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Free Money: The Feasibility of Implementing a Universal Basic Income in the United States

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THESIS SUMMARY

This paper serves as a comprehensive but far from exhaustive exploration into the increasingly relevant policy proposition of a basic income provided by the United States federal government. It investigates the historical origins of the proposal, as well as considers the contemporary research and real-world implementations of basic income for context. Acknowledging that circumstances are everchanging and unpredictable, this thesis then explores the question of whether a basic income is possible within the current economic and societal conditions of the United States.

This is the culmination of my Honors education at the University of South Carolina, as I draw upon my acquired academic competencies to research and investigate a bold and progressive idea at the intersection of my interests of finance and public policy. My intention is to provide a thorough, beneficial, and comprehensible consideration of whether basic income is a feasible policy for the United States.

I: INTRODUCTION

“Modern problems require modern solutions” may be a line from comedian Dave Chappelle’s namesake television show, *Chappelle’s Show*, but the principle sure does seem to hold true. As humanity continues to one-up its own achievements with groundbreaking developments seemingly arriving daily, our new and complex problems seem to require new and complex solutions to match them. To solve the dependence on fossil fuels and pollution-heavy power sources contributing to the climate change crisis, we have developed advanced clean power technologies as alternatives, and even made significant breakthroughs in nuclear fusion, the process our sun uses to produce what we can classify based on current needs as unlimited energy. Complexity can often times be the pathway to fixing our societal shortcomings and past mistakes, but as was written by Clare Boothe Luce, “the height of sophistication is simplicity” (1931).

The United States welfare system is not quite the epitome of simplicity. There are seven major welfare programs available to American citizens via the federal government – Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Child’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), housing assistance, and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) (Hayes, 2022). However, in total there are more than 80 federal welfare programs available to lower-income American citizens, offering cash, food, housing, medical care, and more. These programs are built on the basis of equity, intended to help these members of society who need it most – they target the elderly, disabled, and those with little or no income. Benefits range from subsidization of necessary costs (SNAP, energy aid) to a recurring stipend (SSI, social security). While it may seem convoluted enough that there is not only a wide range of programs but that citizens must also apply for each

individually, it somehow gets more intricate. Available benefits vary from state to state depending on qualifications, and program names often also vary despite providing similar services, which then makes comparing them difficult. And such an elaborate system does not come without its costs – to cover the approximately 20% of Americans who accessed the welfare system in 2019, the government spent \$2.87 trillion, or 42.7% of the federal budget, on Medicare (\$1.2T, 17.6%), Social Security (\$1.1T, 16.5%), and Income Security (\$570B, 8.6%) (*Spending Explorer*, 2023). That number increased significantly during the pandemic with increased reliance on the welfare and health care systems and the introduction of stimulus checks via the American Rescue Plan, up to \$4.0 trillion (43%) and \$4.6 trillion (45.4%) in 2020 and 2021, respectively.

Government spending has been a hot topic in recent US political discourse. In 2023, Republicans have deemed large spending cuts a necessity to be paired with a raise of the looming debt ceiling, while Democrats have shaken off the idea completely, arguing that a government default is not to be used as a bargaining chip. Regardless of the bickering, the budget deficit continues to grow and tracking where all the money's going feels more difficult than ever. Both sides of the aisle seemed to agree that cutting spending on social security and Medicare was off the table during President Biden's 2023 State of the Union address, but with those programs being as important as the rest of the welfare bundle, it remains to be seen how and where budgets will be downsized. A potential solution to this spending quandary reverts back to the idea of simplicity and is grounded in the principles of equality, accountability, and transparency: a universal basic income for the American people.

A universal basic income is the simplest and most equal form of welfare. Casting aside existing circumstance, giving all citizens a payment of the same amount at the same time at the same intervals is the most absolute form of equality. The inclusivity aspect also radically

simplifies the process. Instead of applying for individual programs that have a variety of convoluted processes and different requirements for access, a universal basic income is essentially a one-size-fits-all form of welfare. The simplicity of the program would greatly minimize the high degree of bureaucracy present in the current welfare system – there would be no need for individual case workers to means test applicants or keep track of enrollees. This would not only reduce the administrative costs of the welfare system, but the spending that does occur would be significantly easier to track, promoting accountability and transparency from the federal government.

Before one is to cast aside the idea of a basic income as a utopian ideal that will never work in practicality, one must first understand what it is that constitutes a universal basic income. Phillippe Van Parijs, an economist, philosopher, and longtime proponent of the idea, uses the following definition in *Basic Income: A simple and powerful idea for the twenty-first century*: “A basic income is an income paid by a political community to all its members on an individual basis, without means test or work requirement” (2004). There are multiple components to this definition, all of which must be explained to fully understand the nuances of basic income when compared with other welfare proposals. Van Parijs lays out six individual components in his definition:

The first of which arises in the first noun: “*income*.” A basic income is one that is paid not in land, food, subsidy, or any other type of benefit – it comes in cash only. This is often the biggest difference between many programs in the US welfare system and the basic income proposal. Aside from social security and unemployment compensation, which is unstandardized federally, no other welfare program provides its beneficiaries with restriction-free money. A

basic income is just that – with no limitations on use, recipients are able to consume or invest their benefit as they see fit, providing them more autonomy.

The second component to be clarified is that this income is to be paid “*by a political community,*” meaning it must come from publicly pooled resources controlled by a government, though not necessarily a nation’s government. This gives the concept wiggle room to be applied on a state, local, or even continental and world levels (UBI proposals have been made to the European Union and United Nations to no avail) (Van Parijs, 2004). This may be specifically funded out of a redistribution policy implemented by said government or may also come from a larger pool of government revenues as a common expenditure.

The third portion of the definition is that this income from a political community is to be paid “*to all its members.*” ‘All members’ puts forward a range of inclusivity decisions to make when considering the proposal. Is membership of the political community reserved for citizens, or are non-citizen permanent residents included as well? Given the progressive nature of basic income as a concept, most proposals reject exclusionary policy and expand their proposed income to all ‘legal, permanent residents’ (van Parijs, 2004). Other factors, such as age provide thinkers with questions: Some argue that the income is based on an unrealized entitlement to the natural world from birth to death; Therefore, are children to receive it as well? A paired child benefit that can act as a supplement to the adults’ income system is often seen as a solution. Are the retired members of the population, who already receive pension, to be included as well? In most proposals, yes, often at a higher level than that which is paid to younger adults. Are prisoners to be included as well? Van Parijs argues that because the cost of imprisonment is significantly more costly than paying the individual an income, it is logical that they lose it for

the duration of their sentence, but it is returned upon release. There are many different demographics to consider when using the term “*all its members.*”

Fourth, the basic income paid by the political community to all its members is “*on an individual basis.*” Van Parijs rules that the dividend is given to every person, regardless of household status; most currently established minimum guarantee programs are not organized this way, where instead the payment is provided to the head of household (2004). Operating such a system effectively, he argues, requires the government to access information surrounding the living arrangements of all community members, whereas basic income policies are paid to all individuals equally regardless of outside circumstances. This reinforces the liberalizing values of a basic income policy – giving individuals more autonomy with how they choose to utilize their assets as well as limiting the private information they must disclose to the government.

Fifth, the basic income paid by the political community to all its members on an individual basis, “*without means test.*” Van Parijs describes how this differs from the majority of existing welfare policies, explaining “existing schemes operate *ex post*, on the basis of a prior assessment, be it provisional, of the beneficiaries’ income. A basic income scheme, instead, operates *ex ante*, irrespective of any income test” (2004). This is often the most controversial aspect of basic income as well. It not only signals the significantly larger cost when compared to existing programs, but on the surface, it appears to prioritize equality over equity, which is not the case. It is fairly obvious that a basic income policy could not functionally exist alongside the current tax-and-benefit system; most proposals include elimination of redundant programs and implementation of a progressive tax in which the wealthier members of society pay proportionally more of their income to taxes that fund a basic income and other government initiatives than the poor do. This thereby eliminates the equality argument, as with the high-

income members of society shouldering more of the funding, it does not “make the rich richer.” Abolition of a means test has social impacts as well, as Van Parijs details. Universality increases the take-up rate, as the community will be better informed of their benefits with more all people able to access it. Additionally, universality eliminates the humiliation factor facing those who redeem existing benefits, as extending them to all citizens abolishes the negative perception of those who can access them.

Similar to the fifth, the sixth and final component of our basic income definition is that the basic income paid by the political community to all its members on an individual basis, is without means test “*or work requirement.*” A work requirement is not present in all existing guaranteed minimum programs, but modern American programs like Medicaid, TANF, and SNAP require able-bodied adults in recipient households to be working or actively performing an equivalent task, like searching or training for a job (*Work Requirements and Work Supports for Recipients of Means-Tested Benefits*, 2022). This means that the lack of a work requirement is not quite as influential as the lack of a means test, but together this section of the definition overcomes a major pitfall of the established welfare system: the unemployment trap. When the difference between unemployment benefits and the benefits earned from low-income employment is not significant enough, individuals can lack motivation to work and will not take risks to become employed that would put their reliable unemployment collection in jeopardy (Van Parijs, 2004). In a basic income scheme that does not dissipate for an individual upon employment, said individual will always be better off working than not.

With a definition firmly established with its many parts, one must understand the history of basic income proposals, as well as why the idea is still relevant and potentially useful in contemporary times before exploring its feasibility. Prior to exploring whether a universal basic

income could work for the United States, the history, justifications and limitations, and practical applications of universal basic income will be laid out in the following section.

II: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT UBI

The History of Basic Income

While the idea of charity and caring for the wellbeing of our fellow man seems to be built into our human nature, we can only trace the idea of a welfare state as far back as records and institutions will take us. The Book of Deuteronomy speaks of a tithe in the days of the Ancient Hebrews, which was collected every three years and distributed to those in need (*English Standard Version Bible*, 2001, Deuteronomy 14:27-29). But welfare in non-religious institutions and the idea of a government providing support to the poorer members of society was first implemented on a grand scale via the Roman policies of the *cura annonae* (the Imperial grain supply) and *frumentatio* (grain distribution) (Erdkamp, 2016).

The term *cura annonae* referred to the imperial food supply, through which originally the Senate and later the emperor employed policies that “ensured the people’s prosperity through the shipment of grains from his realm” (Erdkamp, 2016). Despite first being in place over 2000 years ago, the core idea of the policy is the same as its contemporary descendants – to improve the welfare of Rome’s constituents. While the motivations of the ruling body may have been purely altruistic in sharing the realm’s wealth for the good of the people, this is highly unlikely. As remains true in the modern social environment of a sovereign state, a fulfilled population is a more stable one to govern than one with unmet needs. Therefore, the impetus is on the ruling party, the emperor and his authorities in the Roman case, to leverage the resources under its control to provide not only necessary sustenance for its people, but stability for its political regime.

While *cura annonae* referred to the physical stock of foodstuffs under imperial control, the *lex Sempronia frumentaria* was the first of the policies to utilize the grain resources for the

benefit of the people. Introduced by C. Sempronius Gracchus in 123 BCE, the policy was not an exact parallel to our current understanding of welfare, but rather a relative of it – the authorities offered a fixed and affordable price for a monthly ration, a subsidy of sorts, to any Roman man over the age of fourteen (though it may have begun at age 11) (Erdkamp, 2016). Later adaptations of this original policy would go on to become gradually more liberal by widening the covered population over the next 60-70 years, culminating with Clodius abolishing the price of the ration and instead making it free.

The *frumentationes* were controversial and opposed by many for the same reason large welfare programs and specifically basic income are by modern critics – cost. Transporting grain from as close as Sicily and as far as Africa for the city of Rome and building facilities large enough to store grain for between 150,000 and 1.25 million people was a costly endeavor. Additionally, the *frumentationes* changed the perception of the role of the government in their life – people now had a scapegoat for food shortages, forcing Senators and Emperors alike to quell riots and political unrest when there was not enough to go around.

