John Holladay Latané and American Diplomatic History in the Era of the Lost Cause

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John Holladay Latané and American Diplomatic History in the Era of the Lost Cause

By

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A photo of Latane c.1922 (Johns Hopkins Sheridan Libraries)

The Famous “Burial of Latane” (Library of Congress)
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Thesis Summary

This thesis examines the impact of the Lost Cause on the writings and ideas of John Holladay Latané, an American historian of foreign policy who was born in Staunton, Virginia in 1869, and died in 1932. Latané had ties to several prominent southern individuals and institutions throughout his life, such as Captain William Latané (his uncle) and Johns Hopkins University, which he both attended (both as an undergraduate and graduate student) and taught at. With this background in mind, a study of Latané’s stances reveals how the Lost Cause ideology intersected with analysis of foreign policy in the early twentieth century United States of America.
Introduction

On April 1, 1917, a mob of over 1,000 people rioted at the Baltimore Academy of Music, disrupting a meeting led by Dr. David Starr Jordan, the former president of Stanford University. Jordan was leading a pacifist movement at the time denouncing Woodrow Wilson’s indications that he would officially end American neutrality. Indeed, Wilson declared war on Germany just three days later. The mob was made up of “representatives of many of the best-known families and institutions in the city” according to the Baltimore Sun, including a Johns Hopkins history professor named Dr. John Holladay Latané.¹ Latané’s presence inside a mob is interesting enough given his position as faculty at a respectable school, but what particularly stands out is that his last name connects him to an icon of Lost Cause, “The Burial of Latané.”

The “Lost Cause” (sometimes specified as the “Lost Cause of the Confederacy”) is an ideology which argues that the southern states which seceded to form the Confederate States of America (CSA) were righteous and heroic for doing so. This argument is based on many of the following historical myths: The South seceded and fought in defense of “states’ rights” (as opposed to doing so in defense of slavery); the Union was an aggressor who won through superior numbers and resources; southern soldiers and leaders were more chivalrous and braver than northern ones; and African Americans were content living as slaves and inherently incapable of living in American society without the guidance of a white master. The Lost Cause additionally supported the myth that the era of “Reconstruction” after the Civil War was a time of disorder and corruption because the Union had given the right to vote and hold office to

African Americans (who were inherently incapable of doing either properly) and carpetbaggers (northerners who led southern governments after the civil war) while banning former Confederates from office. Only after southerners had taken back control of their governments (via the “Jim Crow” laws which indirectly banned African Americans from voting or holding office and the repressed them on the local level through terrorism and lynching) had the South been “redeemed.” The myths of the Lost Cause became the basis for how most white southerners perceived their history in the years following the Civil War and led to the idealization of many southern leaders or icons, such as John Holladay Latané’s uncle and uncle-in-law: William Latané and Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson.

A closer look at John Latané’s scholarly background reveals that he specialized in studying American foreign policy. When combined with his connection to the Lost Cause, this presents an interesting opportunity for study. Works like Gaines M. Foster’s *Ghosts of the Confederacy* (1988) examine how southern historians at the turn of the century were affected by the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Lost Cause, while works such as Samuel L. Schaffer’s 2010 dissertation “New South Nation (2010) examine the effects of the same events on southern politicians. John H. Latané’s unique status as both a direct relative to a Lost Cause icon (his uncle) and as a foreign policy historian opens a new possibility that examines the relation of the

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2 Robert Cook, “The Quarrel Forgotten?: Toward a Clearer Understanding of Sectional Reconciliation,” *The Journal of the Civil War era* 6, no. 3 (2016): 416-429 (myth, state’s rights and not slavery, North as aggressor, slaves were content, giving political power to blacks and carpetbaggers was a mistake that made the South suffer before it was rightfully corrected); Nina Silber, “Reunion and Reconciliation, Reviewed and Reconsidered,” *The Journal of American history* 103, no. 1 (2016): 70-71 (South had righteous cause, confederate soldiers were brave, veterans banned from officeholding initially) Alan T. Nolan, “The Anatomy of the Myth,” in *The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History*, ed. Gary W. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2000), 22-29 (Confederate cause was heroic, North had superior resources, southern soldiers were more chivalrous, terrorizing blacks and “redemption.”)
Lost Cause to U.S. foreign policy. Thus, I ask: How did the Lost Cause influence John Holladay Latané’s views and writings on American Foreign Policy?

“The Burial of Latané” painting that depicts John’s uncle was a popular icon for the Lost Cause in Latané’s time (and it is still recognizable to many today). Given the painting’s iconography, as well as other elements of his background that would have put him into close contact with southern cultural currents (such as upper-class origins, his time at notable southern universities such as Johns Hopkins and Washington and Lee, and his relationship to “Stonewall” Jackson), John Holladay Latané’s view of foreign policy was almost certainly influenced by the Lost Cause. The concern for this essay is how his beliefs were inspired by the Lost Cause and how they manifested themselves.3 Latané’s own writings were obviously invaluable to the project and required a careful analysis. These writings included the books From Isolation to Leadership (1922), A History of the United States (1918), The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America (1900), and America as a World Power (1907): the article “The Diplomatic Relations of the Confederacy” from a section of The South in the Building of the Nation (1909) was also used. The Baltimore Sun provided letters and comments from Latané, background context to issues of the time in certain articles, and details about Latané himself on his death via obituary and funeral reports. A small number of other writings from other southern writers working between the Civil War and WWI were chosen to show whenever Latané was speaking “in line” with common Lost Cause thoughts, such as belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority or claiming the Union won through sheer numbers and resources. Secondary sources provided background context for subjects, including the Confederacy’s foreign policy, general U.S. policy

3 Research and collection of materials has been done primarily via digital databases and websites due to COVID-19 making physical library research difficult, though a small number of books that could not be read online were obtained at the University of South Carolina’s Thomas Cooper Library.
during World War I, the riot in Baltimore, the Wilson administration, and beliefs and behavior of 
other turn of post-Civil War-WWI era southern scholars. Lastly, any statistical or genealogical 
information necessary for the thesis was gathered from Ancestry.com.

A careful study of recurring themes in Latané’s writings, such as providential visions of 
America’s future and anxiety from creating bitter sentiments, reveals his beliefs about American 
foreign policy, and almost all of them can indeed be traced back to the Lost Cause directly or 
indirectly. Latané’s belief in honoring all official treaties is a reaction to the Union breaking 
international law (in Latané’s eyes) to maintain a blockade that allowed the Union to win. 
Latané’s fear of causing “resentment” in other nations (such as insulting Japan’s pride) is 
because the South had already suffered humiliation and “resentment” at the hands of the North 
and no other “civilized” nation deserved that. Even some foreign policy aspects that are not 
directly affected by the Lost Cause, such as a providential belief in righteousness of the United 
States’s international success, are still often “compatible” with a specific Confederate or pre-
Civil War South ideology.

