CHAPTER II

HISTORIC BACKGROUND

PART 1: THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON

The occupation of Folly Island was critical to the Union Army's siege of Charleston, South Carolina (April 1863-February 1865). When General John C. Pemberton ordered Confederate troops to abandon Coles Island and Folly Island, he was warned that the decision would come back to haunt the defenders of Charleston (Figure 2.1). He made it against the advice of several subordinate officers and keen military engineers. In fact, the Coles Island battery was part of the system of coast defense devised in April 1861, by General P.G.T. Beauregard, perhaps the most talented engineer in the Confederacy. By late March of the following year, however, Pemberton believed his command contained too few troops and armaments to hold all of the outposts protecting the Carolina seaport.1

The abandonment of Coles Island, however, opened the way for the Union to control the important Stono River, and to occupy both Coles and Folly islands without having to fight for them.2 The Federals took possession of those sea islands in the spring of 1863. From that time until February 1865, they put Charleston under siege. And while the city held out until the closing days of the war, it underwent the longest and one of the most debilitating sieges in the Civil War. The experience was just as demanding for the besiegers as it was for the besieged.3 The Union troops stationed on Folly Island and the other sea islands below Charleston were challenged not only by an enemy hostile to their presence, but also were subjected to a strange and often harsh environment.

Protecting Charleston was part of the overall Confederate coastal defense plan to deny the Union access to strategic centers and important cities. Southern seaports were the key links to the outside world where the Confederacy’s ability to wage war rested, and perhaps its best chance for winning the conflict.4 Because of its weak industrial base, the South depended heavily upon European markets to arm and equip its military forces and supply goods for the home front. Through Charleston and other port towns, the Confederacy received a steady influx of supplies vital to its war effort.

The United States was aware of the South’s dependency on these imports and set about to disrupt its maritime commerce. In April 1861, President Abraham Lincoln proclaimed a naval blockade of Southern seaports. Soon afterwards, a Blockade Strategy Board convened and drew-up detailed plans to close all Southern ports with a wall of ships or combined land and sea operations. The intent of this blockade was to handicap the Confederacy’s fighting capability by choking off the importation of essential goods.5

While the plan was a sound one, the North was, at the war’s outset, ill prepared to enforce it. In the spring of 1861, the United States Navy comprised less than one hundred vessels only forty-two of which were commissioned. Half the fleet consisted of obsolescent sailing ships and antiquated steamers. Indeed, only three steamers of the Home Squadron were ready for immediate blockade duty along the 3,549-mile-long Southern shoreline. Moreover, the coast of the Atlantic states was marked by a series of barrier and sea islands, as well as waterways cut by numerous bays and inlets. Consequently, the Union was forced to concentrate its dragnet on the Confederacy’s major seaports, including Charleston, that possessed good harbors and interior lines of communication.6

The blockade’s ineffectiveness in the early months of the conflict stimulated a booming business for blockade runners. Attracted by the huge profits to be made by trading through the blockade, Southern and British shippers and merchants set up blockade running companies. Some 1,600 vessels of all classes were employed as blockade runners to feed the Confederacy during the war. As the Union cordon tightened and the risk of capture or destruction increased (so did profits), fast, sleek steamers were designed and constructed specifically for running the blockade. More often than not they were successful.7 Blockade runners brought into the South rifle muskets, cannon, ammunition, swords, bayonets, blankets, shoes, medicine, food, and other necessities, as well as luxury items. A recent study claims that the Confederacy imported at least 400,000 rifles, enough to arm approximately forty percent of the Southern troops.8 Blockade running greatly aided the Confederacy’s fighting capability.

The United States Navy eventually closed most of the important Southern seaports by blockade or captured them in joint operations with the Army. But while the Army and Navy impeded the Confederacy’s sea trade, they failed to sever the lifeline of supplies until 1865. Indeed, the Carolina seaports remained open to overseas trade for almost the duration of the conflict.

Charleston was the Confederacy’s most important seaport on the South Atlantic coast. Early in the war it received the greatest volume of trade of any city on the
seaboard. A new study finds that at least 63 different steam blockade runners sailed in and out of Charleston. Moreover, the city served as the center of operations for most of the South’s blockade running firms. In fact, Charleston so dominated the blockade running trade that its capture early in the war would have been disastrous to the Confederacy, and done much toward discouraging European trade.9

Charleston was significant not only as a favorite port-of-call for blockade runners, but also as a key distribution depot for supplies they imported. The city was linked by rail to North Carolina, Virginia, and Georgia, as well as the states of the lower South. Charleston also held symbolic importance. South Carolina had been the first state to withdraw from the Union, and the secession ordinance was passed in Charleston, giving birth to the Southern Confederacy.10

Because of its strategic and symbolic importance, the United States Navy targeted Charleston for capture early in the war. To Northerners, Charleston was the “cradle of rebellion.” However, the Union’s inability to effectively blockade or launch an invasion against Charleston gave the Confederates time to assemble troops, construct fortifications, and mount cannon for her protection. These efforts made Charleston’s capture more difficult.

Charleston was located at the tip of a peninsula at the confluence of the Ashley and Cooper rivers, about six miles from the Atlantic Ocean (Figures 1.1, 2.1). The city was bounded by the mainland to the north, and James Island to the south. The huge James Island was accessible to the sea through the Stono River. A series of long, low sandy sea islands, bordered by soft alluvial marshes and shallow creeks, ran parallel to the seaboard. The 2,700-yard-wide mouth to Charleston’s deep harbor was formed by two of these islands: Sullivans Island on the north side of the entrance, and Morris Island below it. Between Morris Island and Stono Inlet lay Folly Island, a spindly, six-mile-long spit of sand, with undergrowth, palmetto and pine trees.11

Charleston’s pre-war defenses, built by the United States Army, were designed solely to resist a naval attack. The key to the harbor was Fort Sumter, a two-tiered brick casemated fort on an artificial island on the south side of the main channel. Castle Pickney, an old brick fort on Shutes Island about a mile east of Charleston, and Fort Moultrie, another brick fort located on Sullivans Island, comprised the remainder of the main fortifications guarding the city.12

At the outbreak of the Civil War, the Confederates under the skillful talents of General P.G.T. Beauregard, began to add to and strengthen Charleston’s existing defenses. They constructed strong earthwork batteries around the perimeter of the harbor. By April, 1863, a circle of forts and batteries was fairly complete. These included Battery Beauregard and Fort Moultrie on Sullivans Island, Fort Johnson on James Island, and Batteries Wagner and Gregg on Morris Island. These works were placed in such locations as to produce a converging fire on the harbor and to support Fort Sumter. At the same time, Fort Sumter’s guns covered the surrounding batteries and the approach into the harbor.13

Preparations to defend against a land attack also were made. On James Island, generally regarded as the linchpin to Charleston’s defenses, soldiers and slaves erected works to guard the approach from the Stono River. Most Confederate engineers believed that if the Union Army ever secured a foothold on James Island, the fall of Charleston would be only a matter of time. Federal guns could be emplaced beyond the range of Fort Sumter, but within easy shelling distance of the city. A securely entrenched enemy force supported by reinforcements would require a larger army to dislodge it than was available to Confederate commanders at Charleston. The entrance to the Stono River was defended by an enclosed battery on Coles Island. There was talk of putting works on Folly Island, until General Pemberton ordered these outer islands to be left undefended.14 That was the opening for which the Federals had been waiting.