Even though the Romans were implementing a sort of basic income over two millennia ago, the exact beginnings of the modern philosophy are rather murky. Some attribute it to Thomas More's novel *Utopia*, published in 1551, in which the main character, Raphael Nonsenso, argues that providing the poor with means to live would be a better method to combatting thievery than killing caught thieves (van Parijs, 2021). But it was rather More's contemporary and good friend, Johannes Ludovicus Vives, that first proposed a closer idea of a public minimum income, and not through a fictional work. In the 1526 booklet addressed to the mayor of Bruges, *De subventionem pauperum sive de humanis necessitatibus*, Vives proposed the notion that it should be the government who aids or provides charity to the poor rather than the

church, which had long been the societal norm prior to the Renaissance. This was not a demand for further justice for the underprivileged, argued Vives, but rather a more effective manner for providing the charity that people felt morally obliged to. But even though he felt it is immoral to allow another man to starve, he did feel that context mattered:

Even those who have dissipated their fortunes in dissolute living – through gaming, harlots, excessive luxury, gluttony and gambling – should be given food, for no one should die of hunger. However, smaller rations and more irksome tasks should be assigned to them so that they may be an example to others. [...] They must not die of hunger, but they must feel its pangs. (Vives, 1526)

This publication was the first to propose such a radical shift in the idea of welfare, transferring the responsibility of caring for the poor from the church to the government. As such, Vives' ideas would lay the groundwork for many modern national assistance programs, but there was further development of thought required first. It would be another 150 years before another pair of philosophers – Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, and Thomas Paine – were to rethink the idea of a public basic endowment and write literature that would go on to cultivate our modern welfare programs.

Condorcet was known to be a major proponent of humanity and equal rights for marginalized groups (Landes, 2022). Writing essays arguing for the abolition of slavery in French colonies (*Reflections on Black Slavery*, 1781) and the equal treatment of women (*The Admission of Women to the Rights of Citizenship*, 1790), Condorcet was no stranger to radical ideas, which drew contempt from his contemporaries. This also materialized through his advocacy for a social insurance, which would inspire the massive social assistance policies that were to be implemented in Europe only a century later (van Parijs, 2021). He proposed a pension

for the elderly as well as for widows and their children: “It would free [society] from the periodic bankruptcy of a large number of families, that inexhaustible source of corruption and misery” (Condorcet, 1795). Condorcet’s social insurance proposal moved closer towards the idea of a basic income than his predecessor Vives, arguing that the distribution was to be done for the people’s entitlement instead of out of compassion. Given it was published posthumously in his work *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind*, Condorcet could not expand upon his social insurance proposal. It was two years after his death that his contemporary Thomas Paine would do it instead, exploring and articulating a basic endowment even closer to our modern idea.

Paine’s (1797) ideas could be considered radical even by some of today’s standards: he claimed that the land of the Earth was “the common property of the human race” and that “every proprietor, therefore, of cultivated lands, owes to the community a ground-rent” of which a fund would be composed. This fund would then make up the endowment he described in *Agrarian Justice*:

There shall be paid to every person, when arrived at the age of twenty-one years, the sum of fifteen pounds sterling, as a compensation in part, for the loss of his or her natural inheritance, by the introduction of the system of landed property. And also, the sum of ten pounds per annum, during life, to every person now living, of the age of fifty years, and to all others as they shall arrive at that age. (p. 10)

This is the first idea discussed thus far to not only argue that the sum is to be given out of the people’s entitlement to it, but also that the policy should be widely applicable to all people. Entitlement is the accepted rationale for basic income and other forms of welfare or social insurance today much more than it was in the days of Paine – article 25 of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights declares that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family” (United Nations, 1948).

Although the principles of entitlement and equality are not globally accepted, the liberalization of western society in particular has allowed for them to become commonplace ideas in countries like the United States. Social insurances like the ones detailed by Paine provided for the people by the federal government regardless of demographic, like social security and unemployment benefits, have grown to represent massive portions of the spending budget.

Paine’s model was the first to meet one of the three criteria needed to define a basic income – that it must be available to a large proportion of the population. It also included the recurrence of payment but lacked the final component of sufficient generosity. However, Paine’s contemporary, Thomas Spence, would come closer to meeting this final criterion with his proposed ideas. Spence, who also argued for a rent or tax of sorts on those who own the land, felt that two thirds of the quarterly generated revenue should go towards public expenditures, and the remaining third be distributed among “all the living souls in the parish, whether male or female; married or single; legitimate or illegitimate; from a day old to the extremest age; making no distinction between the families of rich farmers and merchants and the families of poor labourers and mechanics,” which represents the most inclusive statement on the targeted populace of its time (1797).

French writer Charles Fourier would articulate his own support of a minimum income almost forty years later in his 1836 book, *La Fausse Industrie*. In his words, “if the civilized order deprives man of the four branches of natural subsistence, hunting, fishing, picking and grazing, which make up the first right, the class which took the land owes to the frustrated class a minimum of abundant subsistence” (Fourier, 1836). He did not use the term ‘basic income,’

however, rather preferring the term ‘certain minimum’ to refer to the distribution of goods needed to subsist, which poses an issue when attempting to describe Fourierism as the foundation of basic income. In some works, Fourier described a program designed to eradicate poverty – thus making it only for the poor. However, in other writings, he gave the term ‘minimum’ a different meaning, introducing a relative minimum for all members of society to retain the incentivizing benefits of the existing class structure (Cunliffe & Erreygers, 2001). Aside from Fourier’s occasional sole focus on the poor, his ideas were the best fit for all three of the criteria of basic income established in academic literature. Paine included the whole population and Spence expanded the dividend amount, but Fourier was the only of the three to establish that the payments must be sufficient to live upon without other earnings (2019). Meeting all three of these accepted criteria has made Fourierism the foundation of basic income in the eyes of many.

But, despite the ideas posed by More, Condorcet, Paine, Spence, and others, the first to unambiguously propose all three tenets of basic income in their work was Joseph Charlier. Although considered a prominent socialist figure for his time, knowledge of his work and life is limited to his four published works, while the rest remains a mystery (Cunliffe & Erreygers, 2001). Like his predecessors, Charlier believed in the entitlement of the earth to all people as his justification for a distributed income. He maintained that there was a difference between natural and produced resources – the natural fulfill the “vital needs” of people while the produced fill “acquired needs” – and that all people had the absolute right to natural resources, but not the produced. But, unlike them, he did not advocate for a proposed distribution to be means-tested or require any other obligation. In his 1871 work, *Catéchisme populaire, philosophique, politique et social*, Charlier instead proposed a “territorial dividend,” an unconditional, equal, quarterly,

fixed amount payment to all citizens, the amount of which was to be decided via “a representative national council, on the basis of the rental value of all real estate” (van Parijs, 2021). This was the first time that basic income as we know it now was proposed in writing, but Charlier’s work was overshadowed at the time by his Brussels neighbor and revolutionary thinker Karl Marx’s *Communist Manifesto*.

The idea of a basic income or national dividend began to grow in popularity around western politics in the early 20th century, particularly in response to the acute poverty being felt in Britain as result of the first world war. Although the idea had been discussed by thinkers in earlier decades and refined by Charlier, the concept had yet to gain much traction within the political sphere until then. Bertrand Russell, an English philosopher and non-conformist thinker, began arguing for a “certain small income, sufficient for necessities, [to] be secured to all, whether they work or not” at the end of the first world war in 1918 (van Parijs, 2021). In the same year, engineer Dennis Milner proposed a “state bonus” comprised of 20% of the nation’s GDP, intended to alleviate the poverty of the time. Milner’s weekly payment system was discussed at the 1920 Labour Party conference but would be decisively rejected. The momentum continued to grow, as another engineer, Major Douglas, introduced “social credit” mechanisms that would provide families with a national dividend. Although it did not take shape in Britain, it caught on with Canadians as a Social Credit Party was elected to lead the province of Alberta for almost four decades, but never implemented such a dividend. Renowned economists George D.H. Cole and James Meade would also adamantly defend the idea during the interwar period, but it would be overshadowed by the 1941 Beveridge Report. Director of the London School of Economics Sir William Beveridge was tasked by the wartime Grand Coalition of Conservatives and Labour under Winston Churchill to examine the current British welfare system and

recommend new measures for after the conclusion of the second world war (Beveridge, 2000). He proposed a system of equity in which flat rate contributions secured a national minimum income to those unable to work paired with the access to health care for a reasonable rate via the National Health Service – the implementation of a version of this proposal would crowd out any UBI-like discussion from mainstream political discourse in the country.

The idea would once again resurface during the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s United States, first being discussed by Robert Theobald and his Ad Hoc Committee on the Triple Revolution with a minimum income justified by the emergence of automation (still a frequent rationale in calls for UBI today) and by Milton Friedman in the form of a “negative income tax” (van Parijs, 2021). But it was liberal economists like James Tobin, Joseph Pechman, and John Kenneth Galbraith who pushed for a “demogrant,” not designed to uproot the welfare system like Friedman’s proposal, but to rather increase efficiency and the attractiveness of working. The work would culminate in a 1968 petition of over one thousand economists calling upon the government to rework the existing welfare system towards income guarantees. This petition would inspire the Nixon administration to propose the 1968 Family Assistance Plan, which would pass the US House of Representatives before being shut down by a combined opposition of those who felt it too bold and those who felt it too timid. Nixon’s eventual resignation would spell the end for UBI’s short lived US political spotlight.

Though mostly relegated from the mainstream political sphere in the 20th century, academic discussion of a basic income has continued on, and even begun to reenter political discussion in the 21st century. Justifications for the implementation of a basic income have felt more apparent and obvious than ever. The next section will survey the contemporary basic

income academic field: justifications for it, modern proposals, environmental surveys, and political theories.

Justifications for a Basic Income

At its foundation, the motivation for basic income is still grounded in the same core idea as it was over 200 years ago to Paine: all people have a natural right to access the land of the earth so as to sustain themselves. When that is taken away or minimized by the burdens and complexities of ownership in society, it is the obligation of the ruling body of owners to provide non-owners with their natural right to life. The same tenet applies today. With almost all land on earth claimed by a recognized state (see Bir Tawil for an exception), it is the case that living outside the realm of government is virtually impossible. Sustaining yourself off the land would be extraordinarily difficult to accomplish without violating laws regarding ownership and use – even hunting game on one’s own property in the United States requires a license to be issued by a government agency. People no longer have unfettered access to their natural right to life as laid out by Locke without participating in society, therefore the onus is on the government as the central authority to provide people with their natural right to sustenance.

Extending our frame of thinking beyond natural rights, the proposal of basic income is justified as a means to resolving societal issues that limit said rights of the people. Civilization has solved many problems for humanity but has conversely created others. In the modern western capitalist system and others throughout history, all people have the ability to amass power and wealth through the markets, but conversely power and wealth are often compounding assets, which creates economic inequality to the scale we see today. When unchecked and unregulated, those born to the top of society can produce more from their larger pool of

resources when compared to the poorer members of their society born with fewer. From this logic come the phenomenon of growing inequality between societal classes, a frequent pitfall of capitalist systems. In the four decades from 1979 to 2019, the top 1% of earners saw their real annual wages jump 160.3% and the top 0.1% saw a whopping 345.2% increase, while the wages of the bottom 90% grew 26%, comparatively (Mishel & Kandra, 2020). But where does this discrepancy come from? Over-simplified viewpoints attribute it to “hard work,” but empirical evidence details that it come from holding the most advantageous position in capitalism – owning the means of production. Federal Reserve data illustrates that the top 1% holds 54% of corporate equities and mutual-fund shares and have more cumulative assets than the middle 60% of American earners (Kaplan & Kiersz, 2021). These statistics paint the American wealth distribution as a heavily tipped scale, and while it’s indicative of the larger economic environment, how much money individuals have is less of a revealing factor on the financial state of the population as is their ability to fulfill their needs.

When looking to quantify the financial health of the average American, more individualized statistics can help tell the story. The consumer price index and relative purchasing power is a measurement produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics through which economists can measure the ability of consumers to pay for the things they need. The market basket by which the CPI is marked is calculated by examining past consumer expenditure data, considering allocations to various spending areas such as food, energy, and services, then is further subdivided to maximize sensitivity to pricing changes. The CPI grew 352.2% from 1979 to 2019, according to data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, a disproportionately high number when compared with income growth measures, which means one thing: the average American is losing purchasing power. With less to cover more, most working Americans have to

allocate more to day-to-day purchases, which leaves them lagging behind previous generations in terms of saving and their ability to make larger purchases and investments. A high degree of wealth inequality can cause all sorts of problems for a well-employed economy – politically, both Europe and the US alike have seen recent surges in populist movements targeting the “elite” – but employment itself may soon be under threat as well.

