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INDONESIA IN 1984

Pancasila, Politics, and Power

Donald E. Weatherbee

The night of September 12, 1984, saw Jakarta's worst street violence since the anti-Tanaka, anti-*cukong* Malari affair of a decade ago. Hundreds of Moslem youths fired up by inflammatory mosque lectures moved through the streets of Tanjung Priok (North Jakarta) in bloody confrontation with the security forces. Yelling antigovernment and anti-Chinese slogans and epithets, they charged Indonesian army units and were dispersed by gunfire, forced to give way in a rampaging retreat. As many as 28 people were killed. The government quickly rounded up the suspected ringleaders and radical Islamic teachers. While clamping down on the political content of the *da'wah* (Islamic instruction and missionary information activity), the security elite quickly sought to shift the blame for the Tanjung Priok incident to underground communist elements. Even so, Jakarta and other centers in East and Central Java were flooded with underground pamphlets inciting the faithful to take up arms to defend their religion against those who would destroy Islam. A series of bomb blasts and incendiary fires, together with numerous bomb and arson threats, frayed already tense nerves.

The pattern of terrorist events suggested to some a spreading threat of embryonic urban guerrilla warfare.¹ Senior officers of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), including the ABRI commander, General L. B. Moerdani, visited leading mosques and *pesantran* (traditional Islamic schools) to tell the *ulama* and *kiyayi* that ABRI was not the enemy of Islam. "I would like to assert," Gen. Moerdani told an East Javanese audience of about a thousand Islamic teachers, "that Moslems in Indonesia are not cornered and will never be cornered."² But cornered is

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1. *Kompas*, November 15, 1984.

2. *Tempo*, November 17, 1984.

exactly how many of the *santri*—the strictly committed Moslems—feel since they see aggressive propagation of the state ideology of Pancasila as undermining the role of religion.

The Pancasila State

The Indonesian state is based on five fundamental principles (Pancasila): belief in one god, humanitarianism, national unity, consensual democracy, and social justice. First enunciated by Sukarno in June 1945 as the value foundation of an independent state, in the New Order regime of President Suharto the Pancasila has been ideologically specified and operationalized to provide guidance for all relationships in every social domain. Rather than the universal values embodied in the original formulations (later narrowed by Sukarno himself), Pancasila today is interpreted as embodying traditional indigenous (idealized) values of social harmony and absence of political conflict, providing culturally neutral guidelines for behavior in a plural society where "development" tends to be measured by aggregate indicators of economic growth. Furthermore, by making Pancasila the official ideology of all Indonesians, Islam becomes but one of five tolerated religious streams with no legitimate claim to exclusivity.

In 1978 the government embarked on an intensive program of ideological training and upgrading through courses of study known by the contraction of the full Indonesian name as P4 courses.³ By law (II/MPR/1978) all Indonesian citizens are to go through the P4 course. The first targets of Pancasila "upgrading" were bureaucrats, and the courses have now replaced the traditional "hazing" period in the universities and will be in place in the junior and senior high schools in the 1985/1986 academic year. In the lower schools Pancasila Moral Education (PMP) has become part of the standard curriculum. By cabinet decision in October 1984, it was decided to proceed with the Pancasila upgrading of *ulamas*, Christian priests and pastors, and Balinese religious men. Other, voluntary, social groups have followed suit. Even the prostitutes of Samarinda (East Kalimantan) have undergone P4 training "to increase their devotion and service to the community and the nation."⁴

For the government, the internalization of Pancasila values is the necessary mental and spiritual prerequisite for citizens to discharge their duties in the state. For critics of the regime, however, it is an effort to

3. *Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila*. The content of the P4 course is analyzed in Michael Morfit, "Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government," *Asian Survey*, 21:8 (August 1981), pp. 838–851.

4. *Jakarta Post*, October 1, 1984.

buttress authority: for "liberals," a conservative defense of the social and political status quo; for increasing numbers of Moslems, a denial of the proper role of the religion of, statistically at least, 90% of the population. Moslems place the campaign in the context of other government policies that were deemed anti-Islam: the abortive 1973 marriage bill, the struggle over the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the recognition of *kebatinan* (Javanese mysticism) as a religion, questions on the place of religious holidays in the academic calendar, etc., all part of a suspected official policy of secularization to deny a special place for Islam. To *santri* concerns about the political dominance of the syncretic Javanese are added more acute suspicions about Christian missionary designs on the faithful as well as insidious Chinese influence.

