Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The Resurgent "Major Questions" Doctrine

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NATHAN RICHARDSON

Recent Supreme Court decisions have made it clear that reports of the death of the major questions doctrine—under which judicial deference to agency interpretations of law (i.e., Chevron deference) is denied in certain “extraordinary cases”—are premature. The major questions doctrine is no mere legal curiosity; although invoked rarely, it has been central to important cases such as the Court’s recent decision to uphold key provisions of the Affordable Care Act. It also appears likely to play a role in the Court’s upcoming consideration of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, the nation’s most significant and controversial climate change regulation.

This Article first analyzes the history of the major questions doctrine, showing that not only has it returned in force, but it appears to have been present in another form during its supposed hiatus. The Article then reviews the cases employing the doctrine and identifies factors that appear to make a case sufficiently “extraordinary” to trigger it, all of which appear to be present in the Clean Power Plan litigation.

Finally, the Article considers whether the major questions doctrine leads to better judicial decisions. Critics have claimed it is arbitrary or impossible to administer, or that it merely serves judges’ policy preferences. While these critiques have merit, this Article argues that the doctrine is worth keeping because it functions as a crucial safety valve for Chevron deference. Judges may be tempted, or other actors might demand, that courts rather than agencies decide interpretive questions in big cases. Without a major questions exception, these pressures could lead to Chevron being substantially curtailed or even overruled. Chevron’s virtues in ordinary cases, this Article argues, are not worth risking, whatever the failings of the major questions doctrine.
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It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.

-Marbury v. Madison

If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute . . . . Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

-Chevron v. NRDC

In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation. This is one of those cases.

-King v. Burwell

INTRODUCTION

Who decides what the text of a statute means? As a general matter, judges do, as stated most clearly in Marbury v. Madison.1 The well-known Chevron v. NRDC2 case has been taken to have altered that allocation of interpretive authority,3 giving a share of it to administrative agencies in a wide band of cases. In this sense, Cass Sunstein has termed Chevron a

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1 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.”). But see Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137–40 (1944) (giving some weight to agency interpretations).


3 Id. at 842–44.
“counter-Marbury for the administrative state.”

But *Chevron* is not the end of the story. It does not require total deference to agency interpretations of statutes, and there are some classes of cases to which it does not apply at all. One such *Chevron* exception is the major questions doctrine, established more than a decade after *Chevron* in two cases: *MCI v. AT&T* and *FDA v. Brown & Williamson*. This doctrine claws back interpretive authority for judges in certain “extraordinary” cases; in short, it says that when the legal stakes are sufficiently high, agency interpretations of law carry little or no weight, contrary to the standard rule in everyday cases where those interpretations are often determinative. The major questions doctrine is in effect a counter-counter- *Marbury*.

Shortly after the major questions doctrine’s creation in the 1990s, it seemed to disappear. For many years no Supreme Court decisions explicitly cited the doctrine, and some scholars argued that it was dead or at least dormant. But three cases in the 2014 and 2015 Supreme Court terms, most notably and clearly *King v. Burwell*, confirm that the doctrine yet lives. Moreover, the doctrine appears to have been hiding in plain sight, even during its alleged dormancy. A series of cases citing the late Justice Scalia’s colorful observation that Congress “does not hide elephants in mouseholes” is closely related to the doctrine, and some such cases may constitute a previously unrecognized or at least underappreciated line of major questions cases.

The major questions doctrine is not just a curious quirk of administrative law. It can play an important role in high-profile cases at the Court with great policy significance. The EPA’s Clean Power Plan, arguably the agency’s most significant rulemaking in many years and the nation’s most important action to date on climate change, is currently being litigated. That litigation bears all the marks of a potential major questions case—it hinges on interpretation of EPA’s governing statute (the Clean Air Act), and has great economic and political significance. If the doctrine is applied, the future of United States climate policy may be determined by the Supreme Court’s reading (not the EPA’s) of a previously obscure and rarely-used statutory provision.

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7 *Id. at 160–61.*
8 133 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2013).
10 These are but a few examples of cases that may constitute a previously unrecognized or at least underappreciated line of major questions cases. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 275 (2006); Whitman, 531 U.S. at 486; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
More generally, the doctrine is particularly important in an era in which Congress, deadlocked by political polarization, struggles to pass any legislation. Old regulatory statutes remain relevant longer than they otherwise would, increasing agencies' temptation to make bold reinterpretations. Gaps or ambiguities in statutes remain unfilled. Taken together, these factors likely mean more litigation over statutory interpretation in areas of large policy significance (of which the Clean Power Plan is but one example). And interpretive errors by courts and agencies both are less likely to be corrected by Congress.

If these predictions are correct, then whether the major questions doctrine leads to better outcomes—that is, whether the doctrine is a good thing—becomes quite important. To the extent it has been considered by other scholars, the doctrine has for the most part been heavily criticized. Critics claim that the doctrine is not administrable, is arbitrary or inconsistent, that it serves no clear purpose, and that it is merely a cloak for judges' policy preferences. In many ways these critiques are persuasive.

However, I argue that the major questions doctrine is nevertheless an important and possibly necessary concession. With apologies to Voltaire, if the doctrine did not exist, we, or more specifically judges, would have to invent it. One reason for this is that many judges appear, for psychological, traditional, or constitutional reasons, to be reluctant to relinquish authority to interpret statutes in sufficiently extraordinary cases, despite being willing and able to do so in the far more common ordinary cases to which Chevron deference is applied. Another reason is that the public or other actors may demand that courts decide such major cases for reasons of tradition or, more debatably, perceived accountability, and judges may be reacting to these demands in order to preserve the courts' legitimacy and prestige.

If this account is correct, then the major questions doctrine serves an important role as a safety valve (or a fig leaf) for Chevron. Without it, the fuzzy boundaries of Chevron deference would face significant pressure. More precisely, without the major questions doctrine judges' impulse to decide major cases (or the pressure they feel to do so) could lead them to find grounds for denying interpretive deference within Chevron's two-step process, creating precedent that weakens the degree of deference available in other cases. Taken to its extreme, this could mean effectively or explicitly overruling Chevron.

This is a real risk. Despite its simple two-step process and claim to establish a clear line between judicial and agency interpretive authority, Chevron cases remain hard to predict, especially at the Supreme Court, where the major questions doctrine is most likely to be a factor. In particular, whether statutory language is sufficiently clear for judges to decide its

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12 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 4.
13 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
meaning at *Chevron* step one, or ambiguous and therefore consigned to agency interpretation with much weaker judicial oversight in step two, is often a very fine line. Faced with great temptations and/or pressures to decide major cases, judges could easily claim that statutory text is clear (giving them power to determine the outcome alone) when they would not do so in a similar but less consequential case. Such decisions then create precedent that muddies the already difficult ambiguity determination in other cases, regardless of whether they involve major questions or not.

In other words, the alternative to the major questions doctrine may be that judges still decide major cases differently while claiming not to do so, instead ostensibly basing their decisions on general doctrinal rules and interpretive principles at *Chevron* step one. The major questions doctrine relieves this pressure on *Chevron* by confining it to “extraordinary” (and, at least to date, rare) cases.14

Moreover, the major questions doctrine is transparent—by invoking it, judges announce that extraordinary cases will be treated differently. This may be frustrating for doctrinal purists, somewhat arbitrary in application, and unlikely to lead to better regulatory outcomes in the major cases where it is applied. Assuming that one thinks *Chevron* deference itself is valuable, these flaws in the major questions doctrine must, however, be balanced against its ability to preserve *Chevron* by acting as a safety valve in big cases. In my view, the risk of *Chevron* being undermined is the bigger danger.

This Article proceeds by examining the history of the major questions doctrine at the Supreme Court prior to the most recent terms in Section I, then discussing the newest cases in Section II. Section III draws a consistent outline of the doctrine based on these cases. Section IV presents arguments in favor of and against the doctrine made to date, while Section V makes a new set of arguments that the doctrine is worth preserving. Concluding thoughts follow.

I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE

Any discussion of what the major questions doctrine is, and whether it is worth preserving, must start with the cases in which it was created and has been invoked. There are relatively few such cases, at least at the Supreme Court level—this is not a doctrine frequently used by courts at any level. There are, however, two lines of major questions cases. One begins with a pair of older cases which established the doctrine. Some scholars have argued that the Court discarded this doctrinal line in *Massachusetts v. EPA*.15


in 2007.\textsuperscript{16} As I argue below, Massachusetts is probably not that relevant to the doctrine, and in any case, this main line of major questions cases reemerged in the 2015 term. The other line begins with the late Justice Scalia’s 2001 opinion in \textit{Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc},\textsuperscript{17} and sporadically reappears up to its most recent invocation in the 2014 term. Most scholars have treated the two lines as doctrinally separate, but as I will argue, they are at least closely linked, and may sometimes be the same doctrine in different clothes.

A. The “Old” Cases

The older cases in which the major questions doctrine was first articulated (and by “older” I mean relatively older, i.e. late-1990s/early 2000s; the doctrine is a young one) have been extensively discussed in other scholarship regarding the doctrine, and I will therefore describe them only briefly here—starting with \textit{Chevron}, to which the doctrine serves as an exception. Those already familiar with these cases can safely skip this Section.

1. Chevron

Traditionally, courts decided what regulatory statutes meant, and what powers they grant to administrative agencies. As noted above, \textit{Marbury} stands for (among other things) the proposition that courts determine what the law is.\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, the Administrative Procedure Act explicitly delegates interpretative authority to courts.\textsuperscript{19} To be sure, courts would assign some value to agency views, so long as they were persuasive,\textsuperscript{20} but ultimate interpretive authority regarding regulatory statutes was unambiguously in the hands of judges.

This traditional rule is no longer the law. As most with any familiarity with administrative law will recall, the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in \textit{Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council}\textsuperscript{21} established a doctrine of judicial deference to agency interpretations of law, within certain limitations.\textsuperscript{22} Despite professing to make no changes to preexisting doctrine,

\textsuperscript{16} See generally Abigail R. Moncrieff, \textit{Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (or why Massachusetts v. EPA Got it Wrong)}, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 594 (2008) (“In Massachusetts v. EPA . . . the Court dealt a fatal blow to a fledgling, though controversial, doctrine: the “major questions” exception to Chevron deference.”).
\textsuperscript{17} 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
\textsuperscript{18} Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 167 (1803).
\textsuperscript{19} See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”).
its innovations have been characterized as a "revolution" with "imperialistic aspirations." Under what has come to be called "Chevron doctrine," courts reviewing an agency interpretation of a statute will first ask whether Congress has "directly spoken" on the question—i.e., whether a statute is ambiguous, or if instead plain meaning can be found in the text (or perhaps context) of the statute. If there is in fact ambiguity, the agency's interpretation will be given controlling deference unless it is not reasonable or "permissible." 

This famous two-step inquiry has since governed most cases involving agency interpretations of statutes. It has been profoundly influential in both real-world and academic administrative law. As one scholar puts it, "it is an understatement to say that a great deal of judicial and academic attention has been paid to the foundations and meaning of Chevron's two-step inquiry." Chevron's revolutionary feature is its formal delegation of interpretive authority to non-judges. Contra Marbury, "Chevron seemed to declare that in the face of ambiguity, it is emphatically the province and duty of the administrative department to say what the law is."

Chevron's reach was not unlimited, however. Some limitations are included within Chevron itself. Agency interpretations could still be trumped by plain meaning (i.e., lack of statutory ambiguity), as determined by judges. And even where statutory ambiguity exists, agencies are limited to "reasonable" interpretations. But Chevron did not exclude any class of interpretive cases from its reach.

Courts nevertheless constrained Chevron over time, placing some kinds of cases outside its reach. For example, agencies do not receive deference regarding statutes that cut across multiple agencies, such as the Freedom of Information Act. Similarly, United States v. Mead Corp. restricted Chevron deference to agency actions that have the "force of law." Sunstein has termed these doctrines collectively "Chevron Step Zero," referring to their common feature of excluding cases from Chevron deference.

More than ten years after Chevron, the Supreme Court would add to this list of exceptions by creating a major questions doctrine excluding

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23 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 188–89, 198.
24 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
25 Id. at 843.
26 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 189.
27 Id.
28 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
29 Id. at 844 ("[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.").
32 Id. at 221.
33 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 207.
extraordinary or major questions from *Chevron*’s reach.  

2. **Historical Background of the Major Questions Doctrine**

The roots of the major questions doctrine predate *Chevron*. The idea that Congress should decide big questions, with agencies left to decide little ones, has deep roots in administrative law. In 1978, Kenneth Culp Davis argued that:

Congress is and should be geared to major policies and main outlines, and administrators are better qualified to legislate the relative details, often including major policy determinations. The courts should recognize that administrative legislation through the superb rulemaking procedure that is rapidly developing usually provides better protection to private interests than congressional enactment of detail.  

Though Davis’s argument is directed against the nondelegation doctrine, its implications for the level of deference due to agency interpretations is straightforward. Agencies are in their element when they “legislate . . . details,” while Congress’s role is “major policies and main outlines.” Under this view, deference to agencies makes sense in the former case, but not the latter. Davis’ claim that agencies’ superior qualifications extend to “major policy determinations” is an exception that seems to swallow his argument, by illustrating the difficulty in drawing lines between major and minor questions; this is a point that critics of the major questions doctrine stress (and to which I return below).

As noted above, *Chevron* does not limit its deferential reach to minor questions; the Court would not articulate the major questions doctrine for another decade after *Chevron* was decided. However, Judge (later Justice) Breyer did anticipate the doctrine in a 1984 First Circuit decision and an influential 1986 article exploring and defending *Chevron* deference. This defense largely focused on implied delegation as the legal rationale for deference—that Congress’s delegation of power to agencies includes an implied delegation of at least some authority to interpret the statute

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34 See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229 (1994) ("[T]he Commission’s permissive detariffing policy can be justified only if it makes a less than radical or fundamental change in the Act’s tariff-filing requirement.").
35 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 208 (1978).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Infra Section IV.F.
40 Mayburg v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1984).
delegating that power.\textsuperscript{41} For Judge Breyer, however, the degree of implied delegation depended on the nature of the legal question:

The less important the question of law, the more interstitial its character, the more closely related to the everyday administration of the statute and to the agency’s (rather than the court’s) administrative . . . expertise, the less likely it is that Congress (would have) “wished” or “expected” the courts to remain indifferent to the agency’s views. Conversely, the larger the question, the more its answer is likely to clarify or stabilize a broad area of law, the more likely Congress intended the courts to decide the question themselves.\textsuperscript{42}

Under Breyer’s view, \textit{Chevron}’s rationale (in his view, implied delegation) carries its own limiting principle.\textsuperscript{43} Sufficiently “important” cases might be excluded.\textsuperscript{44}

3. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T

The Supreme Court first acknowledged that such a limitation existed in a 1994 telecommunications regulatory case, \textit{MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T}.\textsuperscript{45} The FCC had excluded “nondominant” carriers from rate-filing requirements under the Communications Act of 1934.\textsuperscript{46} The statute required carriers to make such filings but also granted the FCC authority to “modify” filing requirements.\textsuperscript{47} The case therefore hinged on the FCC’s interpretation of this modification authority—did authority to “modify” filing requirements include authority to exempt some carriers from them?

The Court rejected the FCC’s interpretation, ruling that it was “beyond the meaning that the statute [could] bear”\textsuperscript{48} and was a “radical or fundamental change” to the statutory scheme.\textsuperscript{49}

Up to this point, \textit{MCI} need not be taken as a break from \textit{Chevron}. It could be characterized as a \textit{Chevron} step two case: while the bounds of “modify” are presumably ambiguous, perhaps the Court was simply ruling that the FCC’s interpretation was unreasonable, outside the range of that ambiguity, and therefore had to be rejected. Alternatively, it could be characterized as a step one case (holding that “modify” unambiguously did

\textsuperscript{41} Id. at 373.
\textsuperscript{42} Mayburg, 740 F.2d at 106 (citations omitted).
\textsuperscript{43} Id.
\textsuperscript{44} Id.
\textsuperscript{45} 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
\textsuperscript{46} Id. at 221
\textsuperscript{47} Id. at 218 (explaining that the Commission was authorized to modify any requirement in the following section, which includes filing requirements).
\textsuperscript{48} Id. at 219.
\textsuperscript{49} Id. at 229.
not include the power to exclude), based on Justice Scalia’s references to dictionary definitions in the majority opinion (presumably as evidence of plain meaning).\textsuperscript{30}

The Court seemed to go further, however, basing its holding on the boundaries of implied delegation. It concluded that it “is highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion.”\textsuperscript{51} If this statement is taken at face value, then deference to the FCC’s interpretation appears to be unavailable. In the context of the statute, the question is simply too important. In short, the Court ruled for the first time that some interpretive questions were too significant for the Chevron framework to apply.

4. FDA v. Brown & Williamson

Had the Court said no more on the subject, it seems likely that its restriction of implied delegation (and therefore Chevron deference) in MCI could have been written off as dicta. But in 2000, the Court made its clearest statement of a major questions exception in FDA v. Brown & Williamson.\textsuperscript{52} The case stemmed from the FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco products based on statutory language defining drugs subject to agency jurisdiction as “articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.”\textsuperscript{53} Despite this broad statutory grant of authority, the Court rejected FDA jurisdiction over tobacco.\textsuperscript{54}

The Court’s stated rationale was not that plain meaning contradicted the agency’s interpretation—it would be hard to take such a view seriously. But the majority did still, at least formally, characterize its opinion as a Chevron step one holding. It did so by suggesting that step one is not just a question of whether textual ambiguity exists, but rather allows reviewing courts to examine statutes in context, including subsequent legislation, to determine (paraphrasing Chevron) “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”\textsuperscript{55} Subsequent legislation that arguably ratified the FDA’s historical refusal to regulate tobacco appears to have been crucial for the Court’s holding, with discussion of it taking up the majority of the

\textsuperscript{30} Id. at 225–29 (“Virtually every dictionary we are aware of says that ‘to modify’ means to change moderately or in minor fashion.”); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 237 (“Much of Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court emphasized the dictionary definition of ‘modify’—a definition that, in the Court’s view, permitted only ‘moderate’ or ‘modest,’ rather than fundamental, change.”).

\textsuperscript{51} MCI Telecomm. Corp., 512 U.S. at 231.

\textsuperscript{52} 529 U.S. 120 (2000).

\textsuperscript{53} Id. at 126 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994 ed. and Supp. III)).

\textsuperscript{54} Id. at 161 (“Reading the FDCA as a whole, as well as in conjunction with Congress’ subsequent tobacco-specific legislation, it is plain that Congress has not given the FDA the authority that it seeks to exercise here.”).

\textsuperscript{55} Id. at 132.
opinion. In this respect, the Court’s holding is not particularly surprising—Chevron step one has long been understood to allow (even require) reading statutory text in context, using “traditional tools of statutory construction,” rather than in isolation.

But such implied repeal arguments are typically disfavored. If they were the only thing supporting the majority’s reasoning, the opinion would “seem easily impeachable.” The opinion, therefore, needed additional support. It found it in the major questions doctrine. As the Court stated, it explicitly refused to grant Chevron deference to the agency because in “extraordinary cases . . . there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation” and because “we must be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency.” The Court further ruled: “This is hardly an ordinary case. Contrary to its representations to Congress since 1914, the FDA has now asserted jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a significant portion of the American economy.”

The only citation given for this specific position was to Justice Breyer’s 1986 article, though the Court also cited MCI in its discussion. As Sunstein notes, Justice Breyer was ironically not in the majority in Brown & Williamson and in fact dissented specifically from the Court’s major questions arguments.