Automation is seen by many as one of the biggest reasonings for why we need a basic income, and its logic is not hard to follow. With the increasingly rapid growth of technology this century, more and more job responsibilities that have been performed by humans are now able to be automated. But it is not just robotics taking the place of unskilled workers in manufacturing; Machine learning and the recent rapid rise of artificial intelligence are two trends that display the enhanced cognitive abilities robots are able to leverage to perform increasingly advanced tasks. In its 2017 report, *A Future That Works: Automation, Employment, and Productivity*, the McKinsey Global Institute claims that “about half the activities people are paid almost \$15 trillion in wages to do in the global economy have the potential to be automated by adapting currently demonstrated technology, according to our analysis of more than 2,000 work activities across 800 occupations” (Manyika et al., 2017). Although only about 5% of current jobs could be fully automated, almost two thirds of jobs could have 30% of their duties automated. So, while the number of jobs that can be fully machine-performed is relatively low, we could see significant restructuring of current roles (and salaries as well) so as to increase organizational efficiency, productivity, and profits.

The possibility of two thirds of the workforce having their job restructured and salaries cut is extremely unlikely, as is the threat of mass unemployment. After all, automation is supposed to help, not hurt, us, right? In the highly influential essay, *Why Are There Still So Many*

Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace, David Autor argues that worry over the threat of automation as a substitute for human labor is often exacerbated by overstatement from journalists and commentators (2015). Meanwhile, the manners in which human labor and automation complement each other are often glossed over, leaving the increases in productivity and creation of more labor demand largely understated. It is not the loss of jobs that is cause for concern, as prior studies have found no significant long run increase in unemployment, and the labor market has proven to be historically adaptable through centuries of innovation and automation moving demand to different sectors. Instead, it is how this trend disproportionately affects the population that is most worrisome.

Wealth inequality and automation, which are commonly accepted as the two largest justifications for a universal basic income, are increasingly related and create a sort of positive feedback loop. As Kurer & Gallego (2019, as cited in Dermont & Weisstanner, 2020) explain the relationship, it is not so much the threat of mass unemployment that worries researchers when it comes to automation, but rather that the risk of unemployment brought about by automation is unequally distributed, disproportionately targeting “middle-skilled individuals in routine occupations.” With their jobs less secure than their lower and higher earning counterparts, middle-income individuals will have to take increased measures to ensure their ability to sustain themselves, whether they actually lose their job or not. Higher risk of job loss could see middle earners cut their spending and perform other behaviors to cover the possibility of unemployment. Those who do lose their job due to automation will most likely see job openings they are qualified and trained for shrink, leaving them to learn a new skillset on their own resources to transition to a different industry or sector. Meanwhile, those who own the means of production (typically the top 1%, as the earlier equities ownership statistic alluded to) are at no risk of being

displaced and are content to profit off of the increased productivity and lower costs of employing machines rather than people.

While wealth inequality and employment insecurity via automation are population-level issues that could be solved – or at the very least partially alleviated – by a universal basic income, there are a variety of demographic-specific benefits as well: a UBI could act as a means to reduce health inequality, alleviate poverty, and eliminate the welfare trap. There has long been an established link between high levels of inequality in a society and poor health of its lower earners, though determining the cause of the link has not been quite as easy (Painter, 2016). If we can assume a causal relationship between the two, then implementing a program like basic income which reduces inequality will thus reduce health inequality as well, regardless of why the link exists. We can assume that with more money comes less stress on how bills will be paid or needs covered, which can lead to fewer cases of poor mental and physical health for individuals, as shown in the Dauphin and North Carolina studies referenced by Painter (2016). Financial security can often translate to a healthier life overall. As for alleviating poverty, implementing a basic income is a straightforward equation: giving people money means they have more in their pockets, thus raising their income level and allowing them to cover their needs easier. Some critics question whether those living in poverty would even use it for such, arguing that the current welfare system keeps individuals from spending government funds on vices instead of needs. But basic income experiments in developing countries providing unconditional cash transfers to citizens saw many strong benefits. Maytree Director of Policy and Research Noah Zon phrases it simply: “When you give people who don’t have enough money more of it, no strings attached, it gets used well” (2016). The welfare trap problem would also become a relic of a welfare system past. When people don’t lose their state-provided benefits upon gaining

employment, they will always be better off working than not. This means there is no longer a necessity to choose the higher value option of either working for low income or simply receiving welfare, as the second is already guaranteed.

Basic income has a lot of societal and individual benefits as outlined in academic research and discovered in its few practical applications, but there are also limitations that come with this proposal as well, which are addressed in the next section.

Limitations of a Basic Income

There are many who believe that a universal basic income is simply a utopian fantasy, a policy that sounds wonderful and fulfilling in theory but would not be feasible realistically, and there are plenty of valid arguments for this. We will begin by discussing the implied negative behavioral impacts of a basic income before exploring the financial limitations of the policy.

A large critique of the policy is the exact opposite of the justification I explored in the final paragraph of the previous section – some critics argue that UBI will disincentivize work, saying that giving citizens money with no strings attached would inspire them to work less for the job they are already being paid for, thus hurting the labor market (Colombino, 2019). This is a valid concern, but many assume this principle to be applicable to everyone, when in reality it is only a select few who may be susceptible to this behavior – individuals with built-up savings they can rely on for daily spending. The current way that means-tested benefits work is that as an individual works and earns more, their benefits are phased out which disincentivizes low-income work due to the trade-off of earning a similar amount for no work. With a basic income, individuals receive it regardless of primary income level, which eliminates that disincentive and lowers the implied marginal tax rate.

A basic income is not intended to be one's only source of income, but rather supplemental. When considering low-income workers, the annual wage of a \$7.25/hour (US minimum wage) job is just over \$15,000, which places an individual who works 40-hour weeks every week of the year a measly \$500 above the 2022 poverty line (*Poverty Guidelines, 2022*). This level of income provides very little in terms of financial security and personal growth opportunities. A commonly proposed basic income of \$1,000 USD per month is even less than a month's work at minimum wage, meaning a worker on such a salary would need to keep working just to meet their current standard of living, or face a decline were they to become unemployed. It is difficult to imagine that many, if any, would be comfortable and content surviving on a \$12,000 annual dividend alone.

As we move up the wage ladder, we encounter the law of diminishing marginal utility. Higher earners are accustomed to a more comfortable lifestyle, and \$12,000 a year in basic income feels like significantly less to someone who makes \$200,000 per year when compared to someone who makes \$15,000. Therefore, the \$200,000 earner would need to continue working in order to enjoy the financial freedoms their well-paying employment has afforded them. While UBI may cause some to be susceptible to working less, it is not a significant enough amount to cause people to quit their jobs or to work significantly less.

Another critique of a basic income system is that it takes money from the poor and gives to everyone, including "those who don't need it," which only furthers the inequality gap and increases poverty. While it is not equitable that even those in the top 1% who are unphased by \$1,000/month would be receiving it as well, the equality and universality aspects are important pieces of the basic income plan. Universality is inherently more private for the citizen – without means tests, the government does not need to go through one's personal financial and living

situation to determine if they qualify. This cuts out excess bloating in the system and unnecessary bureaucracy, which can lower administrative costs for the program as well. Additionally, UBI promises income to caregivers and non-working parents, predominantly women, empowering their roles and offering them more financial flexibility as well (*Pro and Con: Universal Basic Income (UBI)*, 2021). As for the program supposedly taking from the poor, this is not a fair criticism. All UBI proposals differ, but none attempt to put the lower class in a worse position than they currently are in the present welfare system – basic income is meant to act as a means to reduce economic inequality, not widen it. Most proposals do not call for radical taxation reform (and if they do, it's often targeted at the wealthy), but rather a reallocation of how funds are spent. Therefore, any criticism on where the money is being derived is a criticism of the current system as well. Because of the enormity, however, extra funds would have to come from somewhere. Possibilities include a higher tax on corporate profits or even a value-added tax on items, targeting the high concentration of funds flowing through the economy as opposed to taking it out of the hands of individuals. Funding options will be explored in further depth in Section III.

While it can be easy to poke holes in the current welfare system for how convoluted the qualifications and application process are, another criticism of the basic income idea is that it may go too far the opposite direction by not giving enough consideration to individual situations. Many established welfare programs are intended to fulfill needs that cannot easily be met by a simple cash transfer, such as employment insurance, disability insurance, pensions, or child tax credits (Zon, 2016). In response to this, there are a few different scenarios to address. Basic income is alike enough to unemployment benefits that in the existence of the prior, the latter becomes redundant. It would not only allow for those currently unemployed to meet their needs

as they search for a job, but it covers those currently employed as well, as they can put away their monthly stipend in savings, in which case they already have emergency funds should they lose employment. Other programs are not quite as simple. Medicare, Medicaid, and child benefits are not programs that could be easily covered by an all-encompassing basic income. Medicaid and Medicare would mostly likely see a drop in enrollment as many individuals and families move above the threshold and can then afford private insurance that provides better quality of care with their increased income. Basic income proposals often differ in whether children are included in the population. Most either count children in the population and propose giving them the same stipend as adults that they can then access upon turning 18, or others propose offering an additional, lower stipend per child to the parents of families. Some existing welfare programs would likely need to remain in place to support members of society who need more support than a basic income could afford them.

The perceived extremely high cost of basic income and threat of inflation is often cited as a big worry for opponents of the idea. Providing each citizen with an unconditional income would bring the need to vastly expand the current money supply, they argue, throwing the supply and demand equilibrium out of order and allowing firms to raise prices on consumers to account for their overnight income increase. But even as wages have increased throughout the history of our capitalist system, the race to the bottom for good and service prices still exists between firms. Steeper enforcement of antitrust laws could be useful to keep reactions to this income increase shock at bay by promoting competition between end consumer-oriented firms. As for inflation, the possibility of experiencing it as a result of UBI is fully dependent on the need to expand the money supply, which would be unneeded if the needed excess amount can be generated via additional tax or repurposing already-spent government funds. Inflation already occurs without

any expansion of the money supply, therefore stricter monetary and fiscal policy from the Federal Reserve could be necessary to control the immediate shock before the policy becomes accepted as commonplace.

Aside from inflation, it is no secret that UBI is expensive. But, to pay every American adult \$12,000 a year equates to approximately \$3.06T – less than half of the federal government’s Fiscal Year 2022 spending, \$6.27T (*How Much Has the U.S. Government Spent This Year?*, 2023). So, we see, the money is there to be spent. What remains to be seen (and what will be explored in section III) is whether a potential reallocation of government funds would be enough to support a basic income without massive spending cuts to other programs, or if additional funding needs to be generated via tax. Given the financial enormity of the proposal (and this being the biggest concern of UBI’s critics), all of section III is devoted to understanding the funding possibilities of a universal basic income and creating ballpark estimates for how much they would generate. Before then, however, we conclude section II, *What We Know About UBI*, by looking into past and ongoing basic income experiments across the globe.

Practical Applications

Although there has been a plethora of UBI-like experiments, a fully universal and unconditional basic income has never been implemented at the scale of which we discuss it now. But that is not to say that these experiments are for naught. The evidence and data gathered from them allow us to approximate the various impacts of such a policy – on the economy, society, our health, and beyond (Hasdell, 2020). This subsection is intended to use the empirical evidence derived from practical applications of UBI to better understand what the effects of a large-scale program could look like.

The Alaskan Permanent Fund Dividend is an example of an ongoing UBI-like program. The program is one of the most universal to be seen, with children, refugees, and non-citizen permanent residents all eligible for the annual demogrant (Hoynes & Rothstein, 2019). The PFD cannot be considered a basic income, however, as the annual payment value typically falls between \$1,000 and \$2,000 – too little for an individual to live off of. There has been a lack of research into the microeconomic effects of Alaska’s PFD, mainly because many feel that sales of the oil from which the Fund is financed is owned by the citizens, thereby making how one chooses to spend it private. Research has also been lacking due to fears that any attempt to track how dividends are used may give citizens the impression of an attempt to change the program (Goldsmith, 2002). Although there is little data on how the dividends are used or how they directly impact the labor market, there is data that backs the claim that a basic income can help close the wealth inequality gap. As Goldsmith (2002) writes, “in the last ten years the income of the poorest fifth of Alaskan families increased 28 per cent compared to a 7 per cent increase for the richest fifth. In contrast for the United States over the same period the increase for the poorest fifth was 12 per cent compared to 26 per cent for the richest fifth.” To the contrary, the PFD was implemented much earlier than this trend began to take shape, and a variety of other factors such as increased pay for low-wage workers could have influenced the reduction in wealth inequality. However, the Permanent Fund has in some way helped to accomplish some of the goals that UBI hopes to – shrinking the wealth gap and providing citizens with a stable, though small, income.