The Politics of Pancasila and Polarization

To oppose the social and political impact of the Pancasila state is to become identified with the twin bugaboos of "extremism of the left" (communism) and "extremism of the right" (radical Islam), and in the government's mind the two are linked. The threat and occurrence of Moslem political violence has always been present and manifest. At its inception the republic was attacked by forces of Islamic orthodoxy wishing to create a theocratic state resting on Qu'ranic law rather than religious pluralism and tolerance. Historically, however, most Moslems have tried to advance their interests through legal political competition. The forced alliance of the four Moslem political parties under the United Development Party (PPP) umbrella disciplined Islamic electoral politics in the New Order framework. Nevertheless, the PPP—campaigning with the *ka'abah* as its symbol—did provide a focal point for Moslem political opposition to the government. However, in 1983 the decision was made that all political parties had to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideological principle, and in August 1984, after much protestation, a government stage-managed PPP congress fell into line. Islam as such is no longer openly the ideological foundation of the PPP. Even the use of its traditional symbol is in doubt. The Nahdatul Ulama party, the most resistant of the PPP's constituent members, was expected to follow suit by adopting Pancasila as its sole principle at its December congress.

For the *santri* community one of the lessons of the Dutch colonial experience that has contemporary relevance is that Moslems through their "socio-cultural" consciousness and activities cannot be separated from politics.⁵ For this reason the greatest political focus in 1984 was on

5. Ahmad Syafi Maarif, "Islam in Indonesia: Cultural Opportunity?" *Mizan*, 1:1 (January 1984), pp. 6-7.

the draft bill on mass organizations, one of five draft bills designed to centralize the institutionalization of Pancasila authority in Indonesian life. The draft bill on mass organizations would compel all social organizations, including voluntary organizations organized on the basis of religious profession, to accept the Pancasila as their sole ideological principle. The law as drafted gives the government broad interventionary powers and even the right to suspend or dissolve voluntary social organizations if they are not contributing to the development of a Pancasila society. Although government spokesmen repeatedly assured that the bill was not aimed at Islam, it was seen as a major attack on any legitimate Islamic voice in critical matters of human affairs other than the narrowly religious business of the mosque and *fiqh* (Islamic law).

Although the government's GOLKAR faction together with the military appointees have an automatic controlling majority in the parliament, it appears that the negative reaction to the social organization bill in Islamic circles has given some pause. Open hearings on the draft bills were held by the various parliamentary factions. Before the October recess a special parliamentary committee was formed to study the bills further with a view toward finding some compromise. The problem is, compromise with which Islamic groups? Islam in Indonesia does not speak with a single authoritative voice. The establishment Islamic institutions, and especially the political parties, are domesticated in the New Order framework. The protest comes from nonestablishment, more radical elements who are perhaps touched by foreign influences. Growing numbers of the disaffected are convinced that the regime is fundamentally hostile to Islam and that the champions of religion must be found outside of legal politics and with those who would wave the banner of *jihad*. The year 1984 then saw acceleration of the development of a religious militancy which, in Ruth McVey's words, "radically challenges the socioeconomic and cultural assumptions of the established Indonesian order and appears as the spokesman for the common man against an exploiting elite."⁶

The Political Economy

A different dimension is given the Tanjung Priok affair when it is placed in the context of the accumulation of social and economic problems made even more intense in the urban slums of Jakarta or the other Indonesian cities of a million or more. Gen. Moerdani recognized that

6. Ruth McVey, "Faith as the Outsider: Islam in Indonesian Politics," in James P. Piscatori, ed., *Islam in the Political Process* (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 218.

the sources of unrest mobilizing antigovernment elements were more than just religious when he quipped that the instigators of agitation will say that "only the military and the Chinese enjoy the good life in this country."⁷ The uttering of such sentiments, albeit couched in more sophisticated terms, caused some publications to lose their licenses in 1984. *Expo* was banned in January for an article on the alleged government connections of Chinese billionaires. *Topik* was suspended in February for two articles tending to arouse class hatred among the poor. *Fokus* was banned in May for printing an article on wealth in Indonesia considered likely to create "negative social effects." However, as the editorialist of the Catholic daily *Kompas* pointed out after the *Fokus* ban, "The problem of the economically strong and the economically weak, of those who are already enjoying the fruits of development and those who are still deprived of them is still with us."⁸

