that the primary object and ulterior design of our Federal Government were to secure these rights to all persons under its exclusive jurisdiction; that, as our Republican fathers, when they had abolished Slavery in all our National Territory, ordained that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, it becomes our duty to maintain this provision of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it for the purpose of establishing Slavery in the Territories of the United States by positive legislation, prohibiting its existence or extension therein. That we deny the authority of Congress, of a Territorial Legislation, of any individual, or association of individuals, to

\textsuperscript{29} Because the U.S. Constitution was silent on the issue, by virtue of the principle of federalism, the states were left responsible for governing their own domestic affairs, which included decisions about the practice of slavery.

give legal existence to Slavery in any Territory of the United States, while the present Constitution shall be maintained.\textsuperscript{31}

Republican 1856 Party Platform
June 18, 1856

While Republicans used natural rights philosophy to advance an anti-slavery campaign; they also stated their belief that the “due process” provision of the U.S. Constitution, Amendment 5 (1789), granted legal protection for all persons in the United States. They further recognized sovereign powers conferred on Congress to prohibit the territories from engaging in “those twin relics of barbarism—Polygamy and Slavery.”\textsuperscript{32}

In 1860 the Republican Party slated Abraham Lincoln as their presidential candidate. A moderate, Lincoln personally opposed slavery as wrong morally because he believed that it was improper for one human being to own another. However, he supported the notion that slavery had a right to exist where the U.S. Constitution was silent, and allowed its existence originally (Basler 1858). So, he did not have to compromise his personal beliefs when advancing a Republican Party platform that favored states’ rights to control “domestic institutions” such as slavery. The 1860 Republican platform further reaffirmed their philosophical roots, the right and duty of Congress to thwart the extension of slavery into territories procured from Mexico during the war, and opposition to reopening the slave trade under the flag of the United States of America (Woolley and Peters 1999-2011).

Despite advancing an anti-slavery platform the Republican Party won the 1860 election. Nonetheless, regional conflicts and mounting tensions over slavery ended in the


\textsuperscript{32} Woolley and Peters, “1856 Republican Party Platform,” (June 18, 1856). Ibid.
American Civil War, fought from 1861 to 1865 (Franklin and Moss 1988). In the midst of the War Between the States, President Abraham Lincoln issued Executive Order: “Proclamation 93 – Declaring the Objective of the War Including Emancipation of Slaves in Rebellious States on January 1, 1863” on September 22, 1862. According to Lincoln, this Order was rendered in accordance with constitutional powers of the President, Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution as duly noted:

And by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts of States are, and henceforward shall be, free; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons.

Abraham Lincoln

The Emancipation Proclamation
September 22, 1862

This strategic move by President Lincoln not only clarified the objective of quelling the confederate rebellion to preserve the Union, it also established slavery as an important goal connected to the war, provided a legal basis for manumission, and set the stage for future abolition of the institution of Slavery.

Now the fate of slaves was directly linked to salvation of the Union. Keenly aware of this, Frederick Douglass approached the administration to renew his call for the conscription of black troops into the Union Army. In January 1863 Massachusetts Governor John Andrew was given authority to amass a


34. Douglass called for the use of “colored” troops to fight against the southern confederacy as early as 1861; however, they were not recruited until after Lincoln’s executive order, the Emancipation Proclamation, was issued.
contingency of black soldiers for the war effort. Recruiting soldiers for service, Frederick Douglass enlisted two of his own sons to the Massachusetts 54th Regiment of Colored Troops. Later that year he met President Lincoln beginning “an unusual friendship” that gave Douglass direct access to the President of the United States. In spite of unequal treatment of black soldiers versus white soldiers regarding pay, promotions, and punishment (often death or enslavement) when captured by the Confederates, Douglass urged African Americans to enlist. “Only through black participation in the war, he believed, could abolition and full citizenship for Negroes be established” (Connery 2005). Upon visiting the White House in July of 1863 Douglass shared his sentiments about the maltreatment of black troops fighting for the country. After this meeting the War Department drafted an “Order of Retaliation” General Orders No. 252 dated July 30, 1863 to which President Lincoln affixed his signature, and on which the imprint of Frederick Douglass is clearly seen.

ORDER OF RETALIATION

It is the duty of every government to give protection to its citizens, of whatever class, color, or condition, and especially to those who are duly organized as soldiers in the public service. The law of nations and the usages and customs of war as carried on by civilized powers, permit no distinction as to color in the treatment of prisoners of war as public enemies. To sell or enslave any captured person, on account of his color, and for no offence against the laws of war, is a relapse into barbarism and a crime against the civilization of the age.

35. Douglass’ concern stems from the November 1862 capture of four black Union troops in South Carolina who were summarily executed as approved by Confederate Secretary of War James A. Seddon and President Jefferson Davis.

The government of the United States will give the same protection to all its soldiers, and if the enemy shall sell or enslave anyone because of his color, the offense shall be punished by retaliation upon the enemy's prisoners in our possession.

It is therefore ordered that for every soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war, a rebel soldier shall be executed; and for every one enslaved by the enemy or sold into slavery, a rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor on the public works and continued at such labor until the other shall be released and receive the treatment due to a prisoner of war.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

3.4 PERIOD OF RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION, 1863 – 1877

*Neither Slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States...*

The Thirteenth Amendment
Signed by Abraham Lincoln
February 1, 1865

The period of Radical Reconstruction is distinguished by conflicting policies about the proper resolution of emancipated citizens in the United States. On the one hand, Radical Republicans, dominant in the U.S. Congress and sometimes critical of President Lincoln, advocated policies to abolish slavery; establish civil rights and liberties for emancipated citizens; and efforts to assist them in acclimating to life in a free society. Frederick Douglass, adviser to the President, favored these Radical Republican policies. On the other hand, Southern Democrats preferred their pre-Civil War status quo. Slavery was viewed as a mechanism for both controlling the “Negro” population, and maintaining order. Once the bonds were removed many in the South believed that the states needed to enact legislation with the sole purpose of keeping blacks in check (Franklin and Moss 1988). While Abolitionists supported the immediate manumission of slaves, others promoted either a gradual termination of the institution of Slavery, or its
continuation indefinitely. These various positions led to conflicting policies during the period of Radical Reconstruction.

Inasmuch as Lincoln’s Executive Order – Proclamation 93 ensured the emancipation of slaves in the rebellious states of the confederacy, provided the Union won the war, but it did not abolish the institution of Slavery in the United States. Hence, some eight hundred thousand persons of color remained enslaved (Franklin and Moss 1988). Moreover, after the American Civil War ended President Lincoln faced a myriad of questions about the legal status of emancipated citizens, and “Negro” suffrage. He hoped that once freed the former slave population would choose to leave the United States; however, their substantial presence, especially in the South, meant that he had to resolve the “Negro problem” (Franklin and Moss 1988). Even though Lincoln’s administration and a number of benevolent societies provided relief services for fugitive slaves during the Civil War (DuBois 1901), after the war full emancipation came in the form of legislative and constitutional initiatives championed by the Radical Republicans.

In 1865 the Thirteenth Amendment (13 Stat. 744-775) abolished slavery in the United States. Following ratification of the Amendment, Congress created The Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (13 Stat. 507-509). The Freedmen’s Bureau was tasked with the responsibility of helping Southern blacks and whites make the transition from a slave, to a free society. Among other things, the Bureau was charged with providing temporary relief services such as food rations, health care, assistance with labor contracts, and educational opportunities for formal schooling. W.E.B. DuBois, great-grandson of Elizabeth Freeman (Mum Bett) and a spokesman for African

Americans’ rights, wrote an historical account of the Bureau’s efforts to assist emancipated slaves for the *Atlantic Monthly* (1901), a Boston publication of commentary on major societal issues. In his assessment DuBois (1901) noted that the Freedmen’s Bureau was patterned after a Port Royal, South Carolina (sea island) experiment that was known for successfully turning slaves into free workingmen; however, in the Bureau’s case it was perhaps, destined for failure from the onset in view of the times. Nonetheless, he credited the Bureau with some success in starting “the black peasant proprietor, and it secured the recognition of black freemen before courts of law.”

The Bureau’s greatest success came in establishing 4,000 free public black schools in the South including Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee and Hampton Institute in Hampton, Virginia, with the assistance of benevolent societies like the American Missionary Association and individuals primarily in the North. Still, when local agents failed to deliver, African Americans were critical of the Freedmen’s Bureau, as reported in the following press article.

> The laborer on the plantations is, to a very great extent, in the clutches of his employer. If he goes to the Bureau's agent, he finds there an officer who rides with his employer, who dines with him and who drinks champagne with him. He is not likely to receive impartial justice at the hands of such a prejudiced officer. Most of the agents think their particular business is to furnish the planters with cheap hands and to retain at any cost the laborers on the plantations. They are in fact the planter's guards. □□ It is therefore perfectly useless for the poor laborer to look at the Freedmen's Bureau for relief. He knows in advance that the Bureau will send him back to his unjust or exacting employer. He will not be assisted to get his pay or to get redress but will be told to go back to his master and do his work.

*The New Orleans Tribune*
October 31, 1866

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On April 9, 1866, Congress passed a Civil Rights Act (14 Stat. 27-30), over President Andrew Johnson’s veto. It was intended to protect citizens from Black Codes. The first such code passed in Mississippi in 1865 imposed restrictions on “all free men, freed Negroes and mulattos” from voting, sitting on juries, testifying against white men, carrying weapons in public places, and working in certain occupations.\textsuperscript{39} The 1866 Civil Rights Act stated that all persons born in the United States were citizens “without regard to race, color, or previous condition.” Under the Act African Americans could:

Make and enforce contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence in court, and inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. Persons who denied these rights to former slaves were guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction faced a fine not exceeding $1,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.

1866 Civil Rights Act
14 Stat. 27-30

Consequently, the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868 (14 Stat. 358-359) gave citizenship to “all persons born or naturalized in the United States.” The Amendment further provided legal protections, and made applicable to the states provisions of the U.S. Constitution, Amendment 5 (1789), that prohibited the national government from depriving any person of “life, liberty, and property without due process of law.” Further protection of citizens’ rights came in the form of the Fifteenth Amendment, 1870 (16 Stat. 40-41), when all male citizens were thereby enfranchised without regard to “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” Correspondingly, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (18 Stat. 336), intended to strengthen the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited denial to any person “the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities

\textsuperscript{39} Laws of the State of Mississippi, Passed at a Regular Session of the Mississippi Legislature, held in Jackson, October, November and December, (1865): 82-93; Jackson, (1866): 165-167.
and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres and other places of public amusement.” The Act adjudged unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1883 Civil Rights Cases that addressed consolidated lawsuits filed on behalf of African Americans. The Court ruled that Congress overstepped its authority in banning the practice of racial segregation by individual citizens; Congress had no power to regulate private rights.

In addition, Radical Republican reconstruction policy required confederate states to create new constitutions that granted equal legal protections for black and white citizens alike. African Americans’ responded to both passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, and these new southern reconstruction governments. According to Eric Foner, “former slaves flocked to the ballot boxes and the more ambitious sought political office. By 1877 about 2,000 black men had won local, state, and federal offices in the former Confederate states” (1993: xi). Nevertheless, African American politicians were neither accorded substantive power within the Republican Party organization, nor executive control over any governments despite a majority population in several states of the former Confederacy. Still the Fifteenth Amendment opened the way for seventeen African Americans, known as “the Symbolic Generation,” to serve in the U.S. Congress between 1870 and 1887 as shown in Table 3.1 that follows. 


Black congressional members experienced racial discrimination, a lack of political power to advance their legislative agenda, isolation from Republican Party leadership, and low-ranking committee assignments. Often at odds with the South Carolina state Republican Party, Robert C. De Large, a wealthy resident from Charleston, was elected to the 42\textsuperscript{nd} Congress (1871 – 1873). De Large drew sharp criticism over remarks made in response to accusations of corruption levied against black South Carolina politicians by Democrat Samuel Cox of New York. In his response De Large insisted that the only fault of the black politicians was trusting white Republicans. “While there may have been extravagance and corruption resulting from the placing of improper men in official positions, these evils have been brought about by the men identified with the race to which the gentleman from New York belongs, and not by our race.”\textsuperscript{43} De Large also raised speculations about advocating a partisan shift among African Americans because of his affiliation with Martin R. Delany, a member of the Democratic Party, and because of an 1870 campaign speech in which he stated, “I hold that my race has always been Republican for necessity only”\textsuperscript{44} (McCarthy 1999).

\textsuperscript{43} Quoted in the \textit{Congressional Globe}, 6 April 1871, Appendix, 42nd Cong., 1st session, A230–231.

Table 3.1 The Symbolic Generation: African Americans in the U. S. Congress, 1870-1887

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEMBER</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>TERM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blanche Kelso Bruce</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>1875-1881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Harvey Cain</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>1873-1875; 1877-1879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Carlos De Large</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>1871-1873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Brown Elliott</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>1871-1874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeremiah Haralson</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>1875-1877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Adams Hyman</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>1875-1877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson Franklin Long</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1871-1871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Roy Lynch</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>1873-1877; 1882-1883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Edmund Nash</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>1875-1877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Edward O’Hara</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>1883-1885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Hayne Rainey</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>1870-1879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alonzo Jacob Ransier</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>1873-1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Thomas Rapier</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>1873-1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiram Rhodes Revels</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>1870-1871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Smalls</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>1875-1879; 1882-1883; 1884-1887</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the 1874 congressional election Democrats gained control of the U.S. House of Representatives. Their victory was possible partly because of a split in the Republican Party along racial lines between the Lily White, and the Black and Tan Republicans (Pohlmann 2008) regarding the “Negro” question. The split gave rise to a new breed of Republicans in the late 1870s that were weary of the racial justice agenda of the radical element of the Party. This new breed of Republicans mostly represented the interests of northern industrialists who promoted national unity and economic progress (Silbey 2002). Their emergence marked the beginning of the end for Radical Republicans as southern states were readmitted with full privileges of citizenship for all white citizens (Brisbane 1970). State constitutions were promptly revised. Throughout the South policies known as Jim Crow laws were enacted to strip African Americans of all civil and political rights.

In 1876 Republican candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes faced Democratic candidate, Samuel J. Tilden, governors of Ohio and New York respectively, in one of the most controversial contests in American electoral history. African Americans feared a win by Tilden would mean a reversal of their status, and the return of domestic slavery. Once the votes were tallied, Governor Tilden had won the popular vote; however, the final decision left to the Electoral College resulted in neither candidate winning a majority, so the House of Representatives did not select the president in accordance with the U.S. Constitution (Article II, Section 1). Conflict erupted between the Democrats and the Republicans and a compromise solution, perhaps corrupt, gave Governor Hayes the presidency (Pohlmann 2008; Franklin and Moss 1988; Brisbane 1970). Once inaugurated President Hayes promptly ended Reconstruction of the South, terminated military
occupation, and returned complete governmental control to the states, thereby fulfilling the 1876 Republican/Democratic compromise agreement (Franklin and Moss 1988). After this election the Radical Republicans’ domination of Congress ended and white supremacy resumed.

3.5 PERIOD OF POST-RECONSTRUCTION, 1877 – 1936

“There is no discrimination in the state’s requirements for voters to pass a literacy test and pay poll taxes, as these were applied to all voters.”

*Henry Williams v. State of Mississippi*
170 U.S. 213 (1898)

The questionable compromise of the 1876 presidential election, settled in favor of Republican Rutherford B. Hayes appeared, at first glance, to be a win for African Americans as well. Unfortunately, return of self-governance to the South proved to be most problematic. Democrats in the South immediately addressed their focal “Negro” problem with illegal, extralegal and systemic methods that served “to nullify the political strength of Negroes or to disfranchise them altogether.” Other tactics involved intimidation, violence, and acts of terrorism. Post-Reconstruction unraveled the civil and political rights and liberties promised by Radical Republican initiatives, and relegated to the African-American population a status of second-class citizenship. Regrettably, as Marcus D. Pohlmann (2008) contends, the U.S. Supreme Court played a substantial role in legitimizing a number of southern strategies intended to disenfranchise both black and poor white citizens.


46. The most notable cases included: the *Slaughterhouse Cases*, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); *United States v. Cruikshank*, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); *United States v. Reese*, 92 U.S. 542 (1875);* United States v. Reese*, 92 U.S.
Just prior to the end of the period of Radical Reconstruction, the Mississippi Plan (1875) legally recognized intimidation as a means to prevent African-American participation in the political process. In addition, the State created a new constitution, thereby replacing the Reconstruction document that required full rights of citizenship to freed persons of color. In so doing, Mississippi disenfranchised most African Americans and established its own legal basis for voter registrations, electoral requirements, participation in the political process, serving on juries, and running for political offices (Franklin and Moss 1988; Brisbane 1970). Mississippi resident Henry Williams, an African American, brought suit in the case of *Henry Williams v. State of Mississippi*, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) [cited above] to contest both the 1890 state constitution and state code of 1892 in which passage of a literacy test served as the qualifying condition for voting. Williams contested on grounds that these state provisions violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection of the law. The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling upheld Mississippi’s use of the device; discrimination did not constitute grounds for invalidating provisions of the state law.

Other southern states followed Mississippi’s lead by creating new constitutions and adopting similar strategies like the requirement of property qualifications for voting eligibility, Louisiana’s Grandfather Clause, the Poll Tax, the Literacy Test for voter registrations, and the White Primary system (Brisbane, 1970). Each was developed with the express intent of disenfranchising African Americans. Southern states’ tactics to deny black political participation further hindered the election of African Americans to local, state, and federal offices. Without federal intervention southern states rolled back the

clock on African Americans’ civil rights accomplishments. George W. Murray of South Carolina, a U.S. Congress Member from 1893–1895 and from 1896–1897, entreated legislators thusly: “I beg all true men to forget party and partisanship and right the great wrongs perpetuated upon humble and unoffending American citizens…I declare that no class of people has ever been more misrepresented, slandered, and traduced than the black people of the South.”47 After 1901 African Americans were systematically eliminated from the United States Congress.

With the onset of the Twentieth Century African Americans faced the problem of how to respond to discrimination, disenfranchisement, and disparity. Some migrated from the South to the North some made the exodus to western states like Kansas and Nebraska. Still, others remained in the South. Regardless of their location African Americans encountered racial oppression. Moreover, controversy emerged in the form of three ideological perspectives of how to improve the livelihood of African Americans. These included Booker T. Washington’s economic self-reliance through industrial education, W.E.B. DuBois’ organized determination and aggressive action, and Marcus Garvey’s black nationalism. Although they differed in approach, each theory advanced the importance of African American racial group solidarity. Booker T. Washington pushed for equality through academic and vocational education, as provided by his Tuskegee Institute in Tuskegee, Alabama. While Washington espoused openly an accommodationist philosophy of racial separation with reconciliation as articulated in his Atlanta Compromise Speech of 1895,48 he also advocated surreptitiously racial equality

47. Congressional Record, 5 October 1893 (House, 53rd Cong., 1st sess.): 2161.
and integration by financing litigation challenging disenfranchisement and segregation.  

Controversy erupted when other black leaders like Frederick Douglass and W.E.B. DuBois, suspicious of Washington’s motives, suggested the speech represented instead his terms to surrender on behalf of the Black race: political power, civil rights, and a higher “liberal arts” education for the race.

On the contrary, Jamaican-born Marcus Garvey believed that the U.S. white citizenry would never accept African Americans as equal socially. So, Garvey promoted a kinship with their ancestral homeland—Africa, and return of the African diaspora. Establishing the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), and hosting its first convention in 1920, Garvey urged blacks to go “back to Africa.” With massive support within the black community for his separatist movement:

Garvey established the Black Star Steamship Line in 1919 to encourage trade among black communities in North America, the Caribbean, and Africa, and promote immigration to the West Indies, Central America, and Africa. Shares of the Black Star Line were sold to supporters, and three months after the company was incorporated, Garvey bought the first of three ships, which were to sail under the command of a black captain with an all-black crew. But the Black Star Line turned out to be a disastrous business venture and closed down in 1922. Although it did not accomplish any of its objectives, the steamship company was a potent symbol for the masses of dispossessed black men and women who had invested their money, hope, and pride in it. "Oh! ye of little faith. The Eternal has happened. The Negro incorporated a steamship enterprise by the name of the Black Star Line; he placed $500,000 of common stock on the market at $5 a share, and in ten weeks he sold so many shares to his own people that

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he was able on the 31st of October to take over the first steamship ever owned by the race in modern times.”

On February 12, 1909 Mary White Ovington with Oswald Garrison Villard and William English Walling established the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to promote racial integration. W.E.B. DuBois was the only African American to serve on the NAACP Executive Committee when established in 1910. DuBois was named Director of Publications and Research with the primary responsibility of editor of the association’s *Crisis* magazine, and used his position to condemn lynching, promote racial integration, and demand equality and justice for African Americans. It is not surprising then that one of the first NAACP initiatives was to lobby Congress to pass anti-lynching legislation. The association also employed various strategies such as lobbying and protesting to pressure the polity on behalf of the racial group; to petition for equal rights for blacks in employment, and in the armed services; and to raise public awareness of the plight of African Americans. Like Quock Walker, Mum Bett and other prior efforts to seek redress for wrongs against the race

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52. Ida B. Wells-Barnett, an abolitionist and suffragist who helped develop a number of African American women and reform organizations, previously called for legislative reforms with her *Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All Its Phases* (1892) and *A Red Record* (1895) of lynching statistics.
through the judiciary, the NAACP accessed the courts to test cases that infringed on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. A number of landmark Supreme Court cases resulted in NAACP victories. They included *Guinn v. United States* 238 U.S. 347 (1915) in which the Court ruled the Oklahoma grandfather clause a constitutional violation of the Fifteenth Amendment; *Buchanan v. Warley* 245 U.S. 60 (1917) ruled local governments’ racial zoning unconstitutional; *Moore v. Dempsey* 261 U.S. 86 (1923) in which the Court considered that mob-dominated trials held in Arkansas violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Republican Party prevailed from the end of Reconstruction until the beginning of the New Deal coalition era of the 1930s when Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt defeated Republican Herbert Hoover in 1932. Notable exceptions during this period of Republican Party dominance were Republican President Theodore Roosevelt’s (1901–1909) “Square Deal” and Democratic President Woodrow Wilson’s (1913–1921) “New Freedom” administrations. Roosevelt and Wilson were each distinguished, not as partisans but as Progressive reformers; they ushered in the political philosophy of American Liberalism or Progressivism. They also used similar tactics by befriending and courting black voters during their election campaigns, and then by betraying their loyalties during their terms in office. Neither Roosevelt nor Wilson offered genuine assurances to advance black livelihood like that provided their white counterparts. Instead, African Americans either lagged behind in, or were excluded from, improved economic situations, employment opportunities, housing conditions, and recreational facilities.
Moreover, African Americans were also often in jeopardy of violence and victimized without the assurance of federal protection (Franklin and Moss 1988; Brisbane 1970). President Wilson required the re-segregation of federal facilities and the civil service after about fifty years of integration (Pohlmann 2008); segregation of the armed forces, which according to Wilson was for the safety and security of African Americans; and systematic exclusion of the African American population from the benefits and privileges of full citizenship (Franklin and Moss 1988; Brisbane 1970). Nonetheless, the 28-year absence of African Americans from the United States Congress ended with the election of Oscar S. De Priest, a Republican from the state of Illinois, whose term spanned from 1929 to 1935 with the aid of Ida B. Wells-Barnett of Chicago. His loss to Democrat Arthur Mitchell in the 1934 congressional election referred a “larger political trend occurring in Chicago and many other northern cities; African Americans were changing their allegiance from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party.” Serving from 1935 to 1943, Arthur Mitchell was the first African American Democrat elected to Congress. Succeeded by Democrat William L. Dawson (1943 – 1970), Chicago sent the third African American to Congress in the twentieth century. As Democrats, Mitchell and Dawson were considered heirs of the New Deal legacy.  

3.6 PERIOD OF THE NEW DEAL COALITION, 1936 – 1964

Partisan realignment that began in the 1920s gained momentum during President Roosevelt’s 1936 reelection bid. Notable shifts in political party identifications within the African-American community emerged as allegiance to the Republican Party of


Lincoln began to wane (Weiss 1983). A number of factors contributed to these defections. They included: Herbert Hoover’s failure to address substantive issues of importance to the race, and to grant much needed federal emergency assistance; African-American perceptions of policy congruence with Roosevelt as a consequence of his first term in office; Roosevelt’s handling of relief efforts in response to the devastating economic crisis brought on by the stock market crash of 1929. Additionally, the arrival of African Americans migrating from the South to Northern slums necessitated relief that was provided only since Roosevelt took office. Finally, the emergence of a “new black electorate,” consisting of coming-of-age and first-time voters in 1936, joined the ranks of the Democratic coalition to support the reelection of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Franklin and Moss 1988; Weiss 1983; Brisbane, 1970; Campbell, et al. 1960).

However, not everyone was convinced that leaving the Republican Party for the Democratic Party was in the best interest of the race. According to Nancy Weiss (1983) the first national survey documenting African American political party identifications reported that some citizens were still reluctant to embrace the Democratic Party in 1937. Moreover, 71 percent of the “Black elite” made up primarily of professionals, business and civic leaders still maintained attachments to the Republican Party.

Democratic dominance of the presidency prevailed during the New Deal era. African Americans increased their support for the Democratic Party and for the Roosevelt administration, mainly because they paid at least a modicum of attention to racial group

concerns. New Deal programs provided African Americans the opportunity to escape their captured status within the Republican Party, even though Roosevelt sought to appease the southern wing of the Party by not pushing Congress to move forward with anti-lynching and other civil rights legislation (Frymer 1999). Roosevelt also strategically encouraged black loyalty for the Democrats when he enlisted their advice and assistance in various departments of the federal bureaucracy. According to Franklin and Moss (1988) Roosevelt’s “Black Cabinet” consisted of leaders within the community who were highly skilled and qualified for federal service. These notable leaders included: Robert L. Vann, Special Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General; William H. Hastie, Assistant Solicitor, Department of the Interior; Robert C. Weaver, racial advisor, Department of the Interior; Eugene Kinckle Jones, advisor on Negro affairs, Department of Commerce; Mary McLeod Bethune, Director, Negro Affairs of the National Youth Administration; Edgar Brown, advisor on Negro affairs, Civilian Conservation Corps; Frank S. Horne who worked with federal housing programs; and, William J. Trent, Racial Relations Officer, Federal Works Agency.  

56 In addition, a number of other African Americans served in various capacities within the federal bureaucracy. This relationship allowed the administration to entertain issues of most importance to the race like housing, employment, trade skills and education, as well as relief assistance and benefits in exchange for African Americans’ loyal support at the polls.