I hope to expand the historical connections between the Civil War and its effect on 
America’s foreign policy in World War I. As perhaps the defining event of United States history, 
The Civil War and its effects are still felt today as the U.S. struggles with the questions of civil 
rights and the conflicting memories of the Confederacy. In examining the relationship between 
the Lost Cause and World War I specifically, I hope to suggest new ways that we might examine 
the effect of a seemingly “domestic” problem on foreign policy, particularly World War I; the 
biggest foreign crisis America faced in the 50 years following the Civil War. As for why I chose

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4 Many of these sources were also consulted to find either necessary primary sources or act as professional words 
of authority to back my arguments up.
to use Latané specifically and did not consider any other southern historian who focused on foreign policy at the turn of the century, a quote from Ryan N. Danker puts its best: “The ‘Burial of Latané’, as icon, conveys what historians now call ‘The Lost Cause.’”

Even if John H. Latané is not a symbol for the Lost Cause himself, his connection to a symbol iconic to the whole movement still makes a study of him particularly meaningful.

Part 1: John Holladay Latané: Background and Domestic Policy.

John Holladay Latané was born in 1869 in Staunton Virginia, the town where Woodrow Wilson had been born thirteen years earlier. Latané’s family background was intertwined with the southern white upper class. Although the Latanés were never among the “First Families of Virginia,” they accumulated a number of plantations and slaves (one of the Latané households was home to over 200 slaves at the outbreak of the Civil War) and made connections to prominent Tidewater families via marriage throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. Even after the family lost much of their wealth when slavery was outlawed, many of Latané’s still held influential roles in their local communities. John’s brother James achieved (and lost) the position of chairman for Maryland’s Racing Commission at some point prior to 1932, while their father (also named James) was a “well-known” Reformed Episcopal Bishop in Baltimore. Latané’s class origins likely played a part in his Lost Cause beliefs: historians such as Fred Arthur Bailey have traced part of the Lost Cause’s historical revisionism to the interests of southern upper class

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families and societies. However, Latané’s connections to the Lost Cause went beyond his birthplace, his family’s social status, and their former position as slave owners.

William Latané was John’s father’s younger brother and a Confederate captain who died in a saber charge northeast of Richmond in June of 1862 during the “Ride Around McClellan.”

William’s death and subsequent burial were recorded by Southern Literary Messenger editor John R. Thompson in the poem “Captain Latané,” which was in turn the inspiration for the 1864 painting “Burial of Latané” by William D. Washington. Following the Civil War, engravings of the painting became a “standard decorative item” of southern homes into the early twentieth century, and its popularity transformed it into “a central symbol of the Lost Cause.” Although John never mentioned his uncle, William’s stature within Lost Cause iconography undoubtedly affected his nephew’s thoughts and feelings. Moreover, Latané was also related by marriage to Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, as the historian’s wife Elinor Junkin was the niece and namesake of Stonewall Jackson’s first wife, Elinor Jackson. Regardless of whether he felt a personal

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9 William Latane, Year: 1850; Census Place: Essex, Virginia; Roll: 942; Page: 82b. https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/discoveryui- content/view/14997130:8054?tid=&pid=&queryId=c4f9c32309fae6e7c87168f71e34ab&phsrc=Qtr54&phstart =successSource. The same James Latane who is John H’s father mentioned before is shown living in the same household at a close age to William.
connection with Jackson through this relationship, Latané likely joined many white southerners who saw the general as a hero. In a letter to fellow southern historian William Dodd, Latané declared that any “Southern man who would say that...he would not have followed Lee and Jackson, ought to be kicked out of a Southern school.”\(^1\) At his death in 1932, Latané was buried near Washington and Lee University in the plot of the Junkin family, the root of his connection to Jackson.\(^2\)

Latané’s education and professional career took him across several schools in Maryland and Virginia, among which Johns Hopkins University (JHU) was easily the most important. Latané first graduated from high school in 1889 at Baltimore City College. He obtained his Bachelor of Arts Degree and his PhD at JHU in 1892 and 1895 respectively. He returned to Baltimore City College as a professor of history and economics in 1895 and 1896. He was JHU’s first ever Albert Shaw Lecturer in American Diplomatic History in 1898. He taught at Randolph-Macon Woman’s College from 1899 to 1902 as professor of history and economics, and then he was the professor of history at Washington and Lee from 1902 to 1913. After his period at Randolph-Macon and Washington and Lee, he returned to JHU in 1913.\(^3\) Latané served on the faculty for the rest of his life, acting as professor of American History and head of the history department from 1913 until 1930 (except for 1919-1924 when he was dean of the college of arts

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\(^1\) Bailey. “Free Speech and the Lost Cause,” 261-262. Bailey notes that Latane (unnamed outside of the citation) was inferring an attack on the two men which Dodd never explicitly articulated.; John H. Latane to William E. Dodd, August 9, 1902.


\(^3\) “Latane Obsequies May Be Monday,” 4.
and sciences) and as a member of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations until his death in 1932.¹⁶

Latané’s education at Johns Hopkins was not unusual among southern scholars at the time. Historian Gaines Foster noted that the school (more specifically Herbert Baxter Adams’s seminars) produced many of the South’s first professional historians in the post-Civil War era, starting in the late 1880s.¹⁷ These scholars saw men like Walter Hines Page as heroes and believed that their duty was not just to teach history, but also to act as social critics who would help in the “redemption” of the South after decades of “lagging” behind the North in several sectors (such as economy and education). Many of these historians personally celebrated and defended the Confederacy (unsurprising given their background), but unlike Confederate veterans and the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC), the historians were willing to critically examine the CSA and publicly admit to its faults.¹⁸ Latané was not as critical of the Confederacy as some of the movement’s more open-minded scholars like William Edward Dodd and John Spencer Basset. Latané was also willing to work together with Confederate memorial groups, such as when he presented a statue of Robert E. Lee donated by the UDC to an English military school.¹⁹ Still, like his compatriots, he shared admiration for Page and believed it his

¹⁶ “Latane Obsequies May Be Monday,” 16. A later article in The Sun published on January 4 and titled “Named To Serve At Latane Rites: Four Fellow-Members Of Hopkins Class Of ’92 Honorary Pallbearers: Others Are Selected: Funeral Services To Be Held At 9.30 A. M. Today--Burial In Virginia Tomorrow” claimed that Latané was instrumental to the School’s founding. The school would ultimately become the predecessor to the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.


¹⁸ Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy, 181-186. The full chapter explains how these men came to have these seemingly conflicting viewpoints.

duty to act as an active policy critic in his study of history. One thing that should be noted about Latané’s writing style is that he tends to downplay social, cultural, and psychological factors in his analysis of history in favor of focusing on diplomatic, military, and political factors.\(^\text{20}\) Thus, when analyzing his work, his own social and cultural beliefs often must be inferred.