If the New Order's formula for success is "organizational superiority + economic growth = regime survival,"⁹ i.e., legitimacy depends upon economic performance, then worrisome signs are on the horizon even though outwardly the macro economy looks healthy. In April Indonesia's fourth five-year development plan (REPELITA IV) was inaugurated. It began with a FY 1985 "austerity" budget. The need to accommodate to the "post-oil era" led to slashes in subsidies for consumer essentials such as rice, sugar, and domestic fuel. It was the regime's ability to make politically tough but economically rational decisions and enforce them that helped Indonesia successfully weather the impact of the global recession.

The World Bank's 1984 review of the economy found the Indonesian upturn much stronger than predicted and accepted as realistic the 5% annual growth target of REPELITA IV. Through the year the indicators continued to be encouraging, even as the international oil market slumped. The trade and payment figures seemed favorable. Inflation appeared to be under control. Yet there were disturbing anomalies, not the least the precipitous drop in domestic and foreign private investment, perhaps to only a quarter of what it was in 1983. A number of factors have been advanced to explain this: uncertainties about the impact of the new tax policies, confusion over the debate on the anti-monopoly bill, a wait-and-see attitude toward the government's plans to privatize inefficient and price-controlled state enterprises, regulatory and

7. *Jakarta Post*, October 4, 1984.

8. *Kompas*, May 28, 1984.

9. Donald K. Emmerson, "Regime Survival in Indonesia: Questions for an Old Order," conference paper, August 1983.

administrative bureaucracy, fear of economic nationalism engendered by the counter-purchase policy, etc. Whatever the reason, investment sluggishness has raised questions about achievement of the 21.4% annual increase in private investment built into REPELITA IV. To stimulate investment, the government tried to create a more favorable climate for nonindigenous (Chinese) investment in productive activity. In a widely reported and commented upon address to the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry in March, Gen. Moerdani called for abandonment of the *pribumi* (ethnic Indonesian)/non-*pribumi* distinctions in economic matters. Some backlash to the effort to facilitate greater Chinese involvement in economic development can be discerned in the aftermath of the Tanjung Priok affair. The first bombings were of the Bank Central Asia, part of the holdings of Liem Sioe Liong whose link to President Suharto has come under bitter attack from regime opponents. Questions must now be raised about the effect that the drive for domestic capital will have on the delicate racial issue.

Investment Strategy

A significant issue in the investment strategy of REPELITA IV is the proper mix between labor intensive and capital intensive industries as well as the appropriate technology/high technology dichotomy. The pressing social need that directly relates to regime stability continues to be job creation, and it is independently expected that the employment situation by the end of REPELITA IV will worsen as the labor force population grows. Conservatively we might expect the unemployment rate to rise from the World Bank figure of 4.1% in 1980 to nearly 9%, or in absolute numbers, an increase from nearly 3 million to 10 million unemployed. To this we must add the nearly 30% of the population that is significantly underemployed.

The ability of the agricultural sector to absorb employment is rapidly declining. One would expect an industrialization strategy that would emphasize labor intensive, small-scale industries with a high domestic content. Although the five-year plan attaches priority to job creation and small-scale industry (critics would call it only lip service), in fact it is still programmatically skewed to large-scale capital intensive activity with high import content such as the internationally uncompetitive and already technologically obsolescent Cilegon cold rolling steel mill (another undertaking of the Liem group together with state-owned Krakatau Steel). Furthermore, the centerpiece of Indonesia's industrialization strategy is the development of a high technology complex focused on dual capable military/civilian products of which the PT Nurtanio aircraft enterprise is the most highly visible. Although backed by powerful

political and bureaucratic interests, the spillover of this strategy in terms of jobs and technology transfer to small industry is arguable.¹⁰

President Suharto has vigorously denied as groundless and misleading charges that the economic development program benefited only a minority of the population and was widening the rich-poor gap. He places the program in the longer path of development on which Indonesia has been progressing since the first REPELITA in 1969. Social equity will emerge in this sequence in the sixth REPELITA (1994–1999). The question is whether or not pent up social and economic demands, possibly linked to revolutionary Islam, can be contained until REPELITA VI without much greater coercion.