While the NAACP, particularly its Legal Defense Fund (LDF), continued legal strategies to represent African Americans against injustices during the New Deal era, Asa Philip Randolph, labor organizer and president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car

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Porters that he founded in 1925, proposed a new strategy to improve African Americans’ conditions, the March on Washington Movement. Randolph’s plan entailed a show of racial solidarity among African Americans, along with sympathetic whites, as they converged on the nation’s capitol to demand an end to racial discrimination in the armed forces and in civilian employment, to include the federal service. However, this proposal was not well received by President Roosevelt, primarily because it would draw international attention to the plight of African Americans.\footnote{Bowing to the pressure of a massive march on the District of Columbia, Roosevelt solicited a meeting with Randolph to address his demands. In exchange for calling off the march, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 – Prohibition of Discrimination in the Defense Industry on June 25, 1941. The Order stated, “…I do hereby reaffirm the policy of the United States that there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color, or national origin,” (Roosevelt 1941). The Order, in requiring the federal bureaucracy and all defense-related contracting agents to employ nondiscriminatory hiring practices, provided opportunities for employment within the federal service among African Americans, and a temporary Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) to enforce the Order.\footnote{African Americans persisted in their fight for full citizenship and the protection thereof. In 1942 the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) was founded on the campus of}}

\footnote{57. The Roosevelt administration solicited support against Adolph Hitler’s ethnic cleansing and mistreatment of the Jews in Europe during WWII; publicity about discrimination against African Americans would dilute their cause and bring shame and embarrassment upon the United States.}

\footnote{58. The FEPC disbanded after the end of WWII during President Truman’s administration.}
the University of Chicago by an interracial group of students. Initially membership was mostly northern and white, but eventually became mostly African American. Its inception marked the beginning of a mass movement for civil rights in the United States, and the organization spread throughout the country. Distinguished by their use of bold new strategies and methods, CORE pioneered non-violent civil disobedience to combat racism and to dismantle Jim Crow racial segregation, primarily in the South. They helped organize the 1956 Montgomery Bus boycott and the 1963 March on Washington; they orchestrated lunch counter sit-ins, served as Freedom Riders, and as Foot Soldiers bearing the brunt of violent opposition against firemen’s hoses, police officer’s Billy clubs and attack dogs; violence in response to CORE’s peaceful protests for justice and equality.59

During the New Deal era the civil rights movement gained momentum with increased support from white liberals, and a realization among Democrats that they needed support from the African American electorate, who typically mobilized as a voting bloc, to win elections. The 1940 Democratic Party Platform only alluded to support for African Americans (Frymer 1999). Nonetheless, on July 19, 1944 the national Democratic Party Platform included a plank addressing racial equality. “We believe that racial and religious minorities have the right to live, develop and vote equally with all citizens and share the rights that are guaranteed by our Constitution. Congress should exert its full constitutional powers to protect those rights,” (Woolley and Peters 1999-2011). Accordingly, the 1948

Democratic Party Platform spelled out the Party's civil rights agenda and support of President Harry S. Truman's efforts to promote equality for all citizens. The Democratic Party is responsible for the great civil rights gains made in recent years in eliminating unfair and illegal discrimination based on race, creed or color...The Democratic Party commits itself to continuing its efforts to eradicate all racial, religious and economic discrimination...We again state our belief that racial and religious minorities must have the right to live, the right to work, the right to vote, the full and equal protection of the laws, on a basis of equality with all citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution...We highly commend President Harry S. Truman for his courageous stand on the issue of civil rights...We call upon the Congress to support our President in guaranteeing these basic and fundamental American Principles: (1) the right of full and equal political participation; (2) the right to equal opportunity of employment; (3) the right of security of person; (4) and the right of equal treatment in the service and defense of our nation.

Democratic Party Platform
July 12, 1948

At the 1948 Democratic National Convention held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Hubert Humphrey [D, MN] spoke in favor of the Party’s civil rights plank, sparking controversy among southerners.

Mr. Chairman, fellow Democrats, fellow Americans:

I realize that in speaking in behalf of the minority report on civil rights as presented by Congressman De Miller of Wisconsin that I'm dealing with a charged issue -- with an issue which has been confused by emotionalism on all sides of the fence... Now let me say this at the outset that this proposal is made for no single region. Our proposal is made for no single class, for no single racial or religious group in mind. All of the regions of this country, all of the states have shared in our precious heritage of American freedom. All the states and all the regions have seen at least some of the infringements of that freedom -- all people -- get this -- all people, white and black, all groups, all racial groups have been the victims at time[s] in this nation of -- let me say -- vicious discrimination... Oh, yes, I know, other political parties may have talked more about civil rights, but the Democratic Party has surely done more about civil rights...

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This convention must set out more specifically the direction in which our Party efforts are to go… My friends, to those who say that we are rushing this issue of civil rights, I say to them we are 172 years late. To those who say that this civil-rights program is an infringement on states’ rights, I say this: The time has arrived in America for the Democratic Party to get out of the shadow of states’ rights and to walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human rights…My good friends, I ask my Party, I ask the Democratic Party, to march down the high road of progressive democracy. I ask this convention to say in unmistakable terms that we proudly hail, and we courageously support, our President and leader Harry Truman in his great fight for civil rights in America! 

Herbert Humphrey
July 14, 1948

On July 26, 1948 President Truman issued Executive Orders 9980 and 9981. Executive Order 9980 - Regulations Governing Fair Employment Practices within the Federal Establishment - prohibited discrimination in employment practices on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in executive departments. To enforce this order, Truman required each department to appoint a Fair Employment Officer to implement fair employment policies. In addition, he ordered the U.S. Civil Service Commission to establish a Fair Employment Board, and provide administrative remedies for persons seeking relief because of discrimination arising from employment within the executive branch of the federal government. Moreover, at the insistence of A. Philip Randolph, Truman signed Executive Order 9981 - Establishing the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services (Truman 1948). The Order stated: “It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard

to race, color, religion, or national origin.” Harry S. Truman became the first twentieth century president to effect legislation for black civil rights, even though he faced strong congressional opposition. With these actions a large percentage of African Americans shifted allegiance from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party. In the 1948 presidential election 77 percent of African American voters supported Truman; “a majority of Blacks reported that they thought of themselves as Democrats.”

So, when the Republicans won the 1952 election they had an opportunity to make good on twenty years of pledged commitment to remedy the plight of African Americans. Dwight D. Eisenhower, retired U.S. Army General and World War II hero, won the bid for the Republicans in their presidential election against Democrat Adlai Stevenson. When the Republican Party met for their 1952 national convention in Chicago, Illinois, they berated the Democrats for using prejudice based on class, race, and religion as grounds for their argument against discrimination, for non-enforcement of Federal legislation, and for not fulfilling campaign promises, especially after having held the executive for such an extensive period. Denouncing Democrats as bigots, the Republicans vowed to make appointments to federal positions without regard to race, religion, or national origin. They also pledged both federal action to abolish lynching,

62. However, according to Marcus D. Pohlmann, *Black Politics in Conservative America*, (New York: Sloan Publishing, 2008) the Order was not actually enforced until July 26, 1951 when the U.S. Army implemented a policy of desegregated forces.

poll taxes, and segregation in the District of Columbia, and federal legislation to enforce “just and equitable treatment in the area of discriminatory employment practices.”

President Eisenhower, who won 39 percent of the African American vote (Jackson 2008), executed a number of the 1952 Republican platform planks. For instance, upon assuming the presidency, Eisenhower enforced Truman’s Executive Order 9981, which desegregated the U.S. armed forces, (Pohlmann, 2008). Beginning in 1953 the District of Columbia had begun desegregating hospitals, hotels, movie theaters and other entertainment venues, recreational facilities, restaurants, and public schools. According to Franklin and Moss, the President hoped that Washington, D.C. would serve as a “model” for the nation. In addition, high profile appointments of African Americans to federal positions included J. Ernest Wilkins, Assistant Secretary of Labor, E. Frederic Morrow, Administrative Assistant, Executive Office of the President, and Scovel Richardson, Chairman, United States Parole Board, as well as a number of staff appointments within the House of Representatives and the federal bureaucracy, and the appointment of Governor of the Virgin Islands.

Then again, when the landmark decision handed down by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) held that segregated public school systems were an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Eisenhower, while promising to obey the Court’s judgment, did not use his executive authority to enforce a policy of immediate desegregation. Even after the Court’s ruling in Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) that desegregation should be implemented with “all


deliberate speed,” the President remained somewhat passive. Nevertheless, in 1957 Eisenhower federalized Arkansas National Guard troops and deployed additional U.S. Army soldiers\textsuperscript{66} to ensure the safety of the “Little Rock Nine” as they desegregated Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas (Pohlmann 2008).

President Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10590 “Establishing the President's Committee on Government Employment Policy,”\textsuperscript{67} on January 18, 1955. The Order replaced Truman’s Executive Order 9980 (1951) regarding fair employment practices in the federal service, as amended. Then on January 26, 1955 Eisenhower’s cabinet was presented with a \textit{Report of the Attorney General on the Administration’s Efforts in the Field of Racial Discrimination}.\textsuperscript{68} U.S. Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr. submitted this background report of the Eisenhower administration’s efforts to eliminate segregation and discrimination in education; transportation; the armed forces; hospitals; employment practices; facilities operated by or under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior; airport facilities; the District of Columbia; and, housing. Subsequently, in

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{66}] In accordance with Executive Order 10730 – Providing Assistance for the Removal of an Obstruction of Justice within the State of Arkansas, signed by President Eisenhower on September 24, 1957, and granting authority to the Secretary of Defense “to order into active military service any and all units of the national guard.” Additionally, the Order authorized the Secretary to “delegate authority to the Secretary of the Army or the Secretary of the Air Force, or both, any of the authority conferred on him by this Order” to enforce the integration of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas.
\item[\textsuperscript{67}] Issued in the \textit{Federal Register} (20 FR 409, January 19, 1955), and later amended by Executive Orders: 10772 (August 5, 1957); 10773 (July 1, 1958).
\item[\textsuperscript{68}] Memorandum to the Honorable Sherman Adams, June 4, 1957, from E. Frederic Morrow regarding President Eisenhower’s refusal to meet with African-American leaders (Woolley & Peters, 1999 – 2011, \textit{The American Presidency Project}, The Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum [link]). http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/civil_rights_eisenhower_administration/1957_06_04_Morrow_to_Adams
\end{itemize}
personal communiqués with the Reverend Billy Graham, Eisenhower mulled over the civil rights issue, as seen below in a portion of his March 22, 1956 letter:

I have urgently been thinking about the matters we discussed in our conversation...I refer particularly to that part of our talk that dealt with...ministers...promoting both tolerance and progress in our race relations problems...they could discuss the mounting evidence toward elimination of racial difficulties, even all reasonable men appreciate that eventual and complete success will not be attained for some years...As I told you, my mind constantly turns to the ease with which effective steps might be taken in the adult as compared to the juvenile field. Of course the kind of evidence that we should like to see pile up is the kind that would convince Federal District judges in the several localities that progress is real. All of us realize, I think, that success through conciliation will be more lasting and stronger than could be attained through force and conflict.

Eisenhower went on to suggest to Graham a gradual desegregation plan in which “a few well-qualified” African Americans could begin to run for local elected offices like school boards, city and county commissioners; and to seek entrance into public university graduate programs.

Despite the President’s expressions of concern to Reverend Graham about how to address the problems of American race relations, Eisenhower would not confer with African American leaders. On June 4, 1957 E. Frederic Morrow, Administrative Assistant in the Executive Office of the President, sent a memorandum to L. Sherman Adams, Chief of Staff, at his request. In this memo Morrow notes that African-American

69. President Eisenhower and Reverend Graham exchange ideas about how the problem of race relations could be resolved. The letters begin on March 22, 1956 following a meeting between the two men, and provide additional opinions about how to they might work to gradually settle the issue given Eisenhower’s impending bid for reelection. Correspondence from the President to Graham are dated March 22 and 30, 1956 with Graham responding on March 27 and June 4, 1956
leaders like A. Philip Randolph and Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. had come to the White House to see President Eisenhower; other leaders had sent requests, but all were denied. Morrow detailed the impact of Eisenhower’s refusal, to talk to the Black leaders, on African-American citizens.

I can state categorically that the rank and file of Negroes in the country feel that the President has deserted them in their current fight to achieve first-class citizenship via Civil Rights legislation, etc. Despite the unprecedented record of this Administration in the field of human rights, Negroes are so emotionally involved in this struggle that they are unable to estimate what gains have been made… I can understand this feeling, and it is only because I am a staff member of the Administration and have been an eye witness to its efforts that I can look at these protests objectively rather than emotionally. There is tremendous unrest among the Negro population. Tensions are great, emotions are at high pitch…I feel the time is ripe for the President to see two or three Negro leaders, and to let them get off their chests the things that seem to be giving them great concern. I feel…the President seeing these men will have a great effect upon the morale, sentiments, and attitudes of Negro citizens. Their present feeling is that their acknowledged leadership is being ignored, snubbed, and belittled by the President and his staff.

…Even in the predominantly white audience in Minneapolis at the Republican Workshop three weeks ago, the questions from the floor were on the matter of the President’s refusal to see the Negro leaders and to assure them of his interest in their problem…

Morrow further recommended that President Eisenhower give audience to A. Philip Randolph, Martin L. King, Jr., and Roy Wilkins. If agreed, Morrow would prepare these leaders on proper protocol for this meeting. The proposed meeting with President

Eisenhower took place on June 23, 1958.\textsuperscript{71} In attendance were: Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); A. Philip Randolph, International President, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters; Roy Wilkins, President, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP); and, Lester B. Granger, Executive Secretary, National Urban League. These leaders acknowledged that the 1957 Civil Rights Act (CRA) (Pub. L. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634) signed by Eisenhower was a positive step to protect voting rights, and the first such enactment since passage of the 1866 and 1875 Civil Rights legislation during the Reconstruction era (Pohlmann 2008).

However, King, Randolph, Wilkins, and Granger wanted the President to actively enforce the 1957 CRA. They also made a number of civil rights recommendations to the President which included: convening of a White House Conference on compliance with the Court’s decision to end school segregation; requesting a Civil Rights law to strengthen the 1957 CRA and to extend the Civil Rights Commission beyond its expiration date; instructing the Department of Justice to actively protect citizens’ rights to register for the vote, and against acts of terrorism; and, executing a principle prohibiting use of federal aid to promote segregation in “education, hospitals, housing, or other

\textsuperscript{71} Memorandum for the Record, Meeting of Negro Leaders with the President on June 23, 1958, Memo dated June 24, 1958 (66 pages).
grants-in-aid to state and local governments.” Subsequently, Eisenhower signed the Civil Rights Act (Pub. L. 86-449) on May 6, 1960. This legislation penalized obstructions to citizens’ rights to register and to vote; required preservation of registration and voting records; extended duration of the Civil Rights Commission; and, criminalized the use of explosives.

In spite of efforts toward gradual racial conciliation, African American perceptions of President Eisenhower and the Republican Party were that they did not offer immediate resolutions to eliminate terrorist activities and civil rights violations that they faced daily. They clamored for: Justice and Equality NOW! They could not wait any longer; they increasingly sought redress for wrongs against the race. On the eve of the 1960s novelist and playwright, James Baldwin declared, “To be a Negro in this country and to be relatively conscious is to be in a rage all the time.” This is what President Eisenhower could not understand; he thought the anger of the African American population was aimed at him personally. Upon meeting with King, Randolph, Wilkins, and Granger he learned that African Americans impatiently longed to cast off the shackles of second-class citizenship. Henceforth, African Americans continued to press forward for full rights of citizenship, for justice and equality, and for redress of wrongs against the race.

72. Quoted in Memorandum for the Record, Meeting of Negro Leaders with the President on June 23, 1958, Memo dated June 24, 1958 “A Statement to President Dwight D. Eisenhower.”


Hereafter race was thrust into the forefront of national American politics. During the presidential contest between Senator John F. Kennedy [D, MA] and Vice President Richard M. Nixon in 1960 the Democratic Party vowed to “seek to create an affirmative new atmosphere in which to deal with racial divisions and inequalities which threaten both the integrity of our democratic faith and the proposition on which our nation was founded—that all men are created equal.” Democrats pledged to work for full employment of all citizens, especially those “over 40, minority groups, young people, and women.” To accomplish this, the Party would work to “remove artificial and arbitrary barriers to employment” as well as to other notable areas, such as housing, education, and transportation, in which blatant discrimination occurred. In addition, the Democratic Party promised to establish a permanent Commission on Civil Rights, and to use executive orders, legislation, and legal actions from the Attorney General to terminate racial discrimination. They further promised to: enforce the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights laws signed by Eisenhower to secure voting rights; establish a Fair Employment Practices Commission; prohibit discrimination based on race, color, creed, or national origin in every state and locality; and, secure equal access to voting, housing, education, employment, and public facilities. 75

Similarly, the Republicans vowed to eliminate discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, and national origin. They held that:

This nation was created to give expression, validity and purpose to our spiritual heritage—the supreme worth of the individual. In such a nation—a nation dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal—racial

discrimination has no place. It can hardly be reconciled with a Constitution that guarantees equal protection under law to all persons. In a deeper sense, too, it is immoral and unjust. As to those matters within reach of political action and leadership, we pledge ourselves unreservedly to its eradication.  

Republicans focused on the removal of injustices and the enforcement of legislation and Supreme Court rulings, and continued progress in advancing civil rights for all. They further asserted that their platform did not consist of mere promises; instead, they vowed to resolve problem areas of a practical nature that could be accomplished realistically. These included voting, public schools, employment, housing, as well as public facilities and services.

Despite Republican Party promises of progress, Kennedy defeated Nixon in the general election by a slim margin. It was during this 1960 election that the Democratic Party began to grasp the importance of both African American support at the polls, and solidarity of the racial group in the electoral arena. For instance, African Americans voted as a bloc; which was reported as the “black” vote. In addition, the struggle for civil and economic rights tended to unite disparate elements of the civil rights movement. Regardless of class, gender, age or region, African Americans were determined to achieve the goals of the movement. Perhaps two key gestures may have played a significant role in the black swing vote for Kennedy rather than Nixon during the 1960 general election. First, when Dr. King was sentenced to four months of hard labor in the Georgia State Penitentiary at Reidsville, a pregnant Coretta Scott King appealed to both Vice President Richard Nixon, a proponent of the 1957 Civil Rights Act, and Senator John Kennedy, an opponent of the Act for any aid they could provide. Neither Nixon nor

Kennedy wanted to estrange Southern whites, and each was courting Northern blacks. Nixon was nonresponsive to her plea, while Kennedy, under advice, telephoned to offer his assistance. At his request Kennedy’s brother, Robert F. Kennedy intervened and King was released. It was this one gesture of concern that prompted African Americans to support the Democratic Party. Their expectation was that the Democrats/Kennedy would also support their cause for civil and economic rights. Nixon garnered only 32 percent of the black vote in 1960 (Jackson 2008).

Initially, President Kennedy and U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy seemed more receptive when African-American leaders broached the issue of civil rights; however, the President’s hesitation to take a stand on the issue early in his administration drew mixed perceptions. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy was quite cautious about becoming an activist president, especially with regard to advancing a civil rights agenda. On March 6, 1961 President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925 to establish the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity; a policy of nondiscrimination in government employment; and compliance responsibilities of government contractors and subcontractors, including labor unions and representatives of workers. Most importantly the Order required sanctions and penalties for noncompliance. The Order also granted powers and stipulated duties of the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity as well as federal contracting agencies (Kennedy, 1961). It was not until November 20, 1962, however, that Kennedy issued Executive Order 11063 to establish equal opportunity in housing. The Order required executive bureaucratic involvement in the “provision, rehabilitation, or operation of housing and related facilities” to prevent discrimination because of race, color, creed, or national origin, and “to use their good
offices and to take other appropriate action permitted by law, including the institution of appropriate litigation, if required, to promote the abandonment of discriminatory practices with respect to residential property and related facilities heretofore provided with Federal financial assistance” (Kennedy, 1962).

Consequently as the black civil rights movement continued to gain momentum, three events in the early 1960s played a pivotal role in forcing the President’s hand: the 1960 Greensborough, North Carolina lunch counter sit-ins; the 1961 Freedom Rides organized by the Congress for Racial Equality; and the 1963 protests in Birmingham, Alabama (McAdam 1982). On June 11, 1963 President Kennedy finally took a position and delivered his now historic speech on civil rights, at the insistence of his Attorney General. In his speech, Kennedy vowed to ask the U.S. Congress to enact “necessary measures…giving all Americans the right to be served in facilities which are open to the public--hotels, restaurants, theaters, retail stores, and similar establishments.”77 Most importantly, Kennedy broadened the issue of race to incorporate all Americans, and asked them to grant to African Americans the kind of equality and justice they enjoyed, and expected for themselves (Pohlmann 2008).

My fellow Americans, this is a problem which faces us all--in every city of the North as well as the South. Today there are Negroes unemployed, two or three times as many compared to whites, inadequate in education, moving into the large cities, unable to find work, young people particularly out of work without hope, denied equal rights, denied the opportunity to eat at a restaurant or lunch counter or go to a movie theater, denied the right to a decent education, denied almost today the right to attend a State university even though qualified. It seems to me that these

are matters [that] concern us all, not merely Presidents or Congressmen or Governors, but every citizen of the United States.\footnote{78}{President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights, June 11, 1963. Ibid.}

President John F. Kennedy
June 11, 1963

Subsequently, Kennedy sent a proposed Civil Rights Act\footnote{79}{Portions of this proposal included legislative drafts prepared by Democratic Party Representative Adam Clayton Powell of New York. Accessed May 3, 2012. Black Americans in Congress: http://www.baic.house.gov/} to Congress in the summer of 1963; however, he was assassinated before its passage. On September 10, 1963, Kennedy issued his Executive Order 11118 – Providing Assistance for the Unlawful Obstruction of Justice in the State of Alabama. Herein the President authorized the Secretary of Defense to utilize the armed services to enforce the laws of the United States, court orders regarding desegregation of public schools, and “to suppress unlawful assemblies, combinations, conspiracies, and domestic violence which oppose, obstruct, or hinder the execution of the law or impede the course of justice under the law within that State” (Kennedy 1963).

As U.S. Attorney General, Robert Kennedy also exercised the authority of his office to address the problem of racial segregation and to protect demonstrators. In 1961 Freedom Riders initiated a campaign to test compliance with the Supreme Court ruling in \textit{Sarah Keys v. Carolina Coach Company}, 64 MCC 769 (1955) which banned segregated interstate travel by bus.\footnote{80}{The NAACP initially tested this Supreme Court ruling in 1955 when Rosa Parks refused to surrender her seat in accordance with Jim Crow laws. The test resulted in the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1956.} Dr. King and the Reverend Ralph Abernathy, pastor of First Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama, supported the Freedom Riders who defied the
Jim Crow segregated interstate transit system. King, Abernathy, the 1500 member congregation of First Baptist Church, the Freedom Riders, and other civil rights demonstrators required protection from angry white mobs. Kennedy was forced to send federal marshals and troops to quell the mobs on May 21, 1961. Afterward, on May 29, 1961, Robert Kennedy issued a petition for the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to implement and enforce ICC rulings prohibiting Jim Crow in interstate travel.\footnote{Supreme Court cases and Interstate Commerce Commission rulings addressed desegregation of interstate travel and public facilities. \textit{Sarah Keys v. Carolina Coach Company}, 64 MCC 769 (1955) challenged segregated bus travel; \textit{NAACP v. St. Louis-Santa Fe Railway Company}, 298 ICC 355 (1955) confronted segregated public transportation via railroads and train terminals; and, \textit{Boynton v. Virginia}, 364 US 454 (1960) banned segregated terminals, restaurants, and restrooms (See also: Marcus D. Pohlmann 2008).}

On August 28, 1963 the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom was held. Organized by A. Philip Randolph and a coalition of six civil rights organizations, the event had a massive response with more than 200,000 in attendance. This civil rights coalition included: the Congress of Racial Equality (James Farmer), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (Martin Luther King, Jr.), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (John Lewis), A. Philip Randolph (Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Roy Wilkins) and the National Urban League (Whitney Young, Jr.). They demanded passage of a meaningful civil rights legislation, unlike the 1957 and 1960 laws enacted during the Eisenhower administration; the end of racial discrimination in public schools, and in public and private employment. They further demanded a set hourly minimum wage, protection against police brutality for demonstrators, and self-governance for Washington, D.C.
While initially opposing the march, President Kennedy relented and voiced his support for the march when he realized that it would proceed over his objection. A number of labor unions also supported the jobs march, but the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) was not in support, and white supremacist groups like the Ku Klux Klan opposed the march because it promoted racial equality. Clearly, the March on Washington demonstrated massive support from various segments of American society regardless of race, class, gender or region for black civil rights, as well as a number of disparate African American associations. At the March John Lewis, much like W.E.B. Du Bois, warned African Americans against relying on either of the political parties to accomplish their goals.

The revolution is at hand, and we must free ourselves of the chains of political and economic slavery. The nonviolent revolution is saying, "We will not wait for the courts to act, for we have been waiting hundreds of years. We will not wait for the President, nor the Justice Department, nor Congress, but we will take matters into our own hands, and create a great source of power, outside of any national structure that could and would assure us victory." For those who have said, "Be patient and wait!" we must say, "Patience is a dirty and nasty word." We cannot be patient, we do not want to be free gradually, we want our freedom, and we want it now. We cannot depend on any political party, for the Democrats and the Republicans have betrayed the basic principles of the Declaration of Independence.\textsuperscript{82}

John Lewis
August 28, 1963

Lewis summed up the sentiment of so many lifetimes of struggle; patience was no longer an option. According to King “The hundreds of thousands who marched on Washington marched to level barriers. They summed up everything in a word—NOW. What is the content of NOW? Everything, not some things, in the President’s civil rights bill is part

of NOW.” Finally, Congress enacted substantive legislation to protect the rights of citizens in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. On July 2, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act into law.

3.7 CONCLUSION

Throughout the course of U.S. history African Americans demonstrated, regardless of their economic class or social status—bound or free, men or women, a full awareness of their interconnectedness because of race. This consciousness was further reinforced by perceptions of their interdependence of both fate and task. At each twist and turn on the road to justice and equality, and whenever racism raised its ugly head, African Americans rose to the challenge. They persistently pressed forward to advance racial group interests in accordance with the American promise of democratic principles—life, liberty, and property, which they valued. Their tenacity was seen in efforts to invoke the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of government to act on their behalf. Likewise, they appealed to linkage institutions—the press, advocacy groups, and the political parties—to influence favorably public opinions and policies. At times, when the establishment did not heed their cry for justice and equality, they launched their own platforms to advance the African American racial group agenda. For instance, the Black Church, from its inception, was a consistent haven from which they advanced political discourse, and frontal attacks against oppression, subjugation, and discrimination.

Although historically a majority of African Americans identified themselves as Democrats, this allegiance evolved over time because of their single-mindedness and firmness of purpose to remedy both the inequality of segregation, and injustices they incurred because of both political parties’ failures to adequately address African American racial group interests. Often black partisanship signaled a racial group determination to participate within the polity, and their partisan identifications reflected a practical and rational decision to support “the lesser of two great evils.” Still, from the onset African Americans sought recognition from the two main political parties, and to function within them. Originally, African Americans identified with the Republican Party, a consequence of Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation. However, this party affiliation began to diminish as Republicans failed to act upon the entitlements of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and to protect African Americans’ inalienable rights to life, liberty, and property in accordance with the United States Constitution. While Republicans supported and implemented a number of devices to distance themselves from their “captured” African American constituents, Democrats schemed to lure them into Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition. Subsequently, the Democratic Party emerged as the political party that not only discussed civil rights, the Party also enacted legislation in a feeble attempt to reverse some cruelties of racial inequality in the United States. Even though Franklin Roosevelt failed to advance policies to protect against Southern horrors, like lynching, bureaucratic actions that included relief for the black population during Roosevelt’s administration proved detrimental to the Republican Party. This caused some African Americans to realign with the Democratic Party, which was especially apparent during the 1936 presidential election.
Over time, realignment of the African American electorate seemed to cause even the most reluctant Democrats to realize that the link between race and party garnered electoral victory. Democrats at least considered requests and demands made by African American leaders, and provided at least a modicum of relief. With the emergence of the civil rights protest movement African Americans pushed for immediate legislation to grant them the basic democratic values to which all citizens were entitled, and the protections thereof. As a result, because of bipartisan efforts, Congress passed and Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Among those members in Congress striving for substantive civil rights legislation was a new generation of African Americans that used their political clout to keep civil rights on the governmental agenda, and to support legislation that addressed issues of most importance to the African American racial group. Most of these Congress Members served in an official capacity within their national party organization, received validation and support during their campaigns as Democrats, and were duly elected on the basis of their Democratic partisan associations.

As the next chapter makes clear, African Americans’ support for the Democratic Party continued and became more intense during the historical periods covered from 1965 to 2008. The impact of major legislation like the 1965 Voting Rights Act also transformed voter registration and turnout within the African American community. Devotion to passage of major civil rights legislation as well as the extension of civil rights and implementation of voting rights policies, mainly under the Democratic Party label, added strength to a sense of linked fate woven into African American racial group Democratic partisan identifications.
CHAPTER 4
FROM PROLONGED PROTEST TO FULL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, 1964-2008

*The principal value of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the value above all things, is the recognition finally—by the Congress of the United States—that the Negro is a constitutional citizen…*

Roy Wilkins
June 23, 1964

Ever since passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act there has been considerable cohesion and solidarity among African Americans relative to partisanship. The mid-1960s culminated their realignment, from the Republican Party of Lincoln to the Democratic Party, a shift that began during the New Deal coalition era. This chapter continues the review, begun previously in Chapter 3, of tactics employed by African Americans to secure and enjoy basic democratic values, and the protections thereof. Moreover, this chapter examines partisan policy outcomes, particularly issues that were of most importance to African, and other oppressed, Americans such as decent housing, civil and voting rights, equal employment and fair wages; and, how such policies ultimately established African American attachments to the Democratic Party. Most importantly, the present chapter considers the force of race, or racial group influence, on individual political party identifications. Here the significance of race, and the relationship between race, class, and gender are essential to understanding both the sense of attachment to, and the magnitude of African Americans’ relationship with, the Democratic

4.1 BACKGROUND

By the 1960s the issue of race had gained national attention. African Americans garnered that attention primarily by virtue of persistent peaceful opposition to racial oppression (civil disobedience) using conventional protest methods: marches, sit-ins, lobbying, petitions, and boycotts. Nonetheless, when they took to the streets they were often met with violent confrontation, like the 1963 encounter between Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Freedom Riders, civil rights anti-segregation demonstrators, and Eugene “Bull” Connor, the Commissioner of Public Safety for the city of Birmingham, Alabama (McAdams 1982). Oftentimes televised news reports captured events as they unfolded, and commentators styled peaceful protesters as victims. Cameras showed police brutality, vicious attacks by police dogs or by powerful currents of water from fire hoses. Still, protesters offered no resistance against such cruelty as they were handcuffed; thrown into paddy wagons; and, hauled off to jail where the abuse continued. Through this they gained the world’s attention.