Another program which is considered universal but not a basic income due to payment size is the demogrant provided by the Eastern Cherokee Native American tribe to the adults of the tribe, regardless of employment, income, or living status (Hoynes & Rothstein, 2019).

Individuals are provided with around \$4,000 via a demogrant funded by the tribal casino revenues. Still not enough to live off of, there has been more research into its effects than has gone into the Alaskan Permanent Fund. When comparing Eastern Cherokee children whose families received the dividend to non-Native children of families from the same geographic area, Cherokee children exhibited improved physical, emotional, and behavioral health, leading to higher body mass indices, less arrests, and improved school performance. There was no significant effect on the labor market stemming from the dividend, as individuals continued to work the same number of hours, but had a more positive existence outside of work, experiencing better mental health and less addiction (Marinescu, 2019). Despite paying less than can be qualified as a basic income, the Alaskan and Eastern Cherokee examples display the economic and social effects that even a small dividend can have, and the greater economic freedom individuals experience.

Other more recently established programs in the United States have begun to take the idea a step further by providing a larger sum to individuals, though often the population receiving the dividend is significantly smaller – even with a smaller sample size, this will aid research into the effects of a basic income on the household level. One of these occurred in the small town of Stockton, CA, where the Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration (SEED) provided 125 individuals at or below the median household income an unconditional monthly cash transfer of \$500 for 24 months (Treisman, 2021). Findings from the first year of the study concluded that not only did individuals’ general health and financial wellbeing improve, but movement from part-time to full-time employment amongst the population rose at double the rate of those who did not receive it as well. For the residents of Stockton who received the monthly payment, they were afforded more financial freedom that allowed them to

cover their basic needs easier and instead focus on taking life-improving action like finding full-time employment and making financially conscious decisions. Other findings included that recipients were healthier and less depressed and anxious, while also reducing income volatility and alleviated financial scarcity, which allowed individuals to create “new opportunities for self-determination, choice, goal-setting, and risk-taking” (West et al., 2021).

Overall, recipients experienced better quality of life upon the initiation of the transfers. And while SEED’s Stockton experiment provides great insight into the positive effects of a basic income policy on low-income individuals, it does neglect a few major criticisms of UBI which prevent it from being considered a scalable simulation. Funding was primarily generated from donors, and with only 125 individuals receiving it, we do not have any increased understanding on the cost of a basic income from this experiment. Additionally, without random selection that would have included the top half of earners as well, we cannot derive any meaningful impacts on the labor market, as we do not gain insight into the behaviors of employed individuals who are already earning a comfortable wage.

One of the largest and most promising basic income experiments in the United States to date was originally to be performed by the nonprofit arm of Y Combinator but has now spun off as an individual entity titled OpenResearch. There was a significant amount of attention paid to its pilot studies performed in Oakland, CA in 2016 and 2018, though the combined population of the studies was less than 100 people. The studies were primarily performed to “test and improve study procedures” and the team “did not expect to generate meaningful insight into [their] research questions with the pilot, as the sample was far too small and the time horizon too short to simulate the expectation of long-term economic security” (Bartik et al., 2020). Seeming to be the most comprehensive and research-oriented experiment to date, there are naturally high

expectations for the results of the trial, which intends to provide 1,000 individuals with \$1,000 per month for three years. There will also be 2,000 individuals making up a control group, receiving a modest \$50 per month to better measure results of the experiment. Despite the lofty goals and high hopes, there has been little heard from OpenResearch since the proposal release in 2020 regarding the progress of the experiment. Proponents of basic income hope this to be a turning point in the fight for the proposal with its results, but the recent radio silence is worrying for the hope of any future data from the study.

Internationally, there have been a variety of basic income experiments being performed as well. The Stanford Basic Income Lab counts 143 concluded or active UBI experiments as of 2/10/23, 104 of which have been or are being conducted in the United States (A complete list of the experiments can be found in the Appendix). It must be acknowledged that data has been mixed or not even released from some past experiments, indicating that not all programs have been a resounding success for UBI supporters. For the purpose of this paper, we will examine two experiments which yielded notable positive results – the largest study of basic income to date being operated by GiveDirectly across multiple African countries, and an Iranian stipend intended to replace energy subsidies previously offered to citizens.

Started in 2017, charity GiveDirectly is operating the world’s largest and longest-term study of basic income to date (*UBI Study*, 2023). The \$30M project will offer 20,000 individuals in some of the poorest parts of Kenya, Malawi, and Liberia a transfer of about \$0.75 per day (some for 2 years, some upfront for the same total sum of 2 years, and some for 12 years) to lift them above the local extreme poverty line. Tracking results during the COVID-19 pandemic, they found similar results to other basic income experiments: less hunger, sickness, and depression (Banerjee et al., 2020). But another result was far more interesting: “During the

pandemic (and the contemporaneous agricultural lean season) recipients lost the income gains from starting new non-agricultural enterprises that they had initially obtained, but also suffered smaller increases in hunger” (Banerjee et al., 2020). While this sounds like a negative, it is in fact the opposite. Across the globe, people lost money due to lower levels of commercial activity during the pandemic. This data shows that the individuals who had received the transfers had the ability to take more income risks than their non-recipient peers, building new businesses and streams of income with their transfers which will outlast the pandemic and help them build long-term wealth.

One of the few glimpses into the effects of basic income on labor supply comes from Iran, where the government initiated unconditional cash transfers of around 29% of the median income in 2011 in place of energy subsidies (Geier, 2018). The Iranian government felt these subsidies unfairly benefitted the rich and promoted energy consumption, which was damaging to environmental initiatives. A comprehensive study into how much Iranians were working after the inception of the program displayed positive results for UBI supporters. Economists concluded that although Iranians in their twenties did reduce their hours worked (which they cite as not surprising due to the youth’s disconnection to the Iranian labor market), the cash transfer policy does not negatively affect the labor supply in terms of hours worked or probability of participation – in fact, service sector workers even worked more, presumably using their transfers to expand their businesses (Salehi-Isfahani & Mostafavi-Dehzoeei, 2016).

We can gain further insights into the effects of basic income from experiments that are not quite as close to UBI as well. A cash transfer program with no means-test and no work restrictions implemented by the US Department of Veteran Affairs provided veterans claiming mental disorder disability with a \$1,500 average monthly transfer. Silver and Zhang (2022) used

this program as an opportunity to study the effects of a basic income on work-limited individuals who rely on government financial assistance to meet their needs – a group for which the benefits of basic income have not been explored in depth. The results were largely positive, showing that providing disadvantaged individuals with a moderately higher amount can have substantial effects on their living situation: “We find that an additional \$1,000 per year in transfers decreases food insecurity and homelessness by 4.1% and 1.3% over five years, while the number of collections on VA debts declines by 6.4%. Despite facing virtually no direct monetary costs, healthcare utilization increases by 2.5% over the first five years, with greater engagement in preventive care and improved medication adherence” (Silver & Zhang, 2022). Further research into various unconditional cash transfer programs can not only continue to validate their positive repercussions on specific subgroups of the population, but also reinforce the need for a large-scale policy. Having explored the major UBI experiments in the United States and touched on international and specified studies, we can now begin imagining funding possibilities for a nationwide basic income policy for United States citizens.

III: HOW WE PAY: FUNDING POSSIBILITIES

The biggest criticism of the general universal basic income idea will always be the cost. Giving all citizens enough money to live on has never been done on a large scale by any government, and doing so would require a sizable fiscal commitment, which many critics consider to be too large to even be possible without neglecting other necessary government spending initiatives. In this section, various options will be explored to determine if in fact the price is in fact too large, or if some reshuffling and new tax revenue can generate enough to cover it. Because of the theoretical nature of a never-implemented proposal like basic income and the multitude of impending unknown conditions, it is nearly impossible to perfectly forecast future costs and revenues of a basic income policy. Thus, we will use rough estimates and abridged methodologies to simplify the calculations and produce an answer on its feasibility in the United States. We begin with calculating the hypothetical cost of a UBI for all citizens.

Hypothetical Cost

Georgetown University political philosopher Karl Widerquist (2017) argues that the cost of a UBI is “often misunderstood and greatly exaggerated” in his paper *The Cost of Basic Income: Back-of-the-Envelope Calculations*. Widerquist uses an admittedly oversimplified method for calculating the cost of a UBI in the United States in the article, but his estimates act as a good starting point for the cost discussion to break down the initial stigma many economists and others hold about a program this expensive. He clarifies the simplicity of his calculations in the abstract, stating “These back-of-the-envelope calculations present a greatly simplified UBI scheme meant not [as] a practical proposal but as a method to obtain a ballpark estimate of the cost of UBI in isolation. Even with simplifying assumptions, these figures are several times more

accurate than many common but exaggerated estimates” (2017). Because this thesis is primarily intended to explore the basic feasibility of UBI in the United States and the subsequent impacts of the idea, Widerquist’s simplified methodology will be sufficient despite its accepted inaccuracies.

Widerquist’s logic centers around the taking and giving back of funds between the citizens and the government, which creates the difference between the enormous gross cost we see associated with UBI and the more realistic net cost of the program. In his example, the government takes \$1 from contributor A and gives it to beneficiary B. But, due to the universality of the program, an extra \$1 is taken from contributor A but it is then given directly back to them. The gross cost of these transactions is \$2, but because A’s money is returned to them, the net cost is only \$1. When we consider that all parties are both beneficiaries and contributors in the UBI system, therefore all pay tax to the government and receive the stipend as well, the difference between the costs rises even further. Individuals are never, if very rarely, both paying for and receiving benefits from current welfare and transfer programs like unemployment or disability insurance at the same – their use of these programs is indication enough that they are not in the financial situation to pay large tax amounts. After factoring out this transfer back and forth between the government and individuals, what we have left is the “redistribution burden” – the amount of money that is transferred from one party to another via the government’s redistribution and the associated costs that come with that transfer (Widerquist, 2017).

Widerquist’s methodology will be used to calculate an updated ballpark estimate of the net cost of UBI, otherwise understood to be the redistribution burden mentioned earlier. The 2022 United States poverty line sits at \$13,590 and increases by \$4,720 for each additional

person in the household (*Poverty Guidelines*, 2022). The federal tax bracket at that income level is 12%, which means an individual earning an approximate \$15,220 gross income would end up around the poverty line after tax. To simplify the calculations and explore an exaggerated question of feasibility, we will use an aggressive annual stipend of \$16,000 (\$1,333.33 monthly), paired with a \$6,000 (\$500 monthly) additional dividend per child – a stipend which would drop the effective poverty rate to zero. Widerquist uses a marginal income tax rate of 50% for the net beneficiaries in his calculations – I find that to be overly generous and unrealistic. A 50% marginal tax rate on net beneficiaries could potentially disincentivize work as individuals do not want to lose half of the income they work for. Therefore, I will assume a much more modest 25% marginal income tax rate for the net beneficiaries – still higher than the current marginal tax rate of 12% that most beneficiaries fall in, while also helping to offset the sizable stipend they are receiving. It is important to keep in mind that this is a static calculation based on 2022 data and that dynamic factors like inflation can greatly affect the cost of UBI.

To calculate one’s net benefit or contribution, we can use the following basic equation, where N is the net, U is the stipend amount, Y is their market income, and t represents tax rate:

$$N = U - (Y \times t)$$

This can then be expanded to reflect our stipend amounts for adults (A) and children (C):

$$N = (16,000 \times A) + (6,000 \times C) - (Y \times 0.25)$$

To calculate the breakeven income where a household goes from net beneficiary to net contributor, we must set N to 0 and derive values for A and C. We can utilize 2022 Census data on families and living arrangements, which averages 1.94 adults and 0.56 children:

$$0 = (16,000 \times 1.94) + (6,000 \times 0.56) - (Y \times 0.25)$$

$$Y \times 0.25 = 34,400$$

$$Y = \$137,600$$

Therefore, the average American household would need to make over a market income of \$137,600 in order to become a net contributor – this means over 100 million American households (76.5%) are net beneficiaries according to Census income data (“Current Population Survey Tables for Household Income,” 2022). This figure is also significantly larger than Widerquist’s household breakeven point of \$55,000. As mentioned earlier, the assumptions in this paper are significantly more aggressive than Widerquist’s, implying a larger pool of net beneficiaries whose financial situation is improved by the basic income, but at a larger cost to the whole.