The Federals already had launched a failed attempt to seal Charleston from overseas trade. On December 20, 1861, the first anniversary of South Carolina’s withdrawal from the Union, the Union Navy scuttled and sank an odd assortment of decrepit whaling ships and merchant vessels filled with stones in the main channel leading into Charleston harbor. A second “stone fleet” was sunk in another nearby channel the following month. These efforts proved to be an ignominious failure. To trade runners sailed in and out of Charleston. More­
Figure 2.1: Detail of "Map of the Defenses of Charleston City and Harbor, showing also The Works Erected by the U.S. Forces in 1863 and 1864." (Official Records Atlas, Plate IV-1). (Arrow locates project area).
Union abandonment of James Island, ten months elapsed before the Federal forces made a serious attack on Charleston. This time the Navy Department cooked up a scheme; Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Gustavus V. Fox, proposed to run a squadron of ironclad ships into the throat of Charleston harbor and past the guns of Fort Sumter. Charleston apparently was Fox’s obsession, the “hot-bed of secession” whose Rebel fortifications had turned back his personal effort to rescue Fort Sumter’s garrison of United States troops in April 1861. To the Navy Department in 1863, Charleston was the ultimate prize in the South Atlantic.17

Admiral Samuel F. Du Pont, commander of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, reluctantly agreed to lead the attack. Du Pont opposed using monitors in such an assault. They were a new class of ship relatively untested in battle. The Admiral believed that the best hope for capturing Charleston was still by a land and sea operation up the Stono River. Fox, however, insisted upon an unsupported navy attack using ironclads in the harbor.

When Du Pont complained and delayed the attempt to capture Charleston with the fleet alone, Fox consented to a joint operation, but with the army playing only a limited role. He got the War Department to commit ten thousand infantrymen to support the navy. General Hunter chose General John G. Foster to head the army’s part in the assault. Foster was thoroughly familiar with Charleston, having helped in the pre-war construction of its defenses. Moreover, Hunter approved of Foster’s plan for the army to play a major part in the attack. Hunter never liked Fox’s intention that the soldiers would be merely support to the fleet.

Foster suggested that, while Hunter’s X Army Corps remained in reserve, his own XVIII Army Corps would storm the south end of Morris Island under cover fire from gunboats. Meanwhile, the ironclad flotilla would shell Fort Sumter in preparation for an infantry assault against Battery Wagner, a strong sand fortification toward the north end of Morris Island. With Battery Wagner in Union hands, siege artillery could be emplaced within range to reduce Sumter, after which the fleet could sail virtually unopposed into Charleston harbor.18

The navy officers were dubious of this plan. They doubted that the warships could provide the necessary cover fire for the army landing, much less protect a base on hostile Morris Island. Foster agreed with them after he examined the position from the north end of Folly Island on February 7, 1863.19

Foster revised his original proposal, calling instead for heavy rifled-cannon to be emplaced on the north end of Folly Island, just south of Morris Island across the narrow Lighthouse Inlet (Figure 2.1). These would enable the army to soften Morris Island for an assault, without having to rely on naval fire support.

Du Pont continued to argue for another landing on James Island, where the army would have ample cover fire from gunboats in the Stono River. But the army rejected this plan. For one thing, it still remembered the disaster at Secessionville the previous summer. And while James Island was much larger than Morris Island, a force could not maneuver well on it because of the numerous marshes, creeks, and swamps. Moreover, Foster was unsure of Confederate troop and fortification strength on the island.

While Lincoln and his supporters wanted Charleston and were under considerable political pressure to capture it, they were opposed to a siege, as was implied in Foster’s plan. A siege would require too much time, energy, and resources, and dampen public enthusiasm, if not politically embarrass the administration. For now, Lincoln was more interested in an operation that would produce quick success with the army playing only a minor role. Fox, for his part, agreed. He desired to win the laurels of victory for capturing Charleston with the fleet alone, Fox consented to

The plan of attack essentially reverted back to Fox’s original proposal: a naval squadron of mostly ironclad ships was to run past the guns of Fort Sumter, the chief obstacle to the navy’s passage into the harbor. Surely, Fox believed, the Confederates must evacuate the area once Sumter was lost. The army would land a support force on Folly Island and make ready to invade Morris Island if circumstances dictated. Foolhardy as it all seemed to Du Pont, Fox seriously considered this the most practicable method of attack.

By early April, the army had assumed its position to support the navy. General Hunter reported on the third that approximately half of the troops assigned to the operation were safely in the Charleston vicinity, either on Coles Island or North Edisto Island. On the night of April 6, Colonel Joshua B. Howell’s XVIII Army Corps was transported across from Coles Island to Folly Island.21 Part of General Alfred H. Terry’s detachment of the X Army Corps also was put ashore that evening on Folly Island, while the balance was held at the ready on board transports in Stono Inlet. These soldiers landed the following morning.22 Thus the entire force, probably numbering 10,000 men under the immediate command of General Truman Seymour, Hunter’s chief-of-staff and artillery, were massed on the north end of Folly Island on April 7.

From there preparations were made for crossing Lighthouse Inlet on the night of April 8.23 Du Pont and Hunter delayed a possible invasion of Morris Island until the navy had silenced Fort Sumter. With Sumter out of the picture, the Union troops would not face enfilading fire from its huge guns. Moreover, the commanders hoped that
the fall of that key fortification would demoralize the defenders of Morris Island, if not cause their abandonment of it. In the meantime, the Union soldiers were kept in the woods on Folly Island, supposedly out of sight of the enemy on the opposite shore.

But Confederate pickets had been keeping a sharp eye on Folly Island since Foster’s reconnoitering party had appeared back in February. Consequently, they were fully aware of the Federal landing on the island in early April. They informed General Beauregard, who had been reassigned in August 1862 to command Charleston’s defense, that a sizeable Union force was assembling on the north end of Folly Island. This news concerned Beauregard. Just exactly what the Federal presence meant was, as yet, unclear. Were they to cooperate with the navy by remaining on the sea-line islands, or would they strike for the city by operating again on James Island, the weak link to Charleston’s defenses? These questions were answered only with a victory over the Union navy.24

The defenders of Fort Sumter were thoroughly prepared for the Union attack that came on April 7. The channels had been carefully buoyed, so that the gunners of the harbor fortifications would know the exact range of the enemy ships. Du Pont’s assault reflected his cautiousness, the vagueness of his orders, and his lack of confidence in ironclads. He obviously did not intend to press the attack at the risk of losing any of his ships. In the end, the engagement was brief (it lasted barely two hours), and terribly one-sided. Five of the seven monitors in the squadron received extensive damage from the Confederates “wall of fire.” Only one monitor, the U.S.S. Nahant, and the U.S.S. Keokuk, an iron-hulled, lightly armored ship, even got within half a mile of Fort Sumter. For that the Keokuk paid the ultimate price. She was perforated by some ninety shot and shells, and sank the next day. Du Pont’s flagship, the New Ironsides, barely got into the action at all.

