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## CO-EXISTENCE OR CHAOS

SIR ROGER MAKINS, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.\*

To any man, whether he be an American or a foreigner, it is always a momentous occasion to enter for the first time one of the 48 States of this great Republic: each with its own strong individuality, yet all bound together in the greater entity of the Union. To an Englishman it is especially significant to visit for the first time a State whose earliest settlers mostly came from the British Isles: whether directly, as in your low country, or via the North, as in your upcountry region. And to any student of history, it is a moment of mark to cross the borders of the State which gave birth to Andrew Jackson and to John C. Calhoun. It may be that some of my countrymen are unaware of Eli Whitney's great invention: but very few of them are so ignorant that they do not know what happened at Fort Sumter in the year 1861.

Yet those are memories of war and politics and industry. Within these academic walls; on this noble campus, graced by the historic names of Pinckney and Rutledge and De Saussure; it is more fitting for a guest on whom you, Mr. President, have conferred so signal an honour, to recall rather those scholars and administrators who have made this century-and-a-half-old University famous not only in South Carolina, not only throughout the South, but wherever sound learning is held in high esteem.

You are rightly proud of the achievements and the reputation of Lieber, of Thornwell, of Longstreet. And I hope you will allow me to take my small share of pride in one at least of the many achievements here of my countryman Thomas Cooper. The year 1812 was not an auspicious one in Anglo-American history. But it was a New Englander, not the redcoats, who in that year inflicted a severe defeat on the University of South Carolina; when (as I do not have to remind you) Jonathan Maxcy, while adding chemistry to your curriculum, thought fit to abolish the study of Latin and Greek. And it was an Englishman, Cooper, the great chemist, who had enough sense, ten years later, to restore the classics to their proper place. Not for nothing does the pediment of your library bear the words *Ex Libris Veritas*.

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\*Address by the British Ambassador to a special convocation of the University of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C., 20th October 1954.

In discussing the subject of “co-existence or chaos”, it is important to be sure what we mean by both words. Nowadays words tend to acquire special connotations in the public mind, and quite respectable ones get twisted in slogans, or degenerate by propagandist distortion into terms of abuse.

I am sure no-one has any difficulty about “chaos”, and if there is any doubt, it is only necessary to turn to lines in Milton’s “Paradise Lost”:

Where eldest night and Chaos, ancestor  
of nature, held eternal anarchy . . .

In a later age, those of you who have had the good fortune to see Sean O’Casey’s play “Juno and the Paycock” will remember the bibulous Irishman sitting on an upturned packing case and complaining that “the whole world is in a terrible state of chass”. In its classical, as in its contemporary sense, the word means utter confusion, complete disorganisation.

Co-existence is another matter. It is not a word which has hitherto exercised a great attraction on poets or playwrights. In dictionary terms it has a very simple meaning: “to exist at the same time”. That is why in its usage it has to be qualified by some adjective, and we normally hear of “peaceful co-existence”. The trouble about this expression is that it is one of many which has a technical or doctrinal meaning in the Communist vocabulary. It therefore signifies one thing to us and another to the Russians. It occurs in works like Stalin’s “Problems of Leninism” and other statements of fundamental doctrine intended for the guidance of Communists. In this sense, it originally meant the period which begins with the establishment of the first Communist government, and gradually progresses until the last “capitalist” government is overthrown. This is represented as a period of intense struggle between the two systems; and, according to the Communist theory, peaceful co-existence may at any time break out into conflict and war.

After the Second World War, when the Western powers began to take the first steps towards their own self-defence against Soviet imperialism, America’s possession of atomic weapons made a war with the West a prohibitively hazardous operation for the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the term “co-existence” found its way into statements of a more propagandist nature, in which peaceable intentions were expressed without reference to the limitations imposed by Communist doctrine. By the time that both the Western world and the Soviet Union had learned how to make hydrogen bombs,

it became clear to the Soviet leaders that nuclear warfare would mean the destruction of both sides, and that the struggle of Communism against the rest of the world would have to be pursued by means short of war.

When Stalin died, the new Soviet Government was at pains to emphasise that it wanted not merely to avoid increasing, but actually to reduce, the tension which Stalin's implacable conduct of Soviet policy had caused, and even to allow a little cultural and commercial exchange. Thus Malenkov, at Stalin's funeral on March 9, 1953, described his policy as being "against the preparation and unleashing of a new war, a policy of international co-operation and development of business relations with all countries, proceeding from the Leninist/Stalinist thesis of the possibility of prolonged co-existence". Molotov, on the same occasion, actually spoke of "a policy of international co-operation and development of trade relations".