Having determined the breakeven point, we can now exclude data of households over that breakeven point to determine the net cost (we will round down to use \$130,000 to \$134,999 as the last bracket included). This includes approximately 100,357,000 households with a mean size of household of 2.42. We do not have access to the adult to child ratio per income bracket, and thus will translate the ratio of the entire population to the 2.42 mean size, which is 1.88 adults and 0.54 children per household. We can multiply the average number of adults and children by the \$16,000 and \$6,000 stipends and then further by the approximately 100 million households to estimate the total UBI outlay:

$$U = ((16,000 \times 1.88) + (6,000 \times 0.54)) \times 100,357,000$$

$$U = \$3,343,900,000,000 \text{ or } U = \$3.34 \text{ trillion}$$

Using the median income for each bracket multiplied by the number of households, we come out with \$5,704,522,813,000, or \$5.7 trillion for our total market income, or Y. We can then multiply that by the tax rate to generate a number for a flat 25% tax rate on all net beneficiaries that will partially offset the UBI:

$$N = 3.34T - (5.7T \times 0.25)$$

$$N = \$1,917,764,537,000 \text{ or } N = \$1.92 \text{ trillion}$$

We must also factor in an additional percentage of the payment outlay to account for administrative costs of the program. UBI administrative costs should be inherently lower than existing welfare systems due to less of a need for manpower to perform means tests and keep records. Social Security's broad umbrella of included individuals and lack of means test signals that it most likely has a similar administrative budget to what a UBI would require. The program's administrative expenses as a percentage of total expenses have not been above 1.0% since 1988 and has been at or below 0.7% for the last ten years (*Social Security Administrative Expenses*, 2023). Therefore, to continue to be conservative and overestimate the budget, we will set the administrative costs of a UBI at 1.0%, or approximately \$19.2 billion. Finally, we arrive at the ballpark redistribution burden of our conservative hypothetical UBI proposal: *\$1.928 trillion*.

Almost \$2 trillion is no small figure – it is \$600 billion more than the 2022 federal deficit level, which was \$1.4 trillion (“The Federal Budget in Fiscal Year 2022: An Infographic,” 2023). But, as mentioned in the introductory section, even pre-pandemic levels of welfare spending outpaced our proposed redistribution burden by over \$900 billion. Immediately, we can see that the real price of a basic income is not as astronomically high as it is often perceived – it is instead almost \$1 trillion cheaper than the 2019 welfare outlay. UBI is not a one-for-one replacement for our current welfare programs, and while it does make many programs redundant, there are also many that would need to remain intact. In the subsequent sections, we will explore different options for covering this redistribution burden, beginning with repurposing current levels of government spending.

Repurposing

A potential option to cover our \$1.93 trillion redistribution burden is to repurpose funds from other areas of existing government spending. This would be the best-case scenario for taxpayers, as they would not have to face any increases in what they already pay, and now receive a large \$16,000 annual sum in addition. On the other hand, this idea is also the least budget friendly and would require serious spending cuts to other government initiatives to make it work, if it is feasible at all.

Immediate extra funding can be allocated from government programs that become redundant because of the UBI. Spending on unemployment insurance saw a significant increase during the COVID-19 pandemic, with \$794 billion in relief issued in the 17-month period from March 2020 through July 2021 via the traditional benefits program, as well as the Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation, Pandemic Unemployment Assistance, and Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation programs (Iacurci, 2021). Obviously, this level of spending is not sustainable long term – COVID-related benefit programs were ceased in September 2021, and unemployment insurance costs have returned to normal in the time since then. Because unemployment was historically low in 2022, the Department of Labor paid only \$24.26 billion to beneficiaries (US Department of Labor, 2023). This amount accounts for a small piece of our large redistribution burden; therefore, we must eliminate more redundancies to attempt to cover the cost.

Using fiscal data from treasury.gov (2023), 14% of the \$6.27 trillion, or \$865 billion, total federal spending for fiscal year 2022 was allocated to income security initiatives, which includes unemployment insurance, food and nutrition assistance, federal employee retirement, housing assistance, supplemental security income and other smaller programs. Not all of these

are redundancies, and programs like the FERS federal retirement program can sometimes pay their beneficiaries more than what a basic income would. However, there are many similar programs that could have their budget reduced to reallocate funds, specifically related to unemployment/disability benefits or food and housing assistance where the monthly value is noticeably lower than what individuals would be receiving in form of a basic income of this level. The fiscal data from treasury.gov (2023) shows spending on income security programs to be \$865 billion in FY22. To continue being conservative in our estimates and assume that not all of that cost becomes redundant, we will reduce the hypothetical cost savings to \$500 billion, leaving us with \$1.43 trillion left to raise.

The sector that could next be seen as redundant is social security because of its similarities to the basic income proposal in terms of cash transfers. Social security's annual outlay was \$1.3 trillion in fiscal year 2022, which is highly promising (*Spending Explorer*, 2023). However, the average monthly benefit for social security recipients in 2023 is estimated to be \$1,827 per month, almost \$500 higher than our proposed basic income level (AARP, 2023). In order to maintain the benefit of higher income that individuals get for working later into their years, social security must be retained in some form. Using website PolicyEngine, which can simulate the outcomes of various policy changes in the US, our first simulation A (all PolicyEngine simulations are linked in the Appendix) predicts elimination of all social security benefits would free up \$740.7 billion to be spent annually. If we assume an updated social security in which retired individuals' basic income is elevated to what their monthly social security benefit would've been under the former program, we can make a conservative estimate that less 25% of its current outlay could be converted to savings for UBI, which we will set at \$175 billion. Between the cautious projected spending cuts to income security and social

security, we have allocated a hypothetical \$675 billion towards the proposal, leaving \$1.25 trillion left to find.

Any potential cuts to other sectors like Medicare, national defense, or veteran's benefits would almost definitely not be received well, therefore we must consider their budgets virtually untouchable. Having generated our theoretical \$675 billion by repurposing funds from redundant government programs, we are left to locate an additional \$1.25 trillion for our example via other means. In the following sections, various ideas to raise the needed revenue will be discussed.

VAT

The idea of implementing a Value-Added Tax to generate revenue for a universal basic income in the US was first introduced to the political mainstream by Democratic presidential candidate Andrew Yang during the first primary debate of the 2020 election (Gale, 2020). A VAT is a common form of tax based on the concept of "added value," otherwise understood to be the difference between the sales of a business and the price they pay for goods and services – hence the value they add to whatever is being produced. But one may ask, what is the difference between a VAT and the conventional US sales tax? Instead of being paid only once on a good at the point of final sale like sales tax does, a VAT is collected multiple times, at each stage of production. All economically advanced nations except the United States have implemented a VAT, and for good reason – it generates a large amount of revenue through its incremental taxing, is easy to manage, and does not affect the financial decisions of a business or the savings of households.

As mentioned, a VAT would raise a significant amount of revenue – the Congressional Budget Office estimates that a 10% VAT (Half the average VAT level of a European country)

would generate \$600 billion, while the Tax Policy Center estimates \$1.2 trillion in annual revenue, and the Tax Foundation estimates \$1.3 trillion (Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, 2019). The latter two estimates would be perfect for our proposal, producing the remaining needed capital to fund the real cost of our UBI. But as we have done with figures earlier in the exploration, we will err on the side of caution and assume the lower figure of \$600 billion is correct. The largest question surrounding the potential of implementing a VAT is how it would coexist with the current US sales tax. Due to the economic efficiency of consumption taxes, many developed countries have a high reliance on it – the US’s reliance on its consumption (sales) taxes was about a third the OECD average in 2021 (Walczak, 2022). Comparing it with our ballpark \$600 billion in potential revenue from a VAT, the state sales taxes raised a combined \$375.3 billion in 2021 at a tax cost of \$1,131 per person via a weighted average 6% tax rate.

The burden of a VAT would be shared by both firms and individuals alike as opposed to some of the more acute revenue generation options to be explored later. This would help to ease the negative sentiment that often comes as a result of raising taxes in the US. Because more of the burden would fall on firms (aside from small businesses, who are exempt from most existing VATs), the marginal increase on the current \$1,131 average consumption tax burden would not be large, putting money in people’s pockets after receiving they receive the UBI that could be partially funded by a VAT. Considering the US’s small reliance on consumption tax and the shared burden of the policy’s design, a VAT is a valid possible source of additional revenue for a UBI, though it looks unlikely that it could cover all of the funding needed.

Wealth Tax

A highly progressive policy, past Democratic presidential candidates Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren have proposed implementing a wealth tax that targets the highest earners in the United States. Warren's proposal called for a 2% net worth tax for individuals worth \$50 million to \$1 billion, moving up to 6% for individuals worth more than that (Pomerleau, 2020). For comparison, Sanders proposed a 1% net worth tax on people falling between \$32 million and \$50 million in net worth, incrementally increasing to 8% on those worth more than \$10 billion. Their campaigns have claimed that these taxes would generate \$3.7 trillion and \$4.35 trillion over 10 years, respectively, but the true revenue generation ability of these policies is reliant on a multitude of factors, such as its enforceability, behavioral effects, and unforeseen effects of other sources of federal revenue. 13 public estimates have been calculated to attempt to predict the true possibility of this plan, according to Pomerleau (2020), ranging from \$366 billion to \$5.3 trillion over 10 years (the wide range is accounted for by the lack of administrative data on wealth, unlike income). If we take the most conservative estimate, this policy would be too small on its own to have any major impact on funding a UBI, with a \$36 billion annual value, whereas the highest estimate predicts the annual value to be over \$500 billion, which would do significantly more – almost covering our \$1.25 trillion gap when paired with the previous VAT option. We will again err on the side of caution and assume that a wealth tax could raise an annual value of \$100 billion, or \$1 trillion over the ten years other estimates have used.

However, the potential downside of this policy looms extremely large. Targeting the wealthiest members of society who have an unfathomable amount of resources at their disposal and then taxing them on all of their assets, liquid or not, could at best lead to underreporting of income and assets and at worst large-scale tax evasion or even emigration from the country.

Many of the wealthiest people in the country own or have significant influence on the largest corporations in the country and major sources of American GDP – if they were to emigrate as a byproduct of wanting to hold onto more of their wealth, it could be detrimental for other sources of tax revenue and for the larger American macroeconomic environment. Evasion and underreporting are prevalent within the current income tax structure – significant improvements in monitoring would be needed so as to eliminate these practices from a wealth tax, but enhanced IRS enforcement and the significantly smaller population that the tax includes may be helpful to that point. Although probably less than a VAT, the wealth tax would still most likely generate a significant amount of tax revenue – the Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates an annual value of around \$240 billion but that the policy would also have a shrinking effect on wealth accumulation and GDP, which would shrink by 1.2% in 2050 (Huntley & Ricco, 2021). The unknown repercussions of implementing a wealth tax makes this one of the less attractive financing options from a stability standpoint, but makes sense from a populist perspective, and would definitely be a step in further reducing the economic inequality in the US.

Corporation Tax

US corporate tax revenue hit an all-time high in fiscal year 2021, generating \$372 billion at a tax rate of 21% (McBride, 2022). While this record high could be attributed to recent high levels of inflation, it also represents the stream's highest ratio when compared to national GDP, which takes inflation into account as well, since 2015. Some proponents of UBI feel that raising the corporate tax rate on the profits of firms could be a manner through which to fund the policy. However, the side effects of raising the corporate tax rate would leave many employees of the companies worse off than before, potentially even cancelling out the UBI the increased tax

would fund for some – Watson & McBride (2021) from Tax Foundation estimate that were the Biden administration’s proposal of raising the rate to 28% successful, not only would 159,000 jobs be lost, but “the bottom 20 percent of earners would on average see a 1.45 percent drop in after-tax income in the long run.” Their study also estimates that the proposal would only raise an extra \$886.3 billion over the next eight years, or about \$110 billion in annual value, which is large enough to make a dent in the funding needed for our basic income, but the tradeoff of lower revenue driven from other streams like payroll tax and the imminent decreased economic output makes this financing proposal largely unhelpful.

The government would be better off introducing incremental tax increases, like the VAT, that takes the pressure off of a single group of individuals or a group of actors driven by profit like corporations are. The behavioral effects will often negate the benefits of the increased revenue, as in this case, where we could see wealthy individuals or corporations evading taxes or even leaving the country and taking their wealth and economic output elsewhere. There is another option for corporations, however. Making firms pay for the ability to emit carbon from fossil fuels not only can raise a significant amount of revenue for the government, but also supports the international goal of carbon neutrality.