The disparity of fire was as one-sided as the battle. Du Pont’s flotilla expended only 139 shots, while Fort Sumter alone unleashed 2,000 rounds. The guns from Fort Moultrie, batteries Bee and Beauregard on Sullivans Island, and batteries Wagner and Gregg on Morris Island fired another 200 rounds. All told, the Confederates registered 520 hits against the Union ships, and forced them to withdraw.25 Perhaps Admiral Du Pont best reflected the humiliating defeat when he said: “I have attempted to take the bull by the horns, but he was too much for us.”26 Although Du Pont failed to silence Fort Sumter, he did succeed in convincing his superiors of what he had argued from the beginning. Charleston could only be taken by a large scale combined operation.

After three unsuccessful attempts to capture Charleston, some Union military leaders considered it bad strategy to resume operations against the Carolina sea-port. Apparently Lincoln believed otherwise. He still considered Charleston’s capture as a prime objective, at least for political, if not military, reasons.27 The president quickly sent word to Du Pont to resume naval action against Charleston. He also instructed Hunter to secure possession of Folly Island.28

But Du Pont declined to maintain his position inside the Charleston bar, or to offer assistance to the army. He still claimed that the monitors were unseaworthy, and subject to capture if left inside the harbor or close to Morris Island. If the ironclads fell into enemy hands, they could be used to break the already sieve-like blockade of Charleston. Hunter, for his part, was very disappointed that his army was not allowed to assault Morris Island even after Du Pont’s squadron failed to reduce Fort Sumter. On the day of the naval attack his troops held Folly Island, and by the following morning were “in complete readiness” to cross Lighthouse Inlet. Du Pont’s withdrawal ended the best chance for the army to make a lodgement on the more strategic Morris Island at that time.29 Nevertheless, Hunter vowed to hold Folly Island.

On April 11, 1863, Brigadier General Israel Vogdes (pronounced “vog-days”) of the X Army Corps was placed in command of all Union army forces in the vicinity of Stono Inlet, including Folly Island.30 Vogdes was charged simply with reinforcing and holding Folly Island, “without attracting too much attention,” until operations against Charleston could be started-up again. Of particular significance was securing the north end of Folly Island.31

At times the north end of Folly Island was an island unto itself. The ground there was barren and so low that spring tides occasionally swept completely over the lowest section, separating the north end from Folly Island proper. At the northern-most tip, however, the winds and tides formed a ridge of sand dunes covered with scrub brush. Because it commanded the way to Morris Island, the northern point of Folly Island was its most strategic point. There Vogdes stationed five companies of soldiers, who dug rifle pits overlooking Lighthouse Inlet.32

In its entirety Folly Island measured approximately six miles long and three-quarters of a mile in breadth at its widest point (Figure 2.1). A blanket of white sand and groves of palmetto and pine trees covered the island. A wide expanse of beach bordered the sea on the east side of the island. Just beyond the barren beach dunes lay a series of alternating linear ravines and dunes, densely forested with scrub oaks, vines, pines and palmetto trees. A sea of marsh grass marked the west side of the island bordering on the Folly River.33

Just where Folly Island got its name is a matter of debate. A popular and romantic presumption is that the dreams of some unfortunate soul were dashed in a folly upon its weathered shores. Some local residents claim the island was named for clumps of trees, called follies, that
When Gillmore reconnoitered there, the Confederates continued to make their presence known. "A man in civil life must indeed be a fool," a soldier wrote sarcastically, "to think he could live on such a baron place." The soldiers stationed on Folly Island during the war believed it was appropriately named. "The presence of Union troops on Folly Island likewise concerned Confederate forces on adjacent islands. The Southerners escalated their efforts to prevent a successful invasion of Morris Island by bolstering their earthworks on the southern tip. Moreover, vedettes (sentinel stations) were placed on Long Island, between the Folly River and James Island. The Confederates also harassed the Federals by occasionally lobbing artillery shells onto Folly Island. The Union gunboats retaliated by firing projectiles at Confederate batteries.

By late May 1863, General Hunter was bored by the relative inactivity and the failure of the administration to push Admiral Du Pont into resuming active operations against Charleston. In Hunter's view, Union troops were lodged fruitlessly on Folly Island, while the North's continued presence there encouraged the Confederates to strengthen their own defenses, particularly on Morris Island. That made the Federal task of capturing Charleston all the more difficult. "[What] could have been effected in a couple of hours and with but little sacrifice six weeks ago will now involve, whenever attempted," Hunter maintained, "protracted operations and a very serious loss of life." Hunter begged President Lincoln to "liberate" him from "those orders to 'cooperate with the Navy' which tied him down at Charleston. He asked for a force of 10,000 soldiers to invade the heart of Georgia where he planned to destroy railroads and resources, as well as to free slaves. This far-fetched scheme was the excuse Lincoln had been looking for to replace General Hunter. For some time Lincoln had been uneasy with Hunter, a self-righteous volunteer officer. Now Hunter's fanatical plan confirmed the President's suspicion that the general was also a bit crazy.

Hunter's relief paved the way for a more stable and experienced engineer officer familiar with both capturing forts and the South Carolina coastal area. That soldier was General Quincy A. Gillmore, former chief engineer in the Department of the South. Gillmore assumed command on the island, while their comrades cleared trees and undergrowth for a camping ground. The Federals also constructed a road along the island's western side for the movement of troops, supplies, and artillery from Stono Inlet to the north end.36

While the Federals worked as secretly as possible, there was no way they could keep their activity on Folly Island hidden from the nearby Confederates for long. In fact, the Southerners soon infiltrated the Union position to determine its strength. On the night of April 10, a small force of grayclad troops slipped undetected onto the island. By the time the alarm was sounded, they had mortally wounded one Yankee and captured at least one more. This episode frightened Union pickets, making them jittery, and led to a tragedy a few nights later. Startled, trigger-happy guards mistakenly shot and killed a comrade, Captain Bazel Rodgers of the 62nd Ohio Regiment.

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MILITARY MAP

of the middle part of

FOLLY ISLAND

Surveyed by Order of

Brigadier General J. Vogdes

by A. Becker, Capt. U.S.

