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William J. Burling

A "sickly sort of refinement": The Problem of
Sentimentalism in Mackenzie's *The Man of Feeling*



Henry Mackenzie's *The Man of Feeling*, enormously popular when first published in 1771, was acknowledged by an entire generation of readers as the ultimate representation of the sentimental ethos. But outright contradiction now pervades critical discussion of the novel, with interpretation splitting on two central questions: Is Harley, the hero, an ideal man or a fool? And is the novel sympathetic to sentimentalism or opposed to it? The antithetical critical responses to *The Man of Feeling* may be resolved, however, when we recognize that Mackenzie was neither completely attacking nor condoning sentimentalism *in toto*. He was attempting to differentiate what he considered to be attributes of genuine and desirable humane sensitivity from those of the affected sentimentality then *au courant* in the hypocritical *beau monde*.

Important evidence from Mackenzie's critical essays, plays, and other novels reveals that while Mackenzie certainly believed that sensitivity, compassion, and benevolence were essential elements in the character of a truly humane person, he was, in fact, contemptuous of the phenomenon of sentimentality--whether as expressed in fiction or as practiced abroad in society--and consistently attacked or criticized sentimentalism in all of his works. But his failure to make the distinction clear in *The Man of Feeling* resulted from two artistic faults: the lack of a clearly defined, admirable protagonist; and the unfortunate decision

to employ a fragmented, episodic plot. These flaws have produced the wildly diverging interpretations.

The Contemporary Reception

Nearly all readers in Mackenzie's day accepted *The Man of Feeling* at full face value. We may recall here the well-known example of Lady Louisa Stuart, who in a letter to Sir Walter Scott, remarked of the novel's first publication, "when I read it, as I was a girl of fourteen not yet versed in sentiment, I had a secret dread I should not cry enough to gain the credit of proper sensibility."¹ Lady Louisa's reaction typifies the trendy wish to be known as a person of refined sensibilities. By popular consensus, the "ideal" sentimental person possessed an elevated sympathy for the joys and sorrows of others and reacted to even insignificant occurrences of life to an extreme degree. Interest in this mode of behavior reached its height in Europe around 1750 but long before had become debased to more of a social fad than a genuine vehicle for improving human perception and reaction.² That sentimentality was, indeed, a passing fashion is made clear by Lady Louisa's reaction when re-reading the novel aloud to a different generation in 1826, over fifty years later: "I am afraid I perceived a sad change in it . . . and the effect altogether failed. Nobody cried, and at some of the passages, the touches I used to think so exquisite--Oh Dear! They laughed" (p. 273). But in its day, *The Man of Feeling* was required reading and tea-table display material.³

Incorrectly understanding the novel because of artistic faults which I shall attempt to illuminate, virtually all eighteenth-century readers accepted as definitive Mackenzie's portrayal of sentimentality. Robert Burns prized *The Man of Feeling* next to the Bible, and Sir Walter Scott thought the novel a masterpiece rivaling the heights of Shakespeare. But clues from the literary context circa 1771 reveal that sentimentality, far from being the norm of the day, was in fact under attack, hence calling into doubt the reliability of contemporary reader responses to Mackenzie's novel.

A brief survey of works from the late 1760s and 1770s reveals that sentimentality was often either seriously questioned or even outright ridiculed. Oliver Goldsmith's *The Vicar of Wakefield* (1766),⁴ Laurence Sterne's *Sentimental Journey* (1768), Samuel Foote's *Piety in Pattens* (1773) and R. B. Sheridan's *The School for Scandal* (1777) are but a few of the more well-known examples of works from the same period which either satirize sentimentality or, at best, present the

topic in an ambiguous light. The mood of the 1770s was changing quickly and differed distinctly from that of the 1740s and 1750s, the era of Samuel Richardson's *Pamela* (1740) and *Clarissa* (1748)⁵ and Henry Fielding's *Amelia* (1752). The trend toward advocating sentimentality in literary works came and went quickly, and the reversal was thus well established by 1771, continued into the 1790s,⁶ and was complete by the time of Lady Louisa's anecdote from 1826. In view of this and other evidence, I believe that Mackenzie not only was fully aware of the emerging literary bias against sentimentality, but also, as we shall see, endorsed criticisms of sentimentality in *The Man of Feeling*. Modern critics, however, are divided in their interpretations and assessments of Mackenzie's accomplishments.