Carbon Tax

The final funding option to be explored in this thesis will be that of a carbon tax on the emissions of producers, manufacturers, transporters, and more. There are two primary manners through which to execute a carbon tax – carbon credits and carbon pricing. A carbon credit represents one ton of carbon dioxide removed from the atmosphere, which companies can buy to offset their emissions, while carbon pricing is the fee that companies pay when burning the

amount of fuel that equates to one metric ton of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere (Zakrzewski, 2022). Because carbon credits represent both the physical removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere (which costs money) and the fact that there is room for a secondary market in which credits can be bought and sold, carbon pricing has the larger potential to drive revenue for a UBI policy. According to World Bank data, the continental United States currently has seven state-sponsored Emissions Trading Schemes that are either being considered, are scheduled to be implemented, or are already implemented (“Carbon Pricing Dashboard,” 2023). However, there is no federal regulation on pricing of carbon emissions currently, the likes of which could both raise significant revenue for a basic income and also inspire a push in the private sector towards carbon neutrality.

5.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide were emitted by Americans in 2021, which, if priced correctly, could create a sizable source of tax revenue (*Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks*, 2023). However, to maximize the revenue driven and cover all sources of emissions, we would have to tax individuals for their carbon emissions as well. With the average American emitting 16 tons of carbon per year (*What’s Your Carbon Footprint?*, 2023), we must keep the price per ton moderately low so individuals can afford to foot the bill for their emissions. Because the amount of emissions a household produces is positively related to income, carbon pricing also acts as a progressive tax scheme. Individuals who emit more are liable to pay a higher amount proportional to their emissions – an individual who rides the bus to and from work every day will foot a significantly smaller bill than a world-famous celebrity who frequents private jets. The next question becomes where to find the sweet spot for the price of an emitted ton of carbon, one where households will be able to afford their carbon bill while also generating a sizable revenue for the government. Most expert recommendations set the price at

\$25 per ton, which would raise around \$125 billion and run the average individual \$400 per year. Raising the price to \$50 would double the revenue but would also mean the average person must cough up \$800 annually to pay for their emissions.

Additionally, as individuals and firms emit less and technology becomes less fossil fuel dependent (as is the goal of the policy), the revenue generated by the carbon tax will decline. This is much more of a long-term concern, as even the most progressive of states and corporations see carbon neutrality by 2050 as a difficult goal to achieve, however its lack of long-term potential means that eventually something will need to replace it. Continuing our trend of using conservative estimates, setting the potential revenue of a carbon tax at \$100 billion means that it is not large enough to fund a basic income on its own or even when combined with one of the larger potential revenue generators like a VAT or Wealth Tax. Instead, we would need to combine all three of those new taxes in order to fund the redistribution burden of our basic income proposal. Having now explored four potential options for generating additional tax revenue to fund our redistribution burden, the next section will explore whether the United States can or should implement a basic income.

IV: CAN WE DO IT? SHOULD WE DO IT?

Having generated rudimentary and highly conservative estimates for the price of a basic income redistribution burden as well as for the revenues of four of the most popular funding possibilities, we must now decide: Is a universal basic income feasible for the United States? Looking back at our calculations, here are our estimates:

Redistribution Burden: -\$1.928 trillion

Repurposing of Funds from Redundant Welfare Programs: \$500 billion

Repurposing of Funds from Social Security: \$175 billion

Revenue from a Value-Added Tax: \$600 billion

Revenue from a Wealth Tax: \$100 billion

Revenue from a Corporate Tax: \$110 billion

Revenue from a Carbon Tax: \$100 billion

Funds Generated from All Sources: \$1.585 billion

Uncovered Redistribution Burden: \$343 billion

When considering these figures, it is easy to say that universal basic income is not feasible for the United States, as even with introducing all of these extra taxes and repurposing funds from redundant welfare programs we still come up \$343 billion short of the redistribution burden. However, it is important to recall how conservative our calculations have been when deriving these numbers before counting out the achievability of an American basic income.

Going back to the hypothetical cost section, we set our annual basic income at \$16,000 per person and \$6,000 per child, with a 25% marginal tax rate for net beneficiaries, half of the proposed 50% by Widerquist in his calculations (2017). The repercussions of our hypothetical payment (disregarding the funding question) are amazing – a basic income at this level would

lower the poverty rate to around 0.1% and the deep poverty rate to zero, and increase the average household net income by 33.9%, according to PolicyEngine simulation B. It would also reduce the Gini coefficient, a chief measure of economic inequality, by 28.2% and reduce the share of income held by the top 1% by 24.1%. The impacts that such a program would have are nothing short of incredible – but also quite expensive. If we decreased the respective payments by 25% for adults (\$12,000) and children (\$4,500), as in simulation C, we also can reduce the redistribution burden by almost \$500 billion, down to \$1.446 trillion, while still reducing poverty to 0.5%, reducing the Gini coefficient by 23.2%, and still totally eradicating deep poverty. Even reducing the program by 75% (\$4,000 per adult, \$1,500 per child) would only have a \$482 billion redistribution burden while still reducing poverty by over half at 50.7%, deep poverty by 80.3%, and the Gini coefficient by 9.8%, according to PolicyEngine simulation D.

What running these simulations tells us is that even when we reduce the amount being paid out to individuals by a large margin (75%), the impacts are still noteworthy. Meanwhile, the reflected cost becomes both realistic and attainable via implementation of our conservative VAT estimate without any current fund repurposing. So, a UBI appears to be attainable after all! Maybe not to the scale of which we performed our calculations, but PolicyEngine simulations show that we do not need to implement a basic income of such a grand scale to see meaningful shrinking effects on both poverty and economic inequality. However, a universal basic income by definition must be enough for an individual to cover the vast majority, if not all of, their basic necessities. The question now becomes “what is the monthly amount that can cover one’s living costs?” The Alaskan PFD discussed earlier is not classified as a basic income, as \$1,000 - \$2,000 per year is not enough for an individual to live off of – our \$4,000 per month proposal is more than double that but is probably not enough for an individual to survive on unless they were to

live extremely frugally. Our hypothetical cost for the often-recommended amount of \$12,000 per adult and \$4,500 per child (\$1.446 trillion) is attainable if we take our funds from repurposing and implement Value-Added, Wealth, and Carbon taxes (\$1.485 trillion). So, we have the answer to our first question: a universal basic income policy is something the United States CAN implement at a federal level. But we must also answer the second question: SHOULD we?

This is where things get a little bit trickier. The question of should triggers a transition from a matter of fact and feasibility to a matter of opinion and where one falls on the issue of government spending. It is not a matter of opinion, however, that a basic income would perform its intended functions of helping to eradicate poverty, reduce economic inequality, and provide individuals with a consistent financial lifeline, whether they need it because they lost their job to automation or for any other reason they may need it, to be frank. The question of should we implement a UBI in that case comes down to two major points: 1) is the income amount large enough to make a substantive impact on the lives of most people, and 2) what are the unforeseen repercussions of a basic income? There are bound to be unintended consequences with a shift as radical as this – will they be positive? Or will they negatively impact our macroeconomic environment and government behavior? We can do what we can to forecast what the UBI repercussions will be, but it is impossible to predict the future, after all.

In my opinion, the benefits a basic income are difficult to turn a blind eye to. As the wealthiest nation in the world, a policy that has the ability to help the poorest members of our society rise out of poverty while also improving the financial wellbeing of the majority of the population is one that should be capitalized on. Many of the happiest countries in the world are ones with equitable societies with strong social programs, education, and healthcare (Pinsker, 2021). Universal basic income will not directly improve the American education and healthcare

systems (though indirectly, who knows what could happen!), but it can help create a stronger safety net for all of us and build a more equitable society. If happiness is the goal, UBI may be the place to start – we'll never know until we try.

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APPENDIX

PolicyEngine Simulations

Sim A: Abolition of social security – p. 40

<https://policyengine.org/us/policy?focus=policyOutput.netIncome&reform=8100®ion=us&timePeriod=2023&baseline=2>

Sim B: \$16,000/adult and \$6,000/child basic income, 25% tax for net beneficiaries – p. 48-49

<https://policyengine.org/us/policy?focus=policyOutput.analysis&reform=9355®ion=us&timePeriod=2023&baseline=2>

Sim C: \$12,000/adult and \$4,500/child basic income, 25% tax for net beneficiaries – p. 49

<https://policyengine.org/us/policy?focus=policyOutput.analysis&reform=9383®ion=us&timePeriod=2023&baseline=2>

Sim D: \$4,000/adult and \$1,500/child basic income, 25% tax for net beneficiaries – p. 49

<https://policyengine.org/us/policy?focus=policyOutput.analysis&reform=9395®ion=us&timePeriod=2023&baseline=2>

Table 1

List of Universal Basic Income Experiments and Related Programs

Name	Location	Managing Organizations/Agencies	Dates	Number of Participants	Participants receiving the transfer	Type of Targeting	Amount	Frequency of Payment	Duration of Payment
37208 Demonstration	Nashville, TN	Moving Nashville Forward (MOVE)	November 2021 - October 2022	100	Individuals	Geographic and individual/household means-testing and demographic	1000 USD	Monthly	10 months
Abundant Birth Project	San Francisco, CA	Expecting Justice	June 2021 -	150	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	1000 USD	Monthly	15 months
Agreements with Young Adults	N/A	Government of BC	March 2022 -	Any individual transitioning out of care	Individuals	Demographic	1250 CAD	Monthly	12 months
Alaska Permanent Dividend Fund	N/A	Alaska Dept of Revenue	January 1982 -	667,047	Individuals	None	1114 USD (2021)	Yearly	Annual

Albuquerque Public Schools and Las Cruces Public Schools-Students Experiencing Homelessness Pilot	Albuquerque, NM	New Mexico Appleseed	January 2020 - December 2021	65	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	Monthly		3 months in Las Cruces and 4 months in Albuquerque
Arlington's Guarantee	Arlington, VA	Arlington Community Foundation	September 2021 - December 2022	200	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	500 USD	Monthly	18 months
Austin's Guaranteed Income Pilot Program	Austin, TX	City of Austin (including Austin Public Health, the Homeless Strategy Office, the Equity Office); Uptgether	September 2022 - September 2023	135	Households	Geographic and individual/household means-testing and demographic	1000 USD	Monthly	12 months
Baby's First Years	New York, NY	Teacher's College, Columbia University	May 2018 -	1000	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	20 or 333 USD	Monthly	40 months
Baby's First Years	New Orleans, LA	Teacher's College, Columbia University	May 2018 -	1000	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	21 or 333 USD	Monthly	41 months
Baby's First Years	Omaha, NE	Teacher's College, Columbia University	May 2018 -	1000	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	22 or 333 USD	Monthly	42 months
Baby's First Years	Twin Cities, MN	Teacher's College, Columbia University	May 2018 -	1000	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	23 or 333 USD	Monthly	43 months
Baltimore Young Families Success Fund	Baltimore, MD	City of Baltimore	Individuals	200	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	1000 USD	Monthly	24 months
Basic Income Project	United States	Open Research Lab (formerly Y Combinator Research)	Information not available	1000	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing	1000 USD	Monthly	36 months
BIG:LEAP (Basic Income Guaranteed: L.A. Economic Assistance Pilot)	Los Angeles, CA	City of Los Angeles	January 2022 - March 2023	3204	Individuals	Demographic and means-testing	1000 USD	Monthly	14 months
Birmingham's Embrace Mothers Pilot	Birmingham, AL	City of Birmingham	March 2022 - February 2023	110	Individuals	Demographic	375 USD	Monthly	12 months
Black Resilience Fund (BRF)	Portland, OR	Brown Hope	August 2022 - 2026	50	Households	Geographic and individual/household means-testing and demographic	\$1,000 a month for adults \$1,500 for adults with 1 or 2 children \$2,000 for adults with 3 or more children	Monthly	36 months
Breathe: LA County's Guaranteed Income Program	LA County, CA	Strength Based Community Change	June 2022 - July 2025	1000	Individuals	Geographic and individual/household means-testing and demographic	1000 USD	Monthly	36 months