The Court gave clues but no clear statement of what made Brown & Williamson such an “extraordinary case.” The key factors appear to have been tobacco’s “unique political history” and economic significance—the Court stressed that the FDA was attempting to “assert[] jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a significant portion of the American economy.” Regardless of what made the case “extraordinary,” the fact that the Court classed it as such seems crucial to the holding. Brown & Williamson remains the clearest statement of what has come to be known as the major questions doctrine. Almost all subsequent invocations of the

56 See id. at 143–56 (containing the legislative history).
59 See Moncrieff, supra note 16, at 603.
60 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159.
61 Id. at 133 (citing MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229 (1994)).
62 Id. at 159.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 160.
65 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 241; see also Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Unlike the majority, I believe that tobacco products fit within this statutory language.”).
66 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 123.
67 Id.
doctrine directly or indirectly cite back to it.\textsuperscript{68}

B. Massachusetts v. EPA—Did the Court Kill the Doctrine?

1. The Case for the Prosecution

Abigail Moncrieff argues that “[s]even years later, the major questions exception died”—not from disuse, but because, she argues, the Supreme Court killed it in 2007 with \textit{Massachusetts v. EPA}.\textsuperscript{69} In the case, the Supreme Court ruled that greenhouse gases are “air pollutants” within the definition of the Clean Air Act, giving EPA authority and responsibility to regulate them or at least give a reason for not doing so grounded in the statute.\textsuperscript{70} In doing so, it rejected \textit{Chevron}’s deference to the agency’s interpretation (the EPA had argued that greenhouse gases could or should not be regulated under the statute).\textsuperscript{71}

On first impression, this looks like the major questions doctrine at work. Whether EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse gases, emitted by almost every sector of the economy and not previously regulated by the agency, almost unquestionably qualifies as a major question (I will explore what makes an interpretive question “major” in greater detail in Section II.A below, but assume for now that the question at issue in \textit{Massachusetts} qualifies). If so, the \textit{Massachusetts} holding matches what one would expect—no deference for the agency.

But the \textit{Massachusetts} opinion does not cite the major questions doctrine. \textit{Brown & Williamson} is cited, but for unrelated reasons.\textsuperscript{72} Instead, the \textit{Massachusetts} opinion relies on plain language arguments—greenhouse gases are, the Court concluded, unambiguously “air pollutants.”\textsuperscript{73} For the majority, this is a by-the-book \textit{Chevron} step one case. As they put it, “[t]he statutory text forecloses EPA’s reading.”\textsuperscript{74}

Does failure to apply the major questions doctrine imply the Court rejected it? Moncrieff argues it does, for two reasons. First, she agrees with

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{69}] See Moncrieff, supra note 16, at 603; see also Jody Freeman, \textit{Why I Worry About UARG}, 39 HARY. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 16 (2015).
  \item[\textsuperscript{70}] Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 501 (2007).
  \item[\textsuperscript{71}] Id. at 500–01.
  \item[\textsuperscript{72}] The EPA had relied on \textit{Brown & Williamson} in its briefs for the proposition that expanding regulatory jurisdiction to large new areas was disfavored, but the Court rejected this analogy. Id. at 530.
  \item[\textsuperscript{73}] It found that subsequent legislation was less persuasive in the greenhouse gas context than it had been for tobacco in \textit{Brown & Williamson}. Id. at 531. But in doing so the Court did not mention \textit{Brown & Williamson}’s “extraordinary case” language, much less state that \textit{Massachusetts} was not such an extraordinary case.
  \item[\textsuperscript{74}] See id. at 529–31 (“There is no reason, much less a compelling reason, to accept EPA’s invitation to read ambiguity into a clear statute.”).
  \item[\textsuperscript{74}] Id. at 528.
\end{itemize}
Justice Scalia’s dissent in finding the majority’s step-one analysis unsatisfying or incomplete—the dissent (and Moncrieff) are unpersuaded that the statute is unambiguous and, if so, that the agency’s interpretation of that ambiguity is unreasonable.\textsuperscript{75} If this view is correct, the majority opinion is not or should not be a \textit{Chevron} step one case at all, but is instead a wrongly-decided \textit{Chevron} step two case. More precisely, to reach the result it does, the majority needs a reason not to defer to the agency under \textit{Chevron} step two.\textsuperscript{76} The major questions doctrine would satisfy this need, but of course the majority does not invoke it despite it being apparently available.

Second, Moncrieff argues that failure to invoke the doctrine in this case is inconsistent with \textit{Brown \& Williamson} because it “encouraged, rather than prohibited, the Agency’s substantive intervention in [a] major policy debate.”\textsuperscript{77} In other words, in \textit{Brown \& Williamson}, the major questions doctrine was invoked to block an agency expansion of its authority, while in \textit{Massachusetts}, it was not invoked and agency authority was thereby expanded. Moreover, large expansion of agency authority gave the Court pause in \textit{Brown \& Williamson}, but in \textit{Massachusetts} it appeared to be part of the Court’s justification, with the majority arguing that EPA should be allowed to address the “most pressing environmental challenge of our time.”\textsuperscript{78} Moncrieff then argues that despite being killed off in \textit{Massachusetts}, the major questions doctrine should be revived, for reasons discussed in Section I.E below.

2. \textit{Why the Massachusetts Majority is Innocent}

Moncrieff’s obituary for the major questions doctrine was premature, however. As discussed below, the doctrine has since reemerged. Also, I am not convinced that \textit{Massachusetts} should be taken to have killed the doctrine or even to have drawn it into question, for reasons that may shed some light on how the doctrine operates.

The first reason arises from some confusion about \textit{when} the major questions doctrine comes into play. Cass Sunstein has placed the doctrine among some others in a group he terms “\textit{Chevron Step Zero},” alluding to the fact that these doctrines, despite existing outside \textit{Chevron}’s stated two-step framework, nonetheless can determine whether \textit{Chevron} deference is available.\textsuperscript{79} Moncrieff adopts Sunstein’s step-zero classification of the major questions doctrine.\textsuperscript{80} The step-zero name is helpful in that it illustrates that post-\textit{Chevron} limitations to deference may operate \textit{outside} the two-step

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{75} Moncrieff, supra note 16, at 605.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Moncrieff, supra note 16, at 604.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Id. at 606 (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007)).
\item \textsuperscript{79} Sunstein, supra note 4, at 191.
\item \textsuperscript{80} See Moncrieff, supra note 16, at 598 (discussing the emergence of the step-zero doctrine and its recognition by a number of scholars).
\end{itemize}
framework. But it perhaps unintentionally implies that these exceptions to deference always operate before that framework.

The major questions doctrine and other step-zero doctrines need not, however, come into play before *Chevron* step one. *Chevron*'s core doctrinal innovation is judicial deference to agency interpretation of statutes, and this is only available at *Chevron* step two. The major questions doctrine and other step-zero exceptions, therefore, operate to block access not to *Chevron*'s two-step framework as a whole, but only to step two. They are in this sense companions to *Chevron* step one, not prerequisites for it. *Chevron* itself says deference is unavailable if there is no statutory ambiguity. The major questions doctrine and other step-zero exceptions provide alternative rationales for denying that deference. In this sense, the step-zero doctrines can instead be seen as expansions of *Chevron* step one, or parallel alternatives to it. Procedurally, they may be invoked at the same time as step one, prior to it, or even after. They still differ from *Chevron*’s steps one and two in that they are based on factors other than the statutory text (or perhaps context), but they do not exist outside *Chevron*’s procedural framework, as the step-zero name implies.

To put it differently, *Chevron* did not create *Chevron* step one—both before and after *Chevron*, courts had the authority to reject agency interpretations contradicting unambiguous statutes. The step-zero doctrines join this background principle in limiting access to *Chevron*’s actual innovation, deference in step two.

Moreover, in some cases courts may have multiple doctrinal justifications for denying access to step-two deference, and may not necessarily use or discuss all of them. *Massachusetts* appears to be just such a case. The majority had at least two such options available. One was to decide the case on traditional step-one/plain-meaning grounds. The other was to frame the case as “extraordinary” and deny deference with the major questions doctrine. The majority chose the former approach, presumably because it is on much firmer doctrinal ground—why rely on a doctrine (major questions) that has only rarely been invoked when the classic, core tool of judicial review (textual interpretation) is available?

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82 Matthew Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule have offered an alternative view of how *Chevron* operates in their essay *Chevron Has Only One Step*. See Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, *Chevron Has Only One Step*, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 605 (2009) (discussing the view that judges are asking a single question—whether an agency's interpretation falls within some permissible range—and sometimes the answer is treated as step one, sometimes as step two, but, in their view, there is no conceptual distinction between the two). If this view is correct (and in many cases I find it very persuasive), then Sunstein’s “Step Zero” label is more accurate. If *Chevron* has only one step, major questions and other doctrines that deny access to deference must operate before *Chevron*, if at all. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily contradict the analysis of *Massachusetts* presented here.
Of course, the majority could have invoked both doctrines, stating them as alternative bases for its holding. Arguably, this is what the Court did in *Brown & Williamson* in framing its holding formally as a step-one decision but supporting it with major questions arguments. But it was not necessary to do so in *Massachusetts*, and, crucially, failure to do so does not imply rejection of the major questions doctrine, as Moncrieff suggests it does. Consider a hypothetical alternative: the *Massachusetts* majority opinion denying deference on major questions grounds and (unlike in *Brown & Williamson*) not offering an alternative basis under step one. It could hardly be argued that such an opinion operated to reject step-one textual analysis by implication.

Even if one does view major questions and other step-zero doctrines as operating before *Chevron* step one, it is not necessary to interpret *Massachusetts* as overruling the doctrine. Whether they are parallel or sequential, the doctrine and step one still provide alternative bases for denying access to deference. It is possible that the majority avoided the issue of whether the case was a major question for one of many reasons other than a rejection of the doctrine. For example, the majority may have felt that the step-one textual analysis was such a strong argument that no major questions discussion was necessary; essentially, they may have assumed *arguendo* that *Massachusetts* was not a major questions case so as to reach the stronger position they believed their textual arguments offered. Or perhaps it was simply easier to attract votes for a step-one textual opinion than a major questions one.

Moncrieff appears to reject this possibility because she finds the majority’s textual analysis unconvincing (Justice Scalia agreed in dissent). For her, the majority’s opinion demanded support from the major questions doctrine. Because the majority failed to employ the doctrine, Moncrieff concludes they killed it by implication. But the objective strength of the majority’s step-one arguments (if such objective strength of legal opinions even exists) or the subjective views of others are not relevant to the implications of the majority’s failure to use the major questions doctrine in support. If the majority themselves are convinced by their textual analysis, as they certainly appear to be, we should not be surprised by, and should draw no conclusions from, their failure to cite any other doctrines in support. In short, we should be skeptical of implied doctrinal repeal.

Moncrieff’s second argument is that *Massachusetts* effectively killed the major questions doctrine because, *contra* *Brown & Williamson*, it allowed rather than blocked agency involvement in a major question. Under Moncrieff’s view, the doctrine operates (or at least should operate) to

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82 *Id.* at 605, *see* *Massachusetts* v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 549–53 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s statutory analysis).

restrain agencies from interfering in issues that are under political consideration. This rationale for the doctrine is discussed among other normative arguments in Section 1.E below. In my view, this is a misreading of the purpose and function of the doctrine. Taking MCI and Brown & Williamson at face value, the doctrine operates to limit access to Chevron deference, not to achieve a substantive noninterference goal. The doctrine is procedural and authority-allocating, not substantive.

Moncrieff’s noninterference view of the doctrine would operate to deny deference to agencies expanding their authority (Brown & Williamson) but still offer deference to agencies that limit or refuse to expand that authority (in her view, Massachusetts should have done this). But this one-way version of the doctrine lacks support in the earlier cases establishing it. Brown & Williamson states that it is implied delegation (and therefore Chevron deference), not expansion of authority, that should be viewed with skepticism in “extraordinary cases.” MCI more explicitly contradicts Moncrieff’s view—in that case, the FCC regulation at issue exempted certain firms from rate-filing requirements, a contraction of regulatory authority, but the Court nevertheless rejected the attempt on major questions grounds.

It is possible that Moncrieff’s non-interference view of the major questions doctrine is how the doctrine should operate, but it appears inaccurate as a claim regarding how the doctrine actually works, or at least how it did at the time Massachusetts was decided. The majority’s refusal to invoke the doctrine therefore tells us little if anything about the case’s implications for a major questions doctrine driven by noninterference. In other words, Moncrieff’s claim that Massachusetts “denied deference on the ground that the Agency must be forced to make a major decision” appears to be a misreading of the case. Despite the majority’s mention of the seriousness of the climate problem, they seem to have truly believed that the text of the Clean Air Act, not the significance of the substantive issue, controlled whether deference was available. As they put it, the text, not the significance of climate change, “forecloses EPA’s reading.”

C. Extending the Doctrine: “Elephants in Mouseholes”

MCI and Brown & Williamson are the traditional cases establishing the major questions doctrine. As the next section details, the doctrine was explicitly cited in 2015’s King v. Burwell. But the doctrine is not necessarily

87. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 234 (1994) (holding that the FCC’s actions constituted a new system of regulation that was at odds with the express intent of Congress and were thus inappropriate).
restricted to those three cases, even at the Supreme Court level. Another line of cases, beginning with Justice Scalia’s 2001 opinion in *Whitman v. American Trucking*, expresses judicial skepticism toward large expansions of agency authority based on narrow statutory text; as Justice Scalia put it: “Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”

This principle has been repeatedly cited in subsequent opinions, but it has not generally been considered an expression of the major questions doctrine. On its face, the principle is not about major questions at all; instead, it is simply an interpretive rule or canon—thin or narrow statutory text will not be read to authorize large regulatory programs. Like other canons of construction, the principle does have a role to play in *Chevron* cases at step one, as a “traditional tool of statutory interpretation.” Nevertheless, at least in some cases the “elephants in mouseholes” principle appears to have evolved beyond that narrow role to take on a role similar (and maybe identical) to that of the major questions doctrine.

1. *Whitman v. American Trucking*

In *Whitman*, industry litigants challenged the EPA’s setting of national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), arguing that the agency should have considered costs. The D.C. Circuit agreed with the petitioners, holding that Congress’s delegation of standard-setting authority to EPA lacked an “intelligible principle” and therefore was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the agency—unless the agency could cure the constitutional defect by considering costs or applying some other “intelligible principle.”

The Supreme Court overturned the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in an opinion that, for the most part, focused on the text of the Clean Air Act. The Court found no nondelegation problem and reaffirmed previous holdings that the

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91 Lisa Heinzerling has explored this view—“elephants in mouseholes” as an interpretive canon of construction in contexts where agencies assert broad powers based on short, often rarely-used statutory provisions—at length. See Lisa Heinzerling, *The Power Canons*, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (on file with author). She goes further than I do here in drawing a connection between “elephants in mouseholes” and the major questions doctrine in that she classifies both as related interpretive principles within a larger group of “power canons.” Id. This classification is not necessarily inconsistent with that presented here, and we agree that the “elephants in mouseholes” principle/canon and major questions doctrine are related. Heinzerling arrives at a different normative conclusion than I do below, arguing that “power canons are the most dangerous kind of canon from a democratic perspective—normative instructions from unelected judges to legislative and executive branches, unhitched to any plausible constitutional post.” Id.
92 *Whitman*, 531 U.S. at 470.
statutory text foreclosed consideration of costs at this stage of the regulatory process. The “elephants in mouseholes” claim is then deployed to further raise the bar for the industry petitioners. For the Court to agree with their claim to have found support in the text for cost-benefit analysis (the elephant), more than weak or brief textual support (the mousehole) would be necessary. With such textual support absent in the relevant part of the Clean Air Act, the Court easily rejected the industry’s arguments.

At least with respect to this part of its holding, Whitman is not a Chevron case—the agency’s interpretation of the statutory text matched the Court’s reading (no cost-benefit analysis), so whether the agency was entitled to interpretive deference was never an issue. Therefore, the “elephants in mouseholes” principle is not an expression of the major questions doctrine as it is used in Whitman.

But the principle does have its roots in the major questions doctrine. The sentence invoking the principle cites two cases for support—MCI and Brown & Williamson, pointing specifically to the language in each case that establishes the major questions doctrine. The connection is that in Whitman, as in the two earlier cases, the Court was skeptical of interpretations of statutory text that would fundamentally change agency authority (whether by expanding or contracting it). The difference is that in the earlier cases the problematic interpretation was offered by the agency, while in Whitman it was offered by petitioners challenging the agency. Therefore, the degree of deference due to the agency was critical in the earlier cases but irrelevant in Whitman.

This has led scholars analyzing the “elephants in mouseholes” principle to separate it somewhat from its roots in MCI and Brown & Williamson and classify it as a tool for avoiding nondelegation constitutional problems rather than one for constraining agency interpretive discretion (as the major questions doctrine does). This view seems correct insofar as Whitman itself is concerned, but it does not drive a wedge between “elephants in mouseholes” and the major questions doctrine; as discussed in Section IV.C.

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94 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 470.
95 Id. at 468.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 468–71.
98 The Court did analyze another interpretive issue in the case under Chevron, finding that EPA’s interpretation was unreasonable under step two and therefore rejecting it. Id. at 480–81. But this issue was separate from that in which the Court invoked the “elephants in mouseholes” principle discussed here. See id. at 476–86 (distinguishing Part IV of the opinion from the “elephants in mouseholes” principle).
99 Or creating it, depending on one’s view on whether it is a “traditional tool of statutory interpretation” or a recent invention.
100 Id. at 468.
below, some scholars have advanced similar nondelegation-avoidance rationales for the major questions doctrine itself.

2. Other Cases

The “elephants in mouseholes” principle in Whitman was cited in later cases in support of positions that look very much like invocations of the major questions doctrine. It therefore appears to operate as a version or sub-doctrine of the larger major questions doctrine in at least some cases, even if it has independent life as a canon of statutory construction (whether driven by nonelegation concerns or other concerns) in cases such as Whitman. A closer look at two examples of such cases is useful.

First, in Gonzales v. Oregon,\textsuperscript{102} the Court in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy rejected an “interpretive rule” by the Attorney General making drugs regulated under the federal Controlled Substances Act unavailable for use in assisted suicide in Oregon.\textsuperscript{103} The Act gave the Attorney General the authority to deny drug registrations that are “inconsistent with the public interest.” The Court ruled that the interpretive rule exceeded the authority granted by Congress in the statute, denying Chevron deference and, in doing so, citing Whitman’s “elephants in mouseholes” principle.\textsuperscript{104} Justice Kennedy noted the significance of physician-assisted suicide and “earnest and profound debate” on the subject.\textsuperscript{105} It should be noted that Justice Kennedy also cited another step-zero doctrine, denial of deference for agency interpretations that lack the “force of law” under Mead, in addition to the major questions “elephants in mouseholes” doctrine.\textsuperscript{106}

Gonzales looks quite similar to MCI and Brown & Williamson—the agency takes some action based on an interpretation of the statute, and the reviewing court rejects deference to the agency’s interpretation that would otherwise be available under Chevron by pointing to the significance of the issue at hand. Gonzales, in other words, appears to be a major questions doctrine case.

Citing the “elephants in mouseholes” principle adds another prong to the analysis that is not present or at least not explicit in MCI and Brown & Williamson, however—the breadth of the statutory delegation. One might argue that the issue in Gonzales (drug availability for assisted suicide) is not as economically or legally significant as the shifts in agency regulatory authority over entire industries in MCI and Brown & Williamson (though its political significance may be greater). The implicit response under the

\textsuperscript{103} Id. at 249, 275.
\textsuperscript{104} Id. at 251, 258, 267–68 (citing Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468).
\textsuperscript{105} Id. at 267 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1996)).
\textsuperscript{106} Id. at 235–36 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)).
“elephants in mouseholes” principle is that, even if so, the question is “major” in context because the statutory text at issue is so narrow (or, perhaps more accurately, so short).