While imprisoned in Alabama Martin Luther King, Jr. penned his 1963 Letter from Birmingham Jail in which he stated his case for the use of civil disobedience thusly:

Oppressed people cannot remain oppressed forever. The urge for freedom will eventually come. This is what has happened to the American Negro. Something within has reminded him of his birthright of freedom; something without has reminded him that he can gain it… Recognizing this vital urge that has engulfed the Negro community, one should readily understand public demonstrations. The Negro has many pent-up resentments and latent frustrations. He has to get them out. So let him
march sometime; let him have his prayer pilgrimages to the city hall; understand why he must have sit-ins and freedom rides. If his repressed emotions do not come out in these nonviolent ways, they will come out in ominous expressions of violence. This is not a threat; it is a fact of history. So I have not said to my people, "Get rid of your discontent." But I have tried to say that this normal and healthy discontent can be channeled through the creative outlet of nonviolent direct action. Now this approach is being dismissed as extremist… (82).  

Martin Luther King, Jr.  
City of Birmingham Jail  
Birmingham, Alabama  

The subsequent August 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom (Dowd Hall 2005) demonstrated what King referred to as “the creative outlet of nonviolent direct action” to release “pent-up resentments and latent frustrations” (King 1963).

The March on Washington was a massive political rally that provided a national platform for people from different social, economic, and ethnic backgrounds to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the injustices of society, and the unmet promises of American democracy. In his “I Have a Dream” speech, Dr. King made a clarion call for equality for every oppressed segment of society. This included inequality based on race, class, gender and religion regardless of region. Protesters demanded reforms of governmental policies that helped to perpetuate racism, classism, and sexism. In “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past” Jacquelyn Dowd Hall (2005) tells the story of how race, class, gender, and region were intricately tied together throughout the movement. Most importantly she “emphasizes the gordian knot that ties race to class and civil rights to workers’ rights” (1239). Women marched also bearing placards that demanded decent housing, equal rights, jobs for all, and decent pay,

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“NOW!” According to Hall these women protesters were “…thus asserting both their racial solidarity and their identities as activists and workers and thereby as equals of men” (1252).

By 1964 continued discontent with the status quo and unfulfilled demands for change were ultimately expressed through an unconventional method of violent civil disobedience: the urban race riot. A desperate reaction to repressive political, economic, and social conditions magnified by urban blight, severe poverty, racial discrimination, injustices, and unmet expectations of the promises of democracy erupted into full-fledged violence. Not quite a year after King’s message from jail in the city of Birmingham, Alabama, inner city rioters also faced police violence and brutality. Racially charged mob activity engendered criminal behavior, including physical and/or verbal attacks, pillaging, and destruction. Tragically, inner city blacks assaulted a number of major U.S. urban centers like Harlem, Brooklyn, Rochester, New York; and, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, (summer, 1964); Los Angeles (Watts), California (summer, 1965); Chicago, Illinois (summer, 1966); Newark, New Jersey; Detroit, Michigan (summer, 1967). Accordingly, Doug McAdams (1982) purported that “the level of open defiance of the established economic and political order was as great during this period [1966-1968] as during any other in this country’s history, save the Civil War” (182).

4.2 PERIOD OF CIVIL RIGHTS: 1964 - 1980

On July 2, 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the landmark Civil Rights Act (Public Law, 88-352), and followed with additional measures to eliminate many

forms of discrimination based on race, color, creed, sex, and national origin (Whalen and Whalen 1985). Additional steps to strengthen civil rights came when the Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified on January 23, 1964, which eliminated the poll tax. One year after the Civil Rights Act (CRA) was signed into law, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was created (July 2, 1965) in accordance with provisions of the 1964 CRA. The EEOC was charged with enforcing laws against workplace discrimination and investigating complaints of discriminatory treatment, filing suits of employment discrimination, and adjudicating cases brought by employees of federal agencies.86

With this momentous legislation Congress strengthened the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby recognizing African Americans’ constitutional right to full citizenship with the privileges, immunities, and protections thereof, as stated by Roy Wilkins (cited above) in his 1964 address to delegates to the 55th Annual Convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Whalen and Whalen 1985). During this period African American pioneers in Congress, namely Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. of New York, Charles C. Diggs, Jr. of Michigan, and Augustus Hawkins of California participated in the congressional civil rights debates, and helped shape fundamental laws like the Civil Rights Act of 1964. “For the first time, African Americans made substantive, not merely symbolic, gains within the institution.”87

Subsequently, in the November 1964 election in which the President faced Republican

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opponent Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, Johnson garnered 94 percent of the African American vote (Jackson 2008) to win his first elected term as president.

Ever pressing forward, 600 demonstrators left Selma, Alabama on Sunday, March 7, 1965 to protest voting discrimination throughout the state. However, the march quickly ceased when protesters confronted Alabama police on the Edmund Pettus Bridge. Televised broadcasts of police brutality and violence against peaceful participants in the Selma to Montgomery Voting Rights March shocked the American conscience (Baldwin 2011). About six months thereafter, President Johnson received from Congress an extension of Title I, the voting rights provision, of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which he signed into law. The most comprehensive legislation since the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the 1965 Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa-6) outlawed voting discrimination and gave the U.S. Attorney General authority to bring suit on behalf of victims of voting discrimination.

Most importantly, the Voting Rights Act (VRA) “suspended literacy tests, authorized the appointment of federal voting examiners, and created federal machinery to supervise voter registration,” which led to an extraordinary increase in the number of African Americans elected to public offices (Fisher 2001: 1096). In the Act, Congress granted broad sweeping powers to the federal government to combat the disenfranchisement of African Americans. This was challenged in the case of South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) on grounds that the VRA violated the Fifth and Fifteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and states’ rights. Five southern states joined South Carolina in opposition to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and its prerequisite that changes to state voting laws required prescreening by the U.S. Attorney
General. In an 8-1 decision the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the powers of Congress to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, which banned denial of the right to vote based on race (Fisher 2001). Ever since passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act no Republican presidential candidate captured more than 15 percent of the African American vote (Apple, Jr. 1996).

“Yet race riots in Harlem (1964) and Watts (1965) reminded people of the sage insights of World War II activists: it was one thing to sit at the counter but another to be able to afford a meal. Racism had excluded black people from the accumulation of wealth and resources, a historical reality that could not be addressed by legal protection in the present” (Baldwin 2011: 7). Concurrently, in his remarks at the White House Conference on Equal Employment Opportunities regarding the riots in south central Los Angeles (Watts), California that occurred five days following passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, President Johnson noted the overwhelming tie that bound race, class, and gender.88

If there is one thing I think we have learned from the civil rights struggle, it is that the problem of bringing the Negro American into an equal role in our society is more complex, and is more urgent, and is much more critical than any of us have ever known. Who of you could have predicted 10 years ago, that in this last, sweltering, August week thousands upon thousands of disenfranchised Negro men and women would suddenly take part in self government, and that thousands more in that same week would strike out in an unparalleled act of violence in this Nation?

It is our duty - and it is our desire - to open our hearts to humanity's cry for help. It is our obligation to seek to understand what could lie beneath the flames that scarred that great city. So let us equip the poor and the oppressed - let us equip them for the long march to dignity and to wellbeing. But let us never confuse the need for decent work and fair treatment with an excuse to destroy and to uproot.

Yet beneath the discord we hear another theme. That theme speaks of a
day when Americans of every color, and every creed, and every religion,
and every region, and every sex can be trained for decent employment, can
find it, can secure it, can have it preserved, and can support their families
in an enriching and a rewarding environment....

President Lyndon B. Johnson
August 20, 1965

Subsequently, on September 24, 1965 Johnson issued Executive Order 11246 -
Equal Employment Opportunity requiring nondiscrimination by federal contractors,
unless otherwise exempted by the Secretary of Labor in accordance with said Order. The
Order further established the policy of Affirmative Action or positive steps to remove
discrimination against individuals because of their race, color, creed, or national origin
(Johnson, 1965). With this Executive Order Johnson proposed “a moral and policy
response to the losses, both material and psychological, suffered by African Americans
during and after the time of slavery” (Chace 2011, 1). Then, on June 13, 1967 the
President nominated Thurgood Marshall to the U.S. Supreme Court, making him the first
African American and civil rights advocate, to serve in that capacity (Pohlmann 2008).

Nevertheless, violent civil disobedience continued in American urban centers. In
response, Johnson established the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders on
July 28, 1967 under the direction of Governor Otto Kerner of Illinois. He authorized the
Commission to investigate reasons for the urban violence, and to recommend steps to

89. “Sex” was added to this list in 1967 with Johnson’s Executive Order 11375.

90. Justice Marshall served as Director-Counsel of the NAACP-Legal Defense
Fund from 1940 to 1961. He was a civil rights advocate who successfully argued cases
before the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944),
which gained African Americans the right to vote in a Democratic primary election, a
Texas law was found in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. Accessed June 2, 2012.
http://www.naacpldf.org/
effectively remedy the situation. Also known as the Kerner Commission, studies of racial
disorders to American cities showed that 164 civil disorders occurred during the first nine
months of 1967, of which there were about 130 separate race riots during the ‘long hot’
that racial disorders to American cities reflected the profound frustrations and bitterness
of living in the ghetto.\footnote{In The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders the term ghetto” refers to “an area within a city characterized by poverty and acute
social disorganization, and inhabited by members of a racial or ethnic group under conditions of
In its basic conclusion the Report further indicated that:

Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white--separate
and unequal. Reaction to last summer's disorders has quickened the
movement and deepened the division. Discrimination and segregation
have long permeated much of American life; they now threaten the future
of every American. This deepening racial division is not inevitable. The
movement apart can be reversed. Choice is still possible. Our principal
task is to define that choice and to press for a national resolution. To
pursue our present course will involve the continuing polarization of the
American community and, ultimately, the destruction of basic democratic
values. The alternative is not blind repression or capitulation to
lawlessness. It is the realization of common opportunities for all within a
single society. This alternative will require a commitment to national
action--compassionate, massive and sustained, backed by the resources of
the most powerful and the richest nation on this earth. From every
American it will require new attitudes, new understanding, and, above all,
new will. The vital needs of the nation must be met; hard choices must be
made, and, if necessary, new taxes enacted. Violence cannot build a better
society. Disruption and disorder nourish repression, not justice. They
strike at the freedom of every citizen. The community cannot--it will not--
tolerate coercion and mob rule. Violence and destruction must be ended--
in the streets of the ghetto and in the lives of people. Segregation and
poverty have created in the racial ghetto a destructive environment totally
unknown to most white Americans. What white Americans have never
fully understood but what the Negro can never forget--is that white society
is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white
institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.
It is time now to turn with all the purpose at our command to the major unfinished business of this nation. It is time to adopt strategies for action that will produce quick and visible progress. It is time to make good the promises of American democracy to all citizens-urban and rural, white and black, Spanish surname, American Indian, and every minority group…

National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
The Kerner Report (1967)

Moreover, the Report found that economic, political, social, as well as psychological factors had devastating affects on black livelihood; the United States government had to remedy the state of African Americans for the sake of all Americans. To a certain degree, the federal government had begun to address the repressive state of African Americans, and of other minorities that were similarly situated with passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Affirmative Action Policy, and Johnson’s Great Society “War on Poverty” programs, many of which resulted from the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (Public Law 88-452).92

Even though some attention was given to problems ailing the American society, Michael Harrington (1962) focused primarily on the impact of poverty on about 25 percent of the United States population in *The Other America: Poverty in the United States*.93 Racial discrimination was quite prevalent, but poverty did not discriminate on

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93. Reference is to Michael Harrington’s publication about the seemingly invisible poor in America. (Michael Harrington, *The Other America: Poverty in the United States* (New York: Touchstone; Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1962; 1997, 63). Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. also gave a speech about the plight of African Americans
the basis of race, color, national origin, gender, religion or creed. Nonetheless, poverty had a distinctive hold on African American livelihood, particularly those in the inner cities. According to Michael Harrington “Negro poverty is unique in every way. It grows out of a long American history, and it expresses itself in subculture that is built up on an interlocking base of economic and racial injustice. It is in fact imposed from without, from white America.” This link between race and class in the 1960s, according to Davarian Baldwin (2011), “could not be severed, especially during a Vietnam War that sent largely poor people of color to its bloody front lines.”

In the midst of heightened domestic chaos in American urban centers, Johnson made another effort to extend the 1964 CRA by signing the 1968 Civil Rights Act (82 Stat. 73) into law on April 11, 1968. Of particular note was Title VII, or the Fair Housing Act, which banned discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling because of race, color, creed, or national origin; prohibited advertisement of preference in the sale or rental of a dwelling; and promoted the enjoyment of fair housing rights. However, no federal enforcement provisions were given. So, to strengthen Title VII, the 1968 Fair Housing Act, (82 Stat. 81) was enacted by Congress to prohibit discrimination based on “race, color, religion, or national origin in the sale or rental of most housing” (Fisher entitled, *The Other America*. The event, sponsored by the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council, was held at Grosse Pointe High School in Grosse Pointe Farm, Michigan on March 14, 1968. Accessed June 2, 2012. http://www.gphistorical.org/mlk/mlkspeech/index.htm.

2001) under the authority of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for enforcement and compliance responsibilities. Unfortunately, Dr. King’s assassination preceded passage of the Fair Housing Act, and urban unrest continued. Still, litigation ensued as civil rights advocates proceeded to push for enforcement of the 1968 Fair Housing Act; as well as the integration of public accommodations provided in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which were upheld in the *Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States*, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and *Katzenbach v. McClung*, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).

Nevertheless, massive political, economic, and social discontent resulting from escalating the war in Vietnam while reportedly de-escalating; racially related civil disorder and racial tensions; anti-war, students’, women’s, and civil rights protests; migrant workers’ demonstrations; and, broad-based multi-racial political coalitions of disgruntled and activist groups (and gangs) spelled the end. After his first elected term as president, Johnson would not seek the Democratic Party nomination for the 1968 presidential campaign. Despite such turmoil during his administration, Lyndon Johnson was the first president since the American Civil War to alleviate problems based on race, class, and gender. His “Great Society” administrative agenda demonstrated a commitment to address both questions and issues of particular importance to African Americans. Johnson’s principal aim was to transform American society by integrating racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, and other citizens traditionally confined to the

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periphery of U.S. society. His efforts resulted in increased expenditures of federal monies to improve housing, healthcare, early childcare education, libraries, hospitals, sanitation, transportation services, recreational facilities, and the general welfare of all such citizens. Subsequently, the issue of black civil rights subsided and black insurgency declined (McAdams 1982). Neither party’s platform offered a civil rights plank in 1968, even though they each mentioned continued efforts to promote equality and to prohibit discrimination. Many conservative Republicans and white southern Democrats who opposed major civil rights legislation had grown weary of Johnson’s ‘governmental schemes’ to promote equality of outcome, rather than equality of opportunity.

This helped the Republican Party regain control of the presidency with Richard M. Nixon’s 1968 victory over vice President Hubert Humphrey (and Governor George Wallace of Alabama), and his 1972 victory over Senator George McGovern of South Dakota. Like his Republican predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Nixon’s domestic policy agenda, New Federalism, sent mixed signals regarding black civil rights. His was a balancing act in which he furthered equal opportunities for African Americans, in accordance with Johnson’s vision, in his “Philadelphia Plan.” He also requested the U.S. Supreme Court to delay school desegregation, even though he ultimately did more to desegregate public schools in the South than any predecessor since the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling. Furthermore, he seemed bent on appeasing the South while placating African Americans. Nonetheless, Nixon’s domestic programs came at a time when racially related civil disorders in American urban centers were on the decline.

Nixon’s efforts to alleviate discriminatory practices came in the form of his move to advance black enterprise through Executive Order 11458 – Prescribing Arrangements
for Developing and Coordinating a National Program for Minority Business Enterprise (March 5, 1969). The Order called for use of the Small Business Development Center model to establish Minority Business Development Centers (Nixon 1969). In addition, on October 13, 1971, Nixon issued Executive Order 11625 – Prescribing Additional Arrangements for Developing and Coordinating a National Program for Minority Business Enterprise. He required the Secretary of Commerce, and federal departments and agencies, to provide the opportunity for socially and economically disadvantaged persons to own and operate a business enterprise. Furthermore, Nixon’s order of participation in the Minority Business Enterprise federal contracting program was intended for, but not limited to, “Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Spanish-speaking Americans, American Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts” (Nixon 1971).

Moreover, after completing a comprehensive assessment of employment and union membership rates of nonwhite workforces within certain cities during Nixon’s administration, the Department of Labor found evidence of blatant discrimination within the industrial and craft unions. This review paved the way for the controversial Philadelphia Plan [Order]. First applied to workers in the City of Philadelphia, the Plan was extended to other cities in which similar discriminatory practices were obvious. According to Paul Marcus (1970) the purpose of the Plan was to extend Johnson’s 1965 Executive Order 11246 which prohibited employment discrimination. The Philadelphia Order also included a policy of affirmative action and required compliance responsibilities in adherence to goals and timetables reported on all personnel actions: recruitment, selections, promotions, demotions, discipline, reductions, terminations, training and development for each covered class—race, color, creed, sex, national origin.
Concurrently, on August 8, 1969, Nixon signed Executive Order 11478 – Equal Employment Opportunity in the Federal Government, to prohibit workplace discrimination based on race, color, creed, sex, national origin, handicap, or age. The Order further promoted equal employment opportunity through a “continuing affirmative action program in each executive department and agency.” This affirmative action policy was applied to, and required to be, “an integral part of every aspect of personnel policy and practice in the employment, development, advancement, and treatment of civilian employees of the Federal Government” (Nixon 1969). Henceforth, affirmative action meant civil rights (Hoff 2009). Yet, African Americans continued their support for the Democrats.

When race emerged to the forefront of American politics during the 1960s its effects produced enduring changes in the partisan alignment of identifications (Carmines and Stimson 1989). The most noticeable shifts to the Republican Party among population groups within the electorate were whites, Southerners, self designated conservatives, and both younger and older cohorts (Norpoth 1987; Petrocik 1987; Black and Black 1989; Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson 1989). Social status group factors, especially differences in educational background, were also prominent forces in explaining increased Republican Party preferences among white citizens during the period spanning the 1960s (Miller 1992). On the other hand, despite bipartisan support required for passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Nixon’s affirmative action plan, since the mid-1960s African Americans identified overwhelmingly with the Democratic Party (Stanley and Niemi 1991).
4.3 FROM CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS TO CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATORS

Primarily because of favorable governmental action (McAdams 1982), African Americans became increasingly attached to the Democratic Party. Civil rights legislation opened access to electoral office, which African Americans realized predominately through their association with the Democrats. With the elections of Chicago representatives Oscar De Priest (1929-1935), a Republican, and his successors, Democrats Arthur Mitchell (1935-1943) and William Dawson (1943-1970), African Americans returned to Congress. They did not see themselves as civil rights leaders; they saw themselves as legislators (Singh 1998: 51). Members of the House of Representatives included: Charles Diggs of Detroit (1955-1980), John Conyers, Jr., of Detroit (1965-Present), Louis Stokes of Cleveland (1969-1999), William L. Clay, Sr., of St. Louis (1969-2001), Shirley Chisholm of Brooklyn, the first African American woman elected to Congress (1969-1983), George W. Collins of Chicago (1970-1972) who, after his untimely death, was succeeded by his wife Cardiss Collins (1973-1997), the first African American widow to succeed her husband in Congress, and Yvonne Brathwaite Burke of California (1973-1979), the first woman to apply for, and receive maternity leave while serving in Congress. Edward W. Brooke, III was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1966 (1967-1979). His election ended an eighty-five year absence of African American Senators.97 With the exception of Representative Oscar De Priest of Illinois and Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts, these newly elected Members of Congress were all Democrats.

This new generation of legislators demonstrated their intent to participate fully in the business of Congress. In 1971 thirteen Members of the House of Representatives, shown in Table 4.1 below, founded the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). “The central function of caucuses is to bring together legislators with shared interests, backgrounds, and policy goals” (Singh 1998: 58). According to Robert Singh formation of the CBC, as well as other caucuses in Congress, served to provide internal cohesion while employing a strategy of “strength in numbers” to advance their legislative agenda. The CBC confined to African Americans has been under attack for not opening its membership. The issue of maintaining this race-based congressional caucus emerged when white Fortney (Pete) Stark, representing a substantial African American district, asked to join the CBC in 1975. Then Chair Charles Rangel rendered the decision as follows, “The caucus symbolizes black political development in this country. We feel that maintaining this symbolism is critical at this juncture in our development” (Houston 1975: B18). Still, the question of having racial caucuses continued. Some Republicans viewed the Democratic African American and Hispanic caucuses as promoting racial divisions, and therefore inconsistent with promoting policies to achieve a “colorblind” society.98

98. Most recently Representative Tom Tancredo[R, CO] challenged the existence of the Democratic CBC and Congressional Hispanic Caucus, even though the Republicans have similar counterparts.
Table 4.1 Founding Members of the Congressional Black Caucus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEMBER</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>TERM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shirley A. Chisholm</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1969-1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Conyers, Jr.</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>1965-Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ronald V. Dellums</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>1971-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustus Freeman (Gus) Hawkins</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>1963-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Harold Metcalfe</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>1971-1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parren James Mitchell</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>1971-1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles B. Rangel</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1971-Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Stokes</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>1969-1999</td>
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4.2 POST-1970: TRANSITION FROM PROTEST TO POLITICS

Protests that reached a feverish pitch in the mid- to late-1960s began to subside in the early 1970s (McAdams 1982) as African American legislators took up the cause for justice and equality in Congress while civil rights advocates, especially the NAACP-
Legal Defense Fund, continued to focus their challenges within the courts. Likewise, African American political participation became noticeable as they began serving in an official capacity within Democratic Party conventions, and within national, state, and local party organizations. They obtained appointments to various political positions; and, they campaigned for elected offices at every level of government. These were opportunities and political clout available to them only since their association with the Democratic Party. In 1970 there were 1,469 African American elected officials. These consisted of 10 Federal; 169 State; 92 County; 623 Municipal; 213 Judicial/Law Enforcement; and, 362 Education elected officeholders. The number of African Americans elected to public office increased steadily; in 1975 there were 3,503 black elected officials (Fisher, 2001, 1094).

By 1976 the Republican Party platform called for “vigorous enforcement of laws to assure equal treatment in job recruitment, hiring, promotion, pay, credit, mortgage access and housing.” This, they asserted, could be accomplished without the use of quotas. Instead, the Republicans offered to “provide alternative means of assisting the victims of past discrimination to realize their full worth as American citizens. Wiping out past discrimination requires continued emphasis on providing educational opportunities for minority citizens, increasing direct and guaranteed loans to minority business enterprises, and affording qualified minority persons equal opportunities for government positions at all levels.”

as affirmative action, preferential treatment, and quotas; however, what the Republicans failed to recall was that Richard Nixon ordered these set-asides.

Even though the Democratic Party platform was devoid of a civil rights plank, Governor Jimmy Carter of Alabama won the 1976 presidential election with more than 90 percent support from African American voters. Carter initiated some gestures to retain this African American base. He appointed Patricia Harris as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and Andrew Young as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Carter also appointed African Americans to a number of ambassadorships, and to undersecretary and assistant secretary positions within the federal bureaucracy (Franklin & Moss, 1988). Unlike Eisenhower, Carter maintained an open door policy with respect to the African American community, and leaders. On August 8, 1980 President Carter issued Executive Order 12232 – Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). He ordered steps for increased participation of HBCUs in the federally sponsored programs (Carter 1980). Yet, despite such efforts, African-American perceptions held that the President had not done enough to address issues of particular interest to them. They called for the Carter administration to provide more attention to, and appropriations for, day-to-day concerns like housing, relief and assistance for the poor, the employed and unemployed, and for the disparate impact of federal policies on persons of color.

One major concern within the community was the economic state of African Americans. For instance, they were less likely to narrow the extensive income gap between themselves and White Americans. In his “Economic Perspectives” column on “Income in the Black Community,” a report for *Black Enterprise*, Andrew Brimmer (1978) cited a number of indicators explaining the black-white income gap based on 1976
1978 income data from the U.S. Census Bureau. The first indicator showed that “blacks’ actual income was about 61.2 percent of the level that would have been recorded if they shared fully and proportionately in the nation’s economy” (62). Furthermore, there was a disproportionate median income level between blacks and whites. “The median income of the 7.8 million black households was $7,902, and for whites it was $13,289…the median income of black households was 59.9 percent of that for units headed by whites” (62). Brimmer attributed this income gap to restrictions placed on African Americans that denied them access (education, occupation, training) and, hence, the ability to acquire marketable skills.

Moreover, African Americans perceived their economic disadvantages as vestiges of past discrimination and deprivation. Inequities in the distribution of wealth based on household economy further provoked unequal black-white employment patterns and unemployment rates during the Carter administration. Likewise, the U.S. economy was sluggish in the 1970s, and this allowed for perceptions of historical hardships as a primary contributing factor explaining the lack of progress in narrowing black-white income gaps (Brimmer 1978). According to Franklin and Moss (1988), “so many black families within the decade of the 1970s were unemployed and on welfare that it was quite likely that the nation would spawn an entire generation of blacks who had simply never worked to support themselves. The implications of such a possibility were almost too frightening to contemplate.”

Still, the number of middle class and affluent African Americans increased noticeably giving way to what William J. Wilson (1980) viewed as a widening economic gap within the African American community. Years of discrimination and oppression

100. Franklin and Moss 1988, 468.
had produced a large underclass that could neither keep up with, nor compete in, an increasingly technologically advanced society. Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson (1989) also noted that the civil rights period produced a larger middle class, but found that a much larger under-class also emerged. In addition, this period paved the way for speculations about how the income gap among middle- and under-class African Americans would affect racial group solidarity, and about how the significance of race would decline perhaps as class became more important in shaping black life prospects. This was the condition of Black America as delegates gathered for the national Republican and Democratic conventions of 1980. The Republican Platform response held:

Our fundamental answer to the economic problems of black Americans is the same answer we make to all Americans—full employment without inflation through economic growth. First and foremost, we are committed to a policy of economic expansion through tax-rate reductions, spending restraint, regulatory reform, and other incentives…During the next four years we are committed to policies that will: Encourage local governments to designate specific enterprise zones within depressed areas that will promote new jobs, new and expanded businesses, and new economic vitality; Open new opportunities for black men and women to begin small businesses of their own by, among other steps, removing excessive regulations, disincentives for venture capital, and other barriers erected by the government; Bring strong, effective enforcement of federal civil rights statutes, especially those dealing with threats to physical safety and security which have recently been increasing…

Similarly, the 1980 Democratic Party platform pledged to ensure justice and equality under the law for all citizens; and advanced an extensive civil rights plank in which they vowed to address the “economic inequities facing minorities.” The Party further expressed support for a national holiday to commemorate the birthday of slain civil rights

leader, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (MLK).\textsuperscript{102} Even so, Jimmy Carter lost his reelection bid for the presidency; this was primarily a consequence of the national economy. Nonetheless, he still garnered over 90 percent support from African American voters (Franklin and Moss, 1988). His Republican opponent, Governor Ronald Reagan of California, won the 1980 election and was soundly reelected in his 1984 campaign against Carter’s former vice president Democrat Walter Mondale.