Modern Reactions

The majority critical opinion is on the side of Mackenzie as sincere sentimentalist. In his landmark 1931 biography, Harold W. Thompson laid down what has become the foundation of the belief that Mackenzie is the epitome of the sentimental novelist in remarking that *The Man of Feeling* is "the most thoroughly typical sentimental novel in English."⁷ Contemporary criticism is largely an elaboration of Thompson's analysis. Ralph E. Jenkins finds that Mackenzie's purpose was "primarily to educate the public in the virtues of sentiment and to hold up Harley as a model for emulation."⁸ Supporting this position is Gerard A. Barker, who states that Harley, "it seems clear, possesses this ideal justness of behavior . . . [and] rejects the world's standard of conduct though he earns thereby its mockery and contempt."⁹ While sensibility is a liability, because "it makes one an easier prey than a person of a more impassive temperament" (p. 52), still, sentimentalism is Mackenzie's preferred mode of living. The novel, Barker concludes, relies mainly upon "the prevailing mood of pathos . . . for its own sake" (p. 54), i.e., is unabashedly and unashamedly sentimental.

Other critics confirm and extend the implications of Mackenzie's novel. Robert L. Platzner, for example, argues that Harley's plight borders on "Romantic tragedy," being "an 'enlightened' revision of the *contemptus mundi* theme."¹⁰ Harley, "to find himself . . . must lose the world, even at the peril of his dignity and social conscience" (p. 60). Far from being a fool, he is a victim, a martyr to the proposition that a truly sentimental person will be destroyed

by the "Mandevillean hive of universal selfishness" (p. 60). David G. Spencer helpfully points out "that significant difference which exists between Mackenzie himself and Harley his hero: the author's sympathy is tempered with common sense and worldliness and his hero's is not."¹¹ Harley, according to Spencer's reading, is a futile character, and "Mackenzie's novels are moral sermons . . . [which] exemplify a philosophy with which Mackenzie was in full accord" (p. 315). Harley's heart is in the right place, but his head is not, making him a perfect example of the unfortunate dangers of living exclusively by sentimental principles. Therefore, Harley's failings are meant as a lesson to the reader: "the complete man of feeling cannot last in this world" (p. 326). The answer to the dilemma posed by the novel is that one should temper sentiment with reason. We must note, however, that Spencer does not see Mackenzie as opposed, in the main, to sentimentalism. R. Peter Burnham provides an exemplary statement of this perspective in stating that while the novel is often humorous--a point noted by virtually all critics--"the tone never gets even remotely close to the point where the novel would be a satire against the sentimental mentality."¹²

But consensus is not unanimity. Burnham's uneasy concern that the novel might be interpreted as a satire is a reaction to an opposing minority perspective suggested by Michael Rymer, who insists that Harley "is more of a fool than Henry Brooke's Harry Moreland . . ." (i.e., the main character in *The Fool of Quality* [1766-70]).¹³ For Rymer, "there is enough here for us to guard against taking Mackenzie's sentimentalism at its face value"; therefore, the novel is an elaborate joke which mistakenly became the "Bible of the sentimental movement" (p. 68). Harley emerges not as the epitome of human emotion but as an example of the ridiculous extremes to which mankind will reach. Rymer concludes that Mackenzie rejects sentimentalism entirely and that would-be sentimentalists as well as "real" men of feeling are alike in error: "The most important fact is that Harley and the values he represents are plainly satirized" (p. 67). Rymer finds that the excessive number of humorous or ironic scenes makes the novel resoundingly anti-sentimental. The novel, after all, was a fine joke; even Mackenzie's wife said "Oh, Harry, Harry, your feeling is only on paper" (Thompson, p. 181).

And so the critical terrain is divided into opposing and apparently irreconcilable camps. But, of course, this interpretive dilemma, like so many others involving complex

works of art, is overly simplistic. Surprisingly, the resolution I am going to suggest implies a more sophisticated artistic vision than Mackenzie has ever been give credit for. As we shall see, his other writings simultaneously advocate humane sensibility (so far, this sounds exactly like the Thompson-Platzner-Barker camp), but at the same time they scorn the cult of sentimentalism, just as Rymer believes.