For the Western Democracies peaceful co-existence means living together in peace, without any *arriere pensee* or ulterior motive. It does not mean liking the fellows you are co-existing with, or approving of their habits. But it means living together in forbearance, if not in friendship.

You and I are co-existing in this hall at the moment. A great many of you may not like my face, my voice or my clothes, my accent, or even the policies of my Government. But none of you, I hope, derives from these antipathies any ideological compulsion to throw a ripe tomato at me.

It is necessary to bear in mind the different interpretations which are put upon the phrase in Moscow and in the West, when we consider the degree in which peaceful co-existence is possible and the manner in which it can be pursued.

When we speak of peaceful co-existence, we mean co-existence between two halves of the world, the Western or democratic half, and the Eastern half, which by a singular perversion has also arrogated to itself the name of democracy. But we must also bear in mind, in making this division, that there are many great and ancient peoples who, though sympathetic to Western ideals of democracy, do not yet, in all the circumstances, feel themselves strong enough either in their resources or in their administrations to take a final decision to line up with the Western powers. These peoples are among the most ardent seekers after peaceful co-existence in our Western sense.

Fundamentally, the Communist ideology stresses that peace can only be attained when Communism has triumphed throughout the world. This means that, from the Soviet point of view, the agreements which the Communist powers may make with Western powers are essentially transitory in their nature. There is from time to time a certain variation in wording and emphasis in authoritative Soviet communist pronouncements. For example, the latest statement of the fundamental doctrines of modern Russia is to be found in the much-heralded new textbook called "Political Economy", which finally appeared some six weeks ago. This "New Testament" of the Malenkov regime has much to say about co-existence, and makes it specifically clear that it means not co-operation, but continued struggle. Let me quote what is perhaps its most important statement on the subject:

"Lenin showed that the general collapse of capitalism is not a simultaneous act, but a long period of stormy economic and political upheavals and intensified class struggle, a period of the fall of capitalism on a world-wide scale, and the birth of socialist society. This statement of Lenin defines the historical inevitability of a long period of co-existence of the two systems."

It is therefore prudent to assume that the continued objective of Communist imperialism is to undermine, and ultimately to destroy, the Western, or so-called capitalist, powers. The British Delegate to the United Nations, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, put it as follows in a speech to the Assembly recently:

"There is much evidence at the present time that peaceful co-existence represents in the eyes of the Soviet Government co-existence to the extent of the avoidance of an atomic world war, but apart from that the continued support of disruptive and subversive forces working for the Communist world revolution."

On these assumptions it is therefore absolutely necessary, if an armed struggle is to be avoided, that the Western powers should be strong and united. As Sir Winston Churchill has recently said "our policy is peace through strength. We must never willingly or wittingly run the risk of subjugation through weakness".

The purpose of Western strength and unity is not just to be strong for the sake of being strong. It is certainly not for the ultimate purpose of making war. Western democracies are not aggressors. We have to be able to defend ourselves from aggression, whether overt or covert. But our purpose is to seek accommodation and

international agreement by negotiation; and in order to negotiate successfully you have to negotiate from strength. If you are strong, you can afford a little give and take; but as Edmund Burke said long ago, "The concessions of the weak are the concessions of fear".

How are we doing in the Western world in regard to unity and strength? By this I mean composing our differences, fortifying our economies, and strengthening our defences.

Owing to the division between the great powers, we cannot at present rely upon the United Nations to give us security. But we have made progress, within the framework of the U.N. Charter, in building up regional organisations for defence, of which the most familiar is N.A.T.O. and the most recent, the Manila Pact, which we hope will grow and develop greatly as N.A.T.O. itself has been able to do.

But defence organisations will not be effective unless they are based on a solid economic foundation. Each individual country must put its economic house in order, and we must continually strive to knit the free world together on a sound basis of trade and payments.

As regards our differences, we have been doing pretty well in composing a number of questions which threatened the unity of the democratic countries. In the last month or so we have overcome the main obstacles to the integration of Western Germany into Western Europe and to a German contribution to Western defence. The age-old dispute over the borderland of Trieste has been resolved. We in Britain have settled our differences with Egypt about the status of the Suez Canal base, and so opened the way to greater cooperation and security in the Middle East. We and you together, with the assistance of the great oil companies, have resolved our differences in Iran over the disposition of their oil. In a wider field, we have found ourselves working together in harmony on the great issues of disarmament and atomic control. There are still differences of approach between us in regard to the problem of China; but our objectives and interests in the Far East are broadly the same.