\textbf{4.3 POST-CIVIL RIGHTS, 1981 – 2008}

Ronald Reagan, a pronounced conservative, opposed major civil rights legislation, especially the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act because he saw these enactments as an encroachment on states’ rights, a doctrine he fully supported.\textsuperscript{103} Reagan also opposed the MLK national holiday, even though he signed the legislation once presented to him by the U.S. Congress. Moreover, Reagan supported tax exemption status for Bob Jones University in South Carolina, and other private schools openly practicing racial segregation. He revoked Carter’s Executive Order 12232 that called for increased participation of Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) in federally sponsored programs. With his Executive Order 12320 – Historically Black Colleges and Universities (September 15, 1981), Reagan instead ordered the Secretary of Education to develop federal plans to assist HBCUs. The Order also required the

\textsuperscript{102} Taken from “The 1980 Democratic Party Platform,” Ibid.

\textsuperscript{103} Governor Reagan’s campaign began with a speech delivered at the Neshoba County Fair. Prior to Reagan’s appearance, the Mississippi County was most noted for the 1964 lynching of three civil rights workers: James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner. Reagan used this platform to make his declaration, “I believe in states’ rights.” This was a code appealing to many southern white voters (Bob Herbert. “Righting Reagan’s Wrongs?” \textit{The New York Times}, 13 November 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/13/opinion/13herbert.html.)
Secretary to encourage private sector institutions to strengthen and improve HBCUs management, financial structure and research, rather than the federal bureaucracy (Reagan, 1981). Additionally, apart from his appointment of Samuel R. Pierce, Jr. to a Cabinet post, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Reagan primarily held to naming African Americans to traditional federal appointments. For instance, HUD had become a standard “black” position since Robert C. Weaver was first chosen by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966, and Patricia R. Harris was later selected by President Jimmy Carter in 1977 (Franklin & Moss, 1988). Intent on pressing his agenda, African American Reagan appointees were held to a minimum perhaps because Reagan was determined to fill his ‘New Federalism’ administration with persons that espoused his brand of conservative philosophy.

Reagan’s presidential platform agenda demonstrated that he was just so out of touch with the African American citizenry. During his first term, Reagan established an administration whose policies were perceived to threaten the legal and socio-economic gains made by African Americans during the civil rights era (Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson 1989). In Michael Dawson’s (1994) perception “having consistently bypassed and denounced the recognized leadership of the black community, [Reagan] was viewed as extraordinarily hostile to black aspirations” (117). Julian Bond, former chair of the NAACP, also noted that Ronald Reagan “was a polarizing figure in black America. He was hostile to the generally accepted remedies for discrimination. His appointments were of people as equally hostile. I can't think of any Reagan policy that African Americans would embrace” (Pianin and Edsall 2004, A01). Still, at the time of his presidency Reaganomics was expected to improve the economic class situations of all Americans
without regard to race. President Reagan issued Executive Order 12432 – Minority Business Enterprise Development on July 14, 1983 that called for federal agencies to develop plans requiring contractors and grantees to employ minority business enterprises (Reagan 1983).

Using data from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1986) Franklin and Moss (1988) gave an account of black economic situations in 1985, during the era of Reaganomics. They reported that unemployment rates among blacks fell short of those among whites 16.2 percent to 6.2 percent. Even more startling was unemployment among black youths, ages 16 to 19, which increased to an all-time high of 50 percent. African Americans also trailed White Americans “in every meaningful classification, whether by age, education, sex, or occupation” (1988: 477). Hence, reports of economic improvements resulting in an emerging and increasing entrepreneurial and middle-class group were only diminished by the correspondingly significant growth of the under-class among African Americans (Gurin, Hatchett & Jackson 1989; Pinkney 1986; Wilson, 1980).

It is, therefore, no small wonder then that Democratic attachment among African Americans had increased in intensity by Reagan’s 1984 election. He made clear in his Republican—conservative—position that African Americans were not welcome. The late 1980s produced even stronger identifications with the Democratic Party. Using 1988 data collected by the Center for Political Studies, Beck and Sorauf (1992) confirmed the distinctive political partisan preferences of the African-American electorate. They were more likely to identify with the Democratic Party (64 percent), than their white counterparts (31 percent). Moreover, the strength of African American Democratic Party
identifications was 40 percent greater than identifications among White Americans at only 14 percent. Beck and Sorauf (1992) attributed the direction and strength of African American partisan attachments to the importance of race. They argued that race continued to be the primary factor explaining political preference attitudes among African Americans regardless of the presence of any other sociological variables generally associated with the formation of party identifications.

Concurrently, in his *Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America* (1999), Paul Frymer held that:

> Race, nonetheless, remains an overriding issue for African Americans in ways not comparable to most other Americans’ ethnicity or occupational group. Racial discrimination and residential segregation continue to plague African Americans regardless of social and economic class, severely affecting the quality of education and social services available to the black community (1999: 147).

Frymer’s explanation of “electoral capture,” occurred whenever a group remained with the political party because there was no other choice. The relationship between the African-American racial group and the two main U.S. political parties was seen as one of tenancy or possession. Their capture resulted from the African American racial group’s lack of resources necessary to make themselves a viable force within the competitive two-party system. First captured by the Republican Party of Lincoln, the race group eventually became a static component of the Democratic Party. Frymer argued that while chief African American racial group concerns were removed from the national party agenda, such issues remained of critical importance. In this regard the Democratic Party failed to engage substantive policy initiatives to bring African Americans in parity, and to

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safeguard their civil rights and liberties. Since they had no feasible alternative, they therefore remained Democratic Party captives. Often viewed as the most loyal constituents, mass black political choices favoring Democrats also suggests their application of procedural rationality, which was greatly influenced by the significance of race and its impact on the personal lives and economic well being of African Americans particularly, and of the racial group when considering other population groups’ status in the United States.

The significance of race was also quite noticeable in the 1988 presidential campaign that set Reagan’s vice president George H.W. Bush against former Massachusetts Governor Michael S. Dukakis. Neither party platform included a plank pledging civil rights protections for African, or other, Americans. In his address accepting the presidential nomination at the Republican National Convention (August 18, 1988), George Bush stated, “I want a kinder and gentler nation” (Woolley and Peters, 1999 - 2011). Interestingly, during his run for election Bush employed Republican political strategist Lee Atwater as his campaign manager. Known for his uncouth tactics, Atwater devised a plan to discredit Dukakis as a soft on crime liberal as opposed to Bush, a tough on crime conservative. At the forefront of this attack was Dukakis’ support for a prison furlough program that went horribly wrong when Willie Horton, a black man imprisoned for murder, raped a white woman and stabbed her white male companion while on his weekend leave (Tucker 2008). In an attack ad Horton was demonized; his mug shot was altered to portray him as very dark and foreboding (McAndrews 2001). Horton’s published image was perceived as an assault against African-American men, and validation of White Americans’ fears of the big, black ‘Boogie Man.’ While Bush
and Atwater denied any association with this political attack against Dukakis; they were nonetheless viewed as the main culprits. Bush, unable to cast off the Willie Horton debacle, would not gain confidence among African Americans.

In the 1988 general election nearly 90 percent of African Americans voted for Dukakis (Roper Center, 1988); however, Bush won the election. Perceptions of the Bush administration among African Americans remained cautious. For instance, Bush issued Executive Order 12677 – Historically Black Colleges and Universities (April 28, 1989) that established an Advisory Commission within the Department of Education whose aim was to increase participation of HBCUs in federally sponsored programs (Bush 1989). In addition, the President appointed Morehouse College President Dr. Louis Sullivan to the cabinet post of Secretary of Health and Human Services. Contrarily, Bush designated David Souter for appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court. Souter was an opponent of affirmative action policy, which continued to be an important issue within the African American community (McAndrews 2001). Likewise, Bush selected African American conservative Clarence Thomas to replace Thurgood Marshall on the U.S. Supreme Court. He then refused to recall Thomas’ nomination despite allegations of sexual harassment. Moreover, Bush vetoed the 1990 Civil Rights Act calling it a quota bill, and then signed a similar legislation, the 1991 Civil Rights Act, thereby allowing the use of de facto racial quotas if derived from "business necessity." Yet, he refused a recommendation to outlaw race-based scholarships. While Bush seemed to have sent mixed signals, in the perceptions of African Americans he just got it wrong in word and in deed (McAndrews 2001).
In spite of a faltering economy, increasing tension and unrest in major cities, high unemployment, and a rising deficit, President George H.W. Bush ran for reelection in 1992 against former Governor William Jefferson “Bill” Clinton of Arkansas. The Republicans held firm to their conservative philosophy of minimal action to redress racial discrimination while applauding the President.

Asserting equal rights for all, we support the Bush Administration's vigorous enforcement of statutes to prevent illegal discrimination on account of sex, race, creed, or national origin. Promoting opportunity, we reject efforts to replace equal rights with quotas or other preferential treatment.

Republican Party Platform of 1992
August 17, 1992

The 1992 Democratic Party platform rebuffed President Bush with the following:

We don't have an American to waste. Democrats will continue to lead the fight to ensure that no Americans suffer discrimination or deprivation of rights on the basis of race, gender, language, national origin, religion, age, disability, sexual orientation, or other characteristics irrelevant to ability. We support … affirmative action; stronger protection of voting rights for racial and ethnic minorities, including language access to voting; and continued resistance to discriminatory English-only pressure groups. We will reverse the Bush Administration's assault on civil rights enforcement, and instead work to rebuild and vigorously use machinery for civil rights enforcement…

Democrat Party Platform of 1992
July 13, 1992

Bill Clinton won the 1992 election and went on to win the 1996 campaign against Senator Robert “Bob” Dole [R, Kansas]. One of Clinton’s core ideas was opportunity and responsibility, or his plan to force welfare recipients to work. Opportunity and responsibility, as described by Clinton, was the ”idea that government should both help those willing to help themselves and enforce common standards of behavior… We will
do with you. We will not do for you.”

This platform doctrine appealed to both centrists and conservatives alike because it promised workfare instead of welfare. Similarly, Dole promised to advance a conservative philosophy if he won the presidency, and the Republican platform agreed with his position: “When I am president, only conservative judges need apply,” Dole stated. During the 1996 election conservative philosophy regarding civil rights was also clearly expressed in Republican platform doctrine. “We scorn Bill Clinton's notion that any person should be denied a job, promotion, contract or a chance at higher education because of their race or gender. Instead, we endorse the Dole-Canady Equal Opportunity Act to end discrimination by the federal government. We likewise endorse this year's Proposition 209, the California Civil Rights Initiative, to restore to law the original meaning of civil rights” (Woolley and Peters 1999-2011).

The Dole-Canady Equal Opportunity Act of 1995 (H.R. 2128/S. 1085) was introduced as a bill to eliminate race- and gender-based preferences in federal employment; admissions practices by institutions of higher education; and, the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures practiced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The term ‘preferences’ was a reference to goals, quotas, timetables, set-asides, and other such practices in accordance with affirmative action policy. Instead, Dole countered that his 1995 legislation proposed to enforce equal


treatment under the law in accordance with the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Similarly, the 1996 California Civil Rights Initiative, also known as Proposition 209, amended the state constitution to prohibit discrimination and ban preferential treatment based on race, color, ethnicity, gender or national origin in state and local government employment, education, and contracts (Lehrer and Hicks, 2010). While congressional Republican leadership backed away from the Dole-Canady Act (1995), the state of California passed its Civil Rights Initiative, Proposition 209 in 1996. The intent of each of these legislations was to eliminate affirmative action programs and practices, which were viewed as discrimination in the reverse by many Republican conservatives. Contrarily, because affirmative action was still important to many African Americans neither Dole nor the Republican Party was perceived favorably.

On the other hand, most African Americans held a highly favorable perception of the Democratic Party, particularly Bill Clinton. By 1996 electoral support reached an all-time high of 96 percent (Newport, et al., 2009). It seemed as though he could do no wrong, even when confronted with scandals, investigations, and impeachment. This is partly due to his congeniality; he neither avoided African American leaders nor the community. Additionally, he incorporated greater diversity within his administration (Shull, 1999). In 1993 Bill Clinton attended the Convocation of the Church of God in Christ (COGIC) in Memphis, Tennessee.\textsuperscript{107} The President’s address stated as follows:

\textsuperscript{107} During his remarks President Clinton noted that he had also attended the Convocation of the Church of God in Christ (COGIC) when they met in Arkansas the previous year (1992). Further, he acknowledged some of the COGIC bishops in attendance by name along with his bishops: Bishop Walker and Bishop Lindsey. Clinton further stated, “Now, if you haven't had Bishop Lindsey's barbecue, you haven't had barbecue. And if you haven't heard Bishop Walker attack one of my opponents, you have never heard a political speech. [Laughter]” (Miller Center's Bill Clinton Speech
I have worked hard to keep faith with our common efforts: to restore the economy, to reverse the politics of helping only those at the top of our totem pole and not the hard-working middle class or the poor; to bring our people together across racial and regional and political lines, to make a strength out of our diversity instead of letting it tear us apart; to reward work and family and community and try to move us forward into the 21st century. Thirteen percent of all my Presidential appointments are African-Americans, and there are five African-Americans in the Cabinet of the United States, 2 1/2 times as many as have ever served in the history of this great land.  

Bill Clinton  
November 13, 1993

Those appointees included Hazel O'Leary as Secretary of Energy, Democratic national chairman Ronald H. Brown as Secretary of Commerce; former Mississippi congressman Mike Espy as Secretary of Agriculture; Jesse Brown, a disabled Marine veteran, as Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Arkansas health director Dr. Joycelyn Elders as U.S. Surgeon General, and Clifton Wharton, Jr., chairman of TIAA-CREF, as Deputy Secretary of State.

Clinton targeted issues central to African American interests—crime, violence, and drugs. Most importantly, Clinton did not racialize such issues like his predecessor George H.W. Bush and the right wing of the Republican Party. Furthermore, Clinton issued Executive Order 12876—Historically Black Colleges and Universities on November 1, 1993 “to advance the development of human potential, to strengthen the capacity of HBCUs to provide quality education, and to increase opportunity to


109. Ronald H. Brown was the first African American leader of a major political party when named Chair of the Democratic National Committee in 1988 (Ebony 1993).
participate in and benefit from Federal programs.” The Order also established the President’s Board of Advisors within the Department of Education (Clinton 1993). He followed with Executive Order 12892—Leadership and Coordination of Fair Housing in Federal Programs: Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (January 17, 1994), to apply to all programs and activities under the authority of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (Clinton 1994).

In addition, President Clinton seemed to identify with, and understand, the African American plight. A son of the South, he spoke in a manner that was familiar and used expressions to which they could relate. For instance, in his remarks before those assembled at the COGIC convocation referenced above, Clinton invoked the name of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to assess how the community had performed since his death.

If Martin Luther King… were to reappear by my side today and give us a report card on the last 25 years, what would he say? You did a good job, he would say, voting and electing people who formerly were not electable because of the color of their skin. You have more political power, and that is good. You did a good job, he would say, letting people who have the ability to do so live wherever they want to live, go wherever they want to go in this great country. You did a good job, he would say, elevating people of color into the ranks of the United States Armed Forces to the very top or into the very top of our Government. You did a very good job, he would say. He would say, you did a good job creating a black middle class of people who really are doing well, and the middle class is growing more among African-Americans than among non-African-Americans. You did a good job; you did a good job in opening opportunity.

But he would say, I did not live and die to see the American family destroyed. I did not live and die to see 13-year-old boys get automatic weapons and gun down 9-year-olds just for the kick of it. I did not live and die to see young people destroy their own lives with drugs and then build fortunes destroying the lives of others. That is not what I came here to do. I fought for freedom, he would say, but not for the freedom of people to kill each other with reckless abandon, not for the freedom of children to have children and the fathers of the children walk away from them and abandon them as if they don’t amount to anything. I fought for people to
have the right to work but not to have whole communities and people abandoned. This is not what I lived and died for.

My fellow Americans, he would say, I fought to stop white people from being so filled with hate that they would wreak violence on black people. I did not fight for the right of black people to murder other black people with reckless abandon.

President Bill Clinton

By the end of his first term, Clinton’s cabinet and court appointments consisted of about 20 percent African-American men and women. He promoted diversity through presidential appointments (Shull 1999). By the same token, when considering both terms, Clinton’s civil rights record was scant. He distanced himself from the issue, and when the right wing countered his appointment of Lani Guinier as head of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, he withdrew his nomination. Similarly, Clinton retreated from his pro-affirmative action position with, “mend it, but don’t end it,” in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling Adarand Constructors v. Pena 515. U.S. 200 (1995), which ended federal affirmative action programs. Moreover, Clinton’s commitment to move from welfare to workfare was a policy consistent with George W. Bush’s compassionate conservatism. Clinton’s welfare reform had a more adverse affect on African Americans than any other minority grouping because a greater number within the race group had economic situations that placed them below the poverty line or among the working poor.

110. In 1995 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Adarand Constructors v Pena, 515 U.S. 200 that all affirmative action programs must meet a "strict scrutiny” standard, even those approved by the U.S. Congress. This case was a challenge to the Department of Transportation’s Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program established to assist minority contractors in getting contracts for federally funded highway projects.
Despite withdrawals from issues central to African American race group interests, President Clinton moved to promote an open dialogue on race and reconciliation with Executive Order 13050—President’s Advisory Board on Race (June 13, 1997) during his second term. He selected renowned African American historian Dr. John Hope Franklin as chair of a seven-member multi-ethnic board which consisted of: Linda Chavez-Thompson, Suzan Johnson Cook, Governor Tom Kean, Angela Oh, Robert Thomas, and Governor William Winter, with Christopher Edley, who served as senior adviser (Clinton 1997). According to Dr. Franklin this Race Initiative was the first time that a national conversation on race was held in the United States. Furthermore, the intent was not just dialogue; there was sincere hope that action would proceed to improve life situations, and the general climate in American communities; to eliminate discrimination in various areas, such as education, housing, and employment; and, to improve policies with regard to U.S. race relations (Clinton 1997).

Typically, such conversations either dwelled solely on black-white relations to the exclusion of other minorities and white ethnics, or they focused exclusively on the issue of African American slavery. The Board aimed to address race as discrimination and disparities within all American communities, including immigrant communities (Clinton 1997). When during a July 14, 1997 press conference Dr. Franklin was told that Congressman Newt Gingrich [R, Georgia] opposed issuing an official apology to African Americans for slavery, he responded thusly:

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111. Unfortunately, according to John Goering (2001) the President’s Advisory Board on Race did not include a representative for Native Americans.

112. President Bill Clinton announced his Initiative on Race in accordance with Executive Order 13050 (July 13, 1997) at the Rimac Arena in San Diego, California on July 14, 1997. Members of the President’s Advisory Board on Race were introduced and
I think that, whether we do it as a nation or whether we do it as individuals or whether Mr. Gingrich will undertake this himself, we are all to acknowledge that there is some serious contradiction between the policies of this country with respect to race and the fundamental documents and sacred statements with respect to our nation -- that is, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States -- and they are not consonant with the policies that have been pursued by this country with respect to race.

Whether this will bring anyone out to issue a formal apology, I don't know. But anyone who looks at the history of race in this country and looks at the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence will know -- if they can read and write, they will know -- that there is a very serious contradiction, and we have been derelict and responsible for a whole history of miscreant activities, not unlike those which we condemned England for committing in the 17th and 18th centuries.

The President’s Advisory Board on Race was to convene for a yearlong dialogue scheduled to terminate on September 30 1998. This was such a massive undertaking and the President’s principle goal of racial reconciliation seemed elusive. As specified in Executive Order 13050 (1997) the official goals of the Race Initiative were to:

1. Promote a constructive national dialogue to confront and work through challenging issues that surround race;

2. Increase the Nation’s understanding of our recent history of race relations;

3. Bridge racial divides by encouraging leaders…to develop and implement innovative approaches to calming racial tensions;

4. Identify, develop, and implement solutions to problems in areas in which race has a substantial impact…

allowed to receive questions from the press. (Woolley and Peters, “William J. Clinton: Press Briefing by Presidential Advisory Board on Race”
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=48648#ixzz1gOPDRUnp

Nevertheless, John Goering, in the first analysis of the goals of Clinton’s Race Initiative, notes the Board made some accomplishments. Initiating open national dialogues on race was a major feat, primarily because it “took the issue ‘out the closet’ where Republicans had intentionally stashed it decades earlier” (2001: 482). If nothing else Clinton’s Initiative on Race further exposed economic racial disadvantages that remained unresolved. The issue of race in America runs deep in hearts and minds; government cannot mandate reconciliation for the sake of equality and justice. In spite of Clinton’s poor record on civil rights issues, Goering notes that Bill Clinton’s Race Initiative was a brave first try; however, American society has a long road to travel to achieve racial reconciliation. By the end of the Clinton administration most African Americans held persistent Democratic Party identifications and electoral support. This was seen in the near universal backing for subsequent Democratic presidential nominees: vice President Al Gore (95%) in 2000, Senator John Kerry [D, Massachusetts] (93%) in 2004, and Senator Barack Obama [D, Illinois] (99%) in 2008 (Newport, et al. 2009).

The 2000 Democratic Party Platform repeated rhetoric promising to act in response to discriminatory practices because of race, ethnicity, gender, age, disability, or sexual orientations. Democrats pledged again to enforce civil rights laws; fight for inclusion; support fair administration of justice; oppose racial profiling; and, support continuation of affirmative action to ensure opportunity. These planks were reiterated in the 2004 presidential campaign with the inclusion of a promise of political equality in which each vote cast would be counted.\footnote{Political equality (one person, one vote) was a major issue in the 2000 election campaign between Democrat vice President Al Gore and Republican Governor George W. Bush of Texas, particularly in the state of Florida. Candidate Bush claimed that his brother, Florida Governor Jeb Bush, promised he would win the state. This was 114 Accordingly, the Republican Party Platform of
2000 committed to uphold the rights of all citizens, and to oppose discrimination on the basis of race, gender, creed, age, disability, or national origin, but African American distrust for the Republican Party was firmly established as was their capture by the Democratic Party.

In their 2004 National Convention the Republican Party applauded President Bush for making education more affordable for students of Historically Black Colleges and Universities, and of Hispanic Serving Institutions. They further claimed support for “aggressive, proactive measures to ensure that no individual is discriminated against on the basis of race, national origin, gender, or other characteristics covered by our civil rights laws.”

While opposing affirmative action, which they equated to goals, timetables, set-asides, and quotas, George W. Bush and the Republican Party promoted instead “affirmative access.” This was defined as “taking steps to ensure that disadvantaged individuals of all colors and ethnic backgrounds have the opportunity to compete economically and that no child is left behind educationally.” Republicans knew they had to address the election 2000 debacle that occurred in the state of Florida. Many within the African American electorate, as well as other minorities and some white


ethnics perceived that they were denied the right to vote. The 2004 Republican platform supported election reform by the states to ensure voting rights.\textsuperscript{117}

During his presidency, Bush’s domestic agenda advanced a philosophy of compassionate conservatism, which according to Myron Magnet (1999), aimed to bring problems facing the poor to the forefront of national politics. This included: supporting workfare;\textsuperscript{118} active neighborhood policing to attack crime; educating urban under-class students; implementing test standards in schools; engaging private organizations and faith-based institutions for health care and social services. Even though the Bush policy agenda supported issues of particular interest to African Americans as a group, and he appointed African Americans to key executive department posts, he could not garner significant increases in support for himself and the Republican Party. His appointees included high profile individuals, like retired U.S. Army General Colin Powell as Secretary of State, Alphonso Jackson as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and Roderick Paige as Secretary of Education. In addition, Condoleezza Rice served as Bush’s National Security Adviser before replacing Powell as Secretary of State during his second term. On February 12, 2002 President G.W. Bush issued Executive Order 13256—White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universities. The

\footnotesize{117. The Help America Vote Act (Pub. L. 107-252, 42 U.S.C. 15301 et seq.), signed into law on October 29, 2002 by President George W. Bush, required states to implement election reform to improve the voting process for all citizens.}

\footnotesize{118. Workfare, an important factor in President Clinton’s welfare reform agenda, resulted in passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWOR) (PL 104-193), also known as the 1996 Welfare Reform Act. The legislation was signed into law on August 22, 1996.}
Order transferred the White House Initiative from the Office of Postsecondary Education to the Office of the Secretary within the U.S. Department of Education (Bush 2002).

While neither political party offered a civil rights plank, per se, each party’s 2008 platform rhetoric promised voting rights protections, and to ban discrimination based on a litany of traditionally covered classifications. The Republican Party endorsed equal treatment for all, invoking its Lincoln legacy, but reiterated its conservative opposition to affirmative action preferences, timetables, set-asides, and quotas. The Democratic Party platform pledged full benefits of citizenship to residents within the District of Columbia, which included some 600,000 African Americans. Additionally, the Party vowed to address and resolve matters related to poverty, the housing crisis; and, to promote historically Black, Hispanic, and other minority-serving institutions of higher education.

Election 2008 was historically significant because it ushered in a number of “firsts.” This election represented the first time one of the two main political parties nominated an African American for president. Senator Barack Obama [D, Illinois] defeated Senator John McCain [R, Arizona] to become the first U.S. president of mixed race descent who identified himself as “black.” His message of hope and change resonated in the hearts of many who, like African Americans, struggled to recover from the recession and its disproportionate impact on people of color or just wanted to see a change in the Washington, D.C. establishment. Moreover, African Americans were hopeful that this chief executive, unlike any that previously held the office of president, would not only address the issue of race in America, but would also initiate substantive steps to settle the disparate economic, social, and political experiences of those within the racial group.
Likewise, when the Democratic Party held commanding leads in the 2008 election and captured a majority in both houses of Congress, it seemed reasonable that these most loyal of Democratic supporters could expect genuine attention to race group concerns. On the contrary, talk of racial reconciliation and restitution ceased. Since an African American captured the U.S. presidency, there seemed no justification to continue such dialogue because obtaining the highest political office was seen as demonstrated improvements. People were weary of talking about race, again; they felt African Americans should just get over it. Yet, in a real sense race became even more significant because it became a measure of Barack Obama’s presidential performance. Media posts caused racially offensive and stereotypical images of African Americans to resurface.¹¹⁹

Like Clinton, Obama selected a record number of African Americans, as well as other minorities, to various senior executive posts, and promoted diversity through his appointment power. A majority of the President’s appointees were minorities and women, many of whom were the first to serve, particularly those appointed to federal courts. Accordingly, many of Obama’s African American appointees were the first to assume their assigned executive positions. Nominees with Senate confirmation included

¹¹⁹ On 18 February 2009 the New York Post (nypost.com) published a cartoon depicting the shooting of a pet chimpanzee in Connecticut after it viciously attacked a friend of its owner. The image of the pet shot by police was accompanied with this caption: “They’ll have to find someone else to write the next stimulus bill.” A picture of President Barack Obama signing the bill appeared on the preceding page (pp. 11-12) of the Post’s printed edition. In addition, tee shirts bearing Obama’s image as the children’s book character, Curious George, were also seen at Republican rallies during the 2008 election campaign. While many may see these as merely exaggerated cartoon images often presented by political cartoonists, such references of blacks synonymous to monkeys or apes bring up historical implications that deny African Americans “their basic humanity” (Lucy Madison, “GOP Official Apologizes For Sending Obama Chimp Image, Refuses To Step Down” CBS News Political Hot Sheet, 19 April 2011).
Eric H. Holder, Jr. as U.S. Attorney General; Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; Susan P. Rice, United States Ambassador to the United Nations; and, Charles F. Bolden, Jr., Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (whitehouse.gov). Also, following in the footsteps of each of his presidential predecessors since Carter, President Obama issued his White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universities on February 26, 2010. Executive Order 13532, Promoting Excellence, Innovation, and Sustainability at Historically Black Colleges and Universities “in order to advance the development of the Nation's full human potential and to advance equal opportunity in higher education, strengthen the capacity of historically black colleges and universities to provide the highest quality education, increase opportunities for these institutions to participate in and benefit from Federal programs, and ensure that our Nation has the highest proportion of college graduates in the world by the year 2020” (Obama 2010).

