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## Book Review: Immanuel Kant - Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science, ed. Gary Hatfield

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biographisch-realen Bedingungen des (niemals endgültig gewußten) Vollzugs transzendentaler Freiheit zu stellen und zu beantworten. Kant selbst hat in seiner *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* solche Differenzen unmißverständlich bezeichnet. Das transzendente Geschäft hielt er prinzipiell für vollendet, als er geschichtlich-biographisch die Menschwerdung des Menschen in seiner Faktizität und Transfaktizität, als sich in seiner Freiheit selbst erzeugendes Wesen in den Blick nahm. Beide Perspektiven, die transzendente Argumentation und die leiblich-geschichtlich-lebensgeschichtliche Selbsterfahrung des Menschen gehören letztlich untrennbar zusammen. Diese strukturierte Erfahrung des Menschen bzw. der Menschheit mit sich selbst fällt indes nicht einfach mit den Kategorien und Befunden der Sozialwissenschaften zusammen. Diese Erfahrung hat vielmehr den Charakter der Kunde, der Historia. Ihr Erkenntnisanspruch unterscheidet sich deutlich von dem der einzelwissenschaftlichen Hypothesenzusammenhänge. Sie sind nur ein Subsystem im umgreifenden Kontext der Kunde, die ihrerseits den transzendentalphilosophischen Vorgaben durchgängig verpflichtet bleibt. Kants triadisches humanwissenschaftliches Modell vermag das *Nielandtsche* Konzept in sich aufzuheben und der zeitgenössischen Pädagogik ebenso wie den anderen Wissenschaften vom Menschen und Praxeologien grundsätzliche systematische Möglichkeiten zu eröffnen. Ein für die Pädagogik höchst bedeutsamer Nebeneffekt wäre, die von Herbart initiierte Eliminierung der transzendentalen Freiheit aus der pädagogischen Denkwelt und ihre schlichte, folgenreiche Substitution durch den empirisch gemünzten Begriff der Wahlfreiheit in einer Systematik von Freiheiten aufheben zu können. Wesentliche Intentionen *Nielandts* könnten in diesem umgreifenden Modell ihre Erfüllung finden.

Erwin Hufnagel, Mainz

Immanuel Kant: *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science*. Translated and edited, with an introduction, and selections from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, by Gary Hatfield. Cambridge: University Press 1997, xlv + 188 pages (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy).

Kant thought highly of his *Prolegomena*. Thus he said: "I'll guarantee that no one who has thought through and comprehended the principles of critique, even if only in these prolegomena, will ever again return to that old and sophistical pseudoscience." (AA 4:366) One might argue that any adequate edition of this text should make clear what the author's intention was. Gary Hatfield's edition seems to rise to this challenge. If students "return to that old and sophistical pseudoscience", it will not be because of lack of effort on Hatfield's part. In his *Introduction* he outlines Kant's project of reforming metaphysics by revealing its roots in the metaphysics of his time. He seems to think that it derives mainly from the work of Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, Locke, and Hume, for these are the names he mentions. One might have wanted to hear something of Euler, Mendelssohn,

Lambert, Tetens or other more closely related German contemporaries as well, especially since these thinkers are still not as well known among English readers of Kant as they should be.

After giving a basic description of Kant's particular approach to metaphysics and a concise account of his life and writings (with an additional tabular chronology), he provides some useful *Notes on terminology*, such as analytic/synthetic, analytic/dialectic, logic, subject/object, or deduction. He then purports to give a sketch of the *Structure of the work*, which regrettably turns out to be not much more than a synoptic table of contents (xxvi–xxxii). This is followed by hints for *Evaluating the critical philosophy*, which include such catchwords as “thing in itself”, or the “historization of the categories”, etc. But, due to the limits of this *Introduction*, Hatfield does not discuss some of the relevant literature on these topics.

Hatfield provides no bibliography but only references to a *Further reading*, consisting mainly of classical texts on the *Critique*, English translations of Kant's works, and Biographies. A bibliography would be problematic because there are not many books and articles dealing specifically with the *Prolegomena* and because all literature on the *Critique* is also relevant for the *Prolegomena*.

The text itself is primarily based on the eighth edition of Vorländer's text (Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1976). This is especially relevant insofar as the so-called “Blattversetzungshypothese” by H. Vaihinger is concerned, according to which five paragraphs from section 4 have been placed into section 2. However, Hatfield fails to discuss this hypothesis, simply taking for granted the reliability of the Vorländer text.