Let us not magnify these differences: let us rather think of that wide area in which we and you are in agreement and are pursuing common policies. In the last resort the unity and cohesion of the whole free world depends on the unity of action between the United States and the peoples of the Commonwealth. We must beware of the attempts to divide us which are constantly made by our adversaries. We must look vigilantly for any emerging problems which

are likely to cause trouble between us. "A man," said Dr. Johnson, "should keep his friendships in constant repair". That is true also of peoples, and it is eminently true of Anglo-American friendship.

The other half of the world with whom we seek "peaceful co-existence" is often referred to as the Communist bloc, and credited with the solidity of a monolith. Yet it consists of three quite distinct entities: the Soviet Union, the European satellites of Russia, and China, to which one should perhaps now add the two Asiatic satellites, North Korea and Viet-Minh.

It is not my purpose today to dilate upon the nature of international communism. No doubt there is a fundamental identity of principle and ideology in every Communist regime. But few could maintain that the Communist world, though more closely coordinated owing to the ruthless employment of violence and oppression, is a uniform monolith. Communism takes on a national colour in Russia, in China and perhaps, though in a minor degree, in the European satellites. Yugoslavia bears witness to the fact that a Communist state can remain Communist and yet pursue a foreign policy which is opposed to other Communist states. The fact is, of course, that historical traditions and national or regional characteristics constantly tend to break through the most rigid of doctrines, and that this applies with special force to a country's foreign policy, which, in any case, is dictated in large measure by geographical and physical factors. Thus we see, in Soviet foreign policy, many of the same tendencies which existed under the Czars, and we detect imperialist ambitions directed at secular objectives.

Such considerations are particularly relevant when we consider the relationship between Soviet Russia and China. These two states since 1945 have been closely linked together by the Sino-Soviet Treaty. One hears it said that they are irrevocably bound in partnership, and that Chinese policy is, in the last resort, controlled from Moscow. We in Britain have never believed that this is necessarily so. We have thought that while common interests led them to an alliance, there are plenty of problems, territorial, economic, political and even doctrinal which, if they were given free play, might well cause rifts between them. We have felt that Communism in China would be likely to take on specifically Chinese characteristics: I had almost said, would be expressed in Chinese characters, for what could come more handily to an ideologue than an ideograph?

But one cannot expect these divisive factors between Russia and China to operate effectively so long as the pressure of Western policy forces China steadily back into the arms of Russia.

Already the Chinese Communists have been propagating their own version of a peaceful co-existence for Asia. Recently there has been published the text of an agreement between Russia and China in which the Russians gave up their special military and economic privileges in China. They will withdraw from Port Arthur, which in 1945 was welcomed back in Moscow as "Holy Russian soil"; they will give up their 50% shares in the various metal, petroleum, shipping and airline monopolies in China; and so on. Of course there were many other things in the public agreement, and doubtless also much that was not published. The Russians do not, for instance, seem to have endorsed altogether the Chinese policy about Formosa.

This document is therefore open to various interpretations; but at least it proves one thing, that China is not a satellite but an equal of Russia. Here was no pilgrimage to Moscow, no case of the mountain coming to Mahomet, no visit to Canossa: the agreement was made in Peking by a strong Soviet delegation led by Krushev, the Secretary-General of the Party and apparently Russia's No. 2 man.

Possibly the most important factor in the Communist world is the economic factor. If you take Russia and the satellites, you will find Great Britain's trade with them was in 1953 about one per cent of our total trade: with China, it was about a quarter of one per cent. Before the war, about ninety per cent of the international trade of Soviet Russia and what are now her satellites was done with Western Europe, and only ten per cent among themselves. Today the communist drive towards autarky has almost exactly reversed those proportions.

Similarly China has been almost entirely dependent on Russian assistance for her capital development and rearmament. And this increasing economic self-sufficiency, which, combined with the control of armaments, is perhaps the most durable cement in the other half of the world, has of course been fostered and intensified by the policy of embargo which for cogent strategic and political reasons has been imposed in varying degrees by the Western powers on trade with the Communist world.

Here then we have the two halves of the world striving towards a fuller measure of economic and political unity within themselves but with elements of weakness and division on both sides which a crisis would intensify. In addition, we have a large group of peoples whose alignment in a showdown would be uncertain. Both sides are armed with thermo-nuclear weapons and both have the sure knowledge that a world war, if one came, would be the end of both our ways of life



as we know them today. For the victor would be left sitting exhausted, and presumably radio-active, on a heap of ashes.