Although Latané was a historian of foreign policy, he wrote much on American history as well. Latané’s thoughts on the Civil War, including its causes, events, figures, and aftermath, reveal a man who embraced the Lost Cause and its myths. Historian Kenneth W. Keller asserts that Latané saw “the Civil War as a result of ‘sectionalism’ and the conflict between competing northern and southern economies.”\(^\text{21}\) He did not ignore slavery as a cause, but he severely downplayed its role in the conflict. In *A History of the United States* (1918), Latané had said that the decision faced by the “Northern tier of Southern States” following Lincoln’s calls for militia forces after the fall of Fort Sumter was as follows: “their political affiliations, their commercial and industrial interests, and their views of constitutional interpretation, *no less than the institution of slavery* [emphasis added], bound them to the States farther south, there was little doubt as to what the outcome would be.”\(^\text{22}\) In addition, he wrote that the South “claimed to be fighting solely in defense of constitutional rights,” and he treated Lee’s decision to stay in Virginia as a heroic moment in which he was dedicated to defend his home state even if he was personally willing to see slavery end.\(^\text{23}\) As a scholar, Latané did not completely deny that slavery

\(^{22}\) John Holladay Latané, *A History of the United States*, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1918), 350-351 https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=loc.ark:/13960/t7dr36q9d& view=2up&seq=7
\(^{23}\) Latané, *History of the United States*, 353-355. Latané’s choice of wording (“claimed”) implies that he does not necessarily agree with that statement, but even so he is still incorrect or at least misleadingly ambiguous as there are several known instances in which Confederate governments did refer to the importance of slavery.
played a part in the Civil War, but in his examination of the war he saw it as just one of many issues equal in importance, impact, and (lack of) reproach to factors like differing economies.

Latané’s Lost Cause views are further exemplified in how he referred to certain leaders of the war in the South and North. He claimed that Stonewall Jackson’s death at Chancellorsville was the turning point of the war “in a way” and celebrated his flank marches there and at Manassas as “lasting monuments of the united daring and genius of Lee and Jackson.” He also claimed that “Lee was never greater in defeat” then at his surrender at Appomattox because Lee was not willing to prolong the war through guerilla means. As for the North, he singled out Sherman, Butler, Hunter, and Sheridan as the exceptions to the “forbearance,” “self-restraint,” and “chivalry” that he otherwise saw on both sides; he identified no exceptions from the Confederacy.  

Latané’s views of the men on the two sides of the conflict are of course in-line with the myths of the Lost Cause. The only real exceptions to Latané’s views were that he treated Grant with a degree of respect and positioned himself as more “understanding” of Lincoln than his fellow southerners. For Grant, he attributed the “sacrifice” of troops at Cold Harbor to Butler as opposed to Grant’s own incompetence, and concluded that “he was as great in victory as Lee was in defeat.” For Lincoln, Latané specified that he disagreed with southern writers who “charged Lincoln with bad faith” with his announcement to send provisions to Fort Sumter in contrast to what Seward promised in secret negotiations.” Other than these two men, he largely

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24 Latané, *History of the United States*, 384, 420-423. One page on Lee (420) includes the recumbent statue over his tomb, as if to further the noble image of him. In the last page Latané also claims that the Union’s prisons and prison policy were worse than that of the Confederacy.

25 “Latané, *History of the United States*, 412-413, 421. In my opinion, it says a lot that Latané still refers to Grant’s losses in these battles as “sacrifices” specifically.

shares the same views of northern and southern leaders with a majority of other believers in the myths of the Lost Cause.

One of the most blatant examples of Latané’s belief in Lost Cause ideas is in a section on foreign policy from his 1909 work in The South of the Building of the Nation, a series which Keller characterizes as sympathetic to the South and which includes work from J. William Jones, one of the architects of Lost Cause intellectual thought. Latané’s central argument is that the Union blockade of southern ports resulted in the Confederate defeat. As he puts it: “The blockade was the determining factor in the struggle. When General Lee surrendered there were enough able-bodied men in the South to have defied the North to the end of time, could they but have secured from Europe the supplies they needed.” There are two important takeaways from this statement. First, there is the implication that the South only lost due to a lack of resources from Europe. Latané’s section on foreign policy comes right before J. William Jones’ section, in which Jones claims “Is it any wonder that with such ‘overwhelming numbers and resources’ against them that the Confederacy was at last forced to yield?” One of the myths of the Lost Cause is that the Union won not through superior tactics, strategy, or morale, but by crushing the South with superior numbers and overwhelming odds, and Latané’s writing only furthers that myth. The second takeaway from Latané’s conclusion is that if the Union only won by preventing Confederate shipping to and from Europe, then it won “illegally.” One of the central issues Latané pursues throughout his argument is that the Union blockade was both hypocritical and against international law. Latané argued that Lincoln could not claim his blockade of

Confederate ports was in accordance with “the law of nations” while claiming that there was not a state of “public war” in America. Maintaining a blockade and enacting search and seizure of European ships was “never admissible in time of peace,” as international law prevented the maintenance of a blockade outside of war with a belligerent power. Therefore, Lincoln was behaving as if the Confederacy was a belligerent power at war with the Union while simultaneously claiming European powers should not recognize the Confederacy as anything more than an internal rebellion. Other factors of hypocrisy Latané points to include the Union attempt to enter belatedly into the 1856 Treaty of Paris, which would have banned privateering to make Confederate privateers illegal in international law (despite formerly staying out of the treaty for that exact same reason), and the removal of Confederate diplomats Mason and Slidell from the neutral ship Trent, which was “the odious practice of impressment” that America had previously fought England over in the War of 1812. Finally, Latané mentions a report from Mason in which he argued the blockade was not effective due to regular commerce between Confederate states and Cuba, and therefore the blockade was not binding under the 1856 treaty.

In the context of Latané’s characterization of Union foreign policy as hypocritical at best and illegal at worst, his argument takes on new meaning. The Confederacy only lost due to the blockade allowing for the Unions’ “crushing” resources, and the blockade itself was arguably illegal, so therefore the Union’s victory was “illegal.”

Latané’s clearest example of Lost Cause-inspired rhetoric is in his examination of Reconstruction. Latané’s views on the era in A History of the United States are some of the most blatant examples of what Keller describes as “a racist tinge” in his writings. He defended the
“so-called ‘Black Codes’” on the basis that they were just checking “the disorder and vagrancy which were already making such alarming progress among the negro population suddenly freed from white control and unaccustomed to the exercise of self-restraint.” He compared them to laws already enacted in Jamaica and other majority-black regions, “but the North did not understand the necessities of the situation and considered them an outrageous infringement of personal liberty.”

He characterized the inclusion of African Americans and Northerners in officeholding and the exclusion of southern men under the “Ironclad Oath” as such: “Ignorance was thus enfranchised and intelligence disenfranchised.”

Finally, while he admitted that the Ku Klux Klan indulged in “excesses,” he also claimed that they were formed to “check outrages and punish insolent negroes or carpet-baggers,” that they “played mainly upon the superstitions of the negro,” and that the Freedmen’s Bureau was “organizing the negroes against their late masters through means of the Union League and its secret ritual.”

The narrative that African Americans in the South needed white control because they were not fit to run government due to ignorance is a key element of Lost Cause thought. Latané also echoed the idea that Radical Republicans were just using black voters as a means of political control. In his eyes, Lincoln and Johnson only planned to give suffrage to “a few of the more intelligent” and southern states had willingly complied with Johnson’s orders, but the Republicans realized they would lose control of the government if southern politicians could count former slaves as full citizens. Therefore, they decided to “[undo] what Lincoln and Johnson had done and . . . [reorganized] the South on the basis of negro suffrage,” thus establishing a pattern of rampantly defying Johnson and

32 Latané, History of the United States, 427.
33 Latané, History of the United States, 435. This is signalled as a quote in the text, but no source is directly cited.
34 Latané, History of the United States, 440-441.
inflicting their will on the southern States.\textsuperscript{35} Even late in his career, Latané characterized Radical Republicans like Charles Sumner as “vain and egotistical.”\textsuperscript{36}

Latané’s connection to the Lost Cause ran deep. He was related to two of the major icons of the Lost Cause and he was educated at one of the earliest hubs for advanced study in the South. His writings on domestic history reflected many themes of the Lost Cause. He downplayed slavery as a cause of the Civil War. He valorized prominent Confederate generals and demonized Union counterparts. He claimed that the Union won through superior numbers alone (and that to achieve this advantage it resorted to internationally illegal methods). He echoed the belief that Reconstruction and black suffrage was a mistake. Given all these factors, his views on foreign policy were undoubtably affected by the Lost Cause.