The Bridge Project	New York, NY	Monarch Foundation	Phase 1: June 2021 - June 2024 Phase 2: June 2022 - June 2025	Phase 1: 100 Phase 2: 500	Individuals	Geographic and individual/household means-testing and demographic	Phase 1: 250 or 500 Phase 2: 500 for first 18 months, 250 for last 18 months	Bi-weekly	36 months
The Bridge Network	Denver, Colorado	The Bridge Network	July 2021 - June 2023	20 in 12 month pilot, 15 in 24 month pilot	Individuals	Identification through program/service	500 USD	Monthly	12 or 24 months
Cambridge RISE (Recurring Income for Success and Empowerment)	Cambridge, MA	City of Cambridge	September 2021 - February 2023	130	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	500 USD	Monthly	18 months
Camp Harbor View Guaranteed Income Pilot	Boston, MA	Camp Harbor View & UpTogether	August 2021 - August 2023	50	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	583 USD	Monthly	24 months
Central Texas 12-Month Pilot	Austin and Georgetown, TX	UpTogether	March 2021 - March 2022	173	Households	Geographic and individual/household means-testing and demographic	\$1,000	Monthly	12 months
Chelsea Eats	Chelsea, MA	City of Chelsea	November 2020 - May 2021	2000	Households	Identification through program/service	200 - 400 USD	Monthly	6 months
Chicago Future Fund	Chicago, IL	EAT Chicago	October 2021 - April 2023	30	Individuals	Geographic and individual/household means-testing and demographic	500 USD	Monthly	18 months
Chicago Resilient Communities Pilot	Chicago, IL	City of Chicago, Department of Family and Support Services, GiveDirectly	June 2022 - May 2023	5000	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing	500 USD	Monthly	12 months
CLIMB (Columbia Life Improvement Monetary Boost)	Columbia, SC	City of Columbia; Central Carolina Community Foundation	September 2021 - August 2022	100	Individuals	Identification through program/service	500 USD	Monthly	12 months
Community Love Fund	Boston, MA	The National Council	February 2022 - January 2023	21	Individuals	Demographic	500 USD	Monthly	12 months
Compton Pledge	Compton, CA	City of Compton, The Fund for Guaranteed Income	December 2020 - November 2022	800	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing	300, 400 and 600 USD	Bi-weekly or quarterly	24 months
Cook County Promise Guaranteed Income	Cook County, IL	Cook County Government, Bureau of Economic Development (BED), GiveDirectly	October 2022 - 2025	3,250	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	\$500	Monthly	24 months
Dallas Targeted Eviction Prevention Program Fund	Dallas, Texas	UpTogether	December 2021 - November 2024	500	Individuals	Neighbourhood-level means testing	3000	Monthly	12 months

Denver Basic Income Project	Denver, CO	Denver Basic Income Project, Impact Charitable, City of Denver	July 2021 - December 2023	11 (August 2021 soft launch), 28 (July 2022 2.0) and 820 (full launch by November 2022)	Individuals	Identification through program/service	1/3 will receive a one-time cash transfer of \$6,500 at the beginning of the study with an additional \$500 for 11 months, 1/3 12 monthly cash transfers of \$1,000, 1/3 will not receive a cash transfer as the control group, receiving a stipend of \$50 a month.	One-time and monthly, or monthly	12 months
Direct Investment Program in Sacramento (DIPS)	Sacramento, CA	United Way California Capital Region	June 2021 - May 2023	100	Households	Individual/household means-testing	300 USD	Monthly	24 months
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians Casino Revenue Fund	Choctaw Nation	Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians	1996 -	15,414	Individuals	None	3500-6000 USD	Bi-annual	
Elevate MV	Mountain View, CA	City of Mountain View	November 2022 - October 2023	166	American Rescue Plan Act funding	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	500 USD	Monthly	12 months
Excel	Durham, NC	StepUp Durham, City of Durham	March 2022 - February 2023	109	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	600 USD	Monthly	12 months
Family Goal Fund	Chicago, IL	LIFT, Inc	January 2018 -	800+	Households	Identification through program/service	150 USD	Quarterly	Up to 24 months
Family Goal Fund	Los Angeles, CA	LIFT, Inc	January 2018 -	800+	Households	Identification through program/service	150 USD	Quarterly	Up to 24 months
Family Goal Fund	Washington, DC	LIFT, Inc	January 2018 -	800+	Households	Identification through program/service	150 USD	Quarterly	Up to 24 months
Family Goal Fund	New York, NY	LIFT, Inc	January 2018 -	800+	Households	Identification through program/service	150 USD	Quarterly	Up to 24 months
Family Health Project	Lynn, MA	Health Metrics	January 2018 -	30	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	400 USD	Monthly	36 months
Gary Income Maintenance Experiment	Gary, IN	State of Indiana Department of Public Welfare	1971 - 1974	1782	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	275 or 358 USD	Monthly	
Growing Resilience in Tacoma (GRIT)	Tacoma, WA	City of Tacoma	December 2021 - November 2022	110	Individuals	Demographic and means-testing	500 USD	Monthly	12 months
Guaranteed Basic Income Pilot Program	Alexandria, VA	ACT for Alexandria	April 2022 - March 2024	150	Individuals	Neighbourhood-level means-testing and individual/household means testing	500 USD	Monthly	24 months

Guaranteed Income for Artists	St. Paul, MN	Springboard for the Arts	April 2021 - October 2022	25	Households	Demographic	500 USD	Monthly	18 months
Guaranteed Income Pilot Program	Evanston, IL	City of Evanston and Northwestern University	April 2021 - January 2022	165	Individuals	Demographic	500 USD	Monthly	12 months
Guaranteed Income Validation Effort (GIVE Gary)	Gary, IN	City of Gary	May 2021 - May 2022	100	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing	500 USD	Monthly	12 months
Harrison 2 - Colorado Springs	Colorado Springs, CO	UpTogether	November 2020 - March 2023	95	Households	Identification through program/service	168	Monthly	19 months
Houston Equity Fund	Houston, TX	The Houston Fund	September 2022 - August 2023	110		Individual/household means-testing	375 USD	Monthly	12 months
HudsonUP	Hudson, NY	City of Hudson	November 2020 - September 2026	75	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing	500 USD	Monthly	60 months
I.M.P.A.C.T. (Income Mobility Program for Atlanta Community Transformation)	Atlanta, GA	City of Atlanta and Urban League of Greater Atlanta	January 2022 - May 2023	300	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing	500 USD	Monthly	12 months
Immigrant Families Recovery Program - National Immigrant Families Recovery Program	US	Mission Asset Fund (MAF)	2021 - 2023	3000	Households	Identification through program/service			
Immigrant Families Recovery Program: Coachella's UBI Recovery Program	Coachella, CA	Mission Asset Fund (MAF)	October 2022 - 2024	140	Households	Geographic and individual/household means-testing and demographic	400 USD	Monthly	24 months
Immigrant Families Recovery Program: San Mateo County	San Mateo, CA	Mission Asset Fund (MAF), San Mateo County Government	February 2022 - December 2024	500	Households	Geographic and individual/household means-testing and demographic	400 USD	Monthly	24 months
In Her Hands - Atlanta	Clay, Randolph, and Terrell County, GA	GRO Fund	August 2022 - 2024	217	Households	Geographic and individual/household means-testing and demographic	\$850	Monthly	24 months
Ithaca Guaranteed Income	Ithaca, NY	Human Services Coalition of Tompkins County	June 2022 - May 2023	110	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	450 USD	Monthly	12 months
International Institute of Minnesota's Guaranteed Income Program for Refugees	St. Paul, MN	International Institute of Minnesota	August 2022 - July 2023	25	Households	Geographic and individual/household means-testing and demographic	750 USD	Monthly	12 months
Just Income GNV	Gainesville	Community Spring	January 2022 - February 2023	115	Individuals	Demographic	1000 USD first month, then 600 per month USD	Monthly	12 months
Every Dollar Counts		Heartland Alliance	January 2020 - December 2023	Not available	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	50 or 1000 USD	Monthly	26 months
Level Up Guaranteed Income Pilot	Mount Vernon, NY	City of Mount Vernon	November 2022 - October 2024	200			500 USD	Monthly	12 months

Let's Go DMV	Washington D.C.	Venorica ,ÃÚVec,ÃÚ Tucker, Glenda Rodriguez, ROC-DC, Amalgamated Bank, Amalgamated Foundation, Greater Washington Community Foundation and Washington Regional Association of Grantmakers	March 2022-February 2027	75	Individuals	Demographic and means-testing	1000 USD	Monthly	60 months
Long Beach pledge	Long Beach, CA	City of Long Beach	November 2022 - October 2023	250	Long Beach Recovery Act dollars	Neighbourhood-level means testing and individual/household means testing	500 USD	Monthly	12 months
Madison Guaranteed Income Pilot Program (Madison Forward Fund)	Madison	TASC Madison	Sept 2022 - Aug 2023	155	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	500 USD	Monthly	12 months
Magnolia Mother's Trust	Jackson	Springboard to Opportunities	2018 -	100	Individuals	Demographic	1000 USD	Monthly	12 months
Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment (MINCOME)	Winnipeg	Province of Manitoba	1975 - 1978	2263	Households	Individual/household means-testing	316 - 483 CAD	Monthly	N/A
Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment (MINCOME)	Dauphin	Province of Manitoba	1976 - 1978	2263	Households	Individual/household means-testing	316 - 483 CAD	Monthly	N/A
Minneapolis Guaranteed Basic Income Pilot	Minneapolis	City of Minneapolis	June 2022 - May 2024	200	Households	Individual/household means-testing	500 USD	Monthly	24 months
MOMentum	Marin	Marin Community Foundation	June 2021 - May 2023	125	Individuals	Demographic	1000 USD	Monthly	24 months
Montgomery County Guaranteed Income Program	Mongomery, MD	Uptgether, Montgomery Couy Government	August 2022 - July 2024	300	Households	Identification through program/service	8000 USD	Monthly	24 months
Multnomah Mothers' Trust	Multnomah County, OR	Multnomah Ideas Lab	January 2022 - June 2022	75	Individuals	Demographic	1000 USD	Monthly	6 months
NCJWLA Guaranteed Income Project	Los Angeles	National Council of Jewish Women-LA	July 2021 - July 2022	12	Individual	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	1000 USD	Monthly	12 months
New Jersey Income Maintenance Experiment	Jersey City, NJ	Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin -Madison	1968-1972	1357	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	Varied	Monthly	12 months
New Jersey Income Maintenance Experiment	Paterson, NJ	Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin -Madison	1968-1973	1357	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	Varied	Monthly	12 months
New Jersey Income Maintenance Experiment	Prassaic, NJ	Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin -Madison	1968-1974	1357	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	Varied	Monthly	12 months
New Jersey Income Maintenance Experiment	Trenton, NJ	Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin -Madison	1968-1975	1357	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	Varied	Monthly	16 months

New Jersey Income Maintenance Experiment	Scranton	Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin -Madison	1968-1976	1357	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	Varied	Monthly	
New Leaf Project	Vancouver	Foundations for Social Change	2018 - 2019	50	Individuals	Demographic	7500 USD	One time	
New Mexico Guaranteed Basic Income Pilot Project & Study for Immigrant Families	New Mexico	UpTogether	January 2022 - December 2023	330	Individuals	Demographic	500 USD	Monthly	12 months
Newark Movement for Economic Equity	Newark	City of Newark	October 2021 - September 2023	200 receiving bi-weekly payment, 200 receiving bi-annual payment	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing	250 (bi-weekly) or 3000 (semi-annually) USD	Bi-weekly and semi-annually	24 months
Oakland Resilient Families	Oakland	UpTogether, City of Oakland	June 2021 - June 2024	600 (2 cohorts)	Households	Neighbourhood level means testing and demographic	500 USD	Monthly	18 months
Ontario Basic Income Pilot	Hamilton, Brantford, Brant County,	Government of Ontario Ministry of Children, Community and Social Services	2017 - 2018	2748		Individual/household means-testing	16,989 CAD for a single person less 50% of any earned income 24,027 CAD for a couple, less 50% of any earned income Persons with disabilities receive an additional 500 CAD	Annual	12 months
Ontario Basic Income Pilot	Thunder Bay	Government of Ontario Ministry of Children, Community and Social Services	2018 - 2018	1908		Individual/household means-testing	16,989 CAD for a single person less 50% of any earned income 24,027 CAD for a couple, less 50% of any earned income Persons with disabilities receive an additional 500 CAD	Annual	12 months