Scale 1 inch = 1 mile. 

Folly Island Oct. 5, 1863

Figure 2.2: Detail of "Military Map of the Middle Part of Folly Island, Surveyed by Order of Brigadier General J. Vogdes." (A. Becker, Oct. 5, 1863). (National Archives).
attack on Morris Island. If trees needed felling, the men
sawed them from the tops and lowered the pieces gently
with ropes to the ground. All of the cannon were hauled
tediously up the island through the woods and mounted in
the darkness. By bright moonlight or heavy thunder show-
ers, the exhausting work continued. “Our... duty was quite
arduous,” observed a Connecticut soldier, “as we were
obliged to work nights, and had to maintain the utmost
silence, speaking only in whispers.”43

So intent were Gillmore and Vogdes to keep the work
concealed that they declined to destroy the blockade
runner Ruby that ran aground within point-blank-range of
their newly constructed batteries. Confederates salvaged
goods from the derelict ship, while the Union army held
their fire rather than risk exposing their position.44

Despite their efforts, the Federals failed to mask their
designs. Indeed, Confederate commanders on Morris Is-
land and at headquarters in Charleston knew perfectly
well that Folly Island was occupied by an increasingly
large Union force busily at work erecting batteries and
preparing for an offensive. In fact, it seemed that every
Confederate in the area knew what the Yankees were up
to. The intelligence became the source of jokes between
Confederate and Union pickets, who frequently commu-
nicated with each other. Confederate pickets informed
their Federal counterparts that “General Beauregard had
such an exalted opinion of the Yankees on Folly Island
that he was coming over to [pay them] a visit and give
[them] all a ‘farm six feet by two.’”45

Beauregard’s soldiers may have found humor in the
Federals’ presence, but the general himself took a more
serious view. While confident a Union attack was immi-
nent, Beauregard still did not know with certainty where
it would be directed. He strengthened the works on the
south end of Morris Island, yet he continued to think that
James Island was the Federals’ real target.46

That was precisely what Gillmore wanted Beaure-
gard to believe. He suspected that the Confederates were
without the necessary reinforcements and resources to
adequately protect both James and Morris Islands. Gillmore
surmised correctly that Beauregard was compelled to
detach troops from Morris Island to defend James Island.
To further mislead Beauregard, Gillmore planned a
demonstration in force on James Island to coincide with
the main Union attack against Morris Island.

Within about twenty days of taking command, Gillmore was ready to move against Charleston. The north
end of Folly Island concealed ten masked batteries mount-
ing forty-seven field rifles and siege mortars. Each cannon
was provided with 200 rounds of ammunition.47 During
the first week of July, additional troops of the X Army
Corps arrived on Folly Island. General Alfred H. Terry’s
division, about 3,800 strong, and General George C.
Strong’s brigade of 2,500 soldiers landed by the eighth
day of the month. Together with Vogdes’ occupation
coin assigned Admiral John A. Dahlgren to replace the
timid Du Pont as chief of the South Atlantic Blockading
Squadron. Dahlgren assumed his new command on July 6,
1863.49

Gillmore set the attack for July 8. That afternoon
General Terry landed with his division for the show-of-
force on James Island. Under cover fire from the U.S.S.
Pannee and two lightly armed transports in the Stono
River, Terry clashed with Confederates on the same
ground where General Benham had met defeat the previ-
ous summer.

Inclement weather delayed the invasion of Morris
Island for about thirty-six hours. At dawn on July 10,
Vogdes’ guns on Folly Island signaled the beginning of
the assault. The ensuing two hour bombardment from
Vogdes’ cannon and incessant shelling by Admiral
Dahlgren’s gunboats enabled General Strong’s brigade to
establish a beachhead without difficulty. The Federals
soon overran the Confederate works on the south end of
Morris Island, and by mid-morning had advanced to
within musket range of Battery Wagner. Here the attack
bogged down.50

Two unsuccessful attempts were made to capture the
defiant Battery Wagner by direct infantry assault. In the
first on July 11, the Federals reached the parapet but were
turned back by heavy fire. They were repulsed again one
week later in a night attack. Black soldiers of the 54th
Massachusetts led the charge in which they suffered
terrible casualties, including the regiment’s white com-
mander, Colonel Robert Shaw. Several white regiments
also were mauled badly when a portion of the assault
column penetrated the fort, but was then pushed back by
the Confederates. Some wounded were removed to hospi-
tals on Folly Island for treatment.51

Sobered by the loss of more than 1,500 men in frontal
assaults against Battery Wagner, Gillmore turned to siege
tactics. He set up eight batteries of heavy rifled cannon on
Morris Island and adjacent marshes to shell nearby enemy
posts. One gun was the fabled “Swamp Angel,” an eight-
inch Parrott rifle which could reach Charleston, four and
a half miles away, with a 200 pound shell.

Thus began the nineteen-month-long Union siege of
Charleston. At first Gillmore focused his attention on Fort
Sumter. It became the target of relentless bombardments.
During the latter part of August 1863, some 5,643 shots
were fired at it in seven days, according to General
Beauregard. Meanwhile, Gillmore’s infantrymen dug
zigzag trenches toward Battery Wagner. By early Septem-
ber, the approaches were close enough to almost guaran-
tee a successful assault, but the Confederates denied the
Federals the opportunity for victory. Late on September 6,
the Southern troops abandoned Morris Island. Beaure-
gard willingly sacrificed Morris Island to save James Island.52
The heavy shelling of Fort Sumter resumed in October 1863, but the Union objective shifted from trying to capture the fort to simply neutralizing its effectiveness. The Union shells turned the walls of Fort Sumter into rubble, but failed to silence its guns, or open a wedge in the harbor defenses so the navy could attempt an attack. The ultimate financial cost to the city was great, but it did not fall. Even an occasional blockade runner slipped through the Union naval dragnet to bring desperately needed supplies to the besieged city.

Although the siege dragged on, the Federals started drawing off troops and vessels from Charleston by the winter of 1864. They were needed in more important theaters of operation. Lincoln’s administration and military leaders no longer considered Charleston so critical once the Union blockade had virtually sealed Charleston to outside trade, and Union forces had gained control of the strategic Mississippi River in the West. From that time the siege of Charleston degenerated into a holding action.53

Until February 1865, the Union force was usually only large enough to man the siege artillery and protect the barrier island enclave from recapture by the Confederates. A standoff ensued between the two armies, along a front running roughly from Coles Island, across Long Island, to Payne’s Wharf on Charleston Harbor (Figure 2.1). Several incursions were made into Confederate territory, particularly onto James Island, but essentially the Federal force on Folly and Morris Islands was a machine that functioned solely to hurl artillery projectiles at Charleston and its fortifications. This desultory “siege” finally ended on February 17, 1865, when General William T. Sherman’s unstoppable western army had penetrated deeply into the interior of South Carolina, threatening Charleston from the rear. The Confederate forces abandoned the South Carolina coast, and Federal forces from the sea islands occupied Charleston.54

So the Union ordeal at Charleston ended. The Federals’ efforts to capture Charleston by repeated land and sea operations, and then by siege, failed. The prize Confederate seaport finally fell, but Union military strategy to take it by joint Navy and Army cooperation came to nothing. Meanwhile blueclad soldiers stationed on the South Carolina sea islands suffered greatly from the excessive duty and the harsh environment.