Second, in 2009’s *Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper*, Justice Stevens similarly invoked “elephants in mouseholes” in his dissent. A majority opinion by Justice Scalia authorized EPA’s consideration of costs in writing certain Clean Water Act regulations. The dissent characterized EPA’s interpretation as contrary to the plain meaning of the statute (*Chevron* step one) but enlisted “elephants in mouseholes” in support, arguing that consideration of costs was too great a factor in the statutory scheme to be supported by thin statutory basis. This parallels *Brown & Williamson*, with the major questions principle used in support of an arguably weak *Chevron* step-one position rather than as an independent justification for withholding deference.

3. “Elephants in Mouseholes” and the Major Questions Mainstream

These cases, along with two recent cases discussed below, illustrate that decisions citing the “elephants in mouseholes” principle sometimes operate as major questions doctrine cases, even though they do not specifically acknowledge the connection. Moreover, as Jacob Loshin and Aaron Nielson observe, the “elephants in mouseholes” cases illustrate that the principle is nonideological—Justices across the political spectrum from Scalia through O’Connor and Kennedy to Stevens have invoked either the major questions doctrine or an “elephants in mouseholes” version of it in opinions, with many other Justices joining those opinions.

This is not to suggest that “elephants and mouseholes” is only a sub-doctrine of the major questions doctrine. It does have independent significance as a canon of statutory interpretation, perhaps driven by nondelegation concerns, even in contexts where *Chevron* deference is not at issue. Loshin and Nielson also note that the principle is sometimes invoked in cases in fields other than administrative law. In fact, most citations to *Whitman*’s “elephants in mouseholes” language are not

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109 Id. at 226–27 (majority opinion).
110 Id. at 238–39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing *Whitman*, 531 U.S. at 468).
111 Loshin & Nielson, supra note 101, at 37–45.
connected to the major questions doctrine.\textsuperscript{114}

As noted, however, some “elephants in mouseholes” opinions do appear to be applications of the major questions doctrine, denying (or, if in dissent, advocating for denial of) deference to agencies that would otherwise be available under Chevron. This is valuable for two reasons. For one, it helps illustrate that the major questions doctrine did indeed have life after Massachusetts. Second, it adds an additional factor—scope or length of the statutory text—to the major questions analysis. Section III.A.4 below will attempt to place this factor in context among others that appear relevant to whether the major questions doctrine will apply. But before addressing that issue, I first turn to some recent cases invoking the doctrine and another that appears likely to do so in the future.

II. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE RESURGENT

Even if Moncrieff’s claim that Massachusetts signaled the death of the major questions doctrine is incorrect, the doctrine has long appeared to be moribund. The core “extraordinary cases” statement of the doctrine established in MCI and Brown & Williamson was not quoted and does not appear to have been decisive in any Supreme Court case in the fifteen years after Brown & Williamson was decided in 2000. Whitman, as noted, cited Brown & Williamson as support for its “elephants in mouseholes” principle, which has retained continuing importance. But only a few cases in which that principle is enunciated can be classified as major questions doctrine cases.

In the 2014 and 2015 terms, Justices referenced the “elephants in mouseholes” principle and/or the major questions doctrine four times (twice in majority opinions and twice in dissent). Two of these references were in contexts related to the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) and two were in cases concerning EPA regulation under the Clean Air Act. In one of these cases, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,\textsuperscript{115} the dissent references “elephants in mouseholes.”\textsuperscript{116} Hobby Lobby, however, is not a major questions case and

\textsuperscript{114} See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 640–41 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s interpretation of an employer’s requirements under the Immigration Reform and Control Act and finding the “elephants in mouseholes” doctrine applicable); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 645 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (denying a patent examiner’s interpretation of the Patent Act that would cover a broader category of processes based on the “elephants in mouseholes” doctrine); Met Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 116 (2008) (applying the “elephants in mouseholes” doctrine in addressing the standard of review required under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974); see also Loshin & Nielson, supra note 101, at 61 n.255

\textsuperscript{115} 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).

\textsuperscript{116} Id. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
will not be discussed further here. The other three invocations are major questions cases. This may signal a resurgence in importance of the doctrine, and the cases are therefore worth examining.

A. EPA v. E.M.E. Homer City

In *EPA v. E.M.E. Homer City*, the Court considered EPA regulations establishing limits on interstate air pollution under the “good neighbor” provision of the Clean Air Act. That provision requires upwind states to limit emissions that “contribute significantly” to downwind states’ inability to comply with air quality regulations. Overturning the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the majority opinion found EPA’s regulations to be consistent with the statute, at least regarding the questions presented.

In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the majority erred in approving EPA’s “undemocratic revision of the Clean Air Act.” Specifically, Justice Scalia argued that EPA’s regulations “rel[ied] on a farfetched meaning of the word ‘significantly’ in the statutory text.” He further argued that the agency’s interpretation “deserve[d] no deference under *Chevron*[.]” In a now-familiar move, Justice Scalia’s basis for not granting deference was: a) that the statute is not ambiguous, at least not in a relevant respect (*Chevron* step one); and b) that, even if so, EPA’s reading would be a significant alteration of the statutory scheme, requiring greater support in the text. To this end, Justice Scalia cited *Whitman*’s “elephants in mouseholes.”

This is close to a pure major questions-style invocation of the “elephants in mouseholes” principle. Its effect is to deny *Chevron* deference despite ambiguity, or, alternatively, to support a *Chevron* step one finding that no ambiguity exists.

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117 In her dissent in *Hobby Lobby*, Justice Ginsburg cites “elephants in mouseholes” in a context similar to its use in *Whitman*, *id.* at 2787, 2796. She would have rejected petitioners’ challenge to agency regulations on the grounds that their reading of the statute would be a sufficiently significant departure from previous law to require a clear statement from Congress, which she believed was absent. *Id.* at 2796. Had she written a majority opinion rather than a dissent, this would have closely paralleled *Whitman*. Moreover, *Chevron* deference was never available to the agency because the relevant statute (the Religious Freedom Restoration Act) cuts across multiple agencies.

118 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).

119 *Id.* at 1593.

120 *Id.* at 1595.

121 *Id.* at 1610.

122 *Id.*

123 *Id.*

124 *Id.* at 1611.

125 *Id.*

126 *Id.* at 1612.

127 *Id.*
B. UARG v. EPA

Just a month later in the 2014 term, Justice Scalia again invoked the "elephants in mouseholes" principle in rejecting an EPA interpretation of the Clean Air Act, this time writing for the majority. EPA regulations had included review of greenhouse gas emissions in the Act's new source review process on the grounds that (the agency believed) the statute's requirement that such reviews cover "any air pollutant" regulated under the statute was triggered by other regulations limiting greenhouse gas emissions from road vehicles. In this argument, finding that the plain meaning of the statute required the opposite result, In doing so, he denied deference to the EPA's interpretation under Chevron step one. Nonetheless, it is hard to accept UARG as merely a plain meaning/step one case. Justice Scalia went to great lengths to find that "any air pollutant" should not include greenhouse gases in the context of new source review, but may do so elsewhere in the Act, finding that greenhouse gases were generally not included within "any air pollutant" would have overruled Massachusetts. Even if one finds this argument persuasive, it is difficult to accept that there is no ambiguity in the statute and that deference can therefore be denied on Chevron step one grounds.

But Justice Scalia's arguments are not exclusively based on the text of the statute. Indeed, as in Brown & Williamson and other cases discussed above, additional support for refusing deference appears to be necessary. Justice Scalia adds that support with a familiar appeal:

When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate "a significant portion of the American economy," we typically greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism. We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast "economic and political significance."

Though it does not quote Whitman, this is a restatement of the "elephants in mouseholes" principle. The two key elements—significant change in scope of regulatory authority and a short or narrow statutory basis—are invoked. But there is more going on here. In support of this position, Justice Scalia cites not Whitman, but Brown & Williamson and MCI. Therefore, this is not just "elephants in mouseholes," but explicitly the classic major questions

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129 Id. at 2435.
130 Id. at 2439.
131 Id. at 2442.
132 Id. at 2440–42.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 2444 (citations omitted).
doctrine in action. *Chevron* deference has been denied, at least in part because of the significance of the issue at hand. The addition of *Whitman*'s factor regarding statutory text proves, in my view, that “elephants in mouseholes” functions in *Chevron* cases as an extension of the major questions doctrine. If the two had not merged before *UARG*, they appear to have done so afterward. As discussed in the next section, this may have serious implications for future review of EPA efforts to regulate carbon under the Clean Air Act.

**C. King v. Burwell**

In one of the most closely watched cases of the 2015 (or any) term, the Court considered in *King v. Burwell* whether the federal government may (in an IRS rulemaking) make tax credits available to customers of federal health-insurance exchanges, despite language in the statute arguably limiting such credits to exchanges “established by the state.”135 A threshold question was whether the relevant agency was entitled to *Chevron* deference. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, ruled that it was not by explicitly invoking the major questions doctrine.

When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, we often apply the two-step framework announced in *Chevron*. Under that framework, we ask whether the statute is ambiguous and, if so, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. This approach “is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.” “In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.”

This is one of those cases. The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of health insurance for millions of people. Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep “economic and political significance” that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly.136

Moreover, this discussion occurs near the beginning of the opinion, before the Chief Justice considers the relevant statutory text.137 This means that the major questions doctrine is operating before and independently of

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136 *Id.* at 2488–89 (citations omitted).
137 *Id.*
Chevron step one—in this case, it really is Chevron step zero. Unlike Brown & Williamson and many of the “elephants in mouseholes” cases, the major questions doctrine is not deployed to prop up an otherwise marginal Chevron step-one textual argument but as an independent justification for denying deference. In other words, King arguably is the only “pure” major questions case—earlier cases, most clearly Brown & Williamson, characterize the doctrine as a corollary of Chevron step one or as a secondary rationale for rejecting deference to agencies. However, even King is perhaps not a “pure” expression of the doctrine, since the opinion offers an alternative rationale for denying deference—that the IRS lacks the relevant expertise in health policy, and that therefore Congress could not have intended implicit delegation. At a minimum, however, King is the major questions doctrine’s clearest and most direct use by the Supreme Court.

Even more interestingly, the Chief Justice ultimately agrees with the government’s interpretation of the statute, despite denying deference. This has a few implications. First, it illustrates that the major questions doctrine is not (or at least is not always) just a tool used to get around Chevron by judges who disagree with agency interpretations. At least in theory, the doctrine is about allocation of interpretive authority, not substantive outcomes such as greater or lesser agency regulatory authority. Second, it gives the doctrine a stronger independent foundation by separating it from Chevron step one. King is clear that the doctrine is (or can be) an exception to Chevron, not a mere rhetorical device or super-canon among the many “traditional tools of statutory interpretation” available at step one.

Third, King arguably ratifies UARG’s incorporation of “elephants in mouseholes” into the major questions doctrine. The Chief Justice’s demand that if Congress wants to delegate interpretive authority in extraordinary cases, it must do so “expressly” is the mirror image of “elephants in mouseholes.” If a Congressional delegation of substantive authority is vague, sluit, or otherwise suspect, “elephants in mouseholes” implies it will not be taken as an express delegation of interpretive authority, and therefore, Chevron will not apply. In other words, express, not merely implied, delegation is required in major question cases. Since Congress never expressly delegates interpretive authority, this means judges, not agencies, will retain primary interpretive authority in such cases (contra Chevron). In major cases, especially with thin statutory bases for agency authority,

138 The fact that the major questions doctrine can serve either role strengthens, in my view, my earlier claim that Chevron step-one textual analysis and the major questions doctrine (along with other step-zero deference-denial doctrines) are substitutes for each other at the same procedural point, rather than sequential considerations, as the step-zero name might imply.
139 See discussion in supra Section I.B.2.
140 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
141 Id. at 2488–89.
Marbury returns.

Perhaps most significantly, *King* puts the major questions doctrine once again on strong footing at the Court. The long gap between *King* and *Brown & Williamson*, the last unambiguous major questions case at the Court, had led some to conclude that the doctrine was dead or defunct.\(^{142}\) It may be that major questions are simply rather rare, as one should expect given that they are by definition present only in “extraordinary cases.” One or two per decade, plus possibly a few more where thin statutory text justifies application of the “elephants in mouseholes” variant, may be par for the course. Long gaps between such cases should not therefore be taken as evidence that the doctrine is under threat.

III. MAKING SENSE OF THE DOCTRINE

Based on this history at the Court, what can we conclude about when the major questions doctrine will apply? What makes a question “major,” a case “extraordinary,” a change in regulatory authority an “elephant,” or a statutory provision a “mousehole”? The short and perhaps most accurate answer is that it is in the eye of the beholder. Each case is different, and these lines are impossible to define exactly. This is one of the most important flaws in the doctrine, as discussed below. But it may be possible to identify some relevant factors. At least one case the Court is likely to hear in the future also appears to fulfill most, if not all, of those factors.

A. What Makes a MajorQuestions Case?

It is possible, with a close reading of the cases invoking the major questions doctrine, to identify some similarities and thereby suggest indicia of what is likely to bring a case under the doctrine. But these are at most suggestions—the Court has never purported to list all the relevant factors, and those factors that the Court has identified are not apparent in all of the cases. Therefore, to the extent factors are identified, they do not appear to be necessary, much less sufficient—instead, if present, they seem to make it more likely that a given case will be treated as “major” or “extraordinary,” and that *Chevron* deference will therefore be denied. At least four such factors appear relevant.

1. Major Shift in Regulatory Scope

Most of the cases involve an agency interpretation of a statute that would result in an at least arguably significant change in the scope of regulatory authority. *Brown & Williamson* is the clearest example, with the FDA asserting authority over an entire industry (tobacco) that it had not

previously regulated. EPA regulation of greenhouse gases from new sources at issue in *UARG* could be viewed similarly. Justia Scalia's dissent in *E.M.E. Homer City* stressed such a shift (in Justice Scalia's view) from previous understanding of the relevant statutory provision.

In *MCI*, the agency asserted authority *not* to regulate a class of firms, or at least to exempt them from a major part of the regulatory scheme (rate filing). *MCI* also provides the best explicit support for this factor in its citation of "radical or fundamental change" to the statutory scheme as grounds for denying deference.

Not all cases have this element, however. For example, in *King*, the IRS’s assertion of authority to grant tax credits was neither a break with past practice nor an expansion of authority beyond established practice, since the federal exchanges under the ACA were newly established. The IRS was, of course, expanding its authority in the sense that it was regulating tax credits in a new context (the exchanges). But this is a direct result of the creation of those exchanges by the ACA, not an independent reinterpretation of existing statutory authority by the IRS.

The "shift in regulatory scope" factor therefore appears to focus on changes in regulatory practice driven by agency reinterpretations of existing statutory authority, not new legislation. If the factor were not so limited, then any new legislation could spawn major questions cases, as it creates new regulatory programs or authorities. How longstanding a regulatory interpretation must be before changing it is considered a "major" shift is not clear from the cases.

2. Economic Significance

*Brown & Williamson* explicitly points to the economic significance of an agency's interpretation as a factor in whether a case qualifies as "extraordinary" and therefore outside *Chevron*'s scope. There, the Court took issue with the FDA's claim to "jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a significant portion of the American economy." This factor repeatedly reappears in future cases. *UARG* in particular stresses the

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144 This is in some tension with *Massachusetts v. EPA*, which similarly dealt with EPA regulation of greenhouse gases but was not decided on major questions grounds. As I argue in Section II.B infra, that tension is an illusion—it should not come as a surprise that *Massachusetts* was not decided on major questions grounds.
147 *Id.* at 799.
150 *Id.* at 159.
economic impact of EPA’s interpretation, quoting the “significant portion of the American economy” language from Brown & Williamson.151

Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Gonzales similarly quoted the “economic and political significance” language from Brown & Williamson before stressing the “importance” of physician-assisted suicide.152 This perhaps illustrates that whether an issue is economically significant or not is in the eyes of the beholder.

In King, the Chief Justice cites the effects of the agency’s decision on “billions of dollars in spending each year and . . . the price of health insurance for millions of people” in classing the case as “extraordinary.”153 It is worth noting here the slipperiness of this factor, however. Whether an agency interpretation has large economic significance depends on how it is characterized. The decision to make tax credits available to customers of federal exchanges is, at least directly, probably not of large economic significance (though if the physician-assisted suicide industry qualifies, who knows). It is likely only because of the exchanges’ importance to the larger statutory scheme of the ACA (which undoubtedly does have such significance) that it can qualify under this factor. I will explore this characterization or framing problem, which is arguably apparent for all of the factors and therefore the doctrine as a whole, in Section IV.F.2 below.

3. Political Controversy

Another factor seems to be whether the agency interpretation relates to an issue of ongoing public or political concern. Again, Brown & Williamson is among the cases stressing this factor, expressing skepticism that Congress would delegate interpretive authority regarding questions of “economic and political magnitude.”154 But King is perhaps the best example.155 It is hard to imagine a tax regulation being treated as a major question without the degree of public and political controversy surrounding Obamacare/the ACA, even if one agrees that the regulation at issue has large economic significance. Many tax regulations are of crucial importance to an industry.

Many of the cases do not share this factor, however. For example, it is unlikely that the rate-filing requirements in MCI or the air pollution regulations in E.M.E. Homer City attracted significant public attention, though there is evidence that both attracted congressional attention.156

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153 Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
155 See Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2483 (noting that because of both the economic and political significance of the ACA, Congress would be unlikely to assign decisions concerning tax credits to any agency and particularly not to the IRS).
Moreover, it is unclear whether it is public controversy that matters or more narrow political controversy—i.e., in Congress or among elites. If the latter, then perhaps the major questions doctrine serves as a check on agency behavior that ceases to be quasi-legislative and becomes quasi-executive or simply nakedly political. Brown & Williamson and, at least arguably, King, could fit this pattern. In both, agency decisions are not just economically consequential, but can be plausibly viewed as direct expressions of the President’s policy/political priorities, in a way that more typical agency actions cannot. As noted above and discussed in detail in Section IV.E below, for Moncrieff this factor is the key—the doctrine’s value comes from discouraging agency interference in active policy debate.\textsuperscript{157} Whether it is possible to draw meaningful lines between technocratic/quasi-legislative and political/quasi-executive behavior is unclear, however. To some extent any new agency policy or rulemaking reflects the President’s political and policy preferences and may conflict with those of some substantial section of the public or Congress.

4. Thin Statutory Basis

Many of the major questions cases and, by definition, all of the “elephants in mouseholes” cases, involve agency interpretations based on thin statutory text. But this factor is hard to define. The economic significance and public controversy factors can perhaps be taken to define “elephants.” But what, exactly, is a “mousehole”? If it means text that is simply unclear, then the factor is unhelpful—if the statutory text were clear, there would be no case to decide (especially at the Supreme Court level), or even if so, the case could easily be dealt with on Chevron step-one grounds. There must be more to this factor than that.

The factor might refer to the breadth of a statutory delegation of authority; some of the statutory provisions at issue are quite broad, at least as interpreted by the agency. The definition of “drug” in the Food and Drug Act at issue in Brown & Williamson, or the standard-setting provisions in the Clean Air Act (Whitman) or Clean Water Act (Entergy) are quite broad. This view fits with the understanding of “elephants in mouseholes” as a nondelegation canon—it polices delegations that are so broad that, left unchecked, they could cause constitutional problems.