Nonetheless, when the housing bubble burst sending the economy into a tailspin accompanied by rising unemployment and the lack of job creation, enthusiasm for President Obama and the democratically controlled Congress soured within the African American community. As maintained by Dillahunt, et al. (2010) the President provided neither a job strategy nor wealth strategy to relieve the economic pains of Black America. Obama also committed a major policy blunder, when he failed to heed the Congressional Black Caucus, by not targeting economically-disadvantaged communities to receive much needed job creation projects in accordance with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Pub. L. 111-5) also known as the Stimulus Bill. Furthermore, the foreclosure crisis revealed that a disproportionate share of African Americans and
other people of color had been “systematically targeted by the financial industry for predatory, subprime loans. In fact, over half of the mortgages to African Americans in recent years were high-cost subprime loans” even though many may have qualified for regular loans (Dillahunt, et al. 2010: 4). In addressing the foreclosure crisis President Obama and Congress did not stand up to the Republicans or to the financial industry. This resulted in either failure to enact substantive legislation, or passing legislation that was weak and ineffective.

Obama continued to scramble to advance substantive policies for U.S. economic recovery. However, after the mid-term congressional elections the Republican Party gained control of the House of Representatives, while the Senate retained only a slight majority for the Democratic Party. To make matters worse, the Tea Party also emerged with electoral successes that made them a force to be reckoned within the Republican Party. This further complicated any hope of bringing remedy to the most economically-disadvantaged citizens as Republicans and Tea Party advocates alike focused their efforts on tax cuts that would virtually eliminate many federally-funded benefits programs (Ali, et al., 2011). Economic inequality continued, and income and employment gaps remained. As President Obama and the Democratic Party focused their attentions elsewhere, his hold on the African American community began to slip. Nonetheless, even though things appeared bleak within their community, the African American electorate would remain loyal supporters of the Democratic Party.

4.4 CONCLUSION

African-American attachments to the two main political parties remain tenuous at best. The U.S. two-party system leaves them little-to-no leverage to make demands on
the Democratic Party, or on the Republican Party. They find themselves once again cast in DuBois’ (1922) dilemma or Frymer’s (1999) state of “electoral capture.” African Americans, well aware that the Republican Party neither wants nor needs them to win elections, perceive that the Democratic Party also maintains a suitable distance from racial group interests. This enables the Democrats to widen their appeal to other political constituent groups. Once in power neither Democrats nor Republicans enforce civil rights measures and protections or other policies of particular interest to African Americans even if promised in their parties’ platforms. Hence, historical socio-economic and political disparities persist, and the Democratic Party maintains its grip on the African American electorate.

If one were to draw a conclusion from the historical relationship between African Americans and the two main political parties, as examined in this chapter, it should be that race is important. The presence of pro-active and effective African-American leadership provides cues as to appropriate and inappropriate political choices. Civil rights leaders communicated a cohesive message that produced uniformity in partisanship, given their options in the U.S. two-party system. As the prolonged political protest movement subsided it gave way to political participation. Newly elected African American politicians were accorded substantive power within the Democratic Party organization, and within executive, legislative, and judicial offices at every level of government in the United States. Nonetheless, when issues of most importance to African Americans no longer commanded center stage, and the parties became silent on matters of most concern to the racial group, shared social, economic, and political situations made them keenly aware that their interconnectedness was founded on the
basis of race, regardless of class, gender, or other factors typically associated with partisanship. It was the predominant factor explaining their rationality in Democratic partisanship, and in African American perceptions of interdependence of fate, and of an interdependence of task. Race, alone, became a dependable measure with which to gauge political situations, to unite disparate elements of the racial group, to mobilize as a voting bloc, and to engage African American racial group solidarity.

In the subsequent chapter the methodological approach for obtaining and analyzing the data in accordance with the theoretical framework constructed in the second chapter is explained. The aim of the fifth chapter is to show the appropriateness of the research design for investigating African American partisanship in accordance with the Black Utility Heuristic and the concept of linked racial fate. Several hypotheses are examined to test the relationship between race and partisanship in the African American case.
CHAPTER 5

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

This dissertation revisits a long-standing controversy about the single most important determinant of African American partisan predispositions. In so doing the present research study utilizes a modification of the Black Utility Heuristic paradigm advanced in the *theory of African American racial group interests* (Dawson 1994), which addresses this question. The principle aim of this research study is to test the reliability of racial group cues in framing perceptions about the efforts of the two main political parties to address issues of most importance to African Americans. The study topic is identified in the first chapter; relevant literature is explored and the conceptual model is formulated in the second chapter; while a survey of essential background and historical details are covered in chapters three and four. The current chapter focuses on research methods used to conduct this study. Specifically, this chapter explains the methodological approach employed to test the extent to which distinctive racial group solidarity and political cohesion persist among African Americans in their political party identifications, and as compared to other racial and ethnic populations.

In addition, this chapter includes the following: study procedures, sample populations, instrumentations, specifications and definitions of the variables, reiteration
of the hypotheses, model specifications, and the statistical analytical approach. Quantitative research using statistical methods, national survey studies, and individual-level analysis are used to attain the study goals. Data gathered from national survey research studies are then computed for interpretation of the effect of perceptions of linked fate on contemporary political proclivities among African Americans.

Because race is modeled, in this study, as having a profound impact on African Americans’ decisions regarding the two main political parties, it is important to explore the extent to which partisan preference attitudes might differ from the African American racial group political standard. Essential to this examination of party as a function of race are individual perceptions identifying the political party that better serves African American racial group interests, which may also apply to other minority racial and ethnic group populations. Still, other social forces also impact decisions about partisanship. So, another component of this investigation of African American political partisanship is the integration of race, class, and gender, where race is modeled as the central organizing factor. Nonetheless, it is the amalgamation of these factors in the historical case of African Americans that explain how the concept of linked fate influences individual attitude formation. The interconnectedness and interdependence of fate as well as task interdependence among African Americans signify the properties, and determinants, of racial group preference attitudes toward the major U.S. political parties.

5.1 DATA AND METHODS: STUDY PROCEDURES

In the present research study I utilize data collected for the 1996 National Black Election Study series (Tate 1997), and for the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et al. 2009). Most importantly, this dissertation is a modification of Michael C. Dawson’s
(1994) black utility heuristic model which was based on data collected for both the 1984 and 1988 National Black Election Study panel series (Jackson, Gurin, and Hatchett 1984; Jackson 1988). I incorporate the 1996 National Black Election Study in this research because it provides continuity in that it updates data for the National Black Election Study panel series. The National Black Election Study (NBES), developed by the Program for Research on Black Americans, began in 1984 by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan (Jackson 1984; 1988). The 1996 NBES was produced by Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio and distributed by the University of Michigan Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Like the 1984 and 1988 studies in the series, the 1996 National Black Election Study is a large-scale systematic survey that has the feasibility of in-depth investigations of political attitudes, perceptions, and electoral behaviors within the African American population. Additionally, the 1996 NBES data provides a large, representative national sample of adult African Americans. Prior to collection of the National Black Election Study series no other national surveys made possible such comprehensive examination of African American politics (Tate 1997).

Moreover, this investigation employs the 2004 National Politics Study because of significant advantages offered by its examination of “individual attitudes, beliefs, aspirations and behavior at the beginning of the [twenty-first] century” from a comparative perspective (Jackson, et al. 2009, ii). The Program for Research on Black Americans in the Center for Political Studies at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, developed the National Politics Study (NPS). The Study was conducted in conjunction with DataStat Inc., a survey research organization located in
Ann Arbor, Michigan (Jackson, et al. 2009). The NPS builds upon methodologies used successfully by James S. Jackson in both the 1984 and 1988 National Black Election Study panel series. In addition, the 2004 NPS was developed from work completed for the National Survey of American Life (NSAL), 2001 – 2003, (Jackson, et al. 2007), and for the National Latino and Asian American Survey (NLAAS), 2001 - 2003 (Alegria, et al. 2007) in the Program for Research on Black Americans with the Center for Political Studies at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. While providing a large, representative national sample of adult African Americans, the 2004 National Politics Study was perhaps the first nationally representative, explicitly comparative, simultaneous study that surveyed the politics, participation, and preferences of both racial and ethnic populations within the United States (Jackson, et al. 2009). Each of these selected survey studies contain comparable questions that are consistent with questions included by James S. Jackson in the National Black Election Study panel series for 1984 and 1988 (See: Appendix A).

5.2 SAMPLE POPULATIONS

Sample populations are drawn from national survey data collected for the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997), and for the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et al. 2009). Of 1,074 adult African American survey observations read in the 1996 NBES, a sample of 824 observations are used in the current study. In addition, of 3,087 American adult observations from racial and ethnic population groupings in the 2004 NPS, there are 706 African-Americans, 868 Non-Hispanic Whites, 676 Hispanics, 466 Asians, and 371 of Black Caribbean descent included in the subsequent analysis.
5.3 INSTRUMENTATION

Survey questions developed for both the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997, Appendix B) and the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et al. 2009, Appendix C) were extracted for the present investigation. The 1996 NBES questionnaire asks African American citizens to report partisanship; voting preferences; political interests; evaluations of presidential, congressional candidates and groups; opinions of various issues; values, and a myriad of other attitudes toward the social, economic, and political order. Additionally, the 1996 NBES collected data relative to social demography that includes gender, age, education, marital status, income, and occupation (Tate, 1997). Likewise, the 2004 NPS survey contains questions that solicit responses about voting preferences, partisanship, organizational membership, immigration, racial group consciousness, and governmental policies (Jackson, et al., 2009).

The 1996 NBES consists of two components during the 1996 presidential election cycle: a pre-election component, and a post-election component. The survey was administered using a random-digit dialing telephone interview from which a stratified random sample of all African American households in the United States with telephones was drawn. The pre-election population contains 1,216 respondents. Eight hundred fifty-four of those respondents also completed interviews during the post-election component (Tate, 1997). Besides, 3,339 respondents completed computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) for the 2004 NPS (Jackson, et al., 2009). Respondents to questions from the 1996 NBES, pre-election surveys, and from the CATI queries solicited for the 2004 NPS make up the sample population for this study. Data from
these national surveys are computed using IBM SPSS Statistics 20, (IBM Corporation 1989, 2011).

5.4 DEPENDENT VARIABLE SPECIFICATIONS

African American political partisanship is modeled as a sequential decision problem. The decision entails either identification with one of the two main political parties or an identification of political independence. The following alternatives are presented in the 1996 NBES (Tate 1997) based on the following survey question, “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?” The decision problem is identifying individual partisan preference attitudes given this polychotomous response. The goal is to capture one’s party identification, the dependent variable under study in this investigation, or an individual’s affective attitude of preference for a particular political party. Such identification with a preferred political party further denotes a psychological attachment or sense of belonging to that party exclusively, as opposed to official party membership and/or ties to another political party. These attachments typically explain differences in the decision calculus of individuals, and population groups, when choosing from an array of alternatives within the political world (Campbell, et al. 1960). In this study partisan identifications reflect either respondents’ self-report of preferences for one of the two main political parties, or respondents’ preferences for political independence.

Given the problem presented by the dependent ‘response’ variable, the individual’s task appears to require a decision between alternatives specified in the

120. Similarly, the question posed to survey respondents in the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009) asks: “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a republican, a democrat, an independent, or something else?”
above-referenced survey question. Furthermore, this problem entails deciding between two principle alternatives: a political party preference versus a no-party political independence preference, where decisions resulting in an indication of party preference further leads to an indication of which party is preferred, the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, or perhaps another political party. Nonetheless, if no political party is preferred then the decision may yield an Independent identification. The problem stemming from this decision situation is illustrated in Figure 5.1 below.

Figure 5.1 The Sequential Party Decision-Making Process Based on the Party Identification Survey Questions for 1996 and 2004


122. Of course this is a simplification of the partisan decision-making process for purposes of illustration. Additionally, the sequential decision-making process may continue in order to determine the degree of political independence, for instance, a ‘pure’ or Independent-Independent versus an Independent Leaner. Independent-Republican and Independent-Democrat are party leaners who according to Keith, et al. (1986) and Campbell, et al. (1960, esp. 143-144) are more like weak partisans in their political behavior.
Contrarily, when the race-of-respondent is African American I surmise that the most likely sequential order is as depicted in Figure 5.2 below.

![Figure 5.2 The Sequential Party Decision-Making Process for African Americans](image)

This sequential decision-making order supports the utility of procedural or ‘bounded’ rationality (Simon 1947) as an explanation of the way African Americans, individually and collectively as members of the racial group, makes decisions about political partisanship. Much of what we have learned about the race-party relationship points to the policy positions of the two major political parties regarding issues of most importance to African Americans. Since there is a long-term relationship between African Americans and the Democratic Party, it is reasonable to expect the Democratic Party to be a first consideration when African Americans face such decision situations.

In the analysis each party option—Republican, Democrat, or Independent—is assigned a
value to estimate the probability of a decision to identify with a particular political party versus a decision to identify with political independence.\textsuperscript{123}

5.5 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: SPECIFICATIONS AND DEFINITIONS

Variables that influence African Americans’ political partisanship, extracted from the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate, 1997) and from the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et al. 2009), appear in Table 6.1 below.\textsuperscript{124}

In this study individual perceptions of racial group interests play “a more general role in shaping African Americans’ political, economic, and social judgments” (Dawson 1994, 84). A major component of these individual perceptions deemed crucial to African American racial group politics in this research study is Linked Fate, a measure of racial group consciousness or perceptions that what happens to people’s racial group has a lot to do with them, where responses are coded as follows: Strongly Agree=1.00, Somewhat Agree=0.66, Somewhat Disagree=0.33, and Strongly Disagree=0.00. In addition, the significance of social and economic demography in predicting African Americans’ political partisanship is examined. Race, economic class, and gender are modeled as indicators of social and economic status. For purposes of investigation status represents, in a social context, the location of a population group within the socio-economic hierarchy based on economic class affiliations and/or status assignments beyond one’s control like race and/or ethnicity, gender, and age. These status assignments typically result from ascriptive characteristics where race, gender, and age often determine economic class positions.

\textsuperscript{123} All models exclude any responses to the ‘or what’ and ‘or something else’ decision options of the 1996 and 2004 survey questions.

\textsuperscript{124} See also: Appendix A for survey question wording of variables used in this study.
In what follows designations of status variables included in this investigation are specified. *Class* is a measure of economic assets like earned household income calculated in dollars. The 1996 NBES specifies income categories as: \( \leq $10,000; $14,999; $19,999; $24,999; $29,999; $39,999; $49,999; $74,999; $89,999; $104,999; \) or \$105,000 and more. Income data from the 2004 NPS is imputed with monetary values considered based on respondents’ indications of annual family earnings. In addition, status variables include: *Race* (Black) based on responses from adult African Americans to the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997), or based on comparative responses from population groups surveyed in the 2004 National Politics Study and dummy coded as African American, White Non-Hispanic, Hispanic, Asian, and Black Caribbean (Jackson, et al. 2009). Respondent sex (*Gender*) is a dichotomous variable coded as Women=1 and Men=0. *Age* represents a respondent’s actual age, measured in years.

Analogous to party identification ideology is viewed as a philosophical guide that helps adult Americans’ reasoning and choices about objects in the political world (Campbell, et al. 1960); it is one’s political outlook. So, included in the analysis is an *Ideology* variable or summary political ideology scale that appraises the degree of individual preferences for liberalism. The decision options are arranged as Liberal=1.00, Moderate (Middle-of-the-Road)=0.50, and Conservative=0.00. Using the 1996 survey data to determine the extent to which appraisal of the political parties’ efforts to work on behalf of the African American racial group influences the direction of partisanship, a measure of perceptions of how hard the Democratic Party works to represent African American racial group interests is added, ‘Democrats work on issues Blacks care about’ (*Dems Work*) with corresponding responses: Very Hard=1.00, Fairly Hard=0.66, Not Too
Hard=0.33, or Not Hard At All=0.00. Likewise, a dummy measure for political climate is added to examine presidential performance evaluations during the Clinton (1996 NBES) and Bush (2004 NPS) administrations, where Approve=1.0, and Disapprove=0.0 in 1996, and Strongly Approve=1.00, Somewhat Approve=0.66, Somewhat Disapprove=0.33, and Strongly Disapprove=0.00 in 2004. Finally, a “sense of well-being” assesses the nation’s Economy over the past year. The variable is coded as follows: Gotten Better=1.0, Stayed the same=0.5, Gotten Worse=0.0. All of the variables used in the analyses for this study appear in Table 6.1; survey questions are presented in Appendix A.

Table 5.1 Determinants of African American Political Partisanship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Linked Fate</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Dems Work Best to Help Blacks</th>
<th>Political Climate</th>
<th>Nation’s Economy</th>
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<td>Independent</td>
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5.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The primary question guiding this research study is: Why do African Americans think the way they do politically, and what induces them to change? The implication is that individual African Americans’ attitudes toward the two main political parties are
related to racial group political orientations. In this study the relationship between individual and group is predicated on the principle of linked, or the interdependence of, fate and perceptions of similar life experiences and situations. African Americans’ interconnectedness based on the reality of their common fate is typically accompanied by an interdependence of task or shared interests that yield racial group solidarity and political cohesion. There is, therefore, an expectation that “African Americans with stronger (black) linked fates are likely to support a political party whose policy preferences are perceived as consistent with (black) racial group interests.” This is the analytical objective of the first hypothesis.

While the African American racial group is noted for distinctive political party identifications, African American women are unique in their own right. Their contemporary and historical experiences and life situations point to the impact of race, class, and gender on their livelihood. It is therefore important to investigate how the interaction of multiple identities, particularly race and gender, influence an African American woman’s partisanship. Hence, hypothesis 2 suggests that, “African American women are more likely to support the Democratic Party than African American men or women of other ethnicities.”

Also important to this examination of African American partisanship are perceptions about which party better serves racial group interests, hence the third hypothesis states that “African Americans are more likely to identify with the political party that they perceive best helps their racial group.” Again, the significance of perceptions of their interconnectedness suggests that the Democratic, not the Republican, Party should be the most rational and efficient choice even in times of political obscurity.
The party best serving the interests of the racial group should also best fulfill individual goals as well, thereby increasing political cohesion regarding party choice. At this point another important question emerges: Is this merely a “black” phenomenon or does Dawson’s Black Utility Heuristic provide a viable (and similar) explanation for political partisanship among other U.S. racial and ethnic minority groups? This is the focus of the fourth hypothesis, i.e. similarities and/or differences between African Americans and the comparative populations included in this study composed of Non-Hispanic Whites, Hispanics, Asians, and Caribbean Blacks. In the analysis the impact of linked fate is examined by the fourth hypothesis thusly: “The more a person views that the fate of their racial/ethnic group affects their own fate, the greater the likelihood of support for the political party perceived as addressing racial/ethnic group interests.”

5.7 ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

Certain socio-demographic attributes like race and class produce significant and distinctive political effects; however, only race typically provides a relevant explanation for partisanship within the African American community. Beginning with the 1936 presidential election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and particularly since the 1944 presidential election of Harry S. Truman, most African Americans have indicated preferences for, or identifications with, the Democratic Party. Figure 5.3 illustrates the relationship between the dependent variable Party Identification, an attitude of preference for a particular political party, and the independent variables included in the statistical analytic technique that follows.
The main effects are estimated as *race* (being black), *class* (income), and *gender* (being a woman). This determines the most important factor predicting African American partisanship, where race because of the influence of perceptions of *linked fate* is expected to yield greater significance in explaining African Americans’ relationship
with the Democratic Party. In addition, the integration of race, class, and gender in the present research study suggests that other factors may compete meaningfully with race in determining African American racial group politics. In the arrow diagram (Figure 5.3) presented above seven factors figure directly in the explanation of African Americans’ distinctive preference attitudes toward the Democratic Party. The relationships are tested in the subsequent analysis.

5.7.1 STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE

Relevant research studies employ multivariate statistical methods to measure the impact of group-based determinants on people’s political preferences as found in the works of Miller, Wlezen and Hildreth (1999), and Koch (1994). Multivariate analysis consists of appropriate techniques to examine data sets of more than one variable (Abdi, 2003). This includes general linear models (GLM) like multiple linear regression analysis (MLR) using a least square approach as found in works like Bejarano (2005) and Conover (1984). Whereas other researchers such as Luks and Elms (2005) and Manza and Brooks (1999) construct models using special cases of GLM, logistic regression analysis. In Dawson’s (1994, 125) research study of African American political partisanship multiple regression analysis was employed, while a probit regression technique estimated “individual level data with a binary dependent variable.”

In this study multinominal logistic regression analysis is the statistical method employed. This regression technique is required for several reasons. First, a logistic regression procedure is deemed necessary to identify which independent variable, from among the combination of political, economic, and social factors specified herein, best predicts party or no-party preferences within the African-American community, and
among the other racial and ethnic citizenry (Mertle and Vannatta, 2005). Further, the logistic regression model as represented in this study is a special case whereby a single outcome party identification comprises more than two categories; hence, it is a polychotomous variable, and therefore violates the assumption of linearity required for normal regression analysis (Kennedy 1998). Finally, even though commonly constructed as a continuous multi-point summary scale, the party identification variable does not clearly fit specifications for continuous classification, as provided in the 1996 National Black election Study (Tate 1997) and in the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009). Based on the survey question wording for each national study, respondents are asked to decide their partisanship preferences from an array of alternatives that constitute the party identification variable. Hence, multinomial logistic regression is appropriate to handle the case of African Americans facing discrete alternatives on a scale, or among categories, of preference attitudes; and, to rank the influences of racial group factors on personal partisan preferences; such is the case in this investigation.

5.8 MODEL SPECIFICATIONS

Identifying two contrasting outcomes in the sequential decision-making process solves the multinomial logistic regression problem. In the subsequent logistic regression equations, \( \log \) is the logit or log odds that the dependent (outcome) variable party identification—PartyID, equals one while “\( a \)” is the constant or intercept. The \( \beta \) terms are the logistic regression coefficients or parameter estimates for the \( X \) predictor variables, where \( \beta_1, \beta_2, ... \beta_k \) represent the partial association between each predictor and party identification, net the effect of all other predictors. Therefore, in this model, \( \Pr_{| PartyID|} \) is equal to the constant \( a \) plus the \( \beta \) coefficient times the value of the \( X \) predictors. Two logit models are computed in the analysis. One model contrasts a
decision to choose an Independent (no party) political identification with that of a Democratic Party preference, the reference category; it is specified as:

$$\log \frac{\Pr(\text{Party ID Independent})}{\Pr(\text{Party ID Democrat})} = a + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \ldots + \beta_k X_k$$

The second model contrasts a decision to identify with the Republican Party rather than with the Democratic Party. Hence the form of that multinomial logistic regression equation becomes:

$$\log \frac{\Pr(\text{Party ID Republican})}{\Pr(\text{Party ID Democrat})} = a + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \ldots + \beta_k X_k$$

The logistic regression models test the effect of each of the independent “factors” Race [African Americans (1996)] and/or ethnicity [African American, White Non-Hispanic, Hispanic, Asian, Black Caribbean (2004)], Gender [Women/Men], linked Fate [“Happens to Blacks has a lot to do with me” (1996) or “Extent of Respondent’s race fate affecting Respondent” (2004)], political Ideology [Liberal/Moderate/Conservative], assessments of the Democratic Party’s efforts to address African American interests Dems Work [“Democrats work on issues Blacks care about” (1996)], presidential performance evaluations for Clinton in 1996 [approve/disapprove] and Bush in 2004 [strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, or strongly disapprove], appraisal of the nation’s Economy [gotten better/stayed the same/gotten worse] over the past year. These variables predict political partisanship among African Americans in the 1996 NBES (Tate 1997), and when compared to other population groups, as specified above, in the 2004 NPS (Jackson et al. 2004). A control for “covariates” representing the actual age (Age) of respondents, and annual family income [Class] are also included in the analyses.
Data collected for the 1996 NBES is utilized to construct models for testing the first and third hypotheses, while the second and fourth hypotheses are tested using 2004 NPS data. Model specifications follow.

5.8.1 MODEL ONE: THE INFLUENCE OF LINKED FATE ON PARTISANSHIP

In Model 1 five predictors determine the outcome (party identification). They measure perceptions of linked racial fate, class based on annual family income earnings, gender (Women=1, Men=0), political ideology, and a respondent’s actual age. In the analysis that follows this model is used to test the first hypothesis that African Americans with stronger (black) linked fates are more likely to support the political party whose policies are viewed as consistent with the policy interests of the racial group. An important assumption is that the Democratic Party is the first preferable alternative. Using data from the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997) the logistic equations that estimate these relationships assume the following form:

\[
\log \frac{\Pr\{Party\ ID\ Independent\}}{\Pr\{Party\ ID\ Democrat\}} = a + \beta_1\text{Fate} + \beta_2\text{Class} + \beta_3\text{Gender} + \beta_4\text{Ideology} + \beta_5\text{Age}
\]

\[
\log \frac{\Pr\{Party\ ID\ Republican\}}{\Pr\{Party\ ID\ Democrat\}} = a + \beta_1\text{Fate} + \beta_2\text{Class} + \beta_3\text{Gender} + \beta_4\text{Ideology} + \beta_5\text{Age}
\]
5.8.2 MODEL TWO: THE IMPACT OF RACE ON PARTISAN ASSESSMENTS

This model explores the extent to which African Americans’ partisan identifications reflect a view that Democrats best help the racial group. This is the goal of the third hypothesis. Using data from the 1996 NBES for Model 2, the estimated equation becomes:

\[
\log \frac{\text{Pr}[\text{PartyID Democrat}]}{\text{Pr}[\text{Party ID Republican}]} = a + \beta_1 \text{Class} + \beta_2 \text{Gender} + \beta_3 \text{Ideology} + \beta_4 \text{Clinton} + \beta_5 \text{Dems Work} + \beta_6 \text{Age}
\]

The two regression output models contrast the influence of the predictor variables: income, a class measure; gender; political ideology; Clinton’s presidential performance; assessments of how hard the Democrats work to address issues of most importance to African Americans; and age. The results yield contrasts when an Independent identification is preferred as opposed to an indication of preference for the Democratic Party, or when one opts to identify with the Republican Party rather than with the Democratic Party.

5.8.3 MODEL THREE: TEST OF GENDER DISTINCTIONS BY RACE

The third model estimates comparative racial and ethnic survey responses to the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et al., 2009). This model includes a dummy coding to create separate categories for African American women and men, where BlackW=1 and BlackM=0. Also, a dummy coding is utilized to distinguish African American women from all other racial/ethnic women under study (EthnicW=1, BlackW=0). The output generated for this model renders the following equations when
estimating the proposition that African American women have greater feelings of affinity for the Democratic Party than women of other ethnicities, and their male counterparts, which is the aim of the second hypothesis in this research study.

\[
\begin{align*}
\log \frac{\Pr\{Party ID Democrat\}}{\Pr\{Party ID Republican\}} &= a + \beta_1 \text{BlackW} + \beta_2 \text{BlackM} + \beta_3 \text{EthnicW} + \beta_4 \text{Ideology} \\
&\quad + \beta_5 \text{Class} + \beta_6 \text{Economy} + \beta_7 \text{Age} \\
\log \frac{\Pr\{Party ID Independent\}}{\Pr\{Party ID Republican\}} &= a + \beta_1 \text{BlackW} + \beta_2 \text{BlackM} + \beta_3 \text{EthnicW} + \beta_4 \text{Ideology} \\
&\quad + \beta_5 \text{Class} + \beta_6 \text{Economy} + \beta_7 \text{Age}
\end{align*}
\]

The independent variables in the overall model include: African American women (BlackW), African American men (BlackM), all other racial/ethnic women specified as EthnicW, annual family income (Class), the degree of liberalism (Ideology), and a sense of well-being based on evaluations of whether the state of the national economy over the past year has gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse (Economy). A control for the actual age of respondents (Age) is also included in the model. The preceding equations are used to assess the predicted probability of a party decision outcome for each of the two possible categories (Democrat/Independent) as specified above, as opposed to a decision to identify with the Republican Party. The intercept a represents the probability of personal political party identifications when variable gender assumes a value of “0” or when the respondent is a man, and the gender variable assumes a value of “1” or the probability that “being a woman” means being a Democrat. Likewise, among women when the race of respondent is African American the variable assumes a value of “0” whereas when a woman indicates membership in another racial/ethnic category the variable, Race, assumes a value of “1” in the analysis.
5.8.4 MODEL FOUR: FACTORS THAT DETERMINE PARTISANSHIP

Model 4 also estimates comparative racial and ethnic survey responses to the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et al., 2009). The model includes a measure of linked fate perceptions [‘Extent of Respondent’s race fate affecting Respondent’]; and adds a race dummy specified as White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Caribbean. A class variable is also included in the model indicating annual family income. The outcome variable, party identification (PartyID) represents a decision situation based on partisan alternatives of Republican Party, Independent (no party), or Democratic Party personal preferences. This fourth model examines factors that determine political independence or partisanship (Democratic) when compared to a self-report of Republican Party affiliations. Most importantly, the model explains the unique contribution of each predictor variable in prefiguring the probability of personal partisan preferences among population samples represented in the 2004 NPS dataset. Considering the effects of each factor in this multinomial logistic regression model, the full equation predicting partisanship is as follows:

\[
\log \frac{\text{Pr}[\text{PartyID Democrat}]}{\text{Pr}[\text{Party ID Republican}]} = a + \beta_1 \text{Fate} + \beta_2 \text{Black} + \beta_3 \text{Hispanic} + \beta_4 \text{Asian} + \beta_5 \text{Caribbean} \\
+ \beta_6 \text{Income}_2 + \beta_7 \text{Income}_3 + \beta_8 \text{Income}_4 \\
+ \beta_9 \text{Gender} + \beta_{10} \text{Ideology} + \beta_{11} \text{Bush} + \beta_{12} \text{Economy} \\
+ \beta_{13} \text{Age}
\]

\[
\log \frac{\text{Pr}[\text{PartyID Independent}]}{\text{Pr}[\text{Party ID Republican}]} = a + \beta_1 \text{Fate} + \beta_2 \text{Black} + \beta_3 \text{Hispanic} + \beta_4 \text{Asian} + \beta_5 \text{Caribbean} \\
+ \beta_6 \text{Income}_2 + \beta_7 \text{Income}_3 + \beta_8 \text{Income}_4 \\
+ \beta_9 \text{Gender} + \beta_{10} \text{Ideology} + \beta_{11} \text{Bush} + \beta_{12} \text{Economy} \\
+ \beta_{13} \text{Age}
\]
Assumptions for each model are tested in the subsequent analyses. If race continues to be the most important determinant of African American political partisanship the equation is expected to yield a negative relationship between Class and PartyID. On the other hand, if the significance of race declines in determining African American orientations toward the two main political parties, the equation should yield a positive coefficient to denote the impact of economic class position on African American preference attitudes toward the political parties. Using data collected for the 2004 NPS, the impact of race (Black) and income (Class) is measured on party identifications of Americans, focusing on black-white distinctions, to test the fourth hypothesis that there is a “sense of interconnectedness” and interdependence of fate among individuals comprising the racial/ethnic population groupings included in this study.