**Part 2: John Holladay Latané: Foreign Policy**

**Section I: General Foreign Policy**

A recurring element of Latané’s views on foreign policy is his belief that the United States could take an active role on the world stage equal to (if not greater) than the traditional powers in Europe given the United States’ rapidly growing potential and power. As early as 1900, he proclaimed “now that the United States is in a position to make her weight felt in the councils of the nations, it will be to the interests of European powers to keep us out of purely European disputes.” At the time Latané did not completely believe America needed to step onto the world stage (as he felt it still had no obligation to get involved in European affairs and that it

\textsuperscript{35} Latané, *History of the United States*, 424-427, 435, 439-440. Latané also defensively points out that several Northern States at the time made it illegal for African Americans to vote.

\textsuperscript{36} “Letter to the Editor: Dr. Latane Recalls How Grant Dealt With Senator Summer, Of Massachusetts, When He Played The Role Of Willful Obstructionist.” *The Sun*, December 20, 1925. Pg. 10.

[https://search.proquest.com/hnpbaltimoresun/docview/543918284/C09CEBD905184186PQ/2?accountid=10750](https://search.proquest.com/hnpbaltimoresun/docview/543918284/C09CEBD905184186PQ/2?accountid=10750).
should keep Europe out of its own), but his belief that America was a powerful nation which could make its “weight” felt would crystallize over time. By 1922, two years after the United States declined League of Nations membership, he solidified his belief with the following statement: “the world still waits on America, and sooner or later we must recognize and assume the responsibilities of our position as a great world power.”

Interestingly, historian Adrian Brettle has observed that prior to the Civil War, a number of southerners did not want to be left behind as the world was progressing into the new industrial era, and that southern whites in the Confederacy held an “enduring belief in their providential entitlement to a prominent place in the world.” Latané could have inherited this belief that his home (for him all of the U.S.) was “owed” a position of power and influence and combined it with the more common belief in American exceptionalism, as he often advocated the idea that it should not miss out on worldwide events (such as partaking in colonialism in the Pacific, as seen below). Another likely source for Latané’s vision of a powerful America was his fondness for fellow Hopkins alumnus Frederick Jackson Turner’s Frontier Thesis, alongside Latané’s personal belief that America’s expanding frontier was God’s Will and the nation’s expansion was therefore entirely reasonable. If America’s frontier expansion had been both providential and a vital part of its character, then Latané likely believed that continued expansion via international power was a logical follow-up. However, while Confederate figures like Jefferson Davis had advocated for Manifest Destiny, the view that expansion was providential “was

39 Adrian Brettle, *Colossal Ambitions: Confederate Planning for a Post-Civil War World*, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2020), 8, 10. Brettle claims that his first observation is based on the works of other scholars, such as Peter S. Carmichael and Stephen W. Berry II. The quote is from page 10 and comes from his own research.  
something that Southerners shared with other peoples, especially Northerners and the British.”

Still, even if this influence on Latané’s writings was part of a general white American consciousness, it was certainly compatible with his views that were specific to the Lost Cause.

Another characteristic of Latané’s views on foreign policy was that he was a “champion” of the Monroe Doctrine, according to the Baltimore Sun. In 1900 Latané himself described it as “the safest guide in our relations with Europe.” However, while Latané was positioned as a staunch defender of the Monroe Doctrine by the Sun, he did not share his understanding of it with all Americans. As historian Jay Sexton has noted, the Monroe Doctrine in the 19th and early 20th century was not a single unified doctrine but rather an elastic, malleable concept of American foreign policy that could be used to support or condemn numerous foreign policies, such as isolationism, interventionism, and imperialism. In Latané’s vision, the Monroe Doctrine only ensured that America did not entangle itself in the domestic policies of other “civilized” countries and that other nations did not interfere with America’s domestic policy, otherwise the U.S. could act well beyond its own borders. American involvement in “international” matters such as participating in the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, or taking part in “the burden of civilizing and enlightening the non-progressive races” in the Phillipines, while certainly new for the United States, was not a betrayal of the Monroe Doctrine in Latané’s eyes. In 1918 Latané reiterated that participating “in affairs of general international interest” did not weaken the Monroe Doctrine but that instead its principles had “been more frequently

41 Brettle, Colossal Ambitions, 10, 18. Quote comes from page 18.
42 “Latane Obsequies May be Monday,” 4.
43 Latané, Diplomatic Relations, 285.
45 Latané, Diplomatic Relations, 284-289. The first quote comes from page 285, the second from 288.
and broadly asserted since the Spanish war than ever before.”

He positioned himself to defend the U.S. government from accusations of “so-called” policies of expansion and imperialism during the turn of the century.

Latané’s anti-isolationist perspective on the Monroe Doctrine is best understood by examining his view of American isolationism. Latané viewed the initial intention of the Doctrine (as well as the Farewell Address from Washington) as temporary suggestions for the young United States to focus on building itself into a powerful nation without becoming entangled in the interest of foreign powers. America had accumulated so much power and prestige over the past century that following the Spanish-American War “there [was] no longer any need for the isolation of the early days.”

America was strong enough to participate in international events like the Hague Conventions and the Boxer Rebellion, to take part in the burgeoning trade in China, and to act as an impartial observer to treaties while spreading the “American” values of peace and liberty. Latané’s belief that America could—and should—start acting as a member of the international community likely came from his own providential belief in the nation’s expansion and “entitlement” to America achieving a prominent place in the world. Latané valued the basic principle of non-interference in strictly domestic affairs of civilized nations, but otherwise he felt America was in the perfect time and place to take a prominent space on the world stage.

Interestingly, several members of the CSA opposed the Monroe Doctrine due to seeing it as a

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potential block on free trade opportunities, such as those developing in Asia. That Latané’s preferred view of the doctrine included the belief that America should take an active role in Pacific trade and politics makes for a fitting parallel.

**Section II: Turn-of-the-Century Foreign Policy and Imperialism**

Despite his anti-isolationist belief, Latané’s was willing to criticize some aspects of American foreign policy during the turn of the century, with his biggest criticism being anything that incurred “resentment.” Latané felt that one of the most important parts of diplomacy was to avoid creating vitriol with other nations. He approved of the Hague Convention of 1899 because it promised a way for a neutral power to mediate certain conflicts “without incurring resentment.”

Given his views, Latané would commonly criticize the Republican party for creating resentment in other nations, particularly in Latin American and Japan. In the former, he criticized Roosevelt’s “Big Stick” method of engineering a revolution to obtain the Panama Canal, as Latané felt that it not only strained relations with Columbia, but “made a bad impression throughout Latin America.” Referring to U.S. movements in the region between 1898 and 1918, Latané stated: “The fact should not be overlooked that the rapid advance of the United States in the Caribbean Sea during the past two decades has created violent opposition and alarm in certain parts of Latin America.” Latané praised Wilson’s efforts to talk with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile as means of “overcoming the resentment and alarm created by Roosevelt’s aggressive action.”