PART TWO: LIFE ON FOLLY ISLAND

The main base of Union operations against Charleston shifted from Folly Island to Morris Island in July 1863. Yet General Vogdes maintained a sizable occupation force on Folly Island for the remainder of the year, and a lesser one until the end of the war. The soldiers’ duty there was demanding, even for veterans used to hardships and privations.

Some Federals claimed that their stint on Folly Island constituted perhaps the gloomiest period of their service under the Stars and Stripes. “Folly Island was probably the worst place in the army,” complained a soldier. “If there is a worse place than these sea islands I don’t want to see it...”55 The Northerners found it difficult to acclimate themselves to the Carolina weather and the sea island environment while performing the demanding duties required of them to safeguard the beachhead.

The soldiers’ first summer on Folly Island was particularly enervating to their well being. By mid-summer much of the island’s vegetation had been cleared to make way for encampments, and many men were living on the open sand. The sun beating down on the sandy beaches made the temperatures stifling hot. “Our exposure to the excessive heat of the day...” a soldier pointed out, “rapidly reduced the physical tone of the organization.”56 Relief from the heat came only with darkness or northerly winds off the ocean.

The winds may have cooled the temperatures somewhat, but they also ruffled the blanket of sand that covered Folly Island. Sand was everywhere and filled everything you fell asleep,” explained a bluecoat, “on waking your face would be covered, your clothes were full [of sand].”57 The troops also battled insects that bred in the sandy waste of Folly Island, or in marshes that bordered it. Sand fleas and ticks were bothersome, but mosquitoes threatened the soldiers’ sanity. Mosquitoes made sleeping difficult and “even overcoats [were] no protection from the ravenous ... hoard of blood suckers ... stinging, buzzing ... screaming ... dashing into your ears, wearing a fellows life out with coughing, slapping, pinching, and scratching,” maintained a New York soldier.58

The Commissary and Quartermaster Departments only added to the misery of the Union troops on Folly Island. During July and most of August 1863, the staple diet of the men was comprised of molded hardtack, spoiled meat, and coffee. Complaints increased over the vast shortages of good food—beef, pork, sugar, potatoes, bread, butter, milk, fruit, and other “Yankee Notions.” Moreover, the drinking water to be found on the island was brackish and sulfuric. The soldiers constantly dug new wells searching for decent water (see Chapter IV). To make health matters worse, the Quartermaster Department failed to forward the tents of some regiments from their previous stations. The absence of standard camping equipment forced many men to sleep in the open, exposed to all kinds of weather conditions.59

Even with the deprivations the men were expected to fulfill rigorous soldierly duties. Guard duty, fatigue work, and daily drills of companies, battalions, brigades, and divisions characterized most of the daily schedule. Many soldiers drilled on artillery in the morning, and shouldered rifles for infantry maneuvers in the afternoon. One New
Every few weeks a firing was hanging by the thumbs. A soldier faced a week, A young generals to drummer boys, combed the beach gathering ,'66 Island, while "fatty Vogdes" looked on. 6O drinking water, unfavorable living conditions, Florida.6~ kept on reserve, in anticipation of a Confederate 64 Latrines squad if he fell asleep at his the island offered few breaks from the monotony. ining ment, he lamented, once labored for sixty hours, for duty. A medical circular two weeks later disclosed it. For the regiment, or its remnants, it transferred to Fernandina, Florida.65 Every few weeks a medical ship visited Folly Island to remove ill soldiers who needed a change of environment to survive. The vessel seldom had room for all of the sick.

If soldiers avoided physical illness, few escaped despondency and depression. Isolation and the frequency of letters from family and loved ones caused many men to suffer from home-sickness, or "nostalgia," as Civil War physicians termed it. One Federal soldier observed a prevailing depression among his regiment and a stillness rarely broken by the sounds of laughter and joy. [An] indescribable shadow... overhung and pervaded our organization," he recalled. "The men [were in] a negative mood, never seen in the regiment before..."66 A young soldier dealing with a life-threatening illness and nostalgia had a reduced chance of recovery.

When conditions failed to improve, the soldiers’ anger grew, and they vented their frustrations at their commanders. General Vogdes came under heavy criticism. "It is the general opinion that [Vogdes] is the meanest man alive," insisted a trooper. "He is the greatest coward in the Army; keeps a whole company to guard his headquarters, and dares not go out after dark."67 Vogdes attempted to thwart health problems in his command as the summer dragged on. He recognized that more soldiers were casualties of disease than battle in warm weather climates. He strictly followed the sanitary rules of the Department (see Appendix D). Areas favorable for camp grounds were selected as carefully as was possible on the low and marshy Folly Island. Soldiers policed and moved the camps often. Tents were raised at least two feet off the ground, and screened or covered to keep out insects. At the same time, soldiers struck and ventilated their tents at least three times a week. Latrines were sunk at a safe distance from each camp.68

Despite these measures, however, conditions really only got better with an increase and improvement in the food supply, an acceptance on the part of the soldiers as to their situation, and the onset of cooler weather. By late autumn 1863, soldiers, who earlier had condemned Folly Island, were proclaiming it "quite a healthy place," with mild, pleasant weather.69 By mid-winter, more profound changes had taken place. Military duty was less arduous, and the men resumed participation in camp sports and recreation. "The health of the command was excellent," a soldier acknowledged gleefully. "Balls, quoits, [a game similar to horseshoes], and gymnastic exercises were liberally patronized. The men were cheerful... and vivacious."70

The onset of cold weather also brought about a general change in camping locale among the units that remained on Folly Island. In warmer weather, most regimental camps were situated along the beach, where strong breezes partially alleviated the discomforts caused by insects and heat (Figures 2.2, 2.3). With the approach of winter, camps were relocated to the interior or inland side of the island, where insects and "swamp miasma" were no longer a problem, and what remained of the forest provided some shelter from cold winds. It was this movement
PART 3: THE 55TH MASSACHUSETTS VOLUNTEER REGIMENT

Among the units which moved into the project area in November 1863 was a small brigade consisting of two black units, the 1st Regiment of North Carolina Infantry (or 1st North Carolina Colored Infantry) and the 55th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry. This brigade, formerly known as "Wild's African Brigade," had camped since August 1863 at Lighthouse Inlet on the north end of Folly Island.