Multinomial logistic regression analyses and other appropriate statistical techniques examine interaction effects and significance. Unless otherwise specified the .05 level of significance is applicable throughout the study. Findings obtained from the data analyses are reported in the subsequent chapter. The final chapter discusses research study results, conclusions, and recommendations for future research. As much as possible I will address each hypothesis in the order in which they appear in this chapter.
CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS

The purpose of this chapter is to provide descriptive and inferential findings from statistical analyses conducted to explain the relationships among variables employed to predict African American political partisanship. Selected social attributes and demography are taken from data obtained for the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997), and for the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et al. 2009). The statistical software system used to calculate descriptive and inferential statistics of the variables under study is IBM SPSS Statistics 20, (IBM Corporation 1989, 2011).

6.1 DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS

This investigation is guided by four hypotheses designed to elicit specific information pertinent to the research study. The first hypothesis assesses the strength of linked racial fate on African Americans’ partisan preferences given the influence of other socio-economic and political forces. The second hypothesis looks at whether multiple identities will predict distinctive partisan identifications among African American women based on gender, or whether race, alone, determines their partisan preferences. Hypothesis three explores the effect of individual perceptions of the two main political parties and their performance when in government on African American racial group partisan preference attitudes, while the fourth hypothesis suggests that this may not be a
purely Black phenomenon. Hence, a comparative population is included in the analysis.

6.1.1 DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATIONS

Data shows a distinctive pattern of Democratic Party identifications within the African American population that is unrelentingly strong. On average, among African Americans included in the 1996 National Black Election Study [NBES] (Tate 1997) preference for the Democratic Party (68.7%) clearly precedes reports of self-identified Republicans (3.9%) and Independents (19.7%). Moreover, no less than 69.8 percent of African Americans indicated preference for the Democratic Party in the 2004 National Politics Study [NPS] (Jackson, et al. 2009), while only 3.8 percent or about 27 out of 706 African Americans identified with the Republican Party, and 26.3 percent identified themselves as political Independents, a marked increase from 1996.

Similar to African Americans, Black Caribbeans’ feelings of affinity with the Democratic Party (65.8%) is obviously distinctive from self-reports of identifications with the Republican Party (7.5%). Correspondingly, 26.7 percent of Black Caribbeans claim political independence, a percentage virtually identical to that of African Americans. On the other hand, political party identifications of other comparable population groups included in the 2004 NPS present a clearly discernable contrast from their African American counterparts. On the average there is greater variability in the political partisan preferences of Non-Hispanic White respondents with 35.8 percent Democratic Party identifications, 34.8 percent identification with the Republican Party, and 29.4 percent self-reports of political independence. The distribution of political party identifications among Asians yields similar variability; 37.3 percent favor the Democratic Party, 23.6 percent prefer the Republican Party, and 39.1 percent identify themselves as
Independent. Likewise, Hispanics’ preference for the Democratic Party (43.6\%) was significantly higher than Republican Party preferences (20.4\%), and closely followed by Independent identifiers (35.9\%). Table 6.1 and associated graphics (Figure 6.1) present percentages of party identifications among samples from the 1996 NBES and 2004 NPS survey respondents.

Table 6.1 Percentages of Political Party Identifications by Race and Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996 NBES</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 NPS</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3087</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis, to this point, presents the average political partisan identifications of citizens by race per national study. As is clearly illustrated in Figure 6.1 below, regardless of the survey examined, the political preferences of African Americans are
consistently more Democratic and much less Republican than their racial/ethnic counterparts with the exception of Black Caribbeans. When African American preferences average about 69 percent for the Democratic Party, less than 4 percent for the Republican Party, and 23 percent for Independent identifications (1996 and 2004).

Interestingly, distinctive preference attitudes toward the two main political parties emerge between African American women and men. While they demonstrate similar reports regarding identifications with the Republican Party of 4.3 percent men and 4.2 percent women, their preferences for the Democratic Party and Independent identifications reveal marked gender differences. African American women report greater preferences for the Democratic Party (78.0%) than their male counterparts (68.2%). In sharp contrast 27.6 percent of African American men are Independent identifiers while only 17.9 percent of women claim political independence. Further examination of Independent identifiers suggests they are closer to the Democratic Party

![Figure 6.1 Percentages of Political Party Identifications, 1996 and 2004](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black 1996 NBES</th>
<th>Black 2004 NPS</th>
<th>Black Caribbean</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
than to the Republican Party (14.1% and 14.3%, respectively), thereby suggesting that they are actually “weak” Democratic partisans. Still, 28.0 percent of women and 25.4 percent of men indicate that they are “pure” Independents.

When compared to other population groupings African American women are like other women in their preferences for the Democratic Party. Again, with the exception of Black Caribbean respondents, their Democratic partisanship far exceeds that of African American men. Slightly more than 75 percent of African American women on average identify with the Democratic Party, as observed in the 2004 data, compared to roughly 60 percent of African American men. Contrarily, political independence among the men is about 35 percent on average to only about 22 percent among the women, whereas only 5.4 percent men and 2.9 percent women prefer the Republicans. Likewise, nearly 71 percent of Black Caribbean women identify with the Democratic Party, while Democratic partisans among Caribbean men follow distantly at about 57 percent on average.

No other racial/ethnic population group yields this degree of differences between women and men with regard to identifications with the two main political parties. Results of the data analyses from cross tabulations of party identifications by gender, race, and survey samples are reported in Table 6.2, and associated graphics follow in Figure 6.2 for women and Figure 6.3 for men. The analyses of partisanship present the average party identifications by gender and race. A graphical summary of African American partisanship and political independence for each study period is presented in Figure 6.4 below. Clearly African American women are more Democratic, but less Independent, than men.
Table 6.2 Percentages of Party Identifications by Race and Gender, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>African American</th>
<th>Non-Hispanic White</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Black Caribbean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hispanic White</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N: 449</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.2 Percentages of Party Identifications for Women by Race, 1996 and 2004
Figure 6.3 Percentages of Party Identifications for Men by Race, 1996 and 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black 1996</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black 2004</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.4 Summary Percentages of African American Partisanship by Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.1.2 DISTRIBUTION OF LINKED FATE BY GENDER, RACE, AND PARTY

Distributions of linked racial fate reveal distinct gender differences in the way that women and men perceive that what “happens to Blacks has a lot to do with me.” Of 1182 survey responses to the linked fate measure in the 1996 NBES (Tate 1997) 752 (63.3%) are women and 430 (36.4%) are men. Results of cross tabulation analyses appear in Table 6.3. On average, among African Americans that ‘strongly disagree’ with this survey question 63.4 percent or 109 of 752 respondents are women, while about 37 percent or 63 of 430 respondents are men. On average women (63% or 313 of 752), and men (37% or 186 of 430) ‘somewhat disagree’ with the statement regarding race fate differ significantly. Moreover, among respondents reporting agreement with the statement about 63 percent of women and only 37 percent of men ‘somewhat agree’ while 67.4 percent of women and about 32.6 percent of men strongly agree, on average.

In the table below (Table 6.3) category ‘somewhat disagree’ represents close to 50 percent of responses to this measure of linked racial fate with 499 or about 42 percent of total responses. On the other hand, the ‘somewhat agree’ category represented 333 or an average of only 28.2 percent of total responses to the linked fate measure (See: Figure 6.5 below). Nonetheless, while African American women and men appear to have clearly different views about the degree to which linked racial fate is relevant in their lives, within-gender groups show little to no variations across categories of the linked fate measure.
Table 6.3 Percentages of Linked Fate by Gender for African Americans, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>TOTAL (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Happens to Blacks has a lot to do with me”</td>
<td>63.4 (109)</td>
<td>62.7 (131)</td>
<td>63.1 (210)</td>
<td>67.4 (120)</td>
<td>63.6 (752)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>36.6 (63)</td>
<td>37.3 (186)</td>
<td>36.9 (123)</td>
<td>32.6 (58)</td>
<td>36.4 (430)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (N):</td>
<td>100.0 (172)</td>
<td>100.0 (499)</td>
<td>100.0 (333)</td>
<td>100.0 (178)</td>
<td>100.0 (1182)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.5 Percentages of Linked Fate by Gender among Samples of Adult African Americans, 1996
Likewise, in the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009) survey respondents are asked to consider the “extent of Respondent’s race fate affecting Respondent.” Cross tabulation analyses point to similarities in perceptions of linked fate by gender with only a few significant differences when considering race of respondent. Results are reported in Table 6.4. On average no less than 50.8 percent of women and 50.3 percent of men report ‘Not Very Much’ linked fate affecting them. On the contrary only an average of about 12 percent of women and 14 percent of men perceive that race fate affects them to ‘Some’ extent. Whereas both women (37%) and men (36.1%) similarly indicate that the extent to which race fate affects them is ‘A Lot.’

Notable variations emerge in results of the impact of race fate on African American women, where the analysis yields 17.4 percent (Not Very Much), 18.4 percent (Some), with no less than 35.4 percent indicating ‘A Lot,’ as the extent to which race fate affects them, on average (See: Table 6.4). Still, similarities persist when looking at gender per racial/ethnic group population where only a couple of exceptions surface. These similarities appear in average race fate affects (‘Some’ plus ‘A Lot’) among women and men of African American (54% to 59%, respectively), Hispanic (36% to 34%, respectively), and Caribbean (21% to 29%, respectively) descent. Interestingly, Non-Hispanic White men (57%) and women (44%) show marked differences in the extent to which race fate affects them. Contrarily, about 45 percent of Asian women indicate some/a lot of race fate affects; Asian men follow distantly at about 21 percent, on average. Table 6.4 presents results of the cross tabulation analyses for linked fate by race and gender, while Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 illustrate this relationship among women and men by racial and ethnic groups.
Table 6.4 Percentages of Linked Fate Perceptions by Race and Gender, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>African American</th>
<th>Non-Hispanic White</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Black Caribbean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Much</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Lot</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N:</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>(26.7%)</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>(26.9%)</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 6.6 Percentages of Linked Fate by Race among Samples of Women, 2004

Figure 6.7 Percentages of Linked Fate by Race Among Samples of Men, 2004
6.1.3 DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BY RACE AND GENDER

Annual family income is analyzed based on earnings per household in thousands of dollars. Results of descriptive statistics show profound differences within income levels of African Americans and other representative population groups. Figure 6.8 illustrates within-group income differences among African American respondents to the 1996 NBES, where 66.5 percent of household incomes are below $50,000 per annum. Only 24.9 percent of earned incomes are $75,000 and over among African American households represented. On the contrary, no gender gaps emerge in observations across categories of household income using the 1996 NBES data. Annual income for African American women either equal or exceed the income levels of African American men as demonstrated in Table 6.5 below.

Drawing from data collected for the 2004 NPS African Americans (30.8%), Hispanics (40.8%), and Black Caribbeans (31.5%) dominate the lowest annual income range of below $25,000, as can be seen below in Table 6.6 and Figure 6.9 that follows. This is in sharp contrast to Asian (7.6%) and White (16.2%) reports of household income. Asian households also report the highest income of all population groups represented, where 48.6 percent have earnings of $75,000 and over. White family income follows with 35.3 percent. Again, Black Caribbeans’ (22.8%) average household income is similar to that of African Americans (22.6%), but Hispanics follow distantly with only an average annual income of 18.1 percent at the $75,000 and over range. Results of these descriptive statistics point to a distinct pattern in which the relative household income of African Americans, Black Caribbeans, and Hispanics are clearly lower than that of White Non-Hispanics and Asians. This denotes their relatively low position within the social
status hierarchy. Tests and results with associated graphics and tabular presentations follow.

Figure 6.8 Distribution of Annual Family Income for African Americans, 1996
Table 6.5 Distribution of Household Income for African Americans by Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Income</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total: Black</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to $10,000</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$14,999</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$19,999</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$24,999</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$29,999</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$39,999</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$49,999</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$74,999</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$89,999</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$104,999</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$105,000+</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>1113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.6 Percentages of Annual Family Income by Race, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RACE</th>
<th>&lt;$25,000</th>
<th>$25,000-$49,999</th>
<th>$50,000-$74,999</th>
<th>$75,000 AND MORE</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Non-Hispanic</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: 3339

Figure 6.9 Distribution of Annual Family Income by Race, 2004
6.2 INFERENTIAL FINDINGS

At this point in the investigation multinomial logistic regression is used to estimate the effect of race on decisions about the two main political parties, and to explore changes in such effects based on class (income) or perhaps, gender, and other sociopolitical factors included in this study using data collected for the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997), and for the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et al. 2009). The logistic regression models assume the following formulations.125

Model 1:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\log \frac{\text{Pr} | \text{Party ID Independent}}{\text{Pr} | \text{Party ID Democrat}} = a + \beta_1 \text{Fate} + \beta_2 \text{Class} + \beta_3 \text{Gender} + \beta_4 \text{Ideology} + \beta_5 \text{Age} \\
&\log \frac{\text{Pr} | \text{Party ID Republican}}{\text{Pr} | \text{Party ID Democrat}} = a + \beta_1 \text{Fate} + \beta_2 \text{Class} + \beta_3 \text{Gender} + \beta_4 \text{Ideology} + \beta_5 \text{Age}
\end{align*}
\]

Model 2:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\log \frac{\text{Pr} | \text{Party ID Democrat}}{\text{Pr} | \text{Party ID Republican}} = a + \beta_1 \text{Class} + \beta_2 \text{Gender} + \beta_3 \text{Ideology} + \beta_4 \text{Clinton} \\
&\quad + \beta_5 \text{Dems Work} + \beta_6 \text{Age} \\
&\log \frac{\text{Pr} | \text{Party ID Independent}}{\text{Pr} | \text{Party ID Republican}} = a + \beta_1 \text{Class} + \beta_2 \text{Gender} + \beta_3 \text{Ideology} + \beta_4 \text{Clinton} \\
&\quad + \beta_5 \text{Dems Work} + \beta_6 \text{Age}
\end{align*}
\]

Model 3:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\log \frac{\text{Pr} | \text{Party ID Democrat}}{\text{Pr} | \text{Party ID Republican}} = a + \beta_1 \text{BlackW} + \beta_2 \text{BlackM} + \beta_3 \text{EthnicW} + \beta_4 \text{Ideology} \\
&\quad + \beta_5 \text{Class} + \beta_6 \text{Economy} + \beta_7 \text{Age} \\
&\log \frac{\text{Pr} | \text{Party ID Independent}}{\text{Pr} | \text{Party ID Republican}} = a + \beta_1 \text{BlackW} + \beta_2 \text{BlackM} + \beta_3 \text{EthnicW} + \beta_4 \text{Ideology} \\
&\quad + \beta_5 \text{Class} + \beta_6 \text{Economy} + \beta_7 \text{Age}
\end{align*}
\]

125. Explanations for each regression model are given in Chapter 5.
Model 4:

\[
\log \frac{\Pr(\text{PartyID Democrat})}{\Pr(\text{Party ID Republican})} = a + \beta_1 \text{Fate} + \beta_2 \text{Black} + \beta_3 \text{Hispanic} + \beta_4 \text{Asian} + \beta_5 \text{Caribbean} \\
+ \beta_6 \text{Income}_2 + \beta_7 \text{Income}_3 + \beta_8 \text{Income}_4 \\
+ \beta_9 \text{Gender} + \beta_{10} \text{Ideology} + \beta_{11} \text{Bush} + \beta_{12} \text{Economy} \\
+ \beta_{13} \text{Age}
\]

Results of the statistical analyses solve the multinomial logistic regression problem presumed by the party sequential decision-making situations. In the logistic regression models specified above, \( \log \) is the logit or log odds that the dependent (outcome) variable party identification—PartyID, equals one while \( a \) is the constant or intercept. The \( \beta \) terms are the logistic regression coefficients or parameter estimates for the X predictor variables, where \( \beta_1, \beta_2, \ldots \beta_k \) represent the partial association between each predictor and party identification, net the effect of all other predictors. Therefore, in each model, \( \log \frac{\Pr(\text{PartyID})}{\Pr(\text{PartyID Republican})} \) is equal to the constant \( a \) plus the \( \beta \) coefficient times the value of the X predictors. Two logit models are computed in the analysis. Model 1 and Model 2 contrast decisions to choose Republican partisanship or political independence with Democratic Party decisions, the reference category. They estimate possible changes in African American partisanship. Model 3 and Model 4 contrast decisions to choose Democratic partisanship or Independent (no party) political identification with that of Republican partisanship, the reference category among comparison population groupings.
INFERENTIAL FINDINGS: MODEL ONE

The analysis estimates the association between a polychotomous outcome and five predictors using data collected for the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate, 1997). Model 1 assesses the odds that “being Black” mean being a Democrat. The logistic regression notation to express this model is:

\[
\log \frac{\Pr| \text{PartyID Independent}}{\Pr| \text{Party ID Democrat}} | = a + \beta_1 \text{Fate} + \beta_2 \text{Class} + \beta_3 \text{Gender} + \beta_4 \text{Ideology} + \beta_5 \text{Age}
\]

In Model 1 the outcome variable, PartyID (Republican, Independent, Democrat), is a function of five predictor variables: (black) linked fate, family income (class), gender, political ideology, and age. Multinomial logistic regression analysis is the statistical technique used to determine the extent to which this model improves our ability to predict accurately the influence of linked racial fate on African American political partisanship. Results from the significance test of the model log likelihood are reported in Table 6.7 below.

The initial log likelihood value is 817.720 (intercept/constant-only model). The final log likelihood value 758.110 is the computed measure with all of the independent variables (predictors) entered into the logistic regression. The difference between these two measures is the model Chi-Square statistic, where \( \chi^2 = 59.611 = 817.720 - 758.110 \). The model Chi-Square value of 59.611 has a significance level of 0.000, concluding that there is a significant relationship between the dependent variable, party identification, and the set of predictors.
The strength of the relationship is tested using the Pseudo R-Square statistics Cox and Snell ($R^2 = .070$), and Nagelkerke ($R^2 = .096$). So, based on the interpretive criteria for the Nagelkerke $R^2$, I would characterize the relationship as weak.\footnote{With the Cox and Snell measure higher values indicate greater model fit. A problem lies in the inability of this R-Square statistic to reach a maximum value of one (1). Nagelkerke’s R-Square is a modification of the Cox and Snell measure that ranges from zero (0) to one (1), making this a more reliable indicator of the strength of the relationship.} Still, the classification matrix in the multinomial logistic regression output, which is used to evaluate the accuracy of this model, predicts accurately 75.7 percent of predicted and observed cases of party identifications. In addition, likelihood ratio test results show that the variables linked fate (.032), gender (.041), and political ideology (.000) are all significant contributors explaining differences among African Americans in decisions about political partisanship. The output showing the contribution of each variable specified in the model to the reduction in error measured by the -2 log likelihood statistic is presented in Table 6.8 below.

Table 6.7 Model 1: Significance Test of the Model Log Likelihood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Model Fitting Criteria</th>
<th>Likelihood Ratio Tests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2 Log Likelihood</td>
<td>Chi-Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept Only</td>
<td>817.720</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final</td>
<td>758.110</td>
<td>59.611</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of observations used in the logistic regression analysis consisted of 824 adults of some African American background, of which 624 or 75.7 percent
preferred the Democratic Party, 28 or 3.4 percent indicated a preference for the Republican Party, and 172 or 20.9 percent considered themselves politically Independent. Output for the logistic regression analysis presented in Table 6.9 shows that when all covariates in the model equal one, the estimated log odds of an African American reporting Republican partisanship in contrast to reports of Democratic partisanship are:

\[
\log \frac{\Pr(\text{Republican})}{\Pr(\text{Democrat})} = -3.706 + 0.700\text{Fate}_{00} - 0.534\text{Fate}_{33} + 0.110\text{Fate}_{66} - 0.058\text{Class} + 0.270\text{Gender}_{00} + 1.617\text{Ideology}_{00} - 0.250\text{Ideology}_{50} + 0.112\text{Age}
\]

Table 6.8 Model 1: Output of Statistical Significance of Each Predictor Variable Likelihood Ratio Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Model Fitting Criteria</th>
<th>Likelihood Ratio Tests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2 Log Likelihood of Reduced Model</td>
<td>Chi-Square&lt;sup&gt;127&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>758.110&lt;sup&gt;128&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income</td>
<td>759.487</td>
<td>1.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>758.247</td>
<td>.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate</td>
<td>771.893</td>
<td>13.784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>764.521</td>
<td>6.412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>795.343</td>
<td>37.234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>127</sup> The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced model. Omitting an effect from the final model forms the reduced model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are zero.

<sup>128</sup> This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom.
Table 6.9 Logistic Regression Analyses of the Determinants of Republican Partisanship for 824 Adult African Americans in 1996 by IBM SPSS 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>SE β</th>
<th>Wald’s χ²</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Exp^β (odds ratio)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-3.706</td>
<td>.879</td>
<td>17.760</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate=0.00</td>
<td>.700</td>
<td>.647</td>
<td>1.171</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.279</td>
<td>2.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate=0.33</td>
<td>-.534</td>
<td>.650</td>
<td>.674</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.412</td>
<td>.586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate=0.66</td>
<td>-.100</td>
<td>.626</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.860</td>
<td>.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate=1.00</td>
<td>0^b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income</td>
<td>-.058</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.583</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.445</td>
<td>.944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender= 0.00</td>
<td>.270</td>
<td>.403</td>
<td>.449</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.503</td>
<td>1.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender=1.00</td>
<td>0^b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology=0.00</td>
<td>1.617</td>
<td>.518</td>
<td>9.763</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>5.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology=0.50</td>
<td>-.250</td>
<td>.680</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.713</td>
<td>.778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology=1.00</td>
<td>0^b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>.788</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.887</td>
<td>1.118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: a. The reference category is: DEMOCRAT. b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

The effect of the independent regression coefficients (β) on the outcome variable (PartyID), tested using the Wald Chi-Square statistic and the associated p-value (at p < .05), show that only Ideology=0.00 (Conservative) has a significant effect on the probability of Republican Party choices among African Americans in contrast to those that identify with the Democratic Party (Table 6.9). Hence, a person’s decision to identify with the Republican Party based on reported conservative ideological orientations contrasts significantly from partisan preferences of persons reporting liberal proclivities. After controlling for the other covariates in the model, the likelihood of
being a Democrat among persons reporting conservative ideology decreases by a factor of 1.617 compared to liberals. In other words, looking at the odds ratio ($\text{Exp}^\beta$), this model predicts that the odds of deciding to identify oneself as a Republican is 5.040 times higher for a conservative than for a liberal.

Table 6.10 Model 1: Logistic Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Political Independence for 824 Adult African Americans in 1996 by IBM SPSS 20

Contrarily, the estimated log odds of an African American reporting Independent (no party) identifications, as presented in Table 6.10, assumes the following formulation:

$$
\log \frac{\Pr | PartyID \text{ Independent} |}{\Pr | PartyID \text{ Democrat} |} = -0.746 - 0.612Fate_{0.00} - 0.167Fate_{0.33} - 0.606Fate_{0.66} - 0.033\text{Class} + 0.452\text{Gender}_{0.00} - 0.245\text{Ideology}_{0.00} - 0.938\text{Ideology}_{0.50} + 0.126\text{Age}
$$
According to the model the log odds of Independent identifications
\(( \text{Pr } | \text{PartyID Independent } | [.50] )\) is positively related to gender (Men) at \( p < .05 \). On the other hand, the log odds of preference for political independence are negatively related to linked fate, and to ideology (\( p < .05 \)). These variables reveal a statistically significant relationship that clearly distinguishes political independence from Democratic partisanship among African Americans. Linked Fate=0.66, representing respondents who ‘Somewhat Agree’ that what ‘Happens to Blacks has a lot to do with me’ yields a significance value of 0.030; Gender=0.00 ‘Men’ is significant at 0.012; Ideology=0.05 ‘Moderate’ results in a significance level of 0.000.

Moreover, political ideology yields the highest effect on independent identifications. A person reporting ‘Moderate’ ideology is 0.938 times less likely to decide to consider oneself as an Independent than to decide to identify oneself as a Democrat, while controlling all other covariates in the model. Perceptions of linked racial fate among persons that ‘Somewhat Agree’ that they are affected by what happens to African Americans are 0.606 times less likely to decide on political independence than to decide on Democratic partisanship, holding all other predictors constant. Whereas after controlling for the other covariates in the model, a man is only 0.452 as likely to decide to identify as an Independent as he is to decide to identify with the Democratic Party. The \( \text{Exp}^\beta \) or odds ratio, reveal that this model predicts the odds of deciding to consider oneself as an Independent are only 0.391 times higher for moderates than liberals, while for persons who somewhat agree that their individual fates are linked to the racial group, as opposed to those that strongly agree, the predicted odds are 0.546.
times higher. In addition, the odds of Independent identification are 1.571 times higher for African American men than they are for African American women.