The best evidence for Mackenzie's support of humane principles appears in the pages of *The Man of Feeling* itself, but before examining representative episodes from the novel, I shall first survey his views on sentimentality as expressed in some of his other works.

Mackenzie's Position Elsewhere

The clearest evidence for Mackenzie's contempt for sentimentalism is found in his extensive journalistic criticism. In *The Lounger* (1785-87) Mackenzie writes at length on the problems of fiction. Of greatest interest is *Lounger* 20, where he attacks fictions which fail to distinguish between right and wrong, "forming a mistaken and pernicious system of morality . . . particularly in that species called the *sentimental*."¹⁴ "Virtues of sentiment," he complains, nearly displace more important issues of life, such as, among others, duty to parents.¹⁵ The sentimentalists revel in "impressions which never have any effect on their conduct [and] pay in words what they owe in actions" (p. 183). Sentimental fiction, Mackenzie concludes, is a "sickly sort of refinement" which "has an ill effect, not only on our ideas of virtue, but also on our estimates of happiness" (p. 184). We must note here that he does not distinguish between excessive sentimentalism as a mode of real-life behavior and the representation of such excesses in fiction--to discuss either is to discuss both at once. Further, the two main points of his philosophy of life--which he stresses should be expressed and advocated in all fiction--are 1) the establishment of correct notions of virtue, and 2) the importance of happiness. If he feels so strongly about the negative effects of sentimental fiction, then we cannot seriously imagine that he advocates excessive sentimentality in *The Man of Feeling*.

His other novels, likewise, argue against Mackenzie as unabashed sentimentalist. Mackenzie's second novel, *The Man of the World* (1773), presents a family of sentimentalists, the Anneslys, who are nearly destroyed by the villain Sindall, the Man of the World. Nowhere in the novel do we

find a single scene in which exaggerated sentimental actions are presented in an admirable light, and, in fact, as Mackenzie states, "if my tale were fiction, it would be thought too simple."¹⁶ For Mackenzie the black and white world of the typical sentimental novel, such as *The Fool of Quality*, is definitely too simple, and Mackenzie recognized the sentimental fallacy of believing that one needed simply to be sensitive and all would be well in life. The entire message of *Man of the World* stresses that the sentimental view is not enough. The same viewpoint holds in Mackenzie's third, final, and finest novel, *Julia de Roubigne* (1777), with one important addition. Sir Walter Scott has passed down the origin of Mackenzie's plot, a suggestion from Lord Kames that "the calamities of the catastrophe should arise . . . not out of schemes of premeditated villainy, but from the excess of passions and feelings . . ."¹⁷ The theme, in other words, concerns sentimentality run amuck. Every character is admirable in the usual moral sense, yet all but Savillon are destroyed by their extreme sensitivity; the episodes stress the inadequacy of excessive sentimentality to deal with the problems of life.

If Mackenzie is not an admirer of sentimentalism, then what are we to think of the many tearful scenes? The answer, I propose, is that Mackenzie is attempting an experimental, not always successful, mode of fictional representation which incorporates what he thought were the usable, important elements of sentimentalism, as well as the display of excessive affectations. We must distinguish between intentions and actions: the "false" sentimentalist sheds tears because he thinks he must do so for social reasons, and he engages in small acts of charity for the sake of appeasing his own conscience. As Barker rightly notes (p. 144), Diana Danby, a character in Mackenzie's comedy *False Shame*,¹⁸ is called a "sentimentalist," a derisive term in this case, intended to denote hypocrisy and affectation. This type of behavior the general world terms "honorable," however, as exemplified by Respino in *The Man of Feeling* and Sindall in *The Man of the World*. We see then that Mackenzie is working with types; the sincere but paralyzed person of sensibility is thus duly represented by Harley in *The Man of Feeling*, Annesly in *The Man of the World*, and Julia in *Julia de Roubigne*. They are not exemplary, but neither are they entirely devoid of merit. At the heart of their actions are benevolence, good cheer, and recognition and acceptance of adversity, but while they are sincere, they feel too much.