For several reasons, the 55th Massachusetts has been singled out for intensive treatment in the remainder of this chapter. The regiment is one of only three units specifically tied to the project area: the other units being the 1st North Carolina and Battery E, of the 3rd U.S. Artillery. It was one of two units thought to have utilized the cemetery, archaeological site 38CH920: the other unit being the 1st North Carolina. Finally, the primary historical sources available for the 55th Massachusetts are extensive and remarkably detailed, thanks to the efforts of Major, and later Lt. Colonel, Charles B. Fox, regimental adjutant.

The success in raising the black 54th Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry encouraged state officials to form a second regiment, the 55th Massachusetts. The 55th Massachusetts mustered at Readville, Massachusetts late in the spring of 1863, with Colonel N.P. Hallowell as its white commander. Hallowell spent the summer making soldiers out of the motley array of farmers and laborers from the Midwest and Northeast. The regiment shipped out for the front at the end of July 1863.

The regiment made a temporary landing at New Bern, North Carolina, a port town on the Neuse River occupied by the Union since 1862. The 55th Massachusetts remained in New Bern only five days, just long enough to be assigned to General Edward A. Wild's "African Brigade," along with the 1st North Carolina. In contrast to the 55th Massachusetts, which was comprised of mostly freemen, the 1st North Carolina was raised from slaves freed in the Federal occupation of coastal North Carolina. The organization soon received orders to embark for Charleston, South Carolina. The brigade was needed to supplement the forces already in Charleston, including the 54th Massachusetts, which had suffered so severely in the assault on Battery Wagner, on Morris Island. Military authorities had another reason for stationing "Wild's African Brigade" in the Charleston area. They believed black soldiers could better endure, and were more likely to survive, the South Carolina sea islands' humid climate, than their white comrades.

Most of Wild’s regiments made landfall on Folly Island on the third of August. The remainder of the brigade, delayed by foul weather and rough seas, arrived about a week later. General Gillmore assigned Wild's brigade to Vogdes Division, X Army Corps, and stationed...
it on the north end of Folly Island. During August and September, the black soldiers joined the white troops in the arduous labor of a major siege. Work details were kept busy cutting timber, constructing wharves, as well as unloading supplies, artillery, and ammunition from various transport vessels. The 55th Massachusetts also erected batteries, mounted heavy guns, and dug trenches on Morris Island. The soldiers performed most of this work under almost constant fire from Confederates defending Battery Wagner. After the evacuation of Morris Island, the 55th Massachusetts spent most of its time performing fatigue and guard duty on Folly Island.35

Despite presumptions at the time that men of African descent would be better suited to the Carolina climate, sickness and death took a heavy toll on the 55th Massachusetts. The unhealthy environmental conditions and overwork affected all men regardless of race. The declining health of the 55th Massachusetts was further affected by the absence of equipment and clothing. The soldiers' hurried departure from New Bern compelled them to leave behind their tents, blankets, knapsacks, and personal luggage. Their tents finally reached Folly Island in late August, but uniform coats and personal property did not arrive until the end of September. Even then much of it was missing, stolen or lost due to the neglect of the officer left in charge at New Bern. The army declined to compensate the soldiers of the 55th Massachusetts for their losses, and the men suffered as a result. Twelve members of the regiment died of sickness or disease in their first seven weeks on Folly Island and 23 more died by the end of 1863.36

In November, with the siege effort much reduced and the "African Brigade" widely detached on other duties, the 55th Massachusetts and the 1st North Carolina Colored Infantry moved their winter camp on Folly Island (Figures 2.4, 2.5). The orders for preparation of the camp are revealing:

HQ "Wilds Brigade"
Folly Island, S.C. Nov. 4, 1863
Special Order # 52

One Co- each from 1st NCC Vols. and 55th Mass. is hereby detailed to clear ground, and lay out their respective regimental camps... full marching order w. camp equipage & 5 days rations.

A competent officer from each regt. will be present to locate the respective camps, which so far as possible should be uniform as to size and general arrangement.

The large timber on the camp ground will be left standing, so much of the smaller growth as may be suitable for firewood should be collected & preserved.

The uniform width of the men's streets will be 30 ft. or thereabouts, the camp front proper about 500 ft., and the interval between the camp lines on the inner flank, not less than 60 yards.

The detachment will march as early as possible on the 5th inst.
James Beecher
Com. Brigade

Major Fox commanded the detachment of the 55th Massachusetts assigned to prepare the campsite. He left a detailed narrative of the work, excerpted below, and appended a map and drawings (Figure 2.4).

Wednesday Nov. 4" It is just before noon and Col. Beecher has just ridden up to say it is proposed to change the camp of the brigade to a point further south... of course it is in our interest to look out that the location is a good one...

2 1/2 o'clock P.M. Have just returned from our new camping ground. For a winter location it is much better than the one where we now are. The camp will be in the woods, the officers tents on a little ridge... the fronts, as now, toward the marsh, but with an old cotton field, which will make a fine parade ground, and a ridge of land covered with brush and dwarf palmetto, between us and it. We shall send one company down tomorrow, to take charge of the ground and clear it up...

Thursday Nov. 5" All day I have been employed at the new camp, running lines, etc.

Friday Nov. 6" ...the front of our camp is 500 feet, and as the company which is doing the work here - K. Co. - is the one belonging in the extreme left, while my position is on the right in rear of the fourth company, I am as it were camped out in the woods by myself. The Chaplain is a little beyond me, however, and about fifteen men of H, the fourth company are camped on their street.

Sunday Nov. 8" The view from my tent is quite limited, for though it is pitched...
on a little hillock there is one much higher in front and the woods are quite dense in the rear. I will enclosure a sketch. When I want to look out, I climb the bluff in front and look down upon camp. I fear it will take some time to bring things to level. I doubt if we attempt it except on a small scale. The troops around our camp have been but little of colored soldiers I expect and they have a great deal of curiosity, standing and looking at our men.

Monday Nov. 9" Our annoyances we have escaped (by change of camp) the blowing of the sand. The soil is light, but the leaves and undergrowth confine it where it is. I have been tinkering with my tent at odd times during the day, and it is now so nicely closed in that the cold wind will trouble me but little. We finished main part of our camp cleaning today, but hardly expect the Regt. before Wednesday - so we shall go on digging wells, building stables and so on.... All the convalescents and slightly sick men were sent down to me this afternoon, so that with very few men for duty, I really have more men in number of the regiment than are together at any other point. My eyes are somewhat affected by the smoke...from the fires built to clear up the leaves and rubbish.... I bought today a nice little sheet iron stove about a foot square which stands in one corner of my tent and heats it very comfortably.

Wednesday Nov. 11" The regiment is gradually collecting at this place, a large number of convalescents having come down today with much of the baggage...

Friday Nov. 13" Yesterday was a day of hard work. The regiment has not yet moved down, and we are still cutting brush, moving logs, grubbing up stumps, digging wells, & c. [sic] To-day we fixed up two hospital tents quite nicely, and built a stable, or rather a frame to be covered with canvas, for the horses...