6.22 INFERENTIAL FINDINGS: MODEL TWO

Using data collected for the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997) the second model tests the extent to which presidential approval ratings and assessments of work of the parties in government influence African American political partisanship. Several variables are added to the model previously tested. The logistic regression notation utilized to express the second model is:

\[
\log \frac{Pr(\text{PartyID Democrat})}{Pr(\text{Party ID Republican})} = a + \beta_1 \text{Class} + \beta_2 \text{Gender} + \beta_3 \text{Ideology} + \beta_4 \text{Clinton} + \beta_5 \text{Dems Work} + \beta_6 \text{Age}
\]

\[
\log \frac{Pr(\text{PartyID Independent})}{Pr(\text{Party ID Republican})} = a + \beta_1 \text{Class} + \beta_2 \text{Gender} + \beta_3 \text{Ideology} + \beta_4 \text{Clinton} + \beta_5 \text{Dems Work} + \beta_6 \text{Age}
\]

In the second model the outcome variable, PartyID, consists of three decision alternatives: Republican (0.00), Independent (0.50), or Democrat (1.00). Party identification is a function of six variables: family income (class), gender, political ideology, approval of Clinton’s job as president, assessments of how hard the Democrats work to address racial group issues (Dems Work), and age. Of 548 respondents included in the analysis 415 (75.7%) are Democrats, 17 (3.1%) are Republican, and 116 (21.2%) are Independent. Results from the significance test of the model log likelihood follows.
Table 6.11 Model 2: Significance Test of the Model Log Likelihood
Model Fitting Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Model Fitting Criteria</th>
<th>Likelihood Ratio Tests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2 Log Likelihood</td>
<td>Chi-Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept Only</td>
<td>601.880</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final</td>
<td>520.437</td>
<td>81.443</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The intercept-only model yields a -2 log likelihood value of 601.880. Once the computed measure with all of the predictors entered the logistic regression the final log likelihood value is 520.437; the model Chi-Square statistic ($\chi^2$) is 81.443 with a significance level of 0.000, a significant relationship between the dependent variable and this set of predictors. The Pseudo R-Square statistics Cox and Snell ($R^2 = 0.138$), and Nagelkerke ($R^2 = 0.190$) assess the strength of the relationship, which I would characterize as weak. Nonetheless, the classification matrix in the multinomial logistic regression output predicts accurately 77.7 percent of actual and predicted cases of party identifications. Table 6.12 presents the logistic regression output of the contribution of each variable specified in the model. Likelihood ratio tests show that variables political ideology (0.000), Clinton job performance (0.000), and assessments of how hard (Dems Work) to address racial group interests (0.003) are all significant contributors explaining African Americans decisions about political partisanship. Further, The SPSS 20 output shows that the reduced (intercept only) model result of 520.437 is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom.
Table 6.12 Model 2: Output of Statistical Significance of Each Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Model Fitting Criteria</th>
<th>Likelihood Ratio Tests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2 Log Likelihood of Reduced Model</td>
<td>Chi-Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>520.437</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income</td>
<td>520.449</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>521.020</td>
<td>.583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>525.134</td>
<td>4.697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>544.493</td>
<td>24.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton Performance</td>
<td>545.919</td>
<td>25.482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dems Work</td>
<td>540.511</td>
<td>20.074</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The effect of the independent regression coefficients (β) on the outcome variable (PartyID), tested using the Wald Chi-Square statistic and the associated p-value (at p < .05), show that Ideology=0.00 (Conservative) has a significant decreasing effect on the probability of Democratic Party choices among African Americans in contrast to those that identify with the Republican Party (Table 6.13). Hence, a person’s decision to identify with the Republican Party based on reported conservative ideological orientations contrasts significantly from partisanship among persons reporting liberal preferences. After controlling for the other covariates in the model the likelihood of being a Democrat, among persons reporting conservative ideology, decreases by a factor of 1.376 compared to liberals. Still, looking at the odds ratio (Exp^β), this model predicts that the odds of deciding to identify oneself as a Democrat are only 0.252 times higher for a conservative than for a liberal.

In addition, decisions to support the Democratic Party are more likely among persons approving Clinton’s job as president, whereas support of the Democrats
decreased by a factor of 2.359 among those disapproving Clinton’s presidential performance, after taking into account all other covariates. In short, African Americans disapproving of Clinton’s job were merely 0.095 times more likely to choose the Democratic Party than those indicating favorable job ratings. Interestingly, assessments of how hard the Democrats work to address issues of most importance to the African American racial group show that both ‘fairly hard’ and ‘not too hard’ (centrist) views yielded similar results of a 2.304 (fairly hard) and a 2.244 (not too hard) increase in Democratic identifications, after accounting for all other variables in the model. When looking at the odds ratio (Expβ) for each response, the probability of deciding to identify with the Democratic Party is 10.009 times more likely for fairly hard judgments and 9.430 times more likely among persons with feelings that the Democrats do not work too hard on behalf of African American racial group interests.

Output for the multinomial logistic regression analysis presented in Table 6.13 shows that when all covariates in the model equal one, the estimated log odds of an African American reporting Democratic partisanship in contrast to reporting Republican partisanship is:

\[
\log \frac{\text{Pr}[\text{PartyID Democrat}]}{\text{Pr}[\text{Party ID Republican}]} = 2.605 - 0.004\text{Class} - 0.257\text{Gender}_{00} - 1.376\text{Ideology}_{.00} \\
+ 0.763\text{Ideology}_{.50} - 2.359\text{Clinton}_{.00} \\
+ 0.805\text{Dems Work}_{.00} + 2.244\text{Dems Work}_{.33} \\
+ 2.304\text{Dems Work}_{.66} - 0.077\text{Age}
\]
Table 6.13 Model 2: Logistic Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Republican Partisanship for 548 Adult African Americans in 1996 by IBM SPSS 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>SE $\beta$</th>
<th>Wald’s $\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>$\text{Exp}^{\beta}$ (odds ratio)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.605</td>
<td>1.114</td>
<td>5.468</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.971</td>
<td>.996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
<td>1.003</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.939</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender= 0.00</td>
<td>-2.257</td>
<td>.538</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.633</td>
<td>0.773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender= 1.00</td>
<td>1.114</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>1.624</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.996</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology= 0.00</td>
<td>-1.376</td>
<td>.646</td>
<td>4.537</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>0.252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology= 0.50</td>
<td>-0.763</td>
<td>.911</td>
<td>0.702</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.402</td>
<td>2.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology= 1.00</td>
<td>0 $^b$</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.996</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton= 0.00</td>
<td>-2.359</td>
<td>.581</td>
<td>16.462</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton= 1.00</td>
<td>0 $^b$</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.996</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dems Work= 0.00</td>
<td>0.805</td>
<td>1.144</td>
<td>4.537</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>2.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dems Work= 0.33</td>
<td>2.244</td>
<td>.894</td>
<td>6.293</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>9.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dems Work= 0.66</td>
<td>2.304</td>
<td>.786</td>
<td>8.598</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>10.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dems Work= 1.00</td>
<td>0 $^b$</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.996</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: a. The reference category is: REPUBLICAN. b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

On the contrary, the estimated log odds of an African American reporting Independent (no party) identifications, as presented in Table 6.13 above, assumes the following formulation:

$$\log \frac{\text{Pr}[/oP=t{arty ID Independent}]}{\text{Pr}[\text{Party ID Republican}]} = 1.854 - 0.008 \text{Class} + 0.231 \text{Gender}_{0.00} - 1.656 \text{Ideology}_{0.00} - 0.276 \text{Ideology}_{0.50} - 0.920 \text{Clinton}_{0.00} + 0.502 \text{Dems Work}_{0.00} + 0.844 \text{Dems Work}_{0.33} + 1.609 \text{Dems Work}_{0.66} + 0.262 \text{Age}$$
Table 6.14 Model 2: Logistic Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Independent Identifications for 548 Adult African Americans 1996 by IBM SPSS 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>SE $\beta$</th>
<th>Wald’s $\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>$\text{Exp}^\beta$ (odds ratio)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.752</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>1.932</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.165</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.920</td>
<td>0.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.580</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.446</td>
<td>0.586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender=0.00</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>4.707</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>1.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender=1.00</td>
<td>0(^b)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology=0.00</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>1.133</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>0.452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology=0.50</td>
<td>-1.039</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>13.203</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>0.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology=1.00</td>
<td>0(^b)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton=0.00</td>
<td>1.439</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>16.840</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton=1.00</td>
<td>0(^b)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dems Work=0.00</td>
<td>-0.303</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.738</td>
<td>0.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dems Work=0.33</td>
<td>-1.400</td>
<td>0.513</td>
<td>7.453</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dems Work=0.66</td>
<td>-0.694</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>2.481</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>0.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dems Work=1.00</td>
<td>0(^b)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The reference category is: DEMOCRAT. b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

According to the model the log odds of Independent identifications \(\text{Pr} | \text{Party ID Independent} |\) is positively related to Dems Work=0.66 (fairly hard) on issues of most importance to African Americans at \(p < .05\). The probability of Democratic Party affiliations among persons whose assessments of Democrats working ‘Fairly Hard’ to help African Americans is 1.609 times more likely than among persons whose assessments are that the Democrats work ‘Very Hard’ to address African American issues, holding all other predictors constant. The $\text{Exp}^\beta$ or odds ratio, reveal that
this model predicts the odds of an assessment that Democrats work fairly hard deciding to consider oneself as an Independent is 4.999 times higher than a view that the Democrats work very hard on racial group issues. On the other hand, the log odds of preference for political independence is negatively related to Ideology=0.00 with a significance value of 0.012 (p < .05). The probability that conservative political ideology yields decisions favoring Independent identification is 1.656 times less likely than Republican partisanship when holding constant all other covariates in the model. Based on results of the odds ratio, the probability of political independence among conservatives is only 0.191 times more likely than among liberals.

6.2.3 INFERENTIAL FINDINGS: MODEL THREE

Using data collected for the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009), Model 3 considers the extent to which African American women are distinctive in their decisions about the two main political parties when compared to African American men and women of other ethnicities. Multinomial logistic regression analysis is employed for the purpose of examining respondents’ decisions about partisanship preferences. Party identification, a polychotomous outcome variable (Democrat=1, Independent=0.5, Republican=0), is the function of seven predictor variables: Black Women (African American women=1, All others=0), Black Men (African American men=1, and 0 otherwise), Ethnic Women (females of Non-Hispanic White, Hispanic, Asian, and Caribbean descent=1, African Americans and males of all ethnic groupings=0), political Ideology (Liberal=1, Moderate=0.5, Conservative=0), Class (annual family income earnings measured in dollars), the Nation’s Economy appraised over the previous year (Better=1, About the Same=0.5, Worse=0), and respondent’s Age is measured in years.
The logistic regression model is predicting the natural log of the odds of making a decision favoring the Democratic Party, not the Republican Party, or of making a decision electing political independence rather than Republican partisanship. That is,

$$\log \frac{\Pr\{\text{Party ID Democrat}\}}{\Pr\{\text{Party ID Republican}\}} = a + \beta_1 \text{BlackW} + \beta_2 \text{BlackM} + \beta_3 \text{EthnicW} + \beta_4 \text{Ideology} + \beta_5 \text{Class} + \beta_6 \text{Economy} + \beta_7 \text{Age}$$

$$\log \frac{\Pr\{\text{PartyID Independent}\}}{\Pr\{\text{Party ID Republican}\}} = a + \beta_1 \text{BlackW} + \beta_2 \text{BlackM} + \beta_3 \text{EthnicW} + \beta_4 \text{Ideology} + \beta_5 \text{Class} + \beta_6 \text{Economy} + \beta_7 \text{Age}$$

Where $\log \Pr\{\text{Party ID Democrat}\}$ and $\log \Pr\{\text{PartyID Independent}\}$ represent the predicted probability of a Democratic or an Independent decision, each coded as 1. The statistical output reveals that of 2,553 survey respondents in the sample 1259 (49.3%) are Democrat, 761 (29.8%) are Independent, and 533 (20.9%) are Republican. The model that includes only the intercept yields a large -2 Log Likelihood statistic of 2348.477 (Table 6.15); the model that includes the set of predictors also produces a large -2 Log Likelihood value of 1371.408, suggesting how poorly Model 3 predicts partisan decisions. The model Chi-Square statistic is 977.069, with a 0.000 level of significance. In addition, the model yields only a 59.7 percent accuracy of observed and actual cases of partisan identification decisions.

Table 6.15 Model 3: Significance Test of the Model Log Likelihood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Model Fitting Criteria</th>
<th>Likelihood Ratio Tests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2 Log Likelihood</td>
<td>Chi-Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept Only</td>
<td>2348.477</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final</td>
<td>1371.408</td>
<td>977.069</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With a Cox and Snell R-Square of 0.318 and a Nagelkerke R-Square of 0.364 the strength of the relationship between the variables is slightly moderate. All variables in the logistic regression model are significant (p < .05) as demonstrated by the Likelihood Ratio Tests displayed in Table 6.16 below.\textsuperscript{129}

The analysis produces a contrast between determinants of Democratic and Republican partisans, where the resulting logistic regression equation is:

\[
\log \frac{\Pr(\text{PartyID Democrat})}{\Pr(\text{Party ID Republican})} = 9.984 - 1.616\text{BlackW} - 2.615\text{BlackM} - 0.138\text{EthnicW} - 0.303\text{Class} - 0.049\text{Age} - 2.531\text{Ideology}_{.00} - 1.601\text{Ideology}_{.50} + 0.607\text{Economy}_{.00} + 1.872\text{Economy}_{.50}
\]

Table 6.16 Model 3: Output of Statistical Significance of Each Predictor Variable Likelihood Ratio Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Model Fitting Criteria</th>
<th>Likelihood Ratio Tests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2 Log Likelihood of Reduced Model</td>
<td>Chi-Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1371.408\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK WOMEN</td>
<td>1402.670</td>
<td>31.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK MEN</td>
<td>1481.340</td>
<td>109.932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHNIC WOMEN</td>
<td>1381.855</td>
<td>10.447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME (CLASS)</td>
<td>1408.063</td>
<td>36.655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>1411.262</td>
<td>39.854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICAL IDEOLOGY</td>
<td>1717.323</td>
<td>345.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL ECONOMY</td>
<td>1537.657</td>
<td>166.249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a.} This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom.

\textsuperscript{129.} According to the SPSS output (IBM version 20) for the Likelihood Ratio Tests “the chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced model.” Omitting an effect from the final model forms the reduced model. “The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 0.”
Table 6.17 below shows the logistic regression coefficients, Wald test, and odds ratio for each of the predictor variables. As can be seen the Wald Chi-Square statistic shows test results of the unique contribution of each predictor included in the analysis. Using a .05 criterion of statistical significance, all predictor variables have significant partial effects except the variables Ethnic Women and age. The odds ratio ($\exp^\beta$) for African American women indicates that the likelihood of a decision favoring Democratic partisanship, rather than Republican partisanship, increases by 0.199, whereas the increase is merely 0.073 for an African American man when holding all other predictors constant. However, women of other ethnicities do not contribute significantly to predictions of identification with the Democratic Party. Likewise, a person’s actual age is of no consequence when predicting the odds of Democratic partisan identifications in contrast to predicting the odds of Republican partisan identifications.

On the other hand, class, measured by annual family income, increases the odds of choosing the Democratic Party rather than the Republican Party by 0.739, holding constant all predictor variables in the analysis. Democratic preferences among conservatives are only 0.080 times higher, while the odds of Democratic Party preferences for moderate (middle-of-the-road) ideology increase to 0.202 times higher than the odds of Republican Party preferences. The largest effect on decisions to identify with the Democratic Party in Model 3 is attributed to evaluations of whether the Nation’s economy is Better, About the Same, or Worse over the previous year. Among persons specifying a ‘Worse’ as opposed to a ‘Better’ evaluation the odds of being a Democrat is 1.836 times higher than being a Republican. Whereas when holding constant all other predictor variables in the analysis, an evaluation of ‘About the Same,’ when compared to
an evaluation of ‘Better,’ the odds of a decision to identify with the Democratic Party increases to 6.500 times higher than the odds of a decision to identify with the Republican Party.

Variables in the second equation yield logistic regression results when respondents decide to indicate an Independent identification. Output is displayed below in Table 6.18. Decisions to identify oneself as a political Independent rather than a Republican partisan yield the following equation:

\[
\log \frac{\Pr(| Party ID Independent |)}{\Pr(| Party ID Republican |)} = 8.619 - 1.508 \text{BlackW} - 1.769 \text{BlackM} + 0.218 \text{EthnicW} - 0.320 \text{Class} - 0.356 \text{Age} - 1.937 \text{Ideology}.00 - 1.518 \text{Ideology}.50 + 0.686 \text{Economy}.00 + 1.303 \text{Economy}.50
\]

This model is used to predict the odds that a respondent makes an Independent (no party) identification decision. As can be seen in the above table, the variable Ethnic Women is not significant at p < .05 in the model output. In the odds prediction equation, as specified above, all predictors yield negative factors with the exception of assessments about the state of the national economy, which yields positive significant factors; all are significant at p < .05. The table displays the logistic regression coefficients, Wald test, and odds ratio for each of the predictor variables in the second equation. The Wald \( \chi^2 \) statistic of test results for the unique contribution of each predictor included in the analysis, using a .05 criterion of statistical significance, shows that all of the independent variables have significant partial effects with the exception of the variable ethnic women.
Table 6.17 Model 3: Logistic Regression Analysis of Political Independence
Decisions for 2553 Respondents in 2004 by IBM SPSS 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>SE $\beta$</th>
<th>Wald’s $\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Exp$^\beta$ (odds ratio)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>8.617</td>
<td>1.030</td>
<td>70.025</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK WOMEN</td>
<td>1.508</td>
<td>.340</td>
<td>19.629</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK MEN</td>
<td>1.769</td>
<td>.357</td>
<td>24.603</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHNIC WOMEN</td>
<td>.218</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>2.613</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>1.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME (CLASS)</td>
<td>-1.937</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>15.674</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGY=0.00</td>
<td>-1.518</td>
<td>.578</td>
<td>6.890</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGY=1.00</td>
<td>0$^b$</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMY=0.00</td>
<td>.686</td>
<td>.161</td>
<td>18.096</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMY=0.50</td>
<td>1.303</td>
<td>.165</td>
<td>62.419</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>3.681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMY=1.00</td>
<td>0$^b$</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The reference category is: REPUBLICAN. b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Furthermore, the output of the odds ratios (Exp$^\beta$) indicates that when holding all other variables constant for each unit increase on the party identification scale ranging from 0=Republican through 0.5=Independent to 1=Democrat an African American woman is only 0.221 times more likely, while African American men are only 0.171 times more likely, to decide in favor of an independent identification than all other respondents. Even though political ideology is significant, the effect of conservative ideology is much smaller than the effect of African American women and men. As decisions on the party identification scale increase from Republican to Independent,
holding all other variables constant, so too the effect of conservative ideology increases by a factor of 0.144. On the other hand, Moderate/middle-of-the-road ideology increases the likelihood of political independence by a factor of 0.219. The odds ratios for income, a measure for the effect of class on partisan identification decisions, and for age, holding all other variables constant, indicate that the probability of political independence is 0.726 times higher for class, and 0.700 times higher for age. Only assessments of the national economy (‘Worse’=0; ‘About the Same’=0.5) yield a larger effect, with a unit increase on the party identification scale associated with an increase in the odds of deciding Independent identification by a factor of 1.987 for ‘Worse’ economic assessments compared to ‘Better’ economic assessments. When appraisals of the state of the national economy change to ‘About the Same’ the odds of an Independent decision increases 3.681 times higher when compared to an appraisal of ‘Better’ than the previous year.

6.2.4 INFERENTIAL FINDINGS: MODEL FOUR

This final model explores the unique contribution of determinants expected to predict Democratic partisanship. In Model 4 party identification, a polychotomous outcome variable (1=Democrat, 0.5=Independent, 0=Republican), is a function of the following predictor variables: linked fate, race/ethnicity, household income or class, gender, political ideology, approval of Bush’s presidential performance, the Nation’s economy, and age. Multinomial logistic regression analysis is the statistical technique used to determine the extent to which these variables predict political partisanship among comparative populations taken from the 2004 NPS survey data. The logistic regression model predicting the natural log of the odds of making a decision favoring the
Democratic, rather than the Republican, Party, or of making a decision electing political independence rather than Republican partisanship assumes the following form:

\[
\log \frac{\text{Pr}[\text{Party ID Democrat}]}{\text{Pr}[\text{Party ID Republican}]} = a + \beta_1 \text{Fate} + \beta_2 \text{Black} + \beta_3 \text{Hispanic} + \beta_4 \text{Asian} + \beta_5 \text{Caribbean} + \beta_6 \text{Income}_2 + \beta_7 \text{Income}_3 + \beta_8 \text{Income}_4 + \beta_9 \text{Gender} + \beta_{10} \text{Ideology} + \beta_{11} \text{Bush} + \beta_{12} \text{Economy} + \beta_{13} \text{Age}
\]

Output shows that of 854 survey respondents included in the analysis there are 300 (35.1%) Democrats, 265 (31.0%) Independents, and 289 (33.8%) Republicans. The intercept-only model yields a -2 Log Likelihood statistic of 1772.853 (Table 6.20) while the model that includes the set of predictors produces a -2 Log Likelihood value of 1244.385. The model Chi-Square statistic is 528.468, with a 0.000 level of significance. In addition, this model yields a 61.7 percent accuracy of observed and actual cases of partisan identification decisions. Further review of the Pseudo R-Square table in the regression output renders a Cox and Snell R-Square of 0.461 and a Nagelkerke R-Square of 0.519. The strength of the relationship between the variables is moderate.

Table 6.19 Model 4: Significance Test of the Model Log Likelihood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Model Fitting Criteria</th>
<th>Likelihood Ratio Tests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2 Log Likelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept Only</td>
<td></td>
<td>1772.853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final</td>
<td></td>
<td>1244.385</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With the exception of the variable gender all other predictors in the logistic regression model are significant ($p < .05$). As displayed in Table 6.20, when respondents decide to consider themselves Democrats, rather than Republicans, the equation takes on the following formulation:

$$\log \frac{\text{Pr} | \text{PartyID Democrat}}{\text{Pr} | \text{Party ID Republican}} = -2.571 - 0.214 \text{Fate},.00 - 0.742 \text{Fate},.50 + 3.025 \text{Black}$$

$$+ 1.869 \text{Hispanic} + 0.733 \text{Asian} + 2.271 \text{Caribbean}$$

$$- 0.339 \text{Income} + 0.149 \text{Gender} - 1.857 \text{Ideology},.00$$

$$- 1.657 \text{Ideology},.50 + 3.761 \text{Bush},.00 + 2.151 \text{Bush},.66$$

$$+ 0.710 \text{Economy},.00 + 0.925 \text{Economy},.50$$

$$+ 0.198 \text{Age}$$

Table 6.20 Model 4: Output of Statistical Significance of Each Predictor Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Model Fitting Criteria</th>
<th>Likelihood Ratio Tests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2 Log Likelihood of Reduced Model</td>
<td>Chi-Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1244.385</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK</td>
<td>1314.798</td>
<td>70.413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISPANIC</td>
<td>1277.188</td>
<td>32.802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIAN</td>
<td>1250.075</td>
<td>5.690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARIBBEAN</td>
<td>1270.794</td>
<td>26.409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENDER</td>
<td>1246.979</td>
<td>2.594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME</td>
<td>1255.493</td>
<td>11.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>1253.516</td>
<td>9.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXTENT LINKED FATE</td>
<td>1259.875</td>
<td>15.490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICAL IDEOLOGY</td>
<td>1295.980</td>
<td>51.595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPROVE BUSH</td>
<td>1360.308</td>
<td>115.923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL ECONOMY</td>
<td>1258.838</td>
<td>14.453</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom.
The logistic regression coefficients, Wald test, and odds ratio for each of the predictor variables in the equation as specified above are presented in Table 6.22. Using a .05 criterion of statistical significance, the Wald $\chi^2$ statistic of test results for the unique contribution of each predictor included in the analysis shows that gender, age, linked fate=0.00, political ideology=0.50, and national economy=0.50 do not have significant partial effects. On the other hand, the variables that do have a statistically significant relationship with deciding to identify with the Democratic Party in this logistic regression equation are Black, Hispanic, Asian, Caribbean, Class (Income), extent of affect of Linked Fate (‘Some’), conservative Ideology, ‘Strongly Disapprove’ and ‘Somewhat Disapprove’ of Bush’s job as president, and appraisals that the state of the national economy over the previous year is ‘Worse.’

Reportedly, holding all other variables constant, for every unit change in the President’s job ratings when one strongly disapproves of Bush’s performance a 3.781 increase in the log odds of decisions to identify with the Democratic Party is expected than when one approves of his job as president. Furthermore, high odds ratios ($\text{Exp}^\beta$) observed in the regression output indicate Democratic Party, not Republican Party, preferences among survey respondents that ‘Strongly Disapprove’ George W. Bush’s job as president in 2004 when compared to those that ‘Strongly Approve.’ The odds of predicting who will decide to identify with the Democratic Party are 42.997 times higher when responses indicate a strong disapproval of the job performance of President Bush. Likewise, when respondents somewhat disapprove of Bush’s job as president there is a 2.151 increase in the log odds of Democratic partisanship after controlling for other covariates in the model. In other words, the likelihood of Democratic Party identifications
is 8.597 times higher than when responses approve of Bush’s job as president. Race and
ethnicity also yield significant ($p < .05$) high odds of decisions to identify with the
Democratic Party, rather than with the Republican Party.

Table 6.21 Model 4: Logistic Regression Analysis of Democratic Partisan
Decisions for 854 Respondents in 2004 by IBM SPSS 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>SE $\beta$</th>
<th>Wald’s $\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>Exp$^\beta$ (odds ratio)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.571</td>
<td>.757</td>
<td>11.545</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK</td>
<td>3.025</td>
<td>.417</td>
<td>52.644</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>20.589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISPANIC</td>
<td>1.869</td>
<td>.336</td>
<td>30.867</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>6.482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIAN</td>
<td>.733</td>
<td>.350</td>
<td>4.370</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>2.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARIBBEAN</td>
<td>2.271</td>
<td>.471</td>
<td>23.233</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>9.689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENDER</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>.232</td>
<td>.411</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.521</td>
<td>1.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME</td>
<td>-.339</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>9.620</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>.161</td>
<td>1.500</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.221</td>
<td>1.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINKED FATE=0.00</td>
<td>-.214</td>
<td>.269</td>
<td>.631</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.427</td>
<td>.807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINKED FATE=0.50</td>
<td>-.742</td>
<td>.364</td>
<td>4.158</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINKED FATE=1.00</td>
<td>0$^b$</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGY=0.00</td>
<td>-1.857</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>45.922</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGY=0.50</td>
<td>-1.657</td>
<td>.993</td>
<td>2.787</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGY=1.00</td>
<td>0$^b$</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSH=0.00</td>
<td>3.761</td>
<td>.412</td>
<td>83.490</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>42.997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSH=0.66</td>
<td>2.151</td>
<td>.343</td>
<td>39.320</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>8.597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSH=1.00</td>
<td>0$^b$</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMY=0.00</td>
<td>.710</td>
<td>.311</td>
<td>5.206</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>2.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMY=0.50</td>
<td>.925</td>
<td>.309</td>
<td>8.953</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>2.521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMY=1.00</td>
<td>0$^b$</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The reference category is: REPUBLICAN. b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Further for every unit change in decisions of partisanship the likelihood of identifying with the Democratic Party increases by a factor of 3.025 when African
American, by about 2.3 times when Black Caribbean, nearly doubles when Hispanic, and yields 0.733 when Asian compared to White Non-Hispanic respondents, after holding constant all other covariates in the model. Examination of the odds ratios ($\exp^\beta$) for party preferences by race and ethnicity show that African American decisions to select the Democratic Party are 20.589 times higher than White Non-Hispanics, holding the other predictor variables constant. Among other population groups included in this study preferences for the Democratic Party are 9.689 times higher when Black Caribbean, 6.482 times higher when Hispanic, and 2.081 times higher when Asian compared to White Non-Hispanics, after controlling all other variables included in the analysis. In addition, increases in Democratic partisanship relates to evaluations of the state of the national economy. Those who evaluated the Nation’s economy as worse than the previous year are 0.710 more likely to prefer the Democratic Party than those who indicated the economy is better than the previous year. Additionally, among those who indicate that the Nation’s economy is about the same as the previous year are 0.925 times more likely to make decisions favoring the holding Democratic Party as opposed to those who indicate the economy is better, when holding constant the other predictor variables.

On the other hand, perceptions of the extent to which linked fate affects respondents (Some=0.50) and the probability of decisions favoring the Democratic Party differs significantly (at $p < .05$) from the probability of favorable Democratic Party decisions among respondents with perceptions that linked fate affects them ‘A Lot’ (=1.00). Results show that for every unit change in linked fate affecting respondents ‘Some’ there is a 1.308 decrease in the log odds of Democratic partisanship expected, after holding constant all other predictor variables. In short, the odds of deciding to
identify with the Democratic Party among persons who perceive that to some extent linked fate affects them is only 0.270 times higher than persons who perceive that the extent to which linked fate affects them is a lot. Similarly, for every unit increase in conservative political ideology a decrease in the log odds of Democratic Party identification is expected, holding all other predictors constant. So, the odds ratio of preferring the Democratic Party among conservatives is only 0.271 times more likely than among liberals. Moreover, the independent effects of class, measured as annual household income, show that as income increases the likelihood of Democratic partisanship decreases by a factor of 0.339. Hence the odds of being a Democrat, rather than a Republican, based on class of respondent as measured by annual household income, are only 0.713 times more likely.