So what mode of life does Mackenzie propose? In *Lounger* 96, Mackenzie partially defined his ideal in the character of Benevolous: "he gives largely; but as it is neither from impulse of sickly sentiment, or shallow vanity, his largesses tend oftener to incite industry than to supply indigence."¹⁹ Along these lines the major models that Mackenzie intends for readers to admire are Harry Bolton in *The Man of the World* and Savillon in *Julia de Roubigne*, both of whom are charitable for the right reasons, in addition to being sensitive yet able to survive, even to prosper, in a harsh world.

An important dimension of the critical problem now becomes fully apparent: no striking exemplary role model exists in *The Man of Feeling*. We find one minor candidate for admiration in Edward Sedley, whose character fits the Mackenzie norm quite well: "I had ideas of virtue, of honour, of benevolence, which I had never been at the pains to define" ²⁰ Unrefined, natural sensibility, is the hallmark of Sedley's character, and he differs from Harley in that Sedley learns to recognize the "rogues" of the world and to keep his perspective, whereas Harley can only say, "This world . . . was a scene in which I never much delighted . . . It was a scene of dissimulation, of restraint, of disappointment" (pp. 127-28).

But Sedley is not, of course, the main character. The interpretive problem has arisen from the confusion present because Mackenzie at once both glorifies humane sensibility and satirizes the very character who supposedly exemplifies the life of sensibility. Recognizing the bases for Mackenzie's strategies, let us now turn to the text of *The Man of Feeling* to test these assumptions.

Evidence from the Text

Virtually all commentators on *The Man of Feeling* have recognized the presence of irony in many sections of the novel. We recall, for instance, the framing device of the story itself: the "editor" trades an old German book to a curate for the manuscript biography of one Harley. The clergyman had been using the paper for gun wadding; therefore, a number of chapters are missing.²¹ The novel thus assumes a fragmented form. Mackenzie accounted for his intentions in a letter to his cousin, Elizabeth Rose, calling the draft of the novel an "odd Medley . . . of Observations . . . on Men and Manners . . . introducing a Man of Sensibility into different scenes where his Feelings might be seen in

their Effects, & his Sentiments occasionally delivered without the stiffness of regular Deduction"22

We see, then, that he purposely avoided the tight unity of plot which was the hallmark of the literary works of his own day--such as *Clarissa* or *Tom Jones*--seeking to force the reader to focus on individual scenes. Here we have a second cause for the interpretive problem: the "odd Medley" distorted or even destroyed any possibility of the reader recognizing Mackenzie's narrative strategy. Whereas he wished readers to see in select "different scenes" that excessive sentimentality led to severe disadvantages or even outright danger, they instead imagined that he was highlighting the scenes as noteworthy and thus admirable.²³ Dale Kramer has suggested that the novel "is thematically organized around the education of the hero," the result being Harley's disillusionment with the world.²⁴ But perhaps the purpose of the loosely joined episodes was to educate not Harley but the *reader*. As previously noted, Jenkins proposes that the novel sought "to educate the public in the virtues of sentiment" (p. 5). But whereas Jenkins believes that Harley is a model for the reader to admire, I contend that the reader is being asked to differentiate the "usable" components of Harley's sensibility from the faulty ones but cannot do so given the fragmented form.

In order to test this hypothesis, we might turn to an ironical scene which has received much critical comment, the chapter in which is described "The Man of Feeling in love" (XIII). Here we learn that the hero has become attracted to Miss Walton, once a debutante and the toast of London and now at 24 fading in isolated rural seclusion. Harley thinks her paleness "agreed . . . with the pensive softness of her mind" (p. 15). Harley came to paint her beauty, the narrator explains, "ridiculously enough; and ascribed to it powers, which few believed, and nobody cared for" (p. 16). As for Miss Walton, exactly because Harley was shy, she "frequently took more particular notice of him than of other visitors" (p. 16). His love for her grew precisely because she noticed him, for as the narrator critically remarks, "we are always inclined to think her handsomest when she condescends to smile upon ourselves" (p. 17). The net effect of this scene is laughable: she the virtuous but semi-boring female who has lost almost all of her sparkle; he the painfully shy beau who imagines he loves for precisely those faults which make her uninteresting to other men. This couple seems to revel in its ineptitude. The scene is, as the narrator tells us, "ludicrous" (p. 17), and yet in the midst of the humor