But broad statutory grants of authority are common—this factor cannot be enough alone, or even necessarily in combination with other factors. If the grant of authority to the EPA to set national ambient air quality standards

\textsuperscript{157} Moncrieff, supra note 16, at 621–22.
without consideration of cost is a broad one, it does not (apparently) lead to
the conclusion that no EPA interpretations of § 109 of the Clean Air Act are
entitled to Chevron deference. At least for the uses of the “elephants in
mousethongs” doctrine that can be classified as extensions of the major
questions doctrine, something else seems to be in play.

My best guess is that this is simply the length of the relevant text, or
possibly the degree to which multiple provisions in a statute can be
marshalled by an agency to support its interpretation. If an agency asserts
authority based on a single, short provision, the major questions/“elephants
in mousethongs” doctrine seems more likely to apply. For example, the FDA
relied on arguably plain language supporting jurisdiction over tobacco in
Brown & Williamson, but that was based only on a short, one-sentence
definition of “drug,” with tobacco not mentioned elsewhere in the statute. Perhaps more arguably, the FPA’s reliance on “any air pollutant” in the
rulemaking at issue in UARG was rote application/interpretation of three
words, divorced from context. Justice Scalia argues at length that other
parts of the CAA contradict, rather than support, the EPA’s reading.

One way to view this factor is perhaps as a clear statement rule, requiring
that Congress say more, and be more specific, if courts are to find the implied
degregation of interpretive authority central to Chevron. This is appealing, but
it comes close to simply requiring clear statutory language, which as
discussed above, cannot be a factor in whether the major questions doctrine
applies. The evidence that breadth or clarity or length of statutory text is a
factor is extremely strong, but pinning that factor down is difficult. This
makes the factor easy to criticize on a variety of grounds discussed further
below, above all that it is open to highly subjective interpretation by judges.

B. Tracing the Factors

Having identified these four factors, it is possible to review the major
questions cases and examine which factors appear to be present in each.
Significant caution is recommended regarding the chart below. It is possible
to debate whether any of the factors is present in any of the cases. This is
particularly true with respect to the public controversy factor—comparing
the degree of public controversy or engagement across different substantive
issues is almost impossible.

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analysis to evaluate EPA’s interpretation of its NAAQS-setting powers immediately after establishing
that this delegation of authority was quite broad, though well within constitutional limits).

159 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 126 (“The FDCA grants the FDA . . . the
authority to regulate, among other items, ‘drugs’ . . . . The Act defines ‘drug’ to include ‘articles (other
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.’”) (citations omitted).


161 Id. at 2440.
Brown & Williamson is notable as the only one of the cases to (in my view) implicate all four factors.

C. The Clean Power Plan—The Next Major Questions Case?

Another potential major questions case which would arguably feature all four factors appears likely in the near future. In late summer 2015, the EPA finalized its Clean Power Plan.162 The regulation would set the first national greenhouse gas emissions limits for existing fossil-fueled power plants, the largest source of such emissions in the U.S. economy.163 It is widely understood as the most significant federal climate regulation to date, and the cornerstone of President Obama’s climate policy.164 The EPA’s authority to regulate is based on § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act: a provision which dates back to the earliest modern version of the statute in 1970,165 but which has been very rarely used, and never on this scale.166 The regulation has attracted great public controversy167 and was already subject to legal

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*Dispersing opinions only.


165 Id. at 738 n.8.

166 Id. at 737.

167 See A Climate Solution Within Reach, EARTHJUSTICE, http://earthjustice.org/features/getting-a-clean-power-plan/ [https://perma.cc/K3-CN-90H9] (last visited Nov. 3, 2016) (characterizing the Clean Power Plan as “[t]he most important climate change action in a generation” and urging support for it);
challenge at the proposal stage.\textsuperscript{168} Litigation challenging the final rule is a certainty.

Many have viewed Justice Scalia’s reference to the major questions doctrine in \textit{UARG} as a preliminary salvo in this coming battle.\textsuperscript{169} Jody Freeman, in her article \textit{Why I Worry About UARG}, called it a “‘red meat’ reference[] to potential government overreach”\textsuperscript{170} and “entirely gratuitous,”\textsuperscript{171} with the decision “full of troubling hints and clues as to the Court’s skeptical mood.”\textsuperscript{172}

The above analysis of the major questions doctrine cases suggests these fears are not without foundation. A future case in which the EPA’s interpretation of § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act for the Clean Power Plan is at issue would appear to feature all four identified factors. First, although the EPA has a long history of regulating air-pollutant emissions from existing power plants, it has not previously asserted authority to regulate their most voluminous pollutant, carbon dioxide. The Clean Power Plan also envisions (and states regulating under it will likely require) not only changes in emissions at individual plants but significant changes to the electric generation sector more generally.\textsuperscript{173} The regulation, for example, envisions a significant increase in the amount of zero-carbon renewable generation and a large shift from carbon-intensive coal to more carbon-efficient gas generation.\textsuperscript{174} Past EPA regulations have not asserted such authority over the electric sector, though of course they have had large indirect effects on the generation mix.\textsuperscript{175} A strong case can therefore be made that the Clean Power Plan (and the interpretation of § 111(d) on which it relies) constitutes a major shift in regulatory scope of the scale that has in the past triggered the major questions doctrine. As Freeman puts it, the regulation “might plausibly be considered even more economically and politically significant than the FDA’s regulation of nicotine.”\textsuperscript{176}


\textsuperscript{168} \textit{In re} Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330, 333–34, 336 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (rejecting state and coal industry challenges to the proposed Clean Power Plan as premature).


\textsuperscript{170} Freeman, supra note 69, at 10.

\textsuperscript{171} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{172} \textit{Id.} at 21.


\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Id.} at 34,836.

\textsuperscript{175} Dallas Burtraw et al., \textit{Secular Trends, Environmental Regulations, and Electricity Markets}, 25 \textit{ELECTRICITY J} 35, 46 (2012).

\textsuperscript{176} Freeman, supra note 69, at 17.
As Freeman notes, the economic significance factor is also present.\textsuperscript{177} The electric power sector is among the largest in the U.S. economy, with links to every other sector.\textsuperscript{178} It is almost certainly the largest segment of the economy whose regulation was at issue in any of the major questions cases. \textit{UARG} concerned EPA regulation of the same sector but that regulation only applied to new plants.\textsuperscript{179} The Clean Power Plan applies to the much larger class of existing plants.

The same is true for the political controversy factor. Public debate over what action, if any, the United States should take to reduce its emissions has raged for more than a decade. Despite little evidence of action in recent years, Congress has in the past actively debated the issue, nearly passing cap-and-trade legislation in 2010.\textsuperscript{180} Members of Congress have also repeatedly introduced legislation seeking to strip the EPA of the authority necessary to implement the Clean Power Plan and other climate regulations, without success.\textsuperscript{181} Legal debate has been active since well before \textit{Massachusetts} was decided.\textsuperscript{182} There can be little argument that EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act is not an issue of public concern. How the issue is characterized is largely irrelevant—even if the question is narrowed to whether and how EPA should regulate emissions from existing power plants, there is significant public debate. The Clean Power Plan is an issue in the 2016 presidential campaign.\textsuperscript{183}

A Clean Power Plan case would also qualify under the fourth factor—thin statutory basis—on almost any conception of what the factor really means. Section 111(d) is an extremely short statutory provision,\textsuperscript{184} has only rarely been used,\textsuperscript{185} and lacks any specificity regarding how sources must

\textsuperscript{177} Id.
\textsuperscript{178} Id. at 16–17.
\textsuperscript{180} American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
\textsuperscript{181} EPA Stationary Source Regulations Suspension Act of 2011, S. 231, 112th Cong.
\textsuperscript{183} See LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, IN THEIR OWN WORDS: 2016 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES ON THE CLEAN POWER PLAN (last updated Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.lcv.org/assets/docs/presidential-candidates-on-cpp.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GME-CT7D] (listing comments that the 2016 presidential candidates have made concerning environmental regulations).
\textsuperscript{185} See Jean Chennick, \textit{New Power Plant Rule Running Late, with Major Changes Possible}, E&E PUBLISHING (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059978031 [https://perma.cc/LM3R-Q996] (noting that §111(d) has "rarely been used" and quoting David Doniger of the Natural Resources Defense Council referring to the provision as "the 40-year old virgin" of the Clean Air Act).
comply.\textsuperscript{186}

All four factors, therefore, point to a likely future Clean Power Plan case being ripe for application of the major questions doctrine. To give it a place in the above chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Major Shift in Scope</th>
<th>Economic Significance</th>
<th>Political Controversy</th>
<th>Thin Statutory Basis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\textit{MCI v. AT&amp;T}</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
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<td>\textit{FDA v. Brown &amp; Williamson}</td>
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<td>\textit{Gonzales v. Oregon}</td>
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<td>\textit{Entergy v. Riverkeeper*}</td>
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<td>\textit{EPA v. E.M.E. Homer City*}</td>
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<td>\textit{UARG v. EPA}</td>
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<td>\textit{King v. Burwell}</td>
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<td>\textit{Clean Power Plan?}</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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Moreover, in February of 2016, the Court by a 5-4 vote issued an interlocutory stay of the rule pending review in the D.C. Circuit and, presumably, the Court itself.\textsuperscript{187} Such an apparently unprecedented move is a strong early indication that litigation over the Plan is an “extraordinary case” to which the major questions doctrine could apply.

As \textit{King} illustrates, even if this prediction is correct, it does not mean that the Clean Power Plan will be rejected. But it does increase the likelihood of rejection and, more precisely, reduce the likelihood that EPA’s interpretations of § 111(d) will survive scrutiny. How one feels about this is of course closely linked to how one feels about the Clean Power Plan. But increased legal uncertainty does have independent costs—it makes planning by the regulated industry substantially more difficult.

In short, the past two Supreme Court terms (and the 2015-2016 term, if the interlocutory stay is taken as relevant) give compelling evidence that the major questions doctrine has returned to prominence at the Court (if it even


\textsuperscript{187} West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).
ever left). Moreover, a near-future Clean Power Plan case will likely provide the Court with another opportunity to deploy the doctrine.

IV. PAST ARGUMENTS FOR AND (MOSTLY) AGAINST THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE

If the above analysis is correct and the major questions doctrine does have renewed or continuing significance, is that a positive development? Is it likely to lead to better and more efficient regulatory outcomes, greater agency or court accountability, and/or reduce litigation costs and uncertainty (among other values)? Scholars and commentators have offered both praise and criticism of the doctrine, with at least five separate (albeit overlapping) rationales having been offered and to some extent rebutted. This Section explores these arguments for and against the doctrine. In short, the balance of scholarly opinion is at least skeptical, and in many cases deeply critical of the doctrine.

This Section proceeds by separately discussing the various rationales that have been suggested by scholars for the doctrine (including critiques of those rationales), and then evaluating some general criticisms of the doctrine that cut across rationales.

A. Implied Nondelegation

As discussed above, Justice Breyer argued that the legal fiction of implied delegation is weak or even disappears when the legal question at issue is sufficiently significant.188 It is simply implausible, this argument goes, to suggest that Congress intended to delegate legal questions beyond a certain level of import to agency discretion.189

To the extent that the Court has articulated a rationale for the major questions doctrine, it has usually been on such implied non-delegation grounds (not to be confused with the constitutional non delegation doctrine, discussed below). In MCI, the court noted that rate filings were “the essential characteristic of a rate-regulated industry” and found it “highly unlikely that Congress” would leave it to an agency to determine whether an industry will be subject to a rate-filing requirement.190 In Brown & Williamson, as noted above, the Court ruled that in “extraordinary cases” courts should “hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended . . . an implicit delegation.”191 It is this language in Brown & Williamson that the Court cited in King.192 Similarly, the “elephants in mouseholes” version of the major questions doctrine is a nearly explicit statement of implied nondelegation. “Congress

188 Breyer, supra note 40, at 370.
189 Id.
does not hide elephants in mouseholes” is arguably just a metaphor for the idea that Congress cannot have intended to delegate major legal questions to agency discretion without sufficient support in the text of the relevant statute.

If these arguments are persuasive, then they undercut the doctrinal justification for Chevron deference in major cases. Without implicit delegation (whether fact or legal fiction), there is no legal basis for deference to agency interpretations.

However, it is hard to understand why implied delegation should be assumed in interstitial questions but not in major ones. The Court’s statements are conclusory—they do not say why we should assume Congress is less likely to delegate major questions to agency interpretation, just that it is less likely to do so. Digging deeper immediately exposes a controversy over whether implied delegation is merely a legal fiction.

If the principle is an attempt to reflect real legislative intent, and not merely a legal fiction, then why should the presumption evaporate beyond some level of significance? Justice Breyer argues that “Congress is more likely to have focused on, and answered, major questions.” But as Sunstein points out, that claim is unhelpful even if true—if Congress had “answered” the question, there would be no deference issue. The case might never reach the courts since agencies would find themselves limited by Congress’s “answer” in the statute, and if not, plain language (Chevron step one) would resolve the issue. In other words, it is not enough to simply state that Congress does not leave major regulatory questions open—the fact that a statutory interpretation issue has reached the Supreme Court (or even a lower court) disproves the claim.

Of course, Congress is far from perfect. Arguably, it generally decides major questions itself rather than leaving them to agencies, but it sometimes inadvertently leaves large gaps in statutes, or gaps emerge later due to changed circumstances (Massachusetts and climate change being perhaps the best example of the latter). If so, then the major questions doctrine—driven by implied non-delegation—is a fix for that problem. Whether this is correct as an empirical matter is debatable—large gaps in statutes seem at first impression to be common, depending on one’s definition of “large.” Nevertheless, it’s at least plausible.

But even if this claim is true, why isn’t the existence of a statutory gap or ambiguity, however “major,” evidence that Congress intended to delegate

193 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 232.
194 Id.
196 Climate change was not among national environmental priorities at the time the Clean Air Act was passed, yet, the Act was written with sufficient breadth that the Massachusetts court almost 40 years later ruled that greenhouse gases were “air pollutants” within the statutory definition. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 501 (2007).
it to agency discretion? Why is delegation implied for small questions but not large ones? Answering that question requires a theory for why Congress might be less likely to delegate in major questions—the claim that they simply do not do so, except in some rare cases of error, is not enough.

One answer is that empirical evidence suggests Congress is aware of the major questions doctrine, implying that it may write legislation with the doctrine in mind. If true, then Congress might write most statutory provisions with agency interpretation in mind but then write “major” ones in a way that envisions judicial interpretation. This is pretty unsatisfying, however. Most obviously, it is circular, essentially suggesting that the major questions doctrine exists because Congress believes it exists. Also, it presumes that Congress knows at the time of writing statutes where the major interpretive issues or gaps will be but somehow alters the way they are written instead of just explaining or filling them. Finally, it is unclear how Congress would write a statute differently depending on who it thinks will interpret it.

Similarly, if implied delegation is a legal fiction in service of other priorities, then it is meaningless to debate whether Congress is less likely to delegate interpretive authority to agencies in major questions—there is no real intent to uncover. Instead, the argument must quickly shift to those other priorities driving the implied delegation fiction.

An alternative way to look at delegation and the major questions doctrine is to suppose, counterfactually, that Congress had delegated interpretive authority explicitly rather than implicitly—that is, if Chevron had been created by statute rather than by the Court. It could be argued that in such a “Chevron statute” Congress might have reserved some class of interpretive questions, including “major” questions, to courts. But not necessarily, and a theory for why Congress would do so is needed to make such an argument at all persuasive. To debate what Congress might have included in a fictional statute is hardly a valid source of law. Yet this is essentially what the implied nondelegation argument does.

Implied nondelegation, therefore, is an unpersuasive rationale for the major questions doctrine on its own. Whether implied delegation is a legal fiction or not, it is ultimately based on other grounds, discussed below.

B. Competence

Another set of arguments focuses on Congress’s proper or best role, rather than its real or presumed intent. In short, these arguments are based on the proposition that legislatures should decide major questions or, at least,

that agencies should not. This might be due to Congress having greater competence in major questions—it can see the big picture, while agencies may struggle to do so (paralleling Kenneth Culp Davis’s position). Or the argument might be grounded in political accountability or legitimacy—Congress, not unelected agency officials, should decide major policy issues. Moncrieff terms this view “bare majorism,” summarizing it as the “superficial view that agencies should be prevented from implementing major policies.” Justice Breyer’s dissent in Brown v. Williamson articulates this view, hypothesizing that “one might claim that courts, when interpreting statutes, should assume in close cases that a decision with ‘enormous social consequences’ should be made by democratically elected Members of Congress rather than by unelected agency administrators” (though he concluded that such a rule did not apply in the case).

Alternatively, competence and implied nondelegation can be seen as the major questions parallels of the two primary justifications for Chevron deference—separation of powers or implied delegation. If Chevron is justified by implied congressional delegation of interpretive authority, implied nondelegation says that justification evaporates in sufficiently significant cases because Congress cannot be assumed to have made such a delegation. But if Chevron is justified because courts are ill advised to second guess agency decisions, competence says that justification is absent or at least outweighed in significant cases because Congress, not agencies, is the best decision maker.

However, it is not clear why agencies would be better than Congress at deciding minor or interstitial questions but Congress would be better than agencies at deciding major ones. Agency technical or subject-matter expertise would presumably be no less relevant in major questions, at least as a general matter. As Sunstein argues,

there is no reason to think that the considerations that animate Chevron do not apply to large questions. Suppose that an agency is deciding whether to adopt an emissions trading system, rather than command-and-control, in order to reduce air pollution; suppose, too, that this qualifies as a large question rather than an interstitial one. The agency’s expertise is certainly relevant to answering that question.

Moreover, the competence argument is guilty of a bit of sleight of hand. It argues that Congress, not agencies, is best able to decide major questions. Yet, the suggested solution—the major questions doctrine—puts the

198 See Davis, supra note 35, at 208 (describing how Congress should focus on major policy issues while agencies should decide smaller, more administrative questions).

199 Moncrieff, supra note 16, at 611.


201 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 232.
decision in the hands of the courts, not Congress. The conclusion does not follow from the premise, even if that premise is true. This is a problem for the doctrine—even if one agrees that agencies are not the ideal decision makers for major questions, courts might be worse, not better. Indeed, this is part of Chevron's rationale for delegation of interpretive authority to agencies: why should we be less skeptical of courts deciding major questions? As Moncrieff suggests, "it should be clear that agencies are better equipped than judges to answer major political questions just as they are better equipped to answer minor ones." Sunstein goes further, arguing, "to the extent that issues of value are involved, it would appear best to permit the resolution of ambiguities to come from a politically accountable actor rather than the courts."

C. A Nondelegation Canon?

A related argument is that the major questions doctrine might not really be about major questions at all, but it is rather a legal device for avoiding constitutional problems of excessive delegation to agencies—a "nondelegation canon." Under this view, "major" questions would be unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority if agencies are permitted to decide them, or at least would be uncomfortably close to that constitutional line. If that assumption is true, the doctrine removes Chevron as a barrier to addressing unconstitutionally broad delegations (or more precisely, agency interpretations of statutes that create such overbroad delegations) but does so without opening the Pandora's box of a revived formal nondelegation doctrine.