As for Japan, Latané found that each Republican President had committed at least one offense which hurt relations with Japan. McKinley took the Philippines in 1898 and inspired

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49 Brettle, *Colossal Ambitions*, 137-140, 145-146. Brettle discusses how the doctrine of free trade was strong in the confederacy.
50 Latané, *America as a World Power*, 244-245.
“resentment.”

Roosevelt pushed Japan to a peace treaty with Russia in 1905 that absolved Russia of paying indemnities and gave it additional territory, inciting anger in Tokyo in the process. Taft agreed to a treaty in 1911 that prevented Japanese ownership of certain agricultural land in California (therefore damaging Japanese pride) and he attempted to neutralize Manchuria’s railroads by purchasing them, only angering both Russia and Japan.

Latané’s criticisms of Republican foreign policy and hatred for incurring resentment echo certain Wilsonian ideals, such as “equal justice in relations with all nations” and the belief that “larger nations should not bully smaller ones.” At a glance, these principles appear benign and merely statements of respecting dignity. However, the work of historian Samuel L. Schaffer on Woodrow Wilson puts many of Wilson’s ideas, and Latané’s own versions of them by proxy, in a different light. Wilson, like most white southerners, loathed Reconstruction, feeling that one of the North’s goals was to punish and “humiliate” the South as part of their victory. He feared a repeat of such an event happening in the rest of the world. Schaffer identifies Wilson’s repeated use of the words “resentment” and “humiliation” that might be inflicted upon the loser during WWI, and while Schaffer admitted this was partly out of “a noble vision,” he identifies these words as the same way that Wilson described Radical Republicans punishing the South. Wilson’s desire to avoid “humiliating” any defeated nation was great enough that he advocated against seizing German colonies as he felt the nation would be just as upset to lose them as France was to lose Alsace-Lorraine, and Wilson stressed that he held no personal enmity with Germany. Latané may have referred to less severe causes of resentment and humiliation than

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53 Keller, “John Holladay Latané,” 6 (land); Latané, A History of the United States, 536 (indemnities)
56 Samuel L. Schaffer "'A Bitter Memory upon Which Terms of Peace Should Rest': Woodrow Wilson, the Reconstruction of the South, and the Reconstruction of Europe," in Remembering Reconstruction: Struggles over
Wilson had, but his emphasis on avoiding “resentment” (the same term that Schaffer identifies as emerging from memories of Reconstruction and the Civil War) is uncannily similar to Wilson. Through the lens of the Lost Cause, Latané thought the South had suffered a major insult to its pride and dignity, leading to painful resentment of the North for decades. Resentment was not bad on principle; Latané would “know” how awful it was to suffer humiliation and insults to pride given that the South has undergone its own humiliation at the hands of the North (as detailed in his sections on Reconstruction) and “resentment” had been created between the two halves of the nation. Given that Latané only feared incurring “resentment” in established nations (e.g. he does not condemn the U.S. for creating the same kind of “resentment” in the Philippines themselves), he (like many proponents of colonialism) seemingly did not believe that colonized people could meaningfully feel the same humiliation and resentment that a white nation might, just as the Lost Cause dismissed the humiliation and resentment of black Americans.

Besides his fear of causing “resentment” in Japan, Latané had another complaint about the occupation of the Philippines: “With the purchase of the Philippine Islands the United States assumed the task of governing 7,500,000 orientals of alien speech, 600,000 of whom were members of Mohammedan Moros or members of wild pagan tribes.” The only “civilized” segment of the population were members the Roman Catholic Church.\(^57\) Latané’s racism caused him to see Filipinos as a “burden” on the United States. While the “White Man’s Burden” of caring for colonial subjects was a mantra repeated throughout the Western World, Latané’s emphasis on the Filipinos’ differences (“orientals,” “alien speech,” “pagan tribes”) calls to mind similar beliefs in the South. As far back as the Mexican American War, many proslavery

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southerners who were expansionists (especially men like John C. Calhoun, a South Carolina politician who was one of the most active southern politicians in the first half of the nineteenth century) expressed fears of incorporating Mexicans and Native Americans into the U.S. via sudden annexation, fearing the downfall of their own slaves and possibly even individual whites who might turn towards “savagery.”58 This fear extended into the Confederacy, and several politicians instead advocated for a gradual and “peaceful” expansion in which territories willingly joined the Confederacy after years of being exposed to white ideals and settled by white immigrants (a manner somewhat similar to Texas’ own integration into the U.S.)59 While Latané could at least stomach the colonization of the Philippines (likely because they were an ocean away from the continental U.S. and there were reasons listed above that justified U.S. expansion), the way he talks about America’s colonization suggests that he thinks it was too “sudden,” especially given his emphasis on the sheer number of non-whites that America had just acquired sovereignty over. Within a paragraph of his “statistics,” he mentions the Filipino Resistance to the American occupation and the “great cruelty, treachery, and ferocity” on both sides of the conflict, as well as the vile acts that American troops and native scouts resorted to.60 Given the proximity of Latané’s statements, he likely felt that the sudden influx of responsibility was linked to the horrors of the Resistance and American efforts to keep it down, and that in turn America’s ownership of the Philippines should have been more gradual, perhaps even similar to Cuba.

Latané had two distinct understandings of Cuba’s relationship with the United States before and after the Civil War. Prior to the Civil War, control over Cuba had been desired by the

U.S. since the time of Jefferson. Latané suggested that ownership was attractive not only to southern slave owners, but to “a large part of the nation” due to “its strategic importance in commanding the inter-oceanic transit routes of Central America.” Both the abolition of slavery and the establishment of the transcontinental railroad in the aftermath of the “war of secession” had removed any desires to annex Cuba.\textsuperscript{61} Compared to Latané, modern historians have characterized the desire to annex Cuba as primarily a southern interest so that another slaveholding state might be gained, and historian Adrian Brettle has documented that Jefferson Davis saw the North as a block to southern desires for annexation.\textsuperscript{62} Just like his view of the Civil War, Latané simultaneously admitted that slavery affected American policy and downplayed its importance by portraying the annexation of Cuba as the goal of numerous politicians across the whole nation.

Latané’s view of post-Civil War relations with Cuba had a paternalistic character. He commended the rebels of the Ten Years War (1868-1878) for their doggedness, but also dismissed their fighting as “desultory;” he used the exact same term to refer to both sides’ attempts at fighting prior to American entry in Cuban War of Independence (1895-1898). Despite the “desultory” nature of the rebels, Latané portrayed the American people as sympathetic to Cuban patriots and desiring the abolition of slavery and Spanish control over the island from the outbreak of the Ten Years’ War. In 1900, Latané proclaimed that America had “proceeded in good faith with the work of pacifying the island of Cuba and organizing local civil

\textsuperscript{61} “Latané, History of the United States, 492-495 (Jefferson); Latané, Diplomatic Relations, 106, 136 (“object of desire,” “all of the Nation” and beyond). Latané does not suggest that annexation would have been inherently out of the United States’ character.