Mackenzie is dead serious about the merits of these odd lovers. Miss Walton and Harley are both at heart sincere and virtuous, and while each has more than a fair share of social defects and personal foibles, the point remains that they are far from being held up as total failures. They do, after all, love each other, even though their absurd conformity to social protocol ultimately results in their never marrying.

Does Mackenzie wish us to admire Harley's love for Miss Walton? Or is their affair pure sentimental tripe? Is Harley better or worse off because of his enhanced mode of feeling? I suggest that by way of the narrator's wry comments that Mackenzie is attempting to explore all of these questions but finally means to imply that sensitivity encumbers action for both Miss Walton and Harley. Two other scenes, among many, are also critical of sentimentality but in a very different ways.

The first is the famous madhouse scene in chapter XX. Against his will, Harley is talked into touring Bedlam, a popular eighteenth-century London idea of an afternoon's lark. At the asylum Harley speaks with a female resident who unfolds a tale of woe. This is the first tearful episode in the novel, "and, except the keeper's, there was not an unmoistened eye" (p. 34). Mackenzie is attempting to confront the reader with the genuine empathy of Harley as opposed to the specious sentimentality of Harley's companions. Harley weeps because he is truly touched; the other visitors, male and female alike, affect being distressed, but we know they cannot be serious because they wanted to visit Bedlam knowing that they would enjoy running into a sad case or two worthy of tears. Harley, we recall, did not want to go, as no one who truly cares for the plight of the mentally ill would wish to visit simply to come away congratulating himself for his own humanitarianism. The keeper may be hardened to the plight of the inmates, but at least he is not a hypocrite--he does not shed a tear.

Every informed London reader either had been to Bedlam or knew of the pitiful cases in residence there. So Mackenzie cannot be attempting to make the scene even more pathetic and touching than reality: he wishes to use this episode as a "test" for the reader, asking him to determine who sheds tears in this scene and why.²⁵ Harley cries because he has never seen such misery--after all, he had never before been there. But the others, who cried too, apparently went often and for amusement or for the reason before mentioned--to provide an opportunity for self-congratulation as they wallowed in feigned sympathy. As for

charity, Harley's friend gives money to the keeper--the amount is not revealed, so we can only assume it is a pittance. Harley proffers two guineas, a most generous offering. But the mere difference in the amounts is not important: Harley is truly benevolent, a position we noted above in the description of Benevolous in *Lounger* 96. The reader, then, is supposed to recognize the distinction between genuine and affected sensitivity, between sincere intentions and affected actions. Harley's friends are "sentimental"; Harley is truly empathetic and benevolent.

The last episode for our attention is the Respino segment. In the so-called fragment entitled "The Pupil," Harley hears from his friend Sedley the tale of a youth in Milan whose unsavory actions led to the destruction of a family. The culmination of the story is that Respino, the youth, went on to lead a respected life, with the world calling him "*a man of honour*" (p. 125). This character anticipates the villainous Sindall of Mackenzie's second novel, *The Man of the World* (1773), who represents all that is most evil to Sedley, Harley, and, finally to Mackenzie. Respino is a perfect example of the moral delivered at the beginning of the chapter: the world "Will smile, and smile, and be a villain" (p. 118). Taken from *Hamlet* (I.v.108), this quote sets up a serious test for Harley and for the reader: Respino publicly speaks and acts in laudatory ways, yet he privately pursues evil activities.