Foreign Policy

"Our voice should be heard. After all, we are a nation of 160 million people!"

This statement is the bottom line justification for a new national assertiveness in Indonesian foreign policy. After years of carefully projecting a nonthreatening, cooperative low profile in the region and beyond, Jakarta now is beginning to claim a role more consonant with its deeply felt need for leadership. In the words of former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia David Newsom, it is a nation "which is reaffirming its position in the world and the historical view of its nationalism."¹¹ That view is based not only on the political arithmetic of population but also on national perceptions of geostrategic importance, natural resources, "golden age" myths of Majapahit, and an implicit demand for respectful recognition on the international scene of the accomplishments of Suharto's New Order regime. The desire to play a role more commensurate with Indonesia's size, power, and interests was made official in the presidential tasking of the Fourth Development Cabinet announced in March 1983. The fourth item in the five point program (*Panca Krida*) called for the "intensification of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy."

A significant theme in the Indonesian message is that Indonesia is going to participate—struggle if necessary—in determining the regional political map. This is viewed as a natural policy demand of a major regional power, one that says it has a legitimate interest in the alterations of the regional status quo and the settlement of regional problems. Its

10. See, for example, Hal Hill, "High Time for Hi-Tech—or Is It," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 12, 1984.

11. See, for example, "Letter from Indonesia," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 30, 1984.

contemporary relevance, of course, has to do with the Kampuchean crisis in which Indonesia no longer is content to simply follow the lead of ASEAN's frontline state. The more than five years of confrontation with Vietnam have in Jakarta's view made the region vulnerable to Chinese political and strategic designs, further isolated and weakened Vietnam as a potential buffer to China, and impeded the development of self-reliant, nonaligned regionalism.

DUAL TRACK DIPLOMACY

Fearing that simply tailing after Thailand (and by extension the PRC) will only lead farther down the road of a bleeding diplomatic stalemate, Indonesia in 1984 aggressively pursued a "dual track" diplomacy, seeking through a bilateral dialogue with Vietnam a more "realistic" approach to compromise over Kampuchea than that necessarily consensually sanctioned in ASEAN's diplomacy. The most dramatic foreign policy event of the year was General Moerdani's official visit to Hanoi in February. This was the first visit of a senior ASEAN official to Vietnam since 1980 and was made apparently without prior ASEAN consultation or preconditions. Moerdani's remarks downgrading any Vietnamese threat to Southeast Asia and accepting the existence of a China threat to Vietnam reflect Indonesian military frustration with the bargaining mentality of the frontline states. In the same month a delegation from Jakarta's influential Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) traveled to Hanoi to take part in an Indonesian-Vietnam seminar on problems of peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach failed to follow up on any possible openings when he visited Jakarta in March, in fact embarrassing his hosts by his intransigence. With the opening of Vietnam's delayed "dry season" offensive and cross border incursions into Thailand in operations against Khmer resistance camps, Indonesia "put to rest for awhile" its efforts at dialogue with Hanoi, joining its ASEAN colleagues in May and again in July in tough hard-line restatements of the ASEAN conditions. The rent in the fabric of ASEAN solidarity seemed mended.

Almost immediately, however, Indonesians again had second thoughts about the lack of flexibility on the Thai *cum* Chinese side, privately worrying that the midsummer ASEAN rhetoric had been too harsh. Indonesia has been designated by ASEAN as its official interlocutor with Hanoi in an effort to make the dual tracks at least run parallel. Foreign Minister Mochtar resumed the "dialogue" with the Vietnamese in New York during the U.N. General Assembly session. A planned January 1985 official visit by Mochtar to Hanoi will no doubt continue it. It is difficult to imagine, however, any substantive breakthrough in the immediate future.