Sunstein appears to have been the first to articulate this view, summarizing it as, "Congress will not lightly be taken to have delegated to agencies the choice of how to resolve certain sensitive questions... Fundamental alterations in statutory programs, in the form of contractions or expansions, will not be taken to be within agency authority." Sunstein therefore places the major questions among other "nondelegation canons"

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202 Moncrieff, supra note 16, at 612.
203 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 232.
204 See, e.g., Moncrieff, supra note 16, at 616 (describing the distinction between decisions of how to regulate, which are decisions that should be left to agencies, and decisions of whether to regulate, which are decisions that should be left to Congress); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 Yale L.J. 2580, 2607–08 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, The Executive's Power] (noting the widely held view that Congress is prohibited from excessive delegation to agencies); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 316 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Nondelegation] (stating that federal administrative agencies may not engage in certain activities unless Congress has expressly authorized them to do so).
205 See Sunstein, The Executive's Power, supra note 204, at 2608 (emphasizing the view that major questions are unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority if agencies are permitted to decide them).
206 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 245.
that he generally praises as being more administrable than a strong nondelegation doctrine, \(^{207}\) though he remains specifically skeptical of the major questions doctrine. \(^{208}\) Loshin and Nielson similarly identify nondelegation as the principle driving the “elephants in mouseholes” variant of the doctrine. \(^{209}\)

The nondelegation canon and competence or “bare majorness” justifications for the major questions doctrine can also be framed as close parallels: if policy or competence rationales say Congress should decide major questions, the doctrine acts to preserve this authority by cutting out the agency middleman between Congress and the courts (competence). If the Constitution is interpreted to mean that Congress must decide major questions, then the doctrine acts to enforce that requirement in similar fashion (nondelegation canon).

The nondelegation canon argument is really two arguments. One version is about substance, paralleling the traditional nondelegation doctrine. When agencies attempt to regulate large sections of the economy, they risk implicating nondelegation principles, especially when they do so based on thin statutory text. \(^{210}\) The major questions doctrine (and in particular the “elephants in mouseholes” version) gives courts license to check this without resorting to difficult-to-administer constitutional doctrine.

But this explanation of the major questions doctrine cannot be correct, or at least it cannot be complete. Agencies administer large sectors of the economy on a regular basis, often larger than those at issue in the major questions cases. For example, the FDA’s regulation of the pharmaceutical industry is no less significant than its attempted regulation of tobacco in *Brown & Williamson*. HHS and the IRS issued many regulations under the ACA, and there is no obvious reason why the rule at issue in *King* was any more significant than these other regulations. To be sure, the exchanges and possibly the entire ACA would not have worked without the rule, but the same is surely true of many other rules with relatively uncontroversial statutory basis. In short, the major questions doctrine does little if anything to rein in large delegations of authority by Congress to agencies.

The other version of the nondelegation canon rationale for the major questions doctrine focuses on discretion. Even if the doctrine does not rein in substantive delegation, it might rein in agency discretion. Under this view, Congressional delegation of interpretive authority itself might raise nondelegation concerns, beyond a certain point. \(^{211}\) This might be better

\(^{207}\) See Sunstein, *Nondelegation, supra* note 204, at 341 (describing that nondelegation canons are more preferable because they are easily administrable).

\(^{208}\) Id. at 317–18.


\(^{210}\) Sunstein, *The Executive’s Power, supra* note 204, at 2606–08.

\(^{211}\) See Moncrieff, *supra* note 16, at 608–09 (describing the view that congressional delegation of interpretive authority raises nondelegation concerns).
described as a meta-delegation concern. It could also be viewed as a corollary to Justice Scalia’s view in *Whitman v. American Trucking* that agencies may not cure unconstitutionally broad delegations, since to do so would require exercise of the unconstitutionally delegated power.\textsuperscript{212} Major questions cases, on this view, present the opposite problem—agency use of otherwise-constitutional interpretive power in a way that violates or at least threatens constitutional limits.

However, this latter version of the nondelegation doctrine, and its accompanying avoidance canon in the form of the major questions doctrine, is fundamentally different from the traditional nondelegation doctrine and any associated avoidance canons. It is not about protecting the legislative power under Article I, but rather it is about the judicial power under Article III and *Marbury*.\textsuperscript{213} Just as the broad statutes that permeate the modern administrative state delegate great substantive (i.e., legislative) authority to agencies, *Chevron* delegates great interpretive (i.e., judicial) authority to them. The nondelegation doctrine places a formal, albeit indefinite, limit on legislative delegation, possibly with various nondelegation canons operating in its place to limit substantive delegations in practice. If it is a nondelegation canon, the major questions doctrine operates in parallel, setting a limit on the amount of interpretive authority courts may (or, perhaps, are willing) to delegate to agencies. In short, it may be a judicial rather than legislative nondelegation canon.\textsuperscript{214}

Sunstein (crediting Jed Rubenfeld in a footnote) has suggested a narrower version of the major questions doctrine along these lines, limited to cases in which agencies attempt “to move the law in fundamentally new directions without congressional approval.”\textsuperscript{215} Presumably, such moves cross a threshold beyond which agencies are exercising interpretive authority that is at least constitutionally troubling. Sunstein ultimately rejects even such a modified major questions doctrine, however, concluding that “[t]he best use of nondelegation concerns lies elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{216}

Nevertheless, this may be the strongest argument in favor of the major questions doctrine, and I return to it in the next Section. However, it has almost no basis in the Court’s major questions decisions. The closest thing is probably the “elephants and mouseholes” subdoctrine, to the extent that regulation of a major part of the economy based on narrow text are indicia


\textsuperscript{213} Professor Sunstein places the major questions doctrine among other doctrines limiting *Chevron*, calling the group “Marbury’s Revenge.” Sunstein, *The Executive’s Power*, supra note 204, at 2602.

\textsuperscript{214} To return to the “statutory *Chevron*” counterfactual discussed above, the nondelegation version of the major questions doctrine suggests that a statute delegating interpretive authority to agencies would be unconstitutional if it did not reserve a major questions exception for courts.

\textsuperscript{215} Sunstein, *The Executive’s Power*, supra note 204, at 7606.

\textsuperscript{216} Id. at 2607.
of an interpretive delegation so large that it might trigger a constitutional problem. But “elephants in mouseholes” is not presented in constitutional terms but rather as a mere canon of statutory interpretation.217

To illustrate, it is possible to argue that the IRS moved the law “in fundamentally new directions” with the rule at issue in King, making benefits available on federal exchanges.218 If so, it is hard to distinguish that interpretive move from many others that agencies make on a regular basis. It really seems to be the scope, significance, and political controversy of Obamacare that makes King a major questions case. If so, then the major questions doctrine as actually applied by the Court does not fit an interpretive or judicial non-delegation framework.

Moreover, if the major questions doctrine is indeed sub rosa constitutionally motivated, it is underinclusive. It seems likely that agencies regularly make bold interpretive moves that do not risk implicating the major questions doctrine, since they do not result in major changes to agency authority or occur in politically controversial contexts.219 Perhaps Chevron’s step-two reasonableness analysis is sufficient to catch such agency interpretations, but, if so, it only does so rarely. And if Chevron’s step two is enough in interstitial cases, it is not clear why it would not be sufficient in major ones.

D. Agency Aggrandizement

Alternatively, a number of scholars suggest that fear of agency “aggrandizement” might justify the major questions doctrine.220 Under this view, agencies are likely to try to expand their own authority at the expense of Congress or the public.221 This may happen to some degree no matter what

217 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”).
219 As Cass Sunstein has pointed out, Chevron itself is arguably an example of this. There, EPA’s interpretation of “stationary source” to allow “bubbling” of nearby but physically separate smokestacks as a single source was legally controversial (hence the Supreme Court case), but not by all accounts a major political issue.
221 See id. at 1009 (“If the jurisdictional question at issue is an important one, likely to have a major impact on the regulatory program and those being regulated, it seems probable that members of Congress voting for the bill would not have wanted the courts to defer to the agency’s views.”); Moncrieff, supra note 16, at 603 (“[T]he Court’s justification for the Step Zero rule was that agencies should be forbidden
legal rules are set by courts, but *Chevron* deference increases this risk by allowing agencies to bootstrap their own authority. In other words, *Chevron* deference allows small-time aggrandizement in exchange for its great benefits (expediency and agency expertise). But the major questions doctrine prevents (or at least attempts to prevent) agency aggrandizement so serious that it outweighs *Chevron*’s general benefits. Put even more simply, the doctrine prevents Congress from accidentally creating a monster.

The aggrandizement rationale has worries about accountability and antidemocratic action by the executive branch at its core. As Lisa Bressman puts it, in the major questions cases

the Court withheld deference because the respective administrations—agency heads, key White House officials, or even the President himself—although electorally accountable, had interpreted broad delegations in ways that were undemocratic when viewed in the larger legal and social contexts. . . . [T]hese cases are best understood to tell administrations that they may not disregard larger governmental or public interests and still expect to command judicial deference. The cases do not suggest that an administration may act only after aggregating congressional or popular preferences. Rather, an administration may not issue a rule knowing that Congress opposes its substance and would need supermajority support to reverse it, assuming a presidential veto. Moreover, an administration may not resolve a politically charged issue essentially by fiat, knowing that the people presently are engaged in active debate.222

Aggrandizement seems to be part of the Court’s rationale in *Brown & Williamson*—the result is arguably driven by concern that the FDA (and by extension the President) was making a bold power grab by attempting to regulate tobacco.223 Also, Justice Scalia’s “elephants in mouseholes” version of the doctrine specifically addresses this fear by adding the scope of statutory text as a factor in determining whether an agency interpretation receives deference.224 Agency assertions of broad authority based on narrow statutory text, under this view, are more likely to be improper aggrandizement than those with greater (or at least lengthier) support in the statute.

Alternatively, major questions cases could be understood as capturing agency behavior that differs from their typical actions and related statutory
to make such major changes.”); see also Sunstein, *Nondelegation*, supra note 204, at 340–41 (noting that canons “serve as checks on agency authority”).

223 Moncrieff, supra note 16, at 614.
interpretations to which *Chevron* applies. As discussed above, whether an agency decision occurs in an area of active political controversy appears to be an important factor in whether a related statutory interpretation is treated as a major question. Agency officials are typically reluctant to make politically risky decisions, since doing so attracts unwanted and burdensome attention from the public and, especially, Congress. When this norm is violated and agencies attempt to enact new policies with large impacts based on narrow statutory language (i.e., when the four major questions factors are present), then it can be argued that either or both of the assumptions underlying *Chevron*—agency expertise and implied delegation—are no longer valid. This need not necessarily be described as aggrandizement in the sense that agencies are doing something improper that the major questions doctrine must check, but rather that they are merely doing something unusual, such that the normal *Chevron* rule should no longer apply.

Finally, the major questions doctrine could be viewed as a part of a larger judicial project to constrain agency aggrandizement, motivated by a belief that *Chevron*, as generally applied by courts, has enabled such aggrandizement. This is the clear motivation behind Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in *City of Arlington v. FCC* (joined by Justices Alito and Kennedy), in which he argued that “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed.” The partial solution, he suggests, is to establish (or reconfirm) a rule that courts alone must decide the threshold question of whether *Chevron* deference applies to agency action. One way to do so, rejected by the *Arlington* majority, would be to deny deference to “jurisdiction[al]” interpretations by agencies. The major questions doctrine (along with *Mead* and other “step zero” doctrines) functions in a similar way—it gives judges, not agencies, the task of determining whether *Chevron* applies in one class of contexts.

Both doctrines—major questions and “jurisdictional” deference—address contexts in which the risks of aggrandizement seem particularly salient. *Arlington* is motivated by a concern that foxes (agencies) should not be allowed to guard the henhouse (whether deference is available). Major questions, as noted, is in part motivated by fears of raw agency power, or at least of undue accumulation of power.

In his *Arlington* dissent, however, Roberts explicitly rejects this

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223 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 282–88 (1989) (discussing agencies' response and negative consequences of a broadened interpretation, which include, in part, the fact that it "makes agency heads reluctant to change").


225 *Id.* at 1884.

226 *Id.* at 1874–75 (majority opinion).
analogy. The majority opinion (in, arguably, a bit of rhetorical sleight-of-hand) suggests that the jurisdictional/nonjurisdictional distinction is really just an artificial and imprecise one dividing "big, important" interpretive questions and "humdrum, run-of-the-mill stuff"—i.e., exactly the distinction the major questions doctrine attempts to police. Roberts evades the trap, agreeing that "drawing such a line may well be difficult" but distinguishing that task from the necessary one, he suggests, of determining "whether [a statutory] term is for the agency to interpret . . . " This recognition of the line-drawing problem inherent in the major questions doctrine is noteworthy given the Chief Justice’s later reliance on the doctrine in King v. Burwell. Nevertheless, his Arlington dissent is among the strongest statements of judicial concern regarding agency aggrandizement. Similar fears almost certainly motivate judicial interest in the major questions doctrine.

If one finds the growth and power of the federal administrative state to be a troubling development, this rationale for the major questions doctrine (whether framed as aggrandizement or simply atypical agency behavior) is likely to be appealing. Even if not, the value of a doctrine capable of checking the worst agency power grabs is readily apparent. Sunstein praises this rationale, noting that "[p]erhaps there is less reason to trust agencies when they are making large-scale judgments about statutory meaning. Parochial pressures, such as those imposed by interest groups, may distort agency decision[s]; . . . agency self-interest, such as the expansion of administrative authority, may also increase the likelihood of bias." But Sunstein ultimately rejects the aggrandizement rationale, arguing that while agencies might engage in aggrandizement, "it is also possible that their judgments are a product of specialized competence and democratic will." There is "no sustained evidence," he continues, "that when agencies make decisions on major questions, bias and self-interest are the motivating factors." Moncrieff adds that "political checks" prevent agencies from

229 Id. at 1877, 1880, 1886 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the Court should first determine whether Congress intended the FCC to have interpretative authority of statutory ambiguity before granting it Chevron deference).
230 Id. at 1868.
231 Id. at 1884.
232 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) ("In extraordinary cases . . . there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended [an implicit delegation to the agency to fill in statutory gaps]. This is one of those cases.") (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
233 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("My disagreement with the Court is fundamental. It is also easily expressed: A court should not defer to an agency until the court decides, on its own, that the agency is entitled to deference. An agency cannot exercise interpretive authority until it has it; the question whether an agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a court, without deference to the agency.").
234 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 233.
235 Id.
236 Id.
arbitrarily expanding their power; doing so requires “compelling technical and political reasons” that look much like expressions of agency expertise.\textsuperscript{237} As she puts it, the major questions exception “seems to violate Chevron’s institutional capacity assumption . . . .”\textsuperscript{238}

Moreover, the major questions doctrine may not do anything to protect Congress or the public from agency aggrandizement, since it does nothing to increase the authority of either. It does decrease agency authority, but to the benefit of courts, not Congress, and if anything decreases popular authority by shifting power from a political body (executive agencies) to an unelected one (courts).

E. Noninterference

Moncrieff, after rejecting most of the above rationales for the major questions doctrine, suggests an alternative—that courts should use the principle to prevent agency interference in matters where “Congress has, in fact, remained actively interested . . . .”\textsuperscript{239} Moncrieff suggests that noninterference is both an accurate reflection of the doctrine and normatively good.\textsuperscript{240} In both \textit{MCI} and \textit{Brown \& Williamson}, legislation passed after the statutory language at issue in the cases arguably contradicted the agencies’ claims of authority.\textsuperscript{241} While the Court was unwilling to conclude that this later legislation constituted an implied repeal of the earlier statutes,\textsuperscript{242} refusing to defer to the agency’s interpretation on major questions grounds could be viewed as a more moderate but still significant reaction. It is possible to explain \textit{King} on similar grounds—while Congress did not pass new legislation on healthcare after the ACA, it was interested in the issue, as evidenced by repeated attempts to repeal the law.\textsuperscript{243}

Moncrieff analogizes this view of \textit{Chevron} and the major questions exception to federal courts’ practice of abstaining from jurisdiction in certain state law cases, but enjoining state proceedings when it is “likely to result in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{237} Moncrieff, \textit{supra} note 16, at 615.
\item \textsuperscript{238} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{239} \textit{Id.} at 621.
\item \textsuperscript{240} \textit{Id.} at 645.
\item \textsuperscript{241} \textsc{Elizabeth Garrett}, \textsc{Am. Bar Ass’n, Step One of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council} 6–7 (2001), \textit{http://americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/adminlaw/apa/chevronrev42001.doc} [\textit{https://perma.cc/6NKW-7ZXB}].
\item \textsuperscript{242} \textsc{FDA v. Brown \& Williamson Tobacco Corp.}, 529 U.S. 120, 122–123 (2000) (discussing Congressional acts after passage of the Food and Drug Act as relevant to its interpretation, but refusing to conclude that the Act had been repealed).
\item \textsuperscript{243} \textit{See, e.g.,} Ed O’Keefe, \textit{The House Has Voted 54 Times in Four Years on Obamacare. Here’s the Full List}, \textsc{Wash. Post} (Mar. 21, 2014), \textit{https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/21/the-house-has-voted-54-times-in-four-years-on-obamacare-heres-the-full-list/} [\textit{https://perma.cc/ZM8S-GUX9} (“[S]ince [Republicans] took control of the House in 2011, they’ve voted 54 times to undo, revamp or tweak the [Affordable Care Act].”).
\end{itemize}
harmful duplication of pending federal proceedings.”244 While typically courts will defer to agencies (Chevron) just as they defer in other contexts to state courts, the major questions doctrine enforces an understanding that “administrative agencies—despite their concurrent authority to make certain policy decisions—should abstain from rulemaking when the exercise of their authority would interfere with or harmfully duplicate a congressional bargain.”245 In Moncrieff’s view, such agency interference is likely to impede Congress’s ability to decide major policy questions and make necessary trade-offs between interest groups. Put most simply, it would “raise overall lawmaking costs.”246 In this sense, noninterference might be viewed as a specific type of competence argument, but it would be restricted to cases where Congress is actually involved, not all cases where Congress should be involved due to generally greater competence in major policy determinations.

Noninterference works well as a descriptive principle in some cases, like Brown & Williamson and King. In each case, as noted above, Congress was at least arguably continuing to address the substantive issue. Moncrieff sees Massachusetts as a counterexample247 and discusses it at length before concluding that it was incorrectly decided, or at least that the court should have invoked the major questions doctrine.248 However, as discussed in Section 1.B.2 above, in my view Massachusetts can be distinguished on other grounds—as a Chevron step-one case, it never triggered deference and, therefore, never needed the major questions exception.

Nevertheless, I do not find Moncrieff’s normative case for the noninterference rationale for the doctrine to be convincing, for much the same reason as for the other rationales discussed above. There is no clear reason why noninterference should be a concern in major questions but not minor ones. If keeping agencies out of interpretive matters that Congress and/or the public are actively considering is valuable, why only on major questions? An agency might equally short-circuit or complicate decision making on a minor issue as well as a major one. Moreover, some members of Congress or interest groups may see a minor issue as quite important from their perspective.

If noninterference were only about interference with the public rather than with congressional debate, then a major/minor distinction might be more plausible, since the public is less likely to be engaged in a minor issue. But not necessarily—for example, public debates over the federal budget have focused more attention to foreign aid than what the size of such

244 Moncrieff, supra note 16, at 631–32.
245 Id. at 632.
246 Id. at 644.
247 Id. at 634.
248 See id. at 645 (“[T]he major questions rule is necessary as a doctrine of noninterference.”).
expenditures would appear to justify. Moncrieff’s solution is to avoid this
problem by defining “major” questions as those that the public and/or
Congress are actively considering. But that is not how the doctrine has
operated in practice. Many “minor questions” cases in which agency
interpretations have received Chevron deference are the subject of some
congressional or public debate. It is even possible to argue that any
regulatory issue significant enough to be granted certiorari would qualify as
“major,” rendering the doctrine universal at the Supreme Court level.
Clearly, that has not occurred. Therefore, the public or Congress must
choose some threshold of concern beyond which noninterference is a
problem but below which it is not. It is not clear how this line can or should
be drawn. Similar line-drawing problems are discussed in the next section.
Alternatively, the noninterference rationale could be viewed as a special
case of the competence argument. Even if Congress does not always have
special expertise in deciding major questions, the noninterference rationale
suggests that it does when it is actively considering an issue or when an issue
is on the public agenda. This perhaps undercuts some critiques of the
competence rationale by limiting its reach. For example, any difference
between agencies and Congress in terms of subject-matter expertise might
narrow or even be eliminated when members of Congress and their staff are
“tooled up” on a substantive issue before the body. Similarly, it is easier to
argue that Congress’s special political expertise or representative character
should trump agency technical expertise when Congress or the public are
actively engaged in an issue, debating hard choices and trade-offs (at least
in theory).

