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Book Review: Grand Strategies in War and Peace, ed. Paul Kennedy

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The present volume can be seen as a form of follow-on study to Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,* seeking to present, elaborate, and apply the concept of grand strategy to a set of case studies dealing with great powers. Kennedy attempts to define and conceptualize grand strategy in the opening chapter and applies it to the American experience in the tenth, and last, chapter. Three studies of British grand strategy make up chapters 2-4, followed by five chapters on the "Continental powers." The latter group varies substantially in timeframe and clarity of focus, with chapters on the Roman Empire, the decline of imperial Spain, the "military heritage of modern Germany" across a broad time span, France in 1914 and 1940, and the Soviet Union.

Kennedy succinctly notes the purpose of the volume—"to present the reader with historical case studies of 'grand strategy'; that is to say, with assessments of the success or failure with which various powers of Europe sought to integrate their overall political, economic, and military aims and thus to preserve their long-term interests" (p. ix). Unfortunately, this brief statement of grand strategy (elaborated in chap. 1) also provides an idea of the overly ambitious task assigned to the volume's central concept. I wish to assess the value to political scientists interested in the study of international relations, and especially international conflict, of this volume by historians (with two exceptions).

The core of such an assessment must be the meaning and utility of the concept of grand strategy. Following Edward Mead Earle and Liddell Hart, Kennedy presents grand strategy as a way to relate means to ends: "The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests" (p. 5; emphasis original). "All of the elements' include the full use and assessment of diplomacy; questions of national will, morale, and political culture; and the full range of economic resources, including industry, finance, manpower, and wealth.

It is obvious that in attempting to deal with this concept, Kennedy is continuing themes and issues raised in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.* The concept returns to the linkages between economic resources, military capability, and the costs of defense. It returns to questions of diplomacy, resources, and priorities—that is, the constituent elements of 'overstretch,' a central component in Kennedy's explanation of the process of great power ascendance and decline.

At the same time, it is also obvious that grand strategy is related to significant areas of interest to students of international relations: the meaning and measurement of power, the role of alliances, the relationship of power to military and diplomatic success, the relationship between domestic and foreign politics, and the relevance of such broad perspectives as realism, rational choice, and bureaucratic politics.

What appear to be strengths of grand strategy, however, are its major weaknesses. As a concept, what does grand strategy add to well-established concepts, models, or frameworks in international relations? As noted, the concept is too broad, tries to do too much, and lacks the theoretical guidance of other approaches. Broad frameworks that integrate across various levels of analysis exist, for example, in Rosenau's pretheory and in the geopolitical work of the Sprouts linking environment and envisioned unit. (These approaches apply particularly to chapters 1, 7, and 8). The considerations of ends—policies to means—resources is the heart of expected utility and other rational choice approaches (from formal game theoretic work, to Allison's Model I, to standard realist formulations). Problems of resource extraction—control over resources—and its consequences for control over actors and outcomes are central to the literature on power and influence (and well developed in the work of Organski and Kugler). Problems with organizational parochialism and operating procedures (as seen in the studies on the Roman Empire, Germany, and the Soviet Union) are well handled by Allison's Organizational Process Model II, especially as contrasted to the Rational Actor Model I.

In sum, while grand strategy appears to be about how military policy relates to overall governmental domestic and foreign policy, it does not specify any of the ways in which these things should be related. It lacks the theoretical specifications that other conceptual models, frameworks, and formulations provide. Indeed, none of the studies attempts to define or conceptualize grand strategy. The studies do, however, attempt to approach their subjects from some broad understanding of grand strategy. Herein lies the volume's utility; it presents a set of studies which have moved from what Lijphart has called atheoretical case studies to interpretative case studies and that now have the potential to be used by the informed reader in the role of either hypothesis-generating case studies or what Eckstein has called heuristic case studies.

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**A Preponderance of Power** will be of immense value to scholars interested in the grand strategy of the Truman administration. Leffler has combined a solid grasp of secondary material with a comprehensive and very carefully documented analysis of primary sources, including a vast array of previously classified documents. The result is not only a more complete record of U.S. policymakers' thinking about national security but also a more nuanced and sophisticated reconstruction of their concerns and objectives.

Leffler convincingly argues that policymakers believed that U.S. national security required "an external environment compatible with their domestic vision of a good society" (p. 13). The lessons drawn from the rise of fascism, the Depression, and World War II were that closed economic and political systems were not only incompatible with "the nation's core values" and the viability of the U.S. political economy but also created the potential for military threats that could grow into global wars of attrition if countries with closed systems gained control of areas with significant human and material resources. U.S. policymakers believed the Soviet Union created exactly that kind of threat because it