LOOK EAST (BLOC)

Foreign Minister Mochtar has likened dealing with the United States and the USSR to navigating between two coral reefs. A second characteristic marking Indonesia's 1984 foreign policy profile was a rhetorical moving back to a more equidistant position between the superpowers. This was accompanied by a campaign to expand commercial opportunities with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The highlight of the year was Mochtar's visit in April to Moscow, the highest ranking visit by an Indonesian in a decade. Although no progress was made with respect to Kampuchea, the visit was successful in setting the tone for closer economic ties, an Indonesian goal that was emphasized by President Suharto in accepting the credentials of the new Soviet Ambassador to Indonesia in May. The concentrated effort in 1984 to expand economic contacts with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries is part of the general Indonesian attempt to boost non-oil exports. A large delegation from the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry toured the Soviet Union in June. They returned prudently optimistic about the prospects laid out to them by their Soviet hosts. In October, Coordinating Minister for Economy and Finance Ali Wardhana led a government delegation to the Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Meanwhile, many of the regulatory restrictions that had been in place since 1967 constraining direct trade and shipping contacts with communist countries were lifted during the year.

It was not purely economic interest that justified the openings to the East. Indonesian analysts placed the policy squarely in the framework of equidistance between the two superpowers in a region where, from the Indonesian point of view, the long-term threat is from China, and a signal, perhaps, to the United States that Indonesia has other options if the U.S. should place a higher value on its China connection than on ASEAN. President Suharto accepted an invitation for a state visit to the USSR. The outlines of a substantially more "nonaligned" foreign policy were discernible in 1984, but they still do not contain "normalization" of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. On the other hand, there now appears to be an elite civilian/military consensus emerging favoring the opening of direct trade relations with the PRC.

CLOSE NEIGHBORS

Indonesia-Papua New Guinea relations were seriously impaired during the year as Indonesian military activities along their common border and the presence of perhaps 9,000 Irian Jaya "refugees" or illegal border crossers led to bitter and sometimes undiplomatic verbal exchanges between the two countries. These moved from technical issues of prior

communication on border exercises and the administration of repatriation to broader issues of Indonesian cultural policy in Irian Jaya and PNG sympathy for Melanesian separatism. Jakarta was particularly chagrined by the PNG attack in the U.N. General Assembly in October, echoed by Vanuatu. The breakdown in the relationship comes inopportunistically for Jakarta since another aspect of its new policy emphasis has been on developing closer relations with the nations of the South Pacific, both bilaterally and through ASEAN. This is part of the "human resources development" program being formulated by Indonesia following the June 1984 ASEAN decision to be more Pacific-conscious.

The irritated PNG border area also contributed to a further lowering of the temperature in an already cool Indonesian-Australian relationship. Although Canberra assiduously tried to avoid any hint of involvement or interference, the dispute itself tended to confirm suspicions harbored by many Australians, particularly in the ruling Australian Labour Party, about Indonesia's long-range objectives. This, of course, was linked publicly to the East Timor issue, which still arouses passion. That the problem in the relationship is not simply one of atmospherics, style, or the causes of the "left" was clearly demonstrated in March 1984 by the leaking of an Australian secret, cabinet-endorsed defense document that considered the possible, but in the near term unlikely, use of force by Indonesia against Australia in various scenarios including political instability in Indonesia itself.

Although East Timor for some external observers in Australia and elsewhere might still be the referent for evidence of Indonesian expansionism, security forces in mid-1984 claimed that Fretilin's organized resistance finally had been crushed, this after a renewed military campaign following the collapse of earlier policies of peaceful reconciliation. At the United Nations, one of the few remaining venues for effective Fretilin diplomacy, the General Assembly for the second year in a row postponed debate on the question.

Conclusion

Jusuf Wanandi of Jakarta's CSIS, an intellectual unit spurring the new higher international profile, has been quoted as saying, "The world's going to be hearing a lot more from Indonesia now."¹² Its voice has been quiet but increasingly firm. In viewing Indonesia's international position, three factors have been identified as contributing to its contemporary constructive regional role: internal political stability, economic growth,

12. As quoted by Joseph P. Manguno, "Voice of Moderation: Indonesia Intends to Play a More Assertive Role in World Politics," *Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly*, March 12, 1984.

and foreign policy consistency.¹³ The last, foreign policy consistency, which is further described as conciliatory, amicable, and flexible, is in large measure dependent on the first two, essentially domestic conditions. Although there is no empirical basis for expecting domestic breakdown and upheaval, we are not so far removed historically from the stridency of Indonesia's Old Order and its foreign policy excesses not to have some question about how high the new foreign policy profile might become if some of the political and structural problems of Indonesia remain unresolved through REPELITA IV and the expected 1988 presidential succession.

13. B. N. Marbun in *Kompas*, July 19, 1984.