Saturday Nov. 14" As it will give you no idea of our location or the forces near us, I think I will make you a little sketch of the camp this afternoon, that you may judge of our canvas city and our various positions [Figure 2.4]"79

Fox later recalled that the camp was "...soon made, if not the best regimental camp on the island, certainly the best ever occupied there by the regiment."79 Two photographs (Figures 2.5, 2.6) taken of unknown interior camps on Folly Island resemble the camp described by Fox.

The health of the regiment was greatly improved in November and December. Fox recalled that "...the loss by disease during August and September had been heavy, but as severe night fatigue duty was reduced, and especially after the first frosts, deaths became less frequent." In December, "A great improvement was also made in the condition of the regimental hospital, floors being laid, frames put up for the tents, doors constructed, bunks built, and the kitchen, nurses' quarters, and dispensary put in fine order for the comfort of the sick."80

The monthly regimental hospital report for December is reproduced below.

Surgeon General Dale
Sir,

The following is a Summary of the Monthly Return of Sick and Wounded for Dec., 1863:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhoea</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catarrh</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typhoid fever</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typho-malarial fever</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rheumatism</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronchitis</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleurisy</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pneumonia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonsillitis</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermittent fever</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the number of deaths in our own regiment, two privates of Co. A 2nd Reg. U.S. Col'd Infantry died in our hospital. They were on detached service; and as the Post Hospital on Folly Island has been broken up, they had no other place to go to.
Figure 2.4: Map and other details of the interior camp of the 55th Massachusetts established in November 1863; drawn by Major Charles Fox, Nov. 14, 1863. (Massachusetts Historical Society.)
The troops are more comfortably situated than at any previous time since landing here. Nearly every tent is provided with a stove or fireplace.

I have the honor [sic] to remain
Very respectfully
W.S. Brown
Surgeon 55th Mass. Vol. 81

Although the camps served as regimental headquarters, units seldom saw collective duty there. Companies were frequently detached from the 55th Massachusetts for duty elsewhere on Folly Island or adjacent islands. Companies B and I, for instance, spent December 1863, at Pawnee Landing, about two miles north of the winter camp on the Folly River. That same month Companies E and K picketed Long Island. Company F served at Fort Green on Lighthouse Inlet, while Company H spent much of its time at Fort Delafiel, on Stono Inlet.

The carefully prepared winter camp was abandoned on February 13th and 14th 1864, when the 55th Massachusetts and 1st North Carolina (now redesignated the 35th U.S. Colored Infantry) embarked for Jacksonville, Florida. The 55th Massachusetts saw active campaigning, but little combat, during the Florida expedition. They returned to Folly Island by April 20, 1864. They found the island nearly abandoned, with only two other regiments on duty there. The 55th Massachusetts did not re-occupy their previous camp. Detachments were scattered at various posts on the island, and the regimental camp was ultimately placed at Stono Inlet.

The 55th Massachusetts saw more active duty starting in the spring of 1864. On May 21, four companies of the 55th Massachusetts, accompanied by the 103rd New York, skirmished with Confederates on James Island. It turned out to be only a minor clash, but it gave the black soldiers a little fighting experience. Two days later the entire regiment, commanded by A.S. Hartwell who had replaced the retired Hallowell, made a demonstration near Legareville on Johns Island. The one-day-skirmish was more notable, however, for the exchange of fire between the two supporting Union gunboats and Confederate shore batteries.

In June, the 55th Massachusetts formed part of an army under General Alexander Schimmelfennig in an advance on Charleston. The column to which the regiment was attached included the 33rd United States Colored Troops and 103rd New York. It directed its attack on Fort Lamar on James Island. By then the Union military leaders recognized that their best chance for capturing Charleston was by taking James Island. The Federals failed to make any headway, and the 55th Massachusetts lost seven men killed and 21 wounded.

For the remainder of its stay on Folly Island, the 55th Massachusetts saw heavy duty because of the small number of troops retained on the island. Indeed by August 1864, only three regiments (55th Massachusetts, the 33rd United States Colored Troops, and the 44th New York) occupied the post of Folly Island, including Folly, Coles, and Long Islands. All other units had been pulled away for theaters-of-war elsewhere. Even General Gillmore and General Vogdes departed, going in May 1864, to Virginia, where the fighting was growing more intense as the war entered its final stages. Only a skeletal Confederate army as well remained in the Charleston area to oppose the Federals. Their strength too had been depleted as regiments were assigned to more strategic battlefronts.

The remaining task of the 55th Massachusetts was not guard and fatigue duty on Folly Island, however. It continued to participate in forays against Charleston, though Union military commanders believed by then that capturing Charleston with a strong army advance was unlikely. On November 27, 1864, eight companies of the 55th Massachusetts assisted in an action at Honey Hill, on the Broad River near Hilton Head. The regiment suffered its greatest losses of the war in that battle, 31 soldiers killed, and 138 wounded.

After the Battle of Honey Hill, the 55th Massachusetts saw duty near Savannah, Georgia; Beaufort, South Carolina; and on James Island, but it did not return to camp on Folly Island. The Confederates abandoned Charleston on February 17, 1865, and four days later the 55th Massachusetts was among the Federal regiments that took possession of the city. For the remainder of the war and into the summer of 1865, the regiment served occupation duty in eastern South Carolina. On August 29, 1865, the 55th Massachusetts was mustered out at Charleston, and officially discharged in September upon its return to Massachusetts. P.C. Headley wrote a fitting tribute to black Massachusetts units stating "...They added to the military reputation of the Commonwealth, gave strength to the Union cause, and forever silenced the clamor against them in advance by the enemies of the colored race."
Figure 2.5: Photograph of unidentified Federal camp in the interior of Folly Island. This location strongly resembles that described and depicted by Major Fox (see Figure 2.4). (USAMHI).

Figure 2.6: Photograph of Federal officer's tents in an unidentified interior camp on Folly Island. Major Fox (1863) depicts similar arrangements of shrubs planted around the officer's tents in the interior camp of the 55th Massachusetts. (National Archives).
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II


2. Burton, Siege of Charleston, 152.


17. Jones, Siege of Charleston, 144; Reed, Combined Operations, 258.

18. Reed, Combined Operations, 269-274.

19. In fact, Foster’s reconnaissance alerted the Confederates to the Union plans. Foster and his party indiscreetly aroused suspicion when they appeared on the north end of Folly Island in full view of Confederates on the opposite shore. As a result, the Confederates on Morris Island began to erect batteries to sweep Lighthouse Inlet and the northern end of Folly Island (Bacon to Du Pont, February 16, 1863, and Balch to Du Pont, February 16, 1863, in Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, 30 volumes [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900], Series 1, Volume XIII, 650; War Department, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies in the War of the Rebellion, 128 volumes in 70 parts [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901], Series 1, Volume XIV, 425 [hereafter cited as ORA, e.g. 1, XIV, 425].)