Mackenzie attempts in the Respino segment to outline exactly how people of virtue and benevolence may be victimized by the world. The reader is given a warning: to be sensitive like Harley (or the youthful Sedley) is not a good idea; naive credulity can easily result in disaster.²⁶ The reader must attempt to see the machinations of evil without becoming hardened. When one becomes calloused, as did the misanthrope in chapter XXI, one becomes inflexible and, most unfortunately, unhappy. The misanthrope thus violates one of Mackenzie's two cardinal points of life (as discussed above in relation to *Lounger* 20)--happiness. As the narrator explains early on in the novel,

Indeed I have observed one ingredient, somewhat necessary in man's composition towards happiness, which *people of feeling would do well to acquire*; a certain respect for the follies of mankind: for there are so many fools whom the opinion of the world entitles to regard, . . . that he who cannot restrain his contempt or indignation at the sight, will be too often

quarrelling with the disposal of things, to relish that share which is allotted to himself. (p. 11; my italics)

Cynicism, though easy to fall into, is not, Mackenzie stresses, the way to deal with the problems of life.

Mackenzie thus has pursued his goal of education in three ways: 1) he has indicated that while heightened sensitivity can enhance such emotions as love--as portrayed in the Miss Walton episodes--the condition is not necessarily desirable; 2) he has attempted to show the reader how to distinguish true sensitivity from hypocritical pretensions of sentimentality in the Bedlam and Respino segments; and 3) he has depicted in Harley's unappealing demise the inevitable fate of those who glibly adhere to sentimental values: they fall into cynicism like the misanthrope or are destroyed, like Harley, by the wolves of the world. I repeat, the reader, not Harley, is the intended recipient of the education. Harley learns *nothing*. He is as hopeless at the end as in the beginning. But we are not supposed to scorn the hapless Harley; we are supposed to learn from his shortcomings. His feelings may be properly motivated, but he lacks the intellectual perception to thrive in the world, unlike Fielding's foundling, Tom Jones, whose heart and head are in balance.

So we must conclude that the meaning of *The Man of Feeling* lies somewhere between the opposing extreme views of the critics. Mackenzie is not to be taken literally, as exemplified by Brian Vicker's argument that the author does not "present a divided or ironic response--it is tears, tears all the way" (p. xxii). Nor does *The Man of Feeling* attack sentimentalism and satirize Harley, as urged by Rymer. The two artistic flaws--lack of a clear exemplary character and the fragmented plot--have confused and misled readers from first publication. Artistic ineptitude can, indeed, result in interpretive problems.

Detesting the affected sentimentality of society, as likewise attacked by R. B. Sheridan in his portrayal of Joseph Surface in *The School for Scandal* (1777), Mackenzie kept separate his admiration of certain principles of sensibility from their exaggerated practice, which resulted in affectation at one extreme and debilitating ineffectiveness at the other. Recognizing that the public had at least partially misunderstood his intention in *The Man of Feeling*, because he did not present an example of a fully balanced character and used an eccentric narrative form, he sought to correct his errors in *The Man of the World* by

introducing Harry Bolton and a traditional linear plot. But the excessive and overly simplified villainy of Sindall put off readers. In his third novel, *Julia de Roubigne*, Mackenzie accomplished both of his goals, unambiguously depicting the disastrous effects of excessive sentimentality as well as providing a model for readers in the sensitive but balanced Savillon.²⁷

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NOTES

1. Scott, *The Private Letter-Books of Sir Walter Scott*, ed. Wilfred Partington (London, 1930), p. 273.
2. The classic study of sentimentalism was long considered to be R.S. Crane's "Suggestions Toward a Genealogy of the 'Man of Feeling,'" *ELH*, 1 (1934), 205-30. But Crane's analysis has now been convincingly challenged by Donald Greene, "Latitudinarianism and Sensibility: The Genealogy of the 'Man of Feeling' Reconsidered," *MP*, 75 (1977), 159-83. For additional information on sentimentalism as applied to literary concerns, see Walter F. Wright, *Sensibility in English Prose Fiction, 1760-1814: A Reinterpretation* (Urbana, IL: 1937); A.R. Humphreys, "The Friend of Mankind," *RES*, 24 (1948), 203-18; and A.O. Aldridge, "The Pleasures of Pity," *ELH*, 16 (1949), 76-87. Other important elements of sentimentalism can be found in Erik Erametsa, *A Study of the Word 'Sentimental' and Other Linguistic Characteristics of Eighteenth-Century Sentimentalism in England*, Diss. Helsinki 1951 (Helsinki, 1951; rpt. *Dissertations Literature and Art*, vol. 26. Eugene, OR, 1951).
3. For a convenient summary of the novel's popularity and for the best introduction to Mackenzie, see Gerard A. Barker, *Henry Mackenzie* (Boston, 1975), esp. pp. 18-20.
4. The case for Goldsmith as satirist is likewise exemplified in his "Chinese letters," which, as Robert Hopkins suggests, "in reality mock[s] such." Hopkins, *The True Genius of Oliver Goldsmith* (Baltimore, 1969), p. 99.