Ontario Basic Income Pilot	Lindsay	Government of Ontario Ministry of Children, Community and Social Services	2019 - 2018	1844		Individual/household means-testing	16,989 CAD for a single person less 50% of any earned income 24,027 CAD for a couple, less 50% of any earned income Persons with disabilities receive an additional 500 CAD	Annual	12 months
Osage ARP Cash Assistance		Osage Nation	Aug-21	11,721	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing	Up to 2000 USD	One time	
Paterson Guaranteed Income Pilot Program	Paterson	City of Paterson	July 2021 - June 2022	110	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing	400 USD	Monthly	12 months
People's Prosperity Project	St. Paul	City of St. Paul	October 2020 - March 2022	150	Households	Neighbourhood- level means testing	500 USD	Monthly	18 months
Philadelphia Guaranteed Income Program	Philadelphia	WorkReady, City of Philadelphia	March 2022 - March 2023	Up to 60	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing	500 USD	Monthly	Up to 12 months
PHLHousing+	Philadelphia, PA	Philadelphia Housing Development Corporation (PHDC)	September 2022 - April 2025	300	Households	Individual/household means-testing, demographic and program participation	Payments subsidize household income so that housing costs are 30% of total income, and payments range between \$89 - \$2079	Monthly	30 months
Preserving Our Diversity (POD) Pilot #1	Santa Monica	City of Santa Monica, Housing and Economic Development	November 2017 - December 2018	21	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	151 - 813 USD	Monthly	14 months
Preserving Our Diversity (POD) Pilot #2	Santa Monica	City of Santa Monica, Housing and Economic Development	November 2019 - June 2023	248 - 463	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	750 USD for single person household 1300 USD for 2 person household	Monthly	
Project 100+	Multiple	GiveDirectly	April 2020 - October 2021	200,000	Households	Identification through program/service	1000 USD	One time	N/A
Project Resilience	Ulster County	Ulster County	May 2021 - April 2022	100	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing	500 USD	Monthly	12 months
Providence GI Pilot	Rhode Island	City of Providence, Amos House	November 2021 - April 2023	110	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing	500 USD	Monthly	15 months
San Diego for Every Child	San Diego	San Diego for Every Child	March 2022 - March 2024	150	Households	Neighbourhood- level means testing and demographic	500 USD	Monthly	12 months
Respond, Recover and Rebuild	Cherokee Nation	Cherokee Nation	Jun-21	392,832	Individuals	None	2000 USD	One time	Not applicable
Returning Home Career Grant	Alameda, Contra Costa	Rubicon Programs	May 2021 - May 2022	25	Individuals		500 USD	Monthly	At least 12 months

Artisit Grants	Rochester, NY	The Local Sound	June 2022 - May 2023	5	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	200 USD	Monthly	12 months
Rural Income Maintenance Experiment	Duplic County, NC	Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin -Madison	1970 - 1972	810	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	Varied	Monthly	24 months
Rural Income Maintenance Experiment	Calhoun and Pocahontas Counties, IA	Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin -Madison	1970 - 1972	810	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	Varied	Monthly	24 months
San Antonio Basic Income Pilot	San Antonio, Texas	UpTogether	December 2020 - January 2023	1000	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	Lump sum of 1,908 USD and 400 USD quarterly	Quarterly	24 months
San Luis Valley, Colorado	San Luis Valley, Colorado	UpTogether	December 2021 - September 2022	75	Individuals	Identification through program/service	200 USD	Monthly	18 months
Santa Clara UBI Pilot	Santa Clara, CA	My Path, Excite Credit Union	October 2020 - February 2022	72	Individuals	Demographic	1000 USD	Monthly	18 months
Santa Fe Learn, Earn, Achieve Program (SF LEAP)	Santa Fe, NM	City of Santa Fe	October 2021 - September 2022	100	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	400 USD	Monthly	12 months
San Francisco Housing Stability Fund	San Francisco Bay Area, CA	Tipping Point Community	September 2021 - August 2022	30	Individuals	Identification through program/service	1000 USD	Monthly	6 months
Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment (SIME/DIME)	Seattle, WA	Stanford Research Institute	1971 - 1982	4800	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	316, 400 or 466 USD	Monthly	N/A
Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment (SIME/DIME)	Denver, CO	Stanford Research Institute	1971 - 1982	4800	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	316, 400 or 466 USD	Monthly	N/A
Shreveport Guaranteed Income	Shreveport, LA	City of Shreveport	March 2022 - March 2023	110	Households	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	600 USD	Monthly	12 months
Pathway to Income Equity	Sonoma County, CA	Sonoma County Guaranteed Basic Income Coalition, a group of community-based organizations led by First 5 Sonoma County, Fund for Guaranteed Income	October 2022 - September 2024	500	American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) funding, with additional funds from Sonoma County Board of Supervisors, the city councils of Santa Rosa, Petaluma and Healdsburg, as well as Corazón Healdsburg and First 5 Sonoma County	Individual/household means-testing	500 USD	Monthly	24 months
South San Francisco Guaranteed Income Program	San Francisco, CA	City of South San Francisco	December 2021 - November 2022	160	Individuals	Demographic	500 USD	Monthly	12 months

Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration (SEED)	Stockton , CA	Reinvent Stockton Foundation	February 2019 - February 2021	125	Individuals	Neighbourhood-level means testing	500 USD	Monthly	24 months
Southern Oregon Success	Jackson and Josephine Counties, OR	UpTogether	March 2022 - July 2023	70	Individuals	Identification through program/service	100 USD	Monthly	12 months
Students Experiencing Homelessness Basic Needs Stipend Pilot	Albuquerque, NM	New Mexico Appleseed	2020- 2021	53	Individuals	Demographic	500 USD	Monthly	8 months
Strong Families, Strong Future DC	Washington D.C.	Martha, As Table, Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Development	March 2022 - February 2023	132		Neighbourhood-level means testing, individual/household means-testing and demographic	900 USD	Monthly	12 months
The Youth Cash Transfer Study	New Orleans	The Rooted School	October 2020 - September 2021	10	Individuals	Demographic	50 USD	Weekly	12 months
Thriving Families	Washtenaw County, MI	Ann Arbor Area Community Foundation; United Way of Washtenaw County	April 2022 - April 2024	45	Individuals	Identification through program/service	1250 USD	Quarterly	24 months
Trust Youth Initiative: Direct Cash Transfers to Address Young Adult Homelessness	New York	Point Source Youth	March 2022 - May 2024	30	Individuals	Demographic	1250 USD	Bi-Monthly	Up to 24 months
Trust and Invest Collaborative	Boston and Cambridge, MA	UpTogether	June 2021 - December 2022	1482	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	Minimum of \$760	Monthly	18 months
New Orleans Guaranteed Income Program	New Orleans, LA	City of New Orleans	April 2022 - March 2023	125	Individuals	Demographic	350 USD	Monthly	12 months
Universal Basic Income Project	Yolo, CA	Yolo County	April 2022 - March 2023	54	Households	Demographic and means-testing	Up to 1200 USD	Annual	12 months
UpTogether Morningside	Fort Worth, Texas	UpTogether	January 2022 - January 2023	30	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	265 USD	Monthly	12 months
UpTogether Tulsa	Tusla, OK	UpTogether	July 2021 - October 2023	304	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing and demographic	500 USD	Monthly	18 months
Compass Family Service Basic Income Pilot	San Francisco, CA	Compass Family Services and Wells Fargo Foundation	October 2021 - March 2022	13	Households	Identification through program/service and individual/household means testing	350 USD	Monthly	6 months
West Hollywood Pilot for Guaranteed Income	West Hollywood, CA	City of West Hollywood and National Council of Jewish Women-LA	August 2022 - January 2024	25	Individuals	Geographic and individual/household means-testing and demographic	1000 USD	Monthly	18 months
YALift! (Young Adult Louisville Income For Transformation)	Louisville, KY	Louisville Metro Government	April 2022 - March 2023	151	Individuals	Neighbourhood-level means testing and demographic	500 USD	Monthly	12 months

YBCA Guaranteed Income Pilot	San Francisco	Yerba Buena Center for the Arts	May 2021 - October 2022	130	Individuals	Neighbourhood-level means testing, Individual/household means-testing and demographic	1000 USD	Monthly	18 months
Creative Communities Coalition for Guaranteed Income (CCCGI)	San Francisco, CA	Yerba Buena Center for the Arts (YBCA)	June 2022 - 2024	60	Individuals	Identification through program/service	1000 USD	Monthly	18 months
Basic Income Grant (BIG) Pilot	Otjivero-Omitara, Namibia	Namibian Big Coalition (Council of Churches, Namibian Union of Namibian Workers, Namibian NGO Forum and the Namibian Network of AIDS Service Organisations)	January 2008 - January 2009	930	Individuals	Geographic and demographic	100 NAD	Monthly	12 months
Madhya Pradesh Unconditional Cash Transfers Project	Madhya Pradesh, India	UNICEF and the Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA)	June 2011 - November 2012	5,547 in general village pilot of 20 villages and 756 in tribal village pilot	Individuals	Geographic	100 RS for children and 200 RS for adults (Y1), and 150 RS for children and 300 RS for adults (Y2).	Monthly	18 months for general pilot and 12 months for tribal pilot
Finland Basic Income Experiment	Finland	Kela and Ministry of Health and Social Affairs	January 2017 - December 2018	2000	Individuals	Demographic	560 EU	Monthly	24 months
Renda Basica de Cidadania (Citizens' Basic Income Program)	Maricá, Brazil	Municipal Government of Maricá	December 2019 -	42,000	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing	130 Mumbuca, a currency spendable only within the Municipality of Marica	Monthly	
Basic Income Kenya Study	Western and Rift Valley, Kenya	Give Directly	2017 -	20,847	Individuals	No criteria	1. \$0.75 US per day (44 villages for 12 years) 2. \$0.75 US per day (80 villages for 2 years) 3. 8548 US total lump sum at start equal in net present value as group 2 (71 villages)	Monthly or lump sum	2 or 12 years

Give Directly	Rarieda District, Kenya	Give Directly	2011 - 2013	503	Households	Individual/household means-testing	258 households received monthly transfers (45 USD/month for 9 months); 245 received lump-sum transfer (initial 19 USD followed by 384 USD). In addition, 137 randomly chosen households (either previously receiving monthly or lump sum payment) received 260 USD/month for 7 months.	Monthly or lump sum	16 months
Scheme \$6,000	Hong Kong, China	Government of Hong Kong	2011	~4 million	Individuals	Demographic	6000 HK	Lump sum	
Targeted Subsidies Reform Act	Iran	Islamic Republic of Iran	2010 -	~ 75 million	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing	4 USD (transfers amount to 29% median household income)	Monthly	
Wealth Partaking Scheme	Macau Special Administrative Region, China	Government of Macau	2008 -	638,300 permanent residents and 62,000 non-permanent residents	Individuals	No criteria	1,150 USD (permanent residents); 750 USD non-permanent residents	Yearly	
Human Development Fund	Mongolia	Government of Mongolia	2010 - 2012	~2.7 million	Individuals	No criteria	86 USD (February 2010). Between August to December 2010 7.42 USD/month, and of 16.57 USD/month between January 2011 to June 2012.	Mix of monthly and lump sum	
Youth Basic Income Program	Gyeonggi Province, South Korea	Gyeonggi Provincial Government	2018 -	125,000	Individuals	Demographic	250,000 Won (~212 USD)	Quarterly	12 months
Basic Income for Farmers	Gyeonggi Province, South Korea	Gyeonggi Provincial Government	October 2021 -	430,000	Individuals	Demographic	250,000 Won (~212 USD)	Quarterly	12 months

B-MINCOME	Barcelona, Spain	City of Barcelona	October 2017 - December 2019	1000	Individuals	Geographic and individual/household means-testing and demographic	100 - 1675 EU	Monthly	24 months
Quatinga Velho	Mogi das Cruzes, Brazil	Instituto ReCivitas	2008 - 2014	100	Individuals	Individual/household means-testing	30 Reais	Monthly	
Pilotprojekt Grundeinkommen	Germany	German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)	June 2021 - May 2024	122	Individuals	No criteria	1200 EU	Monthly	36 months
Eight Fort Portal Project	Busibi, Uganda		2017 - 2019	123 adults and 217 children	Individuals	No criteria	18.25 USD for adults and 9.13 USD for children	Monthly	24 months
Novissi	Togo	Government of Togo	August 2020 -	819,972	Individuals or households	Individual/household means-testing	64.70 USD for women and 19.41 USD for men	Bi-monthly	
Liberia Basic Income	Maryland County	GiveDirectly	July 2022 - February 2026	10,987	Households	None	408 USD	Annual	54 months

Note: This data was retrieved from the Stanford Basic Income Lab – see References for citation.