However, a noninterference rationale has the same core contradictions
as the competence and aggrandizement rationales—however much it praises
Congress and/or the public over agencies in the major questions context, the
doctrine itself puts the interpretive decision in courts’ hands, not Congress’s.
Since courts cannot send a statutory interpretation question to Congress for

249 Ponnie Rutsch, *Guess How Much of Uncle Sam’s Money Goes to Foreign Aid. Guess Again!*
NPR (Feb. 10, 2015, 5:17 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandcups/2015/02/10/383875581/guess-how-much-of-uncle-sams-
money-goes-to-foreign-aid-guess-again) (“[O]ur ignorance colors the
way we think about foreign spending. Fifty-six percent of the poll respondents thought the U.S. spends
too much on foreign aid. Once they were told that the U.S. spends less than 1 percent of the federal
budget on foreign aid, only 28 percent still thought the nation was overspending.”).
251 See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, et al., 515 U.S.
687 (1995) (granting Chevron deference to the Fish and Wildlife Service’s reading of the Endangered
Species Act interpreting the term “harm” to encompass habitat destruction). This allowed greater
protection for the Spotted Owl and other endangered bird species, with substantial effects on the
logging industry and local economies. The Spotted Owl controversy was relatively high-profile in the
1990s.
resolution, by the time a case exists it is too late for noninterference—a court has to make a decision one way or another. If Congress disagrees, it can overrule that decision with new legislation, just as it could with respect to agency interpretations. Moncrieff argues that congressional involvement “eliminates the possibility that judicial policy will stick,” but this proves too much—it means that the court’s decision, including whether to give deference to the agency, doesn’t matter since Congress could overrule it.

Finally, and as noted above, under a noninterference view the major questions doctrine would operate in only one direction—it would deny deference to agencies that interpret statutes to expand their authority but not to those who do so to reduce it. This seems inconsistent with MCI, where the agency exempted firms from rate-filing requirements, reducing its authority. It is also arguably inconsistent with the motivations of noninterference. Why would a withdrawal of agency authority be less disruptive to the status quo under public/political consideration than an increase in authority?

F. General Problems with the Major Questions Doctrine

In addition to counterarguments to each of the stated rationales for the major questions doctrine discussed above, critics of the doctrine have offered general critiques that cut across all rationales. Essentially, these are all line-drawing problems, though in somewhat differing flavors.

1. Proving Too Much

The first general critique is that it is hard to defend the major questions doctrine without proving too much and undermining Chevron deference itself. As Moncrieff puts it:

Any workable justification for a major questions exception should operate within the boundaries of Chevron’s two universally accepted intuitions. That is, the rationale for any Chevron exception must not be that judges are ordinarily better at interpreting regulatory statutes than agencies or that judges may allocate interpretive decision-making to a third body, such as Congress, rather than choosing between the agency’s interpretation and their own. Such arguments would counsel in favor of rejecting Chevron wholesale; they cannot justify the mere creation of retail exceptions.

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252 Moncrieff, supra note 16, at 624.
253 See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) (“[A]n elimination of the crucial provision of the statute for 40% of a major sector of the industry is much too extensive to be considered a ‘modification.’ What we have here, in reality, is a fundamental revision of the statute[...].”).
254 Moncrieff, supra note 16, at 610.
For example, the argument for the major questions doctrine grounded in a view that agency aggrandizement is a problem that courts should police seems to point not only in favor of the doctrine but also against Chevron deference. Isn’t any agency power grab that violates legislative intent a problem? As discussed above, for the aggrandizement argument to work in favor of the major questions doctrine specifically, it must distinguish between minor or interstitial cases where aggrandizement is not a concern, or is at least subordinate to other priorities, and major cases where it is a sufficiently big problem to justify abandoning Chevron.

The same problem exists with a superficially appealing move of simply citing Marbury to justify the major questions doctrine—if it is the province of courts to “say what the law is” in major questions, why not also in minor ones? Marbury (or aggrandizement, or competence, etc.) alone is not enough—every argument in favor of the major questions doctrine must also draw a line between cases that implicate the stated rationale and trigger the doctrine, and those that do not. As Davis anticipated and critics of the doctrine argue at length, drawing such a line is difficult in theory, not to mention in practice.

It may therefore be that critiques of Chevron deference are indeed the best arguments for the major questions doctrine. If one thinks Chevron is a mistake, then the major questions doctrine is a way to push back (and it has been successful at doing so). Arguments against Chevron come in a variety of forms, most of them stronger or broader versions of the arguments in favor of the major questions doctrine discussed above. For example, some Chevron critics argue that agency aggrandizement is a pervasive problem, whether the interpretive question is “major” or not—a strong version of the aggrandizement argument.

The same is true in reverse—arguments in favor of Chevron deference can be advanced easily against the major questions doctrine. Critics of the doctrine have done so, as discussed throughout the point-counterpoint above. Take, for example, Sunstein’s argument that agency subject matter expertise should be at least as applicable in major questions, if not more so.

In other words, being a defender of the doctrine requires one to walk a narrow path between praising it and rejecting Chevron. Doing so is not easy,

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255 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
257 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, No. 14-9585, 2016 WL 4436309, at *5 (10th Cir. Aug. 23, 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design. Maybe the time has come to face the behemoth.”).
258 See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 243 (“[T]here is no justification for the conclusion that major questions should be resolved by courts rather than agencies.”).
though I will attempt to do so in Section V, below.

2. Chevron is Not a Blank Check

A related argument is that, as Sunstein puts it, Chevron “does not give agencies a blank check.”\(^{259}\) It remains the case that agency decisions must not violate clearly expressed legislative will, must represent reasonable interpretations of statutes, and must not be arbitrary in any way.\(^{260}\) In other words, deference is only available when a statute is ambiguous (Chevron step one), and that deference is bounded (step two). Also, any agency authority resulting from interpretations is restricted in practice by procedural requirements in the APA and the organic statute. An argument in favor of the major questions doctrine must give a reason why these protections are adequate in interstitial cases but not major ones.

However, most arguments in favor of the doctrine, including the discussions of it in the Court’s opinions, do not mention these protections at all.

3. What Makes a Question “Major”?\(^{265}\)

Perhaps the most fundamental problem with the major questions doctrine, identified by all its critics, is the simple fact that it is hard to determine what divides major questions from minor or interstitial ones. For Sunstein, this is a “thin” line\(^ {261}\) with “no metric . . . for making the necessary distinctions.”\(^ {262}\) Loshin and Nielson note that “[e]lephants and mouseholes are in the eye of the beholder,” making it impossible to apply the doctrine consistently.\(^ {263}\) More colorfully, they note that “we cannot easily know that what we find in the mousehole is truly an elephant—and not just a rather plump mouse,”\(^ {264}\) cleverly illustrating that the bright line rule that Justice Scalia may have intended to evoke with his metaphor is not really so bright in practice. For Loshin and Nielson, this flaw is fatal: it makes the doctrine incompatible with “rudimentary justice,” it “fails to produce a workable rule,” and “quickly devolves into strongly purposive[ist] interpretive techniques.”\(^ {265}\)

Sunstein notes somewhat sardonically that Chevron itself arguably is a major question case. As he puts it, “Chevron hardly involved an interstitial question of the sort at issue in the everyday administration of the [Clean Air Act]; it involved a significant rethinking of the definition of the statutory term ‘source.’”\(^ {266}\) If Chevron itself is arguably major (and therefore, under

\(^{259}\) Id. at 233.

\(^{260}\) Id.

\(^{261}\) Id.

\(^{262}\) Sunstein, The Executive’s Power, supra note 204, at 2607.

\(^{263}\) Loshin & Nielson, supra note 101, at 45.

\(^{264}\) Id.

\(^{265}\) Id. at 45–46 (internal quotations omitted).

\(^{266}\) Sunstein, supra note 4, at 232.
the major questions doctrine, should not apply to its own facts), then how can courts (much less observers) be expected to know the difference between major and minor questions? This argument can be taken too far—Chevron is the name for the deference doctrine because that case was the first to articulate the doctrine, not because its interpretive issue is in the middle of the range of interstitial cases it has come to represent. If it is an edge case, then that may be only a coincidence. Nevertheless, it is a compelling illustration of the difficulty of line-drawing between major and interstitial cases.

A related problem created by the major questions doctrine is that it could undermine Chevron’s role as a more-or-less well understood judicial principle which Congress knows and can legislate against. As Justice Scalia has put it, with Chevron in place, “Congress knows how to speak in plain terms when it wishes to circumscribe, and in capacious terms when it wishes to enlarge agency discretion.”267 If courts sometimes decide to contravene this implied intent of Congress by applying the major questions doctrine, lawmakers will have a difficult time determining what effect their laws will have. While logical, this argument probably overstates the extent to which Chevron is consistently applied even without the major questions doctrine and the extent to which lawmakers consider judicial interpretive doctrines when crafting legislation. It does illustrate a possible negative consequence of the line-drawing ambiguity implicit in the major questions doctrine.

Moncrieff, despite ultimately arguing in favor of the major questions doctrine, does address this line-drawing problem. She notes, in agreement with Sunstein, that “[t]he tariff-filing requirement at issue in MCI was not clearly of greater political or economic significance than the bubble policy at issue in Chevron.”268 She also notes a deeper problem—even if it were possible to state a rough first-order rule dividing major questions from interstitial ones, “the line . . . is easy to distort by reframing the predicate question.”269 Whether MCI is a major question case, she notes, depends on whether it is about telecommunications deregulation generally or just rate-filing policy for a specific class of long distance carriers.270 Similarly, is King about health care reform or a minor addition to the tax code?

Any line between minor and major cases risks being both underinclusive and overinclusive. Minor legal questions might get labeled as major just because they are part of large or controversial regulatory programs (King, arguably), and other questions that seem minor at the time of decision may get labeled as interstitial despite significant and unforeseeable long-term impact (Chevron, again, arguably).

268 Moncrieff, supra note 16, at 611.
269 Id. at 612.
270 Id.
Moncrieff does believe that her proposed noninterference rationale offers a way out of this line-drawing problem because it does not require drawing independent distinctions between major and minor cases. Instead, "[t]he trigger is an agency’s perceptible interference with a specific congressional bargain."\textsuperscript{271} She claims it is superior to other rationales for the major questions doctrine because it, "relies on specific facts in the world that judges are capable of perceiving."\textsuperscript{272}

If true, this would indeed solve the major/interstitial line-drawing problem, but I am skeptical. First, it is not clear why identifying matters where "perceptible interference" occurs with a "congressional bargain" would be easier than labeling them as major or minor based on perceived economic or political significance. Second, and as touched on above, this does not appear to be how the doctrine works in practice. While most or perhaps all of the major questions cases do have some evidence of congressional involvement in the issue that involvement appears to be necessary, not sufficient, for a question to be "major." There are many interpretive issues that Congress or the public considers to varying degrees that nevertheless are not considered "major" by courts.

Take, for example, the decade plus of litigation in the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court over the use of emissions-trading programs under the "good neighbor" provision of the Clean Air Act, including \textit{E.M.E. Homer City}.\textsuperscript{273} Congress has repeatedly examined this issue in floor debates and bills though no bills have passed.\textsuperscript{274} Yet none of the cases have treated the issue as a major question. Moncrieff’s analysis would seem to apply here—a clear statement from the court that trading programs are or are not allowed under the statute would have been helpful, and Congress could have reacted accordingly. But instead debate has continually been stopped, started again, and reshaped by the court’s rulings.

Similar problems exist with other arguments that attempt to shift the doctrine away from the major/minor distinction, such as Sunstein and Rubenfeld’s suggestion that the doctrine be reframed so as to deny deference to agency interpretations that "move the law in fundamentally new directions without congressional approval" and thereby implicate

\textsuperscript{271} \textit{Id.} at 633–34.
\textsuperscript{272} \textit{Id.} at 634.
\textsuperscript{273} See \textit{EPA v. E.M.E. Homer City Generation}, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1593 (2014) (deferring to the EPA’s reasonable interpretation of the Good Neighbor Provision in the Clean Air Act); \textit{North Carolina v. EPA}, 531 F.3d 896, 903, 919 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("Naturally we defer to EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act so far as it is reasonable"); \textit{Michigan v. EPA}, 713 F.3d 663, 669, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (reviewing the reasonableness of the EPA’s air quality standards deferentially).
\textsuperscript{274} See, e.g., \textit{Clean Air Act Amendments of 2010}, S. 2995, 111th Cong. § 418. This bill would grant the EPA the power to administer emissions trading markets for three air pollutants, including sulfur dioxide. This and other similar proposals were termed "3P bills."
nondelegation concerns. Whether an interpretive move is unremarkable or “moves the law” in a big way is in the eyes of the beholder.

G. Evaluating the Arguments

On balance, critics of the major questions doctrine have made a more persuasive case than the doctrine’s backers. Each of the arguments in favor of the doctrine, however superficially appealing and rooted in valid concerns, has serious flaws. Moreover, the doctrine has serious line-drawing problems at its core. It is simply difficult to distinguish major cases from minor ones and, even if that is possible, to argue that deference should be withheld in major cases without the same arguments applying to minor cases.

V. Why the Major Questions Doctrine Remains Necessary

Despite finding the arguments against the major questions doctrine more persuasive, I nevertheless believe the doctrine should be (and will be) preserved, for a reason different from those discussed above. This is not because I think the doctrine promotes important normative goals, at least not directly. I do not think the major questions doctrine is likely to lead to better, more effective, more efficient, more equitable, or more transparent regulation because it prevents agency aggrandizement, puts major decisions in the hands of a better-qualified Congress, or blocks agency interference with political debate.

Instead, the doctrine is a necessary safety valve (or perhaps a fig leaf) for Chevron deference, which does make for better government in the large majority of interstitial cases not subject to the major questions doctrine. To the extent this argument is normative, the benefits of the major questions doctrine are the benefits of Chevron; considered alone, the major questions doctrine might be a net negative. But as I hope to demonstrate, it cannot be considered alone—the two doctrines (Chevron and the major questions exception to it) are inextricably linked.

A. Tension between Chevron and the Judicial Power

To explain the link between Chevron and the judicial power, it is necessary to start with Chevron itself. It is well understood that Chevron deference serves to shift interpretive authority from judges to agencies. Sunstein calls it “a kind of counter-Marbury for the administrative state,” clearly illustrating the principle that Chevron deference means courts are

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275 Sunstein, The Executive’s Power, supra note 204, at 2606.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 2589.
voluntarily giving up some of their authority to "say what the law is." That relinquishment of authority is sharply limited—it only applies in cases of statutory ambiguity, as enforced by the two-step framework. Moreover, it applies only to interstitial (i.e., not "major") ambiguities in regulatory statutes.\textsuperscript{278} It is nevertheless a relinquishment of traditionally judicial authority.

This puts \textit{Chevron} deference in some tension with the judicial role in most other contexts. In every non-regulatory context, and in many (possibly most) administrative/regulatory contexts, courts retain full interpretive authority. \textit{Marbury} remains good law, despite \textit{Chevron}. This tension, I believe, puts \textit{Chevron} under constant pressure whatever the doctrine's practical merits.

\textit{Chevron} also implicates separation of powers concerns; as Patrick Garry puts it, "[i]t has been argued that \textit{Chevron} not only infringes on the judiciary's power to interpret the law, but that it transfers to administrative agencies the power to make law through their interpretations of broadly-worded congressional statutes."\textsuperscript{279} These concerns create another source of tension between \textit{Chevron} and background legal principles, especially for those already skeptical of agency power.

1. \textit{Lawyers}

Perhaps the best illustration of this tension is many law students' experience with \textit{Chevron} deference. At most law schools, students are not exposed to \textit{Chevron} until their second or third year (and in some cases where schools do not require administrative law, not at all). For many of them the idea that a court would or could refuse to decide a question of law comes as a shock at odds with the role of courts they have just learned especially in first-year common law courses. Some never grasp the concept. Even among those that do, I suspect many remain uncomfortable with it even if they can state the rule. I know this describes my own early experience with \textit{Chevron} and it seems to describe that of many of my students.

Practicing lawyers are unlikely to leave any discomfort with the tensions at the heart of \textit{Chevron} behind at the law school, though of course, many will internalize those tensions through practice experience.

2. \textit{Judges}

These tensions may diminish but do not evaporate with experience. For judges in particular, the boundaries of the judicial role—the authority to say what the law is—are critically important. \textit{Chevron} is well established at the

\textsuperscript{278} There are further limitations, such as agency interpretations that do not carry the force of law, or which are purely jurisdictional, grouped together by Sunstein as "\textit{Chevron} Step Zero." Sunstein, \textit{supra} note 4, at 234–36.

\textsuperscript{279} Patrick Garry, \textit{Accommodating the Administrative State: The Interrelationship Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines}, 38 \textit{ARIZ. ST. L.J.} 921, 923 (2006).
core of modern administrative law and is under no serious threat of being overturned. Nevertheless, it would be surprising if judges do not hesitate when deferring to agencies interpretations of ambiguity, or are not troubled by the contrast between such deference and their control of questions of law in other contexts. Judges, with years of experience in the law, have the tools and training to decide legal questions—it is simply what they do. Abstaining from doing so is likely to be difficult, even if judges accept that it is likely to lead to better outcomes for the interpretive questions to which *Chevron* applies.

Justice Thomas in particular seems motivated by the tension between *Chevron* and courts' interpretive authority, leading him to be critical of *Chevron*, or at least the breadth of the doctrine in practice. Concurring in *Michigan v. EPA*, decided in the 2015 term, Justice Thomas summarized this view:

> The judicial power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise its independent judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws. Interpreting federal statutes—including ambiguous ones administered by an agency—calls for that exercise of independent judgment. *Chevron* deference precludes judges from exercising that judgment, forcing them to abandon what they believe is “the best reading of an ambiguous statute” in favor of an agency’s construction. It thus wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretative authority to “say what the law is,” and hands it over to the Executive. Such a transfer is in tension with Article III’s Vesting Clause, which vests the judicial power exclusively in Article III courts, not administrative agencies.\(^{280}\)

Justice Thomas’s view seems to have been, at best, only modestly influential with his colleagues, at least to date. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in *City of Arlington* (joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito) can be read as deeply critical of *Chevron*, or at least of the degree to which application of *Chevron* has enabled growth in unaccountable agency authority.\(^{281}\) Indeed the majority accuses the *Arlington* petitioners and, by implication, Roberts’s dissent of a revisionist project whose “ultimate target . . . is *Chevron* itself.”\(^{282}\) But the *Arlington* majority opinion was authored by Justice Scalia, who in other contexts has been quite skeptical of agency authority. If he was not willing to join a project to limit or perhaps ultimately


\(^{281}\) See *City of Arlington v. F.C.C.*, 133 S.Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (warning that “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed” and concluding therefore that courts alone must determine whether *Chevron* deference applies).