It may not be wholly fanciful to attribute to this knowledge the lowering of international tension in the last few months. The two wars which were in progress in the Far East have been stopped: overt aggression has ceased. We are now embarked on a phase of negotiation, always exacting, frequently inconclusive, often frustrating, but still negotiation which from time to time produces results. Can we doubt that we must continue on this course?

It is sometimes suggested that the pursuit of peaceful co-existence, in the Western sense, is a will o' the wisp; that any negotiations with any Communists are doomed to failure and disappointment; that the Communists cannot be trusted; that since they are bent, if not on open war, at least on subverting and undermining our political system, it is utopian to expect even a temporary adjustment of our differences with them. Well, maybe they are unreliable. But the moral of that is to be strong, to keep up our guard while we talk — not to abandon the attempt in despair. Nor must we allow Soviet obstruction to hold up our own progress in matters which are of importance to the whole world. I venture in this connexion to quote the Governor of South Carolina who spoke, when he was Secretary of State, of "Patience and Firmness", and subsequently wrote:-

"We must let the Soviet leaders know we are sincere in wanting their cooperation, but nevertheless remain firm in the determination that if we do not get it we will go ahead anyway with all those states that will cooperate".

And a British statesman, after a recent visit to Moscow, echoed this in saying that we could only be sure of peace "if we go ahead with the consolidation of the Western world. The Soviet Union tends to want absolute security at the expense of insecurity for everyone else".

I admit that the prospect of vigilant, painstaking and often exasperating negotiation, stretching far into the future, and based, as it must be, on sustained efforts to build up and maintain adequate defensive strength, is a poor substitute for what, in the flush of victory, we had hoped to achieve when we founded the United Nations.

But what is the alternative, other than a steady increase of international tension until something gives way or snaps, and we are involved in another war? What alternative has our kind of democracy except to seek peace through strength? We are opposed, not only in our policies, but also in our bones, to acts of aggression. We

cannot contemplate them ourselves, but we can be firm in our resolution and specific in our warning that if they are attempted against us, we will react. And we can make sure that we have the wherewithal to react with conclusive effect.

If it be objected that such reaction may lead to chaos, then I say, let others be responsible for the consequences to future generations. Let nobody on our side interrupt the process which began on

“the great morning of the world  
when God first dawned on chaos”

or as another English poet put it,

“when of old,  
light uncollected thro’ the chaos urged  
his infant way”.

Nor am I persuaded that the outlook is as bleak and cheerless as it is sometimes represented to be. Is it unreasonable to assume that most men and women everywhere, on whatever side of whatever curtain they may live, have the same desire for peaceful and decent lives; for betterment in their standards of living; for freedom of expression and for the assurance of equal justice under law? No regime, however dictatorial, unless it be based on personal absolutism, can disregard for long the desires and wishes of the people. And even dictators usually come to violent ends. May one not place some reliance on the process of evolution in human societies? I for one do not believe that the Soviet system is so perfectly attuned to the needs of man as to be immune from the laws of change.

In the hectic life which so many of us lead in the twentieth century, we tend — perhaps you in the United States tend particularly — to look for quick and concrete results in diplomacy. Yet this process of evolution, on which I personally base some hope, will inevitably be slow. I am not alone in my optimism. A great living historian, Mr. Arnold Toynbee, said recently :-

“I don’t believe we are going to fight a third world war. I believe we are going to stand the strain of having to live through a long period of nerve-racking ‘missionary warfare’ with an undramatic ending”.

If so, we must give plenty of room for the working of what Mr. John Foster Dulles has called “time and the fundamentals”, and we shall need all the patience and all the firmness which we can collectively muster. Above all, we need confidence in ourselves and our

friends; in our democratic methods; in our way of doing things. This has been expressed again and again, as far as the United States is concerned, in the famous documents and speeches which adorn your history.

For Britain I shall take, for my conclusion, some reflections by a man whose thought was influenced by one of South Carolina's most illustrious sons, John C. Calhoun.

"Liberty", said the great historian, Lord Acton, nearly a century ago, "Liberty is not a means to a higher political end. It is itself the highest political end . . . ."

And in the same essay on *Freedom in Christianity* he speaks of

"the native qualities of perseverance, moderation, individuality, and the manly sense of duty which caused Napoleon to exclaim, as he rode away from Waterloo, 'It has always been the same since Crecy'."

*Sic semper tyrannis.* But let none of us make any mistake. If we are to resist and repel the insidious influence of Communist doctrine, we must ourselves possess not so much a counter-ideology as a robust and rugged faith that the things for which we stand, the political principles which we proclaim, will lead us most surely to the greater security and well-being of our two great countries.