\textsuperscript{62} Brettle, Colossal Ambitions, 2, 22-23. Brettle mentions that there were prominent men in the CSA who opposed the annexation of Cuba, but that was mainly because an alliance with Spain could promote international legitimacy to slavery.
government.”

Latané clearly considered the rebels unable to properly create a government without U.S. help. Any good American would sympathize with their aims, but they “needed” the United States’ support in war and peace to properly bring about their own government. Eighteen years later, Latané praised the U.S. occupation of Cuba from 1898 to 1902 for being “a model of its kind” and had no reservations about the 1901 Platt Amendment to the Cuban Constitution. Latané also chided that “Cubans had not learned the primary lesson of democracy—submission to the majority,” due to an “insurrectionary movement” following the reelection of President Palma in 1906. In essence, Latané had pictured the United States as a benevolent, fair force guiding Cuba to democracy, only intervening because Cuba needed to “learn.” Today, America’s turn-of-the-century relationship with Cuba is rightly considered imperialist: even General Leonard Wood, the leader of the military occupation so praised by Latané, admitted that Cuba had no real independence under the U.S. The American government had given its support to the elite planter classes and white business interests in the countries, who in turn pushed peasants off land in the interests of U.S. sugar companies and instituted new Jim Crow-esque laws to block Afro-Cuban participation in government (despite the key role of many Afro-Cubans in the Independence Wars). The Platt Amendment’s clause on American military intervention for the sake of maintaining “independence” allowed for the presence of U.S. military forces on the island, who commonly took part in arrests and oppression of Afro-Cuban activists.

63 Latané, Diplomatic Relations, 136-148, 174-175. At the time of Latané’s writing, America had occupied Cuba for roughly two years.
64 Latané, History of the United States, 522-525. The Platt Amendment (as well as a corresponding treaty with the U.S.) included clauses that allowed for the U.S. to intervene in Cuban affairs in the name of “maintenance of a stable government” and enshrined any laws established by the U.S. military government as part of Cuban Law. As a reminder, in the same book Latané explicitly denied that the Republican Party’s actions were imperialist less than 10 pages before this section.
providential vision of an America which knew how to “teach” democracy seemingly justified any actions taken by the U.S. as being for the good of a “less civilized” nation in which some races might not be “ready” to vote.

Latané’s views on American foreign policy at the turn of the century primarily reflect two tenets of the Lost Cause. One is the belief that no “civilized” nations should be forced to undergo humiliation and foster resentment. Although this thought on its own would appear benign, Latané’s language, as well as that of his inspiration’s (Wilson) suggests that he was specifically inspired by the view that the South had a great humiliation done on it after the Civil War, seemingly ignoring the possibility that “lesser” civilizations (like Cubans and Filipinos) could feel the same resentment from being controlled by another power. The other tenet expressed is the belief that non-white races needed to be controlled first before they could “learn” democracy. The belief that non-whites needed a “guiding hand” was one of the broader beliefs of the colonizing western powers, but the Latané’s belief appears to originate specifically from a southern line of thought, given his comparison of Jim Crow to Jamaica and the similarities between his statements on Filipinos and similar sentiments held by Confederate leaders regarding Mexicans. The Lost Cause would continue to influence many of Latané’s beliefs even a decade after the turn of the century, as could be seen in his reaction to the biggest event of the 1910s.

Section III: World War I and the Baltimore Riot

Latané’s relationship to World War I provides one of the most interesting episodes of his career. On April 1, 1917, just three days before Wilson’s declaration of war against Germany,
Latané joined a crowd of rioters protesting the pacifistic speech of David Starr Jordan at the Academy of Music, a crowd which included Johns Hopkins and University of Maryland faculty as well as local business elites. After rioters forced themselves into the hall and pressured Dr. Jordan and other pacifists to leave, various members of the mob waited outside his car and checked hotels in hopes of tarring and feathering the speaker (he managed to avoid capture). As the rioters started to disperse, reserve police armed with clubs arrested six of the anti-pacifist rioters.\(^67\) Compared to previous riots in Baltimore, the one protesting David Starr Jordan was “tame” and the six men arrested were soon released with their charges dropped to “disturbing the peace.” How a well-to do upper class scholar like Latané would even be part of a riot to begin with is an interesting story.\(^68\)

Latané was pro-war was in part because he was a major anglophile. The “average” American tended to be sympathetic towards England and the Entente even during the period of neutrality (of course there were exceptions), but Latané’s sympathies to England likely ran deeper than those of most Americans.\(^69\) Latané ended *America as a World Power* (1907) by saying “the course of world politics is destined to lead to the further reknitting together of the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race in bonds of peace and international sympathy.” Although his proposed “alliance” was an informal one “based on community of interests and of aims,” he imagined that such a union would be “the highest guarantee of political stability and moral progress of the world.”\(^70\)

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67 “Pacifist's Meeting Ends In Riot,” 3, 12.
70 Latané, *America as a World Power*, 320.
American cargo bound to Germany at the war’s outset was “merely” the American Doctrine of continuous voyage “carried…. to its logical conclusions.”71 Beyond a few superficial disagreements that resulted from “bad manners,” “the two-great members of the English-speaking family” had shared “fundamental foreign policies.”72 Latané even claimed that “notwithstanding the German influence in America which has had an undue part in shaping our educational methods, our civilization is still English.”73 His statement simultaneously implied that the only worthwhile contributions to America were English (ignoring the value of African, Asian, Latino, and even other European contributions), and that no other cultures should not have an effect on American values. Given Latané’s family’s French origins, John his rampant Anglophilia likely came from the surrounding southern culture. 74

Many of the prominent “New South” believed in “Anglo-Saxon racial superiority,” with the most notable being Walter Hines Page, one of Latané’s idols and Wilson’s ambassador to Great Britain. Samuel L. Schaffer’s dissertation on the “New South Nation,” includes a segment on how Wilson and other southern men in his administration “viewed the events in Europe through a southern-crafted framework that took white supremacy for granted.” Page “held a strong belief in Anglo-Saxon racial superiority” and “hoped to unite the two Anglo-Saxon nations for a higher cause.” Page felt English speakers should rule the Earth. In America, Page had tried to reconcile the White sections of the North and South to lead the U.S. in a new age, and he had hoped to do the same in England, pressing his fellow Anglophile Wilson for support

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71 Latané, *From Isolation to Leadership*, 124-125. Latané had previously condemned the American blockade in the Civil War, so his comment about British actions being preceded by similar Union ones suggests that any complaints should be laid at the feet of the Union first.
73 Latané, *Isolation to Leadership*, 126. Interestingly, Johns Hopkins’ educational style had been inspired by German education.
74 “Latané” is a distinctly French name.
at the war’s outbreak as he thought the two nations combined could protect democracy throughout the world. In Schaffer’s words, “Page’s southern worldview... led him to see the Great War as a racial reunion,” Page himself would use the term “race-reason” to justify why America and Great Britain were so closely linked. While the belief in racial-theories of “superiority” was not unique to the South, Schafer’s dissection of Page suggests that the attraction towards England was specific to the South’s particularly race-sensitive nature in the aftermath of the Civil War. Given an atmosphere of such rampant Anglophilia, Latané surely felt an obligation for the United States to help its “family” in a time of war and assert the dominance of the two nations. Interestingly, historian Adrian Brettle has observed that many Confederates felt a sense of betrayal “about the failure of European powers to recognize their independence” during the Civil War itself, yet Latané and many of the other educated men of the “New South” held no grudge against England. The Lost Cause’s mythology of an inevitable loss to the North’s resources, combined with the heightened emphasis on racial identity (and for Latané personally, the belief that it was the Union’s blockade which prevented aid from Europe) likely helped ease the difficulties in reconciling love for racial heritage and frustration with a nation which denied the CSA its glory.