\(^{282}\) *Id.* at 1873 (majority opinion).
overturn *Chevron*, such a project was doomed to failure during his tenure on the court. On the contrary, Justice Scalia was one of *Chevron’s* consistent defenders.283

Nevertheless, just because Justices (and presumably most federal judges) reject Justice Thomas’s view and accept *Chevron* as settled law does not mean his and similar arguments illustrating the tension between deference and judicial interpretative authority (or Article III) do not resonate at all. I strongly suspect most judges have qualms about deferring to agency interpretations in at least some cases. This remains true even when judges ultimately agree with the agency’s interpretation, as *King* arguably illustrates.284

One illustration is the temptation that judges face in *Chevron* cases. To reiterate, *Chevron’s* delegation of interpretive authority is limited; judges may retain it if they can find a plain meaning of the statute that controls (*Chevron* step one). If a judge is ever uncomfortable with *Chevron’s* delegation in a particular case, he or she need not overturn the doctrine, but instead, only needs to find a plausible (or simply preferred) interpretation and claim that it is unambiguously the correct reading of the statute. It is hard to know how often this happens, in large part because distinguishing between “true” findings of plain meaning/lack of ambiguity and those motivated by preferences is almost impossible. But it undoubtedly happens sometimes and supporters of agency interpretations often level the charge of such manipulation at judges claiming to have found plain meaning. For example, Justice Breyer’s partial dissent in *UARG* claimed the majority was doing exactly this.285

*Chevron’s* two-step process might even exacerbate the tension between it and traditional judicial roles. As Matthew Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule note, “if judges spend an inordinate amount of time trying to figure out the best construction of a statute, it may be difficult for them to shift mental gears to decide whether an agency interpretation that differs from the judge’s sense of the best interpretation is nonetheless reasonable.”286 Cass Sunstein notes in a similar vein that judges may have a “psychological difficulty . . . in believing that an agency interpretation is both reasonable and wrong.”287 Stephenson and Vermeule’s solution is to read *Chevron* as having only a single step, requiring judges to determine whether an agency interpretation is within a permissible range.288 While to

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285 Util. Air Reg. Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2455 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting in part) (“The broad ‘no greenhouse gases’ exception that the Court reads into the statute unnecessarily undercuts that purpose, while my narrow source-related exception would leave the Agency with the tools it needs to further it.”).
286 See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 82, at 605 (emphasis in the original).
287 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 234.
288 Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 82, at 397–600.
some extent persuasive, this revision of *Chevron* would not resolve the underlying tension discussed here—judges are still deferring to agencies on some questions of legal interpretation.

Psychological factors matter for judging. There is some experimental evidence that people including judges treat cases differently based on “salient facts of the case,” including the magnitude of the dispute. As Pedro Bordalo et al. point out, “judges are bombarded with material that draws their attention away from legally relevant facts, including the human aspects of the case, attorneys’ rhetoric, and the introduction of precedents pulling in different directions.” Such salient features of cases, Bordalo et al. argue based on empirical evidence, likely affect judicial decision making. The salience of these and other factors is at its highest in the “extraordinary” cases in which the major questions doctrine operates. Public attention, major effects on the economy, and the large interpretive responsibility created by thin statutory text, combine to make the issues in major cases highly salient for judges, and therefore difficult to consign to agency decision makers.

Similarly, judges may feel that deferring to agency interpretation of statutes is risky—agencies may get it wrong (from the judge’s point of view). In interstitial cases with relatively low-salience issues, judges may feel that this risk is worth the advantages of deference—perhaps better and/or more accountable decision making, or at least a reduced judicial workload. But in major cases with high-salience issues, judges may no longer be willing to accept the risk that an agency will get the interpretation “wrong.”

In short, while *Chevron* is settled law and judges may profess to like it (especially to the extent that it simplifies their job in many cases), I suspect that few love it. Deference to agency interpretations of law will always require judges to put their instincts aside. *Chevron* lashes judges to the mast, preventing them from deciding interpretive questions when agencies are better equipped to do so. But the sirens of judging—doing the job they were trained and selected to do—will undoubtedly still call.

3. *The Public*

While law students are often surprised by *Chevron* deference, and judges and lawyers seem to have made peace with it, the public at large is almost completely unaware of it. Few non-lawyers know the name of the doctrine, much less its core idea of deference to agency interpretations of law. This is, of course, not surprising. Administrative law is not a subject of broad interest. Even among legal subfields, it probably ranks below

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290 *Id.* at S17.
291 *Id.* at S18.
environmental, tax, corporate, or even international law in the level of public interest and familiarity, to say nothing of fields with extensive interest, like criminal law or contracts, with which the average person is likely to have some direct or indirect contact.

Nevertheless, the public often does pay attention to individual cases, particularly at the Supreme Court. And it would likely come as a surprise to even the interested public if the courts were to refuse to decide a legal question. Doing so would clash with a basic civics-class understanding of the role of the judicial branch, as the final arbiter of questions of law. In other words, Marbury is arguably part of the public understanding of the structure of government, even if few non-lawyers have heard of that case.

But of course, courts often refuse to decide legal questions—they do so when they exercise Chevron deference. Usually this is no threat to public confidence in the courts or to the public’s understanding of courts’ role. The interstitial regulatory questions to which deference may apply are particularly unlikely to be of interest to the wider public. Even if the issues are of public interest, few are likely to read court opinions and, thereby, discover how much weight might be given to agency interpretations. Even in Chevron deference cases, headlines will read “the court decided X today,” even if a more accurate headline would be “the court allowed the agency to decide X today.” But that ignorance (probably rational ignorance—this is not intended as a criticism of the public) may not be true for all cases. In sufficiently significant, controversial, or well-reported cases, the level of deference to agencies may become apparent to the public.

B. The Major Questions Safety Valve

In other words, for typical cases involving interpretation of regulatory statutes the tension between the Marbury view of courts’ role and the Chevron reality is not a problem. It may not even be apparent except on close consideration. Administrative lawyers certainly have no great problem functioning in a Chevron world, judges seem to adapt fine, despite their instincts (pace Justice Thomas and a few others), and the public remains blissfully ignorant of any doctrinal tension.

But this steady compromise comes under great strain in “major” cases—those of sufficient economic, legal, or political significance to attract attention from the legal community and the wider public. Getting such cases “right” is much more important—not just for the economic and, public interests affected by the regulation, but for the perception and ultimately legitimacy of courts as well. For Sunstein, this is all the more reason to commit them to agency discretion—it is when technocratic expertise and political accountability are most important.292 But as explained at length above, the doctrinal reaction is the opposite—these are the major questions

292 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 194.
cases removed from *Chevron’s* scope, with courts alone responsible for interpreting the law.

1. *Is the Doctrine Created by Judges, for Judges?*

Why do this? I believe the answer is not one of the normative or constitutional rationales offered by scholars or the Court itself, but rather that judges are simply unwilling (or believe themselves unable) to relinquish interpretive authority in major cases. A cynic might believe this is simply due to judges’ belief in their own law-interpreting ability, an ability they are willing to keep holstered in interstitial cases but not major ones. Or, even more cynically, it is a result of judges’ inability to resist imposing their policy preferences in major cases—the very problem *Chevron* is aimed at remedying. To continue the earlier metaphor, when the siren sings loud enough, judges break free from the mast. Under this view, the major questions doctrine is about aggrandizement, but it is pro-judicial aggrandizement, not anti-agency aggrandizement. Sunstein briefly suggested something similar with his reference to “the psychological difficulty that judges may have in believing that an agency interpretation is both reasonable and wrong . . . .”

*Brown & Williamson* appears to be explainable along these lines. The agency’s interpretation of the statutory language allowing it to regulate tobacco was almost certainly reasonable, to the point that it may be the only interpretation consistent with the plain meaning of the statute. Nevertheless, a majority of the Court felt that this interpretation was nevertheless wrong, based on a plausible, albeit extra-statutory, reading of congressional intent. Such an approach is inconsistent with *Chevron*. To the extent that the Court was unwilling to accept the agency’s interpretation, *Chevron* had to be suspended. Framing the case as “extraordinary” made that possible. Had the agency’s interpretation not led to such great expansion in its power over the economy, or had it not attracted as much attention, it would have been easier for the Court to set aside any “psychological difficulty” and defer to the agency. Instead, the significance of the case and the agency’s bold move made it impossible for the Court to resist imposing its own interpretation.

An alternative and perhaps less cynical version of this judge-driven rationale for the major questions doctrine emerges if one views *Chevron* as more or less a mundane docket-management rule. Under this view, *Chevron*

293 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2013) (“[T]empted by the prospect of making public policy by prescribing the meaning of ambiguous statutory commands . . . . That is precisely what *Chevron* prevents.”).

294 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 234.


296 *Id.* at 159.

297 *Id.*
exists not because Congress really intends to delegate interpretive authority to agencies, or because agencies are better at making interpretive decisions, but because it would not be possible (or at least it would be quite difficult) for judges to decide every interpretive question. As Justice Scalia stated in support of Chevron, “the sheer volume of modern dockets made it less and less possible for the Supreme Court to police diverse application of an ineffable rule.”298 If this view is correct, then the major questions doctrine serves to claw back cases that judges view as sufficiently worth their attention in order to apply detailed judicial analysis of statutory interpretation. The growth of the modern administrative state (and the lack of corresponding growth in the judiciary) makes such scrutiny generally impractical, but that does not mean that it is not attractive or, indeed, unwarranted, in at least some “important” cases. As described above, there may be no clear and principled way (or at least no easy way) to decide which cases deserve such additional scrutiny, but that does not necessarily mean they do not exist. Judges certainly seem to feel that they do, at least in some rare cases.

2. Other Contexts in Which Judges Refuse to Decide

To be sure, it is not unusual for judges to refrain from deciding questions of law in cases before them. Beyond the obvious example of standard Chevron cases, the simplest example is appellate review itself. Standards of review, other than de novo, require judges to preserve at least some decisions or interpretations of lower courts even if they disagree with them. Similarly, federal judges must generally abide by state courts’ interpretations of state law. These rules do not give way in “major” cases—so why should Chevron? Why would judges be able to restrain themselves in a context where the standard of review is, for example, substantial evidence rather than de novo, but not in a major questions case?

The answer may be that judges are more comfortable deferring to other judges rather than to agencies. Put differently, there is no serious argument that standards of review and deference to other sovereigns’ courts is in tension with Marbury, unlike Chevron deference. Judges could hold this view for psychological reasons, driven by experience, tradition, or a sense of “comity.” Or they might frame their discomfort with deference to agencies in major cases in constitutional terms—under this view, Article III requires the judicial branch to decide major cases, but of course it does not require that a particular Article III court decide every case or every component of every case.

If stated in constitutional terms, this looks most similar to the judicial

version of the major questions doctrine as a nondelegation canon discussed above. It is a weaker version of Justice Thomas’s view that Article III always requires judges to decide matters of law,\textsuperscript{299} because it is limited to major cases. Major questions under this view demand greater fidelity to the Constitution’s separation of powers, perhaps because the philosophy and concerns motivating that separation are more salient in major cases, or perhaps simply because the public or other political actors demand that fidelity.

Another example of judges ceding authority is the political question doctrine under which judges will refuse to decide certain questions they deem committed to other branches of government. Such questions, like major questions cases, are likely to be highly politically salient. One might ask why judges would be willing (indeed, sometimes eager) to avoid deciding such political questions while at the same time being tempted, as I argue they are, to decide major questions of agency statutory interpretation. The answer cannot be that other judges are the decision makers—the point of the political question doctrine, like \textit{Chevron}, is that non-judges get to decide.

One way to distinguish the political question doctrine is that it is arguably not a way to allocate decision-making authority over legal questions, but rather, a mechanism for dividing legal from non-legal (i.e., political) questions. Even when delegated to agency authority, interpretation of regulatory statutes is unambiguously a legal act. The same is arguably not the case for a political question, like the power to make war or impeach officials.\textsuperscript{300} Put simply, political questions are non-justiciable, while major questions are not. This also explains why judges might appear eager to avoid deciding political questions while willing to decide major questions of statutory interpretation. Deciding political questions requires judges to decide when there is no law to apply, while deference on major questions requires them to refuse to decide when statutory text is ripe for interpretation.\textsuperscript{301}

Therefore, despite judges’ willingness to defer in everyday \textit{Chevron} cases, appellate review, and political questions, judges are nonetheless tempted to decide major questions of statutory interpretation may persist.

3. \textit{Is the Doctrine Created by Judges, for the Public?}

Alternatively, it might not be the preferences of judges but those of other


\textsuperscript{300} See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 235 (1993) ("In our constitutional system, impeachment was designed to be the \textit{only} check on the Judicial Branch by the Legislature.") (emphasis in original).

\textsuperscript{301} Another distinction is that political questions are usually, if not always, about Constitutional rather than statutory interpretation.
actors that drive judges to retain interpretive authority in major cases. Either
the public at large or political elites might demand that courts decide major
questions. Failure to do so would threaten the legitimacy of courts, particularly the Supreme Court.

Take King, for example.302 By the time the case reached oral argument
at the Supreme Court, lively public debate had begun over a real statutory
interpretation question—whether, in the context of the ACA, the words
“[e]xchange established by the state” included federally-established
exchanges.303 Statutory construction had broken out of judges’ chambers and
law offices and onto cable news. At this point, the public looked to the Court
to decide, not the agency. The Justices may have felt consciously or
unconsciously that an opinion finding ambiguity in the statute and deferring
to the agency’s interpretation would have been unsatisfying to the public and
that it would be viewed as an abdication of responsibility. The major
questions doctrine gives the court an escape route—*even if the substantive
result is the same*.

The idea that judges decide major questions because the public demands
that they do so, is in tension with the standard view that agencies, under the
ultimate control of Congress and the President, are more democratically
accountable than unelected judges. Chevron is generally viewed as a pro-
majoritarian doctrine,304 making the major questions exception to the
counter majoritarian doctrine. But if the public really does demand or expect
judges to decide major cases, then this reading of Chevron deference may
not be accurate, at least in those major cases. The public may feel
consciously or culturally that in major cases courts are more likely to enact
their preferences. This could be because in major cases, the attention focused
on courts makes them more transparent than agency proceedings; the same
is not necessarily true in interstitial cases, which receive less attention. Or
perhaps the public (or at least opinion-shaping elites) thinks that Congress
is more likely to remedy any counter majoritarian interpretive error in major
cases than they are in interstitial cases, thus reducing the relative
accountability advantage of agencies over courts. Or perhaps the public (or,
again, elites) would rather see courts decide fundamental or jurisdictional
questions (like tobacco regulation or climate change) even if they think more
interstitial and technocratic decisions are best left to the agencies.

Alternatively, public demands for court rather than agencies might have

303 Id. at 2487.
304 See, e.g., Damien J. Marshall, Note, *The Application of Chevron Deference in Regulatory
Preemption Cases*, 87 Geo. L.J. 263, 267 (1998) (“The common thread through all of these
interpretations is a preference for democratically accountable decisionmaking. At its core, Chevron
concerns the Court’s aversion to judicial legislation and its preference for the formulation of policy
decisions in the political branches. These concerns fit nicely within any constitutional framework, and
are nearly irrefutable. Chevron’s majoritarian thesis highlights the ‘structural integrity’ of the decision,
and its importance in maintaining legitimate lawmaking.”).
nothing to do with majoritarian accountability but instead might simply be a reflection of traditional roles. This might have constitutional dimensions, with Article III and the quasi-constitutional Marbury as a part of public consciousness, which are not lightly discarded in major cases where attention is focused.

4. Does Motivation Matter?

Perhaps another analogy is useful. Interstitial cases in which Chevron deference applies are like off-Broadway productions, the bread and butter of show business. Major questions cases are like Broadway premieres. The house is packed (the public), the orchestra is in tune (the legal community), and you had better believe that the star (judges), not the understudy (the agency), is going to sing the hit number. The cynical view is that the star takes the stage because ego demands it. The alternative is that the star does so because it is what the public, cast, and crew demand, or because it is what tradition dictates.

I should stress that I make no claim here about which of these explanations best matches judges’ inner motives and external pressures. Answering that question is probably impossible. But in terms of the resulting doctrine, the underlying motivation is not that important. The argument is simply that the major questions doctrine exists because judges are unwilling or unable to defer in major cases. When cases are perceived by judges to be important, or when cases become the focus of public attention particularly when narrow statutory text is at issue, those judges cannot resist to decide them.

C. Necessity—Safety Valve or Fig Leaf?

Even if this view is an accurate description of why the major questions doctrine exists, it is at best an incomplete argument for why the doctrine should be preserved. If, in the most cynical view, the doctrine is simply judicial aggrandizement, it would be relatively easy to argue that it should be done away with.

However, it may be that the doctrine is necessary for Chevron itself to survive. This could be for either or both of two reasons. One is that the doctrine is a necessary safety valve. Take the view of Brown & Williamson in the previous subsection. If it is accurate to describe it as a case where the Court could not resist imposing its own interpretation of the statute, then of course the major questions doctrine was not the only way the Court could have done so. Instead, the Court could have overruled Chevron, or created some other doctrine that limited Chevron even more sharply than the major questions doctrine does. By using and reaffirming the major questions doctrine, the Court was able to limit its rejection of Chevron to “extraordinary cases.” To strain the metaphor even further, perhaps the major questions doctrine is the Court breaking an arm free of the mast, but
no more.

The implication is that if the major questions doctrine was discarded, a future case of similarly great significance, thin statutory basis, or any other combination of factors that makes it “extraordinary” (thereby tempting judges to withhold deference) would again put Chevron under threat. If this is right, then the major questions doctrine is a Chevron safety valve, relieving pressure in cases where the Chevron-Marbury tension is most salient.

The other view is that the major questions doctrine is a fig leaf. Take the view of King in the previous subsection. If it is accurate to describe that case as one in which the public, other governmental actors, or the Constitution demanded the court to make an interpretive decision. Then again, the major questions doctrine was not the only way it could have done so. The Court could have overruled or more sharply limited Chevron. Under this view, in “extraordinary cases” where the court is closely scrutinized, the doctrine hides Chevron from view protecting it for use in the much more common interstitial cases.

The two necessity arguments are not mutually exclusive; in fact, in many cases they may both exist. Truly “major” cases are likely to both tempt judges to refuse deference and implicate legitimacy concerns—in such cases, the major questions doctrine may be both a safety valve and a fig leaf.

If this fig leaf view is correct, then the major questions doctrine is not really an expression of “activist” judges aggrandizing interpretive authority for themselves, as a cynical reading might suggest. Instead, it is a judicially minimalistic doctrine, doing only what is necessary to preserve Chevron in the face of “extraordinary” cases that expose the Chevron-Marbury tension.

Whichever explanation—safety valve or fig leaf—is more accurate (or whichever you prefer), the major questions doctrine protects Chevron deference in the large majority of interstitial cases by operating in the “extraordinary” cases where the tension with Marbury is greatest.

Although Chevron deference has become a core administrative law doctrine, it is not immune to challenges, both direct and indirect. As discussed above, Justice Thomas would repeal or substantially constrain it. The major questions doctrine and other step-zero doctrines, such as Mead (no deference to interpretations that do not carry the force of law), are a result of judicial pushback. Moreover, judges need not overrule Chevron to undercut it. In the absence of the major questions doctrine, they could deny deference to agencies in major cases within Chevron by (as noted above) expanding the degree of ambiguity necessary to get beyond step one—in other words, judges might find plain meaning or no ambiguity

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where meaning is, in fact, under significant dispute, or judges might expand step one to include judicial tools of interpretation. In fact many of the major questions cases appear to do this, characterizing themselves as step one holdings.\footnote{See, e.g., \textit{FDA v. Brown \& Williamson Tobacco Corp.}, 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000) (expressing the view that Congress must authorize an administrative agency to regulate in the public interest).} Expanding step one, unlike application of the major questions doctrine, has spillover effects in interstitial cases.