20. Reed, Combined Operations, 278.

21. David Hunter to Abraham Lincoln, May 22, 1863, ORA, 1, XIV, 455. On March 31, 1863, Colonel Joshua B. Howell commanded the 56th New York and 85th Pennsylvania (Second Brigade, Second Division, XVIII Army Corps). Other regiments may have been assigned to his brigade for the Charleston operation of April, 1863 [ORA, 1, XIV, 435].

23. According to the historian of the 3rd New Hampshire, the troops had “surf and india-rubber pontoon boats” which they were to use to cross Lighthouse Inlet (Eldredge, Third New Hampshire, 269).


25. Reed, Combined Operations, 293-294; Burton, Siege of Charleston, 136-140.

26. Du Pont to Hunter, April 8, 1863. ORA, 1, XIV, 437.

27. Abraham Lincoln’s determination to capture Charleston in the spring of 1863, is suspect. Publicly at least, the president insisted that the Carolina port must be sealed. According to correspondence with General Hunter and Admiral Du Pont, the chief executive hoped that they could gain control of the harbor and its defenses. He wished “the attempt to be a real one (though not a desperate one)...if it afford[ed] any chance of success.” But whether they could succeed or not, Lincoln wanted the department leaders to keep up a demonstration “for a time for a collateral and very important object...But if prosecuted as a demonstration,” Lincoln maintained, “only this must not become public, or the whole effect will be lost.” (Lincoln to Du Pont and Hunter, April 14, 1863, ORA, 1, XIV, 441).

28. Lincoln to Du Pont, April 13, 1863, and Halleck to Hunter, April 13, 1863, ORA, 1, XIV, 440; Hunter to Halleck, April 16, 1863, ORA, 1, XIV, 443.


30. Special Orders, No. 189, VI, Hdqrs. Dept. of the South, April 11, 1863, ORA, 1, XIV, 439.

31. Seymour to Vogdes, April 22, 1863, and Vogdes to Seymour, April 24, 1863, ORA, 1, XIV, 446.

32. Vogdes to Seymour, April 24, 1863, 1, XIV, 446.


37. Vogdes to Halpine, April 16, 1863, ORA, 1, XIV, 444.

38. Vogdes to Halpine, April 16, 17, 20, ORA, 1, XIV, 443, 445, 450.

See also: Balch to Du Pont, June 15, 1863, ORN, 1, XIV 261.


41. Special Orders No. 249, Hdqrs. of the Army, Adjt. Genls. Office, June 3, 1863, ORA, 1, XIV, 464; General Orders, No. 47, Hdqrs. Dept. of the South, Hilton Head, Port Royal, S.C., June 12, 1863, ORA, 1, XXVIII, 2, 3; W.B. Dean ? to Colonel Woodford, 1863, U.S. Army, 1st Brigade, 1st Division Letterbook, 1862-1863, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia (hereafter cited as U.S. Army, 1st Brigade, 1st Division Letterbook, South Carolina). The White House was on the bank of the Folly River, immediately southwest of the SCIAA project area. Today, the Seabrook house occupies the same location. At other times, Gillmore’s Headquarters was located near the beach on Folly Island, and on Morris Island.

42. Gillmore to Halleck, June 15, 1863, ORA, 1, XXVIII, 2, 5.

43. Caldwell, Sixth Connecticut, 64.

Harpers). The navy encouraged Vogdes to destroy the blockade runner Ruby and deny the Confederates her goods. But Vogdes "was of the opinion that it would be better to forgo any small advantage that might be gained by offensive operations against the wreck for the infinitely greater advantage to be gained [by keeping the Federals work a secret]." Vogdes did not, however, object to the blockading vessels attempts to destroy the Ruby. (Du Pont to Balch, June 28, and Balch to Du Pont, June 29, 1863, ORN, 1, XIV, 301-302).

46. Jones, Siege of Charleston, 205.
47. Report of Gillmore, November 15, 1863, ORA, 1, XXVIII, 1, 8-9; Eldredge, Third New Hampshire, 299; Peck "Under Fire at Charleston," Harper's, 360.
48. Report of Gillmore, November 15, 1863, ORA, 1, XXVIII, 1, 10. For order of battle see: Temporary organization of troops on Folly and adjacent islands, July 6, 1863, and Special Orders, No. 399, Hdqrs. Dept. of the South, July 6, 1863, ORA, 1, XXVIII, 2, 15-16.
49. Welles to Dahlgren June 24, 1863, ORN, 1, XIV, 295.
50. Report of Gillmore, November 15, 1863, ORA, 1, XXVIII, 1, 12.
51. Report of Gillmore, November 15, 1863, ORA, 1, XXVIII, 1, 12-16.
52. Faust, Civil War Encyclopedia, 46 and 132.
56. Mowris, 117th New York, 80-81.
57. Hyde, 112th New York, 50.
59. Schimmelfennig to Gordon, September 2, 1863, U.S. Army, 1st Brigade, 1st Division Letterbook, South Carolina; Mowris, 117th New York, 84; Jackson and O'Donnell, Back Home in Oneida, 102; Longacre, Civil War Letters of Wightman, 152-153.
60. Longacre, Civil War Letters of Wightman, 152-153.
63. Hyde, 112th New York, 60.
65. Hyde, 112th New York, 50; Circular, September 29, 1863, U.S. Army, 1st Brigade, 1st Division Letterbook, South Carolina.
69. Longacre, Civil War Letters of Wightman, 158.
70. Mowris, 112th New York, 87.
71. Fox, Charles, Record of the Service of the 55th Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Press of John Wilson and Son, July 1868), 16 (hereafter cited as Fox, Record of the 55th Massachusetts).
72. Fox, Record of the 55th Massachusetts, 1,3.
74. Fox, Record of the 55th Massachusetts, 7, 9-10; Gillmore to Terry, August 2, 1863, ORA, 1, XXXVIII, 3, 35; Jackson and O'Donnell, Back Home in Oneida, 116.
75. Fox, Record of the 55th Massachusetts, 11-12.
76. Fox, Record of the 55th Massachusetts, 10, 12, regimental roster.
78. Fox, Charles, MS, "Extracts from Letters Written to his Wife, July 23, 1863 to February 23rd, 1864." Massachusetts Historical Society. Nov. 4- Nov. 14, 1863.
79. Fox, Record of the 55th Massachusetts, 16-17.
80. Fox, Record of the 55th Massachusetts, 19.
81. Report of Surgeon William Brown, 55th Massachu-


84. Fox, *Record of the 55th Massachusetts*, 27; General Order No. 44, Hqrs. Dept. of the South, Hilton Head, S.C., March 26, 1864. United States Army, Dept. of the South, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia.