Latané may have also been a pro-interventionist due to his perspective on “civilized” nations interfering with each other. In 1900, Latané believed that the new “national” state unified by territory and ethnicity was the current norm of civilized states and countries no longer went to


76 Walter H. Page, ”The United States and Great Britain,” 4 August 1917, reprinted in International Conciliation: Documents Regarding the European War, series 15, no. 114 (May 1917): 3-12.

77 Brettle, Colossal Ambitions, 188.
war just to claim the lands of other peoples. Thus, unlike in the era of Napoleon, “Intervention in civilized states merely for purposes of conquest, or in the interests of a political system, would hardly be countenanced by the great powers of the present.”78 Latané’s idealistic vision of no more intervention would be proven deathly wrong when war broke out across Europe during 1914. While the morality and responsibility of nations involved in World War I is a contested subject to this day, Latané would have likely seen Germany as the one who broke the “rule” of intervention. In the context of 1914 through 1917, Germany might easily be perceived as the aggressor in Europe, as it had successfully begun the invasion and occupation of territory in “civilized” nations such as France and Belgium. Given that Latané portrayed Germany as inherently militant and its leaders as men whose political power rested on military action, he likely saw the invasions in the West as intervention just for the sake of maintaining a militant political system.79 Latané’s desire that “civilized” nations would no longer have to engage in military intervention might have been out of a concern that no nation should share the same fate as the South. The mythology of the Lost Cause saw the Union as conquering force led by the tyrannical Lincoln and Seward while Confederates merely fought a “war in defense of hearth and home,” simply trying to maintain their independence in the face of an aggressive North.80 By the end of the Civil War, some southern soldiers feared that the North was so aggressive and militant that after being conquered, they would be drafted into foreign wars by “a tyrannical Republican administration that required the perpetuation of military conflict in order to survive.”81 Just as Latané had felt no nation should suffer the same “resentment” that had been forced on the South,
he would have felt that no other “civilized” nation deserved to be the victim of aggressive intervention, whether it was from the Union or Germany. While Latané seemingly never felt that the U.S. government relied on military conflict to survive (given his approval of events like the Spanish-American War), his view of a militant Germany appears to be strikingly similar to fear of southern soldiers in the days leading up to surrender.

Latané’s other reasons for supporting American involvement in World War I are only indirectly tied to the Civil War and Lost Cause. At a University of Virginia Alumni Association banquet in February 1917, Latané claimed “The United States must end her isolation and enter the world drama . . . If she does not do it voluntarily she will be forced to do it.” Latané’s view that America might be “forced” in would make sense in the context of 1917 as the Zimmerman telegram was discovered by the British and Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare, both of which acted as threats against the U.S. However, Latané believed that Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing had realized a break was inevitable long before then, and Wilson had promoted peace as long as possible so that most pacifists would see him as genuine and support him when war finally did come. Latané appears to have seen war as inevitable due to his providential view of America’s importance to the wider world putting it on an eventual collision course with Germany, as opposed to the (then) recent acts of German aggression. Latané also felt that the United States had a duty to ensure that Germany did not spread its “kultur” by force, lest it prevent the “evolution of great ideas” in a free world.

84 “War Talks Stir Alumni,” 16. Given that Latané mentioned that America had a great influence on the world at the same banquet, the “great ideas” that needed to develop were likely American ones.
One last possible source for Latané’s pro-war attitude was his religion. Latané became a Presbyterian elder (just like Woodrow Wilson) by the time of his death.\(^85\) For the more deeply religious members of American Protestant society, German culture was considered too atheistic to be “good.” In a wartime interview with southern scholar William Dodd, Wilson confided that Christianity and democracy complemented each other, and German society possessed neither in sufficient qualities.\(^86\) In 1919, a Southern Methodist minister condemned Germany for “build[ing] a civilization on the atheistic philosophy of Nietzsche,” suggesting that it had deserved the hatred it garnered from across Western Europe for relying on the philosophy of an “enemy” of Christ.\(^87\) Latané never directly critiqued Germany for its “godlessness,” but his various critiques of Germany’s character (the “undue” influence on schools, its militant nature, and its “kultur”) and his own providential views on America would have meant that Germany would be “unfit” to lead the world and the United States had a duty to ensure it did not become too powerful.

Still why did Latané participate in a riot against a pacifist movement? Samuel L. Schaffer suggests that white southerners led the pro-war movement for two major reasons. The first is that, on the governmental side, Wilson’s compatriots tended to clamp down hard on anything that might be considered dissent. One example is the Espionage Act (first proposed by congressmen from Texas and North Carolina) which allowed prison sentences of up to 20 years and $10,000 dollar fines, and it had given the Postmaster General Albert S Burleson (the same

\(^85\) Keller, “John Holladay Latané,” 2.
man who segregated the post office) to withhold any mail that “advocated” treason or disloyalty. Any paper that questioned the president’s judgement or advocated pacifism or showed a hint of socialism could risk being taken down, creating a severe check on free speech. In the words of Schaffer, Burleson could restrict fundamental American rights because “his southern worldview allowed him to,” as said worldview privileged the maintenance of social order above all else.88 As far back as the Civil War, the elite southern worldview tended to emphasize the importance of order; Confederate leaders saw their nation as the last elite-run conservative republic, facing the threat of the Union’s “mob rule” style democracy.89 The fear of revolutionizing the social order was “justified” by Reconstruction, in which scholars such as Woodrow Wilson blamed the near ruin of the South on African Americans being put into power by the Union. The South had only been able to “redeem” itself when African Americans were placed back under control of whites and Yankees had been forced back to North.90 The need to maintain a “clean” social order was on the minds of upper-class southern men ever since that time. At the Academy of Music riot, protestors linked David Starr Jordan to “Jew radicals” and the protestors sung a variant of “We’ll Hang John Brown from the Sour Apple Tree” which replaced “John Brown” with “Davy Jordan.”91 The “jew radicals” comments were seemingly in reference to the Pro-peace efforts of Baltimore Rabbi Eugene Kohn and Jordan’s explanation that entry into war was the desire of capitalists, which could easily be seen as socialist thought.92 Thus, Jordan was “aligned” with potential “subversive” social groups (Jews and socialists) and considered comparable to a man

89 Brettele, Colossal Ambitions, 176.
92 “Pacifist Meeting Ends in Riot,” 3, 12.
who tried to radically destroy the entire order of slavery. Latané, and many of the other rioters, likely saw Jordan as a threat to a secure social order that would follow Wilson in the (at this point near inevitable) entry into war, so they saw fit to deny his free speech.