These spillover risks seem significant. Courts are willing to reject agency interpretations of statutes because they run afoul of judges’ view of the plain meaning of the statute, ascertained by application of the “traditional tools of statutory construction.”—that is, \textit{Chevron} step one does have teeth.\footnote{See, e.g., \textit{UARG} (cited in note xxx) at 2442 (concluding that “[i]t is hard to imagine a statutory term less ambiguous than the precise numerical thresholds at which the Act requires PSD and Title V permitting. When EPA replaced those numbers with others of its own choosing, it went well beyond the “bounds of its statutory authority.”)} Since agencies lose on step one more often than step two, arguments in \textit{Chevron} cases usually focus on step one. Agency lawyers typically argue that statutory language is clearly in their favor or, failing that, is ambiguous and that therefore the agency is entitled to deference under \textit{Chevron}. Lawyers for those challenging the agency typically argue that statutory language is incompatible with the agency’s interpretation and that therefore the agency should lose under step one. Both sides will cite previous decisions under \textit{Chevron} with similar or at least analogous text at issue.

In this way, a body of precedent is built, governing the boundaries of interpretation that fall within or outside of step one’s boundaries. Each new decision in step one adds to this precedent. Therefore, if judges are more aggressive in retaining interpretive authority in \textit{Chevron} step one in major cases because of the factors and temptations discussed above, that has effects beyond the major case in question. Over time, the boundaries of step one could expand. Alternatively, if major questions cases are marked as distinct, this precedential impact is limited or not present at all. The major questions doctrine does this, separating “extraordinary cases” from the precedential mainstream.

The best example of such a possible expansion of step one is \textit{Brown \& Williamson}. In that case, the plain language of the statute appeared to favor the agency—tobacco seemed to fall within the definition of “drug” in the Food and Drug Act, and therefore be subject to regulation by the FDA.\footnote{\textit{Brown \& Williamson Tobacco Corp.}, 529 U.S. at 125.} But the Supreme Court rejected that interpretation, ostensibly under \textit{Chevron} step one.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 125–26.} In other words, the Court ruled not just that the agency’s interpretation was not the best interpretation but that the opposite reading (that the FDA could not regulate tobacco) was the only interpretation
consistent with the statute.\textsuperscript{311} Taken at face value, this risked eviscerating \textit{Chevron}. If the Court could so readily conclude that its preferred interpretation was the only permissible reading of the statute under these circumstances, what was left of deference? However, \textit{Brown & Williamson} has not had such an effect—\textit{Chevron} survived and continues to thrive. The reason is the major questions doctrine, which an isolated reading of \textit{Brown & Williamson} might interpret as dicta. Instead, the Court’s identification of \textit{Brown & Williamson} as an “extraordinary case” has allowed it to be easily distinguished in subsequent briefs and decisions.\textsuperscript{312} A legal argument against an agency interpretation of a statute whose closest parallel and best cite is \textit{Brown & Williamson} would be quite weak—as evidenced by the majority’s rejection of such arguments in \textit{Massachusetts v. EPA}.\textsuperscript{313}

Put differently, if \textit{Brown & Williamson} is a step-one decision, it is probably the high water mark for judicial interventionism under \textit{Chevron}. The fact that it remains an outlier is due to the majority opinion’s simultaneous creation of the major questions doctrine.

Similarly, judges unable to resort to the major questions doctrine might be tempted to deny deference under \textit{Chevron} step two, on the grounds that the agency’s interpretation is not “reasonable” or “permissible.” Such step-two decisions are currently quite rare. Even a small number of major questions cases could, without the doctrine to separate them from the step-two precedential mainstream, substantially shift doctrinal understanding of step two, therefore reducing the scope of \textit{Chevron} deference in many non-major cases.

Because judges could otherwise hide their interpretive preferences within the fuzzy boundaries of \textit{Chevron} step one or step two, the major questions doctrine also promotes transparency. In major questions cases, judges are openly admitting to treating the case differently than \textit{Chevron} would otherwise require. This sharply limits (perhaps eliminates) major questions cases’ precedential value in interstitial cases.\textsuperscript{314}

Perhaps the simplest way to summarize the danger that “extraordinary” cases would present to \textit{Chevron} had they not been cabined off by the major questions doctrine is to say, with apologies to Oliver Wendell Holmes, that major cases “make bad law.”\textsuperscript{315} The major questions doctrine, therefore, keeps big cases from making bad law.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Id. at 126.
\item See, e.g., \textit{Massachusetts v. EPA}, 415 F.3d 50,70 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Tatel, J., dissenting); \textit{Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch} 818 F.3d 808, 826 (9th Cir. 2016); (distinguishing \textit{Brown & Williamson} and its implications for deference, more or less on the grounds that the reviewing court determines the issue in question is not “major”).
\item \textit{Massachusetts v. EPA}, 549 U.S. 497, 530–32 (2007).
\item See \textit{id.} (distinguishing FDA v. \textit{Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.}, 529 U.S. 120 (2000)).
\item \textit{N. Sec. Co. v. United States}, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
D. Implications

If the major questions doctrine’s most redeeming function is to preserve *Chevron*, and in particular if it does so in a minimalist fashion, then whether the doctrine is on balance a good thing depends almost entirely on how one feels about *Chevron* itself. Because I share Sunstein’s view that *Chevron* is likely to lead to better, more effective, and more accountable regulation, I therefore disagree with him on the value of the major questions doctrine. In my view, it is worth accepting the doctrine, flaws and all, if only to minimize the long-term risk to *Chevron*, or the risk of unknown problems that might be caused by an alternative limiting principle.

On the other hand, some are skeptical of *Chevron*’s value, because they doubt that agency interpretations of law are likely to lead to better regulatory outcomes or because they believe Article III or other background principles require courts alone to interpret statutes (among other objections). Justice Thomas appears to hold this view. For these *Chevron* skeptics, the best view of the major questions view is less clear. A modest reaction is that if courts are better interpreters, then any doctrine that claws back some of *Marbury* from *Chevron* is a good thing.

A more ambitious view is that the major questions doctrine is an ungrounded exception to an ill-advised (or even unconstitutional) doctrine in *Chevron*. Keeping the major questions doctrine allows judges to avoid confronting *Chevron* when they should, such as in major cases that expose the *Chevron*-*Marbury* tension. Without it, judges would be forced to modify or overturn *Chevron*. In short, this argument goes, if you believe *Chevron* should be rejected, the first step is removing its safety valve. This position is strategic, not ideological, however, and may not be defensible in a judicial opinion. If judges hold this view it may be kept private, though of course commentators have greater freedom to advocate it.

Even if the major questions doctrine is a valuable *Chevron* safety valve/fig leaf, it does not resolve all of the doctrine’s critics’ objections. Most notably, it does not give much, if any guidance on drawing the line between major and interstitial cases—the distinction remains largely arbitrary. This problem is probably insoluble. But it should not be fatal. Administrative law is full of standards masquerading as rules, many of which are applied inconsistently. Although admittedly circular, one view is that if a case is deemed a major question, then it is evidence that the doctrine was needed in that case as a *Chevron* safety valve. Alternatively, preserving *Chevron* may be worth not only accepting the major questions doctrine but also accepting its uncertain boundaries—that is, accepting the risk that the doctrine will be applied to some cases that are not all that “major,” or that

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316 See Sunstein, *The Executive’s Power*, supra note 204, at 2582 (“My major goal in this Essay is to vindicate the law-interpreting authority of the executive branch. This authority, I suggest, is indispensable to the healthy operation of modern government; it can be defended on both democratic and technocratic grounds.”).
the doctrine will not be applied in every case where it should be to serve its role as a safety valve.

In theory, there is some risk that the major questions exception could someday swallow the Chevron rule if the bar for major questions is sufficiently lowered. If that were to occur, support for the doctrine among those who praise Chevron deference would clearly need to be reassessed. The limited number of major questions cases at the Supreme Court level in the roughly twenty-year history of the doctrine makes that risk seem remote, at least today.

My view that the major questions doctrine is a safety valve for Chevron might or might not be characterized as a "legal realist" view. In one sense, it is not—the legal realists' insight was to recognize that legal decisions are often based on factors other than what would traditionally be called "law." The major questions doctrine is the reverse—judges are reverting to traditional judicial analysis of legal texts rather than the "modern" approach of Chevron deference to agencies. Under this view, it is Chevron, not the major questions doctrine that is "realist."

But if one focuses not on the tools used by judges to make the substantive decision but rather on the meta-legal question of who gets to decide, one reaches a different conclusion. If, as I suggest, it is judicial psychology, political forces, public opinion, institutional traditions, and other extra-legal factors driving judges' decisions about who gets to interpret statutes in "extraordinary cases," then indeed the major questions doctrine does look "realist" in a sense. Perhaps, therefore, the major questions doctrine is meta-realistic.

E. An Illustration—Chevron, Major Questions, and the Clean Power Plan

Such labeling may not be all that illuminating. It's perhaps more useful to illustrate how the major questions doctrine can shield Chevron in a specific example. The EPA has been among the greatest agency beneficiaries of Chevron deference, especially under the Clean Air Act317—starting of course with Chevron itself. At least in theory, Chevron has given the agency greater confidence that its interpretations of statutes will survive legal challenges. Without deference, the outcome of challenges would be harder to predict (since it would depend to a greater degree on the panels drawn at the D.C. Circuit and the composition of the Supreme Court). This uncertainty would not only hurt the EPA but arguably also the public and regulated industries. Unelected judges' views would be substituted for the expert views of the more politically accountable agency.

EPA critics, of course, might not share this view—for them, substituting judicial interpretations for those of the agency might be a good thing.

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Moreover, *Chevron* deference has not always resulted in the agency's interpretation prevailing over Congress's, the best examples of which perhaps being *Massachusetts* and the somewhat inconsistent line of cases regarding emissions trading under the "good neighbor" provisions (including *E.M.E. Homer City*).\(^{318}\) Nevertheless, let us stipulate for purposes of argument that deference has led to better regulatory outcomes, despite some arguably inconsistent application.

Finally, we can return to the Clean Power Plan. As discussed above, the regulation—sweeping in its reach—is based on a narrow statutory provision, and is politically controversial. The argument that it is a major question is quite strong. For the EPA and supporters of the Clean Power Plan this is unwelcome—it reduces the likelihood that *Chevron* deference will be available to the agency. Judges may substitute their reading of § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act for that of the agency's, even if the agency's interpretation falls within what would otherwise be a permissible range.

One option is for the EPA or amici to argue in a Clean Power Plan case that the major questions doctrine should be rejected, perhaps citing counterarguments made by Sunstein, Loshin & Nielson, and others.\(^{319}\) But even if this argument is successful it might not change the outcome of a Clean Power Plan case, and it could create long-term problems for the EPA and other agencies. The tensions between *Chevron* and *Marbury* would remain and would likely find expression elsewhere. While overruling *Chevron* might seem unlikely, it is not impossible—Justice Thomas is not alone in his view that it should be overruled or at least sharply limited.\(^{320}\)

Alternatively, courts might react openly by substituting another "safety valve" doctrine for the major questions doctrine. For example, the Court could expand the *Mead* "force of law" exception or reopen debates over whether deference should apply to "jurisdictional" interpretations by agencies. Less openly, judges and justices might simply retain control by aggressively asserting that their interpretations of statutes are unambiguously correct under *Chevron* step one.

Any of these reactions would be harmful to the EPA and other agencies not just in a Clean Power Plan case but in interstitial cases in which they would have previously been entitled to deference, or in which *Chevron* deference would have been more meaningful. In other words, killing the major questions doctrine could have the perverse effect of less deference to agencies overall, not more.

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\(^{318}\) See *supra* Section II.A.

\(^{319}\) See *supra* Section IV.F.3.

\(^{320}\) See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Kevin Daley, *Justice Alito Warns of Dire Future for Speech, Religious Liberty*, *The Daily Caller* (Nov. 17, 2016), [https://perma.cc/51DN-51QZ] (reporting that in a speech before the Federalist Society, Justice Alito said that "agencies are exploiting Chevron to usurp Congress' lawmaking authority" and that Justice Scalia had rethought his position on *Chevron* deference before his passing).
F. Some Counterarguments

I suspect some readers will find this argument unsatisfying—shouldn’t the major questions doctrine be able to stand on its own? And if it cannot be justified on its own merits, shouldn’t we reject it? If that means exposing tensions underlying *Chevron*, so be it—those doctrinal tensions may fade over time, and if not, they can be addressed with new doctrines that address *Chevron*’s limitations without the flaws of the major questions doctrine. In short, shouldn’t doctrines service normative ends, or perhaps Constitutional text? Shouldn’t any doctrine that cannot be so justified be rejected?

This argument is rhetorically powerful, but I can offer two replies. The first is that there appears to be no way out of the contradictions imposed by *Chevron* and the major questions doctrine. It is of course possible that future scholars will offer new doctrinal rules that could meet the aims of the doctrine and/or make judges comfortable with deferring in “major” cases. But there are no obvious solutions now, and I suspect that will remain true—the contradictions and tensions discussed above appear fundamental. Maybe Congress could resolve the problem by specifying for each statute (or even each statutory provision) what degree of interpretive deference courts should afford to agencies. But this seems unlikely and impractical. Where statutory gaps emerge, and how large they are, is often hard to know in advance (and if they were obvious, Congress would have presumably filled them rather than make interpretive rules).

Second, dissatisfaction with my argument that the major questions doctrine is a *Chevron* safety valve based on a view that doctrines should stand on their own merits actually helps to prove the point. It illustrates the discomfort many lawyers feel when doctrines are in tension and cannot be reconciled with each other or with any specific background rationale. Specifically, it is tempting to reject the major questions doctrine if it cannot be reconciled with *Chevron* or be justified on other grounds despite the inconsistency. Every previous account of the doctrine has reached one or the other of those two conclusions.

This temptation is not unlike that which judges appear to experience when confronted with major cases that highlight the tension between *Chevron* and *Marbury*. Their reaction, ironically, has been to add another layer of apparent inconsistency. This is not to suggest that their reasons for doing so are only psychological, but to the extent that legal psychology, instincts, and/or tradition are driving the major questions doctrine, similar factors may underlie dissatisfaction with an account that leaves the doctrine in tension with *Chevron*, unmoved by any normative justification of its own.

Another critique is that my description of and justification for the major questions doctrine is deeply cynical regarding the role and motivations of judges. It is possible, as I have noted above, to describe the motivations of judges in creating the doctrine in quite cynical terms—that they cannot resist deciding interpretive questions in major cases, even when agency
interpretations fall within *Chevron*’s zone of deference. But such a cynical view is not necessary. As described above, judges may feel that the Constitution requires them to decide major cases, or that the public or other political actors demand that they do so. If judges are using the major questions doctrine to fulfill constitutional requirements and preserve the court’s legitimacy, it is much harder to criticize their motivations.

Moreover, even if the view of the major questions doctrine I suggest here is somewhat cynical, it is in good company in the field. Critics of *Chevron* have long been quite critical of agencies’ ability to interpret law and make effective regulatory policy, while proponents of *Chevron* have derided courts for their lack of accountability and expertise relative to agencies. Suggesting that judges may give in to temptation in major questions cases seems like a mild rebuff compared to some of these institutional competence claims.

**CONCLUSION**

Despite the relative rarity of its invocation by the Supreme Court, and premature accounts of its death, the major questions doctrine appears to be alive and well and an important component of administrative law. *King v. Burwell* and, to a lesser extent, *UARG v. EPA* make that clear.

Future litigation over the Clean Power Plan appears quite likely to result in another invocation of the doctrine. But as *King* illustrates, invocation of the doctrine would not decide the outcome of the case. It is possible to imagine another opinion, perhaps written by the Chief Justice or by Justice Kennedy, in a narrowly decided Clean Power Plan case that denies *Chevron* deference but preserves all or most of the Clean Power Plan, much as *King* did for the Affordable Care Act. Alternatively, the doctrine might give those Justices skeptical of EPA regulation of greenhouse gases the tool to attract the fifth vote they lacked in the more abstract context of *Massachusetts*, where the agency also had greater textual support.

Many, whether proponents of the Clean Power Plan or of *Chevron* deference generally, will find this troubling. If one shares those preferences, the concerns are real. The major questions doctrine arguably serves no normative purpose by itself. It likely does not lead to better or more efficient regulation, does not prod Congress to write better statutes, or protect policy debate from interference. Despite identifying common factors in past major questions cases here, it remains difficult to predict when it will be applied.

The death of Justice Scalia may result in an ideological shift on the Court, with possible implications for the outcome of the Clean Power Plan litigation. But there is little evidence that his passing will lead to a doctrinal shift away from the major questions doctrine. Although Justice Scalia voted for the majority in each of the most significant major questions cases (*Brown & Williamson*, *MCI v. AT&T*, and *King v. Burwell*), he only authored one of these—*MCI*. In fact, every justice currently on the court except Justice Alito
has joined a majority opinion explicitly setting aside *Chevron* deference on major questions grounds. Justice Alito joined Justice Thomas’s dissent in *King*, which expressed skepticism about *Chevron* deference going well beyond the major questions doctrine. Justice Scalia’s influence in creating and promoting the “elephants in mouse holes” interpretive canon is significant, of course, but as discussed above, other justices across the ideological spectrum have cited the principle. To be sure, the major questions doctrine is grounded at least in part in skepticism regarding the administrative state, and a new justice’s skepticism will not likely match Scalia’s. But at most this will only affect the frequency with which the doctrine is invoked, not its fundamental viability. After *King*, the major questions doctrine appears to be a well-established part of Court doctrine. Justices may dispute whether it should be applied in a given case, but none, whatever their view on agency authority in general, are on record disputing the validity or wisdom of the doctrine itself.

The doctrine is especially relevant in an era when polarization and other political factors make Congress unwilling or unable to pass substantial new legislation (or, in fact, to confirm a replacement Supreme Court justice). Gaps and ambiguities within existing laws remain unaddressed and must be interpreted by agencies. Old statutes that might otherwise be updated or replaced are used for new purposes. And any interpretive errors by agencies or courts are unlikely to be repaired by Congress. If one is skeptical of the doctrine, therefore, then its dangers seem particularly acute today.

Nevertheless, rejecting the doctrine will not, I believe, lead to better long-term regulatory outcomes. The existence of the major questions doctrine, the way it is described by judges in the cases, and other evidence strongly suggest that judges are unwilling or unable to concede interpretive authority in “extraordinary cases.” Whether this is due to tradition, training, public demand, *Marbury*, Article III, ego, or other motives is unclear and difficult, if not impossible, to determine. The reason is likely different for each judge (and it is unlikely that every judge feels so constrained). But the reason is not as important as the apparent fact that judges seem to feel compelled to decide major cases. If the major questions doctrine did not exist, it would have to be invented.

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323 President Obama’s Supreme Court Nomination, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/scotus [https://perma.cc/B7R6-VBLP] (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) (indicating that on March 16, 2016 President Obama nominated Chief Judge Merrick Garland of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to the United States Supreme Court and 233 days had passed without a senate vote on his nomination as of Nov. 4, 2016).
Similarly, if the Court rejected the doctrine, the motivations behind it would likely find other expression. That outcome could be worse than the current doctrine. Faced with high-profile and economically or socially significant cases, judges would still strain to interpret statutes themselves, rather than delegating authority to agencies. At best, this could result in inconsistent and indefensible *Chevron* opinions, with judges claiming statutory language to be clear and unambiguous despite multiple plausible interpretations. At worst, *Chevron* could be overturned or sharply constrained (as at least one Justice has advocated).

This risk is not worth any gains in regulatory quality, accountability, or predictability from rejecting the major questions doctrine. Assuming it retains roughly its current reach, the doctrine should be accepted as a necessary safety valve.

The only possible complete solution to these problems appears to be in the hands of Congress, which ultimately controls the delegation of interpretive authority (perhaps subject to Article III limits). But Congress shows no indication of including interpretive-allocating provisions in new statutes, much less reopening old ones.