

6-1-1989

*International Business in the 19th-Century: The Rise and Fall of a
Cosmopolitan Bourgeoisie*, by Charles A. Jones

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Publication Info

Published in *American Historical Review*, Volume 94, Issue 3, 1989, pages 753-754.

<http://www.indiana.edu/~ahrweb/>

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region, tax farmers developed intrusive practices to combat evasion, fraud, and contraband. Micheline Huvet-Martinet explores the widespread production of contraband salt in western France, which persisted despite patrols by brigades intent on enforcing the gabelle, and Georges Clause analyzes prosecutions for gabelle fraud in Champagne, where salt from Lorraine cost one-third the legal rate. The inherent inequity of the gabelle, the evils wrought by tax farming, and the erection of internal fiscal frontiers all reflect the well-known administrative chaos of the *ancien régime*. Yet, given the amount of revenue at stake and the complexity of the gabelle apparatus, any reform would have entailed a wholesale fiscal reorganization unthinkable at the time.

The remaining papers in this collection are so varied as to defy a brief summary, but they serve as a useful foil to analyses of the better-known French system. Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada summarizes recent research on salt taxes in Castile, where the ownership and production of salt remained a royal monopoly. Harald Withhöft studies the salt-producing city of Lüneburg, which sold salt throughout the Baltic, and Kuno Ulshöfer surveys the fortunes of Schwäbisch Hall, which supplied the Rhine and Neckar. In both cities, merchant oligarchies controlled all phases of the production, taxation, and exportation of salt. Patrizia Angelucci-Mezzetti relates a different experience in Siena, whose economic foundation lay elsewhere: the commune originally intended only to tax the sale of salt but became a monopolistic producer and importer in order to assure its growing population a dependable supply of an essential commodity.

A general history of salt policies clearly must await further archival research. In the interim, Hocquet has drawn attention to the pervasive, and often neglected, ramifications of these policies for social and institutional history.

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CHARLES A. JONES. *International Business in the Nineteenth Century: The Rise and Fall of a Cosmopolitan Bourgeoisie*. New York: New York University Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 260. \$45.00.

As the dual title suggests, this is really two books in one. The more successful of the two traces the rise and transformation of various merchant houses operating within the British trading empire during the nineteenth century. According to the author, Charles A. Jones, an expert on British enterprise in Latin America, these firms emerged and prospered between the 1780s and the 1840s as a

result of the breakdown of the old mercantilist trade system and the advent of British industrial power. In the second half of the century, however, technological and legal innovations, such as regular steamer service, transoceanic telegraphic communication, and liberalized incorporation, brought forth new competitors to challenge the established position of these houses. In examining the merchants' response, Jones distinguishes between those on the "periphery" of the world trade system (in places such as Buenos Aires, Bombay, Hong Kong, and Sydney) and those at the "center" (meaning England and, especially, London). Peripheral firms, he argues, attempted to defend themselves by specializing in commodity trade or commercial banking or by investing in physical infrastructure (port facilities, railroads, power companies). But, in all these businesses, peripheral firms were at a disadvantage relative to "center" firms, which had better access to technology and capital. Although some peripherals survived as independent players, most were eventually drawn into London-based syndicates, such as the London and River Plate Bank or Marcus Samuels's "tank syndicate" (precursor of Shell Oil), almost all of which came to be dominated by center interests. By the early twentieth century, the peripheral firms were suffering, in Jones's words, "progressive marginalisation" (p. 179). Still, the diverse activities of these far-flung merchant houses over the previous hundred years had helped to lay the foundations for modern multinational enterprise—a development, Jones points out, that heretofore has been attributed almost exclusively to large-scale manufacturers seeking wider markets.

Jones's treatment of international business in the nineteenth century is generally convincing because he assembles an enormous amount of illustrative detail to support it (perhaps too much). By contrast, his second "book," identified in the subtitle, although provocative, is less convincing because the supporting evidence is much less conclusive. Specifically, Jones argues that, with the rise of the new merchant houses of the early nineteenth century, there emerged a new social class, the "cosmopolitan bourgeoisie," bound together by business and kinship ties as well as by the ideology of radical liberalism and free trade represented in the thought and career of Richard Cobden. Jones clearly views this class as a force for good and laments its "fall" in the late nineteenth century when, amid the economic pressures mentioned above, it supposedly fragmented into various national bourgeoisies, abandoned internationalism, and embraced the bellicose imperialism of the (aristocratic) ruling elite. However, Jones's documentation of this ideological shift is sketchy.