The other reason that Schaffer suggests most white southerners (including Latané) were so strongly pro-war is that loyalty was considered a way to show patriotism. Ever since the Civil War, southerners had to live with fact that they had seceded from the Union and lost. With a new war to fight, southerners were patriots willing to do everything in their power so that their country might succeed in a new conflict, in a sense redeeming themselves for the past. Their devotion was so great that “Pacifism equalled disloyalty.” Even the participants in the riot reflected this “redemption,” in a sense. Among the various elites at the riot was Agnes W Gill, the “lead” singer of the above mentioned “hang Davy Jordan” song and the daughter of a recently deceased Confederate soldier who had become a financial and social leader in Baltimore. Given Baltimore’s strong Confederate sympathies during the Civil War, Agnes would not have been unique amongst the crowd; after all John Latané was present and he was the nephew of Captain Latané. Yet despite their backgrounds, the crowd of rioters were still considered to be some of the greatest patriots in the city by the Baltimore Sun. Given Latané’s providential belief that America was destined for greater things once the war was over, he would have been especially excited to “prove” that he was not just a child of the South but instead a patriot who supported America as a whole.

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93 Historian Charles Holden characterized Jordan as being a “political [intellectual] aligned somewhere on the left” without calling him a socialist, suggesting he was not actually the later. Holden, “Prominent Men Beaten Badly,” 273.
95 Holden, “Prominent Man Beaten Badly,” 267. (note, the details mentioned are partially included in an accompanying endnote in the source material, which is on page 283).
Section IV: Wilson and Post-War

Latané’s Wilsonian views are worth exploring. Latané was far from the only southerner scholar to have similar views to Wilson; many white southerners understandably resonated with him given their shared backgrounds. William Edward Dodd, one of the most radical southern historians from Latané’s generation, was utterly charmed by Woodrow Wilson and his policies.97 Latané stands out from other southern scholars in just how “close” he was to Wilson. Both shared the same city of birth and the same faith at the end of their lives. Both were Johns Hopkins graduates, and both were upper-class Virginians but still not part of the “First Families,” and both had prominent careers as scholars.98 Latané viewed Wilson with such respect that he claimed the president “had a moral leadership that was without parallel in the history of the world.”99 Latané would take up many of Wilson’s popular tenets, some of which he stated his own views on, some of which he copied entirely from Wilson.

Latané, like Wilson, emphasized that treaties should always be fairly kept. For example, Latané took care to note that an act passed by Congress in 1912 would have forced Britain to pay more for its tolls than was agreed upon in a treaty from 1901, and therefore the he felt the act should not go through.100 Latané’s commitment to honoring treaties was so great that that in 1900, he defended the continued following of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 which had prevented either the United States or Great Britain from exclusively controlling any potential canal which connected the Atlantic and Pacific. Latané noted with disdain that American public opinion at the time desired exclusive American control over the canal, so he was essentially

99 Latané, From Isolation to Leadership, 196.
saying that a 50-year-old treaty with Great Britain held more importance than the desire of the mass of American people.\textsuperscript{101} Latané’s insistence on keeping treaties seems to come from his analysis of how the Union won the Civil War. As said earlier in this paper, Latané believed that the Union blockade, which he considered to be the cause of the Confederacy’s defeat, was effectively illegal in international law. Latané insistence on following the letter of international laws regardless of their popularity likely stems from the feeling that the South lost due to an “unfair” reason, and he wanted to ensure no “civilized” nation suffered the same fate.

One of the tenets that Latané mostly repeated verbatim from Wilson was the belief that America was fighting not in the interest of any secret treaty or interest in grabbing power, but merely to assert the right to democracy and self-determination.\textsuperscript{102} Just like Latané’s views on Cuba, Wilson had a limited view of who deserved democracy and self-determination. Schaffer notes that Wilson specifically believed in the value of an all-white American democracy, as he saw that the removal of African Americans from government and the return of the white democrats put an end to the suffering brought on by Reconstruction and its destruction of the social order. When the Covenant for the League of Nations was created, it specified that Central Power colonies would become “mandates” where people were taught how to perform self-government, with those in Africa being projected to need the most time. Schaffer explicitly identifies that Wilson used the language to refer to recently freed slaves and recently decolonized subjects: they both needed “tutelage” before they could properly govern themselves. “Wilson's racial beliefs stemmed from more than being born in the South;” instead they were based upon a specific view of what was “right” in the hindsight of Reconstruction.\textsuperscript{103} Latané viewed

\textsuperscript{101} Latané, Diplomatic Relations, 188-214. 
\textsuperscript{102} Latané, From Isolation to Leadership, 198-199. 
\textsuperscript{103} Schaffer, “A Bitter Memory,” 206, 214-217.
democracy as needing to be “taught” in the South, Cuba, and East Indies; like Wilson this view appears to have been specifically informed by the experience of Reconstruction and intensified by the Lost Cause.

Latané’s views on the League of Nations reflected his belief that America was destined to take a place on the world stage as part of the League of Nations. Earlies, Latané showed strong support for potential means of international arbitration, such as the Hague Convention of 1899. Although Latané was disappointed that America failed to join the League, by 1922 he was confident that American would recognize that European problems would affect them in a modern world and they would take the leadership role that “the rest of the world is ready to accord to her again.” By the time of his death in 1932, the Baltimore Sun called him a “champion” of both the League of Nations and the World Court. As noble as his intentions may have been, even Latané’s goal of bringing about international arbitration for peace was inspired by the Lost Cause. The need for one country to not create resentment in another via the use of arbitration came from a desire to avoid ever repeating the “humiliation” inflicted on the South. In addition, the process of Reconstruction had “proven” the need to maintain the existing racial orders for the sake of peace, so it was the duty of the White Western world (particularly America) to paternalistically “care” for non-white subjects, just as it had been the duty of educated smart whites to “care” for African Americans, whether as slaves or sharecroppers. Even the most noble of foreign policy ideas had been tainted by the Lost Cause.

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104 Latané, America as a World Power, 242-249.
105 Latané, From Isolation to Leadership, 290.
106 “Latane Obsequies May be Monday,” 4.
Conclusion

Almost all of Latané’s foreign policy beliefs can be traced back to the Lost Cause. However, most of these ties are indirect and easy to get “swallowed” up by larger ideas, outside some direction connections (such as the emphasis on international treaties due to the belief that the Union broke the law to win). For example, Latané’s attitude that Cuba specifically needed to be taught how to be democratic (alongside the view of his mentor towards all of Africa) could be easily taken as just “standard” colonialism as opposed to the specific reaction to black voting in the era of Reconstruction which the Lost Cause codified as a mistake. Another example is that the belief in a superior American culture would be general standard jingoism, but it could be considered compatible with specific southern strands of thought from the era of the Confederacy. Given that the Lost Cause is primarily concerned with a domestic issue in American history, it does make sense that most of its effects on foreign policy would be subtle. Extra care should be taken when trying to track such domestic ideologies so that one does not totally lose sight of them while looking in national foreign policy.

Next steps would be an evaluation of rural southern Americans and how/if the Lost Cause affected them differently from politicians and southerners in the cities and upper classes. Early on in my senior thesis process I came across an article which discussed the extent of anti-war feelings in the deep South, and Schaffer has mentioned that the rural South tended to be a hotbed of dissent. How rural southerners might have gone against Wilson despite sharing some basic background details with him and his supporters in the cities could be an interesting look at the variability or constants of Lost Cause rhetoric.

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