5. R.F. Brissenden sees *Clarissa* as the first truly sentimental novel in his *Virtue in Distress: Studies in the Novel of Sentiment from Richardson to Sade* (London, 1974).
6. Jane Austen's *Sense and Sensibility*, published in 1811 but written by 1797, is a clear case in point of literary reactions to the residual debate between heart and head which questions the very basis of sentimentality.
7. Thompson, *A Scottish Man of Feeling* (Oxford, 1931), p. 112.
8. Jenkins, "The Art of the Theorist: Rhetorical Structure in *The Man of Feeling*," *SSL*, 9 (1971), p. 5.
9. Barker, *Henry Mackenzie*, p. 33.
10. Platzner, "Mackenzie's Martyr: The Man of Feeling as Sainly Fool," *Novel* 9 (1976), p. 59.
11. Spencer, "Henry Mackenzie, A Practical Sentimentalist," *PLL*, 3 (1967), 314-26.
12. Burnham, "The Social Ethos of Mackenzie's *Man of Feeling*," *SSL*, 18 (1983), p. 133.
13. Rymer, "Henry Mackenzie's *The Man of Feeling*," *DUJ*, 68 (1975), p. 68.
14. Mackenzie, *The Works of Henry Mackenzie*, 8 vols. (Edinburgh, 1808), V, 181.
15. For a perceptive analysis of *Lounger 20* and Mackenzie's other critical writings in respect to the novel, see R.D. Mayo, *The English Novel in the Magazines 1740-1815* (Evanston, IL, 1962), esp. pp. 144-147. I am indebted to Mayo for much of my discussion on this matter.
16. Mackenzie, *Works*, (London 1808); II, 105.
17. Scott, *The Lives of the Novelists* (London, 1928), pp. 299-300; noted and discussed by Barker, pp. 70-71.
18. The play, not published until 1808, originally appeared under the title *The Force of Fashion* at Covent Garden, 5 December 1789.

19. Noted and discussed by Barker, p. 144.

20. Henry Mackenzie, *The Man of Feeling* ed. Brian Vickers (New York, 1967), p. 118. All further references are from this edition and are noted in the text.

21. The "discovery" of a manuscript (usually incomplete and in bad shape) is a structural device that Mackenzie may well have borrowed from Charles Johnstone's popular *Chrysal: or The Adventures of a Guinea* (1760), wherein the editor-narrator stumbles across the manuscript of the story being used to wrap bakery goods.

22. Mackenzie, *Henry Mackenzie, Letters to Elizabeth Rose of Kilravock*, ed. Horst W. Drescher (Munster, 1967), p. 16.

23. I wish to thank my anonymous reader for this and other very fine suggestions which clarified my thesis.

24. See Kramer, "The Structural Unity of *The Man of Feeling*," *SSF*, 1 (1964), p. 191.

25. A similar case can be made for the Emily Atkins episode. Stories of seduced maids were routine in drama and fiction and would continue so afterward (e.g., the "li'l Emy" subplot in *David Copperfield*). For an extensive discussion of this stereotype, see Susan Staves, "British Seduced maidens," *ECS*, 14 (1980-81), 109-34.

26. This point is made very clear by Roberta F.S. Borkart in her excellent analysis of Barnwell in Lillo's *The London Merchant*. Barnwell, a man of good intentions, is seduced by the evil Millwood; in fact, "his goodness draws him into this trap." See Borkart, "The Evil of goodness: Sentimental Morality in *The London Merchant*," *SP*, LXXVI (1979), p. 294.

27. An earlier version of this essay was delivered at the Southern Historical Association Conference in Charlotte, NC in November 1986.