Contrarily, in the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009) when respondent’s decisions indicate preferences for political independence, rather than identification with the Republican Party, the equation produced in the regression output (Table 6.23) assumes the following formulation:

$$\log \frac{\Pr[Party\ ID\ Independent]}{\Pr[Party\ ID\ Republican]} = 0.532 - 0.246Fate_{.00} - 1.308Fate_{.50} + 1.489\text{Black}$$

$$+ 0.938\text{Hispanic} + 0.591\text{Asian} + 1.311\text{Caribbean}$$

$$- 0.277\text{Income} - 0.153\text{Gender} - 1.304\text{Ideology}_{.00}$$

$$- 1.152\text{Ideology}_{.50} + 2.253\text{Bush}_{.00} + 1.143\text{Bush}_{.66}$$

$$+ 0.607\text{Economy}_{.00} + 0.371\text{Economy}_{.50}$$

$$- 0.195\text{Age}$$

As shown in Table 6.23 below, predictor variables race (Black, Hispanic, Asian, Caribbean), Bush=0.00, Bush=0.66, and Economy=0.00 yield positive coefficients that are significant using the .05 criteria of statistical significance. Whereas income (class), the extent of respondent’s race affecting respondent or linked fate=0.50 (‘Some’), and
political ideology=0.00 (Conservative) produce negative coefficients that yield a significant p-value in accordance with a .05 criterion. While gender, age, linked fate=0.00 (‘Not Very Much’), political ideology=0.50 (Moderate/Middle-of-the-Road), and state of the national economy=0.50 (‘About the Same’) are not statistically significant at the p < .05 level. These predictors are not included in the subsequent interpretation.

Table 6.22 Model 3: Logistic Regression Analysis of Political Independence Decisions for 854 Respondents in 2004 by IBM SPSS 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>SE β</th>
<th>Wald’s χ²</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Exp β (odds ratio)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>.532</td>
<td>.632</td>
<td>.709</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK</td>
<td>1.489</td>
<td>.401</td>
<td>13.791</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>4.432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISPANIC</td>
<td>.938</td>
<td>.285</td>
<td>10.863</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>2.556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIAN</td>
<td>.591</td>
<td>.285</td>
<td>4.311</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>1.806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARIBBEAN</td>
<td>1.311</td>
<td>.439</td>
<td>8.910</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>3.709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENDER</td>
<td>-.153</td>
<td>.206</td>
<td>.549</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.459</td>
<td>.858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME</td>
<td>-.277</td>
<td>.097</td>
<td>8.103</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>-.195</td>
<td>.145</td>
<td>1.823</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.177</td>
<td>.823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINKED FATE=0.00</td>
<td>-.246</td>
<td>.235</td>
<td>1.090</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.296</td>
<td>.782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINKED FATE=0.50</td>
<td>1.308</td>
<td>.351</td>
<td>13.856</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINKED FATE=1.00</td>
<td>0[^a]</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0[^a]</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGY=0.00</td>
<td>-1.304</td>
<td>.260</td>
<td>25.146</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGY=0.50</td>
<td>-1.152</td>
<td>.941</td>
<td>1.501</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.221</td>
<td>.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGY=1.00</td>
<td>0[^a]</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0[^a]</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSH=0.00</td>
<td>2.253</td>
<td>.340</td>
<td>43.887</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>9.512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSH=0.66</td>
<td>1.143</td>
<td>.241</td>
<td>22.524</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>3.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSH=1.00</td>
<td>0[^a]</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0[^a]</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMY=0.00</td>
<td>.607</td>
<td>.252</td>
<td>5.794</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>1.834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMY=0.50</td>
<td>.371</td>
<td>.266</td>
<td>1.940</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.164</td>
<td>1.448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMY=1.00</td>
<td>0[^a]</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0[^a]</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^a]. The reference category is: REPUBLICAN. **b.** This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.
The coefficients for each of the predictor variables, which are statistically significant, indicate the amount of change in political party identifications to expect given a one-unit change in the value of a particular independent variable, given all other predictors in the model are held constant. Coefficients for the race variables (Black 1.489; Hispanic 0.938; Asian 0.591; and Caribbean 1.311) are positive and significant indicators of partisan identifications. So, when race of respondent is Black predicted party identifications are expected to yield about a 1.489-unit increase in Independent political identifications above that of White Non-Hispanics, based on an estimate of about a 0.532-unit increase (Intercept), when all other variables in the model are held constant. This produces an odds ratio predicting that Independent identifications among African Americans are 4.432 times higher than Independent identifications among their White counterparts. As race of respondent shifts from African American to Hispanic, Asian, and Black Caribbean predicted preferences for political independence increase to approximately a 0.938-unit, a 0.591-unit, and a 1.311-unit above those of White Non-Hispanics. So, the odds ratios of preference for political independence rather than Republican partisanship is 2.556 times higher among Hispanics, 1.806 times higher among Asians, and 3.709 times higher among Black Caribbeans when compared to White Non-Hispanics.

Additionally, respondents that strongly disapproved, and somewhat disapproved, of Bush’s presidential performance compared to respondents that strongly approved of Bush’s job as president yield positive, significant (at $p < .05$) coefficients. When respondents disapprove strongly a 2.253-unit increase in predicted political independence is expected, while for respondents that disapprove somewhat there is an expected 1.143
unit increase in predicted political independence, after holding all other variables constant. As approval of Bush’s presidential performance changes from ‘Strongly Disapprove’ to ‘Strongly Approve’ predicted political independence increases by 2.253 units, or an odds ratio of 9.512 times higher. Likewise, as approval of Bush’s presidential job performance ratings change from ‘Somewhat Disapprove’ to ‘Strongly Approve’ there is a 1.143-unit increase in political independence, yielding an odds ratio of 3.137 times higher. Additionally, as assessments of the national economy increase by one unit from “Worse” to “Better” a 0.607-unit increase is expected in Independent identifications. An appraisal of the state of the Nation’s economy as ‘Worse’ than the previous year means a decision to favor political independence is 1.832 times higher than an appraisal of the state of the Nation’s economy as ‘Better’.

Moreover, the log of the odds of decisions favoring political independence are negatively related to class or annual earned income; the extent to which linked fate=0.50 (‘Some’) affects respondents; and, political ideology=0.00 (Conservative). So, holding constant all other covariates, as income increases there is a 0.277-unit decrease in the odds of political independence. A review of the odds ratio shows that Independent identification is 0.758 times higher than a Republican identification. Further, as perceptions that to some extent linked racial fate affects respondents increase there is a log-odds parameter estimate of 1.308-unit decrease in decisions favoring political independence, after controlling for the other variables in the model. The odds ratio (\(\text{Exp}^\beta\)) shows that when respondents’ hold perceptions that linked fate has some affect on them the probability of an Independent identification is 0.270 times higher than the probability of identification with the Republican Party. Additionally, when holding all other
predictor variables constant in the analysis, as conservative political ideology increases the odds of decisions of Independent preferences, instead of Republican Party preferences, decrease by 1.152. In other words, the likelihood of Independent political identifications for a conservative, rather than liberal, political ideology is only 0.271 times higher than the likelihood of Republican Party identifications among respondents to the 2004 NPS.

6.3 STUDY FINDINGS

The multinomial logistic regression analyses undertaken in this chapter explore factors that explain African American racial group partisanship. Results suggest that the contributing effects of race (and ethnicity) on party identifications are significant independent effects when holding constant the influence of all other predictors included in this research study. Most notable among African-Americans composing the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997) is the dynamics of linked racial fate where persons that ‘Somewhat Agree’ that they are affected by what happens to the African American racial group are more likely to decide on Democratic partisanship than on political independence. In comparative analyses consisting of African American, White Non-Hispanics, Hispanics, Asians, and Black Caribbeans taken from the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009) African American women are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party than both African American men and women of other racial/ethnic identifications. Whites, Asians, and to a somewhat lesser degree, Hispanics are typically more varied in their political party identifications, and are also influenced by more social factors than African Americans and Black Caribbeans. Differences in class based on income, gender, the extent of the affect of linked fate, political ideology, and evaluations of Bush’s presidential performance make important contributions to the
model. Nonetheless, all groups hold important, in their perceptions of the two main political parties, assessments of the state of the national economy over the previous year.

Finally, findings support at least two conclusions: (1) The observed pattern of very strong sustained identification with the Democratic Party among black (both African American and Black Caribbean) citizens substantially rejects any prediction of the diminishing effect of race because of an increasing effect of economic class. This is particularly so in structuring political preference attitudes toward the two main political parties, or political partisanship; and (2) Differential bases of party identifications continue to structure black-white political orientations of citizens in the United States. Given the continued prevalence of contemporary racial tensions, inequities, and discrimination a sense of interconnectedness with the racial group as well as perceptions of the interdependence of fate and task interdependence are expected to persist and predict political proclivities within the African American racial group. A discussion of research study results, conclusions, and recommendations for future research are presented in the final chapter.
CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The final chapter of this dissertation summarizes the study, presents general conclusions and recommendations for further research based on results of this investigation of African American partisanship.

7.1 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY

The principle aim of this dissertation was to identify and further understand the extent to which linked racial fate and the black utility heuristic paradigm explained African American decisions about the two main political parties, particularly their overwhelming support for the Democratic Party. Building on the scholarship of Michael C. Dawson (1994) this research tested empirically a modification of his study of “African American Partisanship and the American Party System,” Chapter Five in *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African American Politics*. Additionally, this research extended Dawson’s work beyond his study period, and included a comparative population comprised of racial and ethnic groups. The methodological approach for Dawson’s examination involved data collected for the National Black Election Study panel series during 1984 and 1988 (Jackson 1984; 1988). Whereas this study tested four hypotheses using national survey research data compiled for the National Black Election Study (NBES) panel series for 1996 (Tate 1997), and from the National Politics Study (NPS) for 2004 (Jackson, et al. 2009). The sample population consisted of 824 adult African
American survey respondents from the 1996 NBES, and 3,087 racial and ethnic respondents from the 2004 NPS. The 2004 population sample included 706 (22.9%) African Americans, 868 (28.1%) White Non-Hispanics, 676 (21.9%) Hispanics, 466 (15.1%) Asians, and 371 (12.0%) Black Caribbeans. Questions germane to this research study as posed to survey respondents addressed decisions about partisan preference attitudes; ideas about individuals’ connectedness to, and interdependence with, their racial and/or ethnic grouping; evaluations of the political parties, national economy and presidential performance; and the influence of social demography on partisanship.

Seminal studies conducted by Michigan School researchers suggested that party identification, a psychological predisposition of preference, was preceded only by sociological background characteristics like race or ethnicity, economic class affiliation, gender, age, and other related social demography, which was also accepted by revisionist perspectives (Campbell, et al. 1960; Fiorina 1981). In the Michigan model partisan identifications were modeled as affective, stable, and persistent attitudes not often subject to change or to the influence of other factors. Further scholarly investigations revealed the more dynamic, rather than stable, nature of partisan preference attitudes (Brody 1991; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Page and Jones 1979; Markus and Converse 1979 Jackson 1975). Empirical evidence showed that party identifications were susceptible to change, particularly in response to the influence of short-term forces like issues and candidates, the electoral setting, and the political context. Nonetheless, such shifts in the partisan balance of party identifications in the American electorate did not explain African American attachments, which were notably distinctive attitudes of preference for the Democratic Party. Instead of a psychological group (party) attachment, African
Americans’ partisanship appeared more consistent with revisionist explanations of party identification as a summary judgment or “running tally” of individual evaluations of the two main political parties. Hence, their preferences for the Democratic Party reflected an information shortcut based on ideological and policy congruence between the Democrats and the race (Fiorina 1981; Key 1966; Downs 1957), procedurally more rational in accordance with the Simonesque perspective (Simon 1946).

Historical evidence pointed to the long-term force of race in shaping individual perceptions about the two main political parties. Still, the question remained: How did individual African Americans’ arrive at virtually the same decisions when faced with multiple options in a political world of objects? Linked fate emerged as a concept in political science scholarship to identify and explain African American political behavior (Shingles 1981; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Tate 1991). The concept was first employed by Kurt Lewin (1947) in social psychology to further understand the interconnectedness and interdependence of a post-World War II Jewish population. Michael C. Dawson’s (1994) application of the linked fate construct was advanced in his *Theory of African American Racial Group Interests*. In Dawson’s theory “linked racial fate” referred to perceptions that individual interests were shaped by the collective interests of the racial group. The resulting interdependence among individuals explained group solidarity and political cohesion within the African American community. Here “community” relied on perceptions—a neurological process of observations and interpretations—of connectedness among individuals who became keenly aware of their common historical and contemporary experiences, disparate treatment of their racial group within the social, political, and economic order, and differential black life chance opportunities or the lack
thereof in comparison to the majority population. This linked fate construct grew increasingly important when used to explore the group behavior of other racial and ethnic (or pan-ethnic) collectivities representing Latinos (Sanchez & Masuoka 2008; Sanchez 2008; Nicholson, Pantoja & Segura 2005), Asians (Junn & Masuoka 2008), and Black Caribbeans (Watt 2009), and was found to be significant.

Reliance on the centrality of race was essential to Dawson’s theory, primarily because his “black utility heuristic” paradigm was reinforced by the continued significance of race in shaping African American experiences and assessments of life prospects. This was because, in Dawson’s perspective, individual African Americans used their perceptions of racial group interests as a substitute for their own interests. In short, the linchpin in the concept of linked fate was an individual’s identification with the race; a black consciousness that grasped the significant consequences of “being black;” as well as a belief that what happened to the racial group was relevant to one’s own life.

The black utility heuristic, instrumental racial (black) cues, which provided a meaningful explanation for uniformity of individual preference attitudes like partisan identifications ensured adherence to African American racial group interests. This study investigated these claims.

7.2 MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY

Four hypotheses were formulated for the research study. Predicted measures included: linked fate, which quantified perceptions that what happens to people’s racial group affects them; race and/or ethnicity, based on self-reports of identification; economic class, computed as annual family income; gender; age; ideology, a summary scale that appraised the degree of individual preferences for liberalism; judgments about
the extent to which the Democratic Party worked hard to address issues of most
importance to African Americans; political climate, determined by presidential job
performance evaluations during the Clinton (1996) and Bush (2004) administrations; and,
assessments of the Nation’s economy over the past year. Each of these predictors
analyzed the polychotomous outcome, party identification—Republican, Independent,
and Democrat. Variables used in the multinomial logistic regression analyses came from
adult African American respondents to the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate
1997), while variables taken from the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2004)
analyzed survey responses from comparative racial and ethnic adult populations
composed of African American, White Non-Hispanic, Hispanic, Asian, or Black
Caribbean respondents. Details on the manner in which each variable was
operationalized and measured can be found in Chapter 5. In what follows the main
findings for each hypothesis are reviewed and discussed in the order in which they
appeared in Chapter 2.

7.2.1 LINKED FATE AND AFRICAN AMERICAN PARTISANSHIP

The first hypothesis argued that African Americans with stronger (black) linked
fates were more likely to support a political party whose policy preferences were
perceived as consistent with (black) racial group interests. This hypothesis is not
confirmed in the analysis. Results showed that a sense of linked racial fate was only
significant among those who somewhat agreed that what happened to the African
American racial group affected them, but they preferred political independence rather
than Democratic partisanship, as anticipated. The weak performance of linked fate in this
study may have implied that while race continues to be an important force, African
Americans made party choices based on other factors. Socio-demographic attributes added to the equation seemed to have mitigated the expected power of linked fate. For instance, independence or no-party preferences was more likely chosen by African American men than by women, suggesting a gender gap. Furthermore, the one consistently distinguishing factor between Republican partisanship and Democratic partisanship in 1996 was preferred ideological orientations. Conservative ideology predicted accurately preferences for the Republican Party, whereas, moderate ideology decreased the likelihood of political independence. The finding that linked fate does not explain political partisanship is consistent with previous findings that strong (black) racial group connection did not provide an explanation for political participation within the African American community once other factors were taken into consideration (Verba et al 1995; Tate 1991; Bobo and Gilliam, Jr. 1990; Shingles 1981).

7.2.2 GENDERED PERSPECTIVES OF POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP

The finding of gender distinctions relative to political partisanship was further explored in the second hypothesis, which stated that African American women were more likely to support the Democratic Party than African American men or women of other ethnicities. Results from analysis of data from the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al 2009) indicated that African American women were more likely to consider themselves Democrats, rather than Republicans. They were also slightly more likely to prefer political independence, instead of Republican partisanship, than African American men. However, results measuring partisanship for ethnic women were not statistically significant. This finding suggested that African American women were politically distinctive, especially in view of gender differences relative to Democratic
Party attachments. There was a tendency for African American women to be more supportive of the Democratic Party than their male counterparts, and more likely to identify as Democrats than women of other ethnicities. Since the 1980 presidential election when more men supported Republican Ronald Reagan, the noticeable gender gap attracted scholarly attention. Research suggested that women were more likely to vote, and to identify with the Democratic Party than their male counterparts, which included African Americans (Cassese, et al 2007). The findings in this study supported the notion of a gender gap within the African American community.

7.2.3 EVALUATION OF DEMOCRATS’ WORK ON BLACK ISSUES

This study further assessed the premise that African Americans were more likely to identify with the political party that they perceived best helped their racial group using data from the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997). Here preferences for the Democrats indicated influence of the black utility heuristic (Dawson 1994). When compared to assessments that the Democrats work very hard to address African American racial group issues all remaining categories increased the probability of identification with the Democratic Party. Greatest support came from those that decided the Democrats work fairly hard, which was followed closely by responses that they worked not too hard. Still, Democratic partisanship was also likely among persons that thought Democrats worked not hard at all. This finding confirmed that individual perceptions of the Democratic Party working harder (than the Republican Party) contributed to their support for the party, even when differences in evaluation of the efforts made by the Democratic Party to advance issues of most importance to African Americans were present.
Pan-ethnic group consciousness and the use of group identity cues explored in political scholarship suggested the applicability of the *Theory of African American Racial Group Interests* to other collectivities. Even though African Americans remain the most loyal supporters of the Democratic Party, the fourth hypothesis sought to explore factors that were most likely to predict the desired outcome among comparison population groups. Specifically, the proposition indicated that the more a person viewed that the fate of their racial and/or ethnic group affects their own fate, the greater the likelihood of support for the political party perceived as addressing racial and/or ethnic group interests. In essence, this hypothesis returned to the question of linked fate and the use of a group utility heuristic to make decisions about the two main political parties in 2004.

The largest indicator of preferences for the Democratic Party was disapproval of George W. Bush’s presidential performance. Democratic partisanship increased among those that strongly, and somewhat, disapproved of his job as president. Nonetheless, race and ethnicity also accounted for decisions to identify with the Democrats. As expected, African Americans’ choice of the Democratic Party, when compared to White Non-Hispanics, far outweighed those of the other population groups. Black Caribbeans, Hispanics, and Asians, when also compared to White Non-Hispanics distantly followed preferences of African Americans, but also expressed their preferences for the Democrats. On the other hand, Democratic Party preferences decreased slightly among respondents with perceptions that to some extent linked fate affected them. This was in comparison to people who thought that the extent to which what happened to their racial/ethnic group affected them a lot, an indication that the degree of racial and/or
ethnic group consciousness did influence partisanship, but not in the expected direction. Furthermore, Democratic identifications within this comparison population suggested some reliance on a racial (black) or ethnic group heuristic when faced with decisions about the two main political parties.

7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This dissertation set out to determine why African Americans think the way they do politically and what induces them to change, supposing that the explanation was bound in the concept of linked fate. Instead, the distribution of survey responses among African Americans in 1996, revealing a gender gap in such perceptions, showed virtually no variations across categories of the linked fate measure. In addition, linked fate was not significantly shown to impact decisions about Democratic Party identifications in the inferential statistics measuring survey responses in both 1996 and 2004. Further investigation into the concept of linked fate is necessary because survey questions may not tap into the psychological impact of shared racial experiences and adverse historical and contemporary encounters between the races on partisanship. National survey data is most often used to explore the influence of psychological attitudes like party identifications or constructs such as linked fate. Nonetheless, to assess the political effects of linked fate may necessitate an alternative research design. Experiments on the influence of linked fate could prove beneficial in understanding the way people think about the two main political parties. Perhaps with the aid of “confederates” who would work with the experimenter, research could identify and further our understanding of the affect of such interconnectedness and the interdependence of fate on thoughts about the two main political parties. Political science research experiments using confederates
have demonstrated their usefulness in investigations of racial tolerance (Hutchings and Jardina 2009), and the political effects of racial prejudice (Huddy and Feldman 2009).

Additionally, marked gender differences emerged in political party preference attitudes. Survey responses divulged distinctive preference attitudes toward the Democratic Party, which was also seen as the effective work of the black utility heuristic guiding individuals to choose the party that best addressed the interests of the racial group (Dawson 1994). There was a consistent disposition for the Democratic Party. Even when individuals perceived that the Democrats’ only worked ‘fairly hard’ or ‘not hard at all’ on issues of most importance to African Americans, most still decided to identify themselves as Democrats. This may suggest that in the political arena there is an interdependence of fate and task that links them to the Democratic Party “group” more so than to the African American racial group. Hence, electoral capture may actually reflect a kind of “linked fate” since no other rational alternative is available to the racial group besides the Democratic Party (Frymer 1999).

African Americans are the most cohesive electoral group, believing almost unanimously that the racial group’s primary goals are best advanced via political action. Therefore, close proximity to political objects that give them relevance is vital, as well as the transmission of group political standards or norms to ensure consistency. According to Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes in *The American Voter* (1960) when a group standard is “self evident,” like race, important political objects of orientation, like the political party, “embody” group cues, “so that the course of behavior characteristic of [a] ‘good’ group member cannot be held in doubt” (p. 317). They further indicate the following:
Now issues and candidates are transient political objects; the entity that endures is the party. If group influence leads the identified member to take on identification with the party, then little renewal of influence is needed. The individual has, as it were, acceded to a self-steering mechanism, that will keep him politically “safe” from the point of view of group standards. He will respond to new stimuli as a party member and code them properly. As time passes, his identification with the party will increase of its own accord, because the individual will find that event after event demonstrates—in non-group matters as well as group matters now—the rectitude of his own party and the obnoxiousness of its opponent (p. 328).

Further study is therefore needed to assess whether group cues in partisan decisions reflect perceptions of linked racial fate or a sense that one’s fate is linked to that of the Democratic Party.


http://theamericanscholar.org/affirmative-inaction/#.UWWGK459m-8


—. "Executive Order 12876 - Historically Black Colleges and Universities," November 1, 1993. Ibid.


*Congressional Globe*, Appendix, 42nd Cong., 1st sess. (6 April 1871): A230–231


—. Executive Order 10590 – Establishing the President’s Committee on Government Employment Policy, January 18, 1955. Ibid.


Kendall, Diana *Race, Class, and Gender in a Diverse Society: A Text Reader*. Boston, Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 1997.


—. Executive Order 10925 - *Establishing the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity*, March 6, 1961. Ibid.


*Laws of the State of Mississippi*, Passed at a Regular Session of the Mississippi Legislature, held in Jackson, October, November and December, 1965: 82-93, Jackson, 1866: 165-167.


—. "Action Research and Minority Problems" (1946). Ibid.


—. Executive Order 11458 – Prescribing Arrangements for Developing and Coordinating A National Program for Minority Business Enterprise, March 5, 1969. Ibid.


—. Executive Order 9981 - Establishing the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, July 26, 1948. Ibid.


http://www.congressweb.com/aascu/docfiles/ESEA%20PRIMER%20FINAL.pdf


APPENDIX A – TABLES OF SURVEY QUESTIONS

The following tables (A.1 – A.10) show comparability of survey questions used in the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997) and in the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et al 2004). Question wording is presented in the tables that follow for the dependent variable and each independent variable used in this investigation of African American political partisanship.

A.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Table A.1 Self-Identification With A Political Party: Dependent Variable Survey Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigator</th>
<th>Year/Study</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tate, K.</td>
<td>1996 NBES</td>
<td>Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? [QG2]</td>
<td>Republican Independent Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson, et al.</td>
<td>2004 NPS</td>
<td>Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a republican, a democrat, an independent, or something else? [QB6]</td>
<td>Republican Independent Democrat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## A.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

### Table A.2 Linked Racial Fate: Independent Variable Survey Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigator</th>
<th>Year/Study</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tate, K.</td>
<td>1996 NBES</td>
<td>Do you think what happens generally to Black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? [QV1]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson, et al.</td>
<td>2004 NPS</td>
<td>Do you think what happens generally to [R RACE] people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? Will it affect you a lot, some or not very much? [QC6A]</td>
<td>A Lot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not Very Much</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table A.3 Race: Independent Survey Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigator</th>
<th>Year/Study</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tate, K.</td>
<td>1996 NBES</td>
<td>First, let me just confirm that you are of (some) African American background? [Q1]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hispanic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Caribbean</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A.4 Class – Family Income Measured in Dollars: Independent Variable Survey Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigator</th>
<th>Year/Study</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tate, K.</td>
<td>1996 NBES</td>
<td>Which of the following income groups includes the income of all members of your family living here in 1995 before taxes? This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income. [IF UNCERTAIN, what would be your best guess?] [QY6]</td>
<td>Up to $10,000 $10,000-$14,999 $15,000-$19,999 $20,000-$24,999 $25,000-$29,999 $30,000-$39,999 $40,000-$49,999 $50,000-$74,999 $75,000-$89,999 $90,000-104,999 $105,000 &amp; More</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson, et al.</td>
<td>2004 NPS</td>
<td>How much did you and all members of your family living with you receive in the year 2003 before taxes? [QF4]</td>
<td>[Income cleaned &amp; imputed]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.5 Gender: Independent Variable Survey Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigator</th>
<th>Year/Study</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tate, K.</td>
<td>1996 NBES</td>
<td>Sex of Respondent (By Observation)</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson, et al.</td>
<td>2004 NPS</td>
<td>INTERVIEWER QUERY (ASK ONLY IF NEC: Are you male or female?)</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A.6 Age: Independent Variable Survey Question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigator</th>
<th>Year/Study</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tate, K.</td>
<td>1996 NBES</td>
<td>Actual Age [QY1C]</td>
<td>17 - 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson, et al.</td>
<td>2004 NPS</td>
<td>Age [Cleaned] [AGE]</td>
<td>17 - 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.7 Ideology – Liberalism/Conservatism: Independent Variable and Survey Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigator</th>
<th>Year/Study</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tate, K.</td>
<td>1996 NBES</td>
<td>In general, when it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as a liberal, a conservative, a moderate or what? [QG1]</td>
<td>Conservative Moderate Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson, et al.</td>
<td>2004 NPS</td>
<td>We hear a lot of talk about liberals and conservatives. When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as liberal or conservative? [QB5]</td>
<td>Conservative Moderate Liberal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.8 Presidential Job Approval: Independent Variable Survey Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigator</th>
<th>Year/Study</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tate, K.</td>
<td>1996 NBES</td>
<td>Thinking about our nation’s leaders, do you approve or disapprove of the way Bill Clinton in handling his job as President? [QC1]</td>
<td>Approve Disapprove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson, et al.</td>
<td>2004 NPS</td>
<td>How much do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush has handled his job as president? [QB10]</td>
<td>Approve Somewhat Approve Somewhat Disapprove Disapprove</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A.9 The Nation’s Economy: Independent Variable Survey Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigator</th>
<th>Year/Study</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tate, K.</td>
<td>1996 NBES</td>
<td>How about the economy? Would you say that over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse? [QE3]</td>
<td>Gotten Better, Stayed the Same, Gotten Worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson, et al.</td>
<td>2004 NPS</td>
<td>Would you say that over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse? [QF3]</td>
<td>Better, About the Same, Worse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.10 Democratic Party Works Hard On Black Issues: Independent Variable Survey Question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigator</th>
<th>Year/Study</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tate, K.</td>
<td>1996 NBES</td>
<td>How hard do you think the Democratic Party really works on issues Black people care about? Do you think they work very hard, fairly hard, not too hard, or not hard at all on issues Black people care about? [F2]</td>
<td>Very Hard, Fairly Hard, Not Too Hard, Not Hard At All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>