Hatfield's translation is new, but “on occasion” Hatfield draws on earlier translations, especially that of P. G. Lucas (Manchester, 1953) and on L. W. Beck's revised Carus text (Indianapolis, 1950). He follows the editorial principles of the *Cambridge Series*: “seek terminological consistency, avoid sacrificing literalness for ostensible ease in reading, preserve Kant's own sentence and paragraph breaks, keep emendations and interpolations to a minimum ...” (xli). In some respects Hatfield departs from standard translations, e. g. “sensory intuition” instead of “sensible intuition” (*sinnliche Anschauung*), in cases in which the adjective *sinnlich* is used to indicate the kind of cognition, rather than to describe an object as being capable of being sensed. He translates *Erkenntnis* as “cognition” rather than as “knowledge”. The reason for this departure lies, according to Hatfield, in the process character of the Kantian “Erkenntnis” that is better expressed by the English “cognition” than “knowledge” which Hatfield characterizes as a product of cognition. But in the case of “Selbsterkenntniß” (AA 4:317, 328) the text reads “knowledge of itself”. One may at least doubt whether the translator's criterion of the process character holds in those passages. But in general, Hatfield handles very carefully central concepts of the Kantian text that are difficult to translate. Thus he adds two textual notes to the Kantian sentence: “All synthetic a priori principles<sup>e</sup> are nothing more than principles<sup>f</sup> of possible experience.” Principles<sup>e</sup> are <sup>e</sup>*Grundsätze*, and principles<sup>f</sup> are <sup>f</sup>*Prinzipien* (66). The English reader can therefore decide for

himself or herself whether there are significant differences between *Grundsätze* and *Prinzipien* in Kant's *Prolegomena*.

Below the Kantian text there are, beside those textual notes, some factual notes containing useful comments, e. g. an explanation of the term "rhapsody" (77) which Kant uses to characterize Aristotle's 'table' of categories.

The edition contains a helpful and extensive *Index* but the reader may miss a tabular, and commented glossary for an overview of the Kantian terminology and its English equivalent.

Also included in this new edition are selections from the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Parts from the *Preface to the second edition*, Parts from the *Introduction to the second edition*, §§ 1–2 of the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, including the *Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space* [B-edition], Parts from the *Transcendental Analytic*, including § 13 *On the principles of transcendental deduction in general*, Parts from the *First Antinomy*, and a very small portion of the *Transcendental Doctrine of Method*) to let Kant explain his own terminology and to give further statements on his critical philosophy. But there seems to be some arbitrariness in the choice of those passages. The *Critique* is well known and readily available. The reader has to consult the *Critique* anyway – and not just, nor even foremost, the passages included in this edition. Perhaps it would have been more helpful to include the so-called "Göttingen Review" (Garve/Feder) as an appendix instead. This review is more difficult to get and it would have provided some of the essential background of the work. Furthermore, there are some reflections by Kant that were obviously written in immediate connection with the *Prolegomena*. They are included as "*Vorarbeiten zu den Prolegomena*" in R. Malter's edition of the *Prolegomena* (Reclam, 1989), but they are as yet untranslated.

In sum, this edition is – in spite of some minor shortcomings – an improvement over existing editions. While it is to be hoped that the forthcoming volume of the Cambridge edition of Kant's works, which will contain Kant's *Theoretical Philosophy After 1781* will remedy even these shortcomings, it seems to be the best translation available at the moment. It can be highly recommended especially for University Courses, and that means "for the use of apprentices" (against Kant's own will – cf. AA 4:255).

Konstantin Pollok, Marburg

Peter L. Oesterreich: *Das gelehrte Absolute. Metaphysik und Rhetorik bei Kant, Fichte und Schelling*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1997, 205 S.

Der Vf. beginnt mit der Feststellung, daß am „Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts [...] die Rhetorik zunehmend die Züge eines neuen universalen Paradigmas [gewinnt], das alle wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen zu erfassen scheint“ (S. 5), die er zugleich mit der Perspektive verbindet, daß Rhetorik und Metaphysik überhaupt nicht unvereinbar seien. Der Vf. will „eine positive Perspektive der gegenwärtigen Rhet-