Equally sketchy is his discussion of the kinship networks underlying the cosmopolitan bourgeoisie. Ties across regional boundaries—between, say, the merchants of Buenos Aires and the bankers of London—are not well delineated. The author is probably onto something important, but he needs to map out the specific business and family connections much more thoroughly. In its present form, what he offers is less a social history than suggestions, albeit useful ones, for future research.

In sum, this is an uneven but highly imaginative work. The author goes in too many directions at once, throwing out too many ideas that are never developed. A classic case, perhaps, of reach exceeding grasp. Nonetheless, there are important arguments here that scholars will have to take into account in all subsequent work on the social and organizational history of international enterprise. Economic and business historians in particular should give this book a careful reading.

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JEREMY BLACK. *The Collapse of the Anglo-French Alliance, 1727–1731*. New York: St. Martin's. 1987. Pp. xvi, 224. \$35.00.

The death of George I made for considerable confusion in English and in European affairs as well. To whom would the new king listen? How large a personal role would he choose to play? In which departments would he be most active? George II soon turned his eye to foreign affairs. In 1727, Britain's major alliance was with the French, an alliance in which Britain was the junior partner. Cardinal Fleury might complain that the English ought to pay more, as the richer of the two powers, but on most other issues he seems to have had his way.

A French alliance in those years left George II to face the possibility of hostile action by any one of the three eastern powers—Austria, Prussia, or Russia. This alliance was also deeply unpopular with the general public, whose opinion counted for much, and it did little to help the British in their dealings with the reviving power of Spain. Something must be done, cried the impatient king: something, anything. Negotiations were attempted with all the great and many of the secondary powers of Europe in turn, to little or no effect. At first, the Treaty of Seville, concluded with Spain, looked like something, but the Spanish soon repudiated it. In the spring of 1731, the British concluded a treaty with Austria, on terms very favorable to the Austrians but at the cost of their friendship with France. It may be that the

Second Treaty of Vienna secured Hanover from Prussian attack. But it did so, Jeremy Black maintains, only at the cost of isolating the governments of George II in the later 1730s.

Black has searched widely and well in domestic and an impressive number of foreign archives to find material for his study. If he does not read Dutch, or use Spanish, he more than makes up for it by his discoveries in the archives of the minor German and Italian courts. His use of this material is fascinating in itself, showing how the most insignificant German problem ties in with major French and Spanish ones. But he is also careful to connect diplomatic issues to domestic political ones, so that he presents us with almost two monographs, one on the state of Europe and the other on the government of England. The picture that emerges is a complex one. No single individual at this time could be sure of dominating the formation or execution of policy, and to claim any such power for Horace Walpole, or the duke of Newcastle, or the queen, is reductionist. This book may be hard reading, but it is well worth the effort.

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CHARLES B. SCHMITT *et al.*, editors. *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1988. Pp. xiii, 968. \$79.50.

This is the third in the series of Cambridge histories of philosophy, following *Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (1970) and *Later Medieval Philosophy* (1982). W. K. C. Guthrie's three-volume *A History of Greek Philosophy*, also published by Cambridge University Press (1962–69), has served as coverage for the earliest period. The structuring varies in all four volumes. Guthrie's works and the volume on later Greek and early medieval philosophy are organized according to single figures within themes and schools, which I prefer. The histories of the later medieval and Renaissance periods are organized by branches of philosophy. The Cambridge history of the later Greek and early medieval period is thin on Plato and Aristotle, strong on Neoplatonism and patristic thought. Although it reaches Anselm as a medieval Platonist, the gap between it and the volume on later medieval philosophy is notable. The editors of the later medieval history designedly emphasized the aspects of medieval philosophy of most direct interest to contemporary philosophizing; as a consequence there is minimal attention to the great scholastic theologians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

The current volume